Table of Contents

V: Chairperson’s Findings Subsequent to the Investigation

It should be noted that the central focus of the SRG’s criticism of the CFNIS lay in the SRG’s interpretation of the written legal opinions given to the CFNIS. The SRG could not find support in these written opinions for the decision reached by the CFNIS in May 2000 not to proceed with criminal charges at that time. Yet much of a legal opinion rendered by the external counsel on May 18, 2000 consisted of an examination of the evidence that could be used to support a charge of mutiny. The CFNIS task force relied on the analysis of the evidence contained in that opinion to help it decide whether to lay criminal charges, not merely mutiny charges. In light of all the information gathered by the MPCC, which consists of more than those written legal opinions, it was entirely reasonable for task force members to state at the May 30, 2000 CFNIS press conference that they had received external legal advice relating to the laying of criminal charges.

The SRG did not take into account the frequent verbal advice that the external counsel gave the task force. In particular, because it had not asked for or sought additional information, the SRG was apparently not aware that verbal discussions took place about the possibility of laying charges for attempt under the Criminal Code.

The strong criticisms by the SRG of the CFNIS for “misleading” would probably not have arisen had the SRG asked for further information about what was obviously a key issue in its report. If the members of the SRG felt that information was missing, they could have asked Capt Lanouette, designated by the CFPM to act as liaison with the SRG. Capt Lanouette had demonstrated a clear willingness during the work of the SRG to provide any information that the SRG requested.

The mandate given to the SRG by the CDS was to address questions of leadership and the possible administrative measures to be taken with respect to the CF members implicated in the coffee tampering. The CDS had explained the scope of the SRG’s mandate at a press conference held June 1, 2000. It was apparent from this explanation that the SRG would not be examining whether or not charges could be laid. This had already been addressed by the CFNIS investigators. The SRG extended its mandate on its own initiative to include a review of the process by which the CFNIS decided not to lay charges. The SRG did not inform BGen Samson, the CFNIS task force or other concerned individuals, including the CDS, about this extension of the mandate. Nor would BGen Samson have any reason to think that the SRG mandate would extend to assessing the process by which the CFNIS decided not to lay charges and the conduct of CFNIS members.

It would not have been improper for the members of the SRG to speak with the Provost Marshal. BGen Sharpe did write to ex-WO Stopford inviting his input (the letter arrived too late for ex-WO Stopford to respond). The fact that BGen Sharpe also consulted officers not directly or indirectly concerned or involved with this matter, instead of BGen Samson, in the hope that somehow the concerns of the SRG would filter back to her through them, surprised the MPCC.

If the SRG had doubts or questions about the correctness of the process by which the CFNIS decided not to lay charges or about the conduct of CFNIS members, it should have referred these matters to the MPCC and lodged a formal complaint. One of the mandates of the MPCC, pursuant to Part IV of the NDA, is precisely that – to examine any complaint about military police conduct in the performance of policing duties or functions prescribed by regulation. It is important to note that the “laying of a charge” is specifically mentioned as a policing duty or function in the regulations made pursuant to section 250.18 of the NDA.17

Much of the difference of opinion between the SRG and BGen Samson about whether any “misleading” occurred appeared to arise because of the cursory examination by the SRG of the process used by the CFNIS task force which led to a decision not to lay charges. The SRG, driven by its two-week deadline, condemned BGen Samson and the CFNIS before they were given an opportunity to explain fully their rationale for not proceeding with criminal charges. It is unfortunate that, because of the cursory examination by the SRG, the reputations of BGen Samson and the CFNIS were unfairly discredited.

On another issue, at the May 30, 2000, CFNIS press conference, reliance on “external independent legal counsel” was discussed. The MPCC was initially concerned by the failure to mention the involvement of a military lawyer in the preparation of a legal opinion on mutiny. From the interviews conducted by the MPCC, it became apparent that the failure to mention the involvement of a military lawyer flowed from a misunderstanding within the CFNIS. Nonetheless, the involvement of the military lawyer should have been mentioned.

As for the information provided to ex-WO Stopford with respect to the “confessions” collected during the conduct of the CFNIS investigation, there may have been confusion arising from the explanation given to ex-Warrant Officer Stopford. Just as dictionary definitions vary, it would seem that ex-WO Stopford and Insp Grabb may have had a different understanding of the term “confession.” Insp. Grabb seemed to understand “confession” to include a statement to a third party, not merely a statement to a police officer or person in authority. Yet it is also quite reasonable to consider a confession to be a statement by a suspect to a person in authority only. Ex-WO Stopford, for example, appeared to consider statements to a third party to be hearsay, and understood the notion of confession to be something different. As well, the explanation given to ex-WO Stopford by the investigator who briefed him on May 30, 2000, may have referred to five or six people “confessing” to allegations of coffee tampering, and this explanation might have mistakenly referred to “written” confessions. In any event, such an error, if it occurred, was not made with any intent to mislead.

It is unfortunate that the CFNIS decided to send an investigator who had little knowledge of the case to inform ex-WO Stopford of the conclusions reached by the CFNIS. This is not a criticism of that investigator, who had merely been assigned to meet with ex-WO Stopford because they were acquaintances. However, had an investigator more familiar with the case been sent to explain the results, at least some of the apparent confusion relating to the number of confessions might not have occurred.

Concerning the knowledge of the military police and the chain of command about the coffee tampering allegations, the facts provided by Insp Grabb at the May 30 press conference are somewhat, although not substantially, at variance with the task force investigation report dated May 24, 2000. Insp Grabb appears to have erred about the rank of the individual (a non commissioned member and not an officer) who may have brought the allegations of coffee tampering to the chain of command. The MPCC finds no indication that this was in any way deliberate. The main point – that there was some evidence to suggest that the chain of command in Croatia was aware of the poisoning allegations – was reported by Insp Grabb.

In reviewing the CFNIS report, the MPCC took note of the fact that interviews of certain members of the chain of command, conducted during the initial investigation, were not tape recorded, whereas interviews with non-commissioned members were recorded on tape. This way of proceeding may give the impression of offering preferential treatment to senior officers.

A further review of the evidence identified certain avenues of investigation that, in the MPCC’s opinion, the CFNIS could have pursued more fully. Accordingly, the MPCC asked the CFPM to look further into the possible knowledge, by the military police and the chain of command in Croatia, of the coffee tampering allegations. The additional information provided by the CFNIS in response to that request does not enable the MPCC to draw any further conclusions at this time about possible knowledge by the military police and the chain of command in Croatia.