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Family Violence Initiative

CRIMINAL HARASSMENT:

A HANDBOOK FOR POLICE AND CROWN PROSECUTORS

4.8 Sentencing

In reviewing cases for sentencing purposes, Crown counsel should remember that while the criminal harassment provisions were proclaimed into force on August 1, 1993, new sentencing reforms were introduced effective September 3, 1996. These reforms included measures that have had an impact on subsequent sentencing decisions in criminal harassment, most notably regarding the use of conditional sentences. Additional criminal harassment reforms were proclaimed into force on May 26, 1997, that make the commission of an offence of criminal harassment in the face of a protective court order an aggravating factor for sentencing purposes (subsections 264(4) and (5)). As well, effective July 23, 2002, the maximum sentence for criminal harassment was increased from 5 to 10 years, when proceeding on indictment, making it possible to argue that criminal harassment fits the criteria of a “serious personal injury offence” for the purpose of recognizance orders under s. 810.2 of the Code. Consideration may also be given to bringing a dangerous offender application.

4.8.1 Relevant Factors

The length of sentences in criminal harassment cases appears to have been increasing since s. 264 was enacted in 1993. A 1995 decision of the Prince Edward Island Court of Appeal continues to guide sentencing courts dealing with criminal harassment convictions:

The very unsettling aspect of dealing with these offences in the criminal justice system is that, undoubtedly, many offenders will be presenting themselves with no criminal record and with the reputation of being both a good family and community person. The other unsettling aspect of these cases is that if the pattern of harassing conduct continues and is not properly dealt with by the sentence imposed, the result could be very serious physical and/or emotional harm to the victim. In passing sentence trial judges must, therefore, be wary of positive pre-sentence reports depicting the offender as a person whose actions, in respect to the offence, are entirely out of character. The fact an offender shows any propensity toward this kind of conduct, regardless of his unblemished past, is cause for great concern and for a very careful and judicious approach to sentencing. Factors such as the absence of a prior criminal record and expressions of remorse, which must necessarily be considered on sentencing, should not be given undue weight in the sentencing of this offence.

The focus of sentences must be to send a message to the offender, and the public, that harassing conduct against innocent and vulnerable victims is not tolerated by society and most importantly, the Court must insure, as best it can, that the conduct of the offender never happens again recognizing that, if it does, a far more serious offence could be committed. The principles of sentencing must be applied with this focus squarely in mind. (R. v. Wall (1995), 136 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 200)

These passages were recently reproduced in R. v. Bates (2000), 146 C.C.C. (3d) 321 (Ont. C.A.), now one of the leading cases in the country on sentencing for criminal harassment.⁶¹ In this decision, Moldaver and Feldman JJ.A. stated:

The number of recent cases continuing to reach this court emphasizes the extent of the problem of criminal harassment and the need for sentencing courts to respond to this type of offence in the most forceful and effective terms, sending the message of denunciation and general deterrence to the community, and specific deterrence to individual offenders. (para. 42)

Factors to consider at sentencing include the following:

• whether the offence was calculated and planned;
• magnitude and impact of the crime;
• use of violence;
• use of a weapon;
• offender’s previous criminal record, including offences relating to the victim and breaches of restraining and no-contact orders;
• history and context of the offender’s relationship with the victim;
• aggravating or mitigating factors;
• pre-sentence, medical or psychological reports, including any risk assessment related to the victim in particular and the public in general;
• offender’s insight into the crime, and any feelings of remorse;
• punishment, deterrence and rehabilitation;
• victim impact statement or other victim impact information;
• guilty plea;
• time spent in pre-trial custody;
• firearms prohibitions;
• conditional sentence conditions; and
• probation conditions.

See the following cases, for example, for further insight.

R. v. White (2003), 176 C.C.C. (3d) 396 (Ont. C.A.): The majority of the Court of Appeal reduced the sentence to 12 months plus probation (shortened to time served plus probation to reflect credit for time spent in custody, both before the trial and before the appeal). The original sentence was 23 months’ imprisonment plus 3 years’ probation (imprisonment shortened to 18 months to reflect credit for time spent in pre-trial custody). The majority found that the sentence was excessive since the conduct in question was “materially different” from the more egregious conduct in Bates, above, and Thomas, below. However, MacPherson J.A. would have upheld the sentence. He cited the need to denounce and deter criminal harassment in a domestic setting, and noted that since “psychological violence” is at the heart of the offence of criminal harassment, the absence of physical violence is not a mitigating factor.

R. v. Verral (2003), 330 A.R. 171 (C.A.): The Court of Appeal upheld a sentence of 15 months’ imprisonment for criminal harassment (shortened to 11-1/2 months to reflect credit for pre-trial custody) and 3 months consecutive for a related charge of driving while prohibited. The accused’s harassment of his ex-girlfriend included calling her, visiting her and writing her notes over a long period (October 1999 to April 2000); repeatedly visiting her home and place of work; writing crude letters; and threatening to publish nude, sexually suggestive photos of the victim that the accused took during their relationship. The Court quoted the trial judge as stating that the appropriate range of sentencing was from a few months to a maximum of a few years, and that longer sentences generally involved violence and sometimes the use of a weapon. Note that the Court was also considering the maximum penalty under s. 264 to be 5 years.

R. v. Thomas (2001), 146 O.A.C. 298 (C.A.): This case followed Bates, before, and upheld a 3-1/2-year penitentiary sentence for a guilty plea to criminal harassment (shortened to 3 years to reflect credit for pre-trial custody) and 1 year concurrent on a breach of probation charge. The accused had a lengthy criminal record that included assaults against the same victim (his wife) and was on three probation orders at the time of the offence. The harassment had a significant effect on the victim, leading her to change her job and her residence. (See also R. v. Fazekas, [2001] O.J. No. 4128 (C.A.) (QL).)

R. v. Gilkes (2001), 156 Man. R. (2d) 114 (C.A.): The trial judge determined that a 4-year term of imprisonment was appropriate, and shortened this term to 30 months to reflect credit for pre-trial custody. The Court of Appeal upheld the 4-year term but gave greater credit for the pre-trial custody, shortening the imprisonment to 2 years less a day, and added a 3-year probation term. The accused had harassed the complainant with phone calls and letters while incarcerated under a 12-month sentence for uttering threats to the same complainant.

R. v. Finnessey (2000), 135 O.A.C. 396 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [2000] S.C.C.A. No. 565: The Court of Appeal increased the sentence for criminal harassment from 18 months to 2 years and 8 months (shortened to 2 years and 4 months to reflect credit for pre-trial custody). The total sentence for criminal harassment, breaking and entering, and damage to a police vehicle was increased from 20 months plus 3 years’ probation to 4 years. The accused broke into his ex-wife’s home and terrorized her for several hours, threatening to kill her and her family. Over the next 15 months, the accused continued to harass the victim. He phoned her hundreds of times, broke into her home, evaded arrest, and taunted her and police. The Court applied Bates, before, and held that given the seriousness of the facts, a substantial penitentiary term was required to adequately reflect the applicable sentencing principles.

R. v. Bates (2000), 146 C.C.C. (3d) 321 (Ont. C.A.): The accused pleaded guilty to three counts of assault and six counts of failing to comply; was found guilty of uttering threats; and was sentenced to 14 months’ imprisonment (shortened to time served to reflect credit for pre-trial custody) plus 3 years’ probation. The Court of Appeal increased the sentence to 30 months total (shortened to 16 months to reflect credit for pre-trial custody) to address general deterrence, denunciation and specific deterrence. The Court of Appeal stressed that there had been an “escalating pattern of harassment” that three judicial release orders had been ineffective in stemming. There had also been a final threat of homicide and suicide with a “realistic looking weapon.” (See also R. v. Watson, [2002] O.J. No. 5221 (Sup. Ct. J.) (QL), in which the accused was sentenced to 30 months’ imprisonment and 3 years’ probation (shortened to 17 months’ imprisonment to reflect credit for pre-trial custody) for the fifth criminal harassment conviction against the same victim. See also R. v. Lepore, [2001] O.T.C. 479 (Sup. Ct. J.), in which the accused was sentenced to 2 years and 3 months’ imprisonment and 3 years’ probation (shortened to imprisonment of 2 years less a day to reflect pre-trial custody) for 6 months of serious harassment of a former live-in-girlfriend, which included hundreds of phone calls, distribution of a videotape of the accused and the victim having sex, and an attempt to burn down the victim’s family cottage. It was a mitigating factor that the accused had been subject to a pre-trial recognizance order akin to house arrest for 22 months.)

R. v. Kenny, [2000] O.J. No. 5346 (Sup. Ct. J.) (QL), aff’d [2002] O.J. No. 4450 (C.A.) (QL): The accused was found guilty of criminal harassment at a jury trial and was sentenced to 5 months’ imprisonment and 3 years’ probation. The female accused had a deteriorating psychiatric condition and harassed a man who interviewed her for a job at Goldman Sachs. The victim impact statement indicated a debilitating effect on the victim. The Court found that a conditional sentence would not be appropriate in this case, since the accused had previous convictions relating to the same conduct, and if her conduct went unchecked (by moderate prison time allowing for reflection and therapy), there would be a high risk to the victim’s safety.

R. v. Davis (1999), 138 Man. R. (2d) 71 (C.A.): The accused was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment (in addition to 7 months of pre-trial custody) upon a guilty plea to criminal harassment. The accused had previous convictions for harassing this victim, a former intimate, and for breaching recognizance and probation conditions in relation to this victim. The Crown and defence psychiatrists found that there was a high risk that the offender would re-offend, posing a threat of psychological damage to the victim and a long term possibility of physical violence. The Court of Appeal found that although the sentence might have seemed harsh at first, it was fitting since the offender had continued the harassment, in the face of probation and recognizance orders, even after being convicted of similar offences.

R. v. Perrier (1999), 177 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 225 (Nfld. S.C. (T.D.)): The accused pleaded guilty mid-trial and was given a 15-month conditional sentence plus 2 years’ probation. The accused’s harassment of his former spouse included writing insulting and vulgar letters to her, publishing electronic messages on the Internet, establishing a home page, and putting up posters near her home and workplace. The posters made obscene and vulgar comments about her personal life and allegedly promiscuous sexual history, including statements that she had slept with a man who had AIDS and did not tell her boyfriend until after having sex with him. In considering whether incarceration was required, the judge pointed out that the accused had not bothered the complainant for the 18 months since the charge had been laid. The judge cited R. v. Gladue, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, regarding the consensus that imprisonment does not work and that courts must consider all available sanctions other than imprisonment.

R. v. T.(J.C.) (1998), 124 C.C.C. (3d) 385 (Ont. C.A.): The Court of Appeal upheld an 18-month conditional sentence (in addition to 1 month of pre-trial custody), 18 months’ probation and a 10- year weapons prohibition for a guilty plea to charges of sexual assault, assault, two counts of criminal harassment, two counts of failing to comply with an undertaking, and two counts of failing to comply with a recognizance. The complainant was the respondent’s wife and the charges were serious; however, they arose at a time when the respondent was under significant stress and he had no previous criminal record. A psychiatrist testified at the sentencing hearing and provided a concrete treatment plan to address the respondent’s problems. The psychiatrist testified he was satisfied that the respondent did not represent a physical risk to the complainant.

R. v. MacInnis, [1996] Y.J. No. 53 (Terr. Ct.) (QL): The sentence upon guilty plea was criminal harassment (90 days), assault (18 months’ probation) and uttering threats (30 days concurrent). The accused had also served 2 months of pre-trial detention. The Court considered the effect of the harassment on the complainant, the accused’s former wife; she believed the accused was watching her at all times. The accused’s behaviour caused her to become extremely concerned about her safety and the safety of her children; she took in a boarder, had her brother stay with her and got a security system. The Court considered punishment, deterrence and, in particular, rehabilitation, to “ensure the offender’s tendency toward this type of conduct is eliminated.” See also R. v. Gladue, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, regarding sentencing principles and available sanctions other than imprisonment, particularly for Aboriginal offenders.

R. v. Karalapillai, [1995] O.J. No. 2105 (Prov. Div.) (QL): The accused had made repeated threatening calls to an institution that was attempting to combat racism. Upon conviction of criminal harassment at trial, the accused was sentenced to 4 months’ imprisonment and 2 years probation. Principles of general and specific deterrence, denunciation and public protection were all cited as guiding the Court. The Court considered a victim impact statement and a pre-sentence report. The accused’s racial motive was an aggravating factor.

4.8.2 Aggravating (and Mitigating) Factors

• Evidence that the offender, in committing the offence, abused his spouse or child is an aggravating circumstance for sentencing purposes (section 718.2(a)(ii)).
• Where criminal harassment is committed in contravention of an existing restraining order, this shall be considered an aggravating factor for sentencing (subsection 264(4)). See also R. v. Bates (2000), 146 C.C.C. (3d) 321 (Ont. C.A.). If such an aggravating factor exists but the court does not give effect to it, the court must give reasons for its decision (subsection 264(5)). See R. v. Davis (1999), 138 Man. R. (2d) 71 (C.A.).
• The weight to be given to such aggravating factors must be balanced with the need to consider the particular circumstances of the offender and the circumstances in which these offences were committed: R. v. T.(J.C.) (1998), 124 C.C.C. (3d) 385 (Ont. C.A.). See also R. v. Karalapillai, [1995] O.J. No. 2105 (Prov. Div.) (QL).
• The absence of physical violence in criminally harassing a complainant is not a mitigating sentencing factor, since the psychological harm caused by this offence is the “very evil that Parliament sought to punish by creating the crime of harassment.” R. v. Finnessey (2000), 135 O.A.C. 396 (C.A.). (But see i (2003), 330 A.R. 171 (C.A.).)

4.8.3 Circle Sentencing

• See R. v. Gingell (1996), 50 C.R. (4th) 326 (Y. Terr. Ct.), where circle sentencing was used for an Aboriginal offender who pleaded guilty to four charges under subsection 264(2)(b). Note that in conducting circle sentencing, safeguards must be in place to ensure victim safety and offender accountability.

4.8.4 Victim Impact Statements

• Victim impact statements may be prepared for submission at the sentencing hearing. These statements provide an opportunity to describe the harm done to, or loss suffered by, the victim.
• Victim impact statement programs exist in some provinces to help victims complete their statements. Practices vary between jurisdictions as to when and how the statement is gathered.
• Victim impact statements are subject to Crown disclosure obligations where they are part of the Crown’s file. Victims should be advised that they may be cross-examined on their statement.

See for example, R. v. Perrier (1999), 177 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 225 (Nfld. S.C. (T.D.)).

Judges are required to inquire whether the victim has been informed of the opportunity to prepare a statement and may adjourn the proceedings to permit the victim to prepare a statement. Upon request, the victim shall be permitted to read the statement.

4.8.5 Conditional Sentences

A conditional sentence may be an appropriate disposition in a criminal harassment case; see R. v. T.(J.C.) (1998), 124 C.C.C. (3d) 385 (Ont. C.A.), for which the facts and sentence are described in Part 4.8.1. The Supreme Court of Canada stated clearly in R. v. Proulx, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61, that there should be no judicial presumption for or against the use of conditional sentences for any category of offence. The existing pre-requisites, in s. 742.1 of the Code, for the use of a conditional sentence are as follows: that the offence not provide for a minimum penalty; that the sentence be less than two years; that the offender not be a danger to the community; and that the sentence be consistent with the purpose and principles of sentencing, including denunciation, deterrence and incapacitation. The Court also emphasized that conditional sentences should include both punitive and rehabilitative objectives and that conditions such as house arrest or curfew should be the norm. R. v. Bailey (1998), 124 C.C.C. (3d) 512 at para. 17 (Nfld. C.A.), considered the types of conditions that may be imposed as part of a conditional sentence, and stated that Parliament’s intention in enacting the conditional sentencing provisions would be best “served by conditions which may limit the liberty of the subject but allow him or her to serve the sentence in the community.”

The factors that have frequently led courts to reject imposing a conditional sentence for a criminal harassment conviction, where a sentence of less than two years is appropriate, include the following: a significant risk of re-offending; victim safety; and the fact that a conditional sentence would not provide the specific and general deterrence warranted by the gravity of the conduct in question. See R. v. Kenny, [2000] O.J. No. 5346 (Sup. Ct. J.) (QL), aff’d [2002] O.J. No. 4450 (C.A.) (QL); R. v. Simms [2002] N.J. No. 3 (N.L. Prov. Ct.) (QL); and R. v. R.M.C. (2002), 322 A.R. 331 (Prov. Ct.).

In R. v. Waiting (2000), 261 A.R. 334 (C.A.), the Alberta Court of Appeal upheld the imposition of a conditional sentence upon a guilty plea to one count of criminal harassment and one count of breach of a recognizance, but increased the sentence from 8 to 18 months. The Court of Appeal found that the length of an appropriate term of imprisonment cannot simply be “transposed” to a conditional sentence. The court must consider the different nature of the conditional sentence, and give “due weight” to denunciation and deterrence, which will likely require the court to impose a longer term for a conditional sentence than it would for a prison sentence.

Compulsory Conditions (Subsection 742.3(1)):

• Keep the peace and be of good behaviour.
• Appear before the court when required to do so by the court.
• Report to a supervisor
  
  
  1. within two working days, or such longer period as the court directs, after the making of the conditional sentence order; and
  2. thereafter, when required by the supervisor and in the manner directed by the supervisor.
• Remain within the jurisdiction of the court unless written permission to go outside that jurisdiction is obtained from the court or the supervisor.
• Notify the court or the supervisor in advance of any change of name or address, and promptly notify the court or supervisor of any change of employment or occupation.

Optional Conditions (Subsection 742.3(2)):

• Abstain from
  
  
  1. the consumption of alcohol or other intoxicating substances; or
  2. the consumption of drugs except in accordance with a medical prescription.
• Abstain from owning, possessing or carrying a weapon.
• Provide for the support or care of dependants.
• Perform up to 240 hours of community service over a period not exceeding 18 months.
• Attend a treatment program approved by the province.
• Comply with such other reasonable conditions as the court considers desirable, subject to any regulations made under subsection 738(2), for securing the good conduct of the offender and for preventing a repetition by the offender of the same offence or the commission of other offences. Some conditions that have been imposed as “other reasonable conditions” are as follows.
  
  
  • No contact or communication: Almost all conditional sentences for criminal harassment convictions include a condition prohibiting the offender from contacting or communicating with the victim, either directly or indirectly. See R. v. Bailey (1998), 124 C.C.C. (3d) 512 (Nfld. C.A.).
  • House arrest: In R. v. Perrier (1999), 177 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 225 at para. 30 (Nfld. S. Ct. (T.D.)), the Court imposed a condition requiring the accused to stay in his home, with a list of exceptions specifying when he could leave. For example, these exceptions allowed him to receive medical and dental treatment, attend meetings with legal counsel, and pursue employment or education. (See description of facts and sentence in Part 4.8.1).
  • Completion of an intensive sexual offender treatment program: see R. v. P.L.A., 2003 ABPC 179, where the accused was given a conditional sentence of 2 years less a day, and 3 years’ probation. The accused had repeatedly watched and driven by two female 13-year-old complainants as they each walked home from school. When the police seized his van, they found duct tape, gloves, a balaclava, and a case containing film, condoms and rubber gloves. The accused had one previous conviction for attempted rape and was a suitable candidate for community supervision, but without counselling, he had a moderate risk of re-offending.
  • No operation of a motor vehicle unless a named person is a passenger in the vehicle: see the remarks at sentence for R. v. Gerein, (April 7, 1999), Vancouver C39753-01-DD (B.C. (Prov. Ct.)); finding of guilt reported at [1999] B.C.J. No. 1218 (Prov. Ct.).
  • No possession of a camera while in a motor vehicle: see the remarks at sentence for R. v. Gerein, (April 7, 1999), Vancouver C39753-01-DD (B.C. (Prov. Ct.)); finding of guilt reported at [1999] B.C.J. No. 1218 (Prov. Ct.).

4.8.6 Probation Conditions

Mandatory Conditions (Subsection 732.1(2)):

• Keep the peace and be of good behaviour.
• Appear before the court when required to do so by the court.
• Notify the court or the probation officer in advance of any change of name or address, and promptly notify the court or the probation officer of any change of employment or occupation.

Optional Conditions (Subsection 732.1(3)):

• No contact or communication with the victim, either directly or indirectly. Where the victim and the offender have children together, courts have begun using the following clause regarding access to the children, which was imposed on appeal in R. v. Alberts (2000), 147 B.C.A.C. 90 (C.A.): no contact with [name(s) of child(ren)] “except as may be ordered in child custody or access proceedings subsequent to the coming into force of this probation order by a court of competent jurisdiction.” Note that such a term may not always be appropriate and consideration should be given to leaving this determination to the discretion of a probation officer, who may be more aware of the risks in a given case and better placed to monitor the situation. The decisions of a probation officer in this regard should be communicated to the offender in writing.
• Refrain absolutely from being present at, or within a specified distance of, the victim’s place of employment and place of residence (as well as that of any other named persons, such as family, friends or other intimates).
• Refrain absolutely from being present at other designated locations. In R. v. Sayyeau, [1995] O.J. No. 2558 (Prov. Div.) (QL), the offender was prohibited from being present within the city of Cornwall on Sundays, as well as at certain other locations (malls, restaurants and parks on specified days, or at specified times), to allow the victim the freedom to walk about without any fear of further molestation. See also R. v. Bailey (1998), 124 C.C.C. (3d) 512 (Nfld. C.A.), where the Court of Appeal upheld a condition that prohibited the offender from participating in a regatta; this condition gave the victim true freedom of choice to continue participating in the event. The Court of Appeal did, however, strike out a condition that prohibited the offender from coaching young females, as the evidence did not support the conclusion that he had demonstrated a pattern of harassing women attending the regatta.
• Be under the supervision of the probation officer and report to the probation officer forthwith and thereafter at such times and places as the probation officer shall direct.
• During the term of probation, undergo whatever assessment, counselling and treatment the probation officer or any other professional deems necessary, in light of the offender’s conduct that gave rise to the charge, or in light of any other concern.⁶²
• Abstain from consuming alcohol or other intoxicating substances or drugs, except in accordance with a medical prescription.

4.8.7 Firearms/Weapons Prohibition

• Where the offender is convicted, or discharged under section 730 of the Criminal Code, of criminal harassment, subsection 109(1) of the Criminal Code requires the court to make a weapons prohibition order, as follows.
  • First offence: The court must prohibit the offender from possessing non-restricted firearms, cross-bows, restricted weapons, ammunition and explosive substances for at least 10 years and prohibited firearms, restricted firearms, prohibited weapons, prohibited devices and prohibited ammunition for life.
  • Second or subsequent offence: The court must prohibit the possession of all firearms, cross-bows, restricted weapons, ammunition and explosive substances for life. Note that various provincial appellate courts have held that, under subsection 727(1), the mandatory 10-year prohibition order is not available unless the Crown proves that the accused was notified that the Crown would be seeking greater punishment due to earlier convictions. See R. v. Jobb (1988), 43 C.C.C. (3d) 476 (Sask. C.A.); R. v. Ellis (2001), 143 O.A.C. 43 (C.A.); and R. c. Caplin, [2001] J.Q. no 5941 (Qc. C.A.).
• Section 113 allows for the partial lifting of a prohibition order where the person establishes, on a balance of probabilities, that he requires a firearm or restricted weapon for sustenance hunting or employment purposes.

4.8.8 Forfeiture

• Section 115 provides that weapons in the possession of a person who has been prohibited from possessing weapons are forfeited unless the prohibition order states otherwise.

4.8.9 Authorization Revoked or Amended

• Section 116 provides that any documents relating to weapons that a person is prohibited from possessing are revoked or amended when the prohibition order commences.

4.8.10 Chief Firearms Officer

• Where a court makes, varies or revokes a firearms prohibition order, the court must notify the Chief Firearms Officer without delay (section 89 of the Firearms Act).

4.8.11 Fine

• The imposition of a monetary penalty, in combination with probation, and restitution may be appropriate. See R. v. Wall (1995), 136 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 200 (P.E.I.S.C. (C.A.)).

4.8.12 Restitution

• Under section 738, the court may order restitution to the victim for ascertainable costs arising from the commission of the offence. See, for example, R. v. S.J., [1997] Y.J. No. 123 (Terr. Ct.) (QL).

4.8.13 Victim Surcharge

• A victim surcharge will be imposed in every case and can only be waived where the offender establishes hardship. See R. v. Rowe (1994), 126 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 301 (Nfld. S.C. (T.D.)).

Note: Bill C-79, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (victims of crime) and another Act in consequence (Royal Assent received on June 17, 1999, in force December 1, 1999), amended the “victim surcharge” provisions by raising the amounts of the applicable surcharges.

4.8.14 Breach of Probation

• Charge the offender with any breach of probation conditions (section 733.1). See, for example R. v. White, [1998] O.J. No. 3225 (Prov. Div.) (QL), where the Court sentenced the offender to the maximum jail term of 6 months, and imposed a further 12 months of probation for breaching a no-contact condition of a probation order.

4.8.15 Dangerous Offender Applications

• In appropriate cases, consideration may be given to bringing a dangerous offender application.⁶³ Note that long-term offender applications continue to be available as well.

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