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Speech by Jacques Duchesneau, President and Chief Executive Officer, Canadian Air Transport Security Authority
THE CANADIAN ASSOCIATION FOR SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE STUDIES (CASIS)
CASIS 20TH ANNIVERSARY INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
Transportation Security:
Have the 9/11 Lessons Been Learned?
October 21, 2005
Montreal, QC
Check against delivery
Thank you for having me here today. I am honoured to be in the presence of such an esteemed group of people - true leaders in the realm of security, working together to achieve common goals. I would also like to thank the organizers of this conference for putting together a programme that raises a number of very pertinent and important questions. It is often said that asking the right questions is the first step towards getting the right answers.
This leads me to the main question of this session - Have the 9/11 Lessons Been Learned? I firmly believe, in no uncertain terms, that we are, without a doubt, more secure today than we were just a few short years ago. When it comes to air transport security in particular, the traveling public can indeed rest assured that we have built several layers of protection to guard them against threats, from the moment they commence their journey to the moment they arrive at their final destination.
From enhanced training to the installation of state-of-the-art technology to the addition of multiple layers of measures, we have made the system more secure.
However, there is still more to be done. We may be more secure, but we are not as secure as we can be.
We must do more. We must not let an illusion of apparent security - which has blanketed the general populace in the absence of another attack on the scale of 9/11 - permit us to become complacent. We have done a good job of telling the public that they are much safer today but we have not done enough to keep them aware of the continued dangers and the ongoing need for heightened security measures.
No security system will ever be 100% effective. We in the security community all understand that. However, this reality must not stop us from trying to achieve this success rate just the same. The death of one more innocent civilian at the hands of terrorists is one too many.
The shear number of air passengers - which has increased to 1.9 billion1 in 2004 up from 1.7 billion in 2003 - indicates that we have done a good job in making the traveling public "feel safer". But, we still have a long way to go to actually make them more secure -we need to put a real dog in the yard, not just a "Beware of Dog" sign.
The Nature of the Threat
Why are we still not secure? For starters, we cannot even identify who exactly we need to protect against. Who is the enemy? We cannot even answer that question.
We cannot answer that question because it is a faceless enemy - a faceless yet resourceful, adaptive, innovative, flexible, resilient, and patient enemy. Al Qaeda the group is effectively neutralized. In its place, we find Al Qaeda the ideology.
Al Qaeda the ideology is even more lethal than Al Qaeda the group.
While the persistent efforts of the global community to target and eliminate Al Qaeda operatives has been highly successful, these campaigns have not eliminated its abilities to organize, plan, re-ignite and inspire fear and anxiety over and over again. Al Qaeda has never had a recruitment problem; in fact, its main problem has always been selection as it only accepts 15-20% of volunteers who came to Afghanistan in the hopes of joining it.2
In reaction to global pressure and counter-terrorist efforts, Al Qaeda has recovered and developed a new strategy- a strategy which has inspired and motivated many new followers. In fact, some would argue that people are now acting in Al Qaeda's name without even being, so called 'members'. Much of the motivation and inspiration to join the battlefield is done via media outlets, including video messages, radio broadcasts and postings on Internet sites.
Some very interesting research in this area has been done by Marc Sageman, a clinical assistant professor at the University of Pennsylvania and independent researcher on terrorism. He is a former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer, who spent a year on the Afghan Task Force and then went to Islamabad from 1987 to 1989, where he ran the U.S. unilateral programs with the Afghan Mujahedin, and New Delhi from 1989 to 1991.
Mr. Sageman has collected biographical material on approximately 400 Al Qaeda terrorists to test the validity of the conventional wisdom on terrorism. As a result of his extensive research, Sageman has dispelled several popular myths about terrorists.
Some of his more interesting observations involved the internet and its impact on terrorism. According to his research, there are over 6,000 jihad websites that provide a wealth of information that is readily available to terrorists or would-be terrorists. These websites are targeted to a younger audience, who feel marginalized from society. Furthermore, they allow these young consumers to pick and choose the elements that they can identify with. These sites have developed a sound-bite interpretation of Islam and the information that is posted eliminates the necessity for leaders and/or training. Additionally, the internet is gender neutral thereby encouraging more female participation.3
The terrorism battlefield has become a virtual battlefield. We are experts in conventional warfare, but how do we fight effectively on a virtual battlefield, especially against a faceless enemy?
So, who and what will the next targets be? This question too, is difficult to answer.
But, one thing we do know is that past successes for terrorists are frequently an indicator of future attacks. If you know something works, and works well, why not try to repeat it? Terrorists live by this rule. Take for example the recent attacks in Bali on October 1st. Three years ago this month Bali suffered a similar attack, which killed more than 200 people. It had taken three years of hard work to convince tourists to come back to the island - hard work that was undone in an instant on October 1st .
As we have seen, many types of attacks can be executed relatively easily with extensive planning, little money and readily-available materials and supplies. Furthermore, the phenomenon of suicide terrorism is increasing and there are a limitless number of volunteers ready to take on a mission of this nature.
"The bottom line is that the ferocious escalation of the pace of suicide terrorism that we have witnessed in the past several years cannot be considered irrational or even surprising. It is simply the result of the lesson that terrorists have quite reasonably learned from their experience of the previous two decades: suicide terrorism pays." Robert A. Pape Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, Random House New York, 2005
Based on recent events, we can see a trend developing whereby we see fewer attacks that resemble September 11 th and we see more attacks that resemble March 11th in Madrid, Spain where bombs were detonated on busy commuter trains and attacks like those on the London transit system. This is an alarming trend.
Vulnerabilities
We also know that the terrorists are watching us. Watching us very closely. In fact, they probably know our vulnerabilities better than we do. They are studying these vulnerabilities and they will attack us where we are weakest. This we know well.
Aviation has long been a target. Because it is a highly attractive target - frequently a national symbol with large groups of people condensed and enclosed in a small area which, if targeted, is likely to cause massive numbers of casualties - it will remain a target for the foreseeable future. Are there still areas that need our attention?
Yes, there are. We need to look more closely at air cargo, ground security, MANPADs, catering services and other areas that may make us vulnerable. The system is only as secure as its weakest link - we need to ensure we have no weak links.
Perspective
At the same time, we must also put this threat into perspective. Yes, we must be prepared and we must not be complacent. We must live our lives.
We cannot and should not live in fear. Yes it is true that a small group of individuals can pose a serious danger to our society and the world order.4 These actors do not need to be superpowers. The highjackers of 9/11 clearly demonstrated the power of a small group of hateful men who had a very dangerous imagination and meticulously plotted to kill as many innocent people as they could. What I am arguing is that we cannot let this small group of individuals control our actions and our lives.
Statistics show that the chances of being in a terrorist attack are 1 in 88,000 as compared to a car accident which is 1 in 228.5 And yet, everyday, we get into our cars because we have taken precautions, there are rules and regulations that we follow when driving a vehicle that make us feel safe and secure. Similarly, we can take precautions and live our lives without living in fear of a terrorist attack.
"London Prepared"6
London Prepared is a website that has been developed to ensure that the city is prepared in the event of an emergency. This is an excellent example of a city that is aware of the nature of threat and has taken considerable steps to prepare in the event of an emergency by engaging and informing the public so that people do not live in fear and can live regular lives. It empowers the public through emergency preparedness education.
Hurricane Katrina
On the contrary, the recent hurricane that hit New Orleans in Louisiana, has taught us some very valuable lessons about emergency preparedness. Despite the fact that the American government invested millions and millions of dollars after 9/11 in emergency preparedness to ensure the safety of their public; despite the fact that forecasts had predicted the vulnerabilities of the levee system in New Orleans and despite the fact that weather forecasts predicting days in advance that a category 5 hurricane was going to hit the city- New Orleans was drastically and unfortunately unprepared. The failure in emergency planning in New Orleans is to be shared on all levels. But one thing is for sure: the public was not engaged and did not understand the level of threat and risk associated with the storm.
The Illusion
I began my talk by telling you that I firmly believe we are more secure that we were just a few short years ago. So far, I have painted a very bleak picture. But, as the head of the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority, I do stand here today, confidently, and can tell you, in all honesty, that we have done a lot - a lot of good things that have made the public safer each time they board an aircraft.
We have built an effective system of layered security - one designed to detect and deter terrorists before they have a chance to strike in the first place.
We have made aviation less of an "easy" target. We do our best to ensure no bad people and no bad things get on planes. We have given our screening officers better training and better pay but more importantly, we have given them the confidence they need to do their job and to do their job well.
Many of these layers of security are visible, others are not. Our efforts have given passengers the confidence they need to travel - a necessity to maintain the viability of the industry. We have done a good job at telling the traveling public about our better security.
However, that being said, we are seeing more and more evidence of passengers becoming frustrated with the long lines at screening checkpoints and invasive searches. How soon we forget. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the few people who did manage to muster the courage to travel by air quite happily waited in long lines and diligently removed their shoes and surrendered their nail clippers. But today, we see passengers verbally and physically abusing screening officers on a daily basis. We see growing impatience and deadly complacency.
How then do we do our job effectively? We need to develop a strategy for success.
A Strategy for Success
It is no secret that we are faced by an enormous and daunting challenge. The security environment of the past was much less complex and much more predictable. But what can we do? I am a firm believer in the following:
• The terrorist threat is a global problem. We need a global solution to counter it. We need to forge an international, strategic and united alliance. Conferences such as these are an important first step. We need to follow our "talk" with "actions". Real actions.
• We need to manage the aviation security arena using a risk-based system. We need to focus energies on assessing, analyzing and planning strategically. We need to understand our risks well and apply our limited resources in those areas. For example, rather than putting all passengers through the same screening process, we need to focus our energies on the high risk passengers.
• We must have trust in the professional competence of those on the front-lines. We have given them a job to do and we must give them the flexibility to do this job the best way they can. We need to give them the power and authority to exercise good judgment. We are working to ensure the rules and regulations are results based to ensure they will act when it really matters.
Additionally, we must tell them that they are doing a good job - on a regular basis. The combination of routine screening, low probability of an attack and long periods of time, often many years, between successful attacks, is a recipe for disaster. Our security workers need to be reminded periodically why their role is so important - why they need to be alert and meticulous at all times. They must be reminded that we are counting on them.
• The traveling public and regular citizens are our most important allies. We must brief them and we must engage them. We must not paint an illusion for them. They too must see the reality. Education is critical. This will make our jobs easier and it will make their traveling experience a much better experience all-round. We need to ensure that passengers pack smart so that they can fly smart. We need to encourage passengers and the larger airport community to be observant and vigilant. If they see something out of the ordinary they need to say something. We need a community to defeat a community of terrorists.
We in turn, must do our best to inconvenience the traveling public as little as possible. We need to focus on detecting bad people and bad things rather than on giving each person the same level of scrutiny when this is clearly not necessary. Only a very minute percentage of the traveling public poses a real threat. We need to focus our energies on this percentage and make things easier for the 80-year old grandmothers and the two-year old children who happen to have the same name as a known terrorist. We cannot afford to lose the support of the public.
• We must do a better job of integrating and engaging Muslim communities, and especially Muslim youth. We must counteract the growing radicalization in Diaspora communities. We must give them alternatives to Islamist extremism. If we give young people opportunities to realize their dreams, to utilize their creativity and we respect them and their rights, they will be less inclined to blow themselves up and more inclined to participate in our society.7 The battle against terrorism is foremost a battle for hearts and minds. We must not forget this.
• We, like the terrorists, must be flexible, innovative, resilient, and adaptive. We must adopt a long-term strategy and exercise patience, just like our foes. We need to plan well-beyond the current terrorist generation - the security measures we put in place today must also be relevant in the future. We cannot simply rely on technology that will be redundant in a few years time. We must be proactive rather than reactive.
• We must continue to add layers to our security system. We must address the areas for improvement in security - whether in air cargo, ground security or when it comes to the threat posed by MANPADS. We must find innovative ways to do this that includes a combination of measures and does not rely solely on new technology. Critically, we must not wait until another 3000 lives are lost.
How do we measure our success?
As Thomas Friedman "While our lives have been powerfully shaped by 9/11, we need leadership with great optimism, we need to dream of a better world and stop looking back at memories. We need to be the generation that wakes up each morning and not only imagines that things can be better but also acts on that imagination every day."8
This strategy will not be easy. It is much easier to be a terrorist than a counter-terrorist. Terrorists have the option to fail - we do not.
The truth is that we will never know whether or not we have done everything that needs to be done. We will certainly know when we have failed, however. The next terror attack is a question of "when" not "if". Until then, we must not hide behind an illusion of security. Let's step up and do the job we have been tasked with.
1- ICAO Journal (Vol. 60, Number 5, 2005): Annual Review of Civil Aviation 2004
2- Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004
3- Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004
4- Thomas Friedman, The World is Flat, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005
5- Statistics were taken from the following website
http://www.nsc.org/lrs/statinfo/odds.htm
7- Thomas Friedman, The World is Flat, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005
8- Thomas Friedman, The World is Flat, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005, pg. 469
