Opening Statement to the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs

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National Defence—C4ISR Initiative in Support of Command and Control
(Chapter 4 - April 2005 Report of the Auditor General)

21 April 2005

Sheila Fraser, FCA
Auditor General of Canada

Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to discuss Chapter 4 of my April 2005 Report on the C4ISR Initiative in Support of Command and Control at National Defence. With me today are Hugh McRoberts, Assistant Auditor General, and Wendy Loschiuk, Principal responsible for audits of the Department of National Defence.

I appreciate the Committee’s decision to review this chapter because it focusses on a very complex and important subject—that is, using technology to help the Canadian Forces improve the way they gather and use information for operations. The CF wants commanders to have every advantage possible for faster, more effective command and control. Therefore, the goal is to have fully integrated and interoperable command and control systems by 2008 and then to continue to improve the capability. However, I have some concerns about how this initiative is proceeding.

Action can be taken now to improve the chances of achieving the best possible outcome. The Department has indicated to us that it is committed to making the C4ISR initiative work; it has agreed with all our recommendations, and in some cases, is already addressing our concerns. We have included as an appendix to this statement a chart outlining the responses.

As you know, new technologies can be expensive, especially for military applications. C4ISR technology is no exception, and National Defence is planning to invest significantly. Our analysis shows that it has spent $4 billion since the early-1990s on projects related to C4ISR and plan to invest a further $6 billion over the next 10 years. The Navy, Army, and Air Force cannot afford to individually pursue C4ISR systems development, nor should they. C4ISR must be implemented in a structured, disciplined, and efficient way. Otherwise, there is a real risk that the end result will be incompatible or duplicate systems, along with excess costs.

To have a C4ISR initiative that is affordable and achievable, National Defence needs better mechanisms to help it choose which projects to pursue and to guide how systems will be developed. To make this happen, the Department needs to put in place some key elements.

First, they need to develop as a priority a joint C4ISR doctrine and concept of operations. In July 2002, the Canadian Forces came to that conclusion themselves. Yet today, in 2005, there has been no action on the necessary doctrine. A doctrine and concept of operations are fundamental to how military operations are conducted. Without these, the Canadian Forces do not have a blueprint to guide how C4ISR systems should develop.

DND is using an appropriate systems-development methodology to identify and refine requirements and to provide a path for C4ISR development, but it now needs to advance to improve these results. DND has recently begun working on a common architecture that systems will follow. By making it a priority and giving responsibility for systems development to the Assistant Deputy Minister for Information Management, DND is moving in the right direction.

Exactly what C4ISR means to DND needs to be clarified. The C4ISR Command Guidance and Campaign Plan is a good start, but DND needs to better define achievable goals, criteria for success, and interoperability.

During operations such as those in Bosnia, Afghanistan, and the Persian Gulf, the individual services have worked in combined deployments with other militaries. Our allies in NATO and NORAD want DND to be a meaningful partner with them. C4ISR is an initiative for both joint and combined operations, but each may have different demands. For example, the Canadian Navy works jointly with the Air Force off Canada’s coasts but also must work in a combined way with the U.S. Navy, as it did in the Persian Gulf. The Navy wants systems that allow it to function effectively in both types of operations.

Navy, Army, or Air Force projects should have a common goal and, where appropriate, develop along a common path. We found that projects often proceeded along service-specific “stovepipes”. But this is not be the best way to proceed for C4ISR if there are to be interoperable and integrated systems. Again, National Defence recognized that the many C4ISR-related projects needed to be reviewed to ensure that they were consistent with the Department’s vision and that they were still needed. We agree. We identified 91 projects of which many started before DND began its C4ISR initiative. DND needs to make sure these costly projects are all relevant.

Mr. Chairman, the Department needs to enforce oversight of C4ISR projects and provide assurance that all projects will ultimately be compatible with fully defined C4ISR goals. DND already has a committee to assess projects, but too many projects bypassed it before being approved.

Stronger oversight should also include assessing the risks inherent in this initiative due to its complexity. DND has not yet done a systematic risk assessment, although it has identified five possible risk weaknesses.

National Defence also needs to find skilled personnel to operate and maintain the C4ISR systems. The Department believes many of the needed skills can be found in-house if the personnel are given some training; however, the timelines set out to train people to fill C4ISR jobs needs to be accelerated to meet the Canadian Forces’ needs.

National Defence needs to provide Parliament with assurance that it is using the C4ISR initiative to improve command and control in a disciplined, structured, and efficient way. This is a very significant investment, and every advantage to increase the chances of success should be taken. Here are some questions the Committee may want to ask the Department:

Will the Department still be able to meet its 2008 target of fully integrated and interoperable systems?
Can the Department assure the Committee that all the C4ISR projects identified for spending over the next 10 years are consistent with its C4ISR objectives?
Can the Department provide the Committee with a timeframe for delivering the necessary key elements important to ensuring success—that is, a doctrine, concept of operations, definitions for interoperability and enterprise architecture?

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my opening statement. We would be happy to answer any questions.

Glossary

C4ISR	Command and Control, Communications, Computing, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance consists of the doctrine and concepts, the connectivity, the information systems, the sensors, and the tools required to effectively support Command across the entire spectrum of Canadian Forces operations through the timely attainment of trusted and relevant information.
Command and control	The exercise of authority and direction by a designated commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the force's mission. The functions of command and control are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures that are employed by a commander in planning, directing, co-ordinating, and controlling forces in the accomplishment of the mission.
Doctrine	The set of fundamental principles that guide military actions in support of objectives. Doctrine is approved at the senior level of the Canadian Forces.
Concept of operations	A clear and concise statement of the line of action chosen by a commander to accomplish the mission. CONOPs are approved at the senior level of the Canadian Forces.
Interoperability	The Canadian Forces does not have a definition of interoperability. NATO defines interoperability as the ability of Alliance forces and, when appropriate, forces of Partners and other nations to train, exercise, and operate effectively together in the execution of assigned missions and tasks.
Enterprise architecture	A strategic information asset base, which defines the mission, the information necessary to perform the mission, the technologies necessary to perform the mission, and the transitional processes for implementing new technologies in response to changing mission needs.
Joint Operations	Operations requiring the Navy, Army, and/or Air Force to work together to achieve objectives.
Combined Operations	Operations requiring the Navy, Army, or Air Force to work with other militaries or other government departments and non-government agencies to achieve objectives. For example, the Canadian Air Force will conduct combined operations within NORAD.

Annex — Departmental response

Para. #	Recommendation	Department’s Response
4.46	National Defence should put a priority on developing joint C4ISR doctrine, concept of operations, and a definition of interoperability by the end of 2006.	Agreed. Doctrine, operating concepts, and clear definitions are recognized as important elements of C4ISR implementation, and their development continues to be a high priority. Although the writing and approval of doctrine and concepts of operations are complex undertakings, the Department will endeavour to have these elements developed by the end of 2006.
4.53	Senior management should ensure that, in the future, all projects justified as part of C4ISR are reviewed and approved by the Joint Capability Requirement Board and the C4ISR Oversight Committee, as part of the project approval process to provide assurance that the projects will ultimately be compatible with C4ISR goals as they evolve	Agreed. Future C4ISR projects will be subject to review by the Joint Capability Requirement Board and the C4ISR Oversight Committee.
4.59	National Defence should complete its enterprise architecture as a priority.	Agreed. Based on the findings of the Department's Information Management Strategic Review, and ongoing activity to establish an Information Management Strategic Plan, the establishment of an enterprise architecture is indeed a high priority. Enterprise architecture and the C4ISR Campaign Plan should build upon each other in an iterative, symbiotic manner in order to produce an enterprise architecture that best supports operational requirements and, by extension, C4ISR.
4.66	The Department should review its spiral objectives to ensure that they are sufficiently clear so that results can be measured.	Agreed. The "spiral" objectives in the C4ISR Campaign Plan are under constant review. Spiral development is actually designed to evolve as implementation proceeds and the desired end state becomes clearer. The tasks and objectives analyzed during this audit were in the first two spirals of the campaign plan. With the passing of each spiral, lessons are learned, tasking methodology is improved, and objectives are clarified. In this regard, many of the suggestions made by the audit team during the course of this audit have already been incorporated into spiral three and will be built increasingly into subsequent spirals.
4.67	The Department should develop key performance indicators that can provide senior management with a true measure of what has been achieved.	Agreed. As outlined in the response to 4.66 above, the Department will establish and implement measurable indicators of success, where practicable.
4.71	Senior management should take action to more fully and quickly integrate human resources planning into its C4ISR implementation strategy.	Agreed. The Department is very cognizant of the importance of the human dimension of C4ISR, and we are currently making every effort to ensure that appropriately skilled personnel will be available when they are required to fill C4ISR jobs. In this regard, although it is acknowledged that it does take four to seven years from recruitment until technical personnel are fully trained, the majority of C4ISR jobs are expected to require senior military personnel. For the near future, therefore, these jobs will be filled by existing military personnel rather than by new recruits. Where practicable, the military personnel selected to fill these C4ISR jobs will receive any additional skill sets required for specific jobs. In addition, some skill-set shortages can be mitigated through the use of civilian resources. In recognition of the importance of HR, the assistant deputy ministers responsible for military and civilian personnel are represented on all departmental decision-making and review boards. They have also put an HR plan in place to address C4ISR requirements. This plan has been fully integrated into the overall C4ISR Campaign Plan and is aggressively being followed to provide the HR requirements needed to achieve a fully integrated and interoperable C4ISR capability by 2008.