International Counter-Terrorism Measures since 9/11: Trends, Gaps and Challenges ¹

The attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C. on Sept. 11, 2001 had enormous and unanticipated consequences for the international system. Most significantly, the possibility of a protracted international conflict has been re-introduced to the world for the first time since the end of the Cold War. The dramatic attacks also signalled a new type of threat by non-state actors to governments and civilian populations. The unexpected ease with which the 9/11 attacks were carried out threw into doubt governments' capacity to ensure the security of citizens and vital infrastructure and called into question many accepted security and administrative practices. The attacks also highlighted how political, economic, social and cultural differences between various regions of the globe can be translated into violence.

While 9/11 embodied transformation of the international system, the depth and extent of this change should not be overstated. Indeed, the continuities between the attacks by Al-Qaeda and underlying alterations to our global systems over the past twenty years are critical for understanding how the international community might respond in the future. Changes that were previously underway played a role in 9/11, such as innovative use of civilian technology in conflict; targeting of civilian populations to the end of causing maximum economic, social, military, political and cultural dislocation; the rising capacities and aims of non-state actors; global mediatization of conflict and violence; and, the role of failed states as a source of instability, in this case as a base from which attacks on members of the international community could be conceived and supported. These transformations in the international security environment dictate a long-term, multi-dimensional and concerted response by international organizations, regional organizations, and individual governments. The following document provides an overview of international counter-terrorism measures that respond to 9/11 with an eye to demarcating trends, weaknesses and challenges.

Measures by the UN and its agencies

The most comprehensive international response to 9/11 came from the United Nations (UN). The UN is uniquely positioned to respond to terrorism as an international organization whose members include most world governments. In addition to the response by central bodies such as the Security Council (SC), various UN agencies initiated a wide range of measures to build on the framework set by the twelve existing anti-terrorism conventions and respond to a new form of threat. The foundation for the UN response is Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) ², which aims to strengthen international cooperation to prevent and suppress funding and preparation of terrorism. UNSCR 1373 calls on states to prevent and suppress financing of terrorism, criminalize fund-raising by their citizens, freeze assets of those who commit terrorism, and prohibit their citizens from funding those who commit acts of terrorism.

UNSCR 1373 also specifies other state measures: better exchange of operational information [on movement of persons or networks, forgery of travel documents, arms trafficking, IT use, and possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)]; improved judicial cooperation and information exchange; bilateral and multilateral counter-terrorism cooperation; ratification and implementation of international counter-terrorism treaties and protocols as well as previous SC resolutions ³, ensuring that asylum seekers are not involved in terrorism; and, verifying possible abuse of refugee claims by terrorists. To monitor implementation, the SC set up the Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) as a monitoring body to which states had to report within 90 days on steps taken to fulfill the provisions of UNSCR 1373.

The SC subsequently set out further measures. On November 12, 2001, UNSCR 1377 (2001) highlighted the need to assist government implementation of UNSCR 1373. The CTC was directed to establish a directory of sources of advice and expertise on legislation and administration to which all states could contribute. The directory provides resources for governments in the eight areas covered by UNSCR 1373: drafting counter-terrorism legislation; financial law and practice; customs law and practice; immigration law and practice; extradition law and practice; police and law enforcement work; illegal arms trafficking; and, other areas. The intention is to establish a regulatory framework of specific practices and capacities for government management of organized non-state violence. In the document following, the centrality of these eight area in structuring a multilateral response to 9/11 is clear.

The measures in UNSCR 1373 were again followed by SC Resolution 1390 (2002)⁴, which focussed on measures in relation to Osama bin Laden, members of Al Qaeda, Taliban and individuals, groups and organizations associated to them. The measures include freezing economic resources, preventing supply or sale of weapons, and preventing members of the two groups from entering or traveling through their territories. The resolution asked the Sanctions Committee to regularly update a list of Al Qaeda and Taliban members, groups, and entities associated with them. The resolution also ended sanctions against Ariana Afghan Airlines. The SC noted that Afghanistan's national airlines is no longer owned, leased, or operated by or on behalf of the Taliban and that the sanctions applied in 1999 are no longer needed. UNSCR 1390 is significant because of it extends across financial, transport and technical sectors, taking aim at terrorism as a multi-sectoral and transnational form of activity through multilateral action. Following the provisions of UNSCR 1373, UNSCR 1390 calls on states to report on implementation within 90 days, seek information from other states on implementation efforts, and publicize information on the measures in media.

The Ad Hoc Committee Established by General Assembly Resolution 51/210 of December 17, 1996, responded to 9/11 within its mandate to harmonize legal counter-terrorism. Past Committee work led to adoption of two treaties: on terrorist bombings, and suppression of terrorist financing. On February 1, 2002, the Committee Chair said difficulties with the proposed comprehensive international treaty on terrorism centre on an article that covers exclusions from the treaty’s scope. Resolving the difficulties depends on reconciling divergence over the wording in article 18 on acts by "armed forces" or "parties" to conflict and a reference to foreign occupation. Another issue is whether military forces in official duties are to be "governed" by international law or act "in conformity" with it. In addition to article 18 on the scope of application, the preamble, article 1 on a definition of phrases in the draft convention, and article 2 on a definition of terrorism are still unresolved. The Committee recommended that a Sixth Committee (Legal) working group continue urgent work on the comprehensive convention and consider outstanding issues on the nuclear terrorism convention.

After 9/11, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) moved to expand its review of nuclear facilities in member states, identify necessary security upgrades, and organize the financial contributions to carry them out. The IAEA proposed creation of an international response mechanism for nuclear threats from non-state actors and attacks on nuclear facilities. On February 25, 2002, the IAEA Director General summarized agency progress in preventing terrorism with nuclear and radioactive materials and proposed stronger measures. He said the IAEA can improve security by setting up international norms and standards, organizing international fora to exchange information, identifying weak areas and proposing how they might be resolved as well as coordinating bilateral and international support. In the short term, the IAEA aims to obtain better information on governments' protection of nuclear and radioactive materials and facilities.

The IAEA Director General also proposed specific responses to nuclear weapons theft, acquisition of nuclear and radioactive materials, risks to nuclear facilities, and better emergency measures. The latter include systematic evaluation of measures for physical protection, security and design of nuclear facilities, for physical protection of nuclear material in transport, peer review of regulatory infrastructures to secure radioactive sources, assistance to extend government regulations to large orphan sources, expanded assistance to help states protect facilities, help in implementing safety upgrades, development of a methodology to assess protection of installations from violence, an upgraded IAEA Emergency Response Centre, and use of the IAEA Emergency Preparedness Review service to appraise national emergency responses. The long-term IAEA aims are to provide comprehensive threat evaluation to governments, international protection, security and safety standards for nuclear and radioactive materials, effective physical protection by all States, better capacities to meet acts of extreme violence, effective State Systems of Accountancy and Control (SSACs) and control and regulatory oversight in all States, and improved border monitoring and international emergency response.

After 9/11, representatives from 154 countries endorsed a new International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) airline security strategy that includes new mandatory audits on airport security. On Feb. 20, 2002, in an ICAO declaration following a High-level Ministerial Conference in Montréal, Canada focussed on the impact of 9/11 for the airline industry and consumers, stronger aviation security, security audits, and financial and human resources. To restore industry and consumer confidence, the ICAO intended to intensify implementation and enforcement of air security conventions, measures on security threats in given states, and a focus on the needs of developing countries. Better aviation security would be achieved by combining the efforts of states (locked flight deck doors on international flights, better threat and risk assessment, and better security implementation) and the ICAO (requiring locked flight deck doors, better aviation threat analysis, evaluation of existing conventions and standards, action on aviation war risk insurance, and a comprehensive Aviation Security Plan of Action). In their Declaration, Ministers endorsed a comprehensive ICAO Aviation Security Plan of Action to strengthen global aviation security by better identifying, analysing and developing effective responses, enhancing overall safety measures (especially on flight decks), regular, mandatory, systematic and harmonized aviation security audits, coordinated regional and sub-regional security audits, transparent security audit results, and a programme to rectify deficiencies.

Since 9/11, an International Maritime Organization (IMO) working group has developed 12 proposals to improve maritime security. The proposals cover mandatory automatic identification on all ships over 500 tonnes, guidelines to assess port vulnerability, an urgently-needed seafarer identification document, new customs cooperation, and new anti-terrorist alarms on ships. In addition, the working group is assessing how to strengthen key international treaties on high seas terrorism. In Nov. 2001, the IMO Assembly adopted a review of measures and procedures to prevent acts of terrorism which threaten the security of passengers and crews and the safety of ships and also decided to convene a Maritime Security Conference in December 2002 to amend the SOLAS Convention ⁵ and possibly the STCW Convention ⁶.

The IMO Maritime Safety Committee, Legal Committee and Facilitation Committee also started to evaluate the need to update other relevant IMO instruments and / or adopt other security measures. IMO committees reviewed measures such as documents required for seafarers and ship clearance, maritime port security (i.e, whether security considerations should cover all ships, passengers and crew, off-shore terminals and the whole port area, including port approaches, operations and persons ashore such as port personnel or nearby inhabitants); and, whether there is need for severe disciplinary measures or sanctions for those involved in fraud. A high priority item at the MSC seventy-fifth session on developing a strategy on maritime security which took place in May 2002, was how to best integrate maritime security into long-term IMO goals and objectives. The Working Group on Maritime Safety (ISWG) developed a work plan and time frame for Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) approval and action. In preparation, the IMO Secretariat invited parties to various instruments to communicate information on offences committed, measures taken against actual or alleged offenders, and the results of extradition proceedings or other legal proceedings.

The Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (ODCCP) developed a special database on terrorism in their Terrorism Prevention Branch (TPB) over the past several years. It is now a key tool for international decision-making. The TPB researches trends in terrorism and assists countries in capacity-building as well as incorporating international counter-terrorism treaties into national law. A special conference has been organized in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan to focus on developing stronger international counter-terrorism cooperation. In addition, the ODCCP is active in the contexts in which terrorism can develop. On Feb. 28, 2002, the UN Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) survey of opium poppy cultivation confirmed that cultivation has resumed at a "relatively high level" in Afghanistan after a marked decline in 2001. The survey illustrates the far-reaching trends that are linked to terrorism and need for a broadly-based response. While Afghan interim authorities banned opium poppy cultivation on Jan. 17, 2002, most opium poppy fields were already sown. Farmers said they were unsure about the ban's impact on their ability to harvest opium this spring, but the high prices offered by local traders create a powerful incentive in a country devastated by over 20 years of war.

The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) provides information on potential uses of chemical weapons by terrorists, and tracks global movements of chemicals that could be used in terrorist weapons. After 9/11, the OPCW organized an international expert meeting on strategies to combat terrorist use of chemical weapons. The Executive Council established a working group to develop recommendations for the OPCW contribution to global counter-terrorism on Dec. 4-7, 2001. In light of the UN SC resolutions 1373 and 1368, the Council stressed the need to achieve universal adherence to the Chemical Weapons Convention, enact national implementing legislation that criminalizes use of chemical weapons, complete destruction of declared chemical weapons stockpiles, effectively monitor legitimate chemical production and transfers, and ensure OPCW ability to assist and protect in the event of use or threat of use of chemical weapons.

After 9/11, the Universal Postal Union (UPU) organized a presentation on security for representatives of 189 postal services by the US Postal Service, and drew attention to updated US guidelines. The world postal security network offers advice and training to eliminate transmission of dangerous materials by mail. A Bio-terrorism Seminar organized for the UPU's Postal Security Action Group (PSAG) in April 2002 focussed on the US bio-terrorist events in Oct. 2001. Speakers from the US Postal Service (USPS) presented an overview of use of bio-terrorism via the mail, described how the crisis was handled, how they responded to customers, what they learned from events, and what is now done to protect customers, employees and the public from chemical and biological hazards. The seminar included a presentation on developing workable contingency plans for bio-terrorism incidents. Industry representatives also offered information on mail irradiation systems. Discussion on the role of media and its interaction with crisis officials was also on the agenda. Finally, a UPU "Combating Terrorism Resolution CA 1/2001" called on members to commit appropriate resources to postal security initiatives and reinforce or create postal security units to coordinate counter-terrorism activities with the UPU.

Another UN agency to undertake post-9/11 counter-terrorism action was the World Health Organization (WHO). The WHO outlined three lessons for public health officials from the October 2001 anthrax outbreak: prompt health system response to suspicion of deliberate infections, continuous vigilance, and an informed public.

Finally, the UN Economic and Social Council recently passed two resolutions that focus on terrorism and human rights. An April 16, 2002 resolution condemns terrorism "as acts aimed at the destruction of human rights, fundamental freedoms and democracy" and calls for strong multilateral action "in accordance with relevant international obligations under human rights instruments and international humanitarian law"⁷. A second resolution requests that the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights provide guidance on protecting rights and freedoms while fighting terrorism by assisting and advising states and the UN, making recommendations on specific international law in relation to proposed measures, analysing the impact of counter-terrorism measures, and drawing on past work, experience, recommendations and decisions.

Measures by regional organizations

A Nov. 5, 2001 the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism set out practical measures to fight terrorism. Measures to be implemented as a result of the meeting include: review and strengthening of national counter-terrorism mechanisms, early signing / ratification of anti-terrorism conventions, deeper cooperation between law enforcement agencies and best-practices sharing, integration of international conventions on terrorism to ASEAN mechanisms, improved information / intelligence exchange on terrorists and their organizations, movements, funding and other relevant information, better cooperation and coordination between the ASEAN Ministers Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC) and other ASEAN counter-terrorism bodies, member-state capacity-building in investigation, detection, monitoring and reportage, increased international and regional counter-terrorism, and stronger bilateral, regional, and international counter-terrorism cooperation. A Special AMMTC was planned to enhance national, sub-regional and international coordination in April 2002.

The APEC Leaders Statement on Counter-terrorism on Oct. 21, 2001 outlined eight economic measures to fight terrorism. These include: financial measures to cut off funds to terrorists; adherence to international requirements on air and maritime transportation security; stronger regional energy security through the APEC Energy Security Initiative; critical sector protection (telecommunications, transport, health, energy); better customs communication; electronic border security records systems; capacity building and economic-technical cooperation; and, cooperation to limit 9/11 economic fallout and secure regional economic confidence.

European Union action since 9/11 has taken two paths: internal EU and external. Internally, the EU took specific measures to combat terrorism. The Commission approved proposals to increase harmonization and counter-terrorism cooperation on Sept. 19, 2001. On Oct. 19, 2001, the European Council approved a number of measures: a European arrest warrant valid in entire Union; increased operational cooperation between Europol, Eurojust, intelligence services, police forces and judicial authorities; adoption of a Directive on money laundering and decision to turn Financial Action Task Force (FATF)⁸ commitments into legislation; and, approval of Commission proposals on air security. In addition, the EU Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism defined several types of terrorist acts and imposed severe criminal punishments. The EU also adopted a regulatory framework that set a legal basis for an EU-wide freeze of terrorist assets. Finally, the EU asked the UN Centre for International Crime Prevention to develop a project to help implement the 12 UN anti-terrorist conventions in UN Member States.

Externally, the Commission made several moves to facilitate implementation of UNSCR 1373, its capacity-building efforts serving as a model for other multilateral organizations. Existing assistance covers financial law, customs, immigration, extradition, police and law enforcement as well as judicial capacity-building and the fight against terrorist networks. Assistance on financial law includes projects on money laundering as well as study of existing legislation in Andean Pact countries to implement FATF recommendations. Assistance on customs law includes border control and management programmes in Morocco, Central and Eastern Europe, Malta, Turkey, and the Western Balkans.

EU assistance to Afghanistan and its region, Iraq and neighbouring countries, Morocco, Somalia, Sri Lanka, and Albania and neighbouring countries supports migration management and asylum systems, voluntary return to countries of origin and enhancing ability to cope with re-admission obligations, and trafficking and illegal immigration prevention. Extradition assistance provides training for international judicial cooperation. EU police and law enforcement capacity building specifically supports counter-terrorism capabilities, and more general law enforcement in Algeria, Central and Eastern Europe, the Western Balkans, and Palestinian Authority (PA) areas. EU judicial capacity-building includes projects for stronger court systems and public prosecution in Central and Eastern Europe, judicial modernization in Morocco and Tunisia, technical assistance to the Indonesian Attorney-General on forensic accounting, and a project on judicial administration in Nicaragua. EU help in fighting networks related to terrorism includes alternative development projects to combat drugs in several Latin American Countries, and a special Andean and Central American incentive to combat illicit drug production and trafficking.

The EU has identified areas for further assistance in Asia, Latin America, Africa, the Caribbean and Pacific (i.e., the 77 Cotonou Agreement countries), the Mediterranean Region, new independent states in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, EU candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and the Western Balkans. It has also specified possible further assistance not tied to geographical areas. Efforts to foster societies in which terrorism is less likely to emerge or prosper include: funding conflict prevention through capacity building, early warning and confidence building measures; promoting democratization and rule of law; and, promoting rights of national minorities. Finally, as part of wider EU conflict prevention, an EC Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) was established in 2001 for rapid initiatives in peace-building, reconstruction and development. RRM funds are limited to six months and now fully operational.

The Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE) of the Organization of American States (OAS) was set up in 1998 to enhance information exchange, assist drafting counter-terrorism legislation, compile treaties and agreements, strengthen border cooperation, and develop training and crisis management. A Sept. 21, 2001 meeting of foreign ministers identified urgent necessary actions and sped preparation for a Special Conference on Security. The meeting approved the Resolution Strengthening Cooperation to Prevent, Combat, and Eliminate Terrorism (RC.23/UNSCR1/01), which calls for enhanced regional cooperation to extradite perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of 9/11 along with stronger mutual legal assistance and improved information exchange. The meeting also instructed the OAS Permanent Council to convoke a CICTE meeting on urgent action to strengthen hemispheric counter-terrorism. Finally, the resolution asked the Permanent Council to prepare an Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism, subsequently adopted in June 2002 in Barbados, and to study the legal repercussions of government financial support for terrorists and terrorist groups.

At its First Special Session on Oct. 15 2001, the CICTE updated its Work Plan in light of new threats posed by 9/11 and provisions of the Sept. 21, 2001 resolution. Subcommittees were established on border controls, financial controls, and the CICTE Work Plan for 2002-2003. The CICTE Second Regular Session on Jan. 28-29, 2002 received reports on Member State action to follow-up decisions by the foreign ministers, and adopted measures on border and financial controls as well as the 2002-2003 CICTE Work Plan. Measures approved by the CICTE cover border control (i.e., early warning and intelligence-sharing systems to monitor terrorist movements, prevent transit, detain them, and develop linked migration databases without affecting free transit of persons), improved identification and travel documents, customs measures (i.e., better controls in seaports, river ports, lake ports, airports and land crossings), and mechanisms to, for example, share information on best approaches to fighting terrorism and illegal arms trafficking. Financial measures to be adopted include development and modernization of legal frameworks, full implementation of international conventions, effective national-international cooperation as well as training and technical aid.

The 2002-3 CICTE work plan includes activities such as establishment of a Directory of competent authorities, a Directory of competencies (specialized knowledge on financial controls, border controls, domestic legislation, law enforcement, illicit arms trafficking, biological and chemical weapons, illicit use of radioactive materials, drug trafficking, academic and specialized research centers, etc.), an Inter-American Data Exchange Network, a computerized inter-American data bank on terrorism, inputs to the Committee on Hemispheric Security preparatory meetings for the Special Conference on Security, an inter-American handbook of best practices to prevent, combat, and eliminate terrorism, and cooperation on prevention, training, and sharing experience. In addition, CICTE will evaluate need to study the causes of terrorism in the Hemisphere as well as appropriate prevention. CICTE priorities include: data collection; a data exchange network and database; program development, training, and technical assistance; and coordinated policies.

The Bucharest Plan of Action for Combating Terrorism developed by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) set up a comprehensive multilateral framework centred on expanded activities, facilitating state interaction, and identifying appropriate new instruments for action. The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) has a number of experts and programmes. Its Anti-Terrorism Legislation Review provides advice and technical assistance to OSCE Member States in implementing international anti-terrorism conventions and protocols. The ODIHR reviews existing and draft domestic legislation for compliance with international anti-terrorism conventions and protocols. The ODIHR Legislation Alert and Assistance Programme provides technical assistance and advice to Member States in the Caucasus and Central Asia on drafting legislation necessary to ratify international instruments. Technical assistance and advice is also available on request for other OSCE States.

In terms of immigration law and practice, the ODIHR Assistance to Border Service Reform provides training on human rights for border guards so that States in the South Caucasus and Central Asia can upgrade operations and implement international standards and best practices. The Cross-Border Co-operation and Development of Migration Legislation assists states in Eurasia in improving practical cross-border cooperation as well as developing migration legislation. OSCE police and law enforcement work in counter-terrorism includes border policing projects, use of crime intelligence systems and networks, and bilateral assistance for terrorism prevention and police training in specific areas of expertise. The OSCE Secretariat's Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC), Office of the OSCE Co-ordinator on Economic and Environmental Activities (OCEEA) and Senior Police Advisor are the main sources of counter-terrorism expertise. The CPC provides early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management, operational support of OSCE field missions, a data bank, and communication network. OCEEA experts address economic and social aspects of terrorism and sources of terrorist financing following the "Bucharest Plan of Action.” Finally, the ODIHR provides expertise and advice to OSCE States by reviewing legislation for compliance with international legislation, standards and practices as well as training and workshops for public officials and civil society actors.

South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Member States face a unique challenge in formulating a regional response to 9/11 due to proximity to Afghanistan and regional issues such as the status of Kashmir. Counter-terrorism has been a long-standing SAARC priority. The 1987 SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism was one of the first three regional treaties. Following a Summit meeting in Jan. 2002, a Declaration by the heads of State and / or government agreed that terrorism violated the fundamental values in the UN and SAARC charters, reiterated that terrorism seriously threatens international peace and security, supported UNSCR 1373, and reiterated member states' collective and individual efforts to prevent and suppress terrorism.

Measures by Other International and Regional Organizations

The FATF, an independent international body based at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), recommended a series of follow-ups to UNSCR 1373. FATF members include 29 states and two international organizations (the European Commission and Gulf Co-operation Council). The FATF agreed to Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing on Oct. 31, 2001 and is implementing an action plan for adoption in all countries. The Special Recommendations include: ratifying and implementing UN instruments, criminalizing terrorist financing and associated money laundering, freezing and confiscating assets, reporting suspicious transactions, international investigative cooperation, ensuring all money transfers are licensed or registered, providing that persons who conduct wire transfers are clearly identified, and reviewing laws and regulations of institutions that could abuse money transfers. An FATF plenary session on Feb. 1, 2002 announced that the first phase of member self-assessment for the Special Recommendations is complete. The entire assessment will be published in June 2002. The FATF has a key role in structuring a multilateral response to post-9/11 terrorist financing. The Special Recommendations have been widely adopted by states and international bodies and the FATF has regional bodies in the Asia-Pacific, Caribbean, Eastern and Southern Africa, Europe, and South America.

The OECD studied the impact of 9/11 on economic growth. It noted that 9/11 occurred just as capital markets were in a heightened state of uncertainty since hope for a quick recovery had faded and risk premiums had increased. In the weeks after the attacks, volatility rose. However, this decreased by the end of September due to prompt action by policy makers in securing the functioning of financial systems and reducing monetary rates. Domestic spending also assisted by holding up. Weakness came from the corporate sector, which cut investment and reduced inventory, and was subject to widely-publicized scandals in the US. In April 2002, the OECD stated that the information and communication technologies is cautiously recovering. OECD GDP is expected to gradually increase to 2% in 2002 and 3% in 2003 albeit with regional differences and continued uncertainties.

Another international response to 9/11 came from the G7, whose Oct. 2001 Action Plan to Combat Financing of Terrorism set out four priorities: vigorous international sanctions that including freezing terrorist assets, rapid development and implementation of international standards, increased information sharing, and stronger efforts to prevent abuse in the financial sector. As a result, almost 150 countries and jurisdictions issued orders to freeze terrorist assets worth over $100 million US after 9/11. On Feb. 9, 2002, G7 finance ministers and central bank governors, meeting in Ottawa, set measures to strengthen international coordination to freeze terrorist assets. Following the FATF Special Recommendations, the G7 are setting up Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) to share information on money laundering, terrorist financing and tracking terrorist assets. The G7 elaborated further steps to fight terrorist financing in Feb. 2002 in Ottawa, Canada that include: development of mutual understanding of information requirements and procedures to freeze assets, developing key principles on types of information to share, elaborating procedures to share and protect sensitive information, joint identification of terrorist assets to freeze, and continued review to ensure the flow of information on identifying, and tracking and stopping terrorist funds. On April 20, 2002, a meeting of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors announced the first G-7 joint designation of terrorist entities and associated freezing of assets.

The Commonwealth Committee on Terrorism met in London on Jan. 29, 2002. Participants endorsed a draft Plan of Action to implement the Commonwealth leaders' Oct. 25, 2001 statement on terrorism, which is designed to assist members in complying with UNSCR 1373. The Plan includes legal assistance and capacity building for member states to implement UNSCR 1373, assistance in ratifying UN anti-terrorism conventions, review of Commonwealth Extradition and Mutual Assistance Schemes to increase applicability to terrorism, increased law enforcement cooperation, updated measures to fight money laundering and terrorist financing, and building on Commonwealth experience in enhancing international dialogue.

At the Tenth International Conference on Currency Counterfeiting and Fifth International Conference on Fraudulent Travel Documents in April 2002, the largest fora for experts on counterfeiting and travel documents, Interpol Secretary General Ronald K. Noble spoke of the growing need for partnerships between law enforcement institutions and private industry in producing currency and security documents. Computer technology advances provide low cost access to sophisticated scanning and printing systems and feed a strong increase in new counterfeit techniques. Counterfeit travel documents can allow terrorists movement between countries. Secretary General Noble argued that national security now depends on preventing deception with counterfeit and fraudulent travel documents.

NATO has carried out a number of activities that are important to the international response to 9/11. On Sept. 13, 2001, an extraordinary session of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council reaffirmed Treaty commitments in dealing with the terrorist attacks against the US. In Oct. 2001, NATO implemented Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, and started deploying aircraft to the US and naval forces in the Eastern Mediterranean. In December 2002, a statement on adapting NATO defence capabilities to fight terrorism and a ministerial statement on the Alliance response to terrorism were released. In Jan. 2002, NATO sent extra AWACS to help American air defence and announced joint NATO-Russia initiatives to combat terrorism.

After 9/11, an Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) emergency meeting stated that all states must join international efforts to deal with issues which may underlie terrorism (poverty, hunger, disease and despair, regional conflicts, lack of fundamental rights and human rights, and lack of durable development and environmental protection). The OIC views definition of terrorism and drafting of international conventions to combat terrorism as practical issues that must be comprehensively addressed. At the April 1, 2002 Extraordinary Conference of Foreign Ministers of Islamic States on Terrorism, OIC Secretary General Abdelouahed Belkeziz underlined need for an international conference on terrorism to develop a balanced, international definition and said fighting terrorism should be assigned to the UN so that the world organization could regain its role in maintaining international security and peace. The OIC Secretary General appealed to Member States to sign the OIC Convention on Combating International Terrorism so that it can enter into force.

On March 16, 2002, the World Tourism Organization (WTO) stated that recovery of the tourism industry is underway and that the industry is expected to regain pre-crisis levels later this year. A crisis committee created by the WTO after 9/11 includes 21 tourism ministers from countries affected by the crisis, as well as 15 private sector leaders from the WTO Business Council (representing tour operators, transport companies and hotels). Later named the Tourism Recovery Committee, the group first met Nov. 2001 to share market information on the impact of the crisis and develop strategies to overcome it. Governments responded to the tourism slowdown in a variety of ways, including subsidies, tax breaks, shifts in marketing strategies and increased advertising. Major world tour operators say efforts are now bearing fruit in the form of renewed tourism demand.

Finally, the World Customs Organization (WCO) has helped fight terrorism for about 20 years. The Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, for example, promotes improved supply chain security and efficient movement of legitimate trade across borders. WCO attention is now focussed on the US Container Security Initiative. The proposal aims to establish criteria to identify high-risk containers, screen containers before shipping to the US, use technology to pre-screen high-risk containers, and develop smart and secure containers. The proposed system means that US Customs would know that its overseas counterparts have pre-screened, targeted and X-ray scanned potential high-risk cargoes before arrival in the US. While some countries are concerned about expense and implementation, WCO Secretary General Michel Danet has called for further study and development of consensus.

Trends in recent international counter-terrorism measures and fora

A number of trends are apparent in recent international action to combat terrorism. In the first place, efforts to activate the principles in UNSCR 1373 have structured a response that embodies the value of multilateral rule-based approaches. Evidence for this are references to the resolution as the basis for action by regional organizations such as the EU and CICTE. UNSCR 1373 suggests that 9/11 has led to continuity as well as change in the international approach to counter-terrorism since many multilateral efforts by the UN (for example, in terrorist financing or efforts to arrive at a globally workable definition of terrorism) have been underway since the 1990s. Security Council use of UNSCR 1373 to structure international, national and regional responses demonstrates the continued importance of multilateral rule-based conflict resolution.

The value of this approach to conflict management is also evident in other international measures that respond to 9/11. The multilateral approach resulted a variety of measures to assist counter-terrorism capacity-building in fora as diverse as the OAS, EU, and the Commonwealth. Sustained and concrete efforts have been pursued by the ICAO, IAEA, EU, CICTE, and FATF, that is, by: two sectoral international organizations (ICAO and IAEA), two regional organizations (EU and CICTE), and an organization focussed specifically on a single-issue response to terrorism (the FATF). The variety of actions again suggests that counter-terrorism achieves clear results in implementation and legislation through multilateralism. The international community is moreover able to respond to crisis in a multi-dimensional manner on the basis of central principles (UNSCR 1373). The case of the EU is especially instructive due to its multi-dimensional measures that integrate capacity-building for counter-terrorism into existing programmes for development in various global regions.

A clear trend in the international response to 9/11 is the focus on government, individual and non-state behaviours and practices. This has resulted in practical measures to enhance security in civil aviation, maritime safety, postal services, nuclear safety, chemical weapons, and information technologies. The trend is most evident in measures to combat terrorist financing, which are subject to near-universal attention from governments and a specific international body, the FATF. The issue of CBRN terrorism has been addressed sectorally. Although organizations such as the IAEA state that CBRN terrorism is not considered likely, they note its catastrophic consequences merit stronger security and emergency preparedness. In this light, another consequence of 9/11 has been much greater awareness of the need to anticipate catastrophic, high-casualty acts of terrorism.

Problem areas in developing international counter-terrorism measures

In spite of sectorally and regionally decisive counter-terrorism as seen in the EU, 9/11 also exposed problems in the international response capacity. Effective international counter-terrorism is broadly-based and multi-sectoral. It recognizes the need to focus on issues such as the role of financing and drug trafficking. It recognizes the need to strengthen the ability for international action and coordination in areas such as nuclear and radioactive preparedness, security, and emergency threat response. However, the international community is still unable to resolve the problem of the defining terrorism and so comprehensively addresses the issue as a scourge that resembles war in terms of the dangers that it poses and its potential impacts. The failure also means that counter-terrorism efforts might be seen to be tainted by ideology, values, and manipulation. An analogous difficulty would be ratification of a convention on war crimes without defining a war crime. International counter-terrorism efforts will be hampered in specific regions and countries until this weakness is overcome.

Another area of difficulty is that, as the different responses above suggest, international measures are implemented in a context of uneven governmental and regional capacities. This leads to uneven state, regional, and sectoral responses. The most effective response to this difficulty is stronger multilateralism, which will lead to mid- and long-term change across the board. In this way, the economic, technical and political costs of lengthy international conflict could be diminished. Given that 9/11 was carried out by non-state actors who received critical support from a network based in a territory whose rulers did not entirely control it and who lacked international recognition, the lessons of diminished capacities are clear. The threat of catastrophic high-casualty terrorism underlines the importance of a comprehensive international agenda to prevent the domestic collapse seen in Afghanistan from becoming global disaster.

Trends for future

Terrorism is now at the front and centre of international concern. As seen in sectoral and economic organizations such as APEC, it is on every agenda and understood as based in broad networks and having far-reaching consequences. Due to the combined influence of economic, social, political, technological and other forms of globalization, terrorism has now taken a global form. The response to terrorism must therefore be global, multilateral, and multi-sectoral. This transformation points to the changed nature of security. Where security was once a primarily military and exclusively national concern, it is now a global issue for citizens that has unanticipated impacts on groups, individuals and daily life. For one thing, many human and political rights that are the basis of the international community are challenged by those who would remove political debate from institutions and pursue their goals by means of coercive violence. Each government now faces a new set of challenges in protecting citizens from a threat that is catastrophic, transnational and based in innovative techniques.

Future terrorist threats will "piggyback" the trajectory of global trends in areas such as technology and migration in a similar fashion to those who transformed civilian airliners into engines of destruction on 9/11. The international community can best meet this challenge through clearly defining the threats that it faces and formulating a coherent set of multilateral tools for response. The task will occur in various sectors and fora of human activity. It will be based on balancing the need for security with a concern for human and political rights. It will bridge the differences between countries and regions through capacity building. It will be based in the creation of new norms and standards of inter-state and inter-governmental cooperation and action. It will also grow out of a transformed sense of identity that has emerged since 9/11, one that is based in a heightened knowledge of dangers and vulnerabilities as well as the potential benefits of multilateral action.

¹ Attached is a paper on International Counter-Terrorism Measures since 9/11: Trends, Gaps and Challenges. The views expressed in this document are those of the author. They do not necessarily represent the views of the Government of Canada and should in no way be taken to represent the official view of any institution with which the author is associated.

² Resolution 1373(2001), Adopted by the Security Council at its 4385th meeting, on 28 Sept., 2001.

³ UNSCR 1269 (1999) and 1368 (2001).

⁴ Resolution 1390(2002), Adopted by the Security Council at its 4452th meeting, on 16 Jan., 2002.

⁵ International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974.

⁶ International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification, and Watch keeping for Seafarers,\ 1978.

⁷ E/CN.4/2002/L.50/Rev. 1, April 16, 2002.

⁸ For an outline of FATF measures, see below.