Citizenship and Immigration Canada   **Citoyenneté et Immigration Canada**

Public Safety and Anti-Terrorism

Final Report

Evaluation
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION CANADA

September 2003

Canada

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SECTION 1.0
Background

The terrorist attacks perpetrated on the United States on September 11, 2001, led many Canadians to question their sense of security and consider the possibility that terrorist attacks could occur on or be launched from their own soil. In addition to domestic security, maintaining a strong working relationship with our principal trade partner and southern neighbour was and remains a primary concern for Canadians. After the attacks, the governments of Canada and the United States immediately stepped up enforcement efforts at the border and engaged in a series of discussions to further tighten security.

Shortly thereafter, the federal government developed its public safety and anti-terrorism (PSAT) strategy, centred on six broad objectives:

- improving air security;

- enhancing screening at borders;

- heightening border security and facilitation;

- increasing effective intelligence and policing;

- enhancing emergency preparations and support for the military; and

- building on border infrastructure and international capacity.

One of the primary functions of Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) is to manage access to Canada by balancing both facilitation and enforcement functions. Thus, many of the government's PSAT themes directly involve CIC's core activities. For its part, CIC was well positioned to respond to public security issues, particularly as the Department had just completed a departmental assessment that identified areas where enhancement of enforcement and control functions would be most effective.

SECTION 2.0
Multiple Borders Strategy

CIC has long recognized the importance of vigilance at all screening points, whether at ports of entry (POEs), inland or overseas. This led to the development of the Multiple Borders Strategy. Under this strategy, the Department's goal is to broaden entry control by screening all travellers before they reach North America. In this context, a "border" is any point at which the identity of a traveller can be verified. This maximizes Canada's effectiveness in detecting potential terrorists by linking the person, the documentation and all known intelligence at several locations along the person's route. This strategy became the core of CIC's PSAT response.

CIC was aware that it needed to develop an integrated, intelligence-based approach to program delivery. In order to implement the Multiple Borders Strategy effectively, intelligence infrastructure needed to be enhanced. In accordance with this approach, the responsibility to screen and to gather intelligence falls on CIC staff across all 172 points of service, underlining the importance of the coordination and strategic use of intelligence and demonstrating that building intelligence capacity should be the Department's primary goal.

Gathering intelligence alone, however, is insufficient. Maintaining a secure yet open border necessitates the effective use of that intelligence to determine which travellers should be facilitated into Canada and where to exercise controls. Due to the elevated perception of risk at border points, improving screening at each of the multiple borders by providing better tools to front-line staff and international and domestic partners also became one of the central objectives of CIC's PSAT strategy.

Despite investments in intelligence and screening, the resources available to international criminal and terrorist organizations can mean that security threats may succeed in crossing international borders. To deal expeditiously with possible security threats and cases involving severe criminality, a series of measures were put in place to more effectively meet the challenge posed by those who had managed to enter Canada illegally. Managing within Canada to ensure effective investigation, detention and removals is the third main component of CIC's PSAT strategy.

SECTION 3.0
PSAT Funding

Descriptive Statistics

When the Government of Canada announced its PSAT strategy, CIC was ready to aggressively pursue the Multiple Borders Strategy. The Department requested $328.7 million for 2001–02, $413.1 million for 2002–03 and additional funding for the following four years, all totalling $1,734.5 billion.[1] In its 2001 budget, the federal government announced additional funding of $651.9 million[2] over six years for CIC, starting in 2001–02.

The Treasury Board Secretariat provided funds for the three objectives of the PSAT strategy, identified by CIC as follows.

	2001–02	2002–03
Building intelligence capacity	$7,300,000	$23,700,000
Improving screening[3]	$76,900,000	$75,900,000
Managing within Canada	$19,600,000	$28,100,000[4]
Total	$103,800,000	$127,700,000

This first annual PSAT report covers the period January 2002 to September 2003. Although CIC received significant new resources for its PSAT initiatives, the shortfall from the original plan required a realignment of departmental needs with the available funds. This report details how the new resources were applied and identifies the key results achieved to date.

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1   This excludes the permanent resident card figures, which are as follows: $17.3 million for 2001–02, and $48.6 million for 2002–03.

2   Although $651.9 million was approved, CIC only received $639.4 million as a result of the $10 million detention reprofile that was not approved in 2001–02. As well, starting in 2002–03, $0.5 million was transferred to the Immigration and Refugee Board on an ongoing basis.

3   The figures for improving screening include funding for the permanent resident card project (see note 1 above).

4   This figure excludes $0.5 million transferred to the Immigration and Refugee Board for increased detention reviews.

SECTION 4.0
Performance by PSAT Objective

4.1 Building Intelligence Capacity

Intelligence functions at CIC centre on four main objectives:

- intelligence coordination;
- information sharing and working with partners and stakeholders;
- intelligence collection and strategic analysis; and
- fraud prevention.

Intelligence Coordination

Developing and sustaining a solid intelligence capacity is central to CIC's PSAT activities. Although CIC was already engaged in intelligence work before PSAT funds were allocated, intelligence resources were distributed throughout the organization and were not centrally coordinated. The creation of the Intelligence Branch at CIC[5] has allowed the Department to strengthen tactical support to field operations and provide a focal point for partners. CIC has also established intelligence networks that link all overseas operations to Canada-based operations, establishing clear communication lines and setting priorities. Resources devoted to strategic intelligence assessments in support of policy and planning activities were also increased.

Information Sharing and Working with Partners and Stakeholders

Working closely with the United States, CIC has made significant progress on a series of initiatives designed to enhance border security under the Smart Border Action Plan.[6] CIC also signed the renewed tripartite Statement of Mutual Understanding on Information Sharing with the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service[7] and the U.S. Department of State, and pre-published the draft regulations for the Safe Third Country Agreement. This agreement guarantees that all

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5   The Deputy Minister created the Intelligence Branch on March 28, 2002.
6   For information on the plan, visit **www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca**.
7   On March 1, 2003, the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service became a part of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

refugee claimants will have access to a refugee hearing in the first safe country they enter, whether that is Canada or the United States, but not in both countries. This will result in a more efficient use of resources on both sides of the border.

In accordance with the Smart Border Action Plan, intelligence liaison officers have been assigned to partner agencies. At present, two officers are working with domestic partners[8] and one is at the Canadian Embassy in Washington, ensuring liaison with the Department of Homeland Security. Placing officers with partners has improved information and intelligence sharing significantly, while ensuring that CIC's concerns are considered when partners make decisions.

The new *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act* (IRPA), which came into effect on June 28, 2002, led to a major program reform. The implementation of IRPA provided CIC with important enforcement tools by allowing the Department to remove security threats sooner, and imposing harsher penalties for people using or selling forged or false documents. In addition, it has enabled CIC to deny security threats access to Canada's refugee determination process while facilitating the movement of legitimate travellers. Using PSAT resources within the framework of the new act, CIC reconfigured its network of immigration control officers into migration integrity officers (MIOs) and expanded their duties overseas to working closely with partners (airlines, other immigration and law enforcement services, and airport authorities) to reduce the number of improperly documented arrivals in Canada.[9] Despite increased responsibilities for the MIO network, the ratio of improperly documented travellers interdicted over those arriving at Canadian airports has remained at over 70 percent during the reporting period. A sound relationship between partners and MIOs leads to improved intelligence gathering overseas and is consistent with the Multiple Borders Strategy.

Intelligence Collection and Strategic Analysis

In cooperation with the United States and the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency (CCRA), CIC reviews advance passenger information (API) to prevent irregular arrivals at Canada's airports. Passenger information is collected through a computer system designed and maintained by CCRA.[10] CIC officers run the passenger information through several enforcement databases to determine whether any of the passengers may be of interest to the Department. Once the primary analysis is complete, officers in the passenger analysis units use their expertise to provide additional screening of flights, often identifying persons of interest in the process. Analysing the information in advance ensures that lengthy delays are avoided and movement across the border remains brisk.

In partnership with CCRA, CIC provided resources to design, develop and implement joint passenger analysis units (JPAUs) as a pilot, involving shared intelligence between the United States and Canadian officers at both the Miami and Vancouver airports. Canadian and American POE

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8   One was assigned to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (April 2002) and one to the RCMP (January 2003). A staffing action has been initiated for a position with the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency (fall 2003).

9   Improperly documented arrivals have been identified as potentially serious security concerns.

10   CIC's primary resource commitment to the collection of passenger information is providing experienced officers to improve the screening of potential travellers.

officers (CIC, CCRA, Department of Homeland Security) review the API to identify and intercept high-risk passengers. The focus of these units is anti-terrorism and determining the admissibility of incoming passengers. The information required for such interceptions includes detailed analysis of passenger information, travel patterns, trends and intelligence, as well as any intelligence shared by our American counterparts. The data gathered through these units have the potential to contribute significant tactical intelligence, thereby enhancing CIC's ability to identify human smugglers and security risks.[11] This system has proven to be highly effective, resulting in 2,500 additional passengers being referred for examination and a high rate of subsequent enforcement actions.[12]

Building on the API and JPAU initiatives, CIC is developing the National Centre of Expertise, which will analyse trends and exchange information with international partners. The establishment of a centre in Canada is an integral component of the Advance Passenger Information/Passenger Name Record (API/PNR) initiative, which reflects the commitment under the Smart Border Declaration to use innovative technologies to identify high-risk individuals destined to either Canada or the United States. It is also consistent with the CIC Multiple Borders Strategy, focusing control and interdiction efforts away from the Canada-U.S. border.

Fraud Prevention

Fraud prevention is aimed at ensuring the integrity of CIC's immigration and refugee programs in order to protect the safety and security of Canadians. Individuals who enter Canada illegally often do so through the use of fraudulent documentation. The importance of preventing fraud is demonstrated by the fact that the 19 individuals suspected of carrying out the September 11 terrorist attacks had all entered the United States "legally," using misrepresentation and fraud to successfully pass through the U.S. screening processes.

CIC is developing fraud prevention units both overseas and at headquarters to create more anti-fraud tools for officers in the field: overseas, inland, and at our POEs. To this end, CIC has deployed several agents and is analysing how to operate the central unit that will be housed in the Intelligence Branch. In addition, the Department has established an internal network to share intelligence information on fraud prevention.

The development of and upgrades to our secure computer systems have greatly improved case tracking. Furthermore, additions to legacy computer systems have improved the link between overseas and in-Canada intelligence, in turn providing important field support through such innovations as a screen for lost, stolen or fraudulent documents.

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11 An evaluation of the JPAUs is scheduled for this fiscal year.

12 The examination of 33 percent of the passengers referred through API led to enforcement action, representing 117 additional enforcement actions being taken every month.

To provide leadership on fraud prevention to all federal departments and develop additional tools for the field, CIC has established the National Central Repository,[13] which will house samples of all federal government identity documents. This significant undertaking resulted from a series of interdepartmental consultations with law enforcement departments and agencies. Such a repository will prove useful not only for CIC but for all concerned. It will eventually be expanded to include provincial documents.

4.2 Improving Screening

The effective implementation of the Multiple Borders Strategy requires that CIC take advantage of every point of contact with travellers. It also requires the development of screening tools, the use of cutting-edge technology, information sharing with partners and stakeholders where necessary and access to reliable intelligence.

Many aspects of CIC's security agenda are mutually reinforcing. In particular, many of the intelligence initiatives listed above serve to enhance screening as well as provide intelligence. For example, as described previously, API/PNR[14] has increased CIC's ability to identify high-risk travellers before they arrive in Canada and to facilitate travel for those who do not pose a risk.

CIC's strategy for improving screening includes

- the development and distribution of the permanent resident card;

- the enhancement of front-end screening for refugee claimants;

- the management of port of entry pressures;

- the enhancement of overseas screening; and

- the facilitation of movement across the border.

Development and Distribution of the Permanent Resident Card

The permanent resident card (PR card) is a wallet-sized, plastic status card that replaces the paper IMM 1000 Record of Landing document. As of December 31, 2003, the PR card will be the proof-of-status document required of permanent residents seeking to re-enter Canada on a commercial carrier (airplane, boat, train or bus). Although the PR card is not a travel document that will ensure admission to other countries, it provides transportation officials with a more effective means of identifying people with permanent resident status in Canada, thereby supporting CIC's Multiple Borders Strategy. The PR card improves the integrity of the immigration process,

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13 Three positions have been filled, and staff are in the process of collecting documents from federal departments.

14 In previous funding requests, API/PNR has been identified as an initiative that improves screening.

increases border security and provides holders with secure proof of their permanent residence status.

After a brief promotional campaign, the Department began distribution of the fraud-resistant PR card in June 2002. As of September 11, 2003, a total of 608,645 cards had been issued: 225,266 to new immigrants and 383,379 to existing permanent residents. CIC remains committed to distributing the PR card on time and within budget. In replacing the paper document that was subject to frequent fraudulent use, CIC is addressing the most significant threat to the integrity of its documentation.

To provide leadership in document integrity, CIC has created a task force to examine all aspects of document integrity, including the use of biometrics in CIC documents and procedures. In October 2003, CIC will be hosting a forum on biometrics[15] to examine the potential benefits of biometrics and explore critical issues related to its application in public policy, including individual privacy, civil liberties and responsible public management.

Enhancement of Front-End Screening for Refugee Claimants

Front-end screening ensures that all refugee claimants arriving in Canada are checked against CSIS and RCMP records. Officers interview all claimants in detail to verify their background and past activities; check information against several databases; run criminal record checks; fingerprint and photograph the claimants; and seize original travel documents. In the event that the applicant is identified as a security or criminality risk, the applicant is detained. Refugee claimants have had to go through this process since November 2001.

Under IRPA, officers have three days to determine admissibility and eligibility through the verification and identification of people who make refugee claims. Through the use of automated fingerprint machines at major border points and inland offices, CIC is significantly improving fingerprint quality and response times for RCMP background checks. Although the Automated Fingerprint Information System is a pilot project at present,[16] fingerprint identification of suspected terrorists taken into custody occurs within two hours. The goal of the project is to have real-time fingerprint identification, which the RCMP anticipate will be possible by 2008. Real-time fingerprint identification is a high priority for CIC, but its availability will depend on the RCMP's development of real-time capacity.

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15   For more information, see **www.cic-forum.ca/english/**.

16   The Automated Fingerprint Identification System will remain a pilot until the Privacy Impact Analysis Report is complete. This report is required under the TBS Privacy Impact Assessment Policy, which became effective on May 2, 2002.

Management of Port of Entry Pressures

For many years, CIC and CCRA have worked in partnership to manage the border and protect Canada against the entry of inadmissible people. On March 6, 2003, CIC and CCRA signed the renewed memorandum of understanding on the examination and entry of people into Canada. This understanding represented a significant milestone as it introduced new requirements on sharing intelligence in support of the Multiple Borders Strategy, and laid out clearer guidelines regarding our respective roles and responsibilities. It also determined how CIC and CCRA would cooperate in developing proactive measures to jointly assess threats throughout the travel continuum.

Heightened border security places enormous pressures on POEs. CIC has deployed additional officers across the country to improve its ability to examine people seeking entry to Canada and to meet the demands that increased vigilance requires. To further support officers engaged in front-line activities, an officer safety policy was developed to provide protective equipment as well as guidance and training on the use of force. This is an ongoing commitment, as officers require recertification every two years.

After consultations with the RCMP and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), CIC added a chapter on the criminality screening of immigration applicants to the immigration manual. The manual is an important tool for front-line officers making admissibility decisions.

To improve security at airports, disembarkation and rover teams (DARTs) were created. When several international flights arrive within a brief period of time, for example, passengers from each flight may intermingle prior to arrival at the primary inspection line. This situation makes it difficult to determine which carrier brought an improperly documented passenger to Canada. Utilizing the intelligence and information gleaned through API/PNR, DARTs are dispatched to flights to examine documentation. Emphasis is placed on examining people suspected of being human smugglers or security risks. This enables officers to identify the airline that carried an unidentified passenger to Canada and ensures that CIC can charge the transportation costs to the liable carrier. Although DART teams were in existence prior to PSAT, new resources have been provided to expand teams in Vancouver.

Enhancement of Overseas Screening

Even prior to the events of September 11, 2001, the Canadian Immigration Control Program was very effective, achieving a 65 to 70 percent rate of interception of improperly documented arrivals with 44 immigration control officers overseas. An intelligence-based approach, however, demanded a shift in priorities and an expanded mandate. The new mandate includes anti-fraud activities and collaboration with intelligence functions, as well as interdiction activities and related liaison. Officers involved in such activities are engaged both overseas and in Canada and are now called migration integrity officers. With the addition of new overseas officers, there are now 86 MIOs focused on developing intelligence on and responses to irregular migration, visa application fraud, organized crime, war crimes and national security threats. In line with the Department's Multiple Borders Strategy, all overseas officers are now expected to participate in anti-fraud efforts and assist in the development of intelligence. MIOs provide leadership and expertise to other officers on these issues and are credited for their "spectacular success in interception."[17]

The requirement for a visa enhances the integrity of Canada's immigration and refugee protection programs as it allows CIC to screen out travellers who might cause concern before they arrive in Canada. CIC has lifted visa exemptions for several countries where citizenship-granting or passport-issuing practices are considered insufficiently secure, or where there is a high incidence of people travelling to Canada with improper documentation. Since December 2001, visitor visa requirements have been established for citizens of Hungary, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Dominica, Grenada, Kiribati, Nauru, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Zimbabwe. In addition, a visa office has been established in Budapest to ensure high quality service to legitimate travellers from that region while improving control over others.

As a result, since the introduction of the visa requirement on December 4, 2001, the number of Hungarian refugee claimants has reduced dramatically. From January to December 2001, there were 4,161 Hungarian asylum cases, whereas between January and December 2002, there were only 335. As the acceptance rate for these claimants was only 12 percent, the imposition of a visa requirement has saved Canada considerable resources in dealing with unjustified claims. CIC continues to cooperate closely with the United States on both visa policy and visa issuance and has recently intensified the discussions on those issues.

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17   As noted by senior representatives of the Privy Council Office and CCRA, in an armchair discussion on the Smart Border Declaration held on September 11, 2003.

Facilitation of Movement across the Border

Since 1988, trade flows with the United States have increased 150 percent. Robust growth in commercial traffic is now taxing the capacity of some of Canada's busiest border crossings. Recognizing the need to facilitate legitimate travellers, and in conjunction with the United States and CCRA, CIC has participated in the development, enhancement and implementation of several alternative inspection programs for both commercial and individual travellers.[18] Although these initiatives are led by CCRA, CIC is actively involved as it participates in screening procedures and interviews applicants at enrolment centres. To date, more than 51,000 low-risk travellers have enrolled in these programs and many more have applications in process.

4.3 Managing within Canada

CIC's approach to dealing with people who get through Canada's initial defences consists of

- identifying high-risk cases;

- increasing detention capacity; and

- ensuring effective investigations and removals.

Identification of High-Risk Cases

The identification of high-risk cases is essential to the efficient and effective use of resources within the framework of CIC's PSAT strategy. By prioritizing potentially serious security and war crime cases, threats are identified for enforcement action.

As explained earlier in this report, the front-end screening of refugee claimants ensures that high-risk cases are identified. Similarly, applications for citizenship must be reviewed for security purposes to ensure that high-risk cases under consideration in that process are identified. In early 2002, CIC established a task force to review all refugee claimants who had not undergone screening by the Immigration and Refugee Board, a project that has now been completed. In some cases, through the work of the task force, individuals deemed to be refugees have had their refugee status re-examined with a view toward the possible suspension of refugee protection application and hearing. CIC later established a second task force to review citizenship applications, leading to the identification of cases for revocation. Citizenship revocation is a resource-intensive process that entails a thorough review of all original applications and ministerial decisions, and it often involves litigation. Results have been positive: 31 citizenship revocation cases were finalized in 2001, and 124 in 2002.

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18   The alternative examination programs are Nexus, Nexus Air, CDRP, FAST, Canpass and Canpass Air.

To enhance the scrutiny of inland applications, the Case Processing Centre at Vegreville, Alberta, has increased the number of criminal record checks for both immigrant and non-immigrant applications. In April and May 2003, 1,500 additional criminal record checks were conducted, and interaction and information sharing with other law enforcement agencies increased. Vegreville also created the Enhanced Strategic Analysis Unit to assess possible trends and cases of concern, as well as to identify potential security cases.

The creation of a national database for enforcement case tracking with regional and national reporting capabilities has also led to more effective investigations by providing officers in the field with the information they need to pursue investigations. The National Case Management System (NCMS), used in every CIC inland enforcement office, contains data on more than 150,000 active enforcement cases. In March 2003, CIC began to develop a data management framework for the NCMS to include standard operating procedures, monitoring, quality control and performance measurement at both the national and regional levels. The data produced will greatly enhance accountability and reporting at CIC, and pave the way for the implementation of the Global Case Management System that will eventually include and replace the NCMS.

Increasing Detention Capacity

In fiscal year 2002–03, CIC detained 11,503 individuals for a total of 165,070 days, representing an increase of approximately 20 percent in the number of people detained and a 17 percent increase in the number of detention days over the previous fiscal year. This can be attributed to a number of factors, including the increased use of detention for individuals who refuse to establish their identity or who refuse to cooperate in establishing their identity; the passage of IRPA and its improved provisions for detention; the continued use of detention in support of removals; and an increase in long-term detention for those who pose a danger to Canadian society because of security threats or serious criminality. In addition, overall detention numbers increased as a result of new guidelines that brought greater consistency in the application of CIC's detention policy.

CIC policy now requires the detention of individuals arriving in Canada for whom identity is in serious question. Detention, coupled with efforts by immigration officers to confirm the identity of detainees, minimizes the potential security risk posed by undocumented individuals. Since the implementation of this policy, more individuals have provided documentation and they have done so more expeditiously than in the past. The Department is introducing a monitoring and reporting framework for detention to build a performance measurement capability while minimizing inconsistencies in the application of detentions. It will also take advantage of increased intelligence capacity to inform decision making on detention and removals.

Ensuring Effective Investigations and Removals

The link between enforcing the removal from Canada of people who do not have the right to remain and protecting the safety and security of Canadians is well understood. To increase its removal capacity, CIC has deployed resources to strategic areas and has introduced joint removals with its U.S. partners, building on the excellent informal relationships that have been developed.

Although the number of removals for 2002 was 8,434, representing a decrease of 8.7 percent over the previous year, this remains close to the average number of removals in the previous five calendar years. The decrease in overall removals can be attributed to a focus on more serious and, therefore, more difficult cases, which require more time and resources than an average removal case. By prioritizing criminality and security cases for removal, the most serious risks are addressed first. Although overall removals declined as noted above, the number of removals of individuals involved in organized crime, or who were potential security threats to Canada, or suspected violators of human rights, climbed from 13 in 2001–02 to 33 in 2002–03. The prevailing security climate and international tensions have also played a part in making removals increasingly difficult, as countries of origin must accept the return of these individuals. Moreover, airlines have created obstacles by refusing to allow removal cases on their flights or by increasing the escort requirements.

CIC will continue to work with international partners to share best practices and coordinate efforts to expedite removals. CIC has partnered on joint charter flights with the United States as an alternative to enforcing high-risk removals that airlines are increasingly reluctant to participate in. These joint operations allow CIC to remove individuals who are generally not removable, such as security threats and people with a history of severe criminality. To date, CIC has removed one hundred individuals on eight joint charter flights with the U.S. thanks to PSAT funding, and another flight is scheduled for this fall. These removals come on top of the nearly 400 people removed through joint flights conducted without PSAT funding. U.S.-led flights to Nigeria, Somalia and Jordan have taken place as well as a recent Canadian-led flight to Zimbabwe. The Department will also continue its efforts to achieve better cooperation from targeted source countries to issue travel documents and accept the return of their nationals.

SECTION 5.0
Financial Information

PSAT Expenditures for 2001–02 and 2002–03 (in millions of dollars)*

Item	2001-02			2002-03				
	Planned	Actual	Variance	Planned**	Reprofile to 2003–04	Revised Planned	Actual	Variance
Intelligence Officers (Abroad)	$7.3	$7.3	$0.0	$11.7	$-2.0	$9.7	$9.6	$0.1
Intelligence Branch (NHQ)				5.2		5.2	3.1	2.1
Joint Passenger Analysis Unit				2.7	-1.2	1.5	0.6	0.9
Intelligence/Fraud Prevention (in Canada)				1.1		1.1	1.1	0.0
National Document Repository				1.3		1.3	0.7	0.6
Other (Investigative Body, Horizontal Policy)				1.7		1.7	0.9	0.8
BUILDING INTELLIGENCE CAPACITY								
Advanced Passenger Information (API/PNR)	7.3	7.3	0.0	23.7	-3.2	20.5	16.0	4.5
Automated Fingerprinting System				8.7	-3.8	4.9	3.2	1.7
Alternate Inspection Systems (AIS)	6.1	6.1	0.0	2.3		2.3	1.8	0.5
Hungary – Visa Office				0.6		0.6	0.6	0.0
Disembarkation and Rover Team	0.9	0.9	0.0	0.6		0.6	0.6	0.0
Front-End Screening				0.2		0.2	0.2	0.0
Port of Entry Pressures	9.0	9.0	0.0	9.0		9.0	9.6	-0.6
Task Force on Document Integrity/ Biometrics				-		-	0.8	-0.8
Other (Officer Safety, Citizenship Card)				-		-	0.7	-0.7
Emergency Overtime/ POE/Screening				5.9		5.9	6.3	-0.4
IMPROVING SCREENING	43.6	34.4	9.2					
Detention (excluding $0.5M transferred to IRB)	59.6	50.4	9.2	27.3	-3.8	23.5	23.8	-0.3
Case Intervention (Backlog/Ongoing)	4.0	4.0	0.0	13.5		13.5	14.2	-0.7
Removals	3.3	3.3	0.0	5.1		5.1	4.7	0.4
National Case Management System	2.8	2.8	0.0	4.0		4.0	3.5	0.5
Citizenship Revocation Cases	1.6	1.6	0.0	1.8		1.8	2.3	-0.5
Other (Corporate Security, IT, CPIC)				0.2		0.2	0.2	0.0
Promotional Campaign***	4.9	4.9	0.0	3.5		3.5	3.9	-0.4
MANAGING WITHIN CANADA	3.0	3.0	0.0					
Subtotal CIC	19.6	19.6	0.0	28.1	0.0	28.1	28.8	-0.7
Permanent Resident Card***	86.5	77.3	9.2	79.1	-7.0	72.1	68.6	3.5
TOTAL CIC	17.3	17.3	0.0	48.6		48.6	36.6	12.0
	103.8	**94.6**	**9.2**	**127.7**	**-7.0**	**120.7**	**105.2**	**15.5**

*   All figures include corporate support.

** PSAT plan approved in 2002–03.

*** Additional departmental resources were invested in this initiative in 2001–02.

Explanation of Variance

Building Intelligence Capacity: $4.5 million

There was a variance of $4.5 million in intelligence initiatives. This variance is attributable to delays in start-up, including contracts and equipment that could not be procured by year-end. In addition, funds initially set aside to implement investigative body status were not spent as the status was not awarded to the Department in 2002–03. Cost savings in the Joint Passenger Analysis Unit pilot arose from a shift from planned 24/7 operations and from foreign service officers to temporarily relocated staff.

Improving Screening 2001–02: $9.2 million

PSAT resources were not fully spent in 2001–02 due to the timing of the funding approval which did not allow sufficient time for the deployment of staff and the procurement of IT contracts and equipment. These activities were subsequently completed in 2002–03.

Improving Screening 2002–03: $0.3 million

Start-up delays in the Advanced Passenger Information project, attributable to the timing of the Passenger Name Record data which did not become available until 2003–04, and variances in intelligence initiatives allowed for the reallocation of resources to address screening pressures that emerged during the course of the year. These included pressures encountered at POEs, in front-end screening and in the processing of citizenship inventories.

Permanent Resident Card: $12 million

Because of lower than anticipated volumes, $12 million in PR card funding remained unspent in 2002–03. Only 363,366 PR card applications were received, representing 79 percent of an estimated volume of 460,000 applications. It is anticipated that permanent residents who were expected to apply for a PR card in 2002–03 will apply in 2003–04.

Managing Within Canada: $0.7 million

Resources were reallocated from managing illegal access to Canada to addressing detention pressures that arose during the year.

SECTION 6.0
Risk Analysis

Generally, the risks faced by CIC in implementing its PSAT strategy fall into three categories: horizontal, technological and political.

The Government of Canada's PSAT strategy includes several horizontal initiatives involving a number of departments. However, no one department has the overall lead. As a result, challenges and risks arise in terms of stewardship, management and accountability. Each department involved in a horizontal initiative must rely on others to assist in completing some elements of its own component.

While the use of new technologies is critical to many of CIC's PSAT initiatives, the widespread use of new technologies and computer-based systems also entails a level of risk. Although steps have been taken to ensure that networks remain safe and secure, there is always a concern that systems may be hacked or that they may break down. Due to the novelty of some technologies, integrating them with legacy systems is another challenge that could lead to unforeseen costs and implementation delays. These risks are widespread as technology underlies much of the Department's PSAT strategy.

Finally, the highly charged political climate surrounding security issues may also prove to be a significant challenge. The recent detention of 21 individuals in Toronto for immigration fraud highlights the difficulty in dealing with the security and human rights issues at play in detention cases. Parties on both sides of this matter have sincere and legitimate concerns about how detention is employed, leading to significant challenges for CIC in balancing interests and risks.

CIC will be keeping a close watch on these and other challenges as they arise to ensure that the risks taken are justified and that they are mitigated to the extent possible.

SECTION 7.0
Next Steps

CIC will pursue the vigorous implementation of its strategies under the Government of Canada's PSAT agenda.

The provision of annual PSAT reports, as well as interim and summative evaluations, constitute an important part of that commitment, identifying results achieved and establishing clear accountabilities. This fiscal year, CIC will develop a Risk Management and Accountability Framework (RMAF) for PSAT in which we will identify data collection mechanisms and responsibilities. The RMAF will allow the Department to set an accurate baseline as well as to determine a more refined statement of outcomes. This information will be used in evaluations of specific PSAT initiatives to be conducted in 2004–05 and 2005–06, as well as in the final summative evaluation of CIC's PSAT strategy in 2007.

CIC's Internal Audit and Disclosures Branch will also perform a compliance audit to ensure that funds have been used for the purposes intended. The timing will be determined when the departmental audit plan is finalized. In addition, the development of a formal process for assessing the risk for PSAT initiatives is also being considered.