Home Programs Emergency management Critical infrastructure protection Situational awareness The United Kingdom Foot and Mouth Disease Crisis -- Impact on Critical Infrastructure

The United Kingdom Foot and Mouth Disease Crisis -- Impact on Critical Infrastructure

Incident analysis IA06-001
26 May 2006

Table of contents

• Purpose
• Audience
• Executive summary
• Introduction
• Background
• Impact on critical infrastructure
• After the outbreak
• Conclusion
• References
• Endnotes

Purpose

Using the 2001 Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) outbreak in the United Kingdom (UK) as a case study, this paper provides an illustration of how a contagious animal disease can affect critical infrastructure (CI). It also provides background information on FMD and the 2001 outbreak. Canadian CI sector stakeholders can use this analysis to gain a perspective of the overall negative effects that can result from an outbreak of FMD.¹

Audience

This incident analysis is intended for people who work in the transportation, communications and information technology, food, government and safety sectors.²

Executive summary

• Foot and Mouth Disease is an extremely contagious viral disease that affects cloven-hoofed animals. The symptoms of FMD include vesicles or blisters that occur mainly in the mouth or on the feet of the animals. Cattle, sheep, pigs and goats are highly susceptible to FMD, especially in countries where FMD is not endemic.
• The FMD outbreak on which this paper focuses occurred in the UK from February 19 to September 30, 2001.
• The total net cost to farming, rural industry and tourism amounted to the equivalent of 0.2 percent of the UK’s gross domestic product.
• Individual CI sectors can experience negative and devastating consequences as a result of an FMD outbreak.
• Transportation was affected when roads and footpaths were closed, utility companies were prevented from performing maintenance on facilities and assets due to road closures, agricultural producers lost approximately $816 million³, and the government emergency service providers dedicated innumerable human and financial resources to the eradication effort.
• Since the FMD outbreak was officially declared over, UK officials have been working to improve standards and practices to address and implement many lessons learned identified throughout the outbreak.

Introduction

In recent years, the threat of Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) (also known as Hoof and Mouth Disease) has been at the forefront of public and private sector interest due to its proven crippling effects on sectors critical to a country’s prosperity, specifically the economy and the tourism industry. As a result of this interest, several reports have been released discussing how FMD outbreaks can cause significant damage to these sectors. This report focuses on how FMD adversely affected other CI sectors. The CI sectors examined in this paper are: transportation, communications and information technology, food, government and safety. Readers are encouraged to consider that many of the negative consequences experienced by the UK could occur in Canada if an FMD outbreak were to happen here. However, Canada’s animal demographics and distribution are much different than that of the UK, and as a result, the pattern of disease spread might look quite different in Canada. The most effective way to reduce vulnerability and avoid an outbreak of FMD on Canadian soil is to ensure that preventative measures and biosecurity plans are in place and kept up-to-date.The information in this impact assessment was derived from open-source media and government material, including the UK inquiry report entitled Foot and Mouth Disease 2001: Lessons to be Learned Inquiry Report⁴, published on July 22, 2002. The Canadian Food Inspection Agency, Health Canada and the UK Civil Contingencies Secretariat were consulted in the writing of this paper.

Background

Foot and Mouth Disease is an extremely contagious viral disease that affects cloven-hoofed animals. The symptoms of FMD include vesicles or blisters that occur mainly in the mouth (Figure 1) or on the feet (Figure 2) of infected animals. Cattle, sheep, pigs and goats are highly susceptible to FMD, especially in countries where FMD is not endemic⁵. The only recorded human case of FMD in Great Britain occurred in 1966⁶. The infected patient developed a mild temperature, sore throat, blisters on his hands and raised ridges on his tongue, possibly due to drinking FMD-contaminated milk. He suffered no long-term health problems.

Figure 1

Figure 2

There are seven strains of the virus, which can only be differentiated in a laboratory. These strains are: O, A, C, Asia 1, SAT 1, SAT 2 and SAT 3. The 2001 UK outbreak was caused by the PanAsia strain of FMD type O virus.

FMD is not normally fatal; it kills approximately five percent of infected animals. However, due to the lasting, negative effects on an infected animal that has survived the disease (such as decreased milk production, decreased pregnancy rates, weight loss and lameness), infected animals are usually destroyed. Vaccination is being considered as an alternative preventative and control measure for FMD since it is safe to consume meat from animals that have been vaccinated against the virus.

The FMD virus can be transferred in several ways, allowing the virus to spread widely in the affected area. FMD can spread by direct or indirect contact between infected animals, through the air, through the movement of infected animals and through the ingestion of infected meat by both humans and animals. Until thoroughly disinfected, cattle trucks, market places and loading ramps might carry the virus. As well, a vehicle’s wheels, or even a person’s boots, might pick up the virus from contaminated roads and transfer it to other locations. In a cold and dark environment, the virus can persist for long periods of time.

The FMD outbreak on which this paper focuses occurred in the UK from February 19 to September 30, 2001. Before 2001, the most recent outbreak of FMD in the UK occurred from 1967-1968. The Report of the Committee of Inquiry on Foot and Mouth Disease 1968⁷ made several recommendations for prevention and preparedness activities related to FMD, some of which were still relevant in 2001.

Records show that during the course of the 2001 outbreak, approximately 10,512 premises were affected and 4,200,000 animals were slaughtered. According to the UK Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) (formerly the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF)), the source of the FMD outbreak was most likely contaminated meat or meat products. The origin of the outbreak⁸ was discovered to be a pig finishing unit⁹ in the north-east of England. The disease travelled from that location via two routes: through the movement of diseased pigs to holdings in Essex and Kent; and through the windborne dissemination to sheep in a neighbouring holding, which was followed by the sale of the sheep by markets and dealers in northern England. Persons and vehicles that came into contact with the virus assisted in its rapid dissemination, spreading it throughout England, Wales and the southern counties of Scotland. Figure 3 shows the spreading disease as of March 31, 2001.

Figure 3

Foot and Mouth Disease 2001: Lessons to be Learned Inquiry
The solid dots represent confirmed cases of FMD as of 31 March 2001.

The 2001 outbreak’s last confirmed case of FMD was on September 30, 2001 -- 221 days after the first case was confirmed. All UK counties were declared disease-free on January 15, 2002 and the UK regained its international FMD-free status on January 22, 2002.

It has been estimated that due to the 2001 FMD outbreak, the UK’s tourism industry lost between $4.91-7.36 billion and the agriculture industry lost between $1.96-5.89 billion. The total net cost to farming, rural industry and tourism amounted to the equivalent of 0.2 percent of the UK’s Gross Domestic Product. Principal costs to the government were due to the losses incurred by the livestock industry through movement restrictions (severe economic consequences resulting from trade embargos with other FMD-free countries) and by losses in other industries (e.g. tourism and rural business), an intense administrative and disease control response, the slaughter and disposal of livestock, the cleaning and disinfection of premises, and the compensation paid to farmers for slaughtered animals.

In addition to the outbreak’s negative effects on certain sectors of the UK’s critical infrastructure, it caused extreme distress and concern among farmers and the public, and negatively affected the morale of the agricultural sector.

Impact on critical infrastructure

Individual CI sectors can experience negative and devastating consequences as a result of an FMD outbreak. Based on experiences in countries where a foreign animal disease has occurred, an outbreak of FMD in Canada has the potential to cost billions of dollars in resources to control and eradicate the disease and in lost exports and domestic production. The following sections of this paper will discuss the impact the 2001 FMD outbreak had on five CI sectors:¹⁰

• transportation
• communications and information technology
• food
• government
• safety

Transportation

Foot and Mouth Disease is an extremely contagious disease capable of spreading rapidly and by various means. The virus can be transferred to a vehicle’s wheels or a person’s shoes as they move over contaminated roads, highways or footpaths. In response to this, access to the countryside was significantly reduced on February 27, 2001; eight days after the outbreak had been confirmed. In all infected counties, a blanket closure of all rights-of-way was implemented and footpaths were closed to assist in preventing additional outbreaks of FMD throughout the countryside. The designated Local Authority for each infected area was required to perform a risk assessment on each footpath during the outbreak, the results of which determined whether or not the footpath would be reopened. Once the FMD outbreak was overcome, movement restrictions were lifted in phases.

Communications and information technology

The blanket closure of all rights-of-way, implemented eight days following the confirmation of the FMD outbreak, had a clear impact on the operations of utility providers. Utility companies were forced to delay “non-essential” repair operations, and delay the distribution of products and services in affected areas due to transportation restrictions.

Food

The FMD crisis had a far-reaching and devastating impact on the agricultural sector. The majority of outbreak costs on agriculture resulted from the slaughter and disposal of livestock. The cost to agricultural producers amounted to approximately $816 million ($402 million of this total was incurred as a result of restrictions on animal movements).

In order to limit the possibility of disease transferral, the UK government implemented and enforced a precautionary “standstill” period as soon as the outbreak was confirmed. Heavy movement restrictions were put in place to prevent the transport of animals (except those that were going directly to slaughter) and animal carcasses that could have been infected. The implemented movement restrictions and export bans deeply affected various aspects of the agricultural sector, including auction markets, slaughterhouses and food processors. The total monetary loss for these industry sectors was approximately $391 million.

Movement restrictions also triggered problems with the availability of various animal products. The restrictions prevented normal supplies from reaching local and international markets. If an area was classified as an “Infected Place,” specific internal movement restrictions applied. The movement of various products including embryos, ovum, poultry, milk, milk products, utensils, vehicles, slurry, and fodder into, or out of, the Infected Place was prohibited, except where a license to do otherwise was granted. Restrictions on exports such as live animals, meat, meat products, milk, milk products, and hides and skins meant that such products that would normally be disposed of overseas did not reach their target market, thereby increasing the amount of supplies remaining in the domestic market. On February 5, 2002, the European Union Standing Veterinary Committee lifted all remaining export restrictions. However, while they were in effect, the restrictions caused a major loss in export earnings for the agricultural sector, thereby dramatically affecting the economy.

Government

In addition to compensating farmers for the financial losses they suffered, the UK government was responsible for coordinating the FMD eradication effort. The Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs was responsible for coordinating operating procedures and accumulating information to be disseminated to Local Authorities and the public.

The government paid approximately $3.33 billion to farmers as compensation for their slaughtered livestock (this figure also represents the cost of any seized or destroyed infected materials). On average, the UK government received over 1,000 compensation claims per day. However, disagreements over compensation resulted in an appeal of the process by one in ten farmers. This appeal process further delayed essential eradication activities.

Human resources were provided by the UK government and were utilized throughout the outbreak. A few weeks after the outbreak began, UK military personnel, including UK military veterinarians, were deployed to assist in eradication activities and logistical efforts. The eradication-related tasks that the military were responsible for included: ensuring that the slaughter policy was extended to all neighbouring farms and those within a three kilometre radius of the infected farm; completing the slaughter of the infected farm within 24 hours of the FMD diagnosis; and completing the slaughter of neighbouring farms within 48 hours.

In addition, approximately 1,000 local police officers were involved in general policing duties in support of the FMD eradication activities, including gate security at numerous infected farms.

Due to the scope of the eradication campaign, numerous small-animal and large-animal veterinarians from government, private sector and international sources were used to trace animal movements, especially of sheep, and to examine animals. In many cases, the small-animal veterinarians had to work on large animals affected by FMD. The small-animal veterinarians lacked expertise in working with the large animals, which resulted in various difficulties and delays. Delays in the eradication effort also occurred because of necessary policy restrictions; once a veterinarian visited an infected farm, they were not allowed to visit another farm for three days.

Additional human resource challenges included increasing the number of field staff and compensation clerks, and augmenting laboratory and disposal capacity.

Safety

Due to the size of the response effort that is required to handle an FMD outbreak, the crisis required vast amounts of logistical expertise. For example, emergency service officials were forced to travel the countryside in search of farmers that may have infected herds of animals. The per unit labour cost of tracing, assessing and destroying animals drained resources from the campaign very quickly. This occurred primarily due to legislative restrictions and the fact that emergency service staff did not have access to a central database of farms and animal numbers across all species.

Emergency service providers experienced pressure on their human, material and technical resources because they had such a wide variety of responsibilities. These responsibilities included:

• coordinating road blocks and designating suitable routes for the increased amount of traffic through the country
• employing additional personnel to assist in eradication activities
• liaising with schools involved in eradication activities
• setting up multi-agency groups
• running help lines
• sharing information and best practices with nearby councils
• working with public rights-of-way teams to implement footpath bans (and lift them upon FMD eradication)
• issuing licenses for animal movements
• managing internal and external information flow
• assessing the long-term outcome of the disease
• chairing recovery groups
• following expert findings on the condition of the water table and pyres
• liaising with DEFRA and the military
• identifying landfill sites
• carrying out risk assessments

Eradication activities drained emergency service resources but were necessary to prevent further spreading of the disease. Although vehicles were banned from transporting live animals to market, approximately 15,000 vehicles were required to move thousands of carcasses each week. As a mandatory emergency response measure, the vehicles, especially the tires, often underwent thorough cleaning to minimize the risk of transferring the disease. In addition, all abattoirs were forced to install cleaning and disinfection facilities to allow workers to clean and disinfect themselves before they returned home.

During the FMD outbreak, zoning of specific areas was a task deemed fundamental to the eradication campaign. Zoning ensures that officials will be able to keep track of infected herds and suspected cases of FMD, and it also ensures that the eradication effort is well coordinated. Unfortunately, during the UK outbreak, essential zoning was compromised when animal rights activists destroyed the key abattoir.

After the outbreak

The work of numerous personnel involved in the immense FMD eradication effort did not end with the declaration that the UK was FMD-free. Lessons learned identified in the Foot and Mouth Disease 2001: Lessons to be Learned Inquiry Report indicated that the focus of attention following eradication should be:

• keeping disease at bay, which might include movement restrictions and vaccinations
• reducing vulnerability through education and training
• minimizing the impact of any future outbreak through methods such as disease control strategies, legal action, animal tracing, insurance and compensation, and contingency plans

Inherent in these goals are numerous initiatives and projects that require attention on an ongoing basis to maintain a standard level of biosecurity.

Since the FMD outbreak was officially declared over, UK officials have been working to improve standards and practices to address and implement many lessons learned identified throughout the outbreak. Some of the most recent work on FMD in the UK is described below:

• On June 9, 2005, DEFRA began consultations on legislation to implement the European Union Foot and Mouth Disease Directive. The Directive ensures a consistent approach to fighting FMD across Europe and takes into account the latest scientific and technical developments in livestock disease diagnosis and control, as well as the UK’s experience in eradicating FMD in 2001.
• On May 26, 2005, DEFRA published a report that investigates the costs and benefits of a variety of FMD control strategies. The Cost Benefit Analysis of Foot and Mouth Disease Controls [CBA]¹¹ studies a series of possible scenarios and analyzes the financial impacts of various possible responses to each scenario. It uses outbreak scenarios of different sizes, in different areas with different types of livestock, and involving low and high virulence viruses.

Conclusion

An outbreak of a foreign animal disease such as FMD has serious, extensive and long-lasting consequences for the affected country’s critical infrastructure. When FMD rapidly infected UK farms in 2001, various critical infrastructure sectors were required to dedicate funds, resources and extreme efforts to eradication activities. Transportation was affected when roads and footpaths were closed, road closures prevented utility companies from performing maintenance on facilities and assets, agricultural producers lost approximately $816 million, and the government emergency service providers dedicated innumerable human and financial resources to the eradication effort.

Since the FMD outbreak of 2001, affected sectors in the UK have worked to learn from the experience, which has served to strengthen the infrastructure from a similar outbreak in the future. The UK experience provides Canadian authorities and critical infrastructure sectors with many insights that might assist the implementation and enforcement of foreign animal disease preventative measures in their respective domains.

References

Alderson, Lawrence. Foot-and-Mouth Disease in the United Kingdom 2001; its cause, course, control and consequences. 20 July 2001. Retrieved on 30 May 2002.

Amos, Jonathan. Foot and Mouth goes virtual. BBC NEWS -- UK Edition. 18 June 2003. Retrieved on 19 June 2003.

Anderson, Dr Iain. Foot and Mouth Disease 2001: Lessons to be Learned Inquiry Report. LONDON: The Stationary Office. 22 July 2002.

BBC NEWS. FMD report: Outbreak’s economic impact. 29 August 2001. Retrieved on 4 September 2002.

Benny, Thessalonika. Foot and Mouth Disease Impacting Business. International Market Insight, U.S. Department of Commerce. 19 March 2001. Retrieved on 10 January 2005. Link not available at time of publication.

Canadian Animal Health Coalition. Gearing Up for “Emergency Management” -- An Industry Update. January 2002.

Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. Comparisons with 1967. 28 March 2001. Retrieved on 30 May 2002.

Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. Foot and Mouth Disease Control Strategies -- DEFRA Publishes Cost Benefit Analysis. 26 May 2005. Retrieved on 26 July 2005.

Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. How to avoid spreading Foot and Mouth Disease: Guidance from the Chief Veterinary Officer and Chief Scientific Advisor. 13 August 2001. Retrieved on 10 January 2003. Link not available at time of publication.

Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. DEFRA Consults on Detailed Foot and Mouth Disease Control Legislation. 10 June 2005. Retrieved on 26 July 2005.

Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Department for Culture, Media and Sport. Economic Cost of Foot and Mouth Disease in the UK -- A Joint Working Paper. March 2002.

Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. Government Memorandum addressing issues raised in the Framework Document of the Lessons Learned Inquiry -- Executive Summary. March 2002.

Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. News Release -- Origin of the 2001 Foot and Mouth Disease Epidemic. 20 June 2002. Retrieved on 4 September 2002.

The European Commission. Foot-and-Mouth Disease -- Overview of Measures. 11 June 2001. Retrieved on 1 August 2003. Link not available at time of publication.

Home Office. Civil Protection. Issue No 52 -- Summer 2001

The Journal. Britain “is just as vulnerable to FMD as it ever was”. 28 January 2003. Retrieved on 30 January 2003.

Kirk DVM, MPVM, John H. Foot-and-Mouth Disease in the UK -- What can we learn? Are we prepared? 16 March 2001. Retrieved on 30 May 2002.

Kitching, Paul. Canadian Forum on Foot-and-Mouth Disease -- Planning Issues Foot and Mouth Disease -- The UK Experience. Canadian Food Inspection Agency, National Centre for Foreign Animal Disease. 12 July 2002. Retrieved 28 October 2002. Link not available at time of publication.

Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. Foot and Mouth Disease, Public Information, Factsheet 1, Facts on the Disease.

National Farmers Union. Lessons to be Learned from the Foot and Mouth Disease Outbreak of 2001. 21 January 2002. Link not available at time of publication.

Trading Standards Institute. Foot and Mouth Disease Outbreak -- Lessons Learned. March 2002. Link not available at time of publication.

United States Department of Agriculture -- Center for Emerging Issues. Foot and Mouth Disease, United Kingdom -- Impact Worksheet. February 2001. Retrieved on 8 January 2003.

The University of Georgia College of Agricultural and Environmental Sciences. Foot-and-Mouth Disease -- Frequently Asked Questions. Retrieved on 21 November 2002.

Endnotes

¹ An outbreak of FMD in Canada could have a very different progression and impact in Canada than it had in the UK due to different characteristics of various diseases and different animal demographics in the two countries; therefore, it cannot be assumed that the various effects of the FMD outbreak in the UK would also be felt in Canada.

² PSEPC identifies the following to be CI sectors: Energy and Utilities (e.g. electrical power, natural gas, oil production and transmission systems), Communications and Information Technology (e.g. telecommunications, broadcasting systems, software, hardware and networks including the Internet), Finance (e.g. banking, securities and investment), Health Care (e.g. hospitals, health care and blood supply facilities, laboratories and pharmaceuticals), Food (e.g. safety, distribution, agriculture and food industry), Water (e.g. drinking water and wastewater management), Transportation (e.g. air, rail, marine and surface), Safety (e.g. chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear safety, hazardous materials, search and rescue, emergency services, and dams), Government (e.g. services, facilities, information networks, assets and key national sites and monuments), Manufacturing (e.g. defence industrial base, chemical industry).

³ All figures are in Canadian dollars.

⁴ This document can be found at the following URL: http://archive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/fmd/fmd_report/report/index.htm

⁵ FMD is endemic in portions of all livestock-producing continents, except North America, Australia and New Zealand.

⁶ Approximately 40 human cases of FMD have been detected worldwide.

⁷ To view this report, go to: http://www.warmwell.com/northum.html

⁸ To view a DEFRA paper discussing the origin of the 2001 FMD outbreak in the UK, go to: http://www.defra.gov.uk/corporate/inquiries/lessons/fmdorigins.pdf

⁹ A pig finishing unit is a facility where 40-60 pound pigs live until they reach a certain weight (approximately 250 pounds). Once pigs are ready to leave the finishing unit, they are sent to the abattoir.

¹⁰ For the purpose of this analysis, CI sectors are considered to have been affected if they: suffered a decrease or interruption in availability of services; lost significant funds as a result of the outbreak and/or its remediation; and/or felt a significant strain on human, material and/or technological resources.

¹¹ This document can be found at the following URL: http://www.defra.gov.uk/footandmouth/pdf/costben.pdf