27.8 To implement the 1994 policy direction, National Defence developed a comprehensive five-year renewal plan containing five key elements: downsizing, infrastructure rationalization, management renewal, better use of information technology, and alternative service delivery (ASD).
27.9 Alternative service delivery is a term that refers to a systematic search for new and better ways of providing government services. The government-wide policy on ASD is contained in a Treasury Board Secretariat guidance document issued in 1995, entitled Framework for Alternative Program Delivery. That document sets out basic principles and criteria for assessing whether and how the delivery of government programs, activities, services and functions could be changed to better meet government objectives or provide better value. Departments are expected to deliver programs and services as efficiently as possible, whether with in-house staff and resources or through an external supplier. This approach needs to be based on a good understanding of outputs, levels of service and costs of delivery. According to the Treasury Board policy, alternative means of program delivery should cost not more and preferably less than traditional methods.
27.10 The aim of the National Defence ASD program is to provide the framework within which the Department's managers pursue best value for the defence dollar in non-core activities. Best value is determined through business case analyses of available delivery options.
27.12 Centrally managed ASD projects are under the executive authority of the Deputy Minister and the Chief of Defence Staff. Other ASD projects are under the executive authority of commanders and group principals. The Vice Chief of the Defence Staff (VCDS) oversees the ASD program and the centrally managed projects, supported by a steering committee at the assistant deputy minister level with membership from unions, Treasury Board Secretariat, Public Works and Government Services Canada and independent brokers. Other steering committees support commanders and group principals for specific projects under their executive authority. An ASD directorate under the VCDS and the Director General Management Renewal Services provides central policy direction and guidance, develops methodologies and processes, co-ordinates the identification of ASD projects, provides facilitation services to commands and groups and monitors and reports on the progress of ASD activities.
27.13 Moreover, commanders and group principals each have an ASD co-ordinator for the ASD reviews in their areas. These co-ordinators are the primary points of contact for information about individual ASD reviews. Each ASD review is managed and implemented by its own project team, reporting to the executive authority through a steering committee.
27.14 The Department's ASD review process (see Exhibit 27.1) is consistent with the Treasury Board Secretariat's Framework for Alternative Program Delivery. The ASD program is integrated with the Department's business planning process. Service chiefs of staff and group principals are responsible for identifying for ASD review their non-core activities that meet criteria established by the Defence Management Committee. These include:
27.16 We audited 14 completed projects initiated between 1994 and 1996 that represent a broad cross-section of departmental support services. Although five of the projects had begun before the ASD program was initiated, they have the characteristics of ASD projects. The other nine projects were selected from the 40 reviews of support service activities that National Defence has undertaken since introducing the ASD program in 1995. Exhibit 27.2 lists the projects selected for audit; a brief description of each is provided in the Appendix to this chapter.
27.17 We audited the following aspects of the ASD program:
27.19 This audit focussed primarily on the ASD program, although in many cases re-engineering is an essential element of the ASD process - particularly when in-house teams are bidding for a contract to provide services. Our 1996 audit indicated that while re-engineering had been under way for several years, productivity had actually declined in some areas. In testimony before the Public Accounts Committee, senior departmental officials stated that implanting cost-consciousness and a more businesslike approach in National Defence would require a cultural change and would take a considerable period of time. Our current audit found that the needed change is not yet complete.
27.20 The Canadian Forces are sustained by a national support system that provides personnel support, equipment, food, fuel, maintenance and training. Since 1994, National Defence has been pursuing a comprehensive renewal effort in order to allocate more of its resources to defence operations and less to support functions. The ASD program is an important element of this renewal effort. In May 1996, the Defence Management Committee (DMC) estimated that the ASD program would result in annual savings of $200 million by 1999, increasing to $350 million by 2001.
27.21 Due to delays in implementing the initial list of 18 ASD initiatives and a slower-than-expected pace in identifying additional ASD projects, the Department has revised its projection of ASD savings to $175 million a year by end of the planning period 1999-2004.
27.22 We were unable to verify the actual savings achieved in any of the ASD projects we audited. Most have not been established long enough to measure cost savings. Further, baseline costs had not been established for a number of the projects, and, in a number of others, we could not satisfy ourselves that the estimates of baseline costs were comprehensive and accurate.
27.23 The 40 ASD reviews begun to date cover support activities that employ over 16,000 civilian and military personnel. The annual budget for these activities is about $1.3 billion, less than half the total value of all non-core support services that were or could be potential candidates for ASD reviews.
27.24 By June 1999 the Department had completed 18 ASD reviews of support services whose annual budgets total about $202 million. Defence officials now estimate that alternative delivery of those services will realize recurring annual savings of about $68 million. This is approximately 30 percent of the $200 million target for 1999, established when the ASD program was initiated in 1995.
27.26 United States. The U.S. Department of Defense has conducted studies of public/private competitive sourcing for commercial activities that affect over 200,000 military and civilian positions. Based on the results, it established an ambitious savings target of approximately $11 billion between fiscal years 1997 and 2005. However, recent studies by the General Accounting Office have questioned whether the projected cost savings could be achieved by outsourcing. U.S. Defense officials have also indicated that budget reductions and downsizing of civilian personnel in recent years could make its savings projections difficult to achieve.
27.27 Australia. The Australian Department of Defence implemented its Commercial Support Program (CSP) in mid-1991. The CSP identifies non-core activities and exposes them to competitive tendering. It offers industry the opportunity to compete for some work previously done exclusively by military and defence civilian personnel. Early estimates indicated that savings from CSP could be in the region of $350 million a year. In 1996, after five years of the program, the Australian Minister of Defence indicated that progress had been far too slow and that the program had achieved annual savings of $121 million a year. In July 1998, the Australian National Audit Office reported that the Department of Defence was claiming annual savings of $155 million - about half the initial estimate. The report also noted that actual savings were difficult to determine because the Department's financial systems lacked the ability to track savings.
27.28 The United Kingdom. The United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, which has been operating the Competing for Quality Program since 1992, is reporting estimated savings of £366 million a year. This is equivalent to some 22 percent of the previous total annual operating cost of these activities, although no figures on actual savings are available. The Ministry of Defence sought to maximize the benefits of Competing for Quality through tighter arrangements for profit sharing and pricing, changes in workload, and better management of inventories. A 1996 study conducted by the Cabinet Office's efficiency unit looked at the program across the government and analyzed the first three years, 1992-93 to 1994-95 inclusive. It estimated net savings (taking into account the estimated costs of the Competing for Quality process) at between 13 and 15 percent, although no figures on actual savings were available.
27.29 Based on experience in other countries, it appears that National Defence's initial projections of savings may have been overstated. Caution should be exercised in making estimates about the overall savings the program can achieve.
27.31 While we audited several projects that predate the ASD policy, the requirements for business case analysis are basic and represent due diligence in the expenditure of government funds. We therefore expected that projects undertaken before the policy was issued would demonstrate the same level of care as the others in our sample.
27.32 We found that business case analyses had been conducted in 8 of the 14 projects selected for our audit, and not conducted at all in 4 projects. We were unable to audit business case analyses for the 2 remaining projects because the information was not available.
27.33 We assessed the business case analyses using the following criteria contained in the Department's Costing Handbook:
27.36 In the case of the Fleet Maintenance Facilities, the decision was to retain the current method of service delivery until fundamental issues of capability and capacity are resolved.
27.37 Neither the Aerospace Engineering Test Establishment nor the Meaford Area Training Centre had established service levels before the ASD reviews.
27.38 In the Auxiliary Fleet Services, neither the East nor the West Coast unit had established service levels. However, as part of the business case analysis, the analysts did develop past levels of service from historical records and data. Both East and West Coasts are still in the process of establishing service levels for tug operations.
27.39 At the Department's request, we reviewed Project Genesis, an Air Force multi-project effort to preserve a viable fighter force by making force reductions and reducing support costs. We found that costs had been reduced substantially by various means, the greatest portion by reducing the size of the fighter fleet and the North Warning System. However, we are concerned that the air force did not - and still does not - have adequate measures of readiness and sustainment to ensure that reductions in flying hours will not reduce air force capabilities below the required levels. This means that the full impact of these changes cannot be determined.
27.41 In the Goose Bay project, the decision to contract out support services was not based on a sound analysis of in-house costs. In order to evaluate all feasible alternatives, ASD methodology requires that baseline costs be established in advance. We found that baseline costs were rigorously established only after the decision had been made to submit support services to competition.
27.42 Departmental publications claim that the operation of the Meaford Area Training Centre, opened in July 1995, has been an ASD success story. The changes to Meaford originated in a departmental program that predated the ASD program. Although we did find a study that predated the opening of the Centre, it did not adequately define the baseline cost as derived from similar training operations. Two separate costing studies on Meaford highlight the difficulties in developing accurate baseline information when there have been significant changes in service delivery levels. Studies by both departmental staff and external consultants found it difficult to determine whether savings had been achieved. A study completed in May 1999 contained estimates ranging from annual savings of $800,000 to a loss of $300,000, depending on the assumptions made. Officials agreed that the training centre is larger than required, but estimates of the costs of unused capacity varied widely.
27.43 For the NDHQ Facilities Management project, it would appear from the very limited information provided to us that baseline costs were incomplete. This will make it difficult to determine cost savings.
27.45 For most projects we examined, the business case did define the critical success factors against which feasible options were compared. However, we did not find any predefined success factors for the Meaford Area Training Centre and Goose Bay projects.
27.47 The $2.8 billion NATO Flying Training in Canada project was initiated when National Defence received an unsolicited proposal in late 1994 from a private sector firm to provide a NATO flying training program. This proposal eventually became the preferred option. Options for the future Canadian Forces pilot training system had been defined in the spring of 1994 for further study, and informal discussions with the contractor had taken place for at least seven months before the unsolicited proposal was received. NFTC was added to the options in May 1995. Once it had reviewed the NFTC proposal, National Defence did not explore the level of competition that existed in the marketplace. In October 1997, the Treasury Board approved a submission by Public Works and Government Services Canada on behalf of National Defence for a non-competitive contract with Bombardier Inc. to deliver the program. Although there was probably insufficient time between the unsolicited proposal and NATO's deadline for the government to tender the project, we have concerns about the decision to sole-source, which are outlined in the case study.
27.48 The ASD process for the Aerospace Engineering Test Establishment proceeded to competition even though a 1995 market feasibility study had concluded that there was limited market demand for the use of the facilities involved. The negative implications of the market feasibility report were not properly reflected in subsequent decision making. This is significant, given that the ability of a contractor to successfully market spare range capacity was an essential component of the deal put forward by National Defence.
27.50 The NATO Flying Training in Canada program assessed three options:
27.51 For the Goose Bay Support Services project, the study provided to us in lieu of a business case analysis did not analyze the contracting-out option in detail. Further, this study did not adequately define and cost the services to be provided. Nor could we find any evidence that a risk assessment had been undertaken.
27.52 We could not find a formal business case analysis or any other supporting evidence to justify the ASD contract at Meaford Area Training Centre. The limited documentation provided to us did not indicate that any other options were considered. The business case for the Aerospace Engineering Test Establishment project did not meet our audit criteria.
27.53 In the Automated Test Equipment project, the Department analyzed two internal options and one external option for providing services and purchasing equipment and spares. In the external option, the cost of the assets was based on the contractor's proposal to sell equipment and lifetime spares as a package. In the internal options, it was assumed that the Department would purchase the equipment and spares separately, which would cost more. Our analysis indicates that if the same assumptions had been used for all three options, one of the internal options could have cost at least $60 million less over 20 years than the estimated $400 million cost of the external option chosen. However, the external option's ability to deal with short-term obsolescence was a qualitative factor that strongly influenced the decision.
27.55 In 9 of the 14 projects we audited, services have been contracted to industry, to an in-house team or to another government department. We are concerned that in 3 of the 9, including the NATO Flying Training in Canada project, the option chosen was not always supported by sufficient analysis.
27.56 In the case of the NATO Flying Training in Canada project, we have concerns about the cost effectiveness of the chosen option. We found that not all of the suggested options were adequately considered. For instance, the Department of Finance had indicated that it would be more economical for National Defence to buy the training aircraft itself instead of having the contractor purchase them. We found that although an analysis of financing the purchase of the training aircraft was performed, it was completed too late in the process, after a sole-source procurement strategy had been adopted. Also, the risk analysis was not quantified in several areas and lacked sufficient data to support the risk rating scale used to rank the options.
27.57 The Goose Bay Support Services and Meaford Area Training Centre projects lacked a business case analysis that included an analysis of options.
27.61 As it continues to devote a high level of senior management attention to Alternative Service Delivery projects, the Department should ensure that business case analyses:
27.63 We expected to find a department-wide classification of core/non-core activities, core and non-core personnel, and a strategy developed with the help of human resource specialists to ease the transition into ASD. We also expected work force adjustment costs to be considered in the ASD cost analyses. Finally, we expected to find communication with unions throughout the ASD process and a plan to treat employees fairly during the ASD transition, including provision of employment opportunities, continuity of employment and compensation supplements.
27.65 We found that although many of the staff were very dedicated and hard-working, in many cases they had not been trained to prepare the business cases, the detailed statements of work and the analyses needed to make ASD decisions. This lack of training was cited as a cause for concern in the 1998 Quality of Life Report prepared by the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs. The report noted that employees who had participated in the ASD process expressed concern that they had to prepare their ASD in-house bid submissions on their own time - after hours and on weekends - and that they entered the process as complete amateurs. In our review of business case analyses, we found wide differences in quality. The Department has recently developed ASD practitioner workshops and conducted a number of courses in the application of ASD methodology.
27.67 In 1997 the Department conducted a Combatant Capability Study that was related to determining core activities. The results of this study were presented to the Defence Management Committee in October 1997 and were among the key inputs to the Department's major corporate ASD initiatives. We found that the Department is conducting Military Occupational Structure reviews, which relate to core personnel, on a periodic basis. During our audit, we noted that some projects have had to wait for up-to-date information on occupational structures.
27.69 Our audit findings at Goose Bay are an example of the problems that can arise when human resource factors are not properly considered. In addition to buyouts and voluntary departures, the Goose Bay initiative involved wage cuts for many employees, loss of allowances and subsidized housing, transfer of employees to the contractor and offers of blue-collar jobs to white-collar workers. The Department underestimated the human resource impact of these changes. This resulted in extreme dissatisfaction, requiring the Minister to intervene to resolve matters. The lessons learned from the Goose Bay project have resulted in changes to the ASD policy. For example, since May 1998 a new directive has required that any new ASD initiatives that lend themselves to in-house competitive bids will first be tested for savings through a "most efficient organization" to determine if they should proceed to competition with the private sector. This step involves reviewing the in-house activity and taking the necessary steps to ensure that it is conducted in an efficient and cost-effective way. Departmental officials informed us that human resource strategies have now been developed and are awaiting final approval.
27.71 Any ASD project considering the contracting-out option is affected by government compensation policies, under which the Treasury Board currently pays salary benefits (pensions, employment insurance, etc.) equivalent to approximately 20 percent of each employee's salary. Under a contracting-out scenario, National Defence would be responsible for paying these benefits. This means that any ASD option considered by the Department must save at least 20 percent of the salary costs of departmental staff if the Department's budget is to receive any direct benefit from the change. A contracting-out option could offer the service at a lower overall cost to the government and still be rejected as not cost-effective for the Department. In some ASD projects we examined, it was not clear that salary benefits and costs of work force adjustment had been properly taken into account in calculating ASD costs. If they were not, the savings from these projects will be lower than expected. The Treasury Board recently indicated that it will now pay National Defence 20 percent of salary savings on future ASD projects, provided that the Department has met its targeted military and civilian personnel reductions.
27.72 The Goose Bay ASD initiative is an example of a project that did not properly consider the labour code provisions for successor rights. The Department did not obtain a timely legal opinion on the possible application of successor rights. Potential bidders were advised, during the PWGSC-sponsored bidders' conference at a Goose Bay site visit in May 1997, that federal successor rights would not apply. In June 1997, specific questions dealing with the issue of successor rights were raised by one of the bidders. Public Works and Government Services Canada subsequently provided responses to these questions that were distributed to all potential bidders. The bidders were advised, ``The final determination on the applicability of successor rights under provincial and federal legislation can only be made by the labour board of the jurisdiction to which the function is transferred. The parties to that determination are the new employer, the unions and the board. Therefore, as bidders you are strongly urged to pursue, as expeditiously as possible, the applicability of successor rights with those parties." The Department agreed to pay the costs that would result from a subsequent decision if successor rights were found to apply. Costs associated with the potential application of successor rights were excluded from the bids. In November 1998, the Canadian Labour Relations Board issued a decision certifying that successor rights would apply at Goose Bay. The total cost that the government will have to pay as a result of the application of successor rights has yet to be finalized. Government officials told us that the cost of applying successor rights could be over $30 million for the five-year period of the contract. The Goose Bay experience illustrates that the potential application of successor rights is an important risk factor to be considered in the planning phase of any ASD project. The application of successor rights can considerably reduce the forecast savings.
27.74 Our findings show that the unions were participants in all of the Department's ASD projects. The minutes and letters show that they participated in meetings, but they question their level of influence on ASD decisions.
27.76 The Department should ensure that its Military Occupational Structure (MOS) reviews provide the guidance on core/non-core assessment required for Alternative Service Delivery projects.
Department's response: As the military situation changes, the Department will continue to conduct periodic MOS reviews to ensure that occupational structures meet military missions as directed by the government. Pertinent information resulting from these reviews will be made available to ASD projects.
27.77 The Department should ensure that people are trained to evaluate and implement Alternative Service Delivery projects and that appropriate human resource management plans are in place.
Department's response: With recent ASD initiatives, the Department has taken steps to ensure that the staff involved in the development of the business case analyses were properly trained and, where gaps could not be filled in-house, that adequate expertise from outside the Department was brought in to supplement this deficiency. The Department will pursue this approach with any future ASD initiatives.
In the same vein, the Department has introduced corporate human resource strategies for employment continuity in all ASD situations both for military and civilians; consultative mechanisms with all unions both at the corporate and project levels; early involvement of human resource management specialists in ASD project teams; more frequent and direct communication with all employees; and awareness and training workshops on an as-required basis. The Department will continue to monitor results and incorporate appropriate adjustments.
27.79 Our audit of ASD contracts raised a number of concerns about value for money and the equity and fairness of the contracting process. The existence of sole-source contracts reduces the potential for ensuring that the Department is obtaining the required services at the most economical price. Five of the nine ASD contracts we audited, including the $2.8 billion NATO Flying Training in Canada contract, were awarded without competition. We have concerns about two contracts, one that was awarded without competition and one that is about to be extended for a three-year period.
27.80 NATO Flying Training in Canada. We reviewed the rationale for awarding the contract without competition and the events leading to the contract award, to determine if National Defence and Public Works and Government Services Canada had complied with the government's contracting policy and regulations. We found that the decision to award the contract without following the government's normal bid solicitation process was not adequately justified. The case study provides additional details.
27.81 Canadian Aviation Training Centre (CATC) - (Portage-la-Prairie). This contract with Bombardier Inc., which deals with primary flying training, basic helicopter training and multi-engine training, expired in August 1999 and is currently being renegotiated for a three-year renewal, without competition. While this contract amendment worth about $100 million does not contravene government contracting policy, we are still concerned about the principle of competition. Departmental officials told us that in order to have a new contract in place by 1999, it would have had to issue a request for proposal in 1996. At that time, the decision to proceed with the NFTC project had not yet been made and National Defence was not in a position to define its future flying training requirements.
27.84 Meaford Area Training Centre. The Meaford Area Training Centre is a modernized army training facility located in central Ontario that was opened in July 1995. Initially tasked to provide and maintain firing ranges, training areas, facilities and equipment for approximately 10,000 Reserve soldiers in the Ontario area, it has a total training capacity of 384,000 student-days per year. The contractor estimates that the actual utilization rate for Meaford in 1998 was approximately 43 percent of total capacity. The facility includes 44 separate buildings and structures, some 400 military and commercial style vehicles and various items of support equipment, water and sewage facilities, refuelling and maintenance facilities, several kilometres of roads and an extensive training area. It is currently operated by a private contractor under a five-year, fixed-price contract valued at $40 million.
27.85 Canadian Aviation Training Centre, Portage-la-Prairie. The $165 million contract signed in 1991 with Bombardier Inc. to operate the Canadian Aviation Training Centre at Portage-la- Prairie is another, largely fixed-price, contract to operate a facility that National Defence has consistently underutilized. This is primarily due to the difficulty of forecasting future pilot training needs. The Department estimates that in the first six years of the contract, payments for unused capacity of about 20 percent amounted to a maximum of approximately $11 million.
27.87 The government's contracting policies and regulations were not followed in several of the ASD projects we examined. In particular, the NATO Flying Training in Canada contract was awarded without competition and the profit markup is not consistent with Public Works and Government Services Canada's profit policy and guidelines. The pricing of some contracts did not result in value for money, because National Defence did not need all of the services it was paying for and there was no provision for reducing the fixed payments established under the contracts.
27.88 The Treasury Board Secretariat should include, in its continuing work on procurement reform, guidelines and training for large multi-year service contracts. The guidelines and training should address the key issues of how competition is to be addressed in situations where long-term "partnering" would be beneficial to the government.
Treasury Board Secretariat's response: This audit focussed on the resource management principles of ASD and how these specifically apply to contracting-out initiatives. ASD also includes other types of initiatives, including restructuring within the federal public service and partnering with others. In addition to cost effectiveness, ASD is generally expected to improve services to clients, increase management flexibility and reduce risk.
This report contains several useful practices to consider in future ASD initiatives. These will be reflected in the ASD Practice Guide and Database that is currently being developed by TBS. This tool will pull together the collective experience on ASD to guide the evolution of ASD throughout the federal public service.
With regard to the recommendation in paragraph 27.88 , the Treasury Board Secretariat is currently taking the lead on an interdepartmental initiative to reform procurement. We aim to modernize procurement, addressing policy considerations that govern the full procurement lifecycle. The objective of the initiative is to help departments better serve the public through cost-effective procurement strategies while still maintaining appropriate opportunities for Canadian suppliers to compete and to uphold the integrity of the federal procurement system. This initiative should include, among other matters, work on guidance for large, multi-year service contracts. As well, as part of procurement reform, we are committed to developing a program of training and certification for procurement specialists in departments.
Public Works and Government Services Canada's response: Public Works and Government Services Canada is supportive of continuing work on improving the guidelines and training for large multi-year service contracts and will be working with Treasury Board Secretariat in this regard.
27.90 The Department currently has an adequate framework to manage alternative service delivery. This framework had not yet been put into practice for many of the projects we audited. We found that improvements have been made that appear likely to address problems in the future. At the strategic level, the savings projection for the program appears to have been set arbitrarily and may not have been realistic. At the project level, business case analyses varied widely in quality. Managers appear to lack the necessary tools and training.
27.91 Our results indicate that the federal government has much to do before realizing the full advantage of service contracting. The existing government contracting policy is based on competition and assumes that a marketplace exists from which the federal government can solicit bids. This may not always be the case, especially for large contracts where there may be only a single Canadian firm available. It appears that the government needs to consider exactly what it means by "partnering", under what circumstances it would be advantageous, and how competition should be used to keep costs in check. Until this is done, officials will be unable to exploit commercial possibilities and will also be in danger of contravening existing regulations.
27.92 Finally, it is apparent that there is a need for the Department to exercise better business judgment. Contracts may well offer theoretical savings, but these are easily negated by poor business deals. The case of Meaford is an outstanding example of contracting for services that were not required. Public Works and Government Services Canada also needs to ensure that the profit markup on negotiated contracts is supported by an adequate analysis of the risks transferred to contractors.
National Defence's comment: As a strategy to carry out the 1994 Defence White Paper operational requirements, the Department remains firmly committed to divesting itself from delivering non-core activities where it is cost-effective and practical.
The Department acknowledges that results in terms of cost efficiencies for the ASD program as a whole have been lower than those expected for the 1999 timeframe. However, despite the difficulties inherent in the implementation of such innovative initiatives in Canada and in other countries, our own experience in DND since 1995 demonstrates clearly that our expectations in percentage of savings at the individual project level are realistic.
The objectives underlying the ASD program are of a long-term nature. Difficulties in the implementation of the 14 early ASD initiatives that are part of this audit are not an indication that these objectives must be modified. Rather, they indicate the need to have the appropriate framework in place to support our level of commitment. The Department has learned a lot from these difficulties and, as the audit has pointed out, it has incorporated these improvements into a more effective framework, particularly for business case analyses and training. We will continue to review the framework and make necessary adjustments where needed.
It is also worth noting that, despite this audit's focus on contracting out, the DND ASD program includes initiatives that made use of other ASD options such as departmental agencies.
s a final point, the Department believes that the NATO Flying Training in Canada program is innovative and provides good- quality pilot training at a cost lower than the current training system or any foreseeable training option in the future. In the Department's view, the fact that the program is on schedule, on budget and sold out is indicative of the viability of the concept.
Our audit was limited to actions taken by the government. We did not audit the firms providing services or bidding on contracts and imply no criticism of any third party supplying services to the government.
We reviewed departmental project files and interviewed National Defence officials, including headquarters and regional staff responsible for conducting the ASD reviews and implementing ASD projects. We also interviewed Public Works and Government Services Canada contracting officials and staff at the Treasury Board Secretariat. In addition, we conducted a literature review to determine the lessons learned by other countries that have implemented similar initiatives.
Linda Beaulieu
Chantal Michaud
Darlene Mulligan
Julie Erb
Michael Amadio
Chris MacDonald
Nadine Lamoureux
Haleem Mughal
Robert Stopford
Tristan Velez
For information, please contact Peter Kasurak.