The Triennal Judicial Salary and Benefits Commission

The current Triennial Commission process was introduced in 1981 in order to ensure the principle of judicial independence, by "de-politicising" the process for establishing judicial compensation and benefits. Section 26 of the Judges Act requires that every 3 years the Minister of Justice appoint an independent commission of 3 to 5 members to examine and make recommendations with respect to the adequacy of the salaries and benefits of federally appointed judges.

The Commissioners must submit a report with recommendations within twelve months of their appointment to the Minister of Justice. The Minister of Justice is required to table the report in Parliament within 10 days of receipt.

There have been five Triennial Commissions since 1981. The Report of the 1995 Commission on Judges' Salaries and Benefits, chaired by David W. Scott, Q.C., was submitted to the Minister of Justice on September 30, 1996, and tabled in Parliament on October 11, 1996. In accordance with the House of Commons Standing Orders, the report was referred to the Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs.

     The Supreme Court of Canada Independence Decision on Judicial Compensation

On September 18, 1997, the Supreme Court of Canada released a key decision relating to the constitutional requirement of financial security of judges: Reference Re: Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of P.E.I.. That decision reinforced the principle of judicial independence and outlined broad constitutional requirements for the determination of judicial compensation, such as:

• There must be an independent, objective and effective commission that makes recommendations on all aspects of judicial compensation (salaries and benefits).
• To be independent, commission members must enjoy security of tenure by being appointed for a fixed term, and the judiciary must nominate a member.
• To be objective, a commission must use objective criteria in coming to its recommendations.
• To be effective, governments must deal with the recommendations with "due diligence and reasonable dispatch".
  

While the recommendations are not binding, the decision requires that a rational and public justification for not accepting recommendations must be provided, if necessary, in a court of law.

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