9.2 We believe that the ongoing performance measurement system for some components audited should be enhanced to ensure that timely and complete effectiveness information is available at all management levels.
9.3 Given the large number of agreements at EIC, managers cannot be expected to exercise the same degree of control for each agreement. Control should vary with the level of risk and complexity of the agreement. In this regard, initial project approval is a crucial step for managers. However, vague project objectives, coupled with imprecisely defined local labour market needs and priorities, prevent EIC from selecting projects on the basis of merit. This situation increases the need for subsequent monitoring.
9.4 EIC does not respect its own minimum requirements for financial and activity monitoring practices. Furthermore, the Department does not have a strategy for choosing projects to be assessed at the end of the agreement. Limited information is derived from the monitoring of projects. More complete information resulting from the close-out assessment of projects would allow EIC to identify lessons learned that would improve subsequent project selection.
9.5 Although the Community Development Program relies on community-generated initiatives to improve the labour market situation, we found that few of the five-year strategic plans were truly strategic and that the data necessary to measure the impact of implemented initiatives were neither identified nor collected.
9.6 The eventual establishment of local labour boards could help EIC strengthen its mechanisms to ensure that funds available under the Unemployment Insurance Act for training are used effectively.
9.7 Parliament requires reliable information about EIC's activities and their effects on the labour market. It has been informed of EIC's mission, activity objectives and major lines of business. But it has not received evaluation evidence of the effectiveness of EIC's efforts to achieve its overall objective.