Brian Emmett, Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to meet with your Committee.
With me today is Alan Gilmore, the Audit Principal responsible for this
audit.
In 1992, we reported on emergency preparedness in the federal government. As part of that audit, we looked at the government's ability to respond to major earthquakes, nuclear emergencies and oil and chemical spills. As our reports indicate, we have continuing concerns about the capacity of the federal government to respond to major emergencies.
Our December 1997 Report followed up on our observations on oil and chemical spills. We examined the progress made to respond to marine oils spills, marine chemical emergencies and land-based chemical emergencies at industrial sites. We have concerns about each of the three areas.
The Panel's 1990 report concluded that Canada did not have the capability to respond to significant spills.
Since 1992, the Coast Guard has put significant effort into developing a Marine Oil Spill Preparedness and Response Regime. This involved 1995 amendments to the Canada Shipping Act, that, among other things, require oil-carrying vessels and designated oil-handling facilities to have an arrangement with a "response organization" that has been certified by the Coast Guard to respond to oil spills. There are five response organizations. These are private companies, all owned by the major oil companies, that charge fees to maintain a response capability for spills.
In 1995, the proposed fees were published in the Canada Gazette . After receiving a significant number of objections, the government appointed a panel to investigate their fairness. The panel's report concluded that the oil spill response fee structure is unworkable because it is neither fair nor equitable. At the time of our follow-up audit, the problems surrounding the oil spill response regime fee structure remained unresolved.
We are concerned that the absence of an agreement on fees threatens the viability of the oil spill response regime that is now based on arrangements with private sector companies. It should be noted that the panel's report also concluded that the Coast Guard had withdrawn from active control of Canada's oil spill response capability.
There has been little progress in establishing a marine chemical response capability. The limited progress is due, in part, to the difficulties that have been encountered in trying to establish the oil spill response regime.
At the time of our follow-up audit, the Coast Guard was in the preliminary stage of developing a chemical emergency response regime in conjunction with industry.
Our 1992 chapter reported that Canada did not have a national legislative framework for chemical accidents at industrial sites. This is still the case. Environment Canada told us it does not have the mandate to make assessments of hazardous sites and there is no legislation that requires hazardous sites to be registered or companies to report on what preventive measures they have in place.
In 1996, Environment Canada proposed amendments to the Canadian Environmental Protection Act. These amendments included a section that would have given the government authority to establish regulations to help prevent and report industrial site environmental emergencies. The Bill, however, did not reach second reading in Parliament.
The amendments were consistent with the 1995 Report of the Standing Committee on Environment and Sustainable Development entitled "It's About Our Health". This report recommended that the government obtain authority from Parliament to require that hazardous sites be identified and registered. This is a first step to preventing environmental emergencies. Once sites are known, it becomes possible to assess the risks posed and develop response plans. Such legislation would complement voluntary initiatives like those being undertaken by the Major Industrial Accidents Council of Canada, known as MIACC.
MIACC has developed a list of hazardous substances and, at the time of our follow-up audit, was developing an inventory of hazardous sites. About 1,350 sites had been identified at that time. MIACC was also in the process of sending a survey to hazardous site operators for self-assessment of their safety management practices. The results of the survey are expected in the spring of 1998. However, at this point, Environment Canada and MIACC have little information on the extent to which hazardous sites are adequately prepared to deal with emergencies.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my opening statement and we would be pleased to answer your Committee's questions.