RCMP Act - Part VII Subsection 45.45(14)
COMMISSION INTERIM REPORT
30. CLOSING OBSERVATIONS
30. CLOSING OBSERVATIONS
I have some observations to make before moving to my recommendations.
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In Chapter 12 of this report I described police performance that did not meet an acceptable and expected standard of competence, professionalism and proficiency.
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In other chapters I described individual instances of police conduct that was inappropriate to the circumstances and, in some cases, inconsistent with respect for the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Charter of Rights.
There is a clear connection between the two. Most instances of inappropriate police conduct were the direct result of the unacceptable level of police performance described in Chapter 12.
The question then remains: What can explain the instances of substandard RCMP performance reviewed in this report? In this chapter I will review my findings regarding police performance and police conduct, and then attempt to answer that important question.
30.1. Police Performance
Many of the examples of substandard performance reflect failures in the planning process. They are presented here in chronological order, as they played out in the events of November 25.
30.1.1. Briefings and Late Buses
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Inadequate instruction to bus drivers who were to transport their passengers to the UBC campus on the morning of November 25 for a 6:00 a.m. briefing. The result was the last minute assignment, to key positions, of people who were not adequately prepared for their roles and who were not properly integrated into the command structure for that day. At both Green College and Gate 6, officers who could have supported each other's efforts instead acted in isolation and sometimes at cross purposes because they were unaware of each other's presence and their respective roles.
30.1.2. The Open Space in Front of Green College
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Failure to realize that the grounds of Green College located outside the secure zone were an obvious gathering place for those residents of Green College who had previously indicated a desire to protest, with the result that no contingency plans were in place to address the presence of protesters at that location.
30.1.3. Noon March to the Fence
- Failure to have anyone in a command role at the well-publicized noon rally who was aware of the protesters' planned civil disobedience and was in a position to realistically evaluate late-breaking information of dubious credibility about the expected actions of the protesters.
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The last-minute decision to give protesters access to the security fence, which was constructed in a woefully inadequate manner, in spite of long-standing police intelligence and well-publicized information that the protesters had planned, as an act of civil disobedience, to symbolically bump into the line of police officers that they expected to find between them and the fence.
My inability to determine who made the all important decision to allow protesters to have unobstructed access to the security fence tells a great deal about the state of readiness of the police to meet the challenges of the day. I will always believe that, but for that decision, based on dubious information, the events on campus from noon until 4:30 that afternoon may well have been non-violent throughout, though boisterous, noisy and challenging for the police. It was the violence that broke out at the flagpole at noon that set the stage for many of the subsequent events that unfolded over the remainder of the afternoon.
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The recruitment of Deputy Site Commanders during the second week in November, who had no background whatever in APEC planning, and giving them major decision-making roles in the front line on campus on November 25 without adequate involvement or training to prepare them for the senior roles assigned to them.
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Placement of ultimate security responsibility for the major noon hour protest rally, as well as all other security operations on campus that day, with a senior officer who was freed from his daily police duties to come full time to the task just 10 days before November 25, while the senior officers who had planned the security operation over a lengthy period of time stood aside, outside of the chain of command.
The decision to divide and separate the planning from the operational side of the policing responsibility for this event was an ill-advised decision.
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Failure to plan for effective leadership at the flagpole hot spot during the well-publicized noon rally. Supt. Thompsett's absence should have been contemplated, given his need to be in the immediate vicinity of the 18 world leaders for whose safety he held responsibility.
Placing command responsibility at that critical event in the hands of two otherwise competent and sound officers, who had been brought into the APEC circle just days before, was sheer folly.
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Lack of an approved contingency plan setting out the RCMP response to potential protests and demonstrations on campus on November 25.
Instructions for the preparation of such a plan were given only 12 days before the event, to an officer with no background whatever in APEC planning. With insufficient time to have the draft plan considered and finalized, it was never adopted or used.
30.1.4. Blockage of the Exit Routes
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Absence of a tactical plan to ensure the exits from campus remained secure and open while APEC leaders were on campus, and to address the potential blockade of all exit routes from the Museum of Anthropology. This was despite police information gathered well in advance that such a blockade by protesters was entirely possible.
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Confusion and chaos in the APEC Command Centre when it became apparent that all exit routes were blocked, such that protocol went out the window and those with responsibility scrambled in all directions to find a last-minute solution.
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The relieving of Supt. Thompsett of his command responsibility to clear Gate 6 immediately after he had set in motion a process to meet that responsibility, and the assumption of that responsibility by Command Centre, 45 minutes before the scheduled departure of the world leaders, amidst panic and uncertainty at the Centre as to how the exit could be cleared.
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The dispatch of S/Sgt. Stewart from Gate 3 to clear Gate 6 within six minutes, giving him four minutes from his arrival at Gate 6 to accomplish the task.
30.1.5. Involvement of the Local RCMP Detachments
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Exclusion of the UBC Detachment from any meaningful involvement in the security planning for the leaders' meeting on campus until shortly before the event, and then, only on the initiative of the NCO in charge at that Detachment.
The result was that the NCO in charge at the UBC Detachment was left to make decisions that had serious implications for the total security package being delivered by the RCMP on campus on November 25, without the benefit of the background knowledge held by senior commissioned officers in command roles.
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Failure to notify the Richmond Detachment to be ready to receive protesters arrested on campus on November 25, in spite of the fact that the RCMP planners had decided and recorded that the Richmond cells would be used for that purpose.
30.2. Police Conduct that was Inappropriate or Inconsistent with Charter Rights
Certain police conduct contributed to the appearance of a police crackdown on student demonstrations at the APEC conference but in fact was the direct result of the inadequate police performance I have identified above. That conduct included the following:
30.2.1. The Singh Arrest on November 24
Had the UBC Detachment been properly integrated into the security planning process, I believe that Mr. Singh would not have been arrested on November 24 or at any other time for the November 7 megaphone incident. Had the UBC Detachment been required to consult on its plan to eliminate Mr. Singh from campus on November 25 with wise and seasoned heads with full knowledge of the background of the leaders' meeting, I believe that the plan would never have been implemented.
30.2.2. The Removal of the Tibetan Flag
My comments immediately above with reference to the arrest of Mr. Singh apply equally here. The UBC Detachment drove the initiative to have the flag removed and it should not have been in a position to do so. The detachment should have been required to consult on its plan to remove the flag with senior officers, with full background knowledge, who surely would never have succumbed to the pressure applied by the late night visitors to the UBC Detachment and the follow up by the Chinese Consulate.
30.2.3. Removal of Protest Signs Outside of Green College.
Had the calibre of the planning for the leaders' meeting on campus and the delivery of the security package for that event been of the quality that would have been expected, the major gaffe - the failure to recognize this obvious protest site - that gave rise to the complaints relating to Green College would never have occurred.
30.2.4. The Clearing of Gate 6
Nowhere in the entire litany of events reviewed in this report is the inadequacy of the police planning and delivery of the security package for the leaders' meeting more apparent than in the position the police found themselves around 3:00 p.m. on November 25 when they realized that all the exit routes had been blocked and they had no contingency plan for addressing the resulting crisis. The unnecessary pepper spraying of protesters was a direct result of that inadequacy.
30.2.5. The Arrest of Mark Brooks
This was a precipitous arrest made in an atmosphere of crisis, directly attributable to the chaos that resulted from inadequate police planning to ensure the orderly and safe exit of the world leaders.
30.2.6. The Strip Searching of All Female Protesters at the Richmond Cells
Had the Richmond Detachment been notified in advance of what to expect on November 25, I am satisfied these complaints would never have arisen. I have no doubt that Insp. Speevak would have provided leadership in preparing for what could unfold at the detachment on November 25. That would inevitably have led to a consideration and discussion of procedures to be followed on the arrival of prisoners from UBC, including the method of search to be conducted. I cannot imagine that strip searching the student protesters would have been considered necessary, unless unforeseen circumstances were to arise. Certainly the differential treatment of male and female prisoners would not have occurred.
30.3. Police Conduct that was Justified and Necessary
There were, of course, instances of public confrontation between police and protesters where police actions were justified and necessary to preserve or restore the peace.
Examples include:
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the pepper spraying and arrests at the time of the collapse of the fence at the noon rally;
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the pepper spraying and arrest of Mr. Malmo-Levine at the flagpole climbing incident;
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the arrest of Mr. Oppenheim; and
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the second arrest of Mr. Singh.
The police had a duty and responsibility to initiate the latter arrest given the contemptuous disregard for the rule of law by Mr. Singh, who took refuge behind that same rule of law when he complained to this Commission, successfully as it turns out, that his initial arrest earlier the same day had been inappropriate.
30.4. Improper Federal Government Involvement
The federal government's role in the removal of the tenters from the grounds of the Museum of Anthropology on November 22 was one of two instances of its improper involvement in the RCMP security operation. I am satisfied that it was because of the government's intervention that the tenters were removed that evening. Were it not for that involvement, the contrary view of Site Commander Thompsett would have prevailed. As it happened, his view did not carry the day because of the acquiescence of other RCMP personnel, principally Supt. May, who had succumbed to government influence and intrusion in an area where such influence and intrusion were inappropriate.
The other instance of improper and inappropriate federal government involvement in the RCMP's provision of security services was with respect to the size of the demonstration area adjacent to the law school. In that case, the government's efforts did not prevail due to the intervention of others, including Site Commander Thompsett, on behalf of the protesters. Had those intervenors not prevailed, the security challenges the RCMP faced on November 25 may well have been increased.
30.5. Some Answers
What can explain the police performance reviewed in this report that failed to meet an acceptable and expected standard of competence, professionalism and proficiency and which, in many instances, resulted in inappropriate police conduct that gave the appearance of a police crackdown on demonstrations at UBC?
I believe there are two answers to that question.
30.5.1. Separation of Planning and Operations
The experts' evidence, recorded in Chapter 5, that successful policing of a public order event requires that those in command at the event must have been intimately involved in the planning stages is compelling. Most of the work is done in the planning stages and those who do that work have the background and experience to effectively put the plan into action on the day.
In my judgment, the division of roles that occurred here is a major reason for the failure of the policing services delivered on November 25 to meet an acceptable and expected standard of competence, professionalism and proficiency. Insp. Dingwall, who had been second in command for the planning of the event on a full time basis, but was outside the chain of command on campus on November 25, acknowledged - with obvious reference to his two-year involvement - that his knowledge base about APEC "whether you're talking in general or specifics was different"; from that of Deputy Site Commanders Killaly and Edwards, who had been brought in just days before the event.
It may be that there are alternative models to the total integration recommended by the experts who testified and if so they should be explored. Certainly the model of total division that was followed in this instance was a failure.
30.5.2. Failure to Anticipate Events
The RCMP and the VPD were the Security Directorate for the ACCO planning team headed by Mr. Vanderloo. Supt. May had his office in the same downtown Vancouver building as ACCO. He was included in all ACCO directors' meetings. In addition, Supt. May, or Insp. Dingwall as his deputy, attended all ACCO coordinating committee meetings. I have repeated that background from Chapter 5 as it brings into perspective the following evidence of Mr. Vanderloo:
Q: Were you given information about the kinds of protests that could be expected at UBC for the Leader's meeting?
A: Yes, over the course of our preparations - although I was never privy to any of the threat assessment studies because of their security classification - Wayne May would make references to that. The--we were conducting our planning for 95% of the time on the basis that a threat assessment was actually, relatively low. This was even indicated to us by the university that they expected some demonstrators. The demonstrators, I think, were well known to both sides, but the numbers were such that we didn't anticipate tremendous problems. Towards the end, our level of concern went up. The tent city, I forgot the name of the area, right now, on the main boulevard there, but that came as a bit of a surprise.
Q: And what were your concerns about that?
A: Well, it just came as a bit of a surprise because it seemed to indicate a level of protest that could be higher than the threat assessments that we had received.
Q: And when did you learn about that?
A: Probably about, I am not sure about exact time, but three weeks before. I may be slightly off in that but around that time frame.
Q: So when you said that 95% of the time you were functioning as if the threat assessments were low; the other 5% was the last three weeks of your planning process?
A: Yes. That's when sign of student activity appeared to be higher than what it had been before.
Q: Were you advised that the threat assessments had changed in any way from the previous ones that they had told you about?
A: There was more activity and I presume that the RCMP was preparing for that greater level of activity. In terms of changing our own logistical arrangement, it had no impact.
I conclude that, as Supt. May and his planning contingent prepared for the APEC leaders' meeting, they conducted themselves pretty much on the same basis as Mr. Vanderloo and his colleagues with respect to his responsibilities at ACCO. If the genuine concern that ought to have been present on the part of the police was indeed there, it came late in the day. For instance, the flimsy construction of the security fence does not evidence any appreciation that substantial and large scale demonstrations were to be expected. Further, Insp. Dingwall's inquiry on November 9 as to whether an officer had been found to prepare a contingency plan to deal with potential problems that could arise on November 25 was alarmingly late in the planning spectrum. Still further, had there been an appreciation of the extent of the opposition to APEC that was building on campus, as there certainly should have been several weeks before the event, surely steps would have been taken to assemble the Quick Response Teams much earlier than one week before the event and arrangements made for members to do some training together so they could perform as a coordinated group.
All signs indicate that the police were in step with the pace described by Mr. Vanderloo. Specifically, for 95% of the time they did not anticipate tremendous problems. Their level of concern did not rise until "towards the end";.
The last three weeks were either not effectively used by the police or, more likely, there simply was not enough time remaining for them to achieve a high state of readiness for November 25.
30.6. Independence of the Commission Chair
In the closing paragraph of its written submission the B.C. Civil Liberties Association states:
We recommend that the role of the Chair of the Commission - currently occupied by Shirley Heafey - be considered, clarified and, if necessary, constrained. It is entirely unacceptable for a Chair of the PCC to attempt to micro-manage panels or to attempt to influence their proceedings or outcomes. This is all the more so in circumstances such as the present hearing where the Prime Minister, to whom the Chair ultimately owes her job, has a direct and personal interest in the outcome of the proceedings.
In support of that position the Association points to previous proceedings with respect to the 52 complaints that I have considered in this report. I was neither part of, nor know anything of the details of, that previous proceeding. What I do know is that, in the 31 months that I have been on the job with respect to this assignment, there has been absolutely no attempt to micro-manage me nor has there been any attempt to influence the proceedings over which I have presided or the outcome of the hearing either by the Commission chair or anyone else.
Since commencing this assignment I have met with the Chair on one occasion only. On that occasion, the work of the Commission was reviewed in a general sense since I had only become an alternate member of the Commission in late December 1998. There was no reference whatever to the specifics of this proceeding. I have given progress reports to the Chair with respect to timing on three or four occasions, through telephone calls that I have initiated to her for that reason only. The substance of the hearing has never been discussed. That being my experience, I am not in a position to embrace the Association's recommendation.
30.7. Acknowledgement
I acknowledge with appreciation the assistance, throughout this assignment, of Scott Smythe and Leonard Doust, Q.C. of the Vancouver office of McCarthy Tétrault LLP as legal advisors to the Commission and, over the past 13 months, the services of Administrative Assistant Joanne Palmer of Victoria and Lawyer/Editor Kathleen Keating of Vancouver.
30.8. Final Comments
It is inescapable that in most instances where I have found police conduct to have been either inappropriate to the circumstances or inconsistent with Charter rights, the primary responsibility rests with those who held key roles in security planning for the APEC conference. That may go to the highest level at RCMP Headquarters in Ottawa. This seems to have been the source of approval, if not direction, that security services on November 25 would be delivered by officers who were, at best, on the periphery of the two-year planning process, while those intimately involved in that process were out of command from the moment the APEC conference opened.
That division, coupled with the inadequacy of the background knowledge and preparedness of those placed in the command structure on November 25 goes a long way toward explaining why the events of that day had the appearance of a police "crackdown"; on demonstrations at the APEC leaders' meeting.
The decision to delegate the two most senior roles in the planning structure - both Federal Security Co-ordinator and Division Operations Commander - to one man, Supt. May, was probably not prudent. The customary division of roles had allowed for sharing of responsibilities and for accountability. If there were good reasons to combine the roles it probably was not wise to introduce this innovation in the context of such a critically important and large-scale policing assignment.
This was the largest security event undertaken in RCMP history. Given the substantial shortcomings in the planning and delivery of police services which so prominently figured in the sad events of November 25, it is apparent to me that there may well have been a role for senior personnel in Ottawa involving themselves in exactly what was going on in preparing for this big day on Canada's west coast.
I do not move responsibility for what occurred far from the top. For example:
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I have found that S/Sgt. Plante made some decisions that ought not to have been made. The real culprit was the source that allowed him, in isolation, as NCO in charge of the UBC Detachment, to make serious decisions of that kind.
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I feel very much the same way about the involvement of S/Sgt. Stewart and those on site with him at Gate 6. He never should have been placed in the position of having four minutes to clear the road. Given the pressure he was put under, he made some unfortunate decisions but far more culpable, in my view, are those in positions of responsibility who allowed the Gate 6 events to develop and unfold as they did.
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The unacceptable strip searching that went on at Richmond detachment is a similar situation. I fix major responsibility for that occurrence on those with the responsibility, which they neglected to meet, of notifying the detachment of the role assigned to it on November 25. I thought Cst. Watson was a very good police officer who should have been afforded discussion with and guidance from senior detachment officers about the procedures for the day rather than unexpectedly being thrust into a near chaotic situation and left to deal with it.
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I feel very much the same way about the undertakings that the tenters were required to sign to gain their release. Considering the scope of the assignment, the planning process should have allowed for the involvement of much more senior personnel and advice from legally trained persons.
Supt. May acknowledged that he had on many, many occasions answered questions at the hearing with the response: "I do not recall."; Frankly, I was surprised that this was his answer to a number of questions which I thought he would have been able to answer. I reject, however, the suggestion of Complainants' counsel that he was not honest in some of his answers. On the contrary, I believe him to be an entirely honourable man whose performance on the occasion of his APEC assignment, for whatever reason, did not meet an acceptable and expected standard of competence, professionalism and proficiency.
I formed the same opinion of the honour and integrity of Insp. Dingwall. He made mistakes on November 25 and showing up on campus in civilian clothes, believing he held command responsibilities at that location on that day, was likely the first of them but I reject completely the suggestion of Complainants' counsel that he gave false evidence to the Commission.
I have identified constables involved in conduct not appropriate to the circumstances in respect of the first arrest of Mr. Singh and the arrests of Mr. Doucette and Mr. Groebner. I believe those officers to be sound and effective members of the RCMP who, under pressure and in the heat of the moment, acted inappropriately. I do not consider their conduct as requiring censure.
I heard the evidence of approximately 90 members of the RCMP. Most officers in the field met their responsibilities in an entirely satisfactory manner, notwithstanding the difficult situations they faced, due to a large extent to the planning shortcomings over which they had no control. I am of the view, based on my assessment of the calibre of an overwhelming number of the officers who gave evidence, constables, NCOs and commissioned officers alike, in whose hands the future of the RCMP will substantially rest, that what occurred in preparing and delivering police services on this occasion will almost certainly not be repeated, particularly if there is adherence to my recommendations in Chapter 31.
There is evidence in the country to indicate that the RCMP has learned considerably from the events of November 25, 1997. That being so, and if that learning process continues in the wake of a study of the facts I have found and recommendations I make, I am satisfied that the Force, under carefully selected, competent leadership, will be in a position to police future public order events in Canada in a satisfactory manner.
While something went very wrong on November 25, 1997, something is going on that is very right and that is the recruitment of men and women into our national police force who fit the description of "Canada's finest."; I was highly impressed with the calibre of those entering the service. The events I have described in this report may never be erased but it is my belief that they will, in time, be overshadowed by the high calibre of service that those who wear the Royal Canadian Mounted Police uniform are capable of and will surely give to this country.