25.11 These individuals, and an additional 90,000 military and civilian personnel who serve at bases or in operational units, are supported by complex networks of computers and telecommunications through which information is obtained and orders are passed. The Department operates over 600 systems that run on 22 mainframe and mini-computers. It also has over 600 multi-user computers, over 4,000 non-programmable terminals and approximately 45,000 personal computers.
25.12 Telecommunications are also part of the information technology base. The Department employs almost 4,000 people in maintaining the defence strategic communications infrastructure. In addition, it spends $110 million each year to lease telecommunications services from the private sector and other government agencies. It uses more than 50,000 telephones, and maintains seven national voice, video and data systems and networks. Most of the telecommunication links formerly provided by more than 3,000 lines are now made through a single survivable network.
25.13 The Department's total information technology base of computers and telecommunications systems employs almost 8,000 people, including about 2,500 part-time Reserves, and costs approximately $630 million each year to operate. The Department's information technology capital projects planned or in progress are projected to cost $9.5 billion over a 15-year period, of which $2 billion will be for telecommunications. National Defence accounts for 30 percent of the federal government's spending on information technology.
25.14 Much of the information technology in place is outdated, representing obsolete concepts and technology. Many major data processing systems -- including the financial, supply and personnel data systems -- are centralized, national systems running on large mainframe computers. These "stovepipe systems" were designed to meet specific functional needs and they operate independently of each other. There is great difficulty in matching data from one stovepipe system to another. File structures in the systems make it difficult -- and sometimes impossible -- to extract and match data to do required work.
25.15 Until July 1994, six major organizations in the Department shared responsibility for information technology:
25.18 The Department's 1993 communications and electronics study also reported significant problems. The report cited compartmentalization of information technology management; slow and unsuitable processes for managing information technology; and technology that was obsolescent, costly to operate and maintain, sometimes redundant and often unrelated to user needs.
25.19 The Department's study recommended the reorganization of information technology management, and several other significant changes that the Department has accepted and is working toward. Those changes include cancelling several information technology acquisition projects; modifying the acquisition process to allow for earlier involvement of contractors, thus lowering the risk of costly changes when contracts move from planning to implementation; and recognizing the need to eliminate stovepipe data systems that limit the Department's ability to link data bases to each other, especially data on costs and activities.
25.21 Our audit included all information systems acquired and all initiatives begun since 1988, general-purpose computing, military command and control and telecommunications. We did not include information technology embedded in weapons systems, such as target acquisition and flight control computers on the CF-18 and computers used in the guidance and electronic countermeasures systems of individual weapons.
25.22 We audited the Department against Treasury Board criteria for the management of capital projects, along with other specific criteria included with the findings below.
25.24 Our audit indicates that there are significant problems with both program and project management. These problems stem from the absence of an effective central manager for information technology. Such a manager would establish an overall strategy that addresses departmental priorities, set rules for buying and using information technology and provide assistance to line managers and commanders. We found that most individual projects had been managed well, although the most complicated and costly ones experienced problems.
25.25 At the same time, telecommunications and computer operations are becoming more efficient. Individual managers often have been able to improve efficiency within their immediate areas of responsibility.
25.27 According to NATO, a command, control and information system is "an integrated system [comprising] doctrine, procedures, organizational structure, personnel, equipment, facilities and communications [that] provide authorities at all levels with timely and adequate data to plan, direct and control their activities." Military organizations use command and control information systems to communicate, manage and manoeuvre when deployed in the field. They are vital to commanders' ability to use intelligence data in decision making, to plan, to communicate orders and to obtain feedback from the battlefield.
25.28 Command and control information systems are a vital element of warfighting capability. The United States armed services recognized the importance of command and control in their recent operations in Grenada, Panama and the Persian Gulf. The American forces analyzed their shortcomings in those operations and the importance of command and control systems to the Coalition victory in the Gulf War.
25.29 The United States Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recently published a concept paper entitled C4I for the Warrior , intended to solve short-term problems and set long-range goals and strategies. Under that concept, the United States has moved to remedy important problems in duplicative systems, developed by different branches of the armed services, that could not communicate with each other or with allied forces. The American concept establishes a long-range strategy to achieve global interoperability. The goal is to allow commanders at all levels in all armed services to communicate with each other and to access each other's data. The Canadian Forces has no equivalent goal or strategy. The Department is currently working on such a policy.
25.30 We examined all command and control information systems being developed by the Canadian Forces. Prior to the 1990 Gulf War, the Canadian Forces planned to operate with allies but with largely separate sea, land and air elements. Although the Gulf War resulted in the recognition that those elements must work together, we found that each command was developing its own system in almost complete isolation. Existing systems often pre-date the recognition of technology that allows interoperability and of the need for it. In addition, National Defence Headquarters and the Intelligence Branch were developing unique separate systems. Land Force Command has acquired two systems based on different computer-operating system software and is attempting to merge them into an interim Land Force system by March 1995. The Land Force is working on another project to develop a system for the long term. It plans to field this system by 1999.
25.31 Existing Land Force systems have limited battlefield survival capability due to their interim nature and their use in existing vehicles. One of the systems could continue to operate even if individual computers were destroyed, but it is supported on commercial hardware and is vulnerable to heat, moisture, dust and vibration. During recent field exercises it took several hours to set up. The other system uses "ruggedized" hardware, but depends on a central computer that, if destroyed, would put the entire system out of commission. However, there are backup computers. The central computer is installed in a truck offering minimum protection. Both systems depend on telephone lines to communicate, which are vulnerable to enemy fire. Radio links will not become available for several years, when the Tactical Command Control and Communication System is fielded (see paragraph 25.65).
25.32 The Canadian Forces is fielding several systems that are based on different computer software families and cannot interoperate. There was no central manager of technology to co-ordinate system development and ensure that systems could work together. As a consequence, the systems cannot pass information among themselves, even though their users will be required to work together in joint headquarters. Officials told us that, in the future, the Defence Information Services Organization will provide a central management authority for systems development. Efforts are under way to merge the development of future command and control information systems. (see photograph)
25.33 The Department has spent $18 million to date on command and control information systems and plans to spend about $240 million more over the next 10 years. Its plans call for at least four separate systems. Our audit calls into question the viability of project plans that extend over such a long period of time (paragraphs 25.41 to 25.45).
25.34 The Department's projects for command and control systems duplicate each other. The basic functions of all systems -- message transfer, message logging, digitized mapping and graphics, and map and graphics transfer -- are the same, although the computer screens and graphics used by individual services may vary.
25.35 Although the Canadian Forces have had a policy since 1986 to ensure that users co-ordinate the development of command and control information systems, the Department has failed to enforce that policy. As a consequence, commanders have implemented their own systems. As well, project offices have made few efforts to determine the needs of users in other commands and branches. There is no reason why separate service and branch projects could not use the same approach to architecture and development. Air Command's Battle Management Information System (BMIS) is based on a United States Air Force system that already has marine and land force components, but the Canadian Forces have not made use of these in their development efforts. The Department is now working to integrate command and control systems it is developing.
25.36 The Department should consider using "joint" standards to develop all command and control systems, unless the sponsor can justify doing otherwise.
25.37 Concepts and specifications for new command and control systems should require that they be able to interoperate in joint and combined operations and to survive on the battlefield.
Department's response: The current situation regarding Command and Control Information Systems (CCIS) reflects the preliminary nature of automated CCIS within the Canadian Forces (CF). As a result of efforts to date by each of the Commands, the focus has largely been on validating requirements and operating procedures via pilot or prototype systems. Joint interoperability has not received a high priority in these activities until the recent past.
Joint standards and interoperability (paragraphs 25.36 and 25.37) in joint and combined operations are accepted as mandatory requirements. The Information Technology Infrastructure (ITI) and the Canadian Forces Command and Control Information System (CFCCIS) are both actively addressing these requirements.
In general we believe the current situation reflects the early stages of comprehensive CCIS development. There is significant activity under way to ensure compatibility and operability between these early systems as well as focussing on joint and combined CCIS.
25.39 The Department of National Defence is now working on or planning 115 major capital projects of $3 million or more each to acquire information technology. We examined several critical areas of the system used to manage these projects. We assessed the time it takes to deliver products to managers and commanders who need them. We looked at whether senior management has good information to direct and control overall spending. Our audit also examined the degree to which managers take advantage of the cost-saving potential of information technology.
25.40 In 1992 we reviewed the Department's overall program management system for all types of projects. We reported that it was cumbersome and expensive, and ineffective at monitoring projects. Although the Department told us then that the system would be completely revised and significantly improved, we found that very little has been accomplished.
25.42 We examined 110 projects costing between $3 million and $200 million. We found that the average time it takes to implement an information technology project is over seven years. This does not take into account the often lengthy planning period before management approves funding. If the planning phase is considered, information technology projects take, on average, over 14 years to complete. Only six of the Department's planned projects will take less than five years to develop and complete.
25.43 The reason things take so long to accomplish is the Department's management system. It requires a project sponsor to secure management approval for all the necessary funding at the outset. The sponsor must therefore develop complex plans that go far into the future to justify major expenditures. Plans must be submitted to senior management for approval at several phases of the project. A contractor usually is not identified until all the specifications are complete, which leads to further changes and delays. Finally, the posting of military officials from position to position creates turbulence and loss of momentum as old managers leave and new managers learn about the project.
25.44 Many projects could be implemented much more quickly. Some have become obsolete while still in the planning phase (see Exhibit 25.1 ). For example:
25.47 The Department's program management system requires that funds be forecast for 15 years into the future. Information technology is foreseeable for five years at best. Many of the estimates for projects tying up funds in the information technology program are thus inaccurate or unsubstantiated.
25.48 There are several problems caused by stating cost estimates far in advance of any analysis or study of the requirement and the possible technological solutions. Doing so gives central co-ordinating staff the impression that the requirements for large capital budgets are known years in advance of the planned expenditures. Establishing separate funds for each requirement has the effect of encouraging "stovepipe" solutions, when it would be better to address several requirements through a single project. Finally, cost estimates that are too high can lead to the stretching out or deferral of projects with high cost-saving potential or military value, because the plan indicates that funds are not available for them.
25.49 Staff were not able to explain adequately how sponsors had determined the funding levels for 22 out of 61 projects in our sample. Sometimes not even general assumptions were recorded to explain funding levels. In seven cases, sponsors met requirements by other means, such as spending from the operations and maintenance budget, while they continued to identify the same requirements as capital projects. For example:
25.50 The requirement to forecast funding needed 15 years into the future, called for by the Defence Program Management System, does not appear suitable for information technology projects. The main problem is that, due to uncertainty about technical advances and about the projected size of National Defence, it is not clear how much future hardware will cost, what software will be commercially available, or who will use the products. Hence it is not realistic to produce more accurate estimates.
25.51 With inaccuracies so widespread, senior management does not have a clear idea of how projected funds will be spent. In these circumstances, program control is undermined and can become ineffective.
25.53 The Department of National Defence naturally places its first priority on ability to conduct military operations. Nevertheless, failure to reduce support costs over the long run decreases that ability by diverting funds from operations to overhead. What is required is an approach that fully assesses all the costs and benefits of projects so that short-range and long-term benefits are balanced.
25.54 Until January 1994, cost reduction was not a priority in the selection of information technology projects. Since then, the Department has recognized cost savings as a criterion in selecting projects to fund but allows it only 3 of 15 points in the priority ranking system, no matter how much money could be saved. A system with arbitrary point limits is unlikely to assess management trade-offs correctly.
25.55 Moreover, there were problems with the way the new system was implemented. Program managers did not provide adequate guidance to project staff on how to determine the potential for cost savings. Projects where potential savings were not fully defined did not receive even the three points allowed for cost-reduction potential, including a case where the benefits were very promising. Senior managers complained that the point rating system was inaccurate, and had to renegotiate to determine which projects should be given priority. We found that the full magnitude of estimated cost savings was not presented to senior management for some projects. We could not find any documentation to support the lower estimates presented.
25.56 Our sample of 61 projects -- over one half of the entire information technology program -- contained 11 that project offices believed had potential for significant cost savings but that were not implemented as quickly as the potential savings might appear to warrant. According to the estimates of project officials, implementing those projects on a priority basis would have saved at least $700 million (see Exhibit 25.3 ). The projects included the following: (see photograph)
Officials believe the LEMOS project would save at least $28 million each year, and the technology on which it is based is well known. Although the project office estimates that the project could be carried out in four to five years, the Department will not complete the project for 14 years. According to departmental plans, the project will wait eight years for funding and then be implemented over an additional six years.
25.58 The Department has undertaken two projects to provide pay services to the Reserves. We estimate the cost of duplication to be $9 million.
25.59 We also found that the Department had a project in place to buy computer hardware for training facilities at Canadian Forces Base Gagetown, although the Base already had some of the necessary hardware. During our audit, the Department acted to avoid the potential duplication and no loss occurred.
25.60 The Department should re-examine the way it manages its information technology program. It should:
On the first point: The approval to create the Defence Information Services Organization (DISO) focussed primarily on the need to establish a single organization having the authority and accountability for the overall IT program. The DISO has as a priority objective the approval and promulgation of the overall Information Management (IM) Policy and implementation strategy. Concurrently, strategic planning activity is under way to ensure IM/IT strategies are aligned with DND/CF missions and roles, and that these strategies are reflected in associated standards, plans and directives.
On the second point: It is difficult to reconcile the recommendation with the requirement to at least identify individual project areas in the 15-year Defence Services Program (DSP). It is accepted that initial estimates must, by their very nature and the pace of technological change, be very approximate. We are committed even in current practice to a regular review and refinement of such estimates as projects approach the substantive approval stages.
On the third point: The co-ordination of Information System and Management Plans with a comprehensive business plan will contribute significantly to the identification of opportunities for major cost and effectiveness improvements, and thus the development of formal business cases to justify strategic investments, and an accountability framework to assist in verifying results.
The lengthy planning and approval process has been widely recognized and numerous studies and trials related to the overall Defence Program Management System (DPMS) and specific project areas have been initiated to achieve major improvements. It should be recognized and accepted that the 15-year planning data must of necessity be approximate and subject to refinement and verification throughout the steps leading to project approval.
25.62 The Department of National Defence has over 40 projects in progress valued at $2.9 billion in its program to provide general-purpose computing and telecommunication services. We selected a random sample of 12 projects completed or initiated since 1988. Those projects and their estimated costs are listed in Exhibit 25.4 .
25.63 Our audit assessed whether the projects produced results as specified in their plans within agreed time and costs, whether they met Treasury Board criteria for the management of capital projects, and whether they followed the "best practices" of the information technology industry. The criteria included having a clear definition of what the product is supposed to do, considering the costs and benefits of all the reasonable alternatives, staffing the project office with qualified people, ensuring that managers know what they are responsible for, and breaking the work into manageable units.
25.64 Seven of the 12 projects met our criteria. They were primarily hardware purchases with well-defined requirements, and were relatively uncomplicated to put in place. However, the seven projects accounted for only 7 percent of the value of the projects in our sample.
25.65 The other five projects, comprising the other 93 percent of project value in our sample, failed in some significant way to meet our criteria. They tended to be more complicated development projects that would directly affect how work was carried out by large numbers of people. (see photograph)
The project will not supply enough radios to fully equip all Land Force units. The Department regards the project as the minimum requirement. Any cost overruns that cannot be funded, therefore, will require offsets from elsewhere in the communication system or reductions in integrated logistic support.
25.66 Our audit shows that the Department did well when purchasing hardware to meet well-defined requirements. It has experienced the most difficulty in delivering software development projects. Overall, we found that requirements definition and options analysis need to be improved.
25.67 We expected to find a full cost-benefit analysis of all reasonable alternatives that could satisfy project requirements. We expected these analyses to include quantified performance and cost factors, as well as "soft", difficult-to-measure costs and benefits. We found in the group of projects that did not meet our criteria that the level of analysis was poor. Options analyses were mostly qualitative and used order-of-magnitude cost estimates. The options for the TCCCS project, valued at $1.9 billion and aimed at equipping the entire Land Force, were assessed on qualitative aspects only, not on hard performance or cost. The benefits of the $291 million supply system upgrade were not assessed before the project was approved.
25.68 The lack of user involvement throughout the project life cycle increases risk, as do development methods that require user representatives to develop requirements and hand them over to a project manager, who then defines the system needed and in turn hands the completion of the project over to a contractor. This method does not meet "best practice" criteria. The information technology industry prefers a higher level of user involvement, based on small modules that allow for evolutionary development of a large system.
25.69 The two cases presented below contrast the two approaches. The Department has not yet fully incorporated evolutionary system development in its project management system, although it has taken steps in that direction. System developers must go around the program management system to apply evolutionary system design. On occasion they do this by funding projects as "operations and maintenance", which calls for less stringent control. Use of operations and maintenance funding defeats the goals of the project management system and may leave associated logistic requirements unmet because there is an assumption that operations and maintenance projects do not need to address logistics.
25.70 We found that senior project staff often lacked appropriate qualifications and experience in system development. This contributed to the problems encountered by Base ADP and the DDDS/ORAE Computer, and to the delays in the development of the requirements for the supply system upgrade. (see Exhibit 25.5 )
25.71 Also, military personnel change jobs frequently. The larger, longer projects each had, on average, three managers and four directors. The impact of turnover could be reduced if projects were designed in modules that could be completed during the tenure of a single manager.
25.72 The Department should normally use an evolutionary approach to developing information technology projects rather than attempting to deliver the complete system by the existing method, which takes years to put a product in the users' hands. (see Exhibit 25.6 )
25.73 The Department should ensure that capital projects are approved only after adequate options analyses have been completed.
25.74 The Department should take steps to ensure that directors and managers of information technology projects have system development qualifications commensurate with the size of the project.
25.75 The Department should ensure that, to the maximum extent practicable, project staffs are stable throughout the project's life. It should break large projects into smaller, more manageable units that can be completed during the tenure of a single manager.
Department's response: A major change has been instituted to streamline project management by creating a directorate that has the mandate to direct projects from the acceptance of an initial requirement through to system delivery. It is anticipated that this will improve continuity and understanding of requirements, and provide greater flexibility to adapt to changing requirements and to implement early capabilities.
In co-operation with central agency and departmental program management authorities the Defence Information Services Organization is actively investigating evolutionary and modular approaches to systems delivery that fully involve the user, but maintain the required accountability framework (paragraph 25.72).
The recommendation concerning options analyses (paragraph 25.73) is agreed and procedures that already provide for such analyses are being refined to ensure objective assessment of all practical options.
The assignment of appropriately qualified project managers and their availability for the life of the project (paragraphs 25.74 and 25.75) are pursued to the extent possible, consistent with the exigencies of the Canadian Forces and the availability of qualified civilian personnel. The implementation of the evolutionary approach to information technology project development is expected to facilitate modularization of larger projects into more manageable segments.
The recommendations are accepted. Many initiatives are under way to address the noted deficiencies.
25.77 We reviewed five aspects of information technology operations: information systems, telecommunications, departmental data centres, local area networks, and application software maintenance. We concentrated on the economy and efficiency of operations.
25.78 We found that here, too, operational efficiency and effectiveness had been affected by the lack of adequate central management of the entire program. However, we did find that individual managers often had been able to improve efficiency within their immediate areas of responsibility.
25.80 We found that over 45 percent of headquarters staff use information systems and that over 60 percent of them use the information to perform analysis or to make decisions. About 78 percent of the users of these systems told us that they are satisfied with the information system they use (see Exhibit 25.7 ).
25.81 Problems affecting efficiency do exist, however. Almost 60 percent of users have not received formal training and about half of them believe that this detracts from their performance. Exhibit 25.8 depicts the reasons why over a third of users feel that their job-related information requirements are not met by the information system they use. Over a quarter find themselves often searching for information to supplement their computer system. We also found that a minority of about 14 percent are not confident that the data their system provides are free of errors. (see photograph)
25.82 We also found that most of the users who depend on local systems or personal computers input at least some of their data by hand ( Exhibit 25.9 ). More than 20 percent of users of local and personal computers input data by hand directly from hardcopy printouts produced by another computer system. This is costly and negates at least part of the value of the system.
25.83 The Department should ensure that users of information systems are suitably trained.
25.84 The Department should take steps to ensure that information systems contain the data required for users to perform their jobs.
25.85 The Department should improve the transferability of data from one system to another.
Department's response: Steps are being taken to improve the availability of individual training in general information technology skills (paragraph 25.83), and to ensure that adequate provision for training is included in capital projects.
The requirement to obtain required data from more than one source is forecasted to exist for the foreseeable future largely due to the fact that much information is not yet available in an automated form. The ability to access all electronic information is expected to improve dramatically as the departmental information technology infrastructure is fully integrated over the next five years, and data standards are enforced (paragraphs 25.84 and 25.85).
25.87 The Department has reduced costs by about $10 million each year by setting up the Defence Integrated Services Digital Network. However, the full potential of this information network has not been realized because of lack of traffic. Further savings will result as the Department moves more services to the network. This initiative shows that the Department can apply up-to-date and proven technology to reduce costs.
25.88 We assessed the Department's plans for further improvement against a model of what we consider the best use of existing technology. During our audit, the Department identified the major opportunities for cost reduction in its general plans. We estimate that the initiatives identified could reduce costs by over $30 million each year, but the Department has yet to approve detailed implementation plans.
25.89 The principal opportunity for savings lies in replacing the Strategic Message Switching System (SMSS) that the Department uses to send classified messages and messages that must be logged in as received. The SMSS is obsolete and labour-intensive, requiring over 1,200 people to operate and maintain it. The Department is replacing parts of the system by using operations and maintenance funds, but plans to spend over $100 million before the year 2000 through the Defence Message Handling System initiative.
25.90 However, detailed plans for the implementation of this project are still in draft form. Documentation provided limited information about the impacts on expenditure levels, personnel and operations. The lack of personnel redeployment plans is especially significant, since replacing the existing system with secure e-mail would affect over 1,200 jobs and potentially eliminate many of them. Detailed planning is required where large numbers of positions are to be eliminated and personnel affected. Otherwise, the potential cost reduction is at risk, as is a fundamental improvement in service throughout the Department. Without detailed plans, the annual savings are difficult to estimate accurately. However, using assumptions that we believe to be reasonable, we estimate that the Department could save over $25 million a year.
25.91 We found the situation of the Defence Telephone System (DTS) to be similar to that of the Strategic Message Switching System (SMSS). Voice telephone requirements cost $25 million each year, or about 60 percent of the Defence Integrated Services Digital Network costs, and over 20 percent of departmental telecommunications expenditures overall. We estimate that modernizing the DTS could save $5 million a year but, as is the case with the SMSS, detailed implementation plans do not yet exist.
25.92 Besides these opportunities, we identified two other areas where cost savings could be realized. The Department maintains two control centres for the Defence Integrated Services Digital Network and the Integrated Data Network, at a cost of $4.1 million a year. These centres are very similar in nature; consolidating and reducing the staff involved in leasing could save approximately $1.5 million a year. During the course of our audit, the Department began to consolidate the centres. (see photograph)
25.93 The Department is using only 60 percent of the ports and half the volume capacity of the Integrated Data Network. Users have complained about the amount of time it takes to be connected to this service; we found the administrative process to be complex and cumbersome. However, the Integrated Data Network is cheaper to use than the alternatives being used currently.
25.94 During our audit we found that managers frequently had to undertake special studies to answer our questions about the costs of services. Managers agreed that they need this information themselves, and they consider existing systems inadequate to meet their needs for cost information.
25.95 The Department should ensure that plans for the Strategic Message Switching System (SMSS) and the Defence Telephone System (DTS) projects are fully developed and reflected accurately in the Defence Program Management System. The plans should describe benefits, provide accurate estimates of capital and operating costs, provide a detailed implementation schedule and address technical and personnel impacts.
25.96 The Department should reduce costs by accelerating the rate at which users are added to the Integrated Data Network.
25.97 The Department should ensure that adequate information is available to support business planning for the management of telecommunications services.
Department's response: The Department has assigned a very high priority to the rationalization and integration of all national communication networks, subject to the availability of security products. The resource and schedule implications are being fully defined during the course of this planning and design activity (paragraphs 25.95 to 25.97). These plans and resource requirements will be incorporated in the associated Defence Information Services Organization business plans.
25.99 The Department began a study in 1990 to upgrade the data centres, but a cost study was not begun until January 1993 and was completed in December of that year. In January 1994 the Department decided to close one data centre, which will save more than $21 million over the next five years. Delay in acting on this potential for cost savings has cost the Department almost $5 million each year. (see photograph)
25.100 The closure will further improve data centre efficiency.
25.102 The Department does not have a complete inventory of its network investment, although in 1993 it began to develop an inventory and intends to complete the project by 1996. Commands and headquarters groups are responsible for the development and management of their own local networks. The Department has acquired at least 500 networks that support about 45,000 users, at a cost of over $135 million.
25.103 In spite of the extent of its investment in modern network technology, the Department has yet to take full advantage of it. Because managers have developed their networks individually, there has been only limited use of common systems across commands and groups in National Defence Headquarters. Few networks can communicate with each other and there is a risk that some existing networks cannot be linked together. The Department has only recently adopted strategies, policies and management plans to integrate its networks. National projects such as departmental e-mail and the headquarters metropolitan area network are recent.
25.104 The Department has not yet begun to re-engineer its work processes to take advantage of the widespread presence of computer terminals and networks throughout the organization. Some communications capability is in place, such as electronic mail, but the Department has not yet achieved the department-wide interoperability proposed in its long-term plans. We found that there are several different electronic mail systems even within the same Headquarters group.
25.105 As we have noted with respect to the acquisition of major capital items, departmental processes related to the acquisition of the $135 million worth of minor capital items are also inconsistent with the nature of information technology. Approvals for buying equipment involve many people and often take a long time. In one Headquarters group, for example, while most equipment is ordered by users in the fall, purchases are not made until the end of the government accounting year in the spring. Delays in the process deprive users of benefits, may disrupt service support if equipment all arrives at the same time, and can affect warranties because equipment may not be installed when it is delivered. We found that only one information technology manager maintains a workflow system to track technology acquisition and deployment.
25.106 We noted a wide range in the qualifications and training of network support staff. In some cases, funding has been insufficient to meet the training requirements. Land Force Command officials noted serious deficiencies in the qualifications of its network support staff and thus in its ability to use them efficiently and train them.
25.107 The Department should review its network management policies and practices and make them consistent with a technology that may need updating every 36 to 48 months. It should reinforce its efforts to establish standards centrally and distribute them quickly.
25.108 The Department should ensure that network support personnel are adequately trained to perform their duties.
Department's response: The recommendations at paragraphs 25.107 and 25.108 are accepted and the identification of practical solutions is being investigated in conjunction with acquisition, training and management activities for networks.
The assessments in the Operations Management area, which appear to be derived largely from the user survey, are accepted. They reflect the limited progress to date in overall systems integration, as well as the fact that training delivery has not been able to keep pace with the acquisition of work stations.
25.110 We found that, in general, the Department uses modern techniques and tools to update and improve its software to meet user needs. The Department could improve them even more by doing better cost-benefit analyses of proposed system changes to maximize the benefit it receives from its programmers, and by improving the training that programmers receive.
25.112 We also found that long-standing problems in project management still exist. The definition of requirements and the analysis of options remain inadequate and continue to result in extra costs to the Department.
25.113 Finally, we found that the Department has begun to address inefficiency in its telecommunications and computer operations. Significant savings have already been made, but implementing the bulk of possible savings is still in the planning phase.
25.114 The Department has already begun to focus on these problems. The new Defence Information Services Organization can provide a management centre to begin correcting problems in program and project management, and impetus to continued gains in operational efficiency. In addition, initiatives described in the previous chapter to implement business planning and "Defence 2000" in the Department are expected to result in more responsive management and a more efficient management process.