Canada Gazette

Her Excellency the Governor General in Council, on the recommendation of the Minister of Natural Resources, pursuant to subsection 44(1) (see footnote a) of the Nuclear Safety and Control Act (see footnote b), hereby approves the annexed Regulations Amending the Nuclear Security Regulations, made by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission on August 16, 2006.

1. The headings "INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION" and "Interpretation" before section 1 of the Nuclear Security Regulations (see footnote 1) are replaced by the following:

2. (1) The definitions "nuclear security guard", "response force" and "unobstructed area" in section 1 of the Regulations are repealed.

(2) The definitions "effective intervention", "inner area", "licensee" and "protected area" in section 1 of the Regulations are replaced by the following:

"effective intervention" means an intervention that is timely and powerful enough to prevent a person or group of persons, including those equipped with weapons or explosive substances, from committing sabotage or from removing Category I, II or III nuclear material otherwise than in accordance with a licence. (défense efficace)

"inner area" means an area inside a protected area that is surrounded by a barrier or structure that meets the requirements of section 13. (zone intérieure)

(a) in this section and sections 2 to 7.2, a person who is licensed to carry on an activity described in any of paragraphs 26(a), (b), (e) or (f) of the Act in relation to Category I, II or III nuclear material or a nuclear power plant;

(b) in sections 7.3 to 38, a person who is licensed to carry on an activity described in any of paragraphs 26(a), (b), (e) or (f) of the Act in relation to a high-security site; and

(c) in Part 2, a person who is licensed to carry on an activity described in any of paragraphs 26(a), (b) or (e) of the Act in relation to a nuclear facility set out in column 2 of Schedule 2. (titulaire de permis)

"protected area" means an area that is surrounded by a barrier that meets the requirements of section 9. (zone protégée)

(3) Section 1 of the Regulations is amended by adding the following in alphabetical order:

"design basis threat" means the characteristics of a potential adversary in respect of which countermeasures are incorporated into the design and evaluation of a physical protection system. (menace de référence)

(a) anything intended to be used to make a substance capable of producing an explosion, a detonation or a pyrotechnic effect;

(b) anything, or any part of any thing, used or intended to be used or adapted to cause, or to aid in causing, an explosion in or with a substance referred to in paragraph (a); and

(c) an incendiary grenade, firebomb, Molotov cocktail or other similar incendiary substance or device and a delaying mechanism or other thing intended for use in connection with such a substance or device. (substance explosive)

"high-security site" means a nuclear power plant or a nuclear facility where Category I or II nuclear material is processed, used or stored. (site à sécurité élevée)

"nuclear power plant" means a nuclear facility consisting of any fission-reactor installation that has been constructed to generate electricity on a commercial scale. (centrale nucléaire)

"nuclear security officer" means a person whose function is to provide security at a high-security site and to whom an authorization referred to in subsection 18(2) has been issued. (agent de sécurité nucléaire)

"off-site response force" means a local, provincial or federal police service whose members are not located at a nuclear facility. (force d'intervention externe)

(i) trained in the use of firearms, authorized to carry firearms in Canada and qualified to use them, and

(ii) permanently located at a high-security site; or

(b) a local, provincial or federal police service, a Canadian Forces unit or any other force

(i) under contract to a licensee,

(ii) whose members are trained in the use of firearms, authorized to carry firearms in Canada and qualified to use them, and

(iii) whose members are permanently located at a high-security site. (force d'intervention nucléaire interne)

"Personnel Security Standard" means the document entitled Chapter 2 - 4 — Personnel Security Standard, published by the Treasury Board Secretariat and dated June 9, 1994, as amended from time to time. (Norme sur la sécurité du personnel)

"physical protection measure" means an element or a combination of elements in place at a nuclear facility for its protection — or for the protection of nuclear substances at the facility — against potential adversaries. (mesure de protection physique)

"physical protection system" means all of the physical protection measures in place at a nuclear facility. (système de protection physique)

(a) carries out the design, implementation, maintenance or repair of a physical protection system at a high-security site or conducts training related to one or more of those activities; and

(b) is likely to be exposed to, or gain knowledge of, prescribed information in carrying out the activities referred to in paragraph (a). (préposé au soutien du système de protection physique)

"potential adversary" means any person — whether or not they have authorized access to a nuclear facility — who might attempt

"sabotage" means any deliberate act or omission, directed against a nuclear facility or nuclear substances, that

(b) results or is likely to result in contamination of the environment. (sabotage)

"threat and risk assessment" means an evaluation of the adequacy of an existing or a proposed physical protection system designed to safeguard against

(a) intentional acts that could pose a threat to the security of a high-security site; and

(b) the exploitation of weaknesses in the physical protection measures of a high-security site. (évaluation de la menace et du risque)

"vehicle portal" means a structure situated on the perimeter of a protected area that is enclosed on the sides and consists of two movable gates, separated by a space sufficiently large to accommodate land vehicles having an operational requirement to enter the area. (sas pour véhicule)

"vital area" means an area inside a protected area containing equipment, systems, devices or a nuclear substance, the sabotage of which would or would likely pose an unreasonable risk to the health and safety of persons arising from exposure to radiation. (zone vitale)

"weapon" means anything that could be used or is capable of being used to jeopardize the security of a nuclear facility or a nuclear substance or anything, including firearms, that is used, designed to be used or intended for use in causing death or injury to any person or for the purpose of threatening or intimidating any person. (arme)

3. The heading before section 2 of the Regulations is replaced by the following:

4. (1) The portion of section 2 of the Regulations before paragraph (a) is replaced by the following:

(2) Paragraph 2(a) of the English version of the Regulations is replaced by the following:

(2) Section 3 of the Regulations is amended by striking out the word "and" at the end of paragraph (e), by adding the word "and" at the end of paragraph (f) and by adding the following after paragraph (f):

4. An application for a licence in respect of Category III nuclear material, other than a licence to transport, shall contain, in addition to the information required by section 3 of the Nuclear Substances and Radiation Devices Regulations, a description of the measures to be taken to ensure compliance with subsection 7(3) and sections 7.1 and 7.2.

7. Paragraphs 5(e) and (f) of the Regulations are replaced by the following:

(e) the communication arrangements made among the licensee, the operator of the land vehicle transporting the nuclear material, the recipient of the material and any off-site response force along the route;

(f) the arrangements made between the licensee and any off-site response force along the route;

8. The heading "GENERAL OBLIGATIONS" after section 6 of the Regulations is replaced by the following:

9. Paragraphs 7(3)(b) and (c) of the Regulations are replaced by the following:

(c) an area to which access is controlled by the licensee and that is designed and constructed to prevent persons from gaining unauthorized access to the Category III nuclear material by using hand-held tools.

10. Section 8 of the Regulations, the heading before it and the heading "REQUIREMENTS CONCERNING PROTECTED AND INNER AREAS" after it are replaced by the following:

7.1 (1) Subject to subsection (2), if a licensee processes, uses or stores Category III nuclear material in an area referred to in paragraph 7(3)(c), the licensee shall ensure that the area is equipped with devices that

(d) when an event referred to in paragraph (a), (b) or (c) is detected, set off a continuous alarm signal that is both audible and visible to a person in the service of the licensee or of an alarm monitoring service under contract to the licensee.

(2) A licensee need not comply with subsection (1) if it takes physical protection measures in respect of the area that provide the same level of protection as the devices referred to in that subsection.

7.2 (1) Every licensee shall make or cause to be made written arrangements with an off-site response force that is capable of making an effective intervention at an area where Category III nuclear material is processed, used or stored.

(a) annual familiarization visits by members of the off-site response force to the area where the Category III nuclear material is processed, used or stored; and

(b) the joint development of a contingency plan by the licensee and the off-site response force to facilitate the force making an effective intervention.

(3) If a licensee does not have alarm monitoring capability, the alarm monitoring service under contract to the licensee shall notify the licensee and the off-site response force, immediately on receipt of an alarm signal from the area where the Category III nuclear material is processed, used or stored.

7.4 (1) The Commission shall establish a design basis threat analysis and update it as necessary to incorporate changes to the design basis threat.

(2) The Commission shall provide the current design basis threat analysis to every licensee, who shall take that analysis into account in the design of their physical protection system and make modifications to that system as necessary.

7.5 (1) Every licensee shall conduct, at least once every 12 months, a threat and risk assessment specific to a facility where it carries on licensed activities in order to determine the adequacy of its physical protection system.

(2) Every licensee shall make modifications to its physical protection system, as necessary, to counter any credible threat identified as a result of the threat and risk assessment.

(3) Every licensee shall keep a written record of each threat and risk assessment that it conducts.

(4) Every licensee shall provide a copy of the written record, together with a statement of actions taken as a result of the threat and risk assessment, to the Commission within 60 days after completion of the assessment.

11. (1) The portion of subsection 9(2) of the Regulations before paragraph (a) is replaced by the following:

(2) Subject to subsection (3), the barrier shall be designed and constructed to inhibit any unauthorized entry into the protected area and must be one or a combination of the following structures:

(2) Subsections 9(3) and (4) of the Regulations are replaced by the following:

(3) For facilities in respect of which a construction licence is issued after the day on which section 9.1 of these Regulations comes into force, the barrier must be designed and constructed to inhibit unauthorized entry into the protected area and must consist of

(i) an exterior fence extending at least 3 m above grade but otherwise constructed to the specifications set out in paragraph (2)(a),

(ii) an interior fence extending at least 2.4 m above grade but otherwise constructed to the specifications set out in paragraph (2)(a), and

(iii) a separation of not less than 5 m between the two fences that is free of obstructions, other than guard posts, vehicle portals and intrusion detection and assessment devices; or

(b) a structure, whether or not combined with other physical protection measures, that provides the same level of protection as the structures referred to in paragraph (a).

(4) Despite subsection (3), permanent security facilities such as guard posts and vehicle portals may join with the exterior and interior fences provided that a continuous barrier is maintained.

(5) The interior fence referred to in subparagraph (3)(a)(ii) is considered to be the perimeter of the protected area.

(6) Each gate, door, window or other means of entry or exit in the barrier shall be constructed so that it can be closed and locked.

(7) Those means of entry or exit shall be kept closed and locked except when persons or land vehicles are entering or exiting the protected area under the direct visual surveillance of a nuclear security officer.

9.1 (1) Every licensee shall ensure that vehicle portals are used for the entry and exit of land vehicles into and from a protected area.

(2) The gates of a vehicle portal shall not be open at the same time, except if required in the event of an emergency.

(3) No licensee shall permit a land vehicle to enter a protected area unless there is an operational requirement for it to be there.

(4) Every licensee shall implement physical protection measures necessary to reduce the risk of forced land vehicle penetration of a protected area.

10. (1) Every protected area shall be surrounded by an unobstructed area located on both sides of the barrier described in section 9 that extends at least 5 m away from every point of the barrier.

(b) continuously illuminated at an intensity and uniformity sufficient to permit clear observation of any person within the unobstructed area.

(3) Section 10 of the Regulations is amended by adding the following after subsection (2):

(3) Paragraph (2)(a) does not apply to structures in place on the day on which section 9.1 of these Regulations comes into force provided that appropriate physical protection measures are taken to maintain the integrity of the barrier described in section 9.

14. (1) The portion of paragraph 11(a) of the French version of the Regulations before subparagraph (i) is replaced by the following:

(2) Subparagraphs 11(a)(i) and (ii) of the Regulations are replaced by the following:

(i) employ two independent systems that detect intrusion into the protected area,

(ii) detect any tampering that may cause any of the devices referred to in subparagraph (i) or (iv) to malfunction or cease to function,

(3) The portion of paragraph 11(b) of the Regulations before subparagraph (i) is replaced by the following:

(b) kept under the direct visual surveillance of a nuclear security officer who is equipped with a device that can set off a continuous alarm signal that

15. (1) The portion of subsection 13(1) of the Regulations before paragraph (b) is replaced by the following:

13. (1) Every inner area shall be totally enclosed by a structure or barrier that is designed and constructed to prevent, alone or in combination with other structures or barriers, persons from completing both of the following actions before an on-site nuclear response force can make an effective intervention:

(a) gaining unauthorized access to Category I nuclear material by using hand-held tools, weapons or explosive substances; and

(2) Subsection 13(2) of the French version of the Regulations is replaced by the following:

(2) La structure ou la barrière entourant la zone intérieure est située à une distance d'au moins 5 m à partir de tout point de la barrière entourant la zone protégée.

(3) Each gate, door, window or other means of entry or exit in the structure or barrier that encloses an inner area shall be kept closed and locked with a device that, from outside the structure or barrier, can only be unlocked by two persons authorized under section 18, using two different keys or combinations at the same time.

(4) No person authorized to enter an inner area under section 18 shall enter that area unless at least one other person authorized to enter the area enters and remains in the area at the same time.

(5) No licensee shall permit a land vehicle to enter an inner area except when there is an operational requirement for it to be there.

16. (1) The portion of paragraph 14(a) of the French version of the Regulations before subparagraph (i) is replaced by the following:

(2) Subparagraphs 14(a)(i) to (iv) of the Regulations are replaced by the following:

(i) employ two independent systems that detect intrusion into, and unauthorized movement within and out of, the inner area,

(ii) detect any tampering that may cause any of the devices referred to in subparagraph (i) or (iv) to malfunction or cease to function,

(iii) when an event referred to in subparagraph (i) or (ii) is detected, set off two independent continuous alarm signals each of which is both audible and visible, one in the security monitoring room that can be stopped only from that room by a nuclear security officer, and the other in at least one other attended place outside the inner area that can be stopped only from that place by a person who is authorized to enter the inner area under section 18, and

(iv) facilitate an immediate assessment of the cause of an alarm; or

(3) The portion of paragraph 14(b) of the Regulations before subparagraph (i) is replaced by the following:

(b) kept under the direct visual surveillance of a nuclear security officer who is equipped with a device that can set off a continuous alarm signal that

14.1 Every licensee shall identify all vital areas and implement physical protection measures — including access control and measures designed to delay unauthorized access — taking into account the design basis threat and any other credible threat identified by a threat and risk assessment.

15. (1) Every licensee shall monitor from a security monitoring room, access to which is controlled by the licensee, the following:

(i) detect intrusion,

(ii) detect any tampering that may cause a device referred to in subparagraph (i) or (iv) to malfunction or cease to function,

(iii) set off an alarm when an event referred to in subparagraph (i) or (ii) is detected, and

(iv) facilitate the immediate assessment of the cause of the alarm.

(b) designed, constructed and situated so as to reduce vulnerability to damage and to resist forced entry by the use of hand-held tools, weapons, explosive substances or land vehicles until the on-site nuclear response force can make an effective intervention;

(3) Subparagraphs 15(2)(c)(i) and (ii) of the Regulations are replaced by the following:

(i) a two-way radio that can be used to communicate with both the on-site nuclear response force and the off-site response force,

(ii) a device that can be used at any time to alert the off-site response force,

(4) Section 15 of the Regulations is amended by adding the following after subsection (2):

(3) A licensee shall monitor the alarm devices referred to in subparagraphs (1)(c)(iii), 11(a)(iii) and 14(a)(iii) using a primary alarm monitoring system and a backup system. The backup system shall maintain the operation of the alarm monitoring function, including key computer systems, in the event of a failure of equipment essential to the functioning of the primary system.

15.1 A physical protection system shall include a physical protection measure that, in the event of the loss of power, maintains an uninterrupted power supply for a period sufficient to allow for an alternate continuous power supply to be implemented for

(a) all devices required by this Part related to intrusion detection and the immediate assessment of the cause of an alarm, other than lighting as required by paragraph 10(2)(b); and

15.2 (1) Every licensee shall maintain records of all devices, including keys and locks, whether electronic or manual, used to control access to protected, inner or vital areas or to Category I, II or III nuclear material.

(2) The records shall list all devices and their combinations, if any, that have been issued, the date of issue and the individuals to whom they were issued.

(3) If there are reasonable grounds to believe that any device or combination is defective or has been lost, stolen or unlawfully transferred or has otherwise become insecure, as the case may be, the licensee shall immediately take all measures necessary to restore the integrity of the device or combination believed to be affected.

(4) A licensee shall not issue a device or combination controlling access to a protected, inner or vital area or to Category I, II or III nuclear material to any person unless an authorization referred to in subsection 17(1) or 18(1), (2) or (3), as the case may be, has been issued to them and they are required to access that area in the performance of their duties.

20. (1) The portion of section 16 of the Regulations before paragraph (b) is replaced by the following:

16. Every licensee shall maintain a site plan that indicates the location and includes a description of the following, if applicable:

(3) Section 16 of the Regulations is amended by striking out the word "and" at the end of paragraph (e), by adding the word "and" at the end of paragraph (f) and by adding the following after paragraph (f):

21. (1) Subsection 17(1) of the French version of the Regulations is replaced by the following:

17. (1) Il est interdit d'entrer dans une zone protégée sans avoir en sa possession une preuve matérielle de l'obtention de l'autorisation consignée du titulaire de permis.

(2) Section 17 of the Regulations is amended by adding the following after subsection (1):

(1.1) In this section, "site access security clearance" means a clearance granted by a licensee to a person based on a security assessment for site access security clearances referred to in the Personnel Security Standard or on an equivalent security assessment.

(3) Subsection 17(2) of the Regulations is amended by striking out the word "and" at the end of paragraph (d), by adding the word "and" at the end of paragraph (e) and by adding the following after paragraph (e):

(5) An authorization to enter a protected area may be issued for any term not exceeding five years and shall be subject to any terms and conditions that are necessary to minimize the risk to the security of the area.

22. The heading before section 18 and sections 18 to 22 of the Regulations are replaced by the following:

17.1 On the entry into a protected area of a person to whom an authorization referred to in subsection 17(1) has been issued, that person's identity shall be verified by two separate personnel identity verification systems, one of which is an access card reader and the other of which is a biometric personnel identity verification device.

18. (1) Subject to subsection 20(1), no person shall enter an inner area without the recorded authorization of the licensee.

(2) Subject to section 18.6, no person shall act as a nuclear security officer without the recorded authorization of the licensee.

(3) Subject to subsection 20(2), no person shall act as a physical protection system support person without the recorded authorization of the licensee.

18.1 A licensee shall, before issuing an authorization referred to in subsection 18(1) or (3) to a person referred to in that subsection, perform a credit check in respect of the person, obtain the information and documents referred to in paragraphs 17(2)(a) to (e) and grant a security clearance to the person that is valid for five years and is equivalent to a "Secret" level security clearance referred to in the Personnel Security Standard or higher.

18.2 A licensee, before issuing an authorization referred to in subsection 18(2) to a person referred to in that subsection, shall satisfy the conditions set out in section 18.1 in respect of the person — other than the condition set out in paragraph 17(2)(b) — and shall obtain from the person

(a) documentary proof that the person is a Canadian citizen or a permanent resident within the meaning of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act;

(b) a certificate, signed by a duly qualified medical practitioner, certifying that the person does not have a medical condition that would prevent them from performing the tasks that are likely to be assigned by the licensee;

(c) a certificate, signed by a fitness consultant recognized by the Canadian Society for Exercise Physiology or a person with equivalent or higher qualifications, certifying that the person is physically able to perform tasks that are likely to be assigned by the licensee; and

(d) a certificate, signed by a duly qualified psychologist, certifying that the person is psychologically able to perform tasks that are likely to be assigned by the licensee.

18.3 (1) An authorization referred to in subsection 18(2) or (3) includes an authorization to enter an inner area.

(2) An authorization referred to in section 18 includes an authorization to enter a protected area.

18.4 An authorization referred to in section 18 may be issued for any term not exceeding five years and shall be subject to any terms and conditions necessary to minimize the risk to the security of the facility.

18.5 Every licensee shall give to a person for whom an authorization referred to in section 18 has been sought, at the person's request, a copy of any information or documents relating to the authorization in the licensee's possession that were submitted to the licensee by or on behalf of the person.

18.6 (1) Despite section 18.2, a nuclear security officer need not be granted the security clearance referred to in section 18.1 until one year after the coming into force of this section if he or she was a nuclear security guard immediately before that coming into force.

(2) Despite section 18.2, a licensee need not obtain the certificates referred to in paragraphs 18.2(c) and (d) from a person referred to in that section until one year after the coming into force of this section.

19. (1) Every licensee shall establish and maintain a list of all persons to whom an authorization referred to in section 18 has been issued.

(2) Every licensee shall, upon request, provide the list to the Commission or a person who is designated as an inspector under section 29 of the Act.

20. (1) A person who does not have an authorization referred to in subsection 18(1) may enter an inner area if they do so for the purpose of performing duties required by the licensee and they have the written authorization of the licensee.

(2) A person who does not have an authorization referred to in subsection 18(3) may act as a physical protection system support person if they do so for the purpose of performing duties required by the licensee and they have the written authorization of the licensee.

20.1 A licensee shall, before issuing an authorization referred to in subsection 20(1) or (2), obtain the following information:

20.2 (1) A licensee shall, when issuing an authorization referred to in subsection 20(1), make it subject to the condition that the person must be escorted at all times within the inner area by two persons who have the authorization referred to in either subsection 18(1) or (2).

(2) A licensee shall, when issuing an authorization referred to in subsection 20(2), make it subject to the condition that the physical protection system support person must be escorted at all times

(a) within the protected area by a person who has the authorization referred to in subsection 18(3); and

(b) within the inner area, by two persons, one of whom has the authorization referred to in subsection 18(3) and the other of whom has the authorization referred to in subsection 18(1), (2) or (3).

(3) No licensee shall permit a person who has an authorization referred to in section 20 to enter or remain in an inner area or act as a physical protection system support person unless they are escorted at all times as required by subsection (1) or (2).

20.3 Except as otherwise provided in this Part, no licensee shall permit any person to enter or remain in a protected area or an inner area unless the person is a member of an off-site response force, a peace officer or a member of another external emergency response force who requires access to that area for the purpose of carrying out their duties.

21. (1) A licensee may revoke an authorization issued under section 17, 18 or 20 if

(a) there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person who has the authorization poses or could pose a risk to the security of a facility;

(b) the person is no longer employed by or otherwise under contract to the licensee;

(d) the authorization is no longer required by the person in order for them to perform their duties.

(2) Subject to subsection (3), a licensee shall immediately notify the Commission in writing of any revocation made under subsection (1) and the reasons for it.

(3) If a revocation is in respect of an authorization under section 17, a licensee need not inform the Commission of the revocation and the reasons for it unless the revocation was made because there were reasonable grounds to believe that the person to whom the authorization was issued posed or could have posed a risk to the security of the facility.

23. Section 25 of the Regulations and the heading before it are replaced by the following:

25. Every licensee shall ensure that weapons and explosive substances are not taken into a protected area or an inner area unless they are under the control of a nuclear security officer or a member of an on-site nuclear response force or an off-site response force.

24. (1) Paragraphs 27(1)(a) and (b) of the Regulations are replaced by the following:

(a) enter the area unless they allow a nuclear security officer to search them and everything in their possession, including any land vehicle, for weapons and explosive substances; and

(b) leave the area unless they allow a nuclear security officer to search them and everything in their possession, including any land vehicle, for Category I, II or III nuclear material.

(2) Subsections 27(2) and (3) of the Regulations are replaced by the following:

(2) Subject to section 27.1, no licensee shall permit any person to enter or leave a protected area or an inner area unless

(a) on entering the area, the person and everything in their possession, including any land vehicle, has been searched for weapons and explosive substances and, in the case of a land vehicle, for unauthorized persons, by a nuclear security officer, who is physically present using appropriate detection and screening devices; and

(b) on leaving the area, the person and everything in their possession, including any land vehicle, has been searched for Category I, II or III nuclear material by a nuclear security officer using devices capable of detecting that material.

(4) No licensee who has a reasonable suspicion that a person who is in a protected area or an inner area has in their possession weapons or explosive substances that are not under the control of a nuclear security officer or a member of an on-site nuclear response force or an off-site response force or has in their possession Category I, II or III nuclear material without the authorization of the licensee shall permit the person to remain in either area without the person and everything in their possession, including any land vehicle, being searched by a nuclear security officer for the weapons, explosive substances or nuclear material.

27.1 (1) The search requirements set out in subsection 27(2) do not apply to a nuclear security officer or a member of an on-site nuclear response force who is entering a protected area or an inner area on foot, or who requires emergency access to or egress from a facility, as the case may be, for the purposes of carrying out their duties, if their identity as a nuclear security officer or a member of that force has been verified in accordance with section 17.1.

(2) The search requirements set out in subsection 27(2) do not apply to a member of an off-site response force, a peace officer or a member of another external emergency response force who requires emergency access to or egress from a facility, as the case may be, for the purpose of carrying out their duties, if

(a) they provide identification or other evidence that satisfactorily establishes that they are a member of an off-site response force, a peace officer or a member of another external emergency response force;

(b) the purpose of their emergency access to or egress from the facility is verified by a nuclear security officer; and

(a) take any weapons or explosive substances into a protected area or an inner area unless they are under the control of a nuclear security officer or a member of an on-site nuclear response force or an off-site response force; or

27. Section 29 of the Regulations, the heading before it and the headings after it are replaced by the following:

29. Sections 17, 18 and 20 do not apply to or in respect of an inspector who is designated under section 29 of the Act to carry out inspections at a high-security site.

28. The portion of section 30 of the Regulations before paragraph (d) is replaced by the following:

30. Every licensee shall at all times have available at a facility at which it carries on licensed activities a sufficient number of nuclear security officers to enable the licensee to comply with this Part and do the following:

(b) conduct searches of persons, materials and land vehicles for weapons, explosive substances and Category I, II or III nuclear material;

(c) conduct preventive foot and land vehicle patrols of the facility and the perimeter of the protected area to inspect for security breaches and vulnerabilities;

29. The heading before section 31 and sections 31 to 33 of the Regulations are replaced by the following:

31. Every licensee shall provide nuclear security officers with the equipment required to perform the duties set out in section 30, including

(b) portable communications equipment equipped with a device, referred to in paragraphs 11(b) and 14(b), that can set off a continuous alarm signal that is both audible and visible in the security monitoring room;

32. Every licensee shall at all times maintain an on-site nuclear response force that is capable of making an effective intervention, taking into account the design basis threat and any other credible threat identified by a threat and risk assessment.

(2) Every licensee shall, within the 30-day period before issuing an authorization referred to in subsection 18(2) to a person, examine the person's familiarity with the relevant and current security duties and responsibilities.

31. The headings before section 35, sections 35 and 36 of the Regulations and the heading after section 36 are replaced by the following:

35. (1) Every licensee shall make or cause to be made written arrangements with an off-site response force to provide for the protection of a facility at which it carries on licensed activities.

(a) to ensure that there is capability at all times for immediate communication among the security monitoring room, the on-site nuclear response force and the off-site response force;

(b) to ensure that the off-site response force can support the on-site nuclear response force in making an effective intervention when requested to do so by the licensee;

(c) for the installation of a two-way radio referred to in subparagraph 15(2)(c)(i) and an alarm device referred to in subparagraph 15(2)(c)(ii);

(d) for annual familiarization visits to the facility by members of the off-site response force; and

(e) for consultation between the licensee and the off-site response force regarding the arrangements, the resources and the equipment available to the licensee and the off-site response force, and any other matter relating to the security of the facility.

36. (1) Every licensee shall develop and maintain or cause to be developed and maintained, in cooperation with the off-site response force referred to in subsection 35(1), a contingency plan to ensure that an effective intervention can be made, taking into account the design basis threat and any other credible threat identified by a threat and risk assessment.

(2) Every licensee shall conduct or cause to be conducted at a facility at which it carries on licensed activities, in cooperation with the off-site response force, at least one security exercise every two years to test the effectiveness of the contingency plan and of the physical protection system.

(3) Every licensee shall notify the Commission in writing of its intention to conduct a security exercise at least 60 days before the exercise date.

(4) Every licensee shall conduct a security drill at the facility at least once each 30 days to test the operation of one or more of its physical protection measures and the readiness of its security personnel.

32. Section 38 of the Regulations and the heading before it are replaced by the following:

38. Every licensee shall develop a supervisory awareness program and implement it on an ongoing basis to ensure that its supervisors are trained to recognize behavioural changes in all personnel, including contractors, that could pose a risk to security at a facility at which it carries on licensed activities.

39. In this Part, "facility-access security clearance" means a clearance granted to a person by a licensee permitting access to a nuclear facility to which this Part applies.

40. (1) This Part applies in respect of a nuclear facility set out in column 2 of Schedule 2 that is

(b) at any time after being operated by a licensee referred to in paragraph (a), operated by another licensee.

(2) If the provisions of both Part 1 and this Part apply to a licensee, the provisions of Part 1 that relate to Category I and II nuclear material shall prevail to the extent of any inconsistency.

(3) Despite sections 7.1 and 7.2, this Part applies to a licensee that processes, uses or stores Category III nuclear material.

41. An application for a licence in respect of a nuclear facility shall contain, in addition to the information required by sections 3 to 8 of the Class I Nuclear Facilities Regulations, a description of the physical protection measures to be taken to ensure compliance with sections 42 to 48.

42. (1) No licensee shall permit any person to enter or remain in a nuclear facility unless the person has a facility-access security clearance or is

(a) escorted at all times by a person who has a facility-access security clearance;

(b) a member of an off-site response force, a peace officer or a member of another external emergency response force who requires access for the purpose of carrying out their duties at the site of the nuclear facility; or

(2) Before granting a facility-access security clearance to a person, a licensee shall verify the following information:

(a) a record emanating from the Canadian Police Information Centre or from a police service serving the locality where the facility is located, showing the results of a criminal record name check on the person;

(b) the person's personal history, composed of their educational achievement, professional qualifications, employment history and character references, unless the person has been employed for more than 10 years at the facility; and

(c) if a person's personal history cannot be established for at least the last five years, information relating to the trustworthiness of the person including, where available, a criminal record name check on that person from each country in which the person has resided for one or more years in the last five years.

(3) A facility-access security clearance may be granted for any term not exceeding five years and shall be subject to any terms and conditions necessary to minimize the risk to the security of the nuclear facility.

(4) For the purposes of subsection (1), a licensee may accept a facility-access security clearance granted by another licensee or an authorization referred to in subsection 17(1) or section 18.

43. (1) Every licensee shall establish and maintain a list of all persons to whom a facility-access security clearance has been granted under section 42.

(2) Every licensee shall, upon request, provide the list to the Commission or a person who is designated as an inspector under section 29 of the Act.

(a) there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person who has the facility-access security clearance poses or could pose a risk to the security of a nuclear facility;

(b) the person is no longer employed by or otherwise under contract to the licensee;

(d) the facility-access security clearance is no longer required by the person in order for them to perform their duties.

(2) A licensee shall immediately notify the Commission in writing of any revocation made under paragraph (1)(a).

45. No licensee shall permit a land vehicle to enter a nuclear facility unless

(a) there is an operational requirement for it to be there and it is searched for explosive substances, weapons and unauthorized persons; or

(b) it is used by a member of an off-site response force, a peace officer or a member of another external emergency response force for the purpose of carrying out their duties.

46. (1) Every licensee shall process, use and store nuclear substances and other radioactive material in an area within a nuclear facility that is under the visual surveillance of the licensee, or is designed and constructed to prevent persons from gaining unauthorized access to those substances and that material.

(2) Subject to subsection (3), a licensee shall ensure that the area is equipped with devices that

(b) detect any tampering that may cause any of the devices to malfunction or cease to function; and

(c) when an event referred to in paragraph (a) or (b) is detected, set off a continuous alarm signal that is both audible and visible to a person in the service of the licensee or of an alarm monitoring service under contract to the licensee.

(3) A licensee need not comply with subsection (2) if it takes physical protection measures in respect of the area that provide the same level of protection as the devices referred to in that subsection.

47. (1) Every licensee shall make or cause to be made written arrangements with an off-site response force that is capable of making an effective intervention at the nuclear facility.

(a) annual familiarization visits to the nuclear facility by members of the off-site response force; and

(b) the joint development of a contingency plan by the licensee and the off-site response force to facilitate the force making an effective intervention.

(3) If a licensee does not have alarm monitoring capability, the alarm monitoring service under contract to the licensee shall notify the licensee and the off-site response force, immediately on receipt of an alarm signal from the nuclear facility or the area referred to in subsection 46(1).

48. Every licensee shall develop a supervisory awareness program and implement it on an ongoing basis to ensure that its supervisors are trained to recognize behavioural changes in all personnel, including contractors, that could pose a risk to security at a facility at which it carries on licensed activities.

34. The italicized portion of the text in Schedule 1 to the French version of the Regulations is converted from italics to roman type.

35. The heading of column 5 of Schedule 1 to the Regulations is replaced by the following:

36. Schedule 1 to the Regulations is amended by adding the following after footnote 4:

5. Quantities less than the quantities set out in column 5 for Category III nuclear material and any quantities of natural uranium, depleted uranium and thorium should be protected at least in accordance with prudent security practice.

37. The Regulations are amended by adding, after Schedule 1, the Schedule 2 set out in the schedule to these Regulations.

38. The Regulations are amended by replacing the expression "the schedule" with the expression "Schedule 1" in the definitions "Category I nuclear material", "Category II nuclear material" and "Category III nuclear material" in section 1.

39. The Regulations are amended by replacing the expressions "nuclear security guard" and "nuclear security guards" with the expressions "nuclear security officer" and "nuclear security officers", respectively, wherever they occur in the following provisions:

40. The French version of the Regulations are amended by replacing the expression "ouvrage" with the expression "structure", wherever it occurs in the following provisions, with any grammatical modifications that are required:

41. The headings in small capitals before sections 3, 6 and 17 of the Regulations are converted to upper and lower case italics to conform with the format of the new Part headings enacted by these Regulations.

42. The headings in italics immediately before sections 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28 and 34 of the Regulations are converted to roman type to conform with the format of the new Part headings enacted by these Regulations.

43. These Regulations come into force 90 days after the day on which they are approved by the Governor in Council.

As Canada's nuclear regulatory agency, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) regulates activities related to the use of nuclear energy and nuclear substances in Canada, including nuclear power reactors, non-power reactors, nuclear research and test facilities, uranium mines and mills, uranium refineries, nuclear substance processing facilities, medical and non-medical accelerators, and a wide variety of nuclear substances and prescribed equipment.

The Nuclear Safety and Control Act (NSC Act, "the Act") requires that persons or organizations be licensed by the CNSC to carry out nuclear related activities in order to protect health, safety, security and the environment, and to respect Canada's international commitments on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The NSC Act gives authority to the Commission to make regulations to add details to the broader provisions of the Act. The Nuclear Security Regulations set out the physical protection measures required to address security issues, including the unauthorized removal (which is broader and includes theft) of nuclear substances and/or the sabotage of nuclear facilities and substances.

As a result of the heightened threat posed to Canadian nuclear facilities following the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, the CNSC:

These Orders were issued under section 47(1) of the NSC Act authorizing the Commission to make orders in the case of emergencies.

CNSC Order Number 01-1 was issued to major licensees, those deemed as high-risk facilities (including nuclear power plants, and nuclear research and test establishments). Designated Officer Order Number 01-D1 was issued to a second group of facilities having a lower risk profile (including nuclear substance processing facilities, uranium refineries, and nuclear fuel fabrication facilities). These Orders required licensees to implement specific physical protection measures considered necessary to strengthen security at their facilities. Some of the requirements which apply to one or both orders include:

Amendments have been made to the Nuclear Security Regulations to take into account the results of the above review and to incorporate the requirements of CNSC Order Number 01-1 and Designated Officer Order Number 01-D1.The amended regulations strengthen the regulatory regime for the physical protection of nuclear facilities and nuclear substances in Canada.

The existing Nuclear Security Regulations categorize nuclear material into three levels, according to the IAEA recommended guidelines (INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 (Corrected)). Nuclear materials are categorized according to the potential risk of the material being used in a nuclear explosive device, with Category I nuclear materials being the highest risk and Category III nuclear material being the lowest risk. The same categorization is used in the amended regulations.

The amended Nuclear Security Regulations are divided into two parts. Part 1 applies to:

Part 2 applies to the nuclear substance processing facilities, uranium refineries and nuclear fuel fabrication facilities captured by DO Order Number 01-D1. The nuclear substances or materials processed, used, or stored at these facilities are of a lower security risk than the materials used at a high-security site and therefore require a lower level of physical protection than high-security sites.

The additional physical protection requirements for licensees, contained in the amended Nuclear Security Regulations, touch on all aspects of physical protection. The principal requirements, listed below, are varied and are applied depending on whether the licensee operates a facility covered under Part 1 or Part 2 of the amended regulations:

The publication of these amendments will also assure the Canadian public at an appropriate level of transparency, while respecting the need for security, that enhanced physical protection measures at Canadian nuclear facilities are in place on a permanent basis and that the protection of the Canadian public will remain a vital concern to the Government of Canada, the CNSC and the operators of the facilities.

Three alternatives to amending the Nuclear Security Regulations were considered.

The status quo, which consists of using the existing Nuclear Security Regulations, the orders of 2001 and licence conditions, was rejected. The existing orders requiring enhanced security measures were prompted by the terrorist events of September 11, 2001. These orders were issued under subsection 47(1) and paragraph 37(2)(f) of the NSC Act authorizing the Commission to make orders in the case of emergencies and designated officers to make orders under special circumstances, respectively. Such orders are not meant to be permanent. However, the requirements found in these Orders need to be permanently established, as heightened security measures continue to be required to protect the public and the environment. Furthermore, the public should know that the enhanced security measures put into place will be permanent to give them assurance that they are adequately protected.

In addition, the status quo was rejected because other nuclear security enhancements, not included in the Orders, are required in order to bring CNSC requirements in line with international security practices.

The alternative of adding all of the enhanced security-related requirements to individual licences as licence conditions was rejected. Since there are a number of requirements that are common to a set of facilities (i.e. high-security sites or Part 2 facilities), rather than repeating the same requirements in each and every licence as licence conditions, it is more effective to capture these as a minimum set of generic requirements in regulation. However, the CNSC recognizes that licence conditions can be a more effective way of prescribing certain regulatory requirements, including facility specific requirements. See "1. Prescriptive Requirements" under the "Canada Gazette Part I, June 4, 2005 Consultation" below.

The alternative of voluntary compliance was rejected. It does not provide Canadians or the international community with the assurance that adequate physical protection measures have been taken to address threats to Canadian nuclear facilities and substances. Voluntary compliance implies that there is some discretion on the part of the licensee with respect to the implementation of physical protection measures and could potentially leave Canadian nuclear facilities vulnerable to attack. Voluntary compliance also includes the possibility of licensees having to justify investments in essential physical protection measures and could lead to a lack in consistency on how physical protection measures are addressed.

The amendments to the Nuclear Security Regulations serve to strengthen the overall security at nuclear facilities. Canadians, as well as the international community, can be assured that Canadian nuclear facilities and nuclear substances are protected, to the extent feasible, in accordance with international physical protection practices. The amended Nuclear Security Regulations enhance Canadian nuclear security requirements to meet:

Canada's amended Nuclear Security Regulations demonstrates Canada's committed position and vital interest in:

Further, the amended Nuclear Security Regulations makes the general physical protection requirements for nuclear facilities and substances known to the public through publication of the regulations as an unrestricted document. More specific security details are provided in regulatory documents that are not available to the public.

The physical protection requirements of CNSC Order Number 01-1 and of Designated Officer Order Number 01-D1 have been implemented. Licensees have already incurred considerable capital and ongoing costs to implement the requirements of these Orders. Capital costs include costs for buildings, structures and additions, and for equipment and its installation. Ongoing costs include costs for wages and benefits of the additional nuclear security officers and technical staff to operate the facilities' physical protection systems and for equipment maintenance. These expenditures are justified on the basis of protecting the public and the environment against international terrorist threats which could involve radiological sabotage, or the unauthorized removal of nuclear substances which could be used to make nuclear weapons or radiological dispersal devices (dirty bombs).

A number of licensees, on their own initiative, have gone beyond the requirements of the current regulations and orders, and have implemented a number of additional requirements found in the amended Nuclear Security Regulations. Some licensees, on their own initiative, have even exceeded the requirements found in the amended regulations.

While licensees have already expended the majority of costs through implementing the requirements of the 2001 CNSC orders, some licensees still have some outstanding expenditures. A cost breakdown is not included here due to the sensitivity of this security information. The total capital costs for all licensees to implement the physical protection requirements of the orders and the amended regulations are in the range of $300 million.

Annual recurring costs would be largely allocated to wages and benefits of employees who are directly involved in the security of nuclear substances and nuclear facilities. There would also be, recurring costs required for equipment maintenance. Ongoing costs to all licensees will be in the range of $60 million per year.

The CNSC's Nuclear Security Division has had to increase its staff to ensure licensee compliance with the enhanced physical protection requirements specified by the 2001 CNSC orders. Further increases to the CNSC's Nuclear Security Division staff are expected to be required with the amended Nuclear Security Regulations to ensure on-site armed response requirements are effectively monitored and evaluated for compliance. Compliance monitoring costs are recovered from licensees according to the CNSC Cost Recovery Fees Regulations. This will be a recurring cost for licensees for the foreseeable future to maintain the appropriate level of compliance monitoring to verify that licensees adequately meet their security obligations.

The amended Nuclear Security Regulations were developed by the CNSC as a direct response to the terrorist events of September 11, 2001.

Since issuing CNSC Order Number 01-1 and Designated Officer Order Number 01-D1, CNSC staff has significantly increased their contact with affected licensees through the exchange of correspondence, attending meetings, and by conducting more frequent and intensive on-site inspections and reviews of physical protection systems and procedures. The CNSC used these opportunities to discuss, formally as well as informally, the proposed amendments to the Nuclear Security Regulations. Affected licensees were considered to be generally receptive to the proposed amendments. Some licensees expressed concern regarding the cost of implementing the various measures but they also expressed an understanding of the necessity of ensuring, to the extent feasible, the security of their nuclear facilities and nuclear substances in their possession.

In addition to dialogue with affected licensees, the CNSC President and CEO, senior officers and staff met with other stakeholders regarding the use of armed on-site response forces at high-risk nuclear facilities (nuclear power plants and nuclear research and test establishments) and the arming of qualified nuclear security officers. Involved in these talks were federal government departments and agencies and provincial government departments and agencies in the provinces of Ontario, Quebec and New Brunswick. Extensive discussions took place with the Privy Council Office, senior representatives of the federal Departments of Justice, Natural Resources, and the Solicitor General as well as with the Canadian Firearms Centre and provincial Chief Firearms Officers. Numerous meetings were also held with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Ontario Provincial Police, the Sûreté du Québec and the Durham Regional Police Service and with their provincial government counterparts. The majority of departments and agencies gave support for the strengthening of security requirements including the presence of armed response at certain nuclear facilities.

Proposed amendments to the Nuclear Security Regulations were first published in the Canada Gazette, Part I, on October 25, 2003. Interested parties had 30 days in which to comment. Fifteen written submissions were received, including eight from licensees. All licensees subject to the high-security requirements found in Part 1 of the proposed amended regulations submitted comments. Three licensees subject to Part 2 of the proposed amended regulations submitted comments. The following were the significant issues addressed:

Due to the extensive nature of the resulting changes to the proposed amended regulations, they were re-published in the Canada Gazette, Part I, on June 4, 2005.

Proposed amendments to the Nuclear Security Regulations were published for a second time in the Canada Gazette, Part I, on June 4, 2005. Interested parties had 60 days in which to make comments. Seven written submissions were received, including six from licensees. All licensees subject to the high-security site requirements found in Part 1 of the proposed amended regulations submitted comments. One licensee subject to Part 2 of the proposed amended regulations submitted comments.

All comments received were taken into consideration. Licensees were contacted, where necessary to clarify their comments. The comments brought forward suggestions for improvements, corrections and clarification. The CNSC's responses to the ten key issues raised are summarized below.

Comment: It may not be appropriate to include all prescriptive requirements in the Nuclear Security Regulations, as not all prescriptive requirements should be in the public domain. It was suggested that these prescriptive requirements would be better addressed in a standard with the appropriate security protection.

Response: The CNSC remains of the view that prescriptive requirements are necessary in order to ensure consistency and to ensure that Canada's physical protection requirements at nuclear facilities meet international expectations. However, the CNSC recognizes that licence conditions can be more effective for prescribing certain regulatory requirements than regulations. Licence conditions may make references to standards, which makes the requirements set out in the standard legally binding. By including prescriptive requirements in licence conditions greater detail can be provided allowing for

For these reasons, it was decided to remove the following prescriptive requirements from the regulations and to address them in licence conditions:

The prescriptive provision to illuminate the barrier enclosing the protected area (section 9.2) was completely removed, as the amended lighting requirement of subparagraph 10(2)(b) is considered to be sufficient.

Other prescriptive requirements found in the amended regulations, such as fence heights and the requirement for dual independent intrusion detection systems, are the minimum acceptable requirements and are considered appropriate for these Regulations. Additional flexibility and better articulation of compliance expectations are not considered necessary for these requirements.

Comment: The use of the phrase "any credible threat" with respect to the threat and risk assessment (TRA) implies that there are threats that are more demanding than the Design Basis Threat (DBT), to which the licensee is obligated to defend. It is recommended that the phrase "any credible threat" either be removed, or remain in the context that the credible threat is bounded by the DBT.

Response: The word "credible" was added to the proposed amendments based on the comments received during the 2003 Canada Gazette, Part I consultation. The point raised at that time was that some threats identified in the TRA might not ultimately be concluded to be credible. The TRA is an analysis of the local threats for a particular facility and is prepared by the licensee of that facility. The TRA along with the DBT, which identifies the national/international security threats, create a complete picture of the security threats for a facility. The TRA must not be constrained by the threats identified in the DBT. If a licensee, through its TRA, identifies a "credible threat", the licensee is required to protect against this threat in addition to the threats identified in the DBT.

Comment: These definitions are too broad and would result in having many physically large, vital areas which would be impractical to secure. Stakeholders also continued to recommend that these definitions include a quantitative limit such as a public dose limit of 25 rem at the site boundary.

Response: The definitions of "sabotage" and "vital area" remain the same. These definitions should not be restricted by specific criteria. The CNSC maintains the position that any act of sabotage at a high security site is unacceptable and that each high-security site is unique and their vital areas must be considered on a case-by case basis. While stakeholder recommendations for a quantitative limit for these definitions are acknowledged, a single criterion that would apply to all high security sites could not be established. The CNSC will develop a guidance document to give stakeholders direction on how to identify vital areas.

Comment: With the incorporation of the Treasury Board (TB) Personnel Security Standard into the regulations by reference, a change to that Standard will in effect change the regulations without public and stakeholder consultation.

Response: The CNSC considers it appropriate to tie the security assessments for critical infrastructures that are related to national security to the Government Security Policy. The Personnel Security Standard, which is a part of the Government Security Policy, sets the appropriate level of security requirements for government departments. These requirements are considered to be commensurate with the risks associated with critical infrastructures, such as certain nuclear facilities. The TB standard has been incorporated into the regulations in order to ensure the requirements in regulations are always equivalent to what is set in the standard.

The stakeholder comment is correct in saying that the public and most licensees will not have a formal mechanism through which they can comment on changes made to the TB standard. Licensees would however have the option of applying for an exemption under section 7 of the NSC Act, if they consider a change to the applicable sections of this standard to be unreasonable. Applications for exemptions will be considered by the Commission on a case by case basis. The Commission may grant an exemption if the conditions of section 11 of the General Nuclear Safety and Control Regulations are met.

Comment: Greater certainty is needed for the DBT development process. Stakeholders were looking for assurance that the development will be consistent with the methodology used by the international community.

Response: The CNSC does not consider it appropriate to tie the DBT development process to a particular methodology specified in regulation. There must be flexibility to accommodate changing circumstances and advancements in methodology. The CNSC follows IAEA recommendations for its process in establishing the DBT. In order to provide more certainty for stakeholders, the CNSC will develop a document to describe the DBT development process.

Comment: The requirement to demonstrate the mental fitness of Nuclear Security Officers (NSO) should be included in regulation, as proposed in the amendments published in the Canada Gazette in October 2003.

Response: While the notion of mental fitness has been reinserted into the regulations, it is articulated somewhat differently than in the 2003 proposed amendments. When redrafting this provision to accommodate mental fitness again, it was realized that further clarification with respect to physical fitness was also required. The revised wording recognizes the difficulty licensees may have getting a medical doctor to certify that a person is both mentally and completely physically able to carry out the tasks that are likely to be assigned to them by the licensee. The amendment is drafted such that three certificates are now required, certifying that they are able to carry out their duties

Since the current regulations only identify the requirement for a certificate from a medical doctor, a one year transition has been provided for licensees to obtain the physical and psychological fitness certificate requirements (subsection 18.6(2)), recognizing the administrative difficulties licensees may have in obtaining these certificates immediately.

The requirement for staff in NSO-type positions to be able to demonstrate that they are medically, physically and psychologically fit is recognized internationally. All affected licensees have expressed support for this clarification.

Comment: NSOs and the on-site response force members should not be required to be searched under routine conditions. The NSOs and the on-site response force members are already subject to the dual verification of identity requirements of section 17.1.

Response: It is agreed that NSOs and on-site nuclear response force members do not need to be searched when entering the facility on foot and subsection 27.1(1) has been revised accordingly. The distinction of entering the facility on foot is made to make it clear that it would only be the person that is excluded from the search, and that any possessions, including land vehicles would still need to be searched. This amendment has been discussed with affected stakeholders. Licensees are supportive of this change, but would prefer that possessions be excluded from searches as well. The CNSC does not accept this, as the searching of possessions is important to ensuring security.

Response: No change was made to the definition of "explosive substance". This definition, while based on the Criminal Code definition, expands on the definition of "explosive substances" using the definition from the Explosives Act. This is considered to be a more encompassing and applicable definition for nuclear security.

The definition is not considered to be too broad. In order to be defined as an explosive substance under these Regulations, the substance must be "intended to be used...". The purpose for which the material is being brought into the facility is critical in determining whether added security measures are required. For instance, fertilizer that is intended to be used to fertilize lawns would not qualify as an explosive substance under these Regulations.

Comment: While the requirement for a FASC to be renewed every five years is considered reasonable for contract or temporary employees, it is considered to be excessive for permanent employees of Part 2 facilities. Recommend that a FASC for permanent employees be valid for the term of their employment at the nuclear facility.

Response: No change was made to this provision. The CNSC does not share the view that it is not possible for an employee to be charged and convicted of a criminal offence without their employer knowing about it. For instance a person could be incarcerated for weekends only. Just because a person has a criminal conviction does not mean that they are not employable. The approach of using a five year renewal is consistent with the terms that have been adopted or are going to be adopted by other departments and agencies.

10. Clarifications/Corrections: A number of clarifications/ corrections were made, including:

In summary, the CNSC has taken into account the views of licensees and other stakeholders when finalizing these amendments to the Nuclear Security Regulations. The amended regulations capture the minimum generic requirements for nuclear facilities and substances in Canada while facility-specific measures will be addressed through licence conditions, making efficient use of the regulatory tools the CNSC has at its disposal.

Compliance with the new nuclear security requirements will be monitored as part of the CNSC's ongoing compliance program for the affected nuclear facilities. CNSC inspectors and the staff of the Nuclear Security Division will conduct inspections to ensure compliance with the Nuclear Security Regulations and to verify the effectiveness of licensees' physical protection programs. The inspections include follow-up discussions designed to promote compliance. Licensees are required to take prompt action to correct any deficiencies or non-compliance items identified by the CNSC inspectors. Graduated enforcement actions may be used to enforce compliance, such as recommendations, written notices, written warnings, increased regulatory scrutiny, and licensing actions (such as suspending in whole or in part, amending, revoking or replacing a licence).

In addition, orders can be used to enforce compliance. They are issued for special circumstances. An order can be issued by a CNSC inspector or designated officer only when the conditions of subsection 35(1) or 35(2) of the NSC Act are met. Orders can also be made by the Commission in exceptional circumstances pursuant to subsections 46(3) and 47(1) of the NSC Act.

Paragraphs 48(c), 48(e) and 48(k) of the NSC Act state that any person who fails to comply with a licence condition, an order or with the Act or any regulation made pursuant to the Act, respectively, commits an offence, and is subject to the penalties provided by subsection 51(3) of the Act.

Mark Dallaire
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission
280 Slater Street
P. O. Box 1046, Station B
Ottawa, Ontario
K1P 5S9
Telephone: (613) 947-0957, 1-800-668-5284
FAX: (613) 995-5086
E-mail: reg@cnsc-ccsn.gc.ca

EXTRA Vol. 140, No. 4