The Point of this Report

 

The Canadian Forces must be rebuilt for one very good reason: Canadians need better military protection. We need better protection now, and we will need it even more if threats to our well-being increase, which is a reasonable assumption.

 

We Canadians are open to man-made disasters, natural disasters, crises at home and crises abroad. Canada has not been devastated by terrorist attacks since the Air India attacks of 1985, but many of our friends and allies have – the United States, Britain, Spain, Indonesia, Australia and others. And the recent arrests in Southern Ontario should leave no doubt that Canada will someday be on that list.

 

Nature, of course, has every country on its list, and Canada has endured its share of natural disasters. Nobody should doubt that there are more coming. Whether Canada’s crises are man-made or natural, our armed forces constitute the backbone of our response team.

 

Not only do we need to protect ourselves from all kinds of physical threats, we need to protect our country’s interests abroad. For a nation to effectively advance its global interests it must pull its weight on the world scene.

 

We Canadians were significant international players for much of the 20^th century until our influence began to dwindle toward the end of that century. Both the International Policy Statement published by the last government and the enhanced commitments of the current government seek to redress that situation.

 

This government will be unable to meet the dual goals of better protecting Canadians and better advancing Canada’s interests abroad without an effective military. We have an improved military now. We do not yet have the military Canadians need. Attaining it should be a priority for this government, and for all Canadians.

 
 

The Mandate of this Report

 

WOUNDED, the first of our three reports dealing with the state of Canada’s military, was released in September 2005. It focused on the many problems facing the Canadian Forces following decades of neglect.

 

THE GOVERNMENT’S NO. 1 JOB, the Committee’s second report in this three-part series, will focus on solutions to persisting problems. This report will make recommendations that we believe the new government will want to consider as it gets on with the process of rehabilitating Canada’s armed forces – a process to which it has so clearly committed itself.

 

GETTING TO 2026 is the working title of a third report that will examine future challenges facing Canada and recommend structural changes the government must make to end the semi-permanent state of crisis that plagues the Canadian Forces. That report should be released in the coming months.

 

– Solving Our Defence Puzzle –

 

Fixing the Canadian Forces is not going to be easy. There are some problems that can be fixed on an ad hoc basis – order some new G-wagons, acquire some new field artillery, bring in a few thousand new recruits. But an ad hoc approach is not enough. It may create the illusion of healing, but in this case there are too many wounds for random patching. If a body’s organs are not functioning properly, all the Band-Aids in the world will not help.

 

Yes, some problems need immediate attention. But there has to be a master plan. If the Government of Canada is really interested in rehabilitating Canada’s armed forces – and the Committee believes that it is– it will make the big changes that will make a multitude of smaller changes possible.

 

Here are the big pieces of the puzzle, as we see them, in descending order. Piece No. 1 must be put in place, or there is less chance of success at putting Piece No. 2 in place, and so on down the line.

 

 

 

– NATIONAL CHALLENGES (See Part I) –

 

No. 1

 

Public Engagement in National Security and Defence

 

It will be difficult, if not impossible, to create the kind of Canadian Forces that the people of this country need without strong support from two key constituencies:

(a) our national politicians and (b) the public at large. Political leadership and public support are symbiotic – they stimulate each other’s growth. The Committee is pleased to recognize that the new Prime Minister has expanded the previous government’s commitment to upgrading the Canadian Forces. The current Prime Minister made military rehabilitation a major component of his party’s platform during the 2006 election campaign. He went on to signal the Government’s support for the Forces with a personal visit to Canadian troops in Afghanistan in March 2006.

 

The Prime Minister’s interest in the Canadian military is essential if the Canadian public is going to have a clearer understanding of the importance of the Canadian Forces, both to their own well being and the well being of the country. But the Prime Minister cannot turn apathy into energy on his own. Too many Canadians are indifferent toward – or wary of – the concept of a healthy and effective Canadian military for any one person, even the Prime Minister, to turn the tide, no matter how important that person might be. Other people need to be brought on board: the rest of the Cabinet, the governing party’s caucus, opposition politicians, the Canadian media, and most of all, the citizens of Canada. When a repair job is this urgent, and the repairs needed are so numerous, only a concerted effort by all Canadian leaders who understand the nature of the problem is likely to muster the kind of public support required for significant change.

 

No. 2

 

Mustering Political Will

 

The recent history of the Canadian Forces offers one lesson: with political will, anything is possible; without it, nothing is. The challenge facing the Government is one of leadership. To create sustained change, government must stimulate national consensus. But even before that consensus exists, the government has a responsibility to begin making tough choices about the military Canadians need to protect themselves and their interests.

 

This Government has indicated that it is willing to make those choices. The proof will be in the pudding. It also remains to be seen whether the Prime Minister and Defence Minister will be content to make the case for the military on their own, or whether they will attempt to mobilize other politicians and members of Canadian society to join them. Despite its strong place on the platform during the last election campaign, strengthening the Canadian forces has not been mentioned as one of this Government’s five priorities since it took office. Is it a sixth priority? The Committee can only hope so.

 

 

– DIRECTIONAL CHALLENGES (See Part II) –

 

No. 3

 

Recognizing Defence as the Fundamental Obligation of Government

 

The most basic role of any national government is to protect its citizens and their vital interests. To do that, governments must exercise the power they have to come up with ways of accomplishing those ends. Military power is one element of national power.  The Canadian Forces constitute a primary tool in protecting Canadians and their interests.  And yet successive governments have consistently failed to recognize the Department of National Defence as anything more than just another arm of federal bureaucracy, tying DND up in the same red tape protocols and regulations that make getting anything done in Ottawa so difficult.

 

The process for improving the country’s primary mechanism for protecting Canadians and their interests should not keep getting bogged down in quicksand.

 

Defence procurement – which often involves big ticket, long-term, technologically advanced and complex purchases – has floundered so badly that the length of some projects can now be calculated in decades as opposed to years. Equipment purchases often take so long to run the gamut of bureaucratic checks and balances that the equipment is close to being outdated when it finally arrives.

 

These kinds of purchases can be deciding factors as to whether Canadians and their interests are being properly protected. They can also have life-and-death implications for the young men and women who are serving their country.

 

The Department of National Defence can not continue to be treated as an ordinary component of the federal bureaucracy. The Committee believes that ways must be found to give DND and Canadian Forces decision-makers the capacity to move more quickly and efficiently in acquiring the equipment they need to serve Canadians.

 

The Committee will address this issue further in its next report.

 

 

No. 4

 

Following a Strategic Plan

 

Having a strategic plan to revitalize the armed forces is essential to making efficient and intelligent progress. There is such a plan in place. It may not be perfect but in general, it makes sense, and with new input from the current Government the combination can make even more sense.

 

The Defence Policy Statement (released in April 2005) coupled with the goals of the new Government as stated during the last election campaign now represent the directional guidance for the continued transformation of the Canadian Forces.

 

A plan, of course, is only a plan without money until it is funded.  The 1994 White Paper on Defence was a very good strategic plan and would have prevented much of the deterioration that has taken place in the Canadian Forces, had it been adequately funded.  It was not. Canadians now have another good plan in place. May history not repeat itself.

 

 

No. 5

 

Investing in Canada’s Future

 

Without proper funding, any blueprint might as well be written in disappearing ink, as was the case with 1994 White Paper on Defence.

 

It is still too early to assess whether the current Government will be willing to invest the funds that will be required to bring the Canadian Forces to a level at which they can offer Canadians the protection they deserve while advancing the country’s interests internationally. However, if the Spring 2006 budget proves to be a harbinger of what is to come, it falls short.

 

If projections for long-term military spending are based on current spending plus commitments made in the 2006 budget, they come up about $10 billion a year short of the funding that the Committee believes will be required to give Canadians the military they need.

 

Words alone do not work internationally. Nor will words alone rehabilitate an institution that has fallen into deep decline. How much money is really needed to fix the Canadian Forces? Please see Chapter 2.

 

 

– PRACTICAL CHALLENGES (See Part III) –

 

Once the broad challenges listed above have been dealt with, on-the-ground deficiencies need to be addressed on an urgent basis.[1] With a few exceptions, these fall into four general categories:

 

§        Getting More Good People

§        Fixing Procurement Procedures

§        Acquiring Better Equipment

§        Modernizing Infrastructure

 

No. 6

 

Getting More Good People

 

So overstretched had the personnel of the Canadian Forces become by 2004 that the Government of Canada had to do something that many pundits had deemed to be unthinkable: it ordered an “operational pause” for the Canadian Forces until February this year. This was a pause that this Committee had recommended in 2002.[2] At that time the recommendation was dismissed by analysts, politicians and even some senior military personnel as being too embarrassing to Canada to even contemplate.

 

But our leaders began to change their minds, and overseas operations were either shut down or reduced in scope so that military personnel and equipment could be brought home for recuperation and refit. The pause was needed to treat the obvious symptoms of years of trying to do too much with too little – Canada’s armed forces were exhausted.

 

The pause was essential, but it hasn’t solved some of the basic problems. Even after the Government manages to fulfill its commitment to increase the size of the Canadian Forces to 75,000 personnel, there will still be too few people in the Canadian military to properly protect Canadians and advance their interests. Even getting to 75,000 will be difficult – the challenge to recruiting and training systems that had all but disintegrated will be immense. How many people do the Canadian Forces need and how can they ever hope to get them? Please see Part III.

 

 

No. 7

 

Acquiring the Right Equipment

 

Most Canadians are familiar with the Sea Kings, those infamous helicopters purchased by the Government in 1963, primarily as submarine-hunters, and still flying in 2006 when they are not stuck in maintenance, which is often. The Sea Kings were supposed to be replaced in the 1990s. Politics intervened, and no replacement is expected until 2007 (and that may turn out to be an overly-optimistic projection). The truth is that much of Canadian military equipment should have been replaced in the 1990s, but the Government’s fight against budget deficits took precedence.

 

The impact of that fight on the Canadian Forces – which took the biggest hit of any government institution during the cost-cutting – is now manifesting itself. There is a long list of ships, aircraft and all kinds of other equipment that should be acquired to either replace aged existing equipment or to fulfill new roles. The need for new military hardware will be addressed briefly in Part 3, and in greater detail in Part 4, where recommendations will deal with specific needs.

 

 

No. 8

 

Modernizing Infrastructure

 

Infrastructure decay represents a huge and growing liability for the Department of National Defence. It is a liability that tends to get ignored when governments are calculating what needs to be spent on defence in any given year.

 

Government-wide guidelines, set by the Treasury Board, state that departments should spend an amount equivalent to 2 per cent of the Realty Replacement Cost of a piece of infrastructure on maintenance and repair, and another 2 per cent on recapitalization.[3] 

 

The Department of National Defence owns and manages a great deal of property, so what it should be spending on infrastructure maintenance and recapitalization works out to more than $852 million a year.[4] The Department has been unable to come close to these targets in recent memory, spending only slightly more than half of what it is supposed to each year.

 

The cost of correcting the cumulative deterioration to infrastructure will run into the billions. The longer the government puts off addressing the increasingly run-down state of infrastructure held by the Department, the more expensive it will be to fix the problem when they have no choice.

 

It certainly doesn’t make sense to the Committee to add infrastructure before repairing what it has or divesting what it doesn’t need. Please see Part 3.

 

 

PART I

 

National Challenges

 

 

Canadian Mindsets on Defence and Security

 

Change – in this case the revitalization of Canada’s armed forces – will only be sustainable if a majority of citizens are on side. But Canadian citizens have become so engrossed by so many other issues in their private and public lives that matters related to the Canadian Forces have become of peripheral interest to many of them.

 

When Canadians do think about the military, three mindsets tend to complement one another:

 

1.      Canada is not a warlike nation.

 

2.      There is no imminent threat to Canadians.

 

3.      The Americans will take care of us.

 

The Committee believes that these mindsets need to be addressed and amended if the public is going to offer the kind of support that will be needed for change.

 

Canada is not a warlike nation. True, but we do have a history of protecting ourselves, defending our interests and standing up for what is right when the crunch comes. If we did not, our sovereignty and our national identity would be of negligible value. War is terrible, and sane people around the world recognize that. But a proud and moral nation knows how to respond to threats to its own security and sovereignty as well as the wrongs being perpetrated on others. Canada does not have adequate resources to respond in any kind of concerted way. It is not warlike to insist upon having the capacity to respond to random acts of terror. And it is prudent to be able to deal effectively with natural disasters at home and abroad. Both are common sense.

 

There is no imminent threat to Canadians. Not so. Canadians live in a shrunken world in which borders and even oceans offer very limited buffers to disaster. Threats there are threats here. Canada faces a range of potential threats from terrorists, natural disasters and/or pandemics, and, down the road, quite possibly from other nations.[5]

 

Guiliano Zaccardelli, Commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, testified in early May that he expects that a terrorist attack will occur on Canadian soil. The United States, Indonesia, Spain, Kenya, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the Philippines, Australia and Britain have already been hit. Canada has an unenviable place on Osama Bin Laden’s list of countries to be targeted.

 

As for threats from nature, unpredictable weather conditions produced by global warming make the type of natural disaster crises that have brought Canadian Forces to the rescue in the past even more likely in the future.

 

Finally, while threats from other nation states have gone into abeyance for the moment, centuries of history tell us that these types of threats never disappear for very long.

 

If a nation does not have the physical capacity to defend itself, and to stand up for its economy, its culture, and its society, then how does it define sovereignty?

The Americans will take care of us. Americans look out for their own interests first and foremost, and so

should Canadians. The dependence of one nation depending on another nation for its survival is dangerous. If a nation does not have the physical capacity to defend itself, and to stand up for its economy, its culture, and its society, then how do its citizens define sovereignty?

 

The United States is a great friend of Canada. On a huge number of issues, our interests are complementary. The real test of our sovereignty is whether we are capable of acting in our own interests when those interests do not coincide with what any particular U.S. government deems American interests to be. The interests of the two countries will not always coincide.

 

During the Second World War our military was our ticket to survival.

During the two World Wars, Canada stood proud and independent on the world stage, well before the United States became involved. In those days, Canadians knew that our survival as a nation was likely to depend on our military capabilities. Canada needs the capacity to stand proud and independent again.

 

 

How We Lost Touch With One of Our Most Important Institutions

 

From well before Confederation through to the Korean War, Canadians knew that nationhood was – at least in part – predicated on maintaining strong armed forces. Many Canadians have since lost touch with their military. They don’t know anyone who has served in the armed forces. That would have been unthinkable for many previous generations. Nor do they know how important those people are to their physical well being or the international advancement of their interests.

 

There have been very few important institutions that have suffered greater marginalization within Canadian society within the last half-century than our armed forces. There are a variety of reasons for this.

 

The first is “out of sight, out of mind.” Uniformed military personnel are not common in most communities, with many bases located in remote areas. There is no conscription, so most Canadian families are unconnected to military personnel. There has been no mandatory participation of the Reserves in domestic or overseas deployments, as they have been used in the United States (most recently, in Iraq).[6] The deaths of Canada’s sons and daughters have not pervaded the lives of Canadian communities the way they did during the two world wars. Deaths resulting from military duty have blessedly become more rare.

 

Secondly, Canada has become a less-vital component of defending freedom since the Second World War, when we rushed to the rescue of Britain and other European countries far earlier than did the United States. After the Second World War, the Americans took the lead. The Cold War was seen – to a large degree – as a showdown between the Soviet Union and the United States. Canada’s contribution, while important, was not of consuming interest to most Canadians.

 

Military non-involvement started to make sense to many Canadians as many of their American neighbours started dying for causes that were not as clear-cut as the defeat of Nazi Germany, Italy and Japan. America went to Vietnam. Canada did not and it would be hard to find many Canadians today who believe that refraining from joining the United States in that war was a bad decision.[7] The United States has become deeply involved in the Middle East. Canadians participated in the 1991 United Nations-sanctioned liberation of Kuwait, but we stayed home during the reprise fight to topple Saddam Hussein.

 

This marginalization was compounded by the government’s ability to cut the discretionary spending dedicated to national defence.

 

For a variety of reasons then, we lost touch with the importance our military. Our indifference was compounded by what appeared to be government indifference – the first place the government looked to cut spending in the 1990s was the military, reinforcing the image that defence was a peripheral concern. Just as government interest can stimulate public interest – and vice-versa – so can public indifference and government indifference produce the type of monumental lack of interest in the military that pervaded the Canadian psyche at the end of the 20^th century. Everyone went to sleep.

 

 

Why Canadians Need to Come to a New National Consensus

 

Now is the time for a new consensus on national defence. Canadians need one because Canada faces real threats, as discussed above. We also need one because we have thousands of soldiers in harm’s way.  And, finally, we need one because we are at a crossroads of regeneration or decline for the Canadian Forces.

We have more than 2,300 of Canada’s sons and daughters in one of the most dangerous places in the world, and 32 million Canadians should be there with them.

 

Our duty of careto the troops in the field. Canada has contributed significantly to the Global War on Terrorism since September 11, 2001 and will continue to do so. We were in Afghanistan soon after 9/11 and have been there, in one capacity or another, ever since. Despite the casualties Canada has incurred over the last five years, journalists are only now beginning to pay the Canadian mission the attention it deserves. Ditto for politicians. Debate over the mission in Parliament has been peripheral. Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan wasn’t even a major issue during the last election campaign.

 

We have more than 2,300 of our sons and daughters into one of the most dangerous places in the world, and 32 million Canadians should be there with them, but until recently most Canadians probably didn’t even know they were there.

 

We should know exactly what it is they are doing there. We should be arguing about whether or not they should be there and for how long. The last thing we should be is indifferent to them. No matter what we think about the rationale for this mission, we have a duty of care to these people. They are there for us. We need to be there for them.

 

The Canadian Forces are at a crossroads. The neglect of the Canadian Forces has come home to roost. Infrastructure needs repair. Equipment needs replacement. New roles need to be fulfilled. The government has made some commitments to correct this decay.

 

How thorough or wide-ranging has the debate been on these initiatives? How many people could discuss whether the government’s promises will rebuild the Canadian Forces or simply patch over their problems? How knowledgeable are Canadians as to what kind of money it will take to rebuild the military? Do most of us have any idea as to whether the balance between the demands being made of the military and the tool that they are being given to meet those demands are reasonable, as some would contend, and badly out of whack, as others assert? The new government says it is concerned about revitalizing the military. How concerned? Concerned enough to do the job right, or just concerned enough to neutralize criticism from people who understand what is missing? 

 

At the moment, most Canadians do not have enough information to wrestle with these questions. It is important that they get enough information. A country’s self-defence is not a peripheral issue. It should be its primary issue.

 

 

The Essential Players

 

Three powerful forces must come together to give Canadians the armed forces they need:

 

1.     The Government of Canada (with the support of the House of Commons and the Senate)

 

2.     Senior Commanders in the Canadian Military

 

3.     The Canadian Public

 

1. The Government of Canada. Successive governments have failed to engage the public in dialogues on issues such as

 

§         what kinds of threats Canadians face;

 

§         what citizens can and cannot expect from their armed forces;

 

§         what impact military capacity and military activities are likely to have in advancing the country’s national interests; and

 

§         how the country should measure the success (or failure) of any given mission.

 

More about this issue in our next report.

 

2. Senior Commanders of the Canadian Forces. Successive generations of Canadian Forces leaders have not kept the public informed as to their best assessments of the resources the Canadian Forces need to defend Canadians and their interests. In democracies, military authority is subordinate to political leadership.  Government regulations discourage military commanders from being candid. The combination helps lead to public ignorance of holes in our defence framework. 

 

Senior officers testifying to our Committee have proven to be extremely capable at rationalizing government policy. They have focused on their ingenuity at getting their job done with whatever tools they are given, rather than being forthcoming about how deficient the tools have been.  Regulations – government-wide and military – limit their ability to make comments that could be construed as critical of policy. With some notable exceptions, this means the Committee has often been frustrated at eliciting these officers’ best professional judgment as to what is required.

 

In some countries – most notably the United States – senior military commanders are required to publicly provide their legislatures with their best professional judgments of their areas of responsibility. Canada has no such requirement, and the public is the loser because of it.

 

More about this issue in our next report.

 

3. The Canadian Public. How many Canadians are aware of our country’s slow lift-off in getting relief to victims of the South Asian tsunami at the end of 2004? What percentage have any kind of grasp as to how badly our military has been neglected over the past two decades? Have Canadians been presented with enough information to judge what would constitute success or failure for our current mission in Afghanistan? These are important issues. Some Canadians have a handle on them. Many – far too many – do not. And yet, we Canadians have not collectively been able to muster enough anxiety about any of these issues to move the revitalization of the Canadian Forces to the Government’s priority list of important issues. There are Canadians – outside government and outside the military – who understand how unfortunate this is. They need to speak out.

 

 

Leadership and Political Will

 

The Committee believes that cabinet ministers, senators, members of the House of Commons, columnists, reporters, academics, military commanders, rank-and-file soldiers, ex-soldiers, and every other Canadian with insights on the importance of the military should do everything in their power to transfer those insights to the public at large. Only then can a healthy national discussion begin.

 

Once Canadians are presented with all the arguments, we believe they will understand the scale and urgency of the challenges facing the Canadian Forces.

 

If public support is not forthcoming, it makes it much more difficult for any government to come up with the kind of political will needed for profound (and expensive) change. But even if public attitudes do not shift dramatically, the Committee calls upon the Government of Canada and all federal politicians to do what needs to be done to protect Canada, its people and its interests. This cannot continue to be a peripheral file on Parliament Hill.

 

Yes, both the Government of Canada and the Official Opposition have committed themselves to restoring the capacity of the Canadian Forces to defend and protect the lives and interests of Canadians.

 

The Prime Minister has made important symbolic gestures. His personal visit to our troops on the ground in Afghanistan has immeasurably bolstered the overall morale of our Canadian Forces. But symbolism is only a beginning.

 

And what about the other three hundred and eight members of the House of Commons and one hundred and five Senators that make up the Parliament of Canada?

 

Even if the public’s concerns over the capacity of our armed forces to respond to crises never climbs close to the top of public opinion polls, our politicians must recognize how essential the revitalization of the Canadian Forces is to this country and its citizens.

 

If Canadians have not yet engaged in this issue, politicians are going to have to lead Canada in a new direction and do what needs to be done. Leadership is the issue and leadership requires political will. It is a crucial component of any democracy and Canadian politicians need it now.

 

When political will enters the mix, things get done. Take procurement. Although the “average” large military project takes a painstakingly long time to come to fruition, there are a number of historical examples where major projects delivered equipment in a very short time. The acquisition of the Canadian Forces’ Airbuses, Challenger executive jets, Griffon helicopters and one-and-a-quarter ton trucks all spring to mind.

 

They were all fuelled by one common elixir: political will.

 

Take Canada’s preparation for its current deployment to Afghanistan as an example. The Government decided that it had to purchase $234 million worth of equipment for the Canadian Forces in order for the mission to succeed.[8] Rules about buying Canadian, Industrial Regional Benefits, and sole-sourcing seem to have been expedited in favour of what was needed to protect our men and women in the field. In this case, the combination of undeniable need and political will meant: Presto! The acquisitions happened.

 

Things can happen very quickly in Ottawa when decision-makers want them to.

 

 

The Committee’s Role

 

The reason for this Report is that the Committee believes that Canada is facing urgent challenges in the physical protection of its citizens. We cannot sit back and cross our fingers, hoping that words will give way to action.

 

Some changes need to be made, and made quickly. The recommendations that follow address some of the chronic problems facing Canada’s armed forces.

PART II

 

Directional Challenges

 

 

 

Political will is essential to military renewal. But the Government also needs to ensure that it

 

A) Has a sound strategic policy in place and sticks to that strategy;

 

B) Puts sufficient funds behind the strategy; and,

 

C) Moves bureaucratic hurdles out of the way.

 

It is the Committee’s assessment that the government is headed in the right direction on each of these requirements, but has more road to travel.

 

The strategic plan and the need for additional money will be addressed in this chapter. Moving bureaucratic hurdles out of the way will be an area of focus in our next report.

 

CHAPTER 1

 

Follow Strategic Policy

 

A coherent defence policy is a fundamental prerequisite to the revitalization of the Canadian Forces. The Committee’s lead question to Minister of National Defence Gordon O’Connorwhen he testified on May 8, 2006 zeroed in on policy:

 

Senator Forrestall: We work under the assumption that the government's defence policy is the defence policy statement published in April 2005, and the commitment your government has made during and since the election campaign.  Is that generally a fair interpretation of the way in which the government is proceeding?

 

Mr. O'Connor:  Currently, we are developing a capabilities plan. Over arching that plan will be a policy statement philosophy that will encompass our campaign statements and much of the previous policy.  The Defence Department will go forward once that capabilities plan is approved by cabinet.  It will be the department’s guiding document.

 

It is important that the country get a look at the new capabilities plan and the updated policy statement as soon as possible. In their absence, the Committee can only go on the Minister’s general approach, which is very encouraging.

 

The Minister says Canadian defence policy will be an amalgam of his government’s commitments and the previous government’s Spring 2005 International Policy Statement, A Role of Pride and Influence in the World. The Committee supports the general direction of both and believes the government should move quickly toward their implementation. 

 

That being said, the Committee has three concerns about this policy framework. These will be discussed at greater length in later chapters and in the Committee’s next report. They can be broadly stated as: 

 

1.     Whether the framework will create sufficient military capacity to meet Canadians’ needs in the coming years;

 

2.     Whether these plans can be implemented under current funding commitments; and,

 

3.      Whether there are more innovative and efficient ways of achieving these objectives (see Part IV and our next report).

 

The second concern is critical. The last defence policy, the 1994 White Paper on Defence was an enlightened document, full of promises about how Canada would invest intelligently in Canada’s armed forces to ready them for the 21^st century. As mentioned earlier, the money to implement that policy never appeared, leaving the Canadian Forces in their current state, in need of people, money and equipment. Policy is just a bag of words without money.

 

CHAPTER 2

 

Providing Adequate Financing

 

Gordon O’Connor, Minister of National Defence, told us on May 8, 2006 that the government’s plan is affordable.

 

The government’s pledge of $5.3 billion over five years to the Department’s baseline budget, in addition to the previous government’s Budget 2005 commitment of $12.8 billion over five years, is a welcome signal that it is serious about addressing the state of the Canadian Forces.

 

However, we are also convinced that the Government is underestimating both the funding shortfall facing the Canadian Forces and the cost of its new commitments.

 

Bottom line:Current plans are not affordable with the money promised to date.

 

 

Falling Behind

 

The majority of federal spending is mandatory – it automatically flows into legislated programs, such as old age security.  The Government cannot make spending adjustments to these kinds of programs without passing further legislation. Defence spending, on the other hand, is largely discretionary. Without pressure from the public to maintain a healthy military over the past number of years, politicians have withdrawn funds from defence whenever they wanted money for other causes.

 

The Department of National Defence has then been expected to do what it could with the money it had been granted. The cart was put before the horse. Rather than defining the security needs of the Canadian people and finding the funds to meet them, the needs were almost always expected to adjust themselves to the money forthcoming in any given budget.[9]

 

The 1994 White Paper on Defence should have been followed by a revitalization of Canada’s military. Instead it was followed by a series of cutbacks in military spending. In 1983-84, defence spending constituted 1.7 per cent of Canada’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). By 2000-01, it had plunged to 0.9 per cent. It took until 2004-05 for it to rise to 1% of GDP again.[10]

 

One can argue that there was good reason for two decades of spending cutbacks – two successive governments decided to fight Canada’s mounting deficit and debt and had strong public support in doing so. The battle against debt has had a long and extremely successful run, and Canada’s finances are in good order. We need to continue to be fiscally responsible, but continuing to starve essential programs cannot be part of that responsibility. There is no more onerous duty for any government than the protection of its citizens.

 

 

The impact of underfunding

 

The government relies on the Canadian Forces to protect Canadians and their vital interests at home and abroad and to enforce Canadian sovereignty. These are vast and critical responsibilities. They cannot be met as long as Canada’s military continues to be underfunded. The Government’s options for performing these core tasks are going to be limited for at least the next decade – and for longer if the underfunding continues. The Government’s options for performing these core tasks are going to be limited for at least the next decade, even if the appropriate amount of funding were to be invested right away. The Government’s options will be much more limited if the underfunding persists.

 

The consequences have not been dire yet, but neither have they been pretty:

 

§         Underfunding of personnel coupled with a high operational tempo led to burnout and forced the previous Government to declare an operational pause;

 

§         Underfunding of tactical airlift has led to the permanent grounding of 2 aircraft and the general deterioration of the entire Hercules fleet;

 

§         Underfunding of the Navy will mean the loss destroyer-based Command and Control capabilities before they can be replaced;

 

§         Underfunding of recruiting and training has created an organization that does not have the flexibility to grow extremely quickly; and,

 

§         Underfunding of infrastructure has led to a deferred maintenance bill over the last five years alone of almost $1 billion.

 

 

None of these failings in themselves are likely to cause the collapse of Canada’s defence capacity. But collectively they present a worrisome picture.

 

 

Estimating the Department of National Defence’s 2011-2012 Budget

 

They laughed at us when we sat down to play the piano   In 2002, the Committee recommended a $4 billion dollar increase to the Department of National Defence baseline and an operational pause in the Canadian Forces. Its recommendations were roundly criticized as unrealistic.   Within four years, both recommendations have been or are being implemented.

In our last report, Wounded, the Committee estimated that a reasonable annual cost for the military that Canadians need is around $25 Billion to $35 Billion a year.

 

That was before the current government promised to create a range of new capabilities – including the capacity to protect Canada’s Arctic sovereignty. The Committee now believes that the annual realistic cost is at the high end of this range – around $35 billion a year.

 

No one expects an increase of this magnitude to appear overnight. That having been said, the Forces will require an urgent infusion of funds this year and a sustained growth to higher baseline budget levels over several years thereafter to push Canada’s military capabilities to where they need to be.

 

The critical assumptions underlying the Committee’s calculations are that the Government needs to – and should:

 

§         Create a Canadian Forces with an authorized strength of 90,000 personnel;

 

§         Address the critical shortfalls facing capital equipment and infrastructure;

 

§         Enhance the strategic mobility of the Forces; and,

 

§         Continue moving forward aggressively with Transformation.

 

If any of these (necessary) steps are not taken, the cost estimate will, of course, shrink. But we are dealing with what should happen and what we feel must happen, which is not always the same as what does happen.

 

The Committee estimates that the Department of National Defence budget needs to stabilize at our target in fiscal year 2011-2012, around the same time that the Forces reach the authorized strength of 90,000 that we will recommend in Chapter 3.

 

We do know that true and lasting rehabilitation is going to cost a lot more than a one-time infusion of $12.8 billion as committed by the last government in Budget 2005, or than the additional $5.3 billion promised by the new government in Budget 2006.

 

Developing military capabilities often costs more than what has been estimated. There are unforeseeable costs to new pieces of equipment, despite best efforts to minimize them. Contracts pushed out far into the future always have an inherent cost risk.

 

 

Moving Forward

 

The Committee’s estimate of the funding needed to make the Canadian Forces competent to perform their onerous responsibilities prompted a lot of shaking of heads when we first published them, but there has been a more realistic nodding of heads since then. It is important to put these numbers in context, starting with what the previous government had promised and what the current Government says it has in mind for revitalizing the Canadian Forces.

 

The Government has promised to allocate $5.3 billion over and above what the previous government promised. As Minister of National Defence Gordon O’Connor testified: “We are building on the Liberal plan.  Everything is on top of the Liberal plan.”

 

This means that the Department of National Defence’s budget will be approximately $15.19 billion this year and approximately $15.9 billion next year.[12] The Government did not announce in the budget the year-on-year increases for the remaining three years of its commitment. But Mr. O’Connor did testify that: “If we stay on track with our current plans, out at the fifth year, which I think is 2011, we expect our budget to be about $20.3 billion.”[13]

 

 

 

Only baseline increases are real increases.

 

The Committee believes that the Government’s commitment of $5.3 billion to the baseline of the Department’s budget over five years is a positive sign of its commitment to the revitalization of the Canadian Forces.

 

It is important to note that the Minister has stated that the Government’s announced increases will be added to the baseline of the Department’s budget.

 

One-time increases to the defence budget, often provided for acquisition of equipment or more personnel without permanent increases for operations and maintenance, can actually hamstring the Department in the long run. Increases to the baseline are different.

 

The previous government had promised a one-time injection of $12.8 billion over the next five years on top of a relatively steady baseline. Roughly $11 billion of that commitment was scheduled for the fourth and the fifth years.

 

The Committee applauds the new Government’s approach. It will provide more funds to the military and add a measure of spending stability.

 

The Department’s budget will stabilize at around $20.3 billion in 2010-2011. With a follow-on increase in 2011-2012 for inflation, it will only be $4 billion shy of the low end of the Committee’s projections, but $14 billion shy of the more realistic high end.

 

Bottom line: The difference between what the Government currently proposes and what the Committee recommends is not the difference between a $14 billion budget and a $25 Billion to $35 Billion budget. It is the difference between a $20 billion to $21 billion budget and a $25 Billion to $35 Billion budget. There is still a gap there, but not as huge a gap as some critics were pretending.

 

 

The Impact of the Clawback

 

The previous Government’s 2005 federal budget allocated $12.8 billion in additional defence funding over five years, as follows:

 

($ millions)

	2005-2006	2006-2007	2007-2008	2008-2009	2009-2010	Total
National Defence	500	600	1,558	4,466	5,704	12,828

 

 

The new Government tabled a federal budget in May 2006 and it provided DND more funding over and above the funding providing by the last government.[14]

 

($ millions)

	2005-2006	2006-2007	2007-2008	2008-2009	2009-2010	2010-2011	Total
National Defence	--	401	725	TBC	TBC	TBC	5,300

 

 

During the time of the previous Government, the Expenditure Review Committee identified cumulative savings across the government that totalled $10.9 billion over five years, starting in 2005-2006. Just over 89 per cent of these savings – $9.8 billion – was to have come from improved efficiencies.

 

Between 2005 and 2010, DND was expected to give back $640 million, as follows:

 

($ millions)

	2005-2006	2006-2007	2007-2008	2008-2009	2009-2010	2010-2011	Total
National Defence	34	88	143	172	203	--	640

 

 

So, while giving with one hand, the previous Government was also taking with the other. The real increase to defence spending was $12.8 billion – minus the $640 million clawback – or $12.2 billion.

 

The loss of $640 million is significant. It equates to the cost of a fleet of uninhabited aerial vehicles for maritime and sovereignty surveillance, or the acquisition of modern armoured reconnaissance vehicles to protect Canadian troops on dangerous overseas missions.

 

This funding will be lost if this Government allows the original Expenditure Review Committee program to continue.

 

Appearing before the Committee on May 8, 2006, the Minister of National Defence said:

 

“I believe the intent of the Government is to do away with clawbacks, but we are in the midst of it and trying to figure a way out of it.  I cannot give you a definitive answer but that is the trend. The ministers are looking at this to determine what they can do about those clawbacks because it is not the way we budget.  If we are to give $1 billion, then you will get $1 billion.  Right now, we are in a financial bind brought about by the previous plan, and we are trying to get out of it. My expectation is that the dollars stated for defence will be the dollars that defence will receive.”

 

The Committee agrees with the Minister and would strongly support the Government if it decides to move to eliminate clawbacks affecting the Department.

 

 

TheImpact of Accrual Accounting

 

The new Government’s announcement that it will go ahead with accrual accounting will have an as yet undetermined impact on the budget of the Department of National Defence.[15] Accrual accounting is an accounting principle that is being implemented government-wide as part of an effort begun in 1995 by the Treasury Board to get a more comprehensive picture of the Government’s assets and liabilities.

 

In the words of the Office of the Auditor General, “Accrual financial information helps users appreciate the full financial scope of government—the resources, obligations, financing, costs, and impacts of its activities, including the costs of consuming assets over time. This more complete picture helps legislators hold the government accountable for the stewardship of its assets, the full costs of its programs, and its ability to meet short-term and long-term financial obligations.”[16]

 

What this means for defence is that the Department can spread the cost of a piece of capital expenditures such as buildings or major equipment over its useful life instead of listing its entire price in the year it is paid for.

 

Col (ret’d) Brian MacDonald, Senior Analyst with the Conference of Defence Associations Institute and a proponent of moving to accrual accounting, uses the replacement of the Army’s medium trucks as a “simple thought experiment” to illustrate the potential impact of this new accounting method. To summarize Mr. MacDonald’s argument:

 

The Army’s trucks are old and overdue for replacement. New trucks come with a price tag approaching $957 million. There is not enough room in the capital budget over the next few years to accommodate a cost that large. However, if accrual accounting rules applied, new trucks would be far more affordable. Instead of having to find $957 million for new trucks in the year they are purchased, the Department would incur a charge of one-twentieth the total cost, or about $48 million, each year over their expected 20 year lives. Not only would it be possible to acquire more new equipment sooner, the Forces would save on costly life extension programs to keep existing trucks running.[17]

 

Minister Gordon O’Connor made a strong case to us that accrual accounting was one of the reasons that the Government’s plan was affordable. According to Mr. O’Connor, “If we wanted to buy a piece of equipment that has 20 years’ life, we amortize the cost of the equipment over 20 years.  … A budget increase in a particular year, if you take pieces of it for capital, each piece can basically be [divided] by 20.  That is the way the accounting works.  Yes, the money is there.”[18]

 

It is certain that accrual accounting will impact Department of National Defence budget planning and will free up considerable room for increased expenditures on capital equipment.

 

But the Committee does not see accrual accounting as any kind of cure-all for budgetary shortfalls. Accrual accounting only relates to capital expenditures. Accrual accounting will not impact personnel, operations or maintenance costs, which make up the vast majority of departmental spending. The Committee is convinced that even with accrual accounting, there will be more demands for spending than funds available to address them.

 

A detailed evaluation of the impact of accrual accounting will not be possible before the release of the Defence Capabilities Plan and the Department’s Report on Plans and Priorities later this year.

 

 

The Committee’s Projections:

Arriving at Our Estimate of $25 Billion to $35 Billion

 

 

None of these numbers is etched in stone. The Committee accepts that there are many ways to make ends meet, and that increasingly creative ways may be found to put together armed forces that can do the job that Canadians need done. But one simply cannot ignore the fact that there is a lot of catching up to do given years of neglect.

 

Overall, it is difficult to see how anyone could argue against the fact that virtually every component of the Department’s budget is going to require a greater infusion of money in absolute terms. Certainly the increases required to correct capital equipment and infrastructure shortfalls are going to require a lot more money.

 

Let us consider each component in turn.

 

 

Personnel

 

Personnel costs include salary, benefits, pension contributions, and personnel- related O&M like clothing, medical, rental of living quarters, and so on.[19] The Committee estimates expanding the Canadian Forces to 90,000 (which the Committee will recommend in Part III) would cost between $12.5-$15.5 billion annually, up from more than $7 billion this year.[20]

 

Comparison of Government and Committee Growth Projections for the Regular Force
	Total Force Size	Committee’s Estimate of Annual Cost	Completion Date
Government Planned Expansion	75,000	$9.6 billion - $2.6 Billion	2010-2011
Committee Recommended Expansion	90,000	$12.5 billion - $15.5 billion	2011-2012

 

The majority of the estimated escalation is due to increased salaries and benefits for an expanded Canadian Forces. It is based on the gradual expansion of the Regular Force to an authorized strength of 90,000 by 2012 – approximately 28,000 more than the current level; 23,000 more than envisaged in the Defence Policy Statement and 15,000 more than promised by the new Government.

 

The Committee estimates that the cost of each additional 10,000 military personnel to be approximately $2 billion.[21] Based on that estimate, it is reasonable to calculate that fulfilling the Committee’s recommendation of expanding the Regular Forces by an additional 28,000 personnel would cost at least $6 billion annually.

 

This cost will not be as great if the Government decides to hold itself to its election commitment of increasing the Forces to 75,000 personnel overall. The Committee estimates that fulfilling this promise – ie. expanding by only 13,000 additional personnel – would cost approximately $2.6 billion annually. That having been said, the Committee is convinced that at some point the Government will recognize that their promised increase will not deliver close to enough personnel to maintain a capable, sustainable military that is going to be tasked at the tempo of recent years.

 

(The Committee has chosen to focus on the Regular Force in this study but it believes that the Reserve Force will continue to be an important part of the Canadian Forces mission.)

 

In addition to the extra costs associated with a larger force, the Committee believes that the Forces will also face significantly higher recruitment and retention costs as they try to:

 

a.     Expand to 90,000 personnel;

 

b.     Retain personnel approaching natural retirement points; and,

 

c.      Address the challenge of undermanned trades.

 

Expanding to 90,000 personnel will mean significantly higher recruitment costs. The Forces will have to attract larger pools of people to the Forces than at any other time in decades. Convincing so many of today’s young people to join the Canadian Forces will require unprecedented effort and creative solutions – both of which will cost money.

 

Retaining personnel approaching natural retirement points will also cost significantly more in coming years. As the Committee described in its last report, Wounded, the Canadian Forces are facing a demographic bulge as much of their workforce approaches eligibility for retirement. Many of those who might be getting ready to leave have invaluable knowledge and experience that the Forces can ill afford to lose, especially as they grapple with expansion. However, retaining such quality people will undoubtedly require incentives, which cost money.

 

The final element of increasing personnel costs is the challenge of fixing chronically undermanned, or stressed, trades.[22] The Canadian Forces will continue to be plagued by a personnel crisis until it can assure that the problem of undermanned trades is addressed.

 

To address these so-called stressed trades, it is necessary to entice a large number people in highly sought-after trades – like doctors, dentists and mechanics – to choose the Canadian Forces; and conversely, it will be necessary to dissuade personnel in highly sought-after trades from choosing to leave the Forces with their expertise. Again, this will involve incentives.

 

Expanding the capacity of the Forces to provide additional post-secondary, graduate and post-graduate education for its officers (as the Committee will discuss further in its next report) will also carry a cost.

 

 

 

Capital Funding: the Need for Disaster Relief

 

Years of underfunding has forced the Department of National Defence to fall behind in the replacement of existing equipment and the acquisition of new capabilities. The existing listing of projects that must now be tackled – from ships to aircraft to trucks, and buildings that need to be replaced, built or bought – is long and expensive. That is why capital funding is the area in which spending must increase the most.

 

The Department spent 16.7 per cent of its budget last year on capital.[23] As the Committee pointed out in Wounded, this percentage simply does not provide enough money to prevent a decline in equipment and infrastructure. Last year was a fairly typical year and is indicative of a cycle that cannot be allowed to continue.

 

The Department has tried to increase capital expenditures on equipment and infrastructure for many years, without much success. It even tried to formalize the pegging of its capital spending as a percentage of overall defence spending in 1999. In Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence: A Strategy for 2020 the Department set out a five-year target for capital spending that was intended to lead to a “viable and affordable” defence structure.[24] That goal was to be achieved by spending a minimum of 23 per cent of every annual defence budget on equipment and infrastructure. As a first step, Defence Planning Guidance 2000 set an interim goal of 21 percent by April 2004. The Department of National Defence never got close.[25]

 

As the Department’s Assistant Deputy Minister of Materiel Alan Williams testified to the Committee in November 2004:

 

“We are trying to balance paying people, paying for infrastructure, buying new equipment and sustaining existing equipment. You must make those prioritization decisions. [Capital spending] is often the one that is [neglected], because you must pay people, you must sustain the equipment, and you have to house the people, as well as have proper facilities for the equipment. Therefore, it is not surprising that what must be affected most is front-end capital.”[26]

 

Setting a firm, ambitious, target for capital-funded renewal as a percentage of overall Departmental spending would be a reasonable way to correct past investment deficiencies, to restore the Forces’ major weapons systems and capabilities, and to rationalize major procurement schedules for the future.

 

The Committee applauds the Strategy 2020 attempt to reach a 23 per cent goal, but it isn’t going to be sufficient considering the continued deterioration of equipment and infrastructure. A healthy armed forces budget assigns approximately 25 per cent to capital-funded equipment and infrastructure replacement. The Committee believes that a more appropriate level would be approximately 30 per cent.

 

Why? Because the Forces are fighting from behind. The under-capitalization of the Forces has continued for almost seven years since Strategy 2020 was published. Since then, the capabilities of the Forces – from the availability of the Air Force’s Hercules transport aircraft to the age of the Navy’s Destroyers to the state of base infrastructure – have continued to deteriorate.

 

Take, for example, the state of infrastructure. In Wounded, the Committee made the case that the government was falling over $200 million short every year in its Operations and Maintenance spending on the repair of infrastructure across the Forces.

This chronic under-funding has created a huge backlog of deferred maintenance that of course never goes away, but more often than not, creates a much worse situation as roads, buildings and other infrastructure deteriorates past the point of economical repair. At the very least the money must be found to fund necessary ongoing maintenance and stop the decay. In reality, however, additional funding must also be found in the capital accounts to rebuild and replace infrastructure that, due to age and neglect, has passed the point of no return.

Regrettably, a similar situation exists amongst the various fleets of ships, aircraft and vehicles operated by the Canadian Forces. Necessary updates and replacements have been delayed or not done at all and far too much of this equipment has become unmaintainable or operationally irrelevant due to obsolescence.

A number of factors go into replacing equipment. For example, equipment needs to be replaced when it no longer capable of countering threats, when it is technologically obsolete, or when its original manufacturer no longer supports it (making it difficult and costly to get spares or replacements). All of these conditions apply to the Canadian Forces now.

 

To escape this vicious cycle, the Department will have to dedicate more than what a normal defence organization would to capital spending. The Committee is therefore recommending that the Government fund the Department sufficiently to allow it to dedicate 30 per cent of its budget to capital funding by 2011-2012.

 

 

There would be a corollary benefit of to dedicating a firm percentage of budget to equipment and infrastructure: the creation of stable and predictable spending patterns. This will enable the efficient planning of new military equipment acquisition or infrastructure renewal when it is needed. The Forces would then be able to schedule their expenditures in the most economical way possible. This will help avoid the annual reprioritization of projects that compete for too few capital dollars.

 

 

Nuts and Bolts

 

Consider the cost of the largest capital equipment projects that have to be dealt with over the next two decades if the Government is going to implement the Committee’s recommendations.

 

The Committee has estimated its equipment requirements and cost projections based on a Canadian Forces of 90,000 personnel.

 

 

Government estimates of the total cost of equipment in the decades ahead are likely lower than those of the Committee. That is in part, because it plans to acquire less of some items. For example, the Joint Support Ship. The Government plans to acquire three Joint Support Ships, whereas the Committee advocates four are required for reasons outlined in Part IV.

 

In addition to the priorities that the Committee has identified, the Government is also planning the following major projects which the Committee estimates will cost:

 

 

Therefore, the Committee estimates that the expected cost of the largest equipment projects facing the Canadian Forces over the next two decades will cost between $58 - $81 billion.

 

 

 

It should be noted that the above estimate is not the total cost of all capital projects facing the Canadian Forces. Instead it is a list of the largest ticket equipment items only.

 

The list does not include the myriad of smaller equipment projects that will have to be acquired on an ongoing basis. To get a sense of the magnitude of those other projects, consider that the 13 most significant capital equipment projects in the Department of National Defence totaled only approximately 55.3% of the total Capital Equipment portion of the department’s budget for the year 2004/2005.[31]

 

Nor does the list include any of the infrastructure construction projects that will have to be addressed. Government priorities like building an a deepwater port and a training centre in the Arctic, moving quick reaction units to the east and west coasts, installing an airborne battalion in Trenton or creating Territorial Battalions will come with hefty infrastructure costs. These priorities will be addressed further in the Committee’s next report. 

 

The Committee acknowledges that the Department of National Defence is working on a Defence Capability Plan, which is intended to be a comprehensive list of the capabilities the Canadian Forces must have to fulfill the missions assigned to by the Defence Policy Statement and the government’s additional election commitments. That list will obviously include equipment needs. The equipment needs listed in that plan will be critically important. When the Plan is completed and presented to the government for sign-off, the Government should brand it as a roadmap for change.

 

 

Breakdown of Committee Estimate of DND 2011-2012 Budget   - II
CAPITAL FUNDING	APPROX COST
§        Infrastructure recapitalization (per committee recommendation to adhere to Treasury Board guidelines for infrastructure replacement and to address infrastructure decay backlog)	$500-750 million
§        Major new equipment (per committee recommendation in Part 4 to increase Canadian Forces capabilities as soon as possible)	$6-9 billion
§        Other capital requirements	$4-6 billion
TOTAL COST – CAPITAL	$10-15 billion

 

 

Operations & Maintenance

 

As the Canadian Forces enter a period of growth, it is important to recognize that every acquisition of new equipment, every new building constructed, every person brought into the Forces comes with an attendant large tail of costs that continues year after year.

 

 

 

The acquisition or construction cost is the tip of the iceberg in terms of the overall costs of a piece of equipment. Spare parts, repairs, training, software and hardware upgrades, even disposal, contribute to the total life cycle cost of a piece of equipment.

 

Successive Governments have Underfunded Operations and Maintenance

 

The failure of successive governments over the last twenty-five years to recognize these costs has been one of the contributing causes of the Canadian Forces’ current situation.

 

Shortfalls in national procurement accounts mean that you can’t buy enough parts and has often required the shifting of parts between ships or aircrafts or vehicles for operational duty.[32] Peter gets robbed to pay Paul, if only temporarily. The process increases wear and tear on parts and ties up technicians who are already in short supply.

 

Underfunding infrastructure maintenance has a similar impact. The deferred maintenance and recapitalization bill for infrastructure between 2000 and 2004 alone is almost $1 billion (the recapitalization part of which has been discussed above). That means hundreds of millions of dollars worth of lower-priority preventative maintenance didn’t get done between 2000-2004. Skipping preventative maintenance leads to decay taking hold quicker and equipment and/or infrastructure being replaced sooner.

 

The Canadian Forces must invest significantly more than they have in the past to address the Operations & Maintenance shortfalls.

 

The growth in Operations and Maintenance costs will be predicated on:

 

§        The need to address the chronic underfunding of the National Procurement account

 

§        The increased size of the Forces to 90,000 personnel as recommended by the Committee

 

§        The increased capabilities of the Forces as recommended by the Committee (in Chapter 4)

 

§        The increased cost of operations and maintenance on technologically advanced new equipment

 

§        The increased levels of readiness promised in the Defence Policy Statement and as recommended by the Committee (in Chapter 4)

 

§        The increased number of missions the Forces can be expected to undertake in the coming years

 

That is because the Committee believes that some current costs in O&M are inordinately high because equipment is old and needs more substantial attention on a more frequent basis. The purchase of new equipment should mitigate some of those pressures.

 

 

New Equipment is Not Enough

In May 2006, Minister of National Defence Gordon O’Connor testified to the Committee that:

“Whenever we replace the current Hercules fleet, which is costing upwards of $400 million a year to maintain, I think you will find that that new fleet, whichever one it is, will not cost the same amount of money to maintain.  That starts to change the O&M [Operations and Maintenance] mix.

…To maintain current medium army trucks is very expensive.  As we start to replace the trucks, the cost of maintaining them will go down. 

… A lot of the O&M problems are a result of having out‑of‑date equipment that is costing a fortune to maintain.  As we start to move through some of these capital projects, it will start to change that balance.  We will certainly improve the O&M problem into the future; not so much by pouring more money into it, but by changing how they are maintaining and upgrading the equipment.”[33]

 

The Committee finds the Minister’s statement questionable. In November 2004, the Department of National Defence’s Assistant Deputy Minister for Materiel, Alan Williams, testified that:

 

“It is generally believed that the cost to maintain new equipment must be less than that for old equipment. In fact, the opposite is true, with the costs of new equipment often doubling or tripling that of older equipment. New equipment is technologically more complex and involves the maintenance and updates of sophisticated software.”[34]

 

A plan to reduce O&M by acquiring new equipment appears short-sighted to the Committee because it will often be as expensive, if not more expensive, than existing equipment.

 

An absolute increase in operations and maintenance spending is required to allow the Forces to address many of the complaints that the Committee has heard about including: inadequate spare parts, having to share equipment, and a lack of flying hours and sea-days to properly train pilots and ship crews. 

 

 

Breakdown of Committee Estimate of DND 2011-2012 Budget   - III
OPERATIONS & MAINTENANCE COST IN 2011-12	APPROX COSTS
§        Current operations and maintenance cost	$4.3 billion
§        Increased cost of: -       Addressing National Procurement shortfalls -       Maintaining higher levels of readiness and maintaining equipment in a larger Canadian Forces -       Maintaining modern equipment -       Additional training exercises	$4-7 billion
TOTAL COST – OperationS & MAINTENANCE	$8-11 billion

 

 

Statutory, Grants & Contributions

 

Statutory, Grants & Contributions is an amalgam of non-discretionary legislated funding. It is principally made of contributions to NATO and to academic groups. The former accounts for the vast majority of the spending and can be expected to increase commensurate with an increase in the size of the Canadian Forces. The Committee believes that the latter amount will also have to increase significantly.  Details to follow in our next report.

 

 

Breakdown of Committee Estimate of DND 2011-2012 Budget   - IV
STATUTORY, GRANTS & CONTRIBUTIONS COSTS IN 2011-12	APPROX COSTS
§        Statutory directed contributions (per committee recommendation to international organizations like NATO)	$1.1-1.5 billion
§        Expansion of academic and related programs (see the Committee’s next report)	$200-250 million
TOTAL COST – STATUTORY, GRANTS & CONTRIBUTIONS	$1.3-2 billion

 

 

What a $25 Billion to $35 Billion Budget Means Relative to the Size of Canada’s Economy and What Other Nations Spend

 

If this year’s defence budget were $25 Billion to $35 Billion, that would equate to spending between 1.94 per cent and 2.7 per cent of Gross Domestic Product.

 

Admittedly, if we spent that amount this year, it would constitute a hefty price tag for Canada’s national insurance policy. It would put us among the top tier of what most of our allies are spending on defence.

 

However, the Committee is not talking about this year. The Committee believes that the Department of National Defence’s budget needs to grow to at least $25 Billion to $35 Billion by 2011-2012 as the Forces finish expansion to the Committee’s recommended level of 90,000 personnel, aggressively pursue Transformation and begin to take delivery of new equipment. We are saying that the Government needs to add billions more to its projections for 2011-2012.

 

How much that will be relative to the size of Canada’s economy, nobody can be sure. Five years is an eternity to economists. But presuming that the economy grows at a pace consistent with what it has been growing at over the last five years, $25 Billion to $35 Billion will not be unreasonable relative to the estimated size of our economy. The Committee estimates that in 2011-2012 it would constitute roughly 1.58 per cent - 2.21 per cent of Canada’s GDP.[35]

 

This is not out of line with what like-minded nations currently spend on their militaries, both relative to the size of their economies and on a per-capita basis.

 

	Defence Spending per capita ($CDN)	Defence Spending as a % of GDP
Canada 2005[36]	$343	1.01%
Canada 2011-2012 based on a $25 billion defence budget	$757	1.58%
Canada 2011-2012 based on a $35 billion defence budget	$1060[37]	2.21%
United Kingdom	$903	2.29%
The Netherlands	$658	1.52%
Australia	$648	1.98%
United States	$1,733	3.96%

 

Please see Appendix IV for a more detailed look at what a number of countries spend on defence.

 

Budgets for the Department of National Defence should be based on what feels is it needed to create military security for Canadians.

Comparing ourselves with other countries isn’t the way we need to set our defence budget – we must set budgets on the basis of what Canadians need to protect themselves and contribute to world stability. That being said, comparing Canada to other like-minded nations is a useful check. Would spending $25 Billion to $35 Billion on national defence be unreasonable in the community of reasonable nations?  No.

 

Moreover, other countries compare our spending to theirs. Such comparisons send messages as to how committed a country is to advancing its interests internationally. If the Government lacks the tools to make a difference in the world, other nations will have to take up the slack. Those countries will notice, and Canada’s international influence will likely continue to decline.

 

Pegging the Defence Budget – Arguing as the Devil’s Advocate

 

Just for the sake of argument, what if Canada were to peg its defence spending according to a mean or average of the spending of other countries that play a reasonable, middle-power role in world affairs? Again, this would be the Committee’s distant second choice – far better to match our dollars to our needs.

 

However, it might be instructive to compare for anyone who thinks that a $25 Billion to $35 Billion defence budget is unreasonable.

 

A NATO Peg?

 

In 2005, Canadian defence expenditures amounted to a little more than 1 per cent of GDP. Of the 26 NATO members, that put Canada ahead of only Luxembourg, and Iceland (which has no armed forces) according to the Department of National Defence.[38]

 

If Canada were to peg its defence budget at the average amount spent by 26 NATO countries, we would spend approximately 1.7 per cent of GDP. Coincidentally, median NATO defence spending also comes out to about 1.7 per cent of GDP.

 

A G8 Peg?

 

The G8, of course, is comprised of seven leading industrial nations, plus Russia.[39]

 

The latest average defence budget of G8 members is about $34.23 Billion Canadian (excluding the United States).[40] The average defence spending per capita of G8 members is about $460 Canadian (again, excluding the United States).[41]

 

A More General Peg?

 

To save readers the time of turning back to the beginning of this chapter and checking out our Canadian comparison with some other countries that play a reasonably active international role, here is that chart again, calculated in Canadian dollars:

 

United Kingdom   $903

The Netherlands   $658

Australia              $648

Canada                 $343[42]

 

Some countries – like France and the United Kingdom – average nearly 2 per cent of GDP – approximately double Canadian expenditures. If Canada were spending 2 per cent of GDP on defence this year, our total investment would come to about $30 billion – about double the current Canadian defence budget.

 

All of which is to say that – whether you base military spending on Canada’s needs, or base it on comparisons with what other like-minded countries spend – the Committee is being reasonable when it talks about a defence budget of between $25 billion and $35 billion by 2011-12.

 

The Committee recommends that:

 

1.  Canadian defence budgets be based on longer-term thinking about the security needs of Canadians, rather than short-term fixes to manpower shortages and equipment rust-out.

 

2.   The Government should grow to, and maintain the annual budget of the Department of National Defence at, between $25 Billion to $35 Billion by 2011-2012 to increase its capacity to protect Canadians and their interests at home and abroad, and to contribute to international peace and security.

 

3.   A minimum of 30 per cent of the defence budget be allocated to capital expenditures every year to ensure that Canadians serving their country have the infrastructure and equipment they need to do their jobs well, with as little threat to their lives as possible.

 

4.  The Government should immediately cancel the Expenditure Review Committee commitments affecting the Department of National Defence and ensure that the Department has use of at least the full allocation of the original $12.8 billion over five years allocated by the previous Government AND the additional $5.3 billion over the next five years, promised by the current Government.

 

 

 

 

PART III

 

Practical Challenges

 

 

 

CHAPTER 1

 

Getting More Good People

 

This Committee frequently pays tribute to the ingenuity, toughness and valour of those who serve in the Canadian Forces.  We are well aware that the Forces are full of great people.

 

But having great people is not sufficient to make the Canadian Forces effective. Success depends upon having enough great people. The alternative is too often burnout and even the eventual possibility of failure.

 

Now that the operational pause of the last two years has ended, the Committee does not believe that the current number of Canadian Forces personnel can indefinitely sustain the tempo of operations that they will be asked to undertake.

 

A similar level of personnel was overtaxed to a near meltdown in 2004 after a decade of over-deployment before the last government finally ordered an operational pause. That pause was needed to treat the obvious symptoms of trying to do too much with too little for years.  The Canadian Forces were exhausted.

 

Prior to the pause, the Forces found themselves straining to continuously deploy 4,000 personnel on overseas operations.[43] The Chief of the Defence Staff testified to the Committee that he has no reason to believe there will be fewer demands placed on the Forces in the coming years than occurred in the 1990s.[44] The Defence Policy Statement concurs.[45]

 

The Government’s Planned Expansion: A Good First Step

 

Both the last government and the current government—through their respective promises to expand the Forces—have acknowledged that the Forces are under-manned. The new government’s plan to increase the Canadian Forces to 75,000 Regular and 30,000 Reserve personnel is certainly a significant step in the right direction.It represents a commitment to expand the Regular Forces by approximately 20% and it is the first growth of this size in at least a generation.

 

But even 75,000 Regulars will not provide the Canadian Forces with sufficient personnel in the near or long-term to perform the many jobs the Committee believes will be assigned to them by the government. Even after expansion, the Committee believes that there will still be too few people in the Canadian Forces to give the Government the capacity it needs to properly protect Canadians and advance their interests.

 

 

What Size Will Protect Canada?

 

How many more personnel do the armed forces really need?The Committee believes that the Canadian Forces require 90,000 people in uniform, not the 75,000 promised by the government. We invite you to do the math with us.

 

As the Committee commented in its last report, Wounded, the Canadian Forces are operating at a personnel level that is approximately 40-45 per cent below what they require to perform the types of duties they have had to perform over the past decade and are likely to perform in coming decades.[46]

 

Based on the roles and missions described in the Defence Policy Statement, there isn’t much question that increased operational demands will be placed on the Canadian Forces in coming years. Take for example the impact of our mission in Afghanistan on the Canadian Forces. It is taxing our military and limiting our ability to perform missions elsewhere. Any decision as to whether to go into Darfur, for instance, should be made on the basis of whether a mission would be useful, whether it would be done under the auspices of the United Nations, and other such considerations. It should not have to be ruled out because Canada has quickly run out of capacity after putting 2,300 people in Afghanistan.

 

The Committee believes that Canada needs enough military capacity to take on at least two operations the size of the one ongoing in Afghanistan at once. We barely have enough to sustain one.

 

Those demands will have to be met on the back of the massive rebuilding job that will take place over the next decade.

 

In short: it won’t take long for the additional 13,000 new recruits to discover that they should have been an additional 28,000 new recruits. That’s what it would take to get warships, combat units and operational air squadrons up to strength, for stressed trades to be built up, for training resources to be restored, and to have enough people at hand to replace those on leave or in training.

 

The Committee believes that even with the government’s planned expansion the Forces will be unable to meet its five key personnel demands:

 

1)    Sufficiently staffing stressed trades;

2)    Filling existing units;

3)    Reducing personnel tempo;

4)    Increasing the personnel dedicated to recruiting; and,

5)    Staffing new capabilities.

 

Let us look at each in turn.

 

 

1) Fill Existing Units

 

Canadians need to understand that their armed forces – which have shrunk significantly since the 1970s – are even smaller than they look. Typically, only 83 per cent of the Forces’ total strength is available for full employment.[47] Almost one out of five is unavailable for a variety of reasons. That makes life considerably more difficult for the other four who too often have been required to bear the load.

After the downsizing of the 1990s, shrunken units were left with little flexibility. They are staffed to the authorized minimum level, but not always. Some Canadian Forces units have frequently been left without their basic minimum complement of authorized personnel.

 

Again, an authorized number of people is not the same as an available number of people. Units start with less than a full complement, then have to face the added challenge that a sizable percentage of personnel are consistently unavailable for employment or operational deployments due to illness, injury, training, professional development, compassionate grounds, leave or for other causes.[48] Since no extra staffing is provided within units to cover off these absences, personnel must often be borrowed or taken from other units when it comes time for operations.

 

When civilian organizations staff their departments, they usually take into account the fact that some personnel are bound to be missing for vacations, sick leave or training from time to time, and they then hire extra people to take that into account. The Committee does not believe that the Canadian Forces have built in enough of that kind of breathing room to recover from the personnel reductions of the 1990s. 

 

Absentees don’t generally present the huge problems in civilian life that they do in the military. In the military, when a crisis arises, sufficient trained and qualified people are needed quickly.  There are no temp agencies around to get you through.

 

 

2) Stressed Trades

 

The under-manning of Canadian Forces – the holes in units and capabilities – gets even worse when the focus shifts to what are called “stressed trades.”

 

Stressed trades are occupations that are essential to the function of the Forces but are staffed well below authorized strength. These are trades in which personnel are often in short supply in the private sector as well, so extraordinary measures are called for to bring them up to strength.

 

Specialities that require significant amounts of training and experience, like medicine or mechanical trades, are often stressed. They are in limited supply and in high demand.[49] The need for specialist personnel on most missions means that those available are often required to deploy more frequently than others. This often causes burnout, compounding the problem and accelerating the departure of key people from the Forces.

 

Recruiting and training should be geared toward preventing this. The people in stressed trades are often the ones most vital to the success of missions.

 

In June 2005, the Canadian Forces identified about 100 different full and part-time military trades that required additional personnel. For example, there were shortages in the Armour, Communications, Electronics, Logistics, and Combat occupations.[50]

The Committee recommends that:

 

5.   The Canadian Forces increase the authorized strength of critical, high-demand trades to ensure an operationally sufficient supply of personnel in those trades, so that deploying operational units are never undermined by a lack of specially trained personnel to do critical technical tasks; and that the Canadian Forces recruiting and training system be specifically geared to sustain those levels.

 

 

3) Reducing Personnel Tempo[51]

 

The Committee has been commenting on the excessive burden being placed on military personnel since its first reports in 2002. Notwithstanding what the Committee said in For an Extra $130 Bucks:AnUpdate On Canada’s Military Financial Crisis,Personnel Tempo is still one of the chief issues raised with the Committee in its travels across the country. Personnel tempo is a measure of the frequency and duration of time spent away from home on missions or professional development.

 

Because of the shortage of people in the Canadian Forces – particularly in the Army – personnel continue to be required to spend considerable periods of time away from their place of residence.

 

These taskings have hit hardest at the Master Corporal, Sergeant, Warrant Officer and Captain Ranks – the very ranks that provide leadership within field units.

 

This practice tends to have an undue impact upon the best NCOs and officers, because the best people are naturally chosen to train others. That means the best personnel are often the ones whose family lives suffer the most, resulting in extra pressure on the best people to leave the military. The requirement to take on these additional tasks reduces the quality of life for Canadian Forces personnel and also leads to burnout.

 

The Committee notes a recent development that could help monitor and map the scale of the personnel tempo challenge. Units are now required to electronically record “Time Away,” defined as any period of 24 hours or more that a soldier, sailor, airman or airwoman is not at their normal place of residence for reasons other than leave.[52] These records will permit a measure of the quality of work life and will help act as a warning to supervisors and Commanding Officers that burnout or other related problems may be looming.

 

The Committee believes this is a positive step and will monitor to see whether it has a positive impact on the personnel tempo of Canadian Forces personnel.

 

 

4) Better Recruiting and Training

 

The cuts of the 1990s gutted the Canadian Forces recruiting and training systems, and they need to be rebuilt.

 

The Committee believes that to increase the size of the Forces to the level that the Committee has recommended and to expand the Canadian Forces’ professional development capabilities, the recruiting and training capacity must also be greatly expanded.

 

At the direction of Chief of the Defence Staff General Rick Hillier, who has made recruiting a top priority, the Forces have undertaken what he calls OP CONNECTION.  General Hillier wants to make recruiting an inclusive process:

 

“‘Recruiting is everybody’s business’, and I intend to revitalize our recruiting culture.  I expect the complete Chain of Command to be engaged in an aggressive and comprehensive recruitment strategy.  I expect every sailor, soldier, airman and airwoman to recognize their role as a potential CF recruiter, effectively spreading the load from the shoulders of recruiting centre personnel to the shoulders of all Regular and Reserve personnel.  I see this as a shared responsibility and duty and I consider it essential in order to connect in a meaningful way with greater numbers of Canadians.”[53]

 

Good start. But in addition to revitalizing the recruiting culture of the Forces, their basic recruiting and training structures are going to need a lot more personnel if the Forces are going to increase their numbers.

 

 

5) New Capabilities Mean More People Too

 

The Canadian Forces will also require additional units to fulfill a variety of roles that go with the new capacity this Government promised during the election campaign and additional capacity called for by the Committee (either later in this report or in its next report). Some of these include:

 

a.                 An additional naval Standing Contingency Task Force (to create a total of two, one on the east coast and one on the west coast);

 

b.                 A robust and flexible strategic sea lift capability, able to both transport and support deployments of Canadian Forces personnel overseas;

 

c.                  Strategic airlift capability;

 

d.                 A new elite combined arms unit with airborne capabilities dedicated to act as a national strategic reserve force and as support for Joint Task Force Two;

 

e.                  Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles;

 

f.                   The raising of professional education requirements and the creation of training establishments that would help personnel to meet them; and,

 

g.                 A stronger presence in the Arctic.

 

 

Bottom Line

 

It is the Committee’s assessment that:

 

1.     The operational demands on the Canadian Forces will be at least as onerous, if not more so, than it was before the 2004 pause in operations.

 

2.     The problem of stressed trades must be addressed by increasing authorized manning levels in affected occupations.

 

3.     The Canadian government has a duty of care to Canadian Forces personnel to ensure that the brutal personnel tempo that many were subjected to before the operational pause does not recur.

 

4.     The recruiting, training and professional development capacities of the Canadian Forces must all be expanded.

 

Where the New People Will be Needed:

 

 

Why 75,000 Trained and Effective Personnel Means 90,000 Total

 

To maintain a level of 75,000 trained effective personnel, the Canadian Forces will require 90,000 authorized military personnel.

 

The Canadian Forces currently have approximately 64,000 authorized personnel, of whom approximately 54,000 are trained and effective at any given time.[55] The existence of a gap between these two numbers is normal and inevitable.

 

As noted earlier, there are fewer available for employment than authorized because personnel go on training courses, annual leave, injury leave, sick leave, and parental leave.

 

To sustain a level of 75,000 trained and effective, it is necessary to maintain a population in the Canadian Forces that is 15-20% larger than that.

 

The Committee recommends that:

 

6.  The Canadian Forces should maintain regular strength of 90,000 personnel. This is the minimum needed to keep 75,000 trained and effective personnel – the number required to sustain the domestic and overseas tempo Canada may be required to protect its citizens and advance their interests.

 

 

The Need to Grow More Quickly

 

The Committee believes that the personnel shortage in the Canadian Forces must be addressed as quickly as possible to reduce the burden on those already in the Forces and to ensure that the Forces can sustain the capacity that the Government requires to protect Canadians and their interests into the future.

 

The timeline for expanding the Canadian Forces to 75,000 personnel has not been publicly set. Minister of National Defence Gordon O’Connor’s testimony to the Committee on May 8, 2006, suggests that the expansion will occur over the next five years.[56]

 

 

Accelerating Growth

 

The Canadian Forces are being expanded according to a schedule tailored to the number of dollars currently allocated by the Government. This expansion is based on the resources that are available.

 

The Committee is convinced that the Forces could expand faster if more dollars were forthcoming sooner. It is also convinced that the Forces should be expanding more quickly.

 

It is the Committee’s view that the Government should try to hit not just their target of 75,000 personnel but our target of 90,000 personnel within six years (as depicted in Figure 4). This would require the intake and training of 2,000-6,000 new recruits each year between now and 2011-2012, over and above its regular recruiting requirements.

 

Figure 4 – The Committee believes that the Government should provide the resources necessary to expand the Canadian Forces to 90,000 Regular Force personnel by 2011-2012.

 

The Committee readily admits that expanding the Forces to 75,000 personnel (or to 90,000 personnel as the Committee recommends) will pose a challenge. It means attracting, recruiting and training at least 13,000 new personnel incremental to those needed each year to maintain current levels.  This will tax the Canadian Forces.

 

Over and above proposed growth, the Canadian Forces are also fighting demographics. During the next few years an increasing percentage of military and civilian personnel will be approaching retirement age. This means that the Forces will be required to recruit and train more personnel just to maintain current personnel levels.

 

Their departure will be compounded by the lack of a steady stream of experienced replacements coming along behind them. When the Canadian Forces recruiting slowed to a trickle in the 1990s an age-experience gap was created that has produced a shortage of mid-level personnel. If more experienced military personnel who are eligible for retirement decide to leave, the experience level of those replacing them will obviously be lower.

 

During the 1990s, the Forces were forced to limit the Forces’ recruitment efforts as part of a government-wide deficit-fighting campaign. This recruiting interruption is coming home to roost. It has created an unnatural vacuum moving through the Canadian Forces Human Resources system which impacts on almost every facet of the Forces. It is important that the Canadian Forces are never again forced to risk their future – and the safety and security of Canadians – for the sake of short-term and short-sighted cost savings.

 

 

Figure 5 – This depicts the impact of expanding to 75,000 Regular Force personnel on the CF's training infrastructure.

 

Pausing to grow

 

Minister of National Defence Gordon O’Connor testified that he understands the challenge he is facing. According to Mr. O’Connor, “Personnel is the greatest challenge that I am facing in looking … to the future.”[57] He went on to say that he believed that expansion will limit the Forces capacity to take on overseas roles.

 

Mr. O'Connor: Subject to cabinet approval, because I have not briefed them yet, but we anticipate that as long as we are expanding the Armed Forces, we will not be able to maintain two heavy lines of commitment from the army.  We have to devote a large part of the army, air force and navy to generating themselves so that three to five years from now we have a robust army and revitalized air force.  However, it takes effort to do that.  We have to be careful with how much effort we put into offshore operations.

 

The Chairman:  So Afghanistan is going to be the main effort?

 

Mr. O'Connor:    We can maintain Afghanistan, as is, into the future basically forever, but we would be greatly challenged for a substantial commitment elsewhere in the world.[58]

 

The Committee concurs with the Minister. If planned growth is to proceed, and is to succeed as quickly as possible, the military needs time as well as money to revitalize itself. It needs a respite to recruit, to train, and to re-equip itself.

 

This needs to be clear. Expansion will limit the capacity of the Canadian Forces to conduct missions overseas beyond the current commitment to Afghanistan for at least the next five years with two exceptions.

 

The Defence Policy Statement states that the Canadian Forces ought to be able to maintain four ships (with embarked maritime helicopters) and an Air Expeditionary Unit (consisting of one Airbus, and six CF-18 aircraft) overseas indefinitely concurrent to a largely Army mission the size of the one ongoing in Afghanistan. The Committee doubts the capacity of the Canadian Forces to do so at this time.

 

 

The Committee recommends that:

 

7.    The Government publicly commit to a moratorium on additional deployments of the Canadian Army until it has reached a steady state of personnel, likely around 2011-2012.

 

 

Fixing Recruiting

 

Given the urgency of significantly expanding the Forces, and given the demographics that are likely to cause higher-than-normal attrition in the Forces in the next few years, there is a need to revolutionize recruiting mechanisms and associated systems.  

 

Recruiting Must be a Top Priority

 

In our last report, Wounded, the Committee concluded that the Canadian Forces recruiting system was broken. Everyone up to the Chief of the Defence Staff acknowledged that.[59] The system appeared to be incapable of even coping with the normal replacement flow of personnel, let alone bringing enough people on board to expand the Forces considerably.

 

The Committee reported that the Canadian Forces recruiting organization had reached only 76 per cent of its quota of recruits for the first eight months of 2005.[60] Given that slow start, the Committee was pleased that the Canadian Forces then went on to meet their limited intake objectives last year.  This was due to a higher number of applications than normal starting in October 2005.[61]

 

Nevertheless, it remains obvious that the Forces do not have a system in place that can manage the expansion of the Forces to 75,000 or 90,000 personnel. Quite simply, they have not been funded to do so. 

 

Of the several steps the Forces must take to produce enough capable military personnel, these are the first five:

 

§        Attract

§        Screen

§        Enrol

§        Train to be a member of the Canadian Forces

§        Train to specialize in a particular trade as a member of the Forces

 

In Report 1 we demonstrated that the Canadian Forces recruiting process is riddled with problems:

 

1.     In the attraction phase, recruitment advertising was being undermined by newly imposed bureaucratic rules requiring centralized approval for advertising contracts.[62]

 

2.     In the screening phase, long delays often discouraged potential recruits from signing on.

 

3.     There are insufficient resources allotted to screening and enrolment.

 

The Department of National Defence needs to revamp its recruiting and training procedures, but it won’t be able to do that unless they are adequately funded.

 

OP CONNECTION[63] is a good start but the Canadian Forces need to put more premium personnel into recruiting to get anywhere near the 90,000 personnel needed to protect this country’s citizens.

 

Streamline the Process

 

In our last report, Wounded, the Committee concluded that the processing time required to get into the Forces or transfer between the Reserves and the Regulars is too long. Processing delays frustrate interested young men and women, driving potentially good candidates away from the Forces.

 

The Committee was told that “perfect” candidates for entry into the military can be admitted in about a month. Unfortunately, only about three per cent of applicants fall into this category.[64] Those requiring more stringent assessments can take much longer. It sometimes takes up to a year for a member of the Canadian Forces to transfer from the Regulars to the Reserves, or vice versa.

 

Today’s Canadian Forces recruiting process is a complex transaction between the applicant and the institution that involves an array of rules and regulations. Delays are most often caused by snags in security and medical clearances, as well as the lack of an opening in an applicant’s desired military trade and/or a lack of available training slots for recruits going into that trade.

 

The time between signing an enrolment form to the start of basic training needs to be shortened and the process needs to be redesigned so that it can respond quickly to unexpected requirements for new personnel.

 

One way of reducing this time would be to ensure that all recruiting processes are electronic and transferable between Canadian Forces’ components. The Committee is pleased to note that since the summer of 2005, people applying to the Canadian Forces have been able to submit applications online.

 

The Forces must also reduce the amount of paperwork required to become a member of the Canadian Forces, particularly for potential recruits born outside the country. Some countries cannot or will not provide background checks. Other means must be found to assure the Forces that they are enlisting the right people. The Canadian Forces need to better reflect the changing face of Canada.

 

 

Move Outside the Box

 

The success of Canada’s military over the next few decades is going to depend on whether the Canadian Forces proves capable of breaking out of the box and creating a much more innovative and dynamic approach to recruiting.

 

First and foremost, recruiting has long been perceived as a dead-end career opportunity. Given the challenge of expanding the Forces, that can not continue. Recruiting needs good people – people wishing to make their mark and advance their careers.  That means the Forces are going to have to value and promote the recruiting process for what it is: a key component of defence capacity and military capability – perhaps the most important of all.

 

Getting many more of the right people into recruiting will be essential to the rejuvenation of the Canadian Forces.  All military leaders of all ranks must take an interest in attracting and recruiting the best Canadian society has to offer. That will not be possible unless recruiting is treated with the respect and attention it deserves.

 

The art of recruiting must be seen as a key skill, to be pursued by able and ambitious military personnel taking an important step in a successful military career. Recent indications are that senior Canadian Forces leadership understands this. According to a March 2006 Canadian Forces General Message, or CANFORGEN:

 

“The CDS places tremendous importance on recruiting and strongly supports the emphasis being placed on selecting the best people to be recruiters and to reward them for this valuable service… Managing authorities are directed to identify recruiting positions on par with operational positions of equal rank and assign points accordingly in the scoring criteria … This will ensure that a tour in recruiting is at least as conducive towards promotion as an operational, command, or leadership tour in the same rank.”[65]

 

This directive is a step in right direction. The Committee will monitor its implementation in the coming months.

 

More Can Be Done

 

The Committee is convinced that there are ways of going about expanding the Forces that are just waiting to be embraced.

 

As we mentioned in Part II, the Forces should expand its incentive program to persuade qualified personnel not to leave the Forces.

 

But more creatively, here is one idea: enhance the roles of the Army’s Skyhawks Parachute Demonstration Team and the Air Force’s Snowbirds Aerial Demonstration Team. They put on great shows. The Navy should be instructed to create a similar showpiece. Canadians who come out to these kinds of performances like to see what their Army, Navy and Air Force do at their best. Some of them might also like to do what their Army, Navy and Air Force do at their best. These events are the ideal place to encourage young people to consider a military career.

 

The RCMP’s Musical Ride has had great success in combining horsemanship exhibitions with exhibitions that feature such skills as emergency response teams and handling dog teams. These kinds of exhibitions make young people want to be Mounties. More of an effort should be made at Armed Forces demonstration events to make the connection between adventure, intellectual stimulation, the acquisition of skills and military life.

 

Here’s another: expand existing university tuition incentives schemes into a large-scale program similar to the Canadian Officer Training Corps (COTC), which was cancelled in the 1960s.  COTC was located on university campuses across Canada. It attracted students seeking a commission in the Militia. With ever-increasing university costs, the Committee believes that a program that offers to fund a student’s full tuition in exchange for service would attract many more candidates for the Canadian Forces.

 

There are encouraging signs that the Canadian Forces is innovating with respect to recruitment. For example, a directive the Army, Navy and Air Force to support OP CONNECTION demonstrates a new respect for the recruiting process and those involved in it:

 

“The principle for effective CF awareness and recruiting at community events is the same one perfected by countless museums, theme parks and tourist attractions.  It is marketing, not coincidence, which guarantees that everyone who views the display of dinosaur skeletons at the museum will have to pass through the gift shop en route to the exit.  The sales manager knows that these gifts can be irresistible to those whose interest in dinosaurs has just been piqued. A recruiting display similarly situated at the exit brow of a ship open to visitors, or at the exit point of a Kandahar-themed army display, can also be very effective in establishing contact with those whose interest in the CF has just been stimulated.”[66]

 

The Canadian Forces can offer wonderful opportunities to young Canadians. They should be packaging those opportunities in a way that ensures that young people are paying attention.

 

 

Showing Off at Home

 

The Forces should also consider borrowing a recruiting technique from our military’s past: encourage recent recruits to encourage others to join.   There is magnetism to a newly-trained recruit, who goes away from home as one person and returns as something different – someone more confident, someone with a mission in life. Family and friends see a difference.  Some of them might like to join up too.

 

It used to be the practice to send soldiers who had just completed their recruit training home in uniform for a brief period of leave, prior to joining their first unit. It was not uncommon for them to return having influenced someone else to join. It wouldn’t take long to re-introduce this practice, and it wouldn’t take long to monitor the results to see whether there is enough of a payoff to make it a regular practice.

 

Attempts should also be made to create connections between military personnel returning from theatres of operations and their local communities. The Canadian public needs to identify far more closely with the Canadian military. Joining the military should not seem like going to a strange place.

 

The Committee recommends that:

 

8.   The Canadian Forces should build a recruiting and training system that can recruit and train the personnel necessary to maintain a steady state level of 90,000 personnel.

 

9.    All recruiting processes should be streamlined so that every transaction is electronic and transferable between Canadian Forces’ components.

 

10.  The Canadian Forces expand incentive programs to ensure that qualified personnel do not leave the Canadian Forces.

 

11.   The Canadian Forces be allocated the resources to allow them to create a Navy demonstration team to co-ordinate recruiting activities with ship visits to Canadian cities and complement the Snowbird and Skyhawks.

 

12.   Once new recruits are trained, the Canadian Forces should utilize them to attract other new recruits by allowing them to go home for short periods of special leave to encourage others with similar potential to join the Forces.

 

13.  The Canadian Forces should shorten the recruitment process for both the Regular Forces to a maximum of one-month between enrolment and the commencement of basic training.

 

 

CHAPTER 2

 

Acquiring More and Better Equipment

 

Decades of under-funding has restricted the flexibility of Canadian military commanders. It has forced them into convoluted but creative solutions to get things done – to make do with what they have or what they can beg, steal or borrow. This has led at times to the kind of scavenging that wouldn’t be tolerated in any respectable private sector firm – or in any government department.

 

One cannot help but commend the Army for the ingenuity of its Whole Fleet Management program, the Air Force for cannibalizing hangar-relegated aircraft and the Navy for periodically engaging in the process of TRANREQ-ing.[67] These programs attempt to keep the Forces moving by constantly juggling resources.

 

But juggling equipment often involves investments of time and energy that could be better used elsewhere. It also reduces the readiness of too many ships, aircraft and other equipment at any given time because their parts have been plundered for use elsewhere. Our armed forces need to acquire enough equipment and spare parts to be fully operational in a hurry. That is the only way the Government is going to have the flexibility it needs in times of crisis.

 

Part IV will present a list of major equipment essential to the operational success of the Canadian Forces, and vital to the interests of all Canadians. It is, admittedly, a daunting list. But it is not a list to pick and choose from. It is time for the Government to acknowledge that every component on this list is essential. It is also time to lay out the cost of each one, and get on with their acquisition on a realistic schedule.

 

The capital account – which includes spending on lands, buildings and equipment – is where the biggest budgetary increases are required. Many Canadian Forces platforms are deficient, or obsolescent, or both.

 

CHAPTER 3

 

Rationalizing Infrastructure

 

In Chapter 2, the Committee recommended dedicating 30 per cent of the Canadian Forces annual budget for capital expenditures on infrastructure and equipment. This was in large part due to the sorry state of much of the Canadian Forces’ infrastructure.

 

No institution can thrive within deteriorating infrastructure. Canadians need good people with effective equipment to defend them. But good people aren't going to be attracted to the military or want to stay in the military if facilities are crumbling around them.  Nor can effective equipment be properly maintained if the appropriate structures aren't in place to house them and allow for their maintenance.

 

The Department of National Defence controls 34,724 realty assets, including 818 properties, 12,639 works (roads, water lines, electrical grids, etc.), and 21,267 buildings (residential, barracks, storage, offices, etc.).[68] Almost half of them are fifty years old.

 

Figure 6 - The average age of buildings and works controlled by the Department of National Defence. Source: Department of National Defence.

 

 

Like a Beat-Up Car

 

The Department faces an ever growing challenge to maintain these properties to adequate government standards because it lacks the money to do. This creates a backlog of essential maintenance.

 

Why is the mounting infrastructure backlog such an anchor around the Canadian military’s neck? Why is catching up on infrastructure spending so important?  Karen Ellis, the Department’s Assistant Deputy Minister for Infrastructure and Environment, described the situation in simple terms:

 

“It is important because it is similar to a car. If you put money into preventive maintenance and take care of your car throughout its life cycle, you will save money and keep the car in working order for a longer period of time. If you do not do that, you get into breakdowns and more complex problems, all of which results in you paying much more later to replace parts or ultimately to replace the vehicle.”[69]

 

The Department has not had sufficient money to do all the preventative maintenance prescribed by Treasury Board for years.

 

The right amount to spend – according to Treasury Board guidelines – to keep the car on the road is 2 per cent of a piece of infrastructure’s Realty Replacement Value for maintenance and repair, and another 2 per cent of its Realty Replacement Cost for its eventual recapitalization.[70]

 

The Department is not coming close. In Fiscal Year 2005-2006, according to Ms. Ellis, the Department “forecasts an average investment of 1.8 per cent for recapitalization, but only 1 per cent for maintenance and repair.”[71]

 

A shortfall of about 1 per cent might not sound like much until you consider the number and value of the assets the Department of National Defence must maintain.

 

Over $200 million in uncompleted maintenance and repair every year.

The Department controls 34,724 realty assets which have a total realty replacement value of $21.3 billion this year.[72] Maintaining the Department’s infrastructure to the Treasury Board standards would cost approximately $852 million annually. A one per cent shortfall of $21.3 billion amounts to more than $200 million in uncompleted maintenance and repair every year.

 

The bill for under-investment between 2000-2004 alone is $939 million (see figure below).

 

Figure 7 DND underfunded its infrastructure maintenance and recapitalization budgets by a total of almost $939 million between 2000 and 2004 alone. Data from 2004 represents the most recently available year. Source: Department of National Defence.

 

Today’s Canadian Forces not only have to deal with the ongoing challenge of maintenance, they also have to address a backlog created by years of neglect. The Government must fund the Department of National Defence to the level necessary to maintain those assets the Canadian Forces militarily require to fulfill the roles the government is asking them to play.

 

 

Rationalizing Infrastructure

 

Not all infrastructure needs to be repaired. Some could be eliminated. The Canadian Forces are being forced to maintain too facilities in too many locations across the country.

 

Minister of National Defence Gordon O’Connor agrees. As Mr. O’Connor said, “We have too much infrastructure. We have too many buildings, too many everything.  However, until I see a detailed plan on where the too many is against what our policy is and what our intentions are, we cannot start making adjustments.  Down the line, there will be adjustments to infrastructure.”[73]

 

The maintenance of superfluous bases may be due to bureaucratic inertia or political pressure to retain them. Either way, hanging onto infrastructure undermines an already over-stretched institution’s ability to perform its core function—protecting Canadians. It also wastes taxpayer dollars. The Committee will address the Canadian Forces infrastructure footprint further in its next report.

 

 

National Reserve Infrastructure Construction Goals   §        Revitalized Reserve infrastructure nation-wide   §        Creation of multi-use facilities of benefit both to Canadian Forces and to local organizations like Police and Fire Departments

Infrastructure in Canadian Cities

 

While the Committee wants to reduce the overall national infrastructure footprint of the Canadian Forces, it also supports the Government’s goal of bolstering the Canadian Forces presence in cities.

 

In Wounded, the Committee concluded that Reserve infrastructure, and in particular Reserve infrastructure in big cities, is in decline. There are too many aging, inefficient armouries that continue to house Reserve units across the country. Many of these grand old armouries probably deserve to be designated as heritage sites.

 

Brigadier General Young explained the problem in his region, Ontario, where the Forces have infrastructure problems similar to those across the country:

 

“Much of the infrastructure to support the Reserves in Land Forces Central Area was constructed in the early 1900s, when the army was still riding horses and drill was an important part of battle tactics.

 

Armouries built in the 1950s and 1960s used the same basic design as the old armouries, but employed the construction standards of the day. Most of our armouries are inefficient from both an operating and training perspective.

 

The cost to bring these armouries to required standards for such things as barrier-free access and cabling systems to handle modern computer systems is extremely high.”[74]

 

The Committee believes that the government could achieve its objective of re-establishing a Canadian Forces presence in major urban centres by instituting a national program of Reserve infrastructure rationalization and construction to build modern, efficient accommodation for contemporary Reserve units.

 

The aim of the construction program should be to create new facilities designed in conjunction with local stakeholders. These facilities would ideally be multi-use community assets that would improve the training and readiness of the Canadian Forces Reserves, and that of local organizations like Police and Fire departments.

 

These joint-use facilities should be keystones in the Government’s Canada First defence plan, helping the Canadian Forces shift its focus to protection of Canadians at home, linking the efforts of Canada Command to individual communities and fostering a cooperative environment with local first responders. An additional benefit of co-locating some national and local facilities could foster much better teamwork in the event of a crisis.

 

 

The Committee recommends that:

 

14.  The Department of National Defence should be allocated enough funds to invest at least 4 per cent of Realty Replacement Cost annually – the amount recommended by Treasury Board guidelines – toward the maintenance and replacement of its infrastructure to address outstanding deficiencies caused by years of underfunding.

 

15.  The Department of National Defence:

 

a.     Consolidate its aging armouries;

 

b.    Initiate a National Reserves Construction and Rationalization Program that will build or lease modern accommodation for Reserve units, with particular attention to creating shared-use facilities with local or provincial agencies where possible.

 

 

 

 

CHAPTER 4

 

Fix The Procurement Process

 

Many more people and a lot more money are clearly going to be needed if the Government is going to implement the recommendations that the Committee is making in this report. Then again, it should also be recognized that many more people and a lot more money are going to be needed if the current Government going to implement the previous government’s Defence Policy Statement as well as its own election commitments. (The Minister of National Defence has stated clearly that the new Government’s commitments comprise the old Government’s commitments plus his Government’s additional over and above those earlier commitments.)

 

More people and money will not translate into better security for Canadians if the acquisition process cannot be fixed. Unless it is reformed, the young men and women serving in the Canadian Forces are too often going to come up short of equipment they need to do their jobs, perhaps at their peril.

 

It appears that the current government, the Department of National Defence, and the Minister of National Defence are all committed to streamlining the capital procurement process.

 

In his testimony to the Committee on May 8, 2006, Mr. O’Connor outlined a number of ideas for reforming procurement including minimizing Canadianization and avoiding equipment that is not mature in its design wherever possible.[75] The Committee supports him on these issues and believes that more can be done.

 

 

A History of Molasses

 

The key problem – which the Committee identified in Report 1 – is that the procurement process takes too long to translate a military need into equipment that is combat-ready in the hands of its operators. The approval and procurement process affects all capital equipment projects (for a description of the process please see Appendix VIII). The Committee focused most of its attention on Major Crown Projects (projects costing $100 million or more).[76]

 

On average, it takes more than 15 years to acquire equipment in Major Crown Projects. During that time, the Canadian Forces are left to make do with what they have. Many pieces of equipment are obsolete – or at least are becoming so – over 15 or 20 years. That means that the Canadian taxpayer may only be getting a few years of optimal use out of a piece of equipment that should be delivering a lifetime’s worth of use. That inevitably reduces their ability to serve Canadians, either in terms of how much they can do (capacity), or what they can do (capability). Slow procurement is not only dangerous, it is extremely wasteful.

 

Consider the long, tortuous and continuing process to replace the antiquated Sea King helicopters. Designed with 1950s technology and acquired around 1963, the Sea Kings should have been replaced years ago. Not only have they become obsolescent, they require far too many hours of maintenance for every hour they spend in the air.

 

The decision to replace them should have been based on need plus intelligent analysis of the options available to replace them. Instead it became a political football over costs. Meanwhile the capabilities of both the Canadian Air Force and the Canadian Navy have been diminished for far too long. By the time the Air Force’s new fleet of Maritime Helicopters becomes operational around the end of the decade, Canadians will have been waiting almost a quarter century for these new aircraft.

 

We do not believe that there is one Canadian who would disagree with the Committee’s conviction that:

 

An average fifteen-year waiting time for major equipment to be used in the defence of the nation and its citizens – often in life-and-death situations for people on the front lines – is both ludicrous and unconscionable. 

 

Canadians can't wait fifteen years for new equipment because of:

 

§        The poor state and rapid-aging of the Canadian Forces’ current equipment;

 

§        The increased frequency of natural and man-made threats to Canada;

 

§        The duty of care we have to the people serving on the front lines; and,

 

§        The Government’s stated goal of increasing Canada’s place of pride and influence in the world.

 

The current process – known as the Defence Planning and Management process and introduced in 2002 – is the fourth attempt to rationalize defence procurement planning since the Second World War.[77]

 

The 2003 Minister of National Defence’s Advisory Committee on Administrative Efficiency is but one of a number of studies critical of the procurement process.[78]

 

Senior defence officials have been unusually blunt in conceding that Canada’s procurement cycle is far too slow.[79] The Department of National Defence’s Assistant Deputy Minister for Materiel, Alan Williams, told the Committee in 2005 that the Department’s goal is to reduce the average procurement time by about a third, to 11 years.[80]

 

Political Will: A Quick and Effective Catalyst

 

Although most large projects can take more than a decade to complete, there have been exceptions. The acquisition of the CF-18, the Iltis jeep, the Airbuses and the Challenger jets spring to mind. These cases were fast-tracked, either because of an injection of political will, or desperate operational urgency, or circumstantial rapid-delivery opportunities. Sometimes all these factors came into play, but the main catalyst has been political will.

 

 

So Many Spanners in the Works

 

There are a number of reasons for the arduous length of the military procurement process. Some are internal to the Department of National Defence. Some arise from regulations imposed on the department from elsewhere in government. And some, unfortunately, involve the difficulties that all countries face in making purchases for their militaries. There are times when a piece of equipment that a country wants, and urgently needs, isn’t immediately available. All the more reason that our country should be quick and efficient where it can.

 

 

Internal Clogging

 

#1 – Setting out requirements takes too long

 

The 2003 Report of the Minister on National Defence’s Advisory Committee on Administrative Efficiency strongly criticized the Department’s internal process for defining the requirements of capital projects.[81] The Advisory Committee concluded that the internal process – which may eat up nine years on an average procurement – is too long, involves too many reviews and takes up too much senior management time for little value added.

 

#2 – The three horsemen of delay

 

During the days when the Department had no money, it put in place painstaking processes to ensure that it spent the money that it did have prudently. As a result, there are now at least three levels of review before a project even gets to the Minister for approval. Each, of course, causes delay.

 

#3 – Lack of experienced personnel to manage major projects

 

Major capital projects are complicated and managing these projects is difficult. It gets even more difficult when you don’t have experienced people in place.  Because of cuts to the Department of National Defence budget in the 1980s and 1990s, and because the Forces slowed the pace at which they were acquiring equipment during that time, many of the people with the skill sets needed to help manage acquisition projects left the Department.  Such people are now in short supply.

 

Canadian Forces Director General of Strategic Planning, Major General Doug Dempster, testified to the Committee in April 2005:

 

“In the 1990s, we reduced our project management capacity by about half: that is to say, our expert staffs that can work the documents and do the analysis required. In the mid-1990s, we had 1,600 Project Management person years of resources assigned to that task and today we have about 800. We have less staff to move a large number of projects.”[82]

 

#4 – Too many projects pouring into the funnel

 

The length of the list of equipment that the Canadian Forces requires is a further complicating factor. Because of the state of the Forces’ equipment, there are simply far more projects with concurrent needs than funds available. Therefore, the senior leadership of the Department of National Defence has no choice but to prioritize a number of urgently needed projects, delaying some in order that others might be completed. Too many dogs end up scrapping over too few bones.

 

With more money and more people, the Canadian Forces could increase the number of acquisitions they could undertake simultaneously. With more money, the Department could also initiate innovative solutions – like using private sector contractors – to expand its capacity to manage acquisitions.

 

 

The Committee recommends that

 

16.  The Department hire experienced private contract personnel to quickly expand its project management capacity.

 

 

External Clogging

 

#1 – Non-military priorities affect military purchases

 

Sticky red tape is only part of the problem. When these other government departments get involved they do so to carry out their governmental mandates, which may have little or nothing to do with getting military personnel the right equipment to do their job.

 

The Committee (as it mentioned in Part II above) believes this must change. Enabling the purchase of equipment by a department whose sole job description is “to protect Canadians” ought to be recognized as paramount within the federal bureaucracy. Under the current process, too many peripheral concerns get in the way:

 

§        Treasury Board oversees the process of government expenditure

§        Public Works & Government Services Canada wants value for money

§        Industry Canada promotes competition and industrial benefits

§        Indian and Northern Affairs Canada promotes First Nations interests

§        Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency looks out for the East Coast

§        Western Economic Diversification Canada looks out for the West

§        Canada Economic Development for Quebec Regions looks out for Quebec

 

And so on. These are all worthy institutions, pursuing prescribed mandates. But when it comes to acquiring the right equipment to provide Canada’s armed forces with the tools required to defend the country, they too often see trees (their individual mandates) rather than the forest (Canada’s national security). The Committee believes this must change.

 

 

The Committee recommends that:

 

17.  The Government eliminate duplication of approval levels between the Department of National Defence, Public Works and Government Services Canada, and the Treasury Board to reduce the average time between the identification of a deficiency and award of a contract by two-thirds.

 

 

#2 – So many cooks

 

The Department of National Defence is never alone in pursuing its large projects. It must run the gauntlet of the entire federal bureaucracy as other departments – involved because of their mandates – play a role in decision-making at various points in the process.  These may include:

 

§        Public Works and Government Services Canada

§        Treasury Board

§        Justice Canada

§        Industry Canada

§        Privy Council Office

§        Heritage Canada

§        Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency

§        Western Economic Diversification Canada

§        Canada Economic Development for Quebec Regions

§        Indian and Northern Affairs Canada

§        Other government departments depending on the project

 

The sheer friction of bureaucracy resulting from arranging consultation, meetings and conferences for the purpose of coming to any sort of joint agreement on the way ahead often makes this a cumbersome process.

 

#3 – More restrictions: the knee-jerk reaction to scandal

 

Many of the stages of consultation and deliberation connected to the capital procurement process stem from the government’s obligation to ensure that Canadians are well served when taxpayers’ money is spent. That is to be commended. But the Committee believes that there are so many checks and balances now built into the Government of Canada’s procurement system that it has ceased to function efficiently in the acquisition of military equipment.

 

The system that has resulted from recent scandal seems based on the idea that most people are crooks and that only regulation can keep them from squandering or stealing the public’s funds. Treating everyone as a potential crook – instead of dealing firmly and harshly with crooks when they are found – slows the process of government to a snail’s pace. Military institutions cannot operate efficiently in the interests of Canadians that way.

 

Checks and balances are vital to the public’s confidence in government. Procurement of essential military equipment is vital to protecting Canadians and advancing their interests. But too many checks and balances means too much military equipment is delivered so slowly that it often hasn’t arrived when it is needed, and when it does arrive it may not be what is needed any more.

 

Almost all people in government are decent, honest public servants trying to do the best they can for their fellow citizens. Accountability is a fine watchword but so is common sense. The Committee believes that reduced regulation – coupled with a strict enforcement policy against wrongdoers – will provide sufficient oversight and accountability to serve the public interest.

 

Why should military spending be subject to fewer checks and balances than other government expenditures?

 

Because:

 

§        The lives of the people serving their country are on the line

 

§        Equipment delayed may turn out to be the wrong equipment by the time it arrives

 

§        Decisions as to what is the right equipment are complex enough without piling on non-military complications

 

Should the Department of National Defence be exempt from check and balances? Of course not. Should the Government find ways of reducing unnecessary impediments to acquiring the right equipment at the right time? Of course. To fail to do so would be a) inefficient, b) wasteful, and c) morally wrong.

 

 

Further Complexities of Purchasing Military Capabilities

 

Another layer of complexity affecting the procurement of military equipment is external to both the government and the department.  It is the nature of the defence industry itself. Because of the lack of capacity of Canadian industry, the pace of technological innovation and the scale of projects, procuring military equipment is not like making most acquisitions.

 

#1 – Capacity of Canadian industry

 

Canadian defence industrial capacity is not large, in international terms. There are some things that Canada just does not build. Take fighter planes. We stopped building our own decades ago. That limits the number of options within Canada that the government can turn to for fighters. A relatively small number of large firms dominate this industry, world-wide and it is often necessary to turn to those outside of Canada as a source. 

 

#2 – Pace of development

 

The rapid pace of change and innovation in the defence industry can often outstrip our ability to procure needed equipment quickly.

 

#3 – Scale of projects

 

It takes time to design and build complex pieces of equipment. The purchasing process can often be shortened by buying products already in production, but the Committee recognizes that it isn’t always going to be possible to acquire the right piece of equipment within months – or even within a few years – of perceived need.

 

 

Solutions

 

Will military procurement ever be a quick and simple process? No. That having been said, the Government should attach the greatest urgency to addressing the capital acquisition process shortcomings of the Canadian Forces.

 

Part IV describes a number of different capital projects that Forces require to create the options the Government needs to provide security for Canadians. These are also options our military commanders require to assure the safety of personnel in hazardous situations.

 

The Committee believes that the end goal should be the creation of a procurement process in which five years is the norm for an acquisition, rather than fifteen.  Here are seven steps that would help get us to that target:

 

#1 – Exposing political interference for what it is

 

Because the procurement process is so slow, any project can become a potential political target. One fifteen year acquisition might start out as a priority for one government, and then become a target for one or even two subsequent governments searching for money for other causes.

 

Political interference is an inevitable component of military procurement. Politicians always have their constituents’ needs in mind. But every time a politicians makes a short-sighted calculation that hurts the long-term effectiveness of our men and women in uniform they need to be held to account.

 

Canadians need reasoned political direction. They do not need the implementation of half-baked campaign promises that may win votes in a particular riding but which undermine the security of Canadians.

 

Defence planning and procurement is difficult enough to get right without political interference. Protecting citizens, and providing the young men and women that defend their country with the equipment they need, should transcend politics. It doesn’t always. One need only look at the case of a previous government’s cancellation of the Sea King replacement in 1993 to understand that the best plans of the Forces can be swept aside for reasons totally unrelated to the security of Canadians.

 

The Committee believes that one of the problems here is the lack of rigorous thought that often goes into the creation of political party platforms on defence and security. National Defence should not be sketched out on the back of a napkin mid-way through a campaign. The Committee will discuss this issue further in its next report.

 

#2 – Create stable long-term funding

 

Almost all the funding for the Department of National Defence is discretionary (meaning that it can be changed from year to year and is not locked in by legislation). This makes it a ripe target for Ministers of Finance looking to balance the federal books. However, the unintended consequence of tinkering with the Department’s budget is the disruption of decades-long military plans and procurement schedules.

 

Symbolic belt-tightening imposes hidden costs on planners and real costs on contracts that are already in place. Projects get strung out over unnecessarily long periods of time or pushed off until they are long overdue.

 

Some of this is inevitable. The Department of National Defence is not immune to changes in government or changes in the fiscal health of the nation. That being said, the Committee believes that because of the complexity and importance of creating the military capabilities necessary to protect Canadians, politicians of all political stripes should make an effort to minimize changes to long-term strategic plans.

 

The Committee notes that the Department is in the process of creating a Defence Capabilities Plan, a plan to give the military what it will need to conduct the missions the Government assigns it. It is intended to be a roadmap for acquiring the equipment required over the decade.

 

One step towards longer-term stability – and hence more effective Canadian Forces – would be to ensure that the Defence Capabilities Plan is debated and accepted as a roadmap for the Department of National Defence by the major political parties in Parliament.

 

The Committee will discuss this issue further in its next report.

 

#3 –   Reduce the number of projects that need to be considered by the rest of the government

 

The Government’s legitimate interest in reviewing the acquisition process of the Department of National Defence should be guided by the urgent need to increase the capacity of the Forces to help that same Government respond to crises. Canadians simply do not have the luxury of waiting fifteen years for protection.

 

The number of hoops that the Department must jump through to acquire a major piece of equipment should be reduced. One means of doing this would be to raise the level of expenditures that the Minister of National Defence can authorize without having to get permission from other departments or Cabinet.[83]

 

The Minister of National Defence’s expenditure authority level is currently $30 million ($60 million for construction projects).

 

The Advisory Committee on Administrative Efficiency recommended that the Minister of National Defence should request an increase in his/her expenditure authority, raising it to $60 million on certain projects.[84] The Advisory Committee believed this would shorten the approval process of most projects by between three to six months per project. The Advisory Committee also argued that the Minister should increase the levels delegated throughout the Department of National Defence. That would be a step in the right direction, but not a big enough step.

 

 

Too Low a Limit for Such a Major Portfolio

 

The Committee believes that even a limit of $60 million is too low for the Minister of National Defence considering that over the next decade the minister will face a longer, larger and more costly list of projects any other department in government. 

 

According to the Department of National Defence 2005-2006 Report on Plans and Priorities, there are forty-nine large projects for which estimated costs exceed the Minister of National Defence’s current expenditure authority limit. That leaves them tied to bureaucratic approval processes outside the Department of National Defence.

 

If the Minister of National Defence’s approval authority were raised to $60 million, there would still be thirty-seven projects that would be subject to negotiate government-wide red tape. However, if the Minister’s expenditure authority were raised to $500 million, only 10 projects would have to negotiate government-wide red tape.

 

 

The Impact of Raising Ministerial Expenditure Authorization Levels on Major Projects
Ministerial Expenditure Authority Level	Number of Projects that must leave the department for government-wide approval
$30 Million(current)	49
$60 Million(proposed by the 2003 Committee on Achieving Administrative Efficiencies)	37
$500 Million (proposed by our Committee)	< 10

 

Suggesting that the Minister’s expenditure authority increase from $30-60 million to $500 million would inevitably raise eyebrows. Such an increase will mean that certain projects now defined as Major Crown Projects – i.e. necessitating Cabinet review and approval – would fall under the Minister’s exclusive authority and reduce Cabinet oversight on these projects.

 

Other ministers whose departments spend large sums of money may not need higher limits, because much of their expenditures are determined by legislation, and they don’t need to get Cabinet approval over and over again. Defence spending is largely discretionary, so approval is not built in.

 

The expansion of the Minister’s authority is both necessary and long overdue. The level that defines Major Crown Projects is arbitrary and in need of revision. The $100 million cost threshold at the heart of the definition of a Major Crown Project has remained steady for more than a decade, despite growth in Canada’s economy, inflation and the relative decline in the purchasing power of $100 million. [85]

 

Minister of National Defence Gordon O’Connor agreed in principle with raising authority levels when he testified that: “In principle, if the Minister of Defence authority was larger, you could move a lot of projects faster.”[86]

 

Mr. O’Connor went on to say that the issue would have to be part of discussions with other departments in the future. The Committee believes that those discussions must begin now and it would support any move to increase authority levels for the Minister of National Defence.

 

The Committee recommends that:

 

18.  The Government increase

 

a. the expenditure authority of the Minister of National Defence to $500 million for any capital project; and,

 

b. increase the monetary threshold value of those defence-related projects that must be reviewed by Cabinet – also known as Major Crown Projects – to $500 million.

 

 

#4 – Acknowledge the capacity of Canadian industry and do not use the Canadian Forces as a regional job creation vehicle

 

The Government should recognize there are going to be all kinds of military projects that Canadian industry either lacks the expertise or the capacity to tackle.

 

Fulfilling our Committee’s recommendation to acquire the large aircraft required for strategic lift would be one example. The eventual replacement of the CF-18 fighter constitutes another.

 

The Canadian Forces can only help provide security for Canadians if they are able to acquire the right equipment, wherever it is manufactured.

 

There will always be deals in which the purchase of some components of major equipment from Canadian firms can be negotiated as part of the agreement. These should obviously be pursued unless they are going to be (a) time-consuming; and (b) much more expensive.

 

Purchase off-the-shelf where possible:  The most timely and cost effective way for the Government to provide the Forces with the equipment it needs is to purchase it off-the-shelf internationally. There are extremely few situations in which the Canadian military requires equipment different from what is required by our allies.

 

Don’t use DND for economic development: There are good arguments for providing federal subsidies to develop Canadian industrial capacity and help the economies of struggling regions. But this is an exercise that should take place outside the arena of military procurement. The need to create national security outweighs any country’s perceived need to create economic development.  Without national security, there can be no national economic development.

 

Even where Canada possesses the expertise to provide capabilities that the government requires, the Committee questions Canadian industry’s capacity to tackle all required projects with the speed and efficiency that other options would afford.[87]

 

#5 – Understand the limits of the global defence industry.

 

Under ideal circumstances, in a perfectly competitive industry, there are a number of different firms that can compete to provide a certain piece of equipment.

 

Unfortunately, many areas of national defence is not a perfectly competitive industry and in many instances wide varieties of options are not available that will meet the requirements of the Canadian Forces.

 

Acquiring a military capability is not like buying a personal computer where one can choose between a Dell, an IBM, a Compaq, a Macintosh and so forth. Often, there is only one company that makes specific equipment that the Forces require to do what is asked of them by the Government.

 

This raises all sorts of flags for Government procurement processes. In an attempt to be as transparent as possible, Government generally seeks out competition to ensure that taxpayers get value for money. But competition may not always be possible. Though it usually results in discontent in the defence industry and opposition from other departments of government, it means that sole-sourcing some defence procurement from the get-go makes a lot of sense.

 

 

#6 – Buy second-hand when practical

 

The Government should attempt to acquire equipment second-hand from our allies where it is appropriate.

 

This may be controversial in light of the problems surrounding the acquisition of the Victoria-class submarines. However, this purchase should not discredit the principle of buying second-hand.

 

Despite the problems, the purchase of the Victoria-class submarines was a good deal for Canada (see Appendix IX).

 

Acquiring equipment second-hand is a sound and economical way of quickly equipping the Forces when done properly.

 

The Committee believes that the Government must learn the lessons of the sub purchase:

 

1.  Only consider equipment still in use by another country

 

A chief problem of the Victoria-class submarines acquisition was that the boats were non-operational and effectively mothballed when they were purchased.When one buys second hand, one should ensure the equipment is operational. One way of doing that is to have the selling country deliver it to its Canadian base.

 

2. Treat a second-hand purchase like a new acquisition project

 

Buying ‘used’, especially for large complex systems, can prove difficult if the same rigour used for all aspects of new acquisition aren’t applied. The necessary support arrangements and materiel must be provided to make the transfer of equipment to Canada as the new ‘owner’ as smooth as possible.

 

The submarine purchase was not handled in a similar vein to how other major navy projects were handled in terms of a project management approach. While the focus was on re-activation, the re-location of existing UK training facilities to Canada, and some initial training of first crews, a number of life cycle support considerations had not been addressed by the time the subs were turned over to Canadian custody.

 

For whatever reasons, the submarine program did not enjoy the same degree of Integrated Logistics and Support effort that was instrumental for a relatively smooth transition of Halifax-class ships into service. Specifically, a sufficient range and quantity of spare parts were not purchased and support arrangements with industry were not negotiated (or in some cases even available). This caused problems for materiel support authorities when the boats started sailing after each had undergone its planned Canadianization.

 

3. Minimize Canadianization

 

A key factor that is currently delaying the full use of the Victoria-class submarines is the need to modify the boats with some Canadian components, principally communications gear and weapons. This Canadianization process is a normal part of any acquisition (and it was expected when the government acquired the submarines).

 

Tailoring to Canadian specifications can be expensive and time consuming. There are very few instances where the Canadian Forces require equipment that one of our allies do not already possess or have in production. The Committee believes that Canadianization should, in general, be minimized. That is Canadianization where necessary, but not necessarily Canadianization.

PART IV

 

The Tools to do the Job

 

The early chapters of this report have argued that the Canadian Forces are unable to provide the Government with sufficient options to confront crises at home and abroad because the Forces lack adequate money and people.

 

How do we define sufficient options? The new government has already provided us with a reasonable definition. It says it needs the resources to (a) fulfill the missions assigned by the Defence Policy Statement, as well as (b) fulfill the additional commitments that the Government made during the last election campaign. These are set out in Chapter 2, and the Committee by and large supports the Government’s vision of what is needed.

 

The Minister of National Defence has said that he intends to produce a Defence Capabilities Plan within months. It will outline the tasks the Canadian Forces must be able to accomplish in support of Canada’s Defence Policy and the resources needed – in terms of people and equipment – that will be required to perform those tasks.

 

This document holds great promise. If the Minister follows through, for the first time in living memory the Canadian Forces and the Canadian public will have a clear picture of what must be accomplished and which resources will be needed to make actions match words.

 

The Committee has identified what it believes should be on that list of essential tasks.  This chapter will outline the resources that we believe must be upgraded if which resources need to be upgraded or added to provide the capacity to perform those tasks.

 

The Money Isn’t There

 

One caveat:Neither the recommendations which follow, nor the vision expected to be outlined in the Defence Capabilities Plan, are affordable under current funding or under any funding proposals made public to date by the Government of Canada.

 

One further observation: While this chapter focuses primarily on hardware deficiencies, the cost of correcting these deficiencies does not adequately reflect the additional overall funding that will be needed, particularly for increased personnel costs.

 

Our armed forces need modern hardware, but they also need enough trained personnel to use and maintain that hardware.

 

 

 

 

What if our critical assumptions don’t hold true?

Focus on the priorities 

 

The Committee outlines below all that it believes the Canadian Forces need to do the jobs required of them. However, Senate committees do not determine whether these needs will be met. Governments do. And the reality is that when one adds what the previous government committed to fixing the Canadian Forces to what this government has committed, the cash we believe is needed is going to fall short.

The Government has a variety of options. The first, of course, is that it could recognize the validity of our arguments and come up with enough money to do the job.

 

All other options are, by definition, imperfect. If the Government is going to settle for imperfect options, it had better think them through carefully, because any mistakes could prove tragic.

 

 

Taking the Cost-Cutting Route

 

Rather than nibble around the edges, the Government could decides to axe any one of a number of expensive capabilities, such as fighter aircraft, heavy lift helicopters, or strategic airlift aircraft. 

 

There are those who would argue that Canada can muddle through without all of these. The argument goes like this: smaller countries such as Canada have to concede that their participation in any large operation overseas will likely involve some sort of coalition. Within such coalitions Canada could avoid using resources that it either doesn’t have or are being employed elsewhere by taking advantage of the coalition’s shared pool of resources.

 

This is a less radical version of the argument that Canada really doesn’t have to do all that much to defend itself because the United States will always come to the rescue. The price for reliance on the United States, of course, is sovereignty.

 

The price for continual reliance on our allies for resources is the kind of over-dependence on those allies that has been the hallmark of Canadian defence policy for too many years now.

 

In simple, practical terms, such over-reliance can be extremely dangerous. In any given situation, there may not be enough resources to go around. Who is most likely to get the resources at urgent moments? The country that is providing them? Or the country that is borrowing them?

 

Take the current situation in Afghanistan. Canadian troops rely on the coalition to supply at least two critical elements of their combat power: airborne battlefield mobility (helicopters to get to and from the battle, respond to crises and to evacuate the wounded) and combat air support (fighters, bombers, attack helicopters).

 

Blessedly, there have been are no reports to date of this reliance leaving our troops high and dry in difficult situations. But it is worth noting that Canada is the only country to deploy significant troops to Afghanistan without providing its own air cover to support them.

 

The Chief of the Defence Staff has clearly stated his belief that it is an urgent necessity for Canada to acquire its own medium or heavy lift helicopters to have its own airborne battlefield mobility. The Committee strongly supports his position.

 

In the future, Canada should not deploy Canadian troops in these kinds of circumstances without this type of backup. The Committee will discuss this issue further in its next report.

 

Some tools, of course, are more essential than others. They must survive any cuts the Government might make to optimal military spending. Acquiring or replacing the following six capabilities should be urgent priorities for the Government to address this year:

 

1.                 Strategic Airlift: Canada requires a true long-distance lift aircraft;

2.                 Tactical Airlift: the C-130 Hercules fleet must be replaced;

3.                 Fixed Wing Search-and-Rescue;

4.                 Battlefield mobility: the need for medium-lift Helicopters is urgent;

5.                 Fleet mobility and resupply: getting on with the Joint Support Ships; and,

6.                 Army Logistic Support: the need for new medium trucks.

 

A discussion outlining the importance of each of these will follow below.

 

If the Government is unwilling to move towards the $25 Billion to $35 Billion level of funding recommended by the Committee, its best option would be to eliminate certain capabilities. Not reduce. Eliminate. If four items have to go, these are the ones:

 

1.                 Armed Naval Icebreakers (to be discussed in the Committee’s next report);

2.                 The Multi-Mission Effects Vehicle;

3.                 The “Big Honking Ship”; and,

4.                 The Mobile Gun System.

 

CHAPTER 1

 

Navy

 

Sea Changes:

Giving Depth to the Navy

 

The current Defence Policy Statement states that the Navy will maintain two task groups of up to four warships.[88] One of these task groups will contribute to a Canadian Forces Standing Contingency Task Force, a high readiness force that will able to deploy anywhere on 10 days notice. The other will be attached to a Mission-Specific Task Force with a less urgent mandate, ready to be deployed on 30 days notice.

 

Maintaining a single High Readiness Task Group is essentially a gamble. The Government would be gambling that if the High Readiness Task Group has been deployed, Standard Readiness ships could respond to any other crises that might arise.

 

This is a risky wager. The Committee believes that having only one High Readiness task group on hand constitutes insufficient emergency response capacity for a country of Canada’s size and global responsibilities.

 

Given that the mobility of the Standing Contingency Task Force is going to depend upon adequate sea lift, the Committee believes that both coasts should have high readiness task groups, to provide for timely deployment to anywhere on the planet. This would require keeping more ships at High Readiness.

 

If Canada had two high readiness task groups and one was deployed, it would leave the other in “go position” for any other emergency.

 

It makes little sense to maintain a high readiness task group on one coast when there is a 50 percent chance that an emergency will arise closer to the other coast.

 

The Committee believes that the medium- to long-term possibility of instability on the Pacific Rim – an idea which the Committee will address further in its next report – is just one scenario that could necessitate the rapid deployment of a High Readiness Task Group from a specific coast. What would happen if the High Readiness Task Group were on the East Coast at the time, or for that matter deployed overseas? The Government would be limited in its options.

 

Moving a task group from one coast to the other – a journey of over 10,000 kilometres – can take two weeks. Fuel costs and wear and tear on personnel are two other important considerations.

 

The Committee believes that though creating a second high readiness task group will require additional ships, personnel and money, it is imperative that the government plan and implement it as soon as possible.

 

 

The Committee recommends that:

 

19.  The Department of National Defence should create two High Readiness Task Groups – one based on the Atlantic coast and one on the Pacific coast.

 

 

Replacing our Destroyers, Upgrading our Frigates

 

In our last report, Wounded, the Committee observed that the Navy’s major warship platforms, Frigates and Destroyers, were aging and will have to be replaced over the next fifteen to twenty years. Replacement of the Destroyers is long overdue and the need to replace the Frigates looms on the horizon.[89]

 

The Navy has plans in place to address both these issues. The Committee, however, is not convinced that sufficient urgency is being attached to either issue. The Destroyers and Frigates are essential to Canada’s defence capabilities.

 

Since 1990, Canada has sent warships on several missions in support of allied and United Nations maritime operations enforcing sanctions in the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Adriatic.

 

Interdiction operations like these involve locating and hailing merchant ships and, if necessary, sending boarding parties to verify ships’ registries, status and cargoes.

 

One obvious example: the 2001-2003 Operation Apollo deployment against terrorism in the Middle East. As part of Operation Apollo, the Navy rotated 16 of its 18 major warships and 95 per cent of its 4,100 sailors to the Arabian Sea. During that two year operation, Canadian ships hailed more than 21,800 vessels and conducted more than half of the 1,100 boardings completed by the multinational coalition fleet in the region.

 

Canada’s Frigates and Destroyers offer the Government its primary capacity to:

 

§        Maintain sovereignty in our own waters;

 

§        Defeat enemies at sea;

 

§        Provide fire support to soldiers ashore;

 

§        Interdict, far from our shores, vessels that might be carrying weapons of mass destruction, terrorists, illegal immigrants, narcotic drugs, or people or goods infected with virulent diseases;

 

§        Enforce sanctions against rogue states;

 

§        Suppress piracy along international sea-lanes; and,

 

§        Participate in naval peacekeeping in disputed waters.

 

Replacing the Navy’s Destroyers is long over-due

 

Our Destroyers also offer Canada its only means of commanding a task group of Canadian or coalition ships. This is a capability widely admired and appreciated by our allies, but it is also a capability that should be admired and appreciated by Canadians. Without this capacity, Canadians sailors in conflicts zones will always be commanded by someone else.

 

The Navy has begun planning for a Single-Class Surface Combatant – which would feature a mix of capabilities in a common hull – as a replacement for both destroyers and frigates. Currently, the project office for the new class of vessels is conducting studies to determine operational requirements for the new ships.

 

The Committee believes that there is considerable potential to developing a single class of new ships to replace the capabilities of both the Destroyers and Frigates. It would markedly reduce Operating, Maintenance and Training costs associated with developing two different types of replacements.

 

The Navy has a small team dedicated to pursuing the Single-Class Surface Combatant, but it is obviously in the very early stages of study and it and the Project have not yet reached the formal Identification stage of the Project Approval process.[90]

 

The Navy does not plan to begin acquiring these ships until the middle of the next decade. The Committee is concerned that given the length of time it can take the Forces to acquire new pieces of equipment, the Single-Class Surface Combatant may not be available until long after the Destroyers are gone.

 

To that end we propose two remedies: a. accelerate the development of the Single-Class Surface Combatant; and, b. explore the temporary acquisition of destroyers that are already in use with our allies, such as the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers used by the United States Navy.

 

Upgrading the Frigates must occur on schedule

 

To address the current state of the Halifax-class Coastal Patrol Frigates, the Forces have planned the Frigate Life Extension Project (FELEX) to upgrade key systems. This is a normal part of a ship’s life cycle. The work is currently scheduled to begin in 2010, with each hull being in refit – and out of commission – for 27 months, with the program ending in 2017. At the very least, this means that there will be times between 2010 and 2017 when the government will have to do without half of the Frigate fleet (see figure 8).

 

 

 

 

 

Figure 8 - The chart above depicts the currently planned schedule for the Frigate Life Extension Project. Ships will be at significantly reduced readiness for both the time that they are in refit as well as the time they will be in workup (source: Department of National Defence)

 

The Frigate Life Extension Project is a worthwhile program, but one that needs to be monitored closely. It should be completed as quickly as possible, without the delays that befell the Aurora Maritime Patrol Aircraft and CF-18 Fighter modernization programs (see pages 151-152). The decision to contractually break those programs into smaller components meant that aircraft stayed out of commission for longer than necessary, leaving the Government with reduced options to patrol our skies and intercept threats.

 

The Committee has not seen any evidence that this stutter-step approach is planned with the Frigate Life Extension Project. It certainly shouldn’t be. Defence delayed is defence denied.

 

The Committee recommends that:

 

20. The Canadian Forces accelerate the Single-Class Surface Combatant project as a successor to the Iroquois-class Destroyers and the Halifax-class Frigates, with the goal of first delivery by 2013.

 

21. The Canadian Forces complete the Frigate Life Extension Project as efficiently as possible to minimize any reduction in the capacity of the Forces.

 

 

Fleet Supply and Strategic Mobility

 

The Defence Policy Statement requires that the Canadian Forces possess the capability to deploy military forces just about anywhere in the world. That means being able to move people and equipment far from our shores.

 

In Report 1, the Committee documented the fact that the Canadian Forces are down from three to two aged naval replenishment vessels and are suffering from an overall lack of strategic sealift capability. Both issues should be addressed quickly in light of the Defence Policy Statement.

 

 

Replenishing the Fleet = Replacement of the Navy’s AORs

 

There is a plan in place to acquire three Joint Support Ships (JSS) to replace the two remaining obsolescent Auxiliary Oiler Replenishment (AOR) ships.[91] These ships are used to supply the Fleet and carry cargo such as foodstuffs, fuel, ammunition, medical/dental facilities and water. At an average age of 36, these vessels are reaching the end of their service life.

 

The plan is that the Joint Support Ships would match or exceed the AORs’ capabilities. Each new vessel would require fewer crew members than the AORs, have the capacity to transport a limited amount of wheeled equipment, and provide some command and control support for forces ashore.

 

Pursuing a replacement to the AORs is laudable, but the Committee has two problems with the current plan: the pace of progress is too slow, and the number of vessels being acquired is insufficient.

 

The Department currently plans to take delivery of the first Joint Support Ship in 2012 and achieve initial operating capability in 2013.[92] By then the average age of the AORs will be almost forty-five.

 

The Department does not plan to award the contract to build the vessel until at least 2008 – and that presumes that there will be no slippage in the Government’s slippage-prone project approval and procurement process. That 2008 target is too distant. Innovative approaches should be adopted to accelerate the delivery of these vessels.

 

Furthermore, acquiring just three vessels will not provide the Government with sufficient flexibility to complete the number of missions that might be important to the country at any given time. Without access to fleet replenishment vessels like AORs, the Navy’s capacity to support its other ships and the Canadian Forces overseas will be limited.

 

An example of this occurred just last fall. Neither of the Navy’s two aged AORs – one on each coast – was able to deploy as part of the Government’s response to Hurricane Katrina because both were in lower states of readiness due to scheduled refits.

 

AORs are ideal for disaster assistance. In 1992, for example, in response to Hurricane Andrew, HMCS PROTECTEUR delivered relief supplies to Miami, Florida, and the Bahamas.[93]

 

The reason HMCS PRESERVER, the Navy’s East Coast AOR, was not part of the Canadian contingent deployed to the U.S. Gulf Coast was because the ship had just come out of refit and was still undergoing readiness trials when Katrina hit. Had she been available, she would undoubtedly have been used just as HMCS PROTECTEUR was for Hurricane Andrew.[94]

 

HMCS PROTECTEUR has now entered a similar scheduled refit, which will leave the Forces without that capability on the West Coast.

 

The Navy cannot control Mother Nature.  But the Government can control whether the Navy has the capacity to offer responses to these kinds of disasters.

 

However, while the three Joint Support Ships specified in the current project represent an increase in capability (i.e. the roles the Canadian Forces can play) and capacity (how often they can play these roles), the Committee is not convinced that three vessels will provide the Government with sufficient flexibility to respond effectively in times of crisis. Three ships means the Canadian Forces will have to regularly rotate one ship from coast to coast just to ensure that each coast is covered when significant scheduled maintenance is required.

 

Also, the Committee believes that the need for JSS-type vessels has grown since the project was first announced. The expeditionary sealift requirement expected to be included in the Defence Capabilities Plan is in addition to the Government’s announced intention to acquire three Joint Support Ships. This new capability will require support from a JSS-like ship. Furthermore, if the Government accepts the Committee’s recommendation for a High Readiness Task Group on each coast (see pg. 86 above), there will be a need to maintain a Joint Support Ship at high readiness on both coasts at all times.

 

Acquiring only three ships of any type is insufficient to ensure the availability of a ship on each coast. The minimum number is four. Regular fleet maintenance schedules mean that roughly one out of three vessels will always be unavailable.

 

The Committee believes that three Joint Support Ships limit the government’s flexibility and are simply not enough to do the entire job. The government should acquire at least four.

 

The Committee recommends that:

 

22. The Department acquire enough capacity to have at least one Joint Support Ship available at high readiness on each coast at all times, which requires at least four ships.

 

23.  The Government should provide the Department with whatever resources it requires to acquire four Joint Support Ships as quickly as possible, with first delivery by 2010.

 

 

Strategic Sealift = “Big Honking Ship”

 

Over and above the need to replace the Auxiliary Oiler Replenishment vessels, and as indicated in the previous section, the Defence Policy Statement also points to a requirement for a larger vessel that could perform strategic sealift functions beyond the limited capacity of Joint Support Ships.

 

The Committee supports the goal of making the Canadian Forces more mobile, and therefore believes that the Government must provide them with the means to acquire a new capability to embark, transport, deploy and recover a large number of troops and their equipment, vehicles and other cargo, by air and sea.

 

No current platform in the fleet can adequately perform this task. The Joint Support Ship fulfills a different role. Nobody should think that the Department’s requirement that the Joint Support Ships have 2,500 lane meters per ship for storage will provide enough capacity to fill all the Forces’ sealift needs.[95]

 

The larger vessel has been referred to as a mini-aircraft carrier (which it is not) and “the Big Honking Ship” (which it certainly would be).

 

Whatever you call it, the Forces need something larger than a Joint Support Ships if they are to effectively operate in areas like littoral failed and failing states.  It would be capable of supporting forces ashore in littoral areas, and by owning it, rather than renting it, the Government could avoid situations like that which occurred with the GTS KATIE.[96]

 

The Forces are in the early stages of considering their operational requirements for this type of vessel.

 

There is no indication that the Government intends to have a uniquely Canadian ship designed in this case, for which the Committee is thankful. Several of Canada’s close allies already have a class of vessel that performs this sort of task well.

 

They are using a class of ship that is called a Landing Platform Dock (LPD). The LPD’s primary function is to embark, transport, and deploy and recover (by air and sea) troops and their equipment, vehicles and miscellaneous cargo. They vary in size and specifications from country to country.

 

This is what Canada needs, and this type of design is available off-the-shelf should the Government wish to acquire these kinds of vessels. The Canadian Forces should make it a priority to acquire a number of these vessels in the international marketplace.

 

The Committee believes acquiring only one ship of this type would be misguided and insufficient. It would drastically reduce the Government’s flexibility to deal with more than one crisis at a time, or any crisis at all when it was in refit. How often would it be badly needed when it was in refit or already involved in another operation? 

 

Using the same reasoning that the Committee used for Joint Support Ships, we advocate that Canada should have a least one such LPD-sized vessel available at all times on the east and west coasts, which would require the purchase of four vessels in total. 

 

 

The Committee recommends that:

 

24.  The Canadian Forces should acquire sufficient Landing Platform Dock vessels or their equivalent, each capable of carrying an Army battle group and its equipment at a time.

 

25.  The Government should provide the Department with whatever resources it requires to acquire four Landing Platform Dock-like ships as quickly as possible.

 

 

Submarines

 

Maintaining a sub-surface capability is critical to Canada’s ability to maintain sovereignty in its own waters and operate effectively overseas, either on our own or as a component of coalition forces. The need for this capability will endure for the foreseeable future.

 

The Government has a duty to ensure that the submarines will serve us effectively. The Committee has always believed that Canada should maintain a strong submarine capacity.[97] Our four Victoria-class submarines can:

 

§        Conduct covert surveillance of our territorial waters;

 

§        Intercept unwanted shipping;

 

§        Conduct continental maritime defence;

 

§        Protect a Canadian expeditionary force at sea; and

 

§        Be used to covertly deploy special operations forces overseas.

 

These are not theoretical capabilities. The ability to approach violators of Canadian waters unobserved is hugely valuable to the Canadian Navy in activities such as fisheries patrols and counter-drug operations. The Navy has concluded that the very existence of Canada’s submarine capability – then the Oberon-class – provided an important deterrent effect during the “Turbot Crisis” fisheries dispute of 1995.[98] Anecdotally, they are also reported to have had a deterrent effect on American fishing boats operating in disputed waters on Georges Bank.

 

Anyone with doubts about the utility of the vessels and their role in the Forces need to look no further than the report of the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans’ Affairs on the procurement of the boats.[99]

 

The Victoria-class submarines are approaching their mid-life point. As soon as the submarines are fully operationally ready, planning for their mid-life refits and eventual replacement should begin.

 

 

The Committee recommends that:

 

26.  The Canadian Forces should restore its submarine capability by making Canada’s four submarines operational as quickly as possible, setting in place plans for their mid-life refit as necessary, and outlining a plan for their eventual replacement by a new generation of submarines.

 

 

Meeting the Demand for New Ships

 

Given the size of Canada’s coastline, the importance of our maritime capabilities, and the time and effort required to acquire significant new maritime capabilities, there will always be a standing demand for various types of vessels in the fleets of the Navy, the Coast Guard, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans and the RCMP.

 

The federal government’s current shipbuilding policy was developed in 2001 after consultations between government and shipbuilding industry officials about the problems facing the industrial sector.[100] As part of the policy, the federal government committed to procure, repair and refit vessels in Canada subject to operational requirements and the continued existence of a competitive domestic marketplace.

 

The Canadian Forces and the Canadian Coast Guard urgently require the recapitalization of their respective fleets (discussed in detail in Chapter 4 and in our third report). In the next five to ten years, the Navy requires the new Joint Support Ships, possibly a strategic sea-lift capability, and a replacement for the Iroquois-class Destroyers. It must also undertake significant stringent maintenance programs to maintain Victoria-class submarines, and complete the mid-life upgrade to the Halifax-class Frigates. And that doesn’t even begin to address the needs of the Coast Guard, RCMP and the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (each for different types of vessels).

 

The Committee is concerned that the tremendous need for ship construction in the coming years may outstrip the capacity of Canadian industry to support it (the extent of the situation is shown in Figure 9 but does not include any activity for the RCMP). Only a handful of shipyards in Canada can handle the construction of large ships for the Navy and the Coast Guard. The time frame and the near-coincident nature of that many programs beg the question of whether Canadian shipyards are able to handle this volume in a timely way. Even an optimist would have to say probably not.

 

The Committee believes that the national need for these vessels is greater than the build-in-Canada commitments of the shipbuilding policy which could delay the delivery of some ships until Canadian industrial capacity can handle their construction.

 

The Committee recognizes the intent of the shipbuilding policy but it notes that it contains the words ‘subject to operational requirements’. The Committee believes that – with the looming demand across all the government fleets – operational requirements dictate that some of the work must be done offshore to enable an overall program of the magnitude above to be completed as quickly and as cost-effectively as possible.

 

 

Figure 9 – Composite Timeline of Expected Navy and Coast Guard Demand on the Shipbuilding Industry in Canada. The above chart depicts major naval shipbuilding projects currently planned between 2005-2020 by the Canadian Navy and other government departments. It does not include stated commitments of the government for armed Naval Icebreakers or the Big Honkin’ Ship because no timeline has been set for these projects. It also does not include expected demand of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

 

Smart planning requires long-term funding stability. This is particularly true of funding to acquire new ships. Funding should not reflect a dragged-out, start/stop, ‘feast-or-famine’ cycle that makes it difficult to build and maintain ships efficiently and keeps some ships in service long after they should be.

 

Funding for new ships – wherever they need to be built – should be sustained to allow for departments to manage the renewal of their fleets in a rational manner and permit a steady number of opportunities for industry and hence the efficient use of its capacity. In this way Canada will put the necessary vessels in the hands of those who sail them when they need them, which should always be the overriding aim.

 

Furthermore, it has been an accepted principle for too long that the cost of new ships for the Navy comes with a non-military related premium. Certainly, that was the case with the design and construction of the HALIFAX Class Frigates. The Canadian Forces paid a premium of about 25% for designing and building those ships in the way that they did. The Forces cannot afford to allow that to happen again.

 

If the price tag of new Navy ships is inflated because of a non-defence-related policy, like regional economic development, the Department of National Defence should not bear the cost. Whatever other department is served by a premium, like Industry Canada in the case of economic development, should pay for it.

 

 

The Committee recommends that:

 

27.  The Government aggressively pursue the recapitalization of the Navy and Coast Guard fleets as quickly as possible, wherever the most cost-effective solutions can be acquired;

 

28.  The Government maintain steady funding for new ships to support rational and timely fleet management;

 

29.  The Government ensure that any non-defence related premium that arises from a procurement decisions for Navy ships not be borne by a government department such as Industry or Heritage Canada, and not the Department of National Defence.

CHAPTER 2

 

Army

 

What Canada needs on Land

For the latter half of the 20^th Century, the Army oriented toward the Cold War and was structured to face heavily mechanized forces in a European theatre. Since the end of the Cold War, driven by budgetary and doctrinal considerations, the Army has shrunk and moved away from that model.

The Defence Policy Statement crystallizes this evolution by calling for continuous change of focus to a lighter, more mobile, and knowledge-based Army that is better suited for the asymmetric threats of the 21st Century – the “ball of snakes” as General Hillier describes these new threats. To sustain this evolution, the Army must change the way it recruits, trains and fights.

The Statement calls for the Army to perform a variety of combat and non-combat roles on behalf of Canadians, including warfighting, peace support, and humanitarian missions.

 

It was U.S. Marine Corps General Charles Krulak who coined the term “Three Block War”:

 

“In one moment in time, our service members will be feeding and clothing displaced refugees – providing humanitarian assistance. In the next moment, they will be holding two warring tribes apart – conducting peacekeeping operations – and, finally, they will be fighting a highly lethal mid-intensity battle –all on the same day…all within three city blocks. It will be what we call the ‘three block war.”[101]

 

This is the type of warfare that Canadian Forces are fighting in Afghanistan. This is part of the wide range of duties that fall within the overall mandate of responding to man-made and natural disasters to protect Canadians and their vital interests.

 

Beyond the unilateral defence of our country, Canada is committed to collective defence through alliances with the United States and NATO, and through ad-hoc arrangements with other nations as part of coalitions. To meet these commitments, Canada must maintain multi-purpose combat-capable forces able to fight in all types of environments.

 

Evolutions in modern warfare and the technology used to fight it are constantly changing the way the Canadian Forces must prepare to engage in ground operations. The Canadian Forces have learned many lessons since the end of the Cold War about what the Army needs to do to succeed in modern operations. It has focussed its thinking and its doctrine around concepts like Network-Enabled Operations and the Three Block War. 

 

Like all armies, the Canadian Army is organized to fight as a team, with an array of complementary combat capabilities that are designed to act in concert to defeat any adversary. Direct and indirect fire weapons, capable of engaging opponents at short, medium and long range that can destroy enemy personnel, armoured vehicles, maritime vessels and aircraft all need to be knit together to mobilize a winning military team. No one weapon can meet all needs. Like a golfer, the Army needs a full bag of different clubs, each designed for a specific purpose. However, unlike the golfer, the Army is often swinging all of its clubs at the same time.

 

The Committee believes that the Army is heading in the right direction. However, in order to be able to successfully and effectively achieve its aims, there are eight major procurement projects (and a host of minor ones) that need to be completed.[102]

 

#1. Equipping Canada’s Soldiers to Fight, Win and Survive

 

Over the next decade, the technology that soldiers carry will have to change dramatically to improve fighters’ capacity to operate in complex terrain, particularly in urban areas.

 

A soldier’s success depends greatly on his or her understanding of the situation at hand, the ability to take and execute orders, provide information to their commanders, identify friend from foe, and engage and subdue the enemy.

 

The goal of the Integrated Soldier System Project is to improve each of these capabilities. It will package electronic devices, weapons accessories, operational clothing and other personal equipment into an integrated system.

 

The Committee estimates that this program will cost $300-500 million. The project is in its early stages. The Department plans for first deliveries of elements of the project in 2009 and full capability in 2015.

 

This program is essential to ensuring that the men and women of the Canadian Forces have the equipment they need to achieve their mission and return home safely. It should be accelerated. Waiting a decade for full operational capability is unacceptable. 

 

 

The Committee recommends that:

 

30. The Department of National Defence should accelerate the Integrated Soldier System Project relying on proven capabilities, to achieve full operational capability by 2009.

 

 

#2. Knowing What’s Going On Around You: Land Forces Intelligence Surveillance Targeting, Acquisition and Reconnaissance (LF-ISTAR)

 

Just as the capabilities of individual soldiers and units need to be upgraded, so do Army-wide capabilities. An overall upgrade will help save lives, act as a force multiplier and improve the chances of mission success.

 

The Forces are trying to ensure that the right kind of information is being collected, analyzed, distilled into sound knowledge, and being made available in a useable, timely fashion to everyone who needs it. This is the goal of the Land Forces Intelligence Surveillance Targeting, Acquisition and Reconnaissance project (LF-ISTAR).

 

The project does not center on any one piece of equipment. It is designed to collect battlefield information and link several battlefield functions to assist the force commander in achieving his aims. This ‘system of systems’ employs a variety of electronic sensors which can include cameras, infrared sensors, battlefield radar and equipment to intercept electronic signals.

 

LF-ISTAR is an omnibus title for a number of smaller projects and existing capabilities that are being brought together to create an enhanced information and intelligence capability for the land forces.[103]

 

At the moment, funding status of this complicated $1 billion project is uncertain.

 

 

The Committee recommends that:

 

31.  The Department of National Defence should accelerate the Land Force Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (LF-ISTAR) project, with the aim for full operational capability not later than 2009.

 

 

#3.Knowing What’s Going on Around You Part II: LARV

 

Situational awareness is the product of information gathered from close by – emanating from sources like other soldiers and reconnaissance vehicles, and information from far away – like UAVs, communications intercepts and satellite intelligence.

 

A good ground reconnaissance vehicle is critical to gathering that information. The Committee supports the Canadian Forces’ acquisition of 75 Armoured Patrol Vehicles for Operation Archer in Afghanistan as a first step towards maximizing this capability.

 

The armoured patrol vehicle (APV) provides good protection for troops while they conduct patrols. It also provides the capacity to conduct command, liaison and reconnaissance tasks in mountainous terrain and complex urban centres. It incorporates enhanced mine blast resistance as well as protection against both improvised explosive devices and ballistic threats.

 

Canada has a duty to provide the best protection possible to our soldiers in the field. The suicide bomber and “improvised explosive device” attacks on our troops in Afghanistan over the last few months have served as tragic reminders of this duty.

 

The Committee estimates that the Forces will require approximately 200 more of these vehicles at a total cost of approximately $650 million.

 

 

#4. Getting From Here to There Part I: Big Trucks

 

There is an urgent need to replace the Canadian Forces’ workhorse trucks, called the Medium Logistic Vehicle, Wheeled (MLVW).

 

The Forces’ acquired 2,769 MLVWs acquired in the early 1980’s and had an expected service life of 15 years. Ours reached the end of their expected service life in 1997-1998 – about eight years ago.

 

The age and heavy usage of the vehicle has resulted in a five-fold increase in the maintenance cost per kilometre.[104] Corrosion has become a huge problem. A spray program is expected to keep the fleet in service until 2008. Corrosion isn’t the only problem. Spare parts have become scarce, braking systems are breaking down, and overloading has taken its toll.

 

The Department of National Defence has concluded that between 2008 and 2012 the fleet will become unsupportable. Extending the life of these trucks beyond that time is technically imprudent and economically foolish.

 

This is a large fleet, which means a large-scale purchase of vehicles is needed.  These will be militarized commercial vehicles that will dramatically improve the capability of the Land Forces to do bread-and-butter work.

 

At an estimated cost of $1.43 billion, the MLVW’s replacement, called the Medium Support Vehicle Systems (MSVS), is the most expensive land capability project in the works. But new trucks are long overdue.

 

Some or all of these new vehicles should be adapted by reinforcing them with armour. Recent U.S. and allied experience in Iraq and Afghanistan with “improvised explosive devices” has highlighted the vulnerability of lightly armoured logistics vehicles. 

 

The Committee recommends that:

 

32.  The Government should accelerate the acquisition of approximately 2,900 Medium Support Vehicle Systems (MSVS), with the intent to take first delivery no later than 2008.

 

 

#5. Getting From Here to There Part II: Smaller Trucks

 

The Forces will also soon need to replace its smaller logistics vehicle, the Light Support Vehicle, Wheeled (LSVW). The LSVW is used throughout the battlefield in such roles as troop transport, medical evacuation, maintenance, administration and light cargo. It is transportable in a CC-130 Hercules aircraft.

 

These vehicles are, on average, 12 years old and will go beyond their service life around the end of the decade.

 

The Light Support Vehicle, Wheeled (LSVW) provides transportation capacity between that of the smaller Iltis and G-Wagon, and the larger 2 ½ ton Medium Logistic Vehicle, Wheeled (MLVW). It is based on Italy’s Iveco Model 40.10 and was built at the Kelowna plant of Western Star.

 

The LSVW's cargo capacity is too small for traditional tactical loads. Large stowage boxes and a spare tire mount behind the cab result in a fairly short cargo bed. To overcome the space restrictions, LSVW’s often tow an 850 kg trailer to provide adequate carrying capacity. Towing trailers and piling on the cargo exacerbates the LSVW’s other key limitation – the rather anaemic power provided by its Fiat 2.5 litre diesel engine.

 

The LSVW is unpopular. It has been criticized for poor handling, top-heaviness, unreliable brakes and transmission, and awkward engine access amongst other things. However, much of the difficulty resulted from the original specifications.

 

The Department emphasized fuel efficiency and low purchase price when they were looking for a new light support truck.  That is what it got – a vehicle with top speeds of 25 km/h off-road and only 90km/h on pavement.

 

Neither the small engine (only 115 hp despite turbo-charging) nor the weak automatic transmission is adequate for tough military operational support duties. The transmission occasionally pops out of gear under stress.  Fading breaks and rust have shown up far too early in the lives of these vehicles.

 

In the end the Canadian Forces got what they paid for – caveat emptor.[105]

 

The Committee believes that the Forces will require approximately 4,700 replacements for these trucks as the Army transforms into a larger, but lighter and more mobile force. The Committee estimates that the cost of replacing the Light Support Vehicle Wheeled will be $700-750 million. Replacing them as they reach the end of their mandate service life will reduce excessive maintenance costs to keep them running longer.

 

The Committee believes that planning for the next generation of Light Support Vehicles should take into consideration the likely need to equip some or all of them with armour.

 

 

The Committee recommends that:

 

33.  The Government should accelerate the acquisition of the next generation of light support vehicles, with the intent to take first delivery no later than 2011.

 

#6. Firepower: Replacing Outdated Artillery

 

The ability to deliver massive firepower from anywhere within an area of operations is critical to military success. That firepower can be used to destroy an enemy or support infantry that have come under attack.

 

It has to be recognized that artillery has traditionally been a blunt instrument. Increasing concerns about civilian and friendly fire casualties has limited the utility of Canada’s current artillery. Not only is unnecessary collateral damage morally wrong, it undermines support from the Canadian public.

 

The Forces existing M109A4 are on average thirty-four years old – fourteen years beyond the Treasury Board guidelines for service life.[106]

 

The Forces began replacing their aging M109A4 self-propelled howitzer with M777 light-towed howitzers for Operation Archer in Afghanistan last Fall.

 

In a three-block war, precision is mandatory. So is the capability to employ both lethal and non-lethal weapons. And greater reach is always an asset.

 

The Committee believes that the Forces continue to replace their aging artillery. The Committee estimates the cost of the project at $900 million (for approximately 83 weapons).[107]

 

 

The Committee recommends that:

 

34. The Government should complete procurement and fielding of the new generation M777 guns no later than 2008

 

 

#7. Firepower: Acquiring the Mobile Gun System

 

The Army’s transformation into a lighter and more mobile force does not negate its need for firepower to dominate the battlefield. Quickness is increasingly important, but it cannot replace strength.

 

Even the most benign humanitarian operations have the potential to escalate suddenly into combat operations, in which a direct fire capability will be critical to the safety of Canadian soldiers and their winning a battle.

 

The Leopard C2 tank represents the Canadian Forces’ primary direct-fire capability. It is reaching retirement age. In their place, the Canadian Forces plan is to procure 66 modern Direct Fire Support Variants (DFSVs) of the Mobile Gun System.

 

Replacing tracked tanks with a wheeled Mobile Gun System is part of a plan to become a lighter, more strategically mobile force. The Mobile Gun System is smaller and lighter than the Leopard tank. Although it cannot be transported in a Hercules aircraft without being partially dismantled, the Mobile Gun System can be carried on larger aircraft.

 

Although the Leopard tank is still an effective direct-fire vehicle, Canada has rarely deployed them either because it was politically unpalatable, or sometimes because the Canadian Forces had no method of transporting these heavy beasts to a theatre of operations in a timely way. 

 

In the lingo of the boxing ring, tanks are heavyweights. The Mobile Gun System is considerably lighter but not nearly as well protected. MGS is worth considering, but the Committee has some reservations that it might not represent good value for money spent.  Our allies have not yet decided whether to invest in this system. We shouldn’t be rushing ahead with them, not at this point anyway.

 

 

#8. Firepower: Developing the Multi-Mission Effects Vehicle (MMEV)

 

The Army also needs vehicles with the capacity to engage ground targets – such as armoured vehicles and bunkers – as well as aircraft, including helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles and cruise missiles.

 

Enter the Multi-Mission Effects Vehicles (MMEV), which will combine anti-armour and air-defence capabilities on one platform. The MMEV will also be able to engage targets hidden behind surrounding landscape features – such as hills and buildings – with its non-line-of-sight weapons system. This combination of capabilities on one platform will provide ground force commanders with an unprecedented level of flexibility. 

 

The Committee supports the concept in principle, but has some hesitation in accepting the MMEV – as currently conceived – as being the best answer. The idea of having multiple capabilities on one vehicle sounds exotic, but it may not be all that practical. It could be viewed as an ill-advised attempt at cost cutting at the expense of soldier safety and operational effectiveness.

 

There may be those who think a smaller number of MMEVs could be procured in place of a larger number of single-capability anti-armour, anti-air and indirect-fire weapons. But if an MMEV is destroyed or disabled on the battlefield, the operational commander loses all three capabilities in one moment.

 

There is another concern. In September 2005, the Government announced its intent to undertake a project to design, develop and deliver MMEVs for the Canadian Forces. The full production of the MMEV fleet is expected to begin in 2010 following the completion of the design and development phase of the MMEV project. Do we want to invest in a long development process, or wait and consider where our allies are going on this technology?

 

The MMEV is a Canadian design. The Canadian Forces worked with Defence Research & Development Canada and Canadian industry through the Technology Demonstration Program to develop the fire control systems and ergonomics that will feed directly into the development of the MMEV.[108]

 

While the Committee is certainly not opposed to innovative military developments within Canadian industry, it is wary of the high costs and difficulties that have often accompanied the development of weaponry that is uniquely Canadian.

 

It is usually a better idea to buy off the rack. The Committee hopes the MMEV is the exception to the rule, but suggests that the Government remain alert to ensure that the most cost-effective route is taken to develop this capacity.

 

Our soldiers need a first-class product delivered, and the Canadian Forces need a first-class product delivered at a reasonable cost. The MMEV must be procured in sufficient quantity to offer operational redundancy on the battlefield and be built in such a way that delivery and cost are as promised. We cannot afford – either in terms of financial costs or risk to soldiers’ lives – to get bogged down in an industrial development exercise that doesn’t pay off on the battlefield.

 

 

CHAPTER 3

 

Air Force

 

 

What Canada needs Aloft

 

Strategic Airlift

 

Strategic airlift allows for the movement of large quantities of equipment and personnel rapidly over long distances.  In order to be effective, strategic airlift must be capable of moving even the largest military equipment to get a mission up and running and to keep it re-supplied once it is underway. This may include vehicles, artillery pieces, field hospitals, water purification plants and even helicopters.

 

Speed of response is vital.  Only if Canada has its own strategic airlift capacity can the Government of Canada move essential personnel and equipment to virtually any part of this country or the world in short order.

 

Despite the fact that Canada is a huge country, and despite the fact that it is also thousands of miles from  most potential military theatres of operation, Canada has not possessed a true strategic airlift capability since the Second World War.

 

Canada managed to meet most of its Cold War obligations by pre-positioning the majority of the vehicles, ammunition and other supplies required for the first days of any conflict at forward bases and staging areas. Those bases are gone now. This means that ways must be found to ship heavy equipment directly from Canada. The Canadian military currently has no effective, reliable and timely way of doing this.

 

Canada’s defence policy, like the defence policies of most of our traditional allies, emphasizes lighter, more agile and responsive armed forces.  Agility implies quick and easy movement. It is a contradiction in terms to suggest that our forces can be agile or responsive if they cannot rapidly get to where they are needed.

 

We Muddle Through Emergencies at Home

 

At home, we have muddled through a series of recent emergencies, including the Red River flood in 1997 and the Quebec-Ontario ice storm of 1998. In both cases, we were fortunate that we had enough time to respond, since lives were not immediately at risk. Nevertheless, we were forced to ask the United States for heavy airlift assistance during the Ice Storm.

 

Can we count on that kind of luck and generosity in the future? Would we be able to respond to a massive earthquake anywhere in the country? The Canadian Forces have personnel and resources spread across the country to assist in just about any kind of national emergency. But will we be able to get them where they are urgently needed when the time comes?

 

Hitching Rides Overseas

 

The approach of earlier Canadian governments to strategic lift people and equipment overseas has been to charter commercial planes or hitch rides with the Americans. In 1992, Canada relied on the U.S. Air Force to transport some of our armoured vehicles to Somalia. In 2002, we used civilian rentals and U.S. military aircraft to deploy to Afghanistan. Our less-than-sprightly DART response to the earthquake in Pakistan was accomplished using charter airlift.

 

The importance of strategic airlift is not lost on our allies.  The US maintains a fleet of more than 300 large airlifters (a mix of the C-5 Galaxy and the C-17 Globemaster), and even at that, occasionally finds the need to use commercial resources for less critical or less dangerous missions. A consortium of predominantly NATO nations has set about designing and building a completely new military airlifter (the Airbus A400M) to meet their strategic airlift needs. Barring any delay in the programme, the first will be delivered in 2009. The original seven countries (Germany, France, UK, Belgium, Spain, Turkey and Luxemburg) have since been joined by Malaysia, Chile and South Africa. Unwilling to wait for the A400M, in 2001 the UK leased four of the C-17’s from the US as an interim measure. They have now decided to purchase them at the end of the lease and will acquire a fifth, in addition to purchasing the A400M when it comes available. Australia has announced that it will acquire up to four of the C-17’s, with the first being delivered about a year from now.

 

Being Part of a NATO Airlift Pool is Insufficient

 

As a stopgap measure, ten NATO nations (including Canada) have entered into a collective arrangement that will allow the participating nations to access a pool of leased Antonov-124’s until the A400M is fielded. NATO has made arrangements with an eastern European company for AN-124’s to be available on 72-hour notice for an extendable period of three years.

 

This agreement is clearly a short-term solution for our European allies while they are waiting for their A400Ms. But it is not a good solution for Canada, even on an interim basis.  Since the aircraft will be based in Europe, response times to Canada will be longer than they are for other participants.  In a crisis involving more than one of the participants, Canada would likely have to wait its turn to gain access to this limited pool of aircraft.  When the program expires Canada is likely going to be left to its own devices since many of the other participating nations are planning to purchase A400Ms. One other problem: there is no guarantee that this commercial entity will remain viable over the long term or that the approximately 20 aging aircraft that make up this fleet will be replaced when their lifetimes expire.

 

Strategic airlift is at present and will likely remain a scarce commodity around the world. If Canada had this capability, we would be in a position to provide welcome, rapid, visible and relatively economical assistance in a wide array of military and other crises.[109]

 

The Committee believes that a fleet of 6 to 8 aircraft capable of carrying outsized cargo rapidly over trans-oceanic distances would be sufficient to meet these requirements.

 

The Committee recommends that:

 

35.  The Canadian Forces acquire a fleet of 6 to 8 strategic airlift aircraft by early 2008 that can guarantee a rapid response to emergencies in Canada and around the world and proper support to Canadian operations overseas.

Hercules Tactical Airlift

 

The CC-130 Hercules has been the Canadian Forces’ trusted workhorse since the 1960s.

 

These aircraft provide the ability to move troops, supplies and smaller vehicles within an area of operations and are unique in their ability to operate from short and austere airports that provide little in the way of ground services. This capability is absolutely essential in the remote regions of Canada and for the support of Canadian troops operating in difficult territory abroad. The Hercs have also been pressed into service as the fixed-wing search and rescue aircraft for northern, central and eastern Canada.

 

 

Canada’s Fleet of 32 30 Hercules is Aging, Dwindling

 

Canada’s fleet of Hercules is among the oldest in the world. The cost and time required to maintain our Hercules has skyrocketed. In the coming years, it is likely to cost more to keep the current fleet flying than it would to purchase new aircraft.

 

In 2002, the Committee reported that on any given day up to 20 of the Hercules – or about two-thirds of the Canadian Forces fleet at the time of 32 aircraft – sit on the ground waiting to be repaired. This sad situation has actually worsened. Nineteen of the oldest Hercules are reaching the point of being “beyond economical repair.” The fleet now only consists of 30 aircraft as two have already been parked permanently and will never fly again. The rest will soon follow.

 

Media reports during the November 2005 election campaign suggesting that a plan had been approved to replace the Hercules fleet were premature. No contracts were signed and no replacements are on their way.

 

These aircraft have been lifelines for Canadian Forces operating at home and abroad. Troop mobility is essential. Re-supply under difficult operational conditions is essential.  Canada needs this kind of aircraft to perform these critical tasks.

 

If we need strategic airlift (and we do), we also need to replace the wide range of capabilities that the Hercules can provide.

 

The Committee recommends that:

 

36. The Canadian Forces should replace the oldest 20 to 25 aircraft in its Hercules fleet as an urgent priority with a target of no later than 2007 for the first delivery of the new aircraft with similar capabilities.

 

 

Medium-Lift Helicopters

 

The Government decided to dispense with Canada’s modest fleet of seven Chinook medium-lift helicopters as a cost-saving measure in the early 1990’s. They were sold to the Netherlands. The Government assessed the needs of the Canadian Forces at the time, and determined that the Chinooks were expendable.

 

Experience gained in recent operations, however – especially in Afghanistan – has shown that Canada needs the type of battlefield mobility provided by the Chinooks. They are a real asset, especially in tough geographic locations.[110] Ironically, the Canadian Task Force in Afghanistan relies on our Dutch allies to carry troops in the very Chinooks that were once part of Canada’s fleet.

 

These helicopters are especially useful where roads and railways and other conventional means of transport are disrupted. The Canadian Government was forced to contract a Russian-built medium lift helicopter to support the DART in its ongoing earthquake relief mission in Pakistan.[111] Canada is filled with remote and rocky terrain, so these helicopters would also be useful for domestic disasters.

 

The Forces have yet to put a number on how many medium-lift helicopters they require. The Committee, noting the Defence Policy Statement’s increased emphasis on special operations capabilities and light fast-moving sea-based expeditionary forces, and taking into account our own recommendation to expand the military, recommends the purchase of significantly more medium lift helicopters than were sold off.

 

Without medium-lift helicopters, Canada will be forced, as LGen Andrew Leslie testified, to keep “sending young men and women tiptoeing through minefields at midnight because we don’t have the lift to pick them up and put them on the top of the hill.”[112]

 

The Committee estimates that approximately 16-20 Medium Lift Helicopters, at a total cost of approximately $2 billion, would be sufficient to adequately maintain the capacity that is required to ensure that Canadian Forces personnel can effectively and safely prosecute the missions the Government asks of them.

 

The Committee recommends that:

 

37. The Canadian Forces commence procurement of a fleet of 16 to 20 medium-lift helicopters with a target of 2007 for first delivery.

 

 

Maritime Helicopters

 

The requirement for a Medium Lift Helicopter capability is a separate issue from the seemingly endless project to replace the notorious Sea Kings, Canada’s maritime helicopters. As the Committee noted in Report 1, the fleet of 29 Sea King helicopters (now 28 Sea King helicopters)[113] eat up vast amounts of maintenance resources for every flying hour and now principally support only the High Readiness ships. A new fleet of 28 CH-148 Cyclone helicopters will not be operational until near the end of the decade.

 

Sea Kings operate off Frigates, Destroyers and Auxiliary Oil Replenishment ships and perform a variety of tasks including anti-submarine warfare that differ than those envisaged for the Medium Lift Helicopters.

 

The new Maritime Helicopters will provide a critical extension to the “eyes and ears” of Canada’s surface fleet that was designed to have onboard helicopters to fully realize its potential to counter both surface and sub-surface threats. It is essential that this long-overdue program move forward at the best possible pace to make this enhanced capability available to our Navy as soon as possible.

 

CF-18 Fighters

 

CF-18s represent our only tool for controlling Canada’s airspace, protecting our cities from an airborne threat, fulfilling our obligation to help protect North American airspace under the NORAD agreement and providing air cover in support of Canadian Forces operations abroad.

 

In the last five years, CF-18s have provided increased airborne surveillance following the 9/11 attacks and provided overhead CF-18 protection for G8 Conference at Kananaskis, Alberta. As they did during the Cold War – and now in the face of a possible terrorist threat – a number of these aircraft stand on continuous alert at various locations around Canada.

 

The Committee believes that fighters constitute a unique, essential tool and that the Government must maintain this capability for at least the next ten to

fifteen years.

 

The first step to maintaining this capability is completing belated mid-life update programs. CF-18s were purchased in the early 1980’s.  They are past due for updating with more technologically advanced sensors and communications equipment and adapting them to modern precision weaponry. Not only will these updates increase the effectiveness of these aircraft, they will make it possible for Canada to continue to work with our allies.

 

The decision to split the update program into smaller components may have been the only affordable choice at the time. It has meant, however, that these essential new capabilities will not be in place for quite a while.  A significant percentage of the aircraft fleet will be stuck in hangars undergoing modification for at least another five years

 

Participation in the Joint Strike Fighter Project

 

As we approach the end of the expected life of the aircraft, the question remains: What comes next? The Government must now begin to address the future of Canada’s fighter capability in the next decade. 

 

At the moment, there is no active program to replace to the CF-18. Canada is however, one of nine countries participating in the development of the Joint Strike Fighter, a US-led program to build the next-generation fighter aircraft.[114] Canada has invested approximately $200 million in the program thus far and will decide by the end of 2006 whether to remain in the program into its next phase. Canada’s participation has given it a seat at the development table with the opportunity to contribute to the design; has gained Canadian industry access to compete for high technology development and manufacturing work (worth about $150M so far); and has given us a preferential place in line should we eventually decide to purchase the aircraft.

 

 

CP-140 Aurora Maritime Patrol Aircraft

 

CP-140 Aurora Maritime Patrol Aircraft detect and counter submarines in our waters, provide air surveillance of our territory and coastlines, and are used for maritime surveillance in support of Canadian Forces operations abroad.

 

Like CF-18s, the Maritime Patrol Aircraft were purchased in the early 1980’s and are going through a protracted mid-life update program.

 

Colonel Matte, the officer responsible for our east coast Aurora Maritime Patrol Aircraft, told the Committee that because of this refit program – and the lack of spare parts and technicians – his greatest challenge was simply getting aircraft in the air:

 

“The capacity to generate flying hours today is less than half of what it was in the early 1990s. While our air crew remain safe and proficient to fly their assigned missions, there has been an appreciable reduction in the number of hours flown and subsequently the exposure and experience gained by our crews.”[115]

 

More bad news: it now appears that the CP-140 will require extensive structural upgrading if it is to continue flying past 2020. Funding for this airframe project is already late and requires immediate approval by the government.

If the Government of Canada fails to maintain the Canadian Forces' Aurora capability, the Forces will lose its only strategic surveillance platform. Canada's ability to monitor its coasts and the North will be significantly diminished.

 

 

The Committee recommends that:

 

38.  The government and the Canadian Forces make it a priority to complete the Aurora upgrade programs in the minimum possible time so that these essential capabilities are once again available to protect Canadians.

 

 

Fixed-Wing Search and Rescue Aircraft

 

Canadians and visitors to Canada can find themselves lost, hurt and desperate in remote parts of our rugged terrain or in our coastal waters. Their equally desperate loved ones have always been able to bank on the fact that the Canadian Forces have often been able to come to the rescue.

 

To bolster its capacity to help those in dire straits, the Canadian Forces recently acquired the new Cormorant Search and Rescue helicopter. Once it becomes fully operational, it will provide an enhanced rescue capability for many years to come.[116]

 

There is another major component of the Forces’ Search and Rescue capacity: the fixed-wing search aircraft.  The news here is not so good. Fixed-wing missions are currently conducted using the aging CC-115 Buffalo aircraft in the western mountainous regions of Canada and the CC-130 Hercules in the remainder of the country.[117] The CC-115 Buffalo played a much larger role in Search and Rescue until the mid-1990s when most of them were retired due to age and the prohibitive cost of maintenance.

 

These aircraft were replaced from the existing fleet of CC-130s Hercules. Now these aircraft are in the same shape as their retired predecessors.

 

Canadians depend upon the Forces’ reliability to perform Search-And-Rescue. In the Fall of 2004, the previous Government recognized this fact and at one point it announced that a replacement program be placed on the “fast track.”

 

Two years later, no new fixed-wing Search-and-Rescue platform has been ordered. The process seems to have been knocked off track by the perceived needs that a competitive bidding process take place and that Canadian industry be given an opportunity to participate.

 

 

The Committee recommends that:

 

39.  The government re-energize the “fast track” acquisition of approximately 20 to 24 aircraft to fulfill the fixed-wing search and rescue role so that the first of these aircraft can be delivered by 2007.

 

 

Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles

 

Canada has a tremendous challenge overseeing its expansive territory and endless coastlines.

 

Even in the days when more resources were available, it was difficult to maintain surveillance of our land and waters with manned aircraft and surface ships. Now that potential threats to Canada are more diverse, and new challenges to Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic loom on the horizon, we are even less able to stand by.

 

The rapidly emerging field of uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) offers hope for a practical and affordable solution.

 

Recent operations by Canada and/or its allies in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated that UAVs are an invaluable reconnaissance tool where ongoing surveillance is required in unfriendly surroundings.

 

 

 

According to Major General Andrew Leslie:

 

“We had [tactical unmanned aerial vehicles] in Afghanistan. They did great work. The ability to use [UAVs] to see over the next hill is a mission winner, whether it is war, peace support or humanitarian support. I think five or ten years from now, it would be nice if a variety of elements down the army chain of command, company, battle group and brigade, had their own means of checking out what is on the other side of the hill without sending a young soldier through a minefield at midnight.”[118]

 

Though the Canadian Forces are using UAVs on an interim basis in the difficult terrain of Afghanistan, Canadian troops generally lack a reliable means of “finding out what is over the next hill.”

 

The Forces have tested several versions of this technology in various environments in Canada, including the Arctic and on the Atlantic Coast. The Canadian Forces Experimentation Centre outside Ottawa is currently engaged in a study of UAVs.

 

The Committee first recommended that the Government acquire an array of uninhabited platforms in its report Canada’s Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World (October 2003). Such an array would include both tactical and strategic uninhabited aerial vehicles. It would cost approximately $250 million, depending on the type and number of vehicles acquired.

 

UAVs hold great promise as part of the solution to Canada’s surveillance needs at home and abroad. The more ambitious the Government becomes in integrating this technology into general use, the safer Canadians, their military personnel and their sovereignty will be.

 

 

The Committee recommends that:

 

40.  The Government and the Canadian Forces should acquire, deploy and operate an array of uninhabited air vehicles as an integral component of a national intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance picture by 2008.

 

CHAPTER 4

 

Other Capabilities

 

Special Operations Capabilities

 

Cold War era conventional military forces are organized and equipped to fight ‘conventional’ battles that are largely force-on-force encounters. They are characterized by large armoured land formations, technologically sophisticated ‘blue-water’ naval ships and equally sophisticated ‘blue-sky’ superiority jet fighter aircraft. Conventional fighting usually took place in open areas, like the eastern US in the American civil war, the Russian steppes in the Second World War, or in the Iraqi desert in the Gulf War. Conventional operations could also be conducted in urbanized regions like Europe in the Second World War, or in Baghdad during the US invasion of Iraq.

 

Forces that were designed to fight in a less sophisticated environment, against guerrilla or insurgent forces in difficult terrain such as a jungle, highly urbanized or mountainous region, were characterized as ‘unconventional’. They are generally lightly equipped and the troops consider themselves to be more aggressive and physically fit than ‘conventional troops,’ although this is emotionally debated among soldiers. Examples of unconventional operations would be the British operations against the Japanese in Burma during the Second World War, much of the US operations in Vietnam and current coalition operations in major Iraqi cities. Note that conventional operations can become unconventional, and vice-versa. US operations in Iraq were originally conventional during the invasion, but have become unconventional now because of insurgent forces.

 

Special operations are distinct from conventional and unconventional operations. They are operations that aim to destroy, neutralize or disrupt selective, high-value targets. Examples might include the killing of an effective enemy commander, the destruction of an important enemy headquarters or facility, the rescue of hostages held by terrorists, or the capture of war crime suspects.

 

NATO defines special operations as “military activities conducted by specially designated, organized, trained and equipped forces using operational techniques and modes of employment not standard to conventional forces. These activities are conducted across the full range of military operations independently or in coordination with operations of conventional forces to achieve political, military, psychological and economic objectives. Politico-military considerations may require clandestine, covert or discreet techniques and the acceptance of a degree of physical and political risk not associated with conventional operations.”

 

Special Operations Forces (SOF) are generally not designed for force-on-force encounters, but are organized and trained to strike selected, high-value targets. They strive to make every action an unfair fight in their favour. Well-trained SOF are disciplined and ruthless, with a ‘no-fail’ attitude.

 

The recently established the Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM) has the following missions:

a.                 provide the CDS and operational commanders with high readiness forces capable of conducting special operations across the spectrum of conflict at home and abroad;

b.                 provide centralized command of all activities and organizations that generate special operations forces;

c.                  conduct special operations  on orders of the CDS;

d.                 develop special operations forces, doctrine and procedures.

 

CANSOFCOM includes the following units:

 

a.                 Joint Task Force 2 (JTF-2) – Canada’s counter terrorist unit, located at Dwyer Hill, ON;

b.                 Canadian Special Operations Regiment (CSOR) – to operate independently or in support of JTF-2, located at CFB Petawawa, ON;

c.                  Special Operations Aviation Unit (SOAU) – a helicopter squadron located at CFB Petawawa, ON;

d.                 Joint Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Defence Company (JNBCD Coy) – to protect military personnel or assist civilian authorities in the event of a nuclear, biological or chemical incident, located at Trenton, ON.

 

To be effective, Special Operations Forces must combine highly motivated and capable personnel, extreme and rigorous training and sophisticated, technologically advanced equipment. They also need effective combat back-up in critical operations.

 

The Special Operations Command will be capable of operating as an independent formation but its primary focus will be to generate Special Operations Forces elements to support Canada Command (Canada COM) and the Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command (CEFCOM).[119]

 

The Committee has examined the structure and role of JTF-2, as well as the proposed additional Special Operations components. We have concerns as to whether their structure and resources allotted will adequately support the very demanding roles that this extraordinary force will be expected to play.

 

 

Enabling Special Operations

 

The Committee acknowledges the government’s intention to provide CANSOFCOM with a suite of modern “enabling” capabilities, including combat reinforcement, logistical and medical support. This will greatly increase the capacity and effectiveness of Canadian special operations.  

 

What are these enabling capabilities that JTF-2 requires to improve its performance?

 

§        Assured strategic airlift that guarantees Special Operations Forces can reach any part of Canada in single-digit hours.

 

§        Assured ground mobility to move to – and manoeuvre within – the incident area.

 

§        An expanded logistics capability to assure that it is able to support and sustain multiple operations – of real importance if Canada sustains multiple terrorist attacks at the same time.

 

§        A variety of capabilities that could spell the difference between success and failure on high-risk assignments. These include special language skills, unique weapons skills, unconventional modes of clandestine insertion and expanded intelligence capabilities.

 

§        A new, well-equipped, Special Operations Forces training base to replace inadequate facilities at Dwyer Hill, outside Ottawa.

 

All this points to a new and welcome interest in modern special operations by DND and the Canadian Forces. Some changes and additions to headquarters bureaucracy and support will be needed to ensure appropriate force development activity in this field. While such capability has been embedded in operational level headquarters and the Strategic Joint Staff, there is a need to develop effective and continuous special operations force development and equipment procurement.

 

 

The Committee recommends that:

 

41. DND immediately establish a standing Special Operations Forces Equipment Project Office to address the need for expanded special operations equipment on a continuing basis, for an enlarged Canadian Special Operations Forces formation.

 

 

Joint Task Force 2 (JTF-2)

 

JTF-2, which operates both domestically and internationally, is Canada’s ultimate counter-terrorist force – our incident-management response force of last resort. The unit, equipped with leading-edge technology, is composed of highly-trained assault specialists whose capability and reputation rank them among the very best in the world. JTF-2 is held at high readiness and trained to conduct counter-terrorist operations anywhere in Canada or abroad.

 

Canadians know very little about JTF-2. The Committee expressed concern over the amount of secrecy surrounding the unit in Report 1. While the Committee accepts the requirement for operational and personal security, authorities should do more to make Canadians aware of the role and missions of JTF-2 without compromising its safety or usefulness. The updated JTF-2 website is at least a step in the right direction.[120]

 

JTF-2 has had some difficulty in retaining personnel in recent years. Life for personnel is both secretive and highly demanding. It places significant stress on family life. It is a mix of anxiety – waiting on constant call – and intense pressure when the call finally comes. As well, private security companies have been expanding exponentially since 2001 and they often offer lucrative short-term contracts that can significantly exceed JTF-2 military pay and allowances over the same period.

 

The Committee is pleased to note that the Government has acted to address this issue by increasing the allowances.[121] The JTF2 allowance has been increased from two to six steps based on years of qualifying service with annual compensation ranging from $7,488 to $8,964 for general support personnel, from $13,680 to $16,356 for close support personnel and from $21,756 to $25,260 for assaulters.

 

The Canadian Forces compensation scheme includes special allowances to compensate CF members for skills and knowledge requirements that are not used regularly over a career and therefore are not compensated in base pay. The Special Operations Assaulter Allowance is an example of such an allowance. The allowance contains six steps with annual compensation ranging from $15,000 for those with less than two year’s qualifying service as an assaulter to $39,576 for those with 14 years or more qualifying service.

 

These allowance improvements, together with the other rewards of military service and recent base pay improvements, make JTF 2 compensation competitive with the external labour market and with members of other nations’ special operations forces. 

 

The Canadian Forces are working to double the size of JTF-2 but indications are that the expansion is going slowly. The Government will not reveal the status of the unit’s planned personnel expansion.

 

 

The Committee recommends that:

 

42.  The Canadian Forces complete the expansion of JTF-2 by 2009.

 

Canadian Special Operations Regiment (CSOR)

 

The Canadian Special Operations Regiment was established on 1 February 2006 and is currently in the process of building up personnel, training and equipment. It will be a highly trained, high mobility special operations force that is capable of independent operations, as well as supporting both special and conventional operations forces. At full strength, the Canadian Special Operations Regiment will have approximately 750 personnel and form three direct action companies and a special operations forces company that will complement other capabilities in CANSOFCOM, including JTF-2.

 

Drawn from all parts of the CF, the unit will have a broad range of capabilities to operate in Canada and abroad. Personnel will possess a host of skills that enable them to operate in a variety of terrains and environments. They will be highly flexible and adaptable, with the capability to work in small groups for extended periods of time without significant support. The Regiment’s tasks could include support to counter-terrorism operations, direct action, special reconnaissance and other sensitive, high-risk operations.

 

By summer 2006, half of the unit headquarters and service support will be in place, as well as the first company trained to a basic level. To ‘jump start’ the process, the Army Commander provided this first company complete from the 3^rd Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment. Remaining volunteer personnel will be recruited from across the Canadian Forces – male and female; Regular and Reserve; sailor, soldier and air personnel.

 

There will be two categories of personnel in the Regiment. Category 1 will comprise Canadian Special Operations Regiment Operators, to be employed in tactical special operations and high value tasks. Category 2 personnel will be drawn from Regular and Reserve force military occupational groups to fill specific staff and support positions.

 

The Committee recommends that:

 

43. Other Canadian Forces elements provide further “jump start” formed bodies, commensurate with their ability to do so and in keeping with the unit ability to absorb them. For instance, to follow the lead of The Royal Canadian Regiment, each of the other Army infantry regiments might provide a company. Or the Royal Corps of Canadian Artillery and the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps could provide a platoon each. The Navy may wish to contribute an initial group of trained boarding party personnel to establish a presence.

 

 

Canadian Special Operations Aviation Unit

 

The Canadian Special Operations Aviation Unit is currently equipped with the Bell-Textron CH 146 Griffon helicopter, a helicopter that some feel is not adequate for conventional military operations let alone special operations.

 

In 1998, the Auditor General said in a report

 

“We noted in the projects we examined that affordability constraints resulted in only low-end capability being purchased, limitations in the number purchased, or both … the Griffon helicopter cannot meet the army's original lift and communications requirements.”

 

Also in the same report,

 

“Operational tests that could have been carried out on the Griffon to assess the aircraft's suitability for military use were not done before acquisition. As a result, the Department is now discovering that the aircraft's capabilities are being stretched to their limits, particularly when the Griffon is used in applications that push its envelope, such as search and rescue operations. Problems not yet resolved include engine over-torques, and electrostatic shocks to personnel who ground the aircraft as it hovers…. prior to acquisition the Department did not test the new Griffon helicopter's ability to conduct military missions. After the aircraft was introduced into service it became apparent that its capability to perform certain military tasks is limited.”[122]

 

The purchase of the Griffon was the first major Canadian Forces foray into “commercial off-the-shelf” procurement. Unit purchase prices were lower since development costs were already absorbed by previous commercial customers for the civilian Model 412. The Canadian Forces needed only to pay for the militarization kits. Despite the ease of adapting the civilian 412 model to military roles, the Griffon remains essentially a commercial helicopter – hardly the type of helicopter to be assigned to special operations. Unfortunately, unclassified information on the current status and use of the Griffon helicopter in the Canadian Special Operations Aviation Unit is not being made public.

 

What is known however, is that when carrying troops equipped for combat, the Griffon can be fitted with either long range fuel tanks or Kevlar armour plating, but not both. This means that troops going further into a conflict zone are less protected. The Griffon is also incapable of lifting even the lightest artillery gun in the Canadian inventory. Tail blade weakness has also resulted in crashes, some of which have killed pilots.[123]

 

This is hardly a helicopter that should be assigned to Special Operations Forces.

 

The Committee recommends that:

 

44.  DND immediately establish a project office to initiate procurement of a modern, combat capable tactical helicopter suitable for use by Canadian Special Operations Forces; and

 

45. A Special Operations Forces helicopter be acquired by 2009, to be operationally capable when the expanded JTF-2 and the full Canadian Special Operations Regiment reach its full operational capability.

 

 

Joint Nuclear Biological and Chemical Defence Company

 

Since 1976, the Canadian Forces has maintained an enhanced and deployable nuclear, biological and chemical defence response team (NBCRT) for support to domestic operations. The events subsequent to September 11, 2001, emphasized that nuclear, biological and chemical defence is a critical element of domestic and international security. Increasing the Canadian Forces capability was given a higher priority and the December 2001 Federal Budget provided $30 million to enhance NBC defence capability across the military and establish the JNBCD Company as an immediate response unit, at Canadian Forces Trenton, where it has access to military airlift in time of crisis.

 

The JNBCD Company maintains an initial response component on a very high readiness posture as part of the National Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Response Team and can be deployed by road or by air.

 

The JNBCD Company is a truly “joint” unit with members coming from the army, navy and air force. It can conduct detection, sampling and identification of the full range of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear hazards, and provide expert advice to incident commanders and senior officials. February 1, 2006 marked CF JNBCD Company’s reassignment to Canadian Special Operations Forces Command where it continues to be able to rapidly respond to Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear (CBRN) terrorist threats as the CF Component of the National CBRN Response Team or Special Operations Force.

 

 

Tactical Airlift – Big Honkin’ Helicopters

 

This report also discussed the need for medium lift tactical helicopters to provide battlefield mobility. This capability is also required for the tactical deployment and support of Special Operations Forces. Although there are some special fittings required from time to time when supporting special operations, there is not, at this time, a requirement to have dedicated medium-lift helicopters placed in support of Canadian Special Operations Forces. However, in procuring the medium lift helicopters recommended earlier in this report, it is essential that enough of them be procured to ensure the availability of at least three at any time, to support special operations.

 

 

The Committee recommends that:

 

46.  The acquisition of medium lift helicopters, recommended earlier in this report, include sufficient numbers to ensure the availability of at least three helicopters, to be placed in support of special operations if needed.

 

 

Tactical Airlift – CC130 Hercules

 

Earlier in this report, the grave difficulties facing the Canadian Forces CC-130 Hercules aircraft fleet were discussed and recommendations made for the purchase of new tactical airlift aircraft. The urgent need for Hercules replacement is reinforced by the fact that the operational deployment of Special Operations Forces and all Canadian parachute forces is, for the most part, dependent on Hercules aircraft.

 

Further, as with special operations tactical helicopters, the deployment and support of Special Operations Forces requires specially equipped versions of Hercules aircraft, suitable for a variety of non-traditional combat scenarios. And given that Special Operations Forces must be held at high readiness and prepared to deploy at short notice, time does not allow the leisurely adaptation of Hercules aircraft equipped for normal duty, into an immediately capable special operations aircraft.

 

If Canada’s expanded special operations capability is to be taken seriously, there is no alternative to having dedicated tactical airlift assigned in support.

 

 

The Committee recommends that:

 

47.  In addition to the replacement CC-130 Hercules aircraft called for earlier in this report, DND further procure three additional Hercules aircraft to be dedicated to special operations and appropriately equipped for that role; and

 

48.  Of the three special operations aircraft, at least one be maintained at the same high readiness as the Special Operations Forces it will support.

 

 

Strategic airlift

 

Earlier in Part IV of this report, we recommended that The Government and the Canadian Forces acquire a fleet of strategic airlift aircraft that can guarantee a timely and robust response to emergencies in Canada and around the world and proper support to Canadian operations overseas. Domestic emergencies could include terrorist activity.

 

As Canada’s ultimate counter-terrorist force, JTF-2 must be able to reach any likely crisis site within Canada, in single-digit hours, if it is to be at all effective. From the base of Special Operations Forces in the Ottawa area, no location in the country should be without the effective operational help of JTF-2 beyond nine hours – that’s a maximum of nine hours from warning to operational assault if necessary.

 

In order to be able to do this, Canadian Special Operations Forces require assured, high readiness strategic airlift, capable of deploying operationally capable Special Operations Force elements to any target area in the time required. An important criteria inherent in this requirement, is the ability to be able to land on austere airstrips. As a result, if the crisis arises in anywhere other than a significant urban area with a large airport, the Canadian Forces Polaris aircraft will not be able to land. On the other hand, where a CC-130 Hercules aircraft can land in a variety of austere locations, it does not have the speed or load capacity to meet urgent special operations domestic deployment times.

 

While it is true that, depending on the location, a combination of Polaris and Hercules aircraft might be sufficient (e.g. fly the Polaris into Edmonton, then transfer the JTF-2 operational element and its equipment into a Hercules that flies to the crisis site in Jasper, Alberta), it eats up valuable operational time and produces additional complications that are not needed. The optimum requirement is for a strategic lift aircraft that can land on austere airstrips if and when required.

 

While the deployment of Special Operations Forces abroad will also entail a degree of urgency, quick reaction in international deployments is less critical than in domestic crises. Nonetheless, international deployments of Special Operations Forces will have their own unique requirements and any aircraft procured must be able to be suitably adapted as necessary to effectively support this activity.

 

The Committee recommends that:

 

49.  In procuring a fleet of strategic airlift aircraft, as recommended earlier in this report, the aircraft acquired must be suitable for the strategic deployment of Canadian Special Operations Forces direct to the maximum possible number of locations in Canada, in a time and manner appropriate to operational readiness requirements that will be established; and

 

50.  The strategic airlift aircraft required be appropriately adaptable to the support of special operations and that the numbers acquired allow for at least one aircraft to held at the same high readiness as the Special Operations Forces.

Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART)

 

Canada’s DART is staffed by approximately 220 Canadian Forces[124] personnel equipped to fly into disaster areas and deliver limited medical treatment, limited engineering capacity and 200,000 litres of safe drinking water a day for up to 40 days.[125] It has deployed five times since it was established in 1996.

 

At Town Hall meetings the Committee hosted across Canada, the Committee quickly discovered how popular this unit is. That makes sense: the DART dispenses emergency care for people in distress, rather than bombs or bullets.

 

The Disaster Assistance Response Team has successfully deployed twice in the last eighteen months to aid victims of the December 2004 Asian Tsunami and the October 2005 earthquake in Pakistan. 

 

The DART may be popular with Canadians generally, but critics complain that it inhales money and is an inefficient and often ineffective way to deploy disaster assistance. CARE Canada President John Watson has been quoted as saying that sending the DART to Sri Lanka after the December 2004 South Asian Tsunami made “no sense, except as a PR exercise.”[126]

 

As it noted in Report 1, the Committee accepts that there are negative aspects to the DART’s capability and how it is employed. It is very expensive to deploy. The Turkey mission cost $15 million. The cost of the Kashmir mission has been estimated at more than $12 million.

 

However, the Committee respectfully discounts most criticism of the DART because it believes there is an incalculable benefit to Canadian interests in having Canadian Forces personnel in Canadian uniforms delivering relief to people around the world. The Government of Canada can support international aid agencies, such as Mr. Watson’s, and continue to deploy the DART as well.

 

The Committee believes that the unit could be deployed in more timely and effective ways.

 

 

Getting DART There on Time

 

DART is always on 48-hour notice to ship out, but its ability to deploy rapidly is limited by the speed at which it gets orders to do so and its ability to get to the location of a crisis.

 

It was, for example, only six days after the October 2005 earthquake in Pakistan that politicians authorized deployment of DART. The majority of the DART left for Pakistan a day later and the last of the team deployed three days after that.[127] There needs to be a way to reduce that lag time.

 

Even when a decision is made to go, the Forces lack the in-house capability to move the DART and its equipment efficiently. To get the DART to a place like Pakistan quickly, the Forces must rent aging Russian strategic airlift aircraft to carry its equipment (personnel are not allowed to travel on these aircraft). This is not only expensive; it adds an element of uncertainty to a deployment. At present, the Forces must acquire strategic lift after a crisis occurs, while other countries without lift may also be vying for that transport.

 

 

There is currently too much lag time before the DART gets off the ground. Canadian Forces spokespersons are always quick to point out that the DART was not designed as an emergency response team like police or firefighters, instead DART is designed to mitigate the impact of an emergency after it occurs. The Committee believes that the principle is wrong and that DART should be something much closer to an emergency response team.

 

The most critical work in any disaster is done first in the very short term. Long-term rehabilitation is important, but life-and-death crises are more important. Though the DART is always ready to go, the Government has not proven that it has the deployment procedures in place to get the DART to a disaster site within a week, when the most urgent work is done. Nor is the team permitted to hang around long enough to help put enduring solutions into place for trauma victims.

 

Protocols should be altered and infrastructure changed to get the DART into the air more quickly, and with a wider variety of relief capacity.

 

There will be times when the DART won’t be able to get into the air soon enough – foreign governments may take too much time giving approval, for instance. But better to expend extra resources being ready than to show up late.

 

 

Widening the DART’s Scope

 

The DART currently has a very narrow niche. It is designed for a set of specific tasks.  By all accounts it does them very well. But according to the Government, it is not an all-purpose disaster response force that would have been appropriately deployed to New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina, or to Haiti after flooding there in 2004.

 

The Government should seriously consider expanding the DART’s mandate and capabilities. It should also give greater focus to potential domestic operations as part of the government’s “Canada First” strategy

 

Finally, the DART’s command centre is currently in Kingston, its personnel are in Petawawa (few of whom are assigned to DART on a full-time basis), and its deployment centre is in Trenton. The whole unit should call Trenton home, and be on 24-hour standby for deployments to crises in Canada and around the world.

 

All this, of course, is predicated on Canada having its own strategic airlift capacity (see pages 166-167 above).

 

 

The Committee recommends that:

 

51.  The Canadian Forces should:

 

a.     Station the DART and its equipment at a facility that is co-located with the strategic and tactical airlift that will move it;

b.    Acquire sufficient capable Canadian-controlled strategic airlift to give the DART a global reach within hours;

c.      Establish closer liaison between DART and appropriate government departments and agencies such as the Public Health Agency, the RCMP and Transport Canada;

d.    Conduct joint training exercises to ensure that the DART will be able to operate in efficient harmony with provincial and municipal first responders across the country, and conduct similar exercises with other like-minded nations around the world; and,

e.      Expand the DART’s capabilities to deal with a wider array of natural disasters.

 

52.  The government should:

 

a.       Instruct the Canadian Forces that the Government’s  default decision will be to deploy the DART where possible, as soon as possible, and the unit should prepare accordingly;

b.       Ensure that regional defence and police attachés are aware of the DART’s capabilities and are trained to assist the DART advance team as soon as it is on site;

c.        Speed up federal decision-making on the use of the DART by establishing more effective inter-departmental protocols for its deployment.

 

 

Defence Intelligence

 

Military intelligence receives information from human and technological sources, open and covert sources, internal sources from within the Forces or the government, and external sources – particularly other governments. The Canadian Forces must have the capacity to collect, process, analyze and disseminate this information to its planners and commanders.

 

In Report 1, the Committee concurred with two internal Department of National Defence studies which identified serious deficiencies in Defence Intelligence.[128] The Committee also made the point that ongoing Canadian Forces structural changes (to create Canada Command, Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command and the Special Operations Group) will further strain defence intelligence resources.

 

Some of these challenges are being addressed. The rehabilitation process called for by the Defence Intelligence Review has been labelled high priority and it is being implemented.

 

It remains essential that Canada increase the number of trained military intelligence personnel. This can only be accomplished by increasing the capacity of the Canadian Forces School of Military Intelligence to train intelligence officers.

 

The Committee recommends that:

 

53. The Canadian Forces should expand the Canadian Forces School of Military Intelligence and increase the number of trained military intelligence officers.

 

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APPENDIX I

Order of Reference

 

Extract from the Journals of the Senate, Thursday, April 27, 2006:

It was moved by the Honourable Senator Kenny, seconded by the Honourable Senator Moore:

That the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence be authorized to examine and report on the national security policy of Canada. In particular, the Committee shall be authorized to examine:

(a) the capability of the Department of National Defence to defend and protect the interests, people and territory of Canada and its ability to respond to and prevent a national emergency or attack, and the capability of the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness to carry out its mandate;

(b) the working relationships between the various agencies involved in intelligence gathering, and how they collect, coordinate, analyze and disseminate information and how these functions might be enhanced;

(c) the mechanisms to review the performance and activities of the various agencies involved in intelligence gathering; and

(d) the security of our borders and critical infrastructure.

That the papers and evidence received and taken during the Thirty-seventh and Thirty-eighth Parliaments be referred to the Committee; and

That the Committee report to the Senate no later than March 31, 2007 and that the Committee retain all powers necessary to publicize the findings of the Committee until May 31, 2007.

After debate,

The question being put on the motion, it was adopted.

Paul C. Bélisle

Clerk of the Senate

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APPENDIX II

Index of Recommendations

 

 

1.   Canadian defence budgets be based on longer-term thinking about the security needs of Canadians, rather than short-term fixes to manpower shortages and equipment rust-out.

 

2.  The Government should grow to, and maintain the annual budget of the Department of National Defence at, between $25 Billion to $35 Billion by 2011-2012 to increase its capacity to protect Canadians and their interests at home and abroad, and to contribute to international peace and security.

 

3.  A minimum of 30 per cent of the defence budget be allocated to capital expenditures every year to ensure that Canadians serving their country have the infrastructure and equipment they need to do their jobs well, with as little threat to their lives as possible.

 

4.  The Government should immediately cancel the Expenditure Review Committee commitments affecting the Department of National Defence and ensure that the Department has use of at least the full allocation of the original $12.8 billion over five years allocated by the previous Government AND the additional $5.3 billion over the next five years, promised by the current Government.

 

5.   The Canadian Forces increase the authorized strength of critical, high-demand trades to ensure an operationally sufficient supply of personnel in those trades, so that deploying operational units are never undermined by a lack of specially trained personnel to do critical technical tasks; and that the Canadian Forces recruiting and training system is specifically geared to sustain those levels.

 

6.   The Canadian Forces should maintain regular strength of 90,000 personnel. This is the minimum needed to keep 75,000 trained and effective personnel – the number required to sustain the domestic and overseas tempo Canada may be required to protect its citizens and advance their interests.

 

7.    The Government publicly commit to a moratorium on additional deployments of the Canadian Army until it has reached a steady state of personnel, likely around 2011-2012.

 

8.   The Canadian Forces should build a recruiting and training system that can recruit and train the personnel necessary to maintain a steady state level of 90,000 personnel.

 

9.  All recruiting processes should be streamlined so that every transaction is electronic and transferable between Canadian Forces’ components.

 

10.  The Canadian Forces expand incentive programs to ensure that qualified personnel do not leave the Canadian Forces.

 

11.  The Canadian Forces be allocated the resources to allow them to create a Navy demonstration team to co-ordinate recruiting activities with ship visits to Canadian cities and complement the Snowbird and Skyhawks.

 

12. Once new recruits are trained, the Canadian Forces should utilize them to attract other new recruits by allowing them to go home for short periods of special leave to encourage others with similar potential to join the Forces.

 

13. The Canadian Forces should shorten the recruitment process for both the Regular Forces to a maximum of one-month between enrolment and the commencement of basic training.

 

14. The Department of National Defence should be allocated enough funds to invest at least 4 per cent of Realty Replacement Cost annually – the amount recommended by Treasury Board guidelines – toward the maintenance and replacement of its infrastructure to address outstanding deficiencies caused by years of underfunding.

 

15.  The Department of National Defence:

 

a)     Consolidate its aging armouries;

 

b)    Initiate a National Reserves Construction and Rationalization Program that will build or lease modern accommodation for Reserve units, with particular attention to creating shared-use facilities with local or provincial agencies where possible.

 

16.  The Department hire experienced private contract personnel to quickly expand its project management capacity.

 

17.  The Government eliminate duplication of approval levels between the Department of National Defence, Public Works and Government Services Canada, and the Treasury Board to reduce the average time between the identification of a deficiency and award of a contract by two-thirds.

 

18.  The Government increase

 

a. the expenditure authority of the Minister of National Defence to $500 million for any capital project; and,

 

b. increase the monetary threshold value of those defence-related projects that must be reviewed by Cabinet – also known as Major Crown Projects – to $500 million.

 

19.  The Department of National Defence should create two High Readiness Task Groups – one based on the Atlantic coast and one on the Pacific coast.

 

20.  The Canadian Forces accelerate the Single-Class Surface Combatant project as a successor to the Iroquois-class Destroyers and the Halifax-class Frigates, with the goal of first delivery by 2013.

 

21.  The Canadian Forces complete the Frigate Life Extension Project as efficiently as possible to minimize any reduction in the capacity of the Forces.

 

22. The Department acquire enough capacity to have at least one Joint Support Ship available at high readiness on each coast at all times, which requires at least four ships.

 

23.  The Government should provide the Department with whatever resources it requires to acquire four Joint Support Ships as quickly as possible, with first delivery by 2010.

 

24.  The Canadian Forces should acquire sufficient Landing Platform Dock vessels or their equivalent, each capable of carrying an Army battle group and its equipment at a time.

 

25.  The Government should provide the Department with whatever resources it requires to acquire four Landing Platform Dock-like ships as quickly as possible.

 

26. The Canadian Forces should restore its submarine capability by making Canada’s four submarines operational as quickly as possible, setting in place plans for their mid-life refit as necessary, and outlining a plan for their eventual replacement by a new generation of submarines.

 

27.  The Government aggressively pursue the recapitalization of the Navy and Coast Guard fleets as quickly as possible, wherever the most cost-effective solutions can be acquired;

 

28.  The Government maintain steady funding for new ships to support rational and timely fleet management;

 

29.  The Government ensure that any non-defence related premium that arises from a procurement decisions for Navy ships not be borne by a government department such as Industry or Heritage Canada, and not the Department of National Defence.

 

30. The Department of National Defence should accelerate the Integrated Soldier System Project relying on proven capabilities, to achieve full operational capability by 2009.

 

31.  The Department of National Defence should accelerate the Land Force Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (LF-ISTAR) project, with the aim for full operational capability not later than 2009.

 

32.  The Government should accelerate the acquisition of approximately 2,900 Medium Support Vehicle Systems (MSVS), with the intent to take first delivery no later than 2008.

 

33.  The Government should accelerate the acquisition of the next generation of light support vehicles, with the intent to take first delivery no later than 2011.

 

34. The Government should complete procurement and fielding of the new generation M777 guns no later than 2008

 

35.  The Canadian Forces acquire a fleet of 6 to 8 strategic airlift aircraft by early 2008 that can guarantee a rapid response to emergencies in Canada and around the world and proper support to Canadian operations overseas.

 

36.  The Canadian Forces should replace the oldest 20 to 25 aircraft in its Hercules fleet as an urgent priority with a target of no later than 2007 for the first delivery of the new aircraft with similar capabilities.

 

37.  The Canadian Forces commence procurement of a fleet of 16 to 20 medium-lift helicopters with a target of 2007 for first delivery.

 

38.  The government and the Canadian Forces make it a priority to complete the Aurora upgrade programs in the minimum possible time so that these essential capabilities are once again available to protect Canadians.

 

39.  The government re-energize the “fast track” acquisition of approximately 20 to 24 aircraft to fulfill the fixed-wing search and rescue role so that the first of these aircraft can be delivered by 2007.

 

40.  The Government and the Canadian Forces should acquire, deploy and operate an array of uninhabited air vehicles as an integral component of a national intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance picture by 2008.

 

41. DND immediately establish a standing Special Operations Forces Equipment Project Office to address the need for expanded special operations equipment on a continuing basis, for an enlarged Canadian Special Operations Forces formation.

 

42.  The Canadian Forces complete the expansion of JTF-2 by 2009.

 

43. Other Canadian Forces elements provide further “jump start” formed bodies, commensurate with their ability to do so and in keeping with the unit ability to absorb them. For instance, to follow the lead of The Royal Canadian Regiment, each of the other Army infantry regiments might provide a company. Or the Royal Corps of Canadian Artillery and the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps could provide a platoon each. The Navy may wish to contribute an initial group of trained boarding party personnel to establish a presence.

 

44.  DND immediately establish a project office to initiate procurement of a modern, combat capable tactical helicopter suitable for use by Canadian Special Operations Forces; and

 

45. A Special Operations Forces helicopter be acquired by 2009, to be operationally capable when the expanded JTF-2 and the full Canadian Special Operations Regiment reach its full operational capability.

 

46.  The acquisition of medium lift helicopters, recommended earlier in this report, include sufficient numbers to ensure the availability of at least three helicopters, to be placed in support of special operations if needed.

 

47.  In addition to the replacement CC-130 Hercules aircraft called for earlier in this report, DND further procure three additional Hercules aircraft to be dedicated to special operations and appropriately equipped for that role; and

 

48.  Of the three special operations aircraft, at least one be maintained at the same high readiness as the Special Operations Forces it will support.

 

49.  In procuring a fleet of strategic airlift aircraft, as recommended earlier in this report, the aircraft acquired must be suitable for the strategic deployment of Canadian Special Operations Forces direct to the maximum possible number of locations in Canada, in a time and manner appropriate to operational readiness requirements that will be established; and

 

50.  The strategic airlift aircraft required be appropriately adaptable to the support of special operations and that the numbers acquired allow for at least one aircraft to held at the same high readiness as the Special Operations Forces.

 

51.  The Canadian Forces should:

 

a)     Station the DART and its equipment at a facility that is co-located with the strategic and tactical airlift that will move it;

b)    Acquire sufficient capable Canadian-controlled strategic airlift to give the DART a global reach within hours;

c)     Establish closer liaison between DART and appropriate government departments and agencies such as the Public Health Agency, the RCMP and Transport Canada;

d)    Conduct joint training exercises to ensure that the DART will be able to operate in efficient harmony with provincial and municipal first responders across the country, and conduct similar exercises with other like-minded nations around the world; and,

e)     Expand the DART’s capabilities to deal with a wider array of natural disasters.

 

52.  The government should:

 

a)     Instruct the Canadian Forces that the Government’s  default decision will be to deploy the DART where possible, as soon as possible, and the unit should prepare accordingly;

b)    Ensure that regional defence and police attachés are aware of the DART’s capabilities and are trained to assist the DART advance team as soon as it is on site;

c)     Speed up federal decision-making on the use of the DART by establishing more effective inter-departmental protocols for its deployment.

 

53. The Canadian Forces should expand the Canadian Forces School of Military Intelligence and increase the number of trained military intelligence officers.

 

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APPENDIX III

Extract from the Chief of the Defence Staff’s Action Team 1 Report

Part 1– Executive Summary

 

 

INTRODUCTION - THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND CANADA

 

1. General. The security environment facing Canada and the CF poses a myriad of complex defence and security challenges. Using the failed and failing states that dot the international landscape as havens from which to attack, global terrorism has become a major security threat, while inter and intra-state conflict throughout the world continues to affect Canadians and Canadian interests. In order to meet these challenges effectively, the recently released Defence Policy Statement (DPS – reference A) has provided a new vision for the CF that will require fundamental changes to its organization and culture.

 

2. Post-Cold War Conflict. Although in general terms the future is uncertain, some of its specific features are more apparent. At the end of the Cold War, many analysts developed the belief that major interstate wars had become a thing of the past and that a more peaceful era, fuelled by liberal democracy and the triumph of the free market over communism, would spread throughout the world.[129] In the following decade, it became all too apparent that these hopeful predictions bore little resemblance to reality, and that conflict and international strife have been major and enduring features of the post-Cold War security environment, especially in regions characterized by failed and failing states.

 

3. Globalization and Canada. The problems created by failing states will continue to be sources of concern for the foreseeable future. The reason for this is that in the globally interconnected world, domestic, continental and international security have become increasingly integrated. Whether a state can compete in the globalized economy will largely determine whether it succeeds or fails. Pressures from within due to the scarcity of resources, including fresh water and sources of energy, and from rapid urbanization, environmental degradation, and pandemic disease will also influence a state’s fate.[130] Moreover, modern communications, which are a by-product of globalization, will mean that these problems will be increasingly difficult for the world’s wealthiest countries to ignore. In short, the world has changed fundamentally, and Canada is certainly not the “…fireproof house, far from the sources of conflagration” as Canada’s League of Nations delegate Raoul Dandurand boasted in 1927.[131]As the recent history of Afghanistan demonstrates, events in remote countries have an immediate impact at home, and this reality has exposed Canadian complacency and shattered our sense of security.

 

4. Emerging Threats. Conflict will likely take many forms and will continue to be characterized by a violent clash of wills pulled between Clausewitz’s ‘paradoxical’ trinity: primordial violence, hatred and enmity; the play of chance and probability; and the rationality of policy.[132]Conflict will range from inter-state and intra-state warfare to asymmetric threats to the Canadian homeland from trans-national terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda, which have the ability and the willingness to cause a level of damage and destruction once reserved solely for nation-states. Indeed, the nightmare scenario of a terrorist attack employing weapons of mass destruction has forced western societies to view their national security in a new light (including enhancing law enforcement and other domestic security practices) and to draw stronger links between the military and lead civil authorities.[133]Indeed, one of the “great challenges confronting Canada in the years ahead will be defining an appropriate strategy that can deal with the inevitable shifts in US strategic focus as it responds to the evolving war on terrorism.”[134]Not only will this require an increased focus on security cooperation with the US, but reflective of the interrelated nature of domestic and international security, there will be increased calls for intervention involving ‘coalitions of the willing’ in the failing regions of the developing world.[135]

 

5. Threats to Canada. The recently released DPS has acknowledged the interrelated nature of domestic and international threats to Canadian security brought about by the increasingly globalized world. Indeed, not only has a global economy emerged, but also a far more interconnected world in terms of ease of travel and communications. Terrorist organizations will continue to exploit these by-products of globalization in order to advance their agendas on the international stage. Moreover, the DPS also acknowledged the link between failed and failing states and the use of these environments by terrorists from which to plan and mount operations against North America. The defence policy states that an “increasingly interdependent world has tightened the links between international and domestic security, and developments abroad canaffect the safety of Canadians in unprecedented ways. Today’s front lines stretch from the streets of Kabul to the rail lines of Madrid to our own Canadian shores.”[136]

APPENDIX IV

Defence Spending as a Percentage of GDP

 

 

Source: Treasury Board Secretariat and Department of National Defence, Making Sense Out of Dollars 2005-2006.

 

 

Defence as a Percentage of Total Government Expenditures

 

FISCAL YEAR	DEFENCE AS % OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES
1983-84	7.2
1984-85	7.1
1985-86	7.4
1986-87	7.7
1987-88	7.5
1988-89	7.5
1989-90	7.5
1990-91	7.3
1991-92	6.7
1992-93	6.5
1993-94	7.0
1994-95	6.4
1995-96	5.9
1996-97	5.6
1997-98	5.8
1998-99	5.8
1999-00	6.4
2000-01	5.7
2001-02	6.1
2002-03	6.6
2003-04	7.0
2004-05	7.1
2005-06	6.8

 

SOURCE: Treasury Board Secretariat and Department of National Defence, Making Sense Out of Dollars 2005-2006.