THE SATISFACTION OF MINISTERS WITH
THE PERFORMANCE OF THEIR DEPUTY
MINISTERS DURING THE MULRONEY
GOVERNMENTS:
1984-1993

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A WORD FROM CCMD

The following study by Professor Jacques Bourgault of the Université du Québec à Montréal and of the École nationale d'administration publique examines in detail the relations between ministers and their deputy ministers during the two mandates of the government of Prime Minister Brian Mulroney. In a series of interviews carried out in 1995 with 23 of the 53 ministers appointed between September 1984 and June 1993, these former ministers were asked to comment on the nature of the working relationships they established with their deputy ministers and chiefs of staff and the extent to which they may have had a role in the appointment or removal of their deputy ministers. The ministers were provided with a list of criteria for evaluating the performance of their deputies and were asked to indicate, according to each of these criteria, their level of satisfaction with the deputies who served under them.

Professor Bourgault sets his findings in context by first examining the traditional roles and duties of ministers, deputies and chiefs of staff or executive assistants in the Westminster model. He then explores the issue of ministerial responsibility, the role of a professional career public service in serving the public interest, and the key factors likely to influence the relationship between minister and deputy, dealing specifically with the relations between the minister, deputy minister and chief of staff during the Mulroney era. The study is enriched by interesting comparisons with a similar study the author conducted in Quebec with Parti Québecois ministers active between 1976 and 1985.

CCMD is grateful to Professor Bourgault for this substantial contribution to its Research Papers series. This report follows on two earlier studies of deputy ministers Professor Bourgault prepared for CCMD with his former colleague, the Honourable Stéphane Dion. We hope that the following discussion and findings will prove interesting and valuable to ministers and public servants alike, both now and in the future.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In this study, interviews were held with 23 of the 53 persons (43 percent) who were appointed minister during the two Conservative mandates between Sept. 17, 1984 and June 25, 1993. This sample was stratified according to mandate, province of origin, language, sex and type of department. The ministers were part of 103 of the 189 minister/deputy minister teams (55 percent) created during this period and they worked with 63 of the 80 deputy ministers (79 percent) who were appointed during these two mandates. They were asked to participate in a semi-directed interview that lasted between one and four hours.

When the Conservatives came to power, they experienced difficulties that were not resolved until 1986, and this has created the impression that the ministers might not have been satisfied with the professional assistance that they had the right to expect in a democracy based on the Westminster model from a senior public service built on the Whitehall model. The purpose of this study was to determine whether this was indeed the case.

On the basis of our sample, 82.5 percent of the minister/deputy minister teams were a success. As the ministers gained experience and self-reliance, they did become more critical in their outlook.

Satisfaction is highest in the areas of ethics, working capacity, loyalty, discretion, knowledge of area of responsibility, adaptability, respect for ministerial authority, political judgment and the performance of deputy ministers before parliamentary committees.

There was a lesser level of satisfaction in the areas of departmental management, decision-making capacity, policy development, program evaluation, willingness to challenge, and, especially, ideological compatibility, influence in the bureaucracy and the capacity to bring groups and departmental clients on side.

Generally, the minister succeeded in imposing his or her way of doing things and the deputy minister readily adapted to it. Conservative ministers considered for the most part that the deputy minister was not their only principal advisor and gave a considerable role to their chiefs of staff; relationships were smooth in this threesome mostly when roles were shared in a common effort involving the deputy minister.

The most common relationship was that in which both the minister and the deputy minister were involved in policy development, but with each making a separate contribution toward the intended objective. The ministers did not have the impression that their deputy heads wanted to impose their views, but rather that they sought to influence without encroaching upon ministerial control.

The Conservative ministers had smoother relationships with the deputy ministers they appointed than with those they inherited from the Liberal government, but their relationships with the latter were also good for the most part.

The rate of satisfaction identified is comparable to the one revealed in the Bourgault-Dion study dealing with deputy ministers in Quebec who had served under the Parti Quebecois governments between 1977 and 1985.

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AT THE CENTRE OF EXECUTIVE POWER

The Actors

In the Westminster model, ministers are selected by the Prime Minister to become part of the Cabinet and take oath from the representative of Her Majesty to assume responsibility for specific policy areas (Dawson, 1963). In Canada, ministers traditionally are members of the majority party in the House of Commons. They are therefore generally members of the House of Commons or persons who undertake to become such members (the Juneau case). A senator may also be asked to fill a ministerial position in very special circumstances, as was the case in 1979 when the Conservatives did not have enough members of Parliament from all regions of Canada to form a sufficiently representative Cabinet. The Prime Minister selects ministers on the basis of a wide range of factors, including their support for his or her own political career, the appropriate representation of language groups, sexes, regions and religions, the need for continuity in the party, services rendered to the party, and academic and professional background (Bernard 1980, Kernaghan and Siegel 1995). The result is that the minister is not always an expert in the field for which he or she is given responsibility, but of course otherwise demonstrates political wisdom, personal maturity, intelligence, considerable adaptability and strong learning skills.

All deputy ministers are appointed by Cabinet on the recommendation of the Prime Minister who has complete discretion over the selection. Following the Canadian tradition, based largely on the Whitehall model (despite certain differences, including the influence of the British senior service in coopting and in the status of the Accounting Officer, held by a permanent secretary (Franks 1996 and *Halsbury's Laws of England*:380), almost all deputy ministers are recruited from inside the public service (Bourgault and Dion, 1989a), and although there is no massive dismissal when there is a change in government, they are subjected to lateral transfers or, in a few cases, to "removal by promotion" (Bourgault and Dion, 1990a). Therefore, in principle, ministers do not choose their closest officials, and there have even been cases where deputy ministers were specifically assigned to ministers with the purpose of coaching, supporting, protecting and assisting them (Bourgault, 1971).

The third actor considered in this study is the minister's chief of staff. Following the British model, before 1984 this person was simply an executive assistant responsible for managing a very small team of political assistants to the minister. In 1984, the Conservatives decided that the chief of staff would become the minister's key advisor, his or her alter ego in some cases, who would operate on the same level as the deputy minister, with compensation equivalent to that of an assistant deputy minister (Bourgault and Nugent, 1995). The chief of staff would have to be more "senior" than before, more skilled and more experienced, better paid, with a background in business, and, in particular, would have more influence. This new

role inevitably led to many confrontations between political and administrative personnel (Bourgault and Dion, 1995). As the minister's key political advisor, chosen by the minister (Plasse 1994, 26), he or she was often imposed upon a junior minister or a minister whose functions affected the party's financial supporters, as a former minister pointed out.

Duties

The duties of the deputy minister are not well defined in departmental incorporation legislation, which describes him or her as the department's deputy head and senior advisor to the minister, who is accountable to Parliament for the department's global portfolio. Under a constitutional convention established at a time when government was less active and less involved in the management of resources and when public affairs were less complex and interrelated, Canadian ministers are both jointly and individually accountable to Parliament, especially to the House of Commons. Individual accountability means that the minister is responsible in principle for everything that the department decides, and does or does not do.

However, the minister also devotes time and attention to sitting in the House, participating in the work of Cabinet and its committees, serving constituents, assisting the caucus and supporting the party. Managing the department's affairs is not always easy, especially since the minister rarely has a professional background relevant to the area for which he or she is given responsibility. Because of these limitations, ministers cannot manage the department's operations down to the finest detail, even though they are completely accountable. They therefore rely on the professional assistance of a loyal, competent and career-oriented senior public service managed by the department's deputy head, who directs and monitors the work of departmental employees, manages the policies for which the minister is responsible, advises the minister on these matters and manages the department "to ensure that everything goes well."

Ministerial responsibility can lead to a minister's resignation in cases, for example, where the minister personally violates legal requirements or the Criminal Code, rules of conduct or security, the principles of judicial autonomy, the rules on the disclosure of interests, etc. Resignation has also occurred when a minister, having been informed of problem situations, refused to consider the officials' advice and took a decision that was later determined to be inappropriate (the tuna affair). Resignation was not called for in matters where the minister was not informed and was not personally involved, although the minister did have to provide explanations and apologies and to announce that corrective actions would be taken immediately (the mussel affair). These criteria for ministerial accountability reveal the importance of the minister's relationship with the deputy minister, the department's key official.

The Minister/Deputy Minister Relationship

Understanding the minister/deputy minister relationship is critical for five reasons:

- the deputy minister is the interface between the public service community responsible for policy development and implementation based on its knowledge, and the political community responsible for decision making based on its legitimacy;

- These two communities converge with the minister and deputy minister as focal points, reflecting, on the one hand, both the projects and interests of the governing party, caucus and pressure groups, and, on the other, the need to consider longer-term issues, continuity and linkages with other organizations and jurisdictions;

- a good minister/deputy minister relationship also demonstrates the extent to which the elected members of the House of Commons can be appropriately supported by the bureaucracy;

- if the purpose of the public service is to serve the public interest through support of the government in power, fulfilment of this purpose can best be assessed at this focal point where relations between politicians and officials converge; and lastly,

- the New Public Management focuses on service to clients and on the quality of this service, and for this reason it was important to assess how the minister, the deputy minister's first client, perceived this service.

Each minister/deputy minister relationship is unique: it is shaped by the personality of each individual, by his or her ambitions, by the perception each has of his or her role and relations with the other person, by past experience in similar situations, and by the perception each has of his or her influence in the hierarchy; it is also based on social and professional backgrounds (gender, language, region of origin, etc.).

There would therefore be no point in suggesting a magic relationship "model" which ensures automatic satisfaction for both the minister and the deputy minister. The literature in this area provides only selective accounts of the general experiences of ministers or deputy ministers. This study has aimed, instead, at understanding the importance of certain issues likely to affect the level of satisfaction felt by ministers toward their deputies.

Issues Related to Satisfaction

At least five key issues illustrate that it is important for the minister to be satisfied with his or

her deputy. These are related to the nature of the democratic system, to program costs and efficiency, to the credibility of the government system, and to the need to maintain a career senior public service.

The House of Commons entrusts the ministerial team with the implementation of the component of the winning party's platform that is outlined in the Speech from the Throne addressed by the Prime Minister to the Governor General. It is the duty of deputy ministers to ensure that this program is implemented with loyalty, diligence and competence within their departments (Kernaghan, 1976). Without such professional support for the minister, there is a danger that bureaucratic influence will predominate over the influence of the "people's elected representatives" – and this is exactly what certain Conservative groups accused Canadian senior public servants of doing in 1984 (Segal, 1997).

The conflicts generated when ministers are dissatisfied increase the costs of operations within organizations and sometimes require additional staff to avoid dealing with players who are in conflict.

These conflicts negatively affect the government's efficiency when a policy cannot be implemented or is delayed because of their occurrence. When they are publicized by the media, these conflicts and their impacts inevitably reduce the trust taxpayers may have in the government system they are financing. The credibility of public institutions decreases as the public's cynicism increases.

Finally, when ministers are satisfied, maintaining a career senior public service can be justified since they consider that they are being well served by people from the ranks who enjoy a certain amount of job security. Dissatisfaction would feed the arguments of those who are calling for the adoption in Canada of a "spoils system" based on the arrival of people who are politicized and recruited from outside the public service and who are automatically replaced when there is a change in government. In 1984, the Conservatives reproached Canada's senior public servants for being – or for having become – Liberals during their long association, since 1963, with Liberal governments.

The Case of the Conservatives in 1984

Much has been written about the concerns of both the Conservatives and senior officials in 1984, and also about the resulting conflicts, their impacts, and their gradual settlement after 1986 (Bercuson, 1986; Savoie, 1993).

It is not our intention to dwell on these analyses here except to say that the ministers did not trust the public service in general and the deputy ministers in particular, that the

Conservative ideology seemed fundamentally different from the values in the public service, that the Prime Minister allegedly threatened the deputy ministers who were not "loyal," and that senior management committees were dismantled in 1984. Furthermore, the chief of staff position that was created undermined the influence of deputy ministers, and there were two major reshuffles involving most deputy ministers in 1984. Lastly, a committee largely external to the public service was struck to review and reduce program expenditures. It was in this difficult environment that dissatisfaction occurred in minister/deputy minister relationships at the beginning of the regime.

By the middle of 1986, relations between the two groups had calmed down following a process of mutual adjustment (Bourgault and Dion, 1990b), and after 1987, the players dealt with one another in a completely different environment.

II

SETTING UP A RELATIONSHIP SYSTEM

This section describes how the relationships between the players were established, according to the ministers who experienced these relationships. Were they involved in the appointment or removal of their deputy head? What type of relationship did they have? Who was the minister's key advisor? And what were the major challenges of this ménage à trois?

Did the Ministers Select Their Deputies?

Ministers do not appoint their deputy head, but are they involved in the selection process? If this were the case, would they be more satisfied with the people they themselves have chosen? This second question will be dealt with later in the report. As for the first, it seems that the ministers were more active in the removal of senior officials than in their selection.

In general, the ministers did not choose their deputy minister: in 12 of the 71 appointments that occurred during their mandate, only eight ministers considered that they played a major role. None of the ministers said that a deputy head was thrust upon them. One even claimed to have prevented one appointment, and another senior minister complained that his views were not considered when a deputy minister was appointed in another department. One third of the ministers said that they wanted to play a much more active role in the selection of deputy heads.

The ministers seemed to have more weight when the decision involved transferring or removing a deputy head; over half of the ministers (12) claimed that they were involved in 16 of the 69 removals (23 percent); two other ministers might have tried to have input if they had not felt that they were "too junior."

The ministers complained that the removal process was lengthy, but they understood why:

"We agreed that he had to go, but it took six months to do it."
"The issue was resolved after nine months ... that's a long time!"
"Changing a deputy minister takes time, especially if he is senior, because this involves a very complex game of musical chairs."

Who Initiates Contacts, and When?

Who determines the style and type of contacts that the minister and the deputy head will have? The first important indication is whether the minister decides to locate his or her office at the department or on Parliament Hill. If the minister chooses the department, this indicates a willingness to get involved ("to get his hands in the motor"), to be near the employees and deputy minister. If the minister chooses Parliament Hill, this necessarily implies more formal relationships due to lack of proximity. Secondly, it is up to the minister to make first contact with the deputy head; the signals given include the time taken to make the first contact, the location of the meeting (the minister's hotel, a restaurant, the office between eight and five or after hours). It is also up to the minister to determine the general framework for the relationship between the minister and the deputy minister; this includes frequency and length of meetings, timing during the day, the type of discussion, whether formal or informal, the desired level of involvement, and the requirement that the chief of staff be present. Lastly, once again it is the minister who decides on the level of his or her own involvement in the department's daily operations, including input with the chief of staff at departmental management committee meetings and also in the detailed development of legislation.

In general, all the ministers interviewed considered that the minister/deputy minister relationship was both formal and informal and that the two players could take the initiative of calling a meeting, depending on individual need. The formal relationships as required by statutory mandate often involved proceedings lasting half a day with the deputy minister and the chief of staff, and also in some cases with several policy advisors. Some ministers also had formal face-to-face meetings with their deputy head once a week.

When the relationship with the deputy minister was successful, there seemed to be more ad hoc and informal meetings; when dissatisfaction with the relationship was most evident, this relationship was strictly formal and ad hoc meetings were quite infrequent.

The Key Advisor: Chief of Staff or Deputy Minister?

The Conservatives gave the chief of staff greater roles and responsibilities which undermined those of the deputy minister, but a certain equilibrium in roles seems to have been achieved after 1986. Following this, who did ministers consider to be their key advisor? The answer to this question reflects both the role that was expected of each player and the trust shown toward the senior public service. In almost all cases, ministers chose their chief of staff, unless the Office of the Prime Minister thrust one upon them (as occurred in two cases). Ministers selected their chiefs of staff among their organizers, friends or family. The chief of staff usually had at least an undergraduate university degree, had already demonstrated that he or she was a keen organizer, and enjoyed the complete confidence of the senior minister he or she was serving, and perhaps

of the Prime Minister's Office as well.

Generally, Conservative ministers did not consider that the deputy minister was their key advisor: only four of the 23 ministers (17 percent) gave this role automatically to their deputy minister. This is a departure from the Whitehall model, since almost half (11) of the ministers interviewed automatically chose their chief of staff. Only seven ministers considered that their two key officials had equally important roles, with each bringing his or her own perspective to an issue, or with the nature of the issue determining whose role should become more important. In fact, the very notion that these roles could be equally important is itself a departure from the Whitehall model.

No correlation was observed between these ministerial preferences and the degree of satisfaction with the deputy ministers. The reasons for such preferences are not based on a biased outlook that the Conservatives may have had against the bureaucracy, but rather on a particular vision that they promoted whereby the political and the administrative communities should be separated.

The Success of the "Ménage à Trois"

How could this new division of roles and responsibilities contribute to a successful "ménage à trois"? Four ministers (17 percent) admitted that they had never succeeded in having this "ménage à trois" of the minister, the chief of staff and the deputy minister work properly. Any success in this area was the result of three major strategies: reducing conflict, avoiding conflict and building on conflict. Of the 19 ministers who succeeded in making this "ménage à trois" work properly, three admitted to having "reduced the role" of their chief of staff to avoid conflicts or to having purposely enhanced the apparent importance of the deputy minister ("I always treated him as my Champion"). The success of most of the ministers (9) was based on their strategy of "separate responsibilities," with the expectation that each would, at least, accept the role of the other. In four cases, ministers insisted on the equality of both officials ("They have to talk to each other and agree on things every day," or " ... very frequent joint meetings"). This approach, according to three ministers, in several cases even led to "positive conflicts" ... "where I was the mediator!" One minister summarized the general impression well by saying: "Each player must have his own role but must also feel that he is part of a common endeavour."

The arrangement was most successful when it was possible to separate the roles of the deputy minister and chief of staff while at the same time allowing the team to make decisions that each of its members perceived as being jointly developed.

The enhanced role of the chief of staff was always considered essential to achieve the balance with bureaucratic power required in a democracy. In fact, the study revealed that while a

majority of ministers wished to maintain a permanent career senior public service in Ottawa, most were willing to do this on the condition that the minister be supported by a "very senior" chief of staff.

III

SATISFACTION

Did the deputy ministers satisfy their client and boss, at least according to the ministers themselves? This question will be answered first in a general way based on the teams themselves and the individuals involved, and secondly on the period in power, the division of roles between players, and the perceived influence in the decision-making process.

Overall Satisfaction Rating

The ministers were satisfied with their deputy ministers in the vast majority of cases. Indeed, for more than 82.5 percent of the minister/deputy minister teams included in the survey (85 out of 103), the ministers said that they were satisfied with the experience, including 43 percent who said they were very satisfied. In the remaining cases, 7 percent of the ministers said they were dissatisfied and 9 percent said they were very dissatisfied. A total of 13 ministers had at least one negative experience; two of these shared one third of the 18 relationships that received a "rather dissatisfied" or "very dissatisfied" rating. However, these two ministers also said that they were either very satisfied or somewhat satisfied with their experience in four other teams. Therefore, it cannot be claimed that these ministers were militantly anti-bureaucracy!

The 18 negative ratings involved 11 of the 63 different deputy ministers involved, one of which received three negative ratings and two others received one negative rating each. Not one minister regularly gave low scores, but there were deputy ministers who received such scores from two or even three different ministers. Indeed, four deputy heads failed to obtain a passing mark each time they were rated, one failed two out of three times and one failed two out of four.

Are the ministers consistent in their evaluations of the deputy heads? The answer would be yes if a deputy minister evaluated by many ministers almost always received roughly the same score. That was the case for 24 deputy ministers: nine of the 12 who were evaluated twice always received the same score, and the 12 who were evaluated three times or more received the same range of scores in ten cases. There is therefore consistency in the ratings made by the ministers, and their statements in relation to other areas of the survey can therefore be considered credible.

Table 1: Ministerial Satisfaction

Rating	Completely Satisfied	Rather Satisfied	Rather Dissatisfied	Completely Dissatisfied	Total
No. of Teams	44	41	8	10	103
No. of Ministers Rated	18	20	6	9	23 ministers 103 teams
No. of Deputy Ministers Rated	23	35	6	9	23 ministers 103 teams

Satisfaction According to Mandate

A number of factors led us to believe that ministerial satisfaction would increase over the years. These include the already negative attitude of the Conservatives when they took power, the conflicts experienced during the transition, the general process of gradual mutual adjustment between the politicians and the senior officials, and the gradual transfer or removal of senior staff linked with the former regime as the new ministers become more and more confident in their role. It can also be argued that ministerial expectations increase as they gain experience and confidence and as their judgment of their senior officials becomes clearer and less naive; in other words, they become less impressionable.

Table 2 shows the rating each minister gave to each of the teams in which he or she was involved. In this scale, the lower the score, the higher the level of satisfaction.

Table 2: Dissatisfaction According to Ministerial Mandate

	1st Mandate	2nd Mandate	Both Mandates	Total
No. of Ministers	6	7	10	23
No. of Teams	20	19	64	103
Average Score	1.7	1.95	1.74	1.77

This table seems to confirm the assumption that the more experienced ministers would be more severe in their rating. Indeed, the ministers who were active during the two mandates show levels of dissatisfaction that are slightly higher than those who were active during only one

mandate. In addition, it is striking to note that despite the apprehensions of the Conservatives, the rate of satisfaction of those who were active during the first mandate only is significantly higher (smaller scores) than in the case of their colleagues who were active only during the second mandate. Furthermore, the ministers who were active during both mandates tended to rate their last deputy heads more severely than their first, giving the impression that they became more critical as they gained experience and self-reliance.

One of the questions dealt with the apprehensions the Conservatives may have had about deputy ministers inherited from former Liberal governments. Where these concerns justified and did they influence the minister/deputy minister relationship? Of the 16 ministers in the survey who worked with 21 such deputy heads, nine said that they indeed had concerns, one said he regretted not having any, and all those who said that they did not have such apprehensions had previous experience as ministers! Nevertheless, only five of these 21 deputy ministers received poor ratings, including two who received a negative rating from a minister who claimed that he did not have such concerns. Over half of the "ministers with apprehensions" gave positive ratings. Only three of the 16 ministers involved inquired about their new deputy minister's background, and two others regretted not having done so. The other 13 ministers knew their deputy minister by reputation (seven cases) or knew the deputy personally (five cases), as is the case with longstanding politicians who deal frequently with career civil servants in their role as members of the opposition.

In summary, the satisfaction rating seems to depend less on such concerns and more on the minister's actual experience and length of time in office, which seemed to make the minister more critical. Only three of the 23 ministers interviewed agree with the statement that "those who were satisfied were those who let their officials manage their department."

Generally speaking, neither the the concerns raised nor the positive biases were justified, because it seems that deputy ministers are never as bad or as good as the rumour on Parliament Hill makes them out to be.

Satisfaction According to Type of Relationship with the Minister

Ministerial satisfaction can depend on the role that the minister expects the deputy head to play: a loyal rubber-stamper? a provider of statistics? a furnisher of ideas? an alter ego? a political agent? a party supporter? or a machiavellian opportunist? To what extent does the type of relationship set up between politicians and senior officials influence a minister's satisfaction with his or her deputy minister?

Aberbach, Putman and Rockman (1981) identified four major types of minister/deputy minister relationships:

1.   *Policy/Administration: the complete separation of roles*, in which the minister develops the policies and makes the decisions and the deputy minister loyally implements them all;

2.   *Facts/Interest: shared expertise and political sensitivity*, in which the deputy head has input into policy development by bringing the facts and the required knowledge into the process while the minister brings in values, ideology and responsiveness to the needs of the public;

3.   *Energy/Equilibrium: shared responsibilities based on the impetus from the political component and on the balance provided by administrative continuity.* Here both politicians and bureaucrats appear rather actively involved in the political process, with the role of each group being determined by the fact that the politicians represent the general non-organized interests of the public, whereas the bureaucrats convey and respond to the narrower interests of specialized clients; and

4.   *Pure Hybrid: the perfect integration of roles*, in which the ministers and senior officials assume undifferentiated roles in the various stages of policy-making and managing.

        Colin Campbell (1989) considers that these models could be refined by adding, between models 3 and 4, three other types of senior official involvement that would nuance the group 4 relationship identified by Aberbach; in our view, these do not cover all of the situations provided for under model 4, which remains relevant. The three new categories are:

3a.   *The reactive career bureaucrat*, who follows his or her own agenda while participating in the development of new government policies;

3b.   *The proactive permanent civil servant*, who does not belong to any political party, but who actively associates himself or herself with some political leaders to facilitate the pursuit of their own agendas and the success of their respective careers; they have an excellent understanding of the political process and are experts on substantive issues; and

3c.   The *politico-administrative amphibian*, who is not necessarily a civil servant but who necessarily belongs to a party; these officials participate in policy development by playing a formal role in the process, for which they demonstrate considerable talent; they negotiate effectively with the bureaucracy, but exercise their influence through privileged linkages with the party in power.

        In theory, the Weberian model of a bureaucracy respectful of democracy would link minister/deputy minister cooperation with model 1 (decision making at the political level and implementation at the management level). However, parliamentary activities take up a considerable portion of the ministers' time, and they are often ill-prepared for policy initiatives

and the management of complex issues. Therefore, models 2, 3, 3a and 3b become more important because they provide for the sharing of areas of responsibility. In the case of joint responsibilities, whether or not they are differentiated, models 3c or 4 prevail.

For the purposes of the study, the first step therefore was to identify in the group surveyed the type of model that a given minister most often "applied" and then to attempt to link it to the rating given to his or her deputy minister. A significant variation in levels of satisfaction would bring into question the efficiency of a given type of relationship applied in the continuum represented at one end by complete separation of roles (model 1) and at the other end by perfect integration of roles (model 4).

The assumption is that in general no significant variation in levels of satisfaction will be observed on the basis of the type of model used, because the relationship model applied depends less on institutional factors than on current challenges in which two personalities come together, each with his or her background, experiences, character, skills, preferences and a specific role to lay, as may have been defined by persons external to the minister/deputy minister team. Such is the case when a deputy head is appointed to "coach" a junior minister or is chosen to ensure representativeness. Such is the case also when a minister is mandated by the Prime Minister to "take back control of the department and its policies."

Table 3 shows the models that the ministers identified with, on the basis of their experience, in the continuum described above. All 103 minister/deputy minister teams were considered. Each minister was asked to categorize each team he or she was involved in according to the models proposed by Aberbach or Campbell.

To identify the dominant models, four points and three points were given respectively for "completely agree" and "partly agree" and only one point for "partly disagree." This method made it possible to combine, for each model identified, individual selections and level of agreement.

Table 3 reveals that the models *Facts vs. Interests* and *Energy vs. Equilibrium* are more often applied than the categories *Role Separation and Reactive Bureaucracy*. The models less frequently applied are *Undifferentiated Roles* and *Proactive Permanent Civil Servant,* in that order. The groupings were quite similar whatever the methods used to make the selection. The results show that the Whitehall model continues to prevail in Canada. In fact, complete role integration was rarely experienced, and there was rather a convergence of political interests and bureaucratic expertise, with the latter providing balance while politicians provided the ideas. Two of the Campbell models are applied in Canada to a certain extent, as was mentioned. However, the reactive bureaucrats prevail mostly in central agencies, whereas the amphibian reflects the considerable and unavoidable adjustments that mandarins have to go through today. The Conservative ministers were, however, mostly in agreement with the three basic models identified by Aberbach.

Table 3: Political Relationship Models by Team

103 Teams	Model/Level of Agreement (score)	Completely Agree (4)	Partly Agree (3)	Partly Disagree (1)	Completely Disagree (0)	Total Score
1	Role Separation	39	26	10	28	244
2	Facts/Interests	50	21	29	3	292
3	Energy/Equilibrium	30	39	22	12	259
3a	Reactive Bureaucrat	21	45	16	21	235
3b	Proactive Permanent Civil Servant	21	18	21	43	159
3c	Administrative Amphibian	15	21	28	39	191
4	Undifferentiated Roles	17	18	15	43	134

The purpose of Table 4 is to show a trend for each minister in categorizing the teams he or she was involved in. The overall perceptions of the ministers reflect the general tendencies identified in Table 3.

The ministers indicated that they experienced mostly the *Facts/Interests* model, followed closely by *Role Separation*. The majority of ministers rejected the models based on *Undifferentiated Roles* and *Proactive Permanent Civil Servant*. Two comments can be made on the basis of these results: on the one hand, the Whitehall model is alive and well in Ottawa, and on the other, it also fared well under the Conservatives, who were accused of trampling this model. Did the Conservatives have a change of heart? Did the bureaucrats and analysts overreact? Or did the high-ranking civil servants succeed in restoring the situation, as has been suggested in the study on managing transitions (Bourgault and Dion, 1990b)?

Are there any links between the levels of satisfaction experienced by the ministers and the model applied? The survey revealed that in the 18 "unsuccessful" teams, 11 practised *role separation* and two, *undifferentiated roles*; in three other cases, the deputy head was perceived as a protector of bureaucracy, and in two cases, relationships were established on the basis of the *facts/interests* model; this latter model was widespread, but only a few instances of dissatisfaction are associated with it.

Table 4: Relationship Models with Deputy Ministers, by Minister

N = 23 Ministers	Model/Level of Agreement	Completely Agree	Partly Agree	Partly Disagree	Completely Disagree	Equivocal
1	Role Separation	10	5	2	6	0
2	Facts/Interests	11	6	4	1	1
3	Energy/ Equilibrium	5	5	6	6	1
3a	Reactive Bureaucrat	4	9	4	5	1
3b	Proactive Permanent Civil Servant	4	3	5	10	1
3c	Administrative Amphibian	4	6	6	6	1
4	Undifferentiated Roles	3	4	5	9	2

This exercise revealed the rather debatable nature of any typology. Whereas typologies must propose mutually exclusive categories, here role separation could be accompanied by the facts/interests model or the drive/balance model or the reactive convergence model. It would therefore be appropriate to refine these profiles further by defining the criteria through which they can be separately identified and the impacts that can be observed in the relationship established. It would be possible in this way to design "standard indicators" and standard questions that would allow for comparisons to be drawn between countries and between different periods.

Furthermore, attempts to identify a causal linkage between a given model and a satisfaction rating should perhaps be avoided. Indeed, it is unclear whether perceived satisfaction results in the application of a certain model or whether the reverse is true. The structure of our questionnaire did not foresee this problem, but further research should attempt to clarify how relationship models evolve on the basis of satisfaction levels identified during the first months of professional association.

Perceived Influence and Level of Satisfaction

Is it the minister or the senior official who really makes the decisions? Does the minister's perception of his or her own influence affect his or her perception of satisfaction? Table 5 shows prevalent trends in influence between ministers and deputy ministers. All the ministers were unanimous in rejecting the idea that "the deputy minister decides and imposes his or her views," and only three believed that "[the deputy's] influence was greater than the minister's." These three ministers rated 16 deputy ministers and their ratings account for only two of the 18 ratings showing dissatisfaction with a deputy head. Seven ministers considered that both members of the team have equal influence; these seven ministers rated 45 deputy ministers and they account for one third of the ratings showing dissatisfaction. Eighteen of the 23 ministers considered themselves to be the decision makers and felt that they had more influence than their deputy ministers. Of the remaining five, only one gave a rating showing dissatisfaction with the department's deputy head.

This exercise therefore reveals that the vast majority of ministers felt that they were in control of their department and that perceptions on sharing influence with the deputy minister accounted for most of the ratings showing dissatisfaction. Here again, the level of satisfaction and its reasons seemed to be very specific to each minister/deputy minister relationship because there is no linkage made with perceptions on controlling decision making. However, even the ministers "in control" revealed some concern with the senior public service, which was almost always perceived as having a hidden, although not politically motivated, agenda.

Table 5: Perceived Influence and Level of Satisfaction

Influence	Completely Agree	Partly Agree	Partly Disagree	Completely Disagree	Number of Ministers
The Deputy Minister Decides	0	0	3	20	23
The Deputy's Influence is Greater Than Mine	0	3	5	15	23
The Deputy's Influence is Equal to Mine	4	3	6	10	23
I decide	14	4	3	2	23

IV

AREAS OF SATISFACTION

In 1987, following a series of interviews with federal deputy ministers, and then in 1989 with a study on their performance evaluation system, we identified the components of their role that were considered "cardinal." In 1990, we asked the deputy ministers in Quebec to identify the main qualities expected of a deputy minister; lastly, in 1993, we examined the roles deputy ministers were expected to play to meet the requirements of their area of performance.

On the basis of the results of these studies, we submitted a grid to each minister listing the areas where satisfaction with deputy minister performance could be assessed; the minister was asked to rate his or her deputy ministers according to each element on the grid by giving a score between one and four, ranging from completely satisfactory to completely unsatisfactory.

Table 6 lists the five categories in the profile and also the components of each category. The "*Abilities*" category includes:

- *knowledge of area of responsibility*, which includes knowledge of the department, of all relevant legislation, of the department's environment and of the issues it deals with; for the minister, this is an essential requirement: "I had one of the best minds in Canada in this area";

- *management skills*, meaning the knowledge and the ability required to take proper action in relation to the organization's resources and operations, to leadership and to employee motivation; according to one minister: "Everyone has his or her strengths and weaknesses; I could count on X to look after the department"; another less fortunate minister said this: "Y could not resolve day to day problems such as accelerating a staffing action or facilitating a reorganization ... ";

- *decision-making capacity*, which involves the capacity of the deputy minister to make informed decisions in complex situations without constantly holding back; one minister complained that: "X had a great mind, but was unable to fire someone, nor, for that matter, to take any kind of decision; everything ended up on my desk";

- *responding calmly under pressure and in crisis situations*, which means that the deputy minister knows how to deal with intense pressure from many sources and especially in crisis situations, where he or she does not panic, does not lose sight of objectives and makes the best decisions under the circumstances;

- *political judgment*, which refers to the capacity of the deputy minister to evaluate the minister's and the department's environment in order to protect the minister as chief of the department; the deputy acts as a "radar," warns the minister against any pitfalls, gives the minister proper advice and briefings for appearances before parliamentary committees, groups and the media; lastly, the deputy knows how to prepare submissions to central agencies and how to choose appropriate relationship strategies with peers, groups and stakeholders.

The "*Content*" category includes:

- *policy analysis*, which makes it possible to determine the best approach and initiatives to implement the policies that the minister wants applied or that are required in the circumstances; according to one minister, "The department had changed too much for X; he could no longer keep up with the pace of society's requirements – these had extended beyond his abilities"; another minister, however, described an opposite situation: "What was great with Y was that on one page, he could outline the whole history of the problem, its causes, its impacts, the options for solving it and what has to be done ... and all that for the following day!";

- *policy and program evaluation*, which involves the capacity in a deputy minister's area of performance to adopt a less technical and a more "macro" approach; the deputy must be able to identify the weaknesses in these evaluations and to ensure that his or her work focuses on the needs of the government and of the department and also reflects the deputy's own understanding of changing environments.

The "*Ethics*" category includes:

- *willingness to work and working capacity*, which involves both the availability of the deputy minister and the deputy's capacity to work long hours day after day over a long period without compromising the quality of his or her decisions or relationships in work situations. The deputy's availability to the minister represents another ethical dimension; one minister was very impressed with his deputy minister: "She had a family, a husband and young children, but I could still call her in the evening, during the night and on weekends, and she always showed up with a smile ... Of course I did not exaggerate, but I often wondered how she managed to read all those files at home before turning in!";

- *loyalty*, which involves a number of considerations and especially the impression the minister has that the deputy head is telling the truth, is ready to warn against any potential pitfalls and is not doing anything that can compromise the minister's power or reputation, as would be the case if the deputy minister somehow "joined forces" against the minister with departmental employees, groups, other deputy ministers or ministers or

with the Prime Minister's Office. One minister berated a deputy minister inherited from the former government: "He would work things out with his officials to give us the hamster cage treatment: everyone runs until they are out of breath but no one gets anywhere!". Other ministers, however, spoke proudly of the professionalism they encountered: "Their first concern is to serve the country and they want to cooperate with you ... ";

- *discretion*, which means the minister is confident that his or her discussions or conversations with the deputy minister will never be disclosed unless that is what the minister wants;

- *willingness to challenge*, through which the deputy minister can bring to the minister's attention in a professional and loyal manner sensitive aspects of the minister's suggestions that may be dangerous, harmful or unjustifiable, with the sole purpose of ensuring that the minister has been completely made aware of every sensitive aspect of his or her initiatives and suggestions. As one minister said: "I was often frustrated to see my deputy minister standing there and never saying anything about my projects", while another, who was even more frustrated, said: "Instead of challenging what I was doing, X preferred to do things in a way that my project would fall through at a later stage".

The category "*Relationship at the political level*" includes four components, namely:

- *respect for ministerial authority*, which includes the manner of conduct with the minister, compliance with the minister's preferences and decisions and the impression left on departmental employees as to the minister's ideas and decisions;

- *personal compatibility*, which allows two persons to establish, in the course of long hours at work, relations that are flexible, spontaneous and based on a minimum of empathy;

- *ideological compatibility*, which refers to a compatible world vision by the two individuals or, at least, to a reduction in conflicts and loss of time or opportunities because the deputy head had to change course; ideally, ministers want their deputy ministers to share their outlook with enthusiasm;

- *complementarity of strengths and weaknesses* between the minister and the deputy minister, through which both have the impression of forming a team in which each member can count on the other to make a contribution where the other is more vulnerable.

The last category deals with "*Relationships extending beyond the department,*" in which we included three components:

- *influence within the bureaucracy*, in which a minister (unless he or she is very senior or head of a powerful central agency) relies on the relations, the networks, the reputation and the alliances of the deputy minister to ensure that his or her projects are quickly and easily pushed through the bureaucratic machinery; according to one minister, "X came from the outside, so he did not have any influence," and another made the same comment because his deputy minister, even if he was recruited inside the public service, had "skipped some stages," and his quick ascent had caused jealousy among his peers;

- *capacity to bring the department's groups and clients on side*, since the deputy minister replaces and extends ministerial authority by receiving delegations, making speeches and communicating by mail or by telephone with these groups and clients; the deputy minister must be informed and capable of making precise assessments and minimizing the difficulties that can originate from these pressure groups or departmental clients;

- *parliamentary committees*, before which the deputy minister has to testify personally and which can be a source of considerable embarrassment to the minister because the deputy minister has to provide answers without in principle casting a shadow on the minister or the department.

On the basis of the results shown in Table 6, the Whitehall model (Kernaghan, 1976) seemed alive and well in Ottawa. Most of the key features of this model were rarely criticized, including working capacity, loyalty, discretion, respect for ministerial authority, technical abilities and political judgment. Some aspects of the Whitehall model did not seem to fare as well, such as management quality and, especially, willingness to challenge the minister. This would come as no surprise to some analysts, considering the hostility surrounding the relationships between ministers and senior officials at the beginning of the Mulroney era.

Generally speaking, the table reveals very positive results: 82.5 percent of the teams were a success. Of the 1,854 micro-judgments made by the 23 ministers on the 103 teams, only 243 ratings showed some or considerable dissatisfaction (13.1 percent). But what are the major criticisms made by all ministers? The ministers, especially those with less influence, would have wanted their deputy heads to have more influence among their peers. Almost one out of three ministers made such a criticism, which in fact was almost always aimed at the "young" deputy ministers and at those who did not come from the senior federal public service. To be efficient, a minister must be able to capitalize on every possible source of influence in the cumbersome and complex decision-making process of government.

The ministers said they were concerned about the lack of ideological compatibility in 18 percent of the teams. This is hardly surprising, considering the shock treatment that the Conservatives had in store for the senior Canadian public service and the program reforms that they had announced. Other areas of dissatisfaction were of greater concern; in more than 15

Table 6: Areas of Satisfaction
Ratings Showing Dissatisfaction and Levels of Satisfaction

Rating	Rather Dissatisfied	Completely Dissatisfied	Total/103	%
Abilities				
Knowledge of Sector	3	4	7	6.8
Management	7	13	20	19.4
Decision-making	9	9	18	17.5
Calm Reaction Under Pressure	6	8	14	13.6
Political Judgment	7	8	15	9.7
Content				
Policy Development	9	1	20	19.4
Policy and Program Evaluation	15	3	18	17.5
Ethics				
Willingness to Work and Working Capacity	1	1	2	1.9
Loyalty	5	6	11	10.7
Discretion	0	2	2	1.9
Willingness to Challenge	8	6	14	13.6
Relationship at the Political Level				
Respect for Ministerial Authority	4	3	7	6.8
Personal Compatibility at the Working Level	5	6	11	10.7
Ideological Compatibility	13	7	20	19.4
Complementarity of Strengths and Weaknesses	7	5	12	11.6
Relationships Extending Beyond the Department				
Influence in the Bureaucracy	18	12	30	29.1
Capacity to Bring Groups and Clients on Side	10	9	19	18.4
Performance Before Parliamentary Committees	3	0	3	2.9

percent of the teams, there was dissatisfaction with the way the department was managed, with the capacity to make decisions and to "walk the talk," with policy development and its lack of imagination, and with the efficiency of policy and program evaluation. Finally, almost one minister in six would have wished that his deputy head had more influence with the groups and the clients that dealt with the department.

The Canadian ministers were quick to point out the professionalism of the deputy ministers. On the whole, they reacted calmly under pressure, they complemented well the minister's strengths and weaknesses and, especially, they knew how to adapt to their ministers on a personal level in order to work efficiently with them.

In general, the ministers rated their deputies very positively. As for the teams that were not successful, the reasons given never included lack of discretion and almost never included technical abilities, working capacity or performance before parliamentary committees; the reasons centred instead on a lack of influence in the bureaucracy (15 out of 18), political judgment and creativity in policy development (12 out of 18), management skills and decision-making (12 out of 18), and the capacity to react calmly under pressure, loyalty and ideological compatibility (10 out of 18).

V

TOWARD A SPOILS SYSTEM?

The question, "Would it be advisable for a new government to change considerably on taking power the existing group of deputy ministers, and why?" tests the commitment of the ministers to the Whitehall model. On the basis also of evidence gathered elsewhere, it seems that in 1984 they would have answered with a resounding yes. Given the conflicts that occurred between 1984 and 1986, their answer would not have been more favourable to the bureaucracy at that time either. However, with mutual adjustments taking their course, there were only four ministers (18 percent) in 1995 who agreed with a complete overhaul "because bureaucrats protect each other" or "because there has to be strong ideological compatibility." One of these ministers recognized that his position was not realistic and that it was necessary to keep most of the deputy heads to ensure the continuity of the government.

Over half (13) of the former Conservative ministers interviewed agreed in 1995 with *maintaining* a career, neutral and professional senior pubic service ... to which several outstanding additions could be made! Seven of these ministers called for changes ranging from relatively significant ("replacing one third of deputy heads during the first six months" ... "policy developers") to more minor ("one to four strategic positions," ... "within certain limits"). Most ministers preferred instead that action be taken "on a case-by-case basis," with the purpose, of course, of removing those who were "politically motivated" and who were "ideological opponents"; they believed that each minister should make recommendations after having had time to review the situation.

An analysis of the answers showing support for the Americanization of management in the senior public service reveals that the ministers dissatisfied with their deputy ministers can be found in all three categories but include mostly those who prefer a career-oriented senior public service. Neither the type of relationship nor the prevalence of influence shows any correlation with the desire to implement a spoils system for the senior public service. It seems that the commitment to the Whitehall model is linked to the type of cooperation occurring between the ministers and deputy ministers and not to overall satisfaction.

Of the 13 ministers who preferred maintaining a career-oriented senior public service, five opted for *role separation* in the relationship models. All the others identified with the cooperative models, including three who even identified with complete integration of undifferentiated roles. The impression is that there is no link between the minister's vision of "status" and the relationship model, which instead seems to depend much more on the personal style of the minister.

VI

COMPARISON BETWEEN CANADA AND QUEBEC

A similar study conducted in Quebec in 1988 with Parti Québecois government ministers active between 1976 and 1985 allows for some revealing comparisons[1] on the application of the Whitehall model in Canadian provinces and especially in a province largely influenced by the French tradition.

The Two Groups and Overall Satisfaction

The two groups of teams studied came one after the other (1976-1985 and 1984-1993), and were active during two Parliaments, which lasted approximately the same length of time (105 and 109 months). The populations and the samples show characteristics that are rather similar statistically, but are different politically.

In Quebec, the survey included 53 of the 140 teams (38 percent). They involved 20 of the 47 ministers (43 percent) and 53 of the 71 deputy ministers (75 percent) active during that period. The time in office of the ministers was 27 months per appointment, and 28 months in the case of the deputy ministers; the period during which the teams operated was 16 months.

It should be remembered that in Ottawa, 103 of the 189 teams (55 percent) were included in the survey; 23 ministers (43 percent) and 63 deputy ministers (71 percent) were interviewed. The period during which the teams in the sample operated was 17 months, which is comparable to the teams in Quebec.

The rate of success of the teams was almost identical, with 81 percent in Quebec and 82.5 percent in Ottawa. In Quebec, the study reveals that all ministers were satisfied with at least one team, and only one federal minister claimed dissatisfaction with all teams. Half of the Quebec ministers reported dissatisfaction with a team, and all of these indicated only one such experience. The percentage of ministers who reported dissatisfaction with a team is slightly higher in Ottawa (57 percent), but three ministers indicated that they had more than one such experience; one of these was dissatisfied with all four teams he was part of!

The level of satisfaction is comparable, but in Ottawa, the cases of dissatisfaction are more concentrated. In many instances, they come from the same three ministers (eight cases of dissatisfaction out of 18) and are aimed at the same deputy ministers, who seemed to have stayed longer in the senior public service system because three of them account for a total of seven of the 18 cases of dissatisfaction. No comparable situation was observed in Quebec.

In Quebec, the ministers that were most dissatisfied were inexperienced in dealing with

their first deputy ministers and were considered "junior" in the Cabinet. In Ottawa, four of the 13 ministers who claimed to have been dissatisfied in a relationship are "juniors," and one-third of the cases in the survey implied a "first" deputy minister.

Factors Contributing to Unsuccessful Relationships

The question used to measure the elements of satisfaction was not asked in the same manner in 1988, when we started our study of the subject. At that time, we asked the Quebec deputy ministers: "What is the main factor contributing to harmony?" and "What is the main factor contributing to conflict?" Therefore, they were only able to indicate the factors that they could think of at the moment.

Six years later, their federal colleagues were given instead a list of elements compiled on the basis of all the factors mentioned in 1988, and they had to make a decision on each one; that is why the list of factors contributing to dissatisfaction was longer in 1995 than in 1988.

In the conditions described above, a reasonable comparison could only be made by considering each case individually to identify the main criticisms made and how often they were made. In both cases, management of the department (leadership role, motivation, factors contributing to organizational harmony) is one of the main criticisms. In both governments, ideological compatibility represents a very important criticism accounting for unsuccessful minister/deputy minister teams.

Interestingly, the lack of influence with peers and the ability to effectively develop policies both play a much more important role in the failure of teams at the federal level than at the Quebec level. Consideration has to be given here to the size of the federal government and also to the corporate culture of the federal senior public service community which is much more "tightly woven" than is the case with their Quebec counterparts.

Table 7: Shortcomings in Unsuccessful Teams

	Quebec 1988	Federal 1995
Number of Unsuccessful Teams	10 of 53 (19%)	18 of 103 (17.5%)
Influence with Peers	20%	83%
Managing the Department & Decision-making	70%	78%
Ideological Compatibility	40%	78%
Political Judgment	20%	67%
Creativity in Policy Development	10%	56%
Respect for Ministerial Authority	40%	23%

Politicization and Corporatism

Is there more risk of failure with a deputy minister inherited from the former government? None of the Quebec ministers and three of the 23 federal ministers mentioned politicization as a factor contributing to failure. It seems, however, that the lack of ideological compatibility played an even more important role in this regard.

In Quebec, of the 53 deputy ministers, 14 had been appointed by the PQ government. In Ottawa, of the 63 deputy ministers, 16 had been appointed by Liberal governments. The rate of failure is slightly greater in these cases in Ottawa (six of 14 problem deputy ministers) than in Quebec (three out of 10). In Quebec, 11 of the 14 deputy ministers from the former government were part of successful teams, compared to 10 of the 16 deputy ministers appointed during the time the Liberals were in power.

It is interesting to compare the results of the appointments made by the new governments: in Quebec, 18 percent of the new appointments became problem cases, compared to 21 percent in the case of the deputy ministers who continued in their position. In Ottawa, the newly appointed deputy ministers account for considerably fewer problems (25 percent) than the deputy ministers inherited from the Trudeau and Turner governments (39 percent).

In Quebec, from 1977 to 1985, relations were as smooth with the senior officials inherited from the former government as they were with those who were appointed. In Ottawa, over the decade that followed the arrival of the Conservatives, there was more dissatisfaction with the deputy ministers that were inherited than with those that they appointed. This is indicative of the difficult adjustment that occurred between the Canadian senior public service and the Mulroney government between 1984 and 1986. Antagonism was created in both camps and the teams were unable to operate effectively because of threats made during the electoral campaign, of changes in ministerial staffs and in the decision-making process, and of the way in which the transition was managed. In general (10 cases out of 16), the majority of deputy ministers appointed when the Liberals were in power became part of successful teams, and this confirms that the senior officials' cooperation and abilities can be used to the best advantage of the political leader (Aberbach and Rockman, 1994).

The federal system seems to reflect the fact that the deputy head's personal reputation and relations with his or her peers play an extremely important role. Indeed, of the total of 18 problem cases reported, the same person was involved in such a relationship three times out of four appointments, another was involved two times out of three appointments, and another had two appointments and had unsuccessful relationships in both. Once a deputy minister's reputation has been solidly established with his or her peers, the deputy can count on many opportunities to "try again to make it right," much more so than in Quebec where no such case was reported, and in fact many federal ministers shared this impression when dealing with "dinosaurs."

In our comparison, politicization seems to create less havoc than corporatism! This is why several federal ministers (eight out of 23) were in fact doubtful as to the viability and usefulness of the performance evaluation system.

Factors Contributing to Harmony

In Quebec, the ministers had identified four major factors contributing to harmony and that we were able to verify with the federal ministers: *insecurity on the part of the minister* seems to play an important role in Ottawa, because the junior ministers were generally very satisfied with their deputy ministers, more so than in Quebec. In Ottawa, almost all senior government ministers reported one unsatisfactory relationship, and they became increasingly critical in their evaluations as they acquired experience. Indeed, there were many cases of ministers being more critical with their last deputy ministers than of their first deputies. Insecurity is a factor that seems more prevalent in Ottawa because of the greater complexity of the federal system, of the importance of the senior public service community and also of the distance separating the ministers from their region of origin.

Common interest seemed to be an important factor contributing to harmony in both cases. One federal minister spoke openly of a "common fate," and three ministers blamed one deputy minister in particular for a bad public experience: "He played 'Yes, Minister' with me ... but at the end of the day he was separated from government!"

The *appointment process* contributed to harmony by creating a balance between the various pressures that are brought to bear on the team. In fact, this process promoted complementarity between the minister and the deputy minister. What was assumed in Quebec was confirmed in Ottawa where no senior minister had the impression of having imposed his or her will on the Prime Minister in the selection of a deputy minister. At most, only suggestions were made or preferences were indicated (in the case of very senior ministers), but then again these ministers admitted that they had not always succeeded in their attempts!

Managing perceptions, identified in Quebec as a factor contributing to harmony, creates bad vibrations (Bourgault and Nugent, 1995) between persons who have concerns, or again is a source of frustration for ministers whose expectations of their deputy minister are too high. This scenario was confirmed in Ottawa: the deputy ministers from the Liberal era were generally viewed with suspicion, but they did not account for a greater percentage of unsuccessful teams than those who were appointed by the Conservatives. On the other hand, some ministers were disappointed with deputy ministers whom they had known in 1979 or later in the opposition, and of whom they expected too much. Finally, the Conservatives who had railed so much against deputy ministers appointed by the Liberals had good or even very good relationships with the majority (six out of 10) of those included in our survey. The perceived conflict was not only "partisan." It could also originate on the professional level when specific aspects of the area of performance are involved, as pointed out by a minister who criticized his deputy head for his

timidity, his fear of one-on-one relationships with his employees: "I needed a shark and I had a brother!" Another minister admitted that his relationship with his deputy head was doomed to failure from the start because, in 1979, he had caught this official in the act of committing a "half-truth."

VII

CONCLUSION

Did the ministers consider that their senior officials served them well? Despite a sampling bias leaning slightly on the "positive" side, it seems that this was largely the case. The former Conservative ministers considered that the Whitehall model seemed to give the desired results provided there were strong chiefs of staff and that there was a watchful eye over the very strong "team spirit" found among senior officials.

There was as much satisfaction in Ottawa as in Quebec, where there was slightly more recruitment from the outside, where group influence was not as strong and where politicization was slightly greater, but where there was greater acceptance of officials inherited from former governments within the framework of a neutral, professional, career senior public service. An explanation for this situation can perhaps be found in the fact that the Conservative transition occurred after more than 20 years of almost complete absence from power.

The difference in level of government and in agenda (centre left for the PQ and centre right for the Conservatives) seemed to be compensated for by common characteristics identified with respect to vulnerability of inexperienced ministers and to conflicts between ministerial staff and bureaucrats that were followed by mutual adjustments. Indeed, arrangements were arrived at in both cases because of the need to exercise authority, with the evident role of "common fate" compensating for the absence of "common faith."

The characteristics that were most appreciated in both cases were knowledge and technical abilities, discretion and willingness to work. Also, in both cases, the ministers wanted deputy heads who show more ideological compatibility and who can be a bit more efficient as managers and leaders. However, the differences between the systems became more apparent, with results revealing that in Ottawa the ministers wanted their deputies to demonstrate more influence with their peers and greater imagination, whereas in Quebec the ministers called for greater respect for ministerial authority. In Quebec, the cases of dissatisfaction were concentrated in the junior ministers, whereas in Ottawa these cases seemed to centre around a few deputy ministers only. In both cases, the factors contributing to harmony are identical.

The series of models identified by Aberbach and developed by Campbell require many clarifications but remain useful, especially if these models become mutually exclusive and if clear and standard indicators can be identified for each.

The democratic process seems to be well served by this feature of the political-administrative system. Indeed, the conflicts that occurred did not seem so widespread (despite their concentration at the beginning of the mandate, intensive media coverage and the time it

took in most cases to find a solution) as to negatively affect, to any significant extent, program efficiency and the credibility of the government system in the eyes of the public. This is why the majority of former ministers wanted to have the career senior public service system maintained, but with two conditions: it must show greater ideological empathy with any new government, and sufficiently powerful political instruments must exist, as provided by a "senior" chief of staff and by greater ministerial input into the selection of deputy heads and their time in office.

The Prime Minister's Office, which follows its own agenda when it decides to assign a particular deputy chief to a minister, might consider adopting a more flexible approach here. Lastly, it is possible that greater input by the ministers in the selection or removal of deputy heads could lessen the quality of the advice they receive if opportunism and the determination to keep their jobs were to make deputy ministers more careful and more biased in the advice they provide to ministers.

NOTE

1. It is not easy methodologically to compare the answers provided by Quebec and federal ministers because the questionnaire submitted to the federal ministers was "closed" and was based mainly on the "semi-closed" questionnaire submitted to the Quebec ministers four years earlier. As a first step, we had identified in the literature the "desired qualifications" of deputy ministers and had assembled these on a cue-list submitted to the Quebec ministers who were asked to answer and provide their comments; based on their answers, on the answers of federal ministers in other studies we conducted and on the study on the COSO (Committee of Senior Officials) process for evaluating the performance of deputy ministers, we developed an evaluation grid listing 18 items under five categories and followed by a global evaluation. The questionnaire was therefore improved over the years following further studies, but the cost was a loss of complete comparability. However, comparisons in trends are still possible because the positions compared are identical and performance characteristics remain very similar.

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ANNEX A

Survey Methodology

Based on the groups of federal ministers and deputy ministers we identified for the period 1967-1993, we began by making a listing of the "minister/deputy minister" teams for the period between September 1984 and June 1993. The list shows 53 persons who were active as ministers in a total of 122 appointments (excluding interim positions, ministers of Sate and ministers without portfolio); in addition, 80 persons shared 105 appointments as official deputy minister during this period (excluding interim, associate deputy minister and senior advisor positions). A total of 189 minister/deputy minister "teams" were created, some of which lasted three months and others five years, the average being 14 months during this period of almost ten years of Conservative government.

During the first mandate of Brian Mulroney, that is from September 17, 1984 to November 21, 1988, there were 104 teams which lasted on average one year and three months; during the second mandate (November 21, 1988 to June 25, 1993), there were 85 teams which lasted on average 14 months.

The second step in the methodology was to categorize the population of ministers by language, sex, region of origin, type of department and especially the mandate during which they held their position, because there was the assumption that the relationship would be less smooth during the first mandate with the change in government (Bourgault, Dion and Lemay, 1993) than during the second mandate when mutual adjustment had already taken place (Bourgault and Nugent, 1995).

Following this categorization of the population, a sampling of ministers was identified and letters were sent asking them if they would be willing to meet with one of the co-researchers; this letter was accompanied by a letter of recommendation from the Vice-Principal of Research of the Canadian Centre for Management Development certifying that the project was supported by the Centre. Also attached were the resumes of the co-researchers, the list of subjects that would be discussed and an article outlining the results of a similar study conducted by the co-researchers in 1988 (Bourgault and Dion, 1992).

One significant difficulty in the exercise was locating some of the former ministers who had gone too deeply into the anonymity of private life. In these cases, we had to deal with third parties, with the result that contacts were not always greatly facilitated and also that we were led to expect a positive response without, however, really being in a position to follow up effectively with the former minister.

In general, the ministers responded positively since of the 28 persons contacted, only five refused to cooperate in the survey, two saying that they were too busy, two refusing to meet with

us for reasons of "ethics" or "embarrassment," and one neglecting to respond despite our repeated requests.

This refusal rate is not considerable compared to other survey techniques. It is high, however, when compared with similar surveys that we have conducted on numerous occasions with Quebec ministers and with federal deputy ministers. It can lead one to believe that some ministers refused to answer because of their concern that their opinion would be too negative: three of these five former ministers went through major controversies during their mandate. The result is that the answers described in this report paint a picture that is perhaps a bit brighter than it would be had everyone answered.

The Sample

The sample is made up of 23 of the 53 persons who were active as minister (43 percent); the 23 ministers interviewed were involved in 71 of the 122 ministerial appointments (58.2 percent).

The ministers interviewed dealt with one to seven departments during the different Mulroney governments. The 23 ministers in the sample were part of 103 of the 189 minister/deputy minister teams (55 percent); on average, each minister in the sample received three appointments and worked with 4.52 deputy ministers; five of the ministers interviewed were involved in only one or two teams, 17 were part of three to eight teams and one worked with 11 deputy ministers.

Ten of the ministers were active during both Mulroney mandates, six were active during only the first mandate and seven during only the second; the sample includes 20 men and three women, and every region of Canada (Atlantic, Quebec, Ontario, the Prairies and British Columbia) is represented in our sample based on the minister's participation in the different Mulroney governments.

There is considerable diversity in the departments where the minister/deputy minister teams were active. They include 20 program departments, four central agency departments (e.g., Justice) and four administrative departments. The Office of the Privy Council was systematically excluded from the study because of its particular situation.

The interviewees were assured that their answers would be processed in complete confidentiality and in accordance with the principle of anonymity, and for this reason, there is no breakdown of the opinions expressed according to the period in the Mulroney government, or according to the type of department.

The teams surveyed lasted from three to 51 months, with an average of 15.6 months, which is close to the average period observed by Osbaldson, but shorter by a few months than the average observed in our own studies (Bourgault and Dion, 1991). A total of 63 different

deputy ministers were part of these teams; 12 were active in two teams, eight in three teams, three in four teams, and one in five teams. In 24 cases, we were able to compare the evaluation of the same deputy head made by at least two differen ministers.

ANNEX B

QUESTIONNAIRE

SURVEY ON FEDERAL MINISTERS' SATISFACTION, 1984-1993

PREAMBLE:

The purpose of this research conducted in cooperation with 25 ministers active in Conservative governments from 1984 to 1993 is to evaluate their level of satisfaction with the performance of the deputy ministers who served under them. This research is financed by the Canadian Centre for Management Development (CCMG) and by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC). As usual, the answers will remain completely confidential and the data will be processed in such a manner as to guaranty the anonymity of all persons making statements and of the deputy ministers concerned.

CHRONOLOGY

According to the information available to us, you were:

A)   Minister of   from   to   and you had as deputy minister:

           - Mr.   from   to   ;
           - Mr.   from   to   ;

B)   Minister of   from   to   and you had as deputy minister:

           - Mr.   during the length of your mandate, from   to   .

1.   APPOINTMENT IN A POSITION OF DEPUTY MINISTER

1.   When you were appointed Minister of   in   ,
     Mr.   was deputy minister.

1.1 Did you have concerns about his links with the former government?

1.2   Did you ask for information on that person? From whom?

1.3   What was your strategy to establish a relationship with that person?

2.   In the case of all the deputy ministers who served under you:

2.1 Are you aware of any attempt that was made to remove one of your deputy ministers? Why did these attempts fail?

2.2 Did you attempt to remove one of your deputy ministers?

2.3 Did you ever succeed in having appointed as deputy minister a person you wanted to have in that position?

2.4 Was a deputy minister ever imposed upon you despite your position on the matter?

2.   DEVELOPING A RELATIONSHIP

2.1 How did you go about developing a relationship with: **Mr.**   **at the Department of**

3.   WORKING RELATIONSHIP

3.1 Working relationships with: **Mr.**   at the Department of   :

3.1.1 How many times did you meet with him, daily/weekly?

3.1.2 On whose initiative did the meetings occur?

3.1.3 Who were your chiefs of staff?

3.1.4 Would you say that he was your most important official at that time, more so than your chief of staff, more so than any other official or any other person? If not, who was that person?

3.1.5 How did you manage the "ménage à trois" with your deputy minister and your chief of staff?

4. SATISFACTION

The following are a number of criteria allowing to evaluate the performance of a deputy minister. For each of your deputy ministers and on the basis of each of these criteria, I would like you to tell me if you were **very satisfied, rather satisfied, rather dissatisfied** or **very dissatisfied**. You can illustrate your answers with examples of situations you experienced at that time.

Qualifications:

	#1	#2	#3
- Expertise (Knowledge of area of responsibility)	___	___	___
- Management skills	___	___	___
- Decision-making abilities	___	___	___
- Ability to react effectively in a crisis and in periods of tension	___	___	___
- Political judgment (Anticipating crisis situations, capacity to protect you, performance before committees, with the media . . .)	___	___	___

Content:	**#1**	**#2**	**#3**
- Imagination in policy development	___	___	___
- Policy and program evaluation	___	___	___

Personal Ethics	**#1**	**#2**	**#3**
- Working capacity	___	___	___
- Loyalty	___	___	___
- Discretion	___	___	___
- Independent thinking	___	___	___

Political Relationships	**#1**	**#2**	**#3**
- Respect for your authority	___	___	___
- Personal compatibility	___	___	___
- Ideological compatibility	___	___	___
- Complementarity of his strengths and weaknesses with your own	___	___	___

External Relationships:	**#1**	**#2**	**#3**
- Influence in the government structure (other senior officials, central agencies, Office of the Prime Minister . . .)	___	___	___
	___	___	___

- Influence with departmental groups and clients   ___   ___   ___

- Performance before parliamentary committees   ___   ___   ___

Overall Rating:

	#1	#2	#3

- Would you say that you were satisfied, rather
  satisfied, rather dissatisfied or dissatisfied?   ____   ___   ___

5.   TYPE OF MINISTER/DEPUTY MINISTER RELATIONSHIP

For each of the statements below, indicate whether you **completely agree (CA), rather agree (RA), rather disagree (RD), or completely disagree (CD).**

     5.1   In the case of **Mr.**   , at the Department of   :

A) I mostly decided without him, and he carried out my decisions.	CA	RA	RD	CD
B) He would bring me the facts and outline the issues, and I decided based also on political considerations.	CA	RA	RD	CD
C) I brought drive, imagination and innovation and I carried the ball; he brought balance, long term consideration and moderation, and he watched out for me and brought me back down to earth when necessary.	CA	RA	RD	CD
D) He took care of process, while I was mostly concerned with the interests of the department's clients.	CA	RA	RD	CD
E) He looked after the organized groups that revolved around the department, while I was mostly concerned with the interests of constituents.	CA	RA	RD	CD

F) Most of the time, I was the one who   CA   RA   RD   CD
    suggested things; he would provide
    feedback and after discussing it, we would
    arrive at a common decision.

G) All things considered, our roles were   CA   RA   RD   CD
    undifferentiated because of the synergy
    between us.

5.2 In terms of influence in decision-making, for each of the statements below, indicate
     whether you **completely agree (CA), rather agree (RA), rather disagree (RD) or
     completely disagree CD).**

    A) All things considered, his influence in decision-making was
        equal to mine.   _____

    B) All things considered, his influence in decision-making was
        greater than mine.   _____

    C) All things considered, he was the one who actually made the
        decisions.   _____

    D) All things considered, I was the one who actually made the
        decisions.   _____

6.   EVALUATION OF DEPUTY MINISTERS

6.1 Are you aware of the evaluation that was made of your deputy ministers
     (COSO process)?

    6.1.1 If yes, did their assessment agree with yours?

6.2 Are you satisfied with the way deputy ministers are evaluated?

7. POLITICAL CHANGEOVERS

In your opinion, would it be advisable for a new government to change considerably on taking power the existing group of deputy ministers?

YOUR VIEWS ARE IMPORTANT. . .

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3_____ 36 - 40	3_____ 11 - 15	3__ EX (1 to 3)	3__ NGO	
4_____ 41 - 45	4_____ 16 - 20	4__ EX Equivalent	4__ Other	
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