Opening Statement to the Standing Committee on Public Accounts

Passport Office—Passport Services
(Chapter 3 - April 2005 Report of the Auditor General of Canada)

11 May, 2005

Sheila Fraser, FCA
Auditor General of Canada

Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to present the results of our audit of Passport Services. With me today is Paul Morse, the Principal responsible for this audit.

In this audit we examined whether the Passport Office has effective control over the issuance of passports and whether it achieved reasonable levels of service, at a reasonable cost.

We found that the Passport Office is struggling to meet increasing security expectations and demands for responsive service.

While we found that the initial training provided to passport examiners in Canada is comprehensive, we noted some problems with the examiner function: Examiners lacked some basic tools to perform their duties; certain employees without the proper security clearance had access to critical assets; and there was poor control over access to the passport issuance system.

There is no formal quality assurance system to ensure that examiners are making proper entitlement decisions.

Examiners rely on information originating from other sources for proof of identity and citizenship, such as birth certificates from the provinces and citizenship certificates from Citizenship and Immigration Canada. Currently, there are no direct electronic links to provincial bureaus of vital statistics or to Citizenship and Immigration Canada that would allow them to quickly verify the data on a birth or citizenship certificate.

Under the leadership of Foreign Affairs Canada, the federal-provincial Council on Identity completed a framework document in the spring of 2004 to establish a consistent approach to verify identity across jurisdictions. At the time of our audit, the Council was waiting for approval of the framework. Such a framework is considered necessary to the development of a national routing system that would allow electronic authentication of foundation documents.

Under section 9 and 10 of the Passport order, the Passport Office has discretion to refuse or revoke a passport to persons who are charged with crimes, serving sentences, or on parole. We could not find any documented criteria for making those discretionary decisions.

In addition, the Passport Office watch list contained only about 2,000 names of persons in those categories. The current watch list is of limited value, as it is incomplete. The Passport Office has not found a way to gain automated access to these important data, such as through electronic links to other government departments’ data bases.

We also observed significant weaknesses in how the Passport Office handled the investigation of sensitive cases such as passport fraud. The Office lacked an effective case management system and had little oversight related to this important activity.

The control over issuance of about 100,000 passports at missions abroad presents several risks. Consular staff typically receive only two days of formal training, compared with four weeks of classroom training and twelve weeks of mentoring provided to domestic examiners.

The Passport Office has not analyzed which of its different delivery methods are more desirable. Its costs have been rising and productivity has been falling. It needs to balance issues of cost, service, and security.

The Passport Office charges user fees for passports. In 2003-04, it collected $158 million to fund its operations. In addition, $54 million in consular fees was collected and deposited to the Consolidated Revenue Fund.

In our view, the Passport Office has not met the ongoing requirement to identify and explain clearly to clients why services are delivered in the manner they are, how charges are determined, and how costs are controlled.

Mr. Chairman, the Passport Office needs to carry out a comprehensive risk assessment of its operations and closely monitor its April 11, 2005 action plan.

Many of the issues we raised are under the control of the Passport Office. Other issues require the co-operation of other federal or provincial government departments.

The Committee may wish to ask officials from the Passport Office and Foreign Affairs Canada the following questions:

• What level of resources and monitoring are Foreign Affairs Canada and Passport Canada committing to the April 11 action plan?
• What is the timeframe to establish a framework or an operational system across jurisdictions to verify identity? What is the risk of failure of such an undertaking? Does Foreign Affairs Canada expect the buy-in of other key players such as other levels of government and other government departments?
• What progress has been made in the electronic sharing of information with entities other than Correctional Service Canada? Have operational targets been set for when links will be in place?
• What is the timing for implementing a better cost system?

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my opening statement. We would be pleased to answer the Committee’s questions. Thank you.