Opening Statement to the Committee on the Environment and Sustainable Development

Follow-Up of Recommendations In Previous Chapters: Emergency Preparedness in The Federal Government – Nuclear Emergencies – 1992, Chapter 24
(Chapter 28 - 1998 Report of the Auditor General)

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26 May 1999

Brian Emmett, Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to meet with your Committee. With me today is Dr. Alan Gilmore, the Audit Principal responsible for this follow-up audit and previous related audits.

In 1987, we reported to Parliament on gaps in federal government preparedness for catastrophic earthquakes, large chemical and oil spills and major nuclear accidents. In 1989, 1992, 1994, 1995 and 1997, we reported follow-up audits of emergency preparedness. The focus of our 1998 follow-up was nuclear emergencies.

A brief summary of events indicates our continuing concerns. In 1984, Health Canada was designated the lead department for nuclear emergencies. In 1986, following the Chernobyl accident, Health Canada’s review of the Federal Nuclear Emergency Response Plan found that the objectives of the Plan and the means to achieve them were not clearly defined and that there were major implementation deficiencies. Our 1989 Report continued to identify a lack of clear goals and co-ordinated plans.

In 1992, we noted that major improvements were still needed in federal emergency planning. We found that most of the 1986 improvements to the Federal Nuclear Emergency Response Plan either had not been implemented or were in the beginning stages of implementation.

In 1992, Health Canada initiated a review of the nuclear emergency response plan. It issued an interim plan in December 1997, now renamed the Federal Nuclear Emergency Plan.

However, most of our concerns about preparedness for nuclear emergencies reported in our reports have not yet been adequately addressed.

For example, 13 federal departments and agencies have significant responsibilities and are expected to prepare support plans. At the time of our audit, Health Canada had not completed its own support plan and had only received two departmental support plans. Without such plans, it is difficult to ensure a co-ordinated effort.

An Emergency Preparedness Advisory Committee has significant decision-making responsibilities. It is composed of assistant deputy ministers from key departments and agencies. However, decision making may be hampered because, as of December 1998, most of the Committee members had not attended meetings during the last four years. Further, none had participated in emergency preparedness training sessions specifically designed to prepare them for their roles.

In 1987, 1992 and 1998, we noted concerns about the lack of national guidelines for initiating protective action against radiation exposure. Ontario, Quebec and New Brunswick have different guidelines. This lack of common standards may result in unnecessary delays and confusion because citizens of different provinces confronted with similar threats may receive different advice and direction.

Health Canada acknowledges that the provinces significantly differ in capability to deal with nuclear emergencies and that it does not have adequate information on resources required.

In 1997, Ontario Hydro assessed all its nuclear generating stations. Seven of nineteen operating reactors were closed. All were rated as "below standard" with respect to emergency preparedness. AECB concluded that although "defence-in-depth" for safety has been eroded at Ontario Hydro nuclear generating stations, the reactors could continue to operate safely in the short term. AECB told us that the status of nuclear stations in Quebec and New Brunswick is similar to that of Ontario Hydro.

In April 1999, subsequent to our December 1998 Report, the interim Federal Nuclear Emergency Plan was tested in CANATEX 3, an interdepartmental, provincial and municipal "desk top simulation" exercise. Health Canada and other departments are evaluating the results of this exercise. Your Committee may wish to consider reviewing these evaluations when they are completed. As well, your Committee may wish to consider obtaining information to allow it to assess AECB’s regulatory approach to the safety of nuclear power plants, including its review of nuclear physical security regulations for these plants.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my opening statement and we would be pleased to answer your Committee’s questions.