

INTRODUCTION

This report deals with security arrangements affecting airports and airlines in Canada.

On June 23 1985 Air India flight 182 was en route from Toronto and Montreal to London and Bombay when it disintegrated off the Irish coast. All 329 persons aboard perished. Less than an hour earlier, a piece of baggage, which was destined for a Tokyo-Bangkok Air India flight, exploded at Tokyo's Narita airport killing two persons. The bomb, which was contained in baggage, had been unloaded from Canadian Pacific flight 003, which had earlier arrived from Vancouver. These events prompted the Prime Minister to ask the Secretary to the Cabinet to have the Interdepartmental Committee on Security and Intelligence undertake a review of airport and airline security in Canada. The review, which resulted in this report, was led by the Intelligence and Security Co-ordinator, who tasked the Deputy Minister of Transport, the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Deputy Solicitor General, the Commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and the Director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service to provide him with information, access to sites, and critical comment, all of which form the basis of the following analysis and recommendations. In the course of the review, the Co-ordinator met with representatives of the Air Transport Association of Canada (ATAC), the International Air Transport Association and the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration, and had access to written representations submitted to the Department of Transport by the Canadian Air Line Pilots Association, the Canadian Air Line Flight Attendants Association and ATAC. He also visited J.F. Kennedy Airport in New York and Pearson International Airport in Toronto.

The report deals with the following issues having to do with air security: the role of intelligence; existing physical and personnel security arrangements; recent improvements to those arrangements and further steps to be taken; the management of terrorist and other similar incidents; the management of the air security system as a whole; and the audit of the system. Throughout, the emphasis is on practical means of improving airport and airline security. This emphasis recognizes the need for a reasonable balance between the expeditious movement of passengers and the assurance of their safety and security. It also recognizes that the human factor is crucial to security, including the travelling public, must be continually aware of the requirements of security and share in the responsibility for its enhancement and maintenance.

The Role of Intelligence in Respect to Air Security

Although Canadian authorities had been alerted to the possibility that Air India could be a target of Sikh terrorism, and action had been taken in co-operation with Air India to improve airport security for the airline, there was no specific intelligence that indicated an aircraft might be bombed. Furthermore, to date, the investigation into the events of 23 June has not disclosed any hard information on who may have been involved

in the Narita bombing, and there is still no intelligence to corroborate the possibility that Air India 182 was destroyed by a bomb.

Intelligence related to airport and airline security is disseminated in a satisfactory manner. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) provides intelligence and intelligence assessments to the Department of Transport and to the RCMP. Information may also be provided by individual air carriers or by their respective governments either to the Department of Transport (DOT) or to the RCMP or to the Department of External Affairs. Generally speaking, information respecting specific projected terrorist targets is rarely forthcoming. Thus efforts to improve sources of information will likely at best achieve results only in the long term and even then the degree of uncertainty will necessarily remain high. It is not, therefore, practical to rely on intelligence as the principal, let alone the sole, means of countering terrorism. The lack of intelligence surrounding the Narita bombing bears this out. The principal value of intelligence lies in assisting authorities to determine levels of security appropriate to the perceived threat. This is an important function and DOT, CSIS and the RCMP should ensure that they have the means to assess intelligence from all sources bearing on air security and to be able to disseminate it to all who require it. In a report to the Interdepartmental Committee following the seizure of the Turkish Embassy in Ottawa earlier this year, the Intelligence and Security Co-ordinator recommended that the Solicitor General's departmental officials chair a committee of intelligence producers and users to meet regularly to review terrorist threat assessments and to ensure that users receive the required intelligence in a timely and usable manner. The Department of Transport should participate actively in this committee.

Given that intelligence cannot be relied on to predict and thus forestall specific acts of terrorism, it is important that a regime of sufficiently rigorous security be maintained in respect of likely targets to deter a terrorist or similar incident from achieving success. Airports and airlines in Canada must diligently observe effective security measures in normal circumstances and be prepared instantly to enhance them in response to particular threat situations.

Airport and Airline Security in Canada

There are some 200 airports in Canada regularly served by scheduled airlines. Roughly half of these are owned or operated by the Government of Canada, including ten international fields. These airports are managed by the Air Administration of the Department of Transport.

Airports and airlines (including their offices) around the world have become favoured targets for terrorist activities. In the past two years there have been twenty three hijacking incidents in Europe and the Middle East alone, and over the past three years there have been nineteen acts or known attempted acts of airport and aircraft sabotage worldwide.

Airport and airline security in Canada is the responsibility of the Minister of transport and is governed by regulations issued under the *Aeronautics Act*. The Act and the regulations impose obligations on federal aviation authorities and on air carriers to observe specified security standards. Recent amendments to the Act will strengthen the Minister of Transport's powers to prescribe and enforce security standards and to satisfy himself that they are being followed. Canadian security standards meet or exceed those established by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).

The day-to-day application of security measures to airports and airlines is shared among a number of entities, thus placing a premium on the need for effective co-ordination among them. The Department of Transport is responsible for establishing overall security standards for airports and airlines, and for the provision of some physical security equipment at airports. By regulation, air carriers are responsible for applying security standards for passengers and for baggage and cargo and for ensuring security from within individual aircraft. At the present time, the RCMP provides physical security and a first line response to criminal incidents at services for customs, drug and other federal responsibilities. The local police force of jurisdiction (which in some cases is the RCMP) provides other criminal investigational services, that is to say in respect of Criminal Code offences.

The objectives of airport and airline security are:

- a) To maintain peace and order generally within the airport complex;
- b) To control access of persons to the airside portion of the terminal and to the airfield; and,
- c) To ensure that all persons, baggage and cargo are accounted for prior to loading in order that measures appropriate to the threat may be applied to minimize the likelihood of terrorist or similar incidents.

The existing security guidelines are based on this concept. A recent audit of security at Pearson, Vancouver, and Mirabel international airports indicates, however, that there have been in practice gaps in the security net, particularly respecting possible unauthorized access to the airfield and the airside portion of the terminal. Unscreened passengers arriving from feeder airports have been able to enter sterile areas in international airports. Deficiencies in monitoring the application of the security standards and in the training of various security personnel at airports were also noted.

Additional Security Measures

The Department of Transport took quick action, in response to the events of June 23 last, to put in place several comprehensive security measures on all international flights leaving Canada. It is also instituting measures to correct the shortcomings noted earlier in this report. Prior to 23 June, the emphasis in security was on preventing the boarding of weapons including explosive devices in hand luggage. In consequence, the "X-raying" of checked baggage was only undertaken in conditions of severely heightened threat, such as existed in respect of Air India, and in that case, imperfectly, since the equipment operated by Air India broke down. The Department has responded to the

possibility of bombs in checked baggage by ordering more "X-ray" machines, by planning to employ additional dogs trained in explosive detection, and by giving further impetus to the development of advanced technology which could be of use in enhancing air security, such as explosive vapour detectors. It is also considering the establishment of a graduated, tri-level system of security ("normal", "enhanced" and "high"). These should prove useful in helping to ensure swift and coherent responses to developing threat situations. It is, however, most important that good security procedures be enforced in normal circumstances and that a security management system operate to respond instantly with additional measures to particular threat situations whether specific or general. DOT, air carriers and interested associations should co-operate closely in the development of this system.

Security measures are different for international and domestic airports. In respect of international airports, as part of the measures adopted since the events of 23 June, the Department ordered all checked baggage for international flights to be "X-rayed". This measure need not necessarily be a standing component of the security standards for normal threat cases. The low level of the threat does not compel its use and sustained screen-operator effectiveness would be difficult to maintain on a continual basis. A passenger-baggage match would be a better front-line defence against sabotage. This could be supplemented with a checked baggage "profile" applied by airline check-in personnel. Current procedures for screening passengers and accompanied luggage appear to be adequate, although there should be improved quality control in their execution.

In cases of heightened or enhanced alerts, all checked baggage should be "X-rayed" and as necessary inspected by dogs trained to detect explosives. Consideration ought also to be given to a routine 10-15% sample hand search of checked baggage. With respect to screening of passengers and accompanied luggage, a routine search of a small percentage of passengers and luggage should be carried out. This could be supplemented by use of a hijacker "profile". All small parcels should be "X-rayed". For larger cargo, "X-ray", physical search, inspection by dog or an undisclosed hold period should be used as appropriate. New explosive vapour detection technology should be available within the next two to three years to speed up the checking of cargo.

In high threat cases it would be prudent to hand search all checked baggage in the presence of the passenger and search all passengers and accompanied luggage. In some instances it may also be useful to require passengers to identify their baggage on the tarmac (or by some similar method). With respect to cargo, it would be prudent to refuse transport in such conditions to any package that cannot be opened for thorough inspection; alternatively, a ban on cargo on passenger flights in high threat situations may be a more effective and simpler procedure.

There should be no exceptions to any of these procedures in enhanced and high threat cases in respect of airline personnel.

Security equipment to satisfy these standards should in all cases be supplied and maintained by the Department of Transport, subject to any cost recovery procedures agreed to by the Department and the air carriers. In addition, the Department should assign priority to supporting, in co-operation with the air carriers, the development of new technology to assist in streamlining and improving the effectiveness of security detection techniques and equipment. Consideration should be given also to the provision of more uniformed RCMP constables for assignment to airport patrol duty. Such a visible presence is judged to have a useful deterrent effect at airports elsewhere, and it would permit regular checks of the operation of the airport's security systems as well as prompt response to emergency situations. Such visible presence would also lessen the possibility of incidents occurring on the landside of the terminal to which there is free public access. Similarly, air carriers should take a greater interest in maintaining a visible security presence in and near their aircraft in order better to monitor and control access to their aircraft.

In respect of domestic airports, the Minister of Transport should satisfy himself that the essential security objectives concerning access by persons and accounting for baggage and cargo set out above are being met. The Minister should determine whether the normal security measures applicable at international airports could be modified without undermining the essential security objectives. The Department must, however, ensure that any persons or materials introduced into international airports from other airfields are subject to the full application of the security standard currently in force at the international airport concerned. The Minister may also wish to consider designating particular domestic airfields as requiring the application of the security measures established for international airports.

Because air carriers by regulation have responsibility for the application of the security standards to passengers and baggage, they hire the personnel who operated the security checkpoints through which passengers and their hand luggage enter the secure airside area of the terminal. They also operate security equipment in respect of cargo, passengers and checked baggage. As a general rule, the air carriers use employees of private security firms. In order to ensure that the security standards are enforced these security firms and, as necessary the air carriers, should be required to provide adequate training for employees used for such duties. In this regard the Department of Transport with assistance from the RCMP should set standards and be satisfied that adequate training has been provided. In addition, such security personnel should at all times work under the supervision of an experienced security professional capable of dealing effectively with unusual circumstances.

With respect to personnel security more generally, it would be desirable for all Canadian airside employees and others with regular access to particularly sensitive areas of the

airport or to the aircraft to be subject to security and criminal indices checks as a condition of employment. Foreign nationals should be vouched for by the air carriers. Clearly visible and controlled identification should be worn at all times. Airport management and the air carriers must make it a continuing priority to inculcate in all workers the need to maintain a high level of security awareness throughout the airport and on the airfield. The public should be made aware of the security measures in place for its protection at airports and on board aircraft, and of the contribution it can make to enhancing this security.

Security Management

The application of airport and airline security is necessarily divided among a number of entities. Airlines will always have an important role to play in respect of the security of their operations. It could, however, be argued that DOT rather than the carriers should provide the personnel necessary to operate the security measures for the checking passengers, baggage, and cargo. This does not appear to be necessary at this time. Clear lines of authority and division of duties as between the Department and the carriers should, however, be established. The Minister of Transport and his Deputy should be responsible for ensuring that there is effective operation of all air security arrangements regardless of who may actually work them.

Except in circumstances of obvious emergency, significant decisions respecting security levels should be taken by the airport manager, senior departmental officials (i.e., the Deputy or his delegates) or the Minister depending on the situation. In normal circumstances, CSIS, the RCMP, and the air carriers should be required to channel intelligence and advice respecting security levels to the Department of Transport, which should have the authority under the new regulations to order air carriers to observe the measure necessary to satisfy the requirements associated with each level of security.

Budgetary arrangements should be as follows: airlines should pay for the operating costs associated with inspection measures for passengers, baggage, and cargo; and other security costs should be drawn from public monies, subject to any subsequent decisions on cost recovery.

Managing Terrorist Incidents

Long-standing policy places responsibility for the management of terrorist incidents in Canada in the hands of the Solicitor General of Canada. He has at his disposal the criminal law enforcement and security intelligence resources required, and is in a position to communicate with and co-ordinate the activities of other federal agencies and provincial and municipal authorities.

The Solicitor General should consult with the Attorneys General of the provinces to ensure that for each airport there is a police force designated that has the resources necessary to respond to a bombing, hostage-taking, or other act of terrorism. They should also pre-designate the commanding police officer who will have lead authority over all

airport, airline and other federal/provincial/municipal bodies that are likely to be involved in the incident. Under the *Security Offences Act* there is a presumption that this would be a member of the RCMP. This officer should report through an agreed-on chain of command to the Solicitor General. The DOT should be responsible for the preparation of a "war book" to handle terrorist incidents, and for ensuring that each entity involved is thoroughly familiar with its assigned functions.

Audit of the Security System for Airports and Airlines

Given the responsibilities of DOT regarding airports and air carriers, the Minister for Transport, in consultation with the Solicitor General, should report annually to the Prime Minister on the adequacy of the security regulations, the effectiveness with which they are applied, and the existence at each airport of an up-to-date "war book" for use in managing the response to terrorist incidents. He should include in that report an account of at least one full-scale rehearsal at each international airport for a simulated crisis incident. Such tests of the system should be conducted regularly in co-operation with the Solicitor General, who should ensure that the co-operation is sought of all relevant law enforcement agencies.

The Solicitor General should satisfy himself that in the event of a hostage crisis or some other terrorist threat, he is in a position to provide the overall direction to those responsible for handling the crisis and in particular that he has at his disposal all relevant information and means of ensuring that it is communicated to those who need it, including the Prime Minister. Mechanisms are in place for those purposes: the Solicitor General should test them to see whether and how well they work, and report to the Prime Minister his findings together with any recommendations for improvement.

CONCLUSION

The review of airport and airline security discloses that standards for such arrangements have by and large been adequate and in line with international standards. Certain changes instituted since the events of 23 June should result in raising the level of the standards and making more stringent their application. The key to effective security is vigilance, which depends on careful audit and regular testing of the system. The threat of terrorism must not be permitted unduly to interfere with the normal activities of daily life, including air travel. It must, however, be recognized that air travellers are vulnerable to terrorist and similar attacks. It is, therefore, most important that air security be based on efficient as well as effective means, as a matter of routine, of security checking large numbers of persons and their baggage as well as air cargo and mail. As the threat increases more painstaking checks become necessary, resulting in proportionately more inconvenience to the travelling public. The key points, however, are to ensure a basic standard of security whose diligent application will satisfy the need to operate the air system both efficiently and safely, and to ensure that in the event of a heightened threat or incident, each player knows what to do.

ANNEX A

Principal Findings of the
Airport/Airline Security Report

1. There was no specific intelligence to indicate a bomb would be on CP flight 003 or that a bomb might have been on Air India flight 182 on June 22, 1985.
2. Because it is not practical to rely on intelligence as the principal, let alone the sole, means of combating terrorism, it is important that sufficiently rigorous security be maintained to deter terrorist or similar incidents against airports and airlines.
3. Canadian security standards meet or exceed those established by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).
4. There have been in practice gaps in the airport/airline security net at Canada's largest international airports, which DOT is moving to correct.
5. It is important that good security procedures be enforced in normal circumstances and that a security management system operate to respond instantly with additional measures to particular threat situations, whether specific or general.
6. The "X-ray" of all checked baggage for international flights need not necessarily be a standing component of the security standards for normal threat cases.
7. _____
_____.
8. The visible presence of police and air carrier officials in the airport complex and on the tarmac is judged to have a useful deterrent effect.
9. It does not appear necessary at this time for DOT to provide the personnel necessary to operate the security measures for checking passengers, baggage and cargo.
10. The key to effective security is vigilance, which depends on careful audit and regular testing of the system.

ANNEX B

Principal Recommendations
Of the Airport/Airline Security Report

1. The Department of Transport, Canadian Security Intelligence Service and the RCMP should ensure that they have the means to assess intelligence from all sources bearing on air security.
2. The Department should participate actively in the committee chaired by the Solicitor General's departmental officials to review terrorist threat assessments and to ensure that users receive the required intelligence in a timely and usable manner.
3. The Department of Transport, the air carriers and interested associations should co-operate closely in the development of the security management system.
4. A graduated, multi-level system of security, with appropriate security measures for each level, will help to ensure swift and coherent responses to developing threat situations.
5. Airline personnel should not be exempt from security procedures in enhanced and high threat cases.
6. The Department of Transport must ensure that persons or materials introduced into international airports from other airfields are subject to the security standards in force at the international airport concerned.
7. The Department of Transport, the RCMP and the air carriers must ensure that the employees of private security firms performing security functions at airports meet prescribed security standards.
8. It would be desirable for all Canadian airside employees and others with regular access to particularly sensitive areas of the airport and to aircraft to be subject to security and criminal indices checks as a condition of employment.
9. All workers at airports and the travelling public should be made aware of the contribution they can make to maintain a high level of air security.
10. The Minister of Transport and his Deputy should be responsible for ensuring that there is effective operation of all air security systems regardless of who may actually work them.

11. Significant decisions respecting security levels should be taken by the airport manager, senior departmental officials or the Minister, depending on the situation.
12. The Solicitor General should consult with the provincial Attorneys General to ensure that for each airport there is a police force designated that has the resources necessary to respond to acts of terrorism.
13. The Solicitor General and the appropriate Attorney General should pre-designate a commanding police officer who will have line authority over all airport, airline and other federal/provincial/municipal bodies that are likely to be involved in a terrorist incident. Under the Security Offences Act there is a presumption that this would be a member of the RCMP. This office should report through an agreed-on chain of command to the Solicitor General.
14. The Minister of Transport, in consultation with the Solicitor General, should report annually to the Prime Minister on the adequacy of the security regulations, the effectiveness with which they are applied, and the existence at each airport of an up-to-date "war book" for use in managing the response to terrorist incidents.
15. The Solicitor General should satisfy himself that, in the event of a terrorist threat or act, he is in a position to provide overall direction to those responsible for handling the crisis and to receive and disseminate information concerning such an event. He should test the mechanisms in place for this and report his findings to the Prime Minister.

ANNEX C

GRADUATED THREAT LEVEL SYSTEM

