17.2 We found the Defence Planning and Force Development Process to be deficient in much the same way as its predecessor, the Policy Planning Process, which we reported in 1984. In its present form, it still does not provide an adequate basis for the unfolding of the Defence Program Management System. None of the projects we examined in our statistical sample was based on formally approved policy planning documents in the Defence Planning and Force Development process, and none had proceeded through the entire process as it is described in official DND documents.
17.3 We found the Defence Program Management System to be ineffective as well as cumbersome, and very expensive in terms of the resources devoted to it. The process simply has not been followed and did not appear to be workable in practice. These shortcomings, added to those identified in the previous chapter related to factors external to DND, have significant adverse impacts on the attainment of value for money.
17.4 Improvement of the Defence Planning and Force Development process is a prerequisite to improvement of the Defence Program Management System.
17.5 The program control process for the day-to-day management of the 550 major capital projects in the Defence Services Program is not described in the Defence Program Management System document or any other official DND document. There is no visible priority system for the entire matrix of projects and the Defence Services Program Information System, in its present form, does not provide a suitable basis for program control.
17.6 Most of the problems we observed - late delivery, cost escalation or failure to provide equipment that meets the operational requirement - were related to external and internal problems generated early in the project life cycle during project initiation.
17.7 In 1988 we reported that excessive amounts of spare parts were being procured and stocked by DND. In this audit, we found that the prices paid were also significantly higher than necessary.