



## Working Paper Series

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# PROFILE OF DEPUTY MINISTERS IN THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA

Jacques Bourgault

**PROFILE OF**  
**DEPUTY**  
**MINISTERS IN**  
**THE**  
**GOVERNMENT**  
**OF CANADA**

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## ABSTRACT

Some people describe the senior managers of the Public Service of Canada as unique: the career of its members, their professionalism, their apolitical nature, the diversity of their recruitment, *et cetera*. This profile describes the socio-economic, professional and political characteristics of Canadian deputy ministers from 1867 to July 2003. In particular, it checks these claims with regard to geographic origin, gender, language, social origin, university education, field of study, former career, career within the deputy minister's community, professional origin, age at appointment, length of time in the position, post-career and political involvement. It also outlines the evolution of this profile according to the main periods that marked Canada's history, by focusing on the most recent decades in which there was a noticeable evolution of certain characteristics: 1867-1917, 1917-1947, 1947, 1967, 1977, 1987, 1997, and 2003. Finally, this publication compares the characteristics of the senior managers of the Public Service of Canada to those of 14 OECD countries by using the results of the most recent scientific studies that characterize the senior officials in these countries with regard to institutional models, social origin, education and career progression. To conclude, although the senior managers of the Public Service of Canada share certain characteristics with several of these countries, they present a very distinctive profile based on their historical origins, the circumstances surrounding the country's development and administration, a distinctive positioning regarding the political role of senior public servants, and a rather unique approach to managing the group of deputy ministers.

**Keywords:** Senior official; Deputy Minister; Public Service politicization; public sector career; governing elite; power; public authority; appointment; Government Minister; performance appraisal; international comparison; demographic comparison.



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As usual, the research assistants did most of the pre-drafting: Omar Trikki meticulously analyzed the deputy ministers' appointment notices as of 1988 and updated the directory; Véronique Massignani sought out the hundred odd new names appearing in the directory in order to complete and clarify their curriculum, encode them and produce the essential selections, lists, tables and research required for the analysis and drafting; and Carole Garand, our assistant who, once again, was the pillar of the project, providing administrative support as well as editing support for correspondence and the drafting of the report.

We would like to extend our gratitude to all of those who helped us track down throughout the world those people who had held the position of deputy minister since 1988, as well as to their families and friends when the deputy minister had passed away. Some invaluable and confidential sources who helped us find certain Deputy Chiefs from bygone eras will recognize themselves.

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## INTRODUCTION

Some people describe the senior managers of the Public Service of Canada as unique: the career of its members, their professionalism, their apolitical nature, the diversity of their recruitment, *et cetera*. This profile describes the socio-economic, professional and political characteristics of Canadian deputy ministers from 1867 to July 2003. In particular, it checks these claims with regard to geographic origin, gender, language, social origin, university education, field of study, former career, career within the deputy minister community, professional origin, age at appointment, length of time in the position, post-career and political involvement.

This report follows a 1991 publication produced in collaboration with Professor Stéphane Dion, then in the Department of Political Science at the University of Montreal, of which the data retrieved ended in 1988. The present report wants on the one hand to update the data to June 16, 2003 and, on the other hand, to put the changing trends of Canada's senior officials into perspective.

The report is divided into two sections. The first is divided into four subsections: the socio-economic profile of deputy ministers, their professional profile, their academic profile and finally, their political profile. In each subsection, the report will attempt to identify the characteristics of the situation at the time of the study, that is to say June 16, 2003. And, since it is important to be weary of snapshots that only reflect the coincidences of a particular situation, we will look at both recent and long-term trends. We will examine the two most recent decades under review, starting in 1987, a period we will call "modern"; then we will examine the period extending from the origin of Confederation, as did the 1991 report. The second section offers international comparisons in order to put the specific socio-political character of Canadian senior officials in context. It is divided in six subsections: it provides first the scope of the study and then identifies three administrative models; secondly it compares the proportion of women, social origin, education, academic profile and professional profile of the most senior public servants in each country reviewed.



## SOCIO-PROFESSIONAL PROFILE OF CANADIAN DEPUTY MINISTERS

### NOTES ON METHODOLOGY

The choice of positions to be studied inevitably leads to discussion. Several approaches had their logic and limitations. Here is ours. For reasons of continuity and relevance, we essentially adopted the same exploratory field as the 1991 study: the same deputy minister positions were either kept or rejected. That is to say that all associate deputy ministers, who are invited to several deputy minister meetings but do not act as heads of agencies, were rejected. Most of the heads of agencies with a specific role, such as the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and Statistics Canada, were not included in the study because of the particular character of their operations. However, others were included because, through the operations of their organization, they took part in the daily activities of government, as is the case of the Canada School of Public Service (CSPS), the Public Service Commission (PSC), the three regional development agencies (that became departments), and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). Obviously, the Deputy Minister for International Trade, and the Clerk and Deputy Clerk of the Privy Council Office (PCO) were considered in this study. However, most of the Privy Council Office Associate Secretaries were not considered since, depending on the case, they were either linked with associate deputy ministers or were on temporary assignments.

Since this study deals with a position that has few incumbents, that is 27 to 30 according to the organizational configurations adopted by the government of the day, the results in percentages over a limited period of time need a well-balanced interpretation given that they are substantially affected by any variation of a single element of the population. For example, since only 27 individuals received their first appointment between 1997 and 2003, each observation from this period has a percentage weight of 3.7. Any shift of a single element creates a variation of 3.7 % on the results. Therefore, it is necessary to interpret the trends rather than to stick too closely to differences of a few percentage points.

Some people were appointed several times, a term used in this study as a synonym for assignment, and it is possible that these appointments were spread over two to three decades. Unless otherwise indicated, we integrated these individuals into the decade of their first appointment (i.e., the decade in which they became a part of the deputy ministers' community). Therefore, unless otherwise indicated, the interpretation of the tables organized by decade must be interpreted as periods of first appointment.

It is important to explain the links with the study published in 1991 in which the research ended in 1988. Wherever possible, we used the same tables and parameters to maintain the study's continuity. It should be noted that the 1991 study dealt with the period between 1867 and 1988 and therefore the last group in the study included all the first appointments to this position over a period of eleven years, instead of the ten years of each of the other groups as of 1867. Our study was not subject to this constraint, so we removed from the 1977-1988 group those individuals appointed after June 30, 1987 in order to include them in the 1987-1997 group, thus creating a new 1987-1997 group of 56 individuals instead of the former 65 who were part of the 1977-1988 group.

The observations are gathered under three chapters: the socio-economic profile, the professional profile and politicization.

## SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROFILE

The importance of a representative bureaucracy within a national public service needs not be demonstrated. The most important factors to take into consideration in Canada at the beginning of this century are sex, language, visibility of a minority status, region of origin and socioeconomic environment. The role of religious affiliation in modern Canadian society seems to have less importance than it once did.

### *Development of Women Deputy Ministers*

On June 16, 2003, eight of the 30 deputy minister positions, or 26% of the incumbents considered in this study, were held by women.

This particular point indicates that the proportion of women has been stagnating in this community. Table 1 shows that women who were completely absent from the senior public service until 1975 have made significant strides since then, being granted 22% of the appointments made during the last five years. An increase of 20% in their representation is noted up until 1987. Without this stabilization in women representation at around 20%, we could have projected that in 1998, if the trend was maintained, women would have held half of the deputy minister positions by 2008.

The catching up is helped by the mechanism of discretionary appointments at this level. The increase in the ratio of women at other senior levels is constant but much less spectacular. The competitive process to fill executive (ex-category) positions led to the appointment of only 14% of women at various position

**TABLE 1.**  
Development of the Percentage of Women Deputy Ministers

	PERIOD OF TAKING OFFICE				
	1867-1977	1977-1987	1987-1997	1997-2003	1867-2003
Women	1%	12%	19%	22%	6%
Men	99%	98%	80%	78%	94%
Answers Received	100%	100%	99%	100%	100%
Size of Group	253	60	56	27	396
Answers Received	253	60	56	27	396

\* As a result of a rounding of fractions, the percentages can be greater than or less than 100 %.

levels: the statutory requirements of these competitions often represent systemic obstacles for people who have sacrificed a degree and years of experience to raise a family. What we can observe is that the performance of trailblazers opened the doors and, as in every environment, overturned prejudices. Women's increased access to the ex categories and to the position of assistant deputy minister supports this expanding representation in two ways: on the one hand their greater number provides a richer and more varied recruitment pool, and on the other, they are more present in professional interknowledge networks that are essential at this level of appointments which are based on trust.

Their presence is not only symbolic since, during the most recent decade, a number of women held some of the highest positions, such as that of the most senior public servants in Canada: Clerk and Secretary to the Privy Council Office, and Head of the Canadian Public Service. Furthermore, others continued to hold high-level positions in departments of crucial importance such as Health, or in non-traditional sectors such as Defence, Transport, Public Works, etc. However, some fields like Finance, Foreign Affairs and the Treasury Board are still out of reach.

## Development of Francophone Deputy Ministers

Table 2 illustrates the number of Francophones amongst deputy ministers since 1867. We can identify five important eras. Regarding the first group, from 1867 to 1917, Francophones were under-represented at 21%. During the following period, from 1917 to 1967, they were severely under-represented at 8% to 18%,

less than half of their proportion of the population. This situation generated very harsh and contrite comments from leading experts in Canadian administration, such as Hodgetts (1973), Granatstein (1982) and the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. In 1967, the golden age of Francophone deputy ministers begins in Canada and, for the next thirty years, the percentage of their appointments will be equal or higher than their proportion of the population. The tabling of the Laurendeau-Dunton Report and the commitment of Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau with his policy on official languages were the cornerstones of the increase in active recruitment of Francophones at senior management levels.

In spring 2001, some Francophone media sounded the alarm in order to draw attention to the fact that Francophones now represented only two out of 26 deputy ministers, or seven percent of the group, which lowered their percentage level below that of the 1917-1947 period. The media also claimed that some of the deputy ministers did not master the French language, which is contrary to the government's staffing policy requirements for these positions, and which led Minister Robillard to make this public statement: "The Prime Minister is very sensitive to the issue of the presence of Francophones amongst the senior public service and has asked the Clerk and assistant clerk (of the Privy Council) to pay special attention to this issue in the next round of nominations and look to on the outside of government if necessary" (*La Presse*, 2001: 8).

According to our compilations, on May 20, 2001, seven Francophones and 23 Anglophones held the 30 deputy minister positions. The proportion of Francophones was 23%, representing the proportion of Francophones in Canada. By contrast, on June 16,

**TABLE 2.**  
Development of the percentage of Francophone Deputy Ministers

	PERIOD OF TAKING OFFICE							
	1867-1917	1917-1947	1947-1967	1967-1977	1977-1987	1987-1997	1997-2003	1867-2003
French	21%	8%	18%	25%	32%	23%	40%	22%
English	78%	93%	82%	76%	68%	77%	60%	79%
Answers received*	99%	101%	100%	101%	100%	100%	100%	101%
Size of group	75	67	62	49	60	56	27	396
Answers received	75	67	62	49	60	56	27	396

\* As a result of a rounding of fractions, the percentages can be greater than or less than 100 %.

2003 there were ten Francophones amongst 30 deputy minister, increasing their representation to 33%. This increase in Francophones indicates an improvement from when the media claimed that they were under-represented. Though we must be weary of deceptive observations because they may be too specific and deal with small groups, several people nevertheless questioned the meaning of this incidence: was it a random incident or the breakdown of a system that was not constantly being monitored? However, Table 2

shows that since 1987, 29% of the appointments (24 out of 83) went to Francophones. Since 1997, with 11 out of 27 appointments, they were granted 40% of the appointments, especially after that spring of 2001.

The causes underlying this phenomenon are diverse and largely cyclical: no one signaled a backlash against Francophones. Following a golden period in which they were numerous and held important positions (e.g., twice Clerk and once Secretary of the Treasury

3a

TABLE 3a.

## Deputy Ministers in Relation to their Region of Birth

	PERIOD OF TAKING OFFICE							
	1867-1917	1917-1947	1947-1967	1967-1977	1977-1987	1987-1997	1997-2003	1867-2003
Maritimes	11%	11%	5%	9%	2%	9%	4%	7%
Quebec	33%	20%	28%	21%	37%	25%	33%	28%
Ontario	30%	48%	28%	28%	36%	38%	33%	35%
West	0%	10%	31%	33%	15%	21%	15%	16%
Other Countries	27%	11%	9%	9%	10%	7%	15%	14%
Answers Received*	101%	100%	101%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Size of Group	75	67	62	49	60	56	27	396
Answers Received	75	67	62	49	60	56	27	396
Information not Available	8	3	4	6	1	0	0	22

\* As a result of a rounding of fractions, the percentages can be greater than or less than 100%.

3b

TABLE 3b.

## Regional Representation in Relation to Region of Birth

	PERIOD OF TAKING OFFICE							
	1867-1917 (A-B)	1917-1947 (A-B)	1947-1967 (A-B)	1967-1977 (A-B)	1977-1987 (A-B)	1987-1997 (A-B)	1997-2003 (A-B)	1867-2003 (A-B)
Maritimes	-4%	+2%	-6%	0%	-6%	+0.07%	-1%	-3%
Quebec	+14%	-5%	+1%	-5%	+11%	0%	-9%	+4%
Ontario	-1%	+21%	-4%	-5%	+4%	+1%	-21%	+4.5%
West	-9%	-18%	+7%	+9%	-11%	+9%	-40%	-6%

\* A = The percentage of deputy ministers born in a given region of Canada compared to the total number of deputy ministers born in Canada.

B = The percentage of inhabitants of a region compared to the entire Canadian population (according to the average in the censuses held during the period being reviewed).

Source: Statistics Canada, Canadian Statistics: Population, Provinces and Territories 1998 to 2002, CANSIM, Table 051-001, online document consulted on September 20, 2003:

<http://www.statcan.ca/english/Pgdb/demo02.htm>



Board (TBS), the principle of rotation could have come into play. One wonders if a new generation of French Canadians was developed and if, within the community, we thought this development should be deliberate and systematic. One plausible explanation is that everywhere and in all areas, the system favours the majority unless deliberate efforts are maintained to ensure a number of the new generation comes from minority groups. If this is the case, we would be well advised to ask ourselves how long we must continue to closely monitor such measures aimed at ensuring representativeness at the senior levels of administration in the bureaucracy. This observation applies to all of social minorities or under-represented groups whose representativeness we want to maintain in the deputy ministers' community.

### *Deputy Ministers in Relation to their Region of Birth*

While this study was being made, nine deputy ministers (out of 30) had been born in Quebec, nine in Ontario, five in Western Canada, three in the Maritimes and four from outside of the country. Quebec was slightly over-represented in this group, while Ontario and the Maritimes were slightly under-represented.

Table 3a illustrates the consolidation of the Ontario-Quebec block with respect to the deputy ministers' regions of birth, its percentage varying between 63% and 73% of the appointments made after 1977. This proportion far exceeds the percentage of the Canadian

population in these provinces. At the same time, the number of deputy ministers born outside of Canada has been increasing significantly since 1997, which could account for the social advancement of new Canadians. Except for the most recent era of review (1997), the Maritimes have maintained an average quota of 5%. As for Western Canada, it has been producing only 15% to 20% of the workforce since 1977. Recruiting outside the central area remains a challenge for all national senior officials, but the scope of this deficit is particularly significant in Canada.

There is a risk that this phenomenon will intensify if competitions for the positions of analysts and managers in departments within the National Capital Region (NCR) are available only to people who already work and live in this region. This could mean that in 15 or 20 years, all else being equal, almost all of the deputy ministers will come from the National Capital.

Eight of the 81 people appointed in the last 16 years, of which four of the 27 appointed over the past six years, were born outside of Canada. Four out of the eight were from Britain, four from Northern Europe and one from the Middle East. In this regard, Canada is a good reflection of the globalization phenomenon and, thanks to the diversity of its staffing, banks on the required understanding to take part in it.

Place of birth may be a deceptive expression of senior officials' origin: some families move according to the rhythm of the parents' career, while other individuals are moulded by the city of their socialization as a young adult. This explains the interest in taking

	PERIOD OF TAKING OFFICE							
	1867-1917	1917-1947	1947-1967	1967-1977	1977-1987	1987-1997	1997-2003	1867-2003
Maritimes	18%	7%	7%	2%	4%	5%	8%	6%
Quebec	28%	12%	19%	22%	18%	19%	19%	19%
Ontario	35%	43%	27%	38%	43%	32%	51%	38%
West	3%	17%	23%	15%	9%	19%	6%	14%
United States	8%	10%	7%	14%	14%	15%	11%	11%
United Kingdom	10%	12%	16%	8%	5%	7%	5%	9%
Other	0%	0%	2%	1%	7%	4%	5%	3%
Answers Received*	102%	101%	101%	100%	100%	101%	102%	100%
Size of Group	75	67	62	49	60	56	27	396
Universities Attended	40	60	104	87	121	81	38	531

\* As a result of a rounding of fractions, the percentages can be greater than or less than 100 %.

into account where the university degrees were granted, especially since the learning culture contributes to the cultural referents of individuals and people generally land their first job in the region where they studied.

Table 4 illustrates university attendance by region, each period of attendance being counted as one item. Some of the 396 deputy ministers attended more than one university, leading to the total of 531 that appears at the bottom of the table. What is interesting about this table is that it indicates the strength of a region's potential cultural influence through the education provided to a student who will later become an influential decision-maker.

The study of the period between 1867 and 1988 sheds light on the americanization of education, the over-representation of education acquired in Ontario, the under-representation of education received in Western Canada and the adequate representation of education received in the Maritimes and Quebec. However, the study noted under-representation of French education in Quebec.

The trends in the two last groups show a slight increase in education received in the Maritimes, the

consolidation of Ontario's dominance, especially given the recruitment of deputy ministers within the national capital, the drop of education received in Quebec and Western Canada, and the stabilization at 21% of education received outside of Canada.

Close to 80% of the deputy ministers' group from the 1987-1997 still in office in 2003 attended universities in Ontario. A significant proportion of these universities are located in the NCR. Between 1997 and 2003, universities in Quebec produced 19% of the education received, followed by 8% in the Maritimes and 3% in Western Canada. 12% of the Canadian deputy ministers studied in the United States. Great Britain and France played a certain role, representing five 5%. Paradoxically, if a group rarely had as many of its deputy ministers coming from abroad (15%, Table 3a), this total of 21% total represents the weakest proportion of education received abroad since 1967. The total education other groups received abroad ranged between 23% and 26%.

### *Social Origin of Deputy Ministers*

Socio-economic representation has long

# 5

**TABLE 5.**  
Father's Occupation

	PERIOD OF TAKING OFFICE							
	1867-1917	1917-1947	1947-1967	1967-1977	1977-1987	1987-1997	1997-2003	1867-2003
Manufacturer (i.e., businessman)	0%	0%	0%	13%	7% (7)	16% (14)	4%	<b>10%</b>
Judge	7%	0%	7%	3%	2%	0%	0%	<b>2%</b>
Senior Official	11%	0%	0%	3%	0%	10%	27%	<b>6%</b>
Politician	4%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	<b>0%</b>
Professional	15%	27%	14%	6%	30%	0%	4%	<b>14%</b>
Minister of a Religion	15%	13%	29%	6%	0%	0%	0%	<b>6%</b>
Merchant (SME)	7%	13%	7%	22%	14%	10%	18%	<b>12%</b>
Middle Manager	19%	20%	14%	6%	5%	8%	0%	<b>9%</b>
Teacher	4%	0%	0%	16%	9%	29%	9%	<b>14%</b>
Farmer	7%	7%	0%	9%	7%	12%	9%	<b>8%</b>
Employee	11%	13%	14%	9%	14%	6%	27%	<b>11%</b>
Labourer	0%	7%	14%	6%	11%	8%	0%	<b>7%</b>
Answers received*	100%	100%	99%	99%	99%	99%	98%	<b>100%</b>
Size of group	75	67	62	49	60	56	27	<b>396</b>
Answers received	27	15	14	32	57	49	22	<b>216</b>
Unavailable information	48	52	48	17	3	7	5	<b>180</b>

\* As a result of a rounding of fractions, the percentages can be greater than or less than 100 %.

differentiated senior officials in North America from those in Europe and Asia who are much more elitist. Intergenerational social promotion, the existence of a significant middle class, and the development of an administrative machinery generating numerous new positions have contributed to this phenomenon. This type of representation takes on all its meaning when we seek to avoid contributing to the popular perception regarding elite circles (corporate state), or avoid spreading the perception that positions are going to the same category of people who reproduce themselves, and when we understand the importance of producing public policies that take into account the actual experiences of minority social groups. The deputy ministers holding office in 2001 came from an above average social environment in 78% of the cases: their parents were senior officials (13%), middle managers (4%), professionals (26%), merchants (22%) or teachers (13%). The other 22% of deputy ministers came from working-class environment where their parents were either employees (18%) or farmers (4%).<sup>1</sup>

The study of the period from 1867 to 1988 identified the social origin of the deputy ministers according to their father's occupation—an information difficult to obtain, especially retroactively. It was available for half of the group as of 1867, then for 66% and 95% of the groups of deputy ministers appointed in 1967 and 1977. If we attribute the lack of information regarding recent groups to a lack of notoriety or the embarrassment of revealing modest roots, the social recruitment it reflects would be even more modest than Table 5 indicates. Throughout the entire study, we noted that half of the deputy ministers were from the middle and upper middle classes, children of workers and employees representing a fifth of these officials. The proportion of recruitment amongst elites was 10%, though only 4%

during the decade beginning in 1977.

The argument concerning bureaucratic reproduction (public servant or senior official from generation to generation) only works for the first group between 1867 and 1917, in which 65% of the deputy ministers' fathers were public servants. This is due to the low geographic mobility and the relative absence of methods of communication. This proportion fell to 30% after 1917.

The new data demonstrate a shift in trends: if the proportion of children of labourers, employees and farmers remains relatively stable (between 22% and 36%) for all of the groups since 1867, the proportion of children of manufacturers and businessmen increased markedly at the expense of the merchant categories (SME), proof of the modernization of titles: not all businessmen are manufacturers!

## PROFESSIONAL PROFILE

### *Level of University Education*

All the deputy ministers in position on June 16, 2003 had an undergraduate degree and almost all undertook master's degree studies, with two-thirds completing them. Almost a fifth of these public servants finished post-graduate studies (17%).

The 1991 study noted that deputy ministers were obviously more educated than the population at large and the managerial staff working for them. Only two deputy ministers appointed since 1977 had not completed undergraduate studies. These were individuals who patiently climbed all the echelons of a public service career.

# 6

**TABLE 6.**

### University Degrees (Highest Level Attained)

	PERIOD OF TAKING OFFICE							
	1867-1917	1917-1947	1947-1967	1967-1977	1977-1987	1987-1997	1997-2003	1867-2003
None	65%	39%	9%	7%	3%	4%	0%	<b>22%</b>
Undergraduate	27%	44%	53%	35%	32%	50%	37%	<b>40%</b>
Graduate	7%	8%	22%	47%	34%	25%	48%	<b>23%</b>
Post-graduate	1%	9%	16%	12%	30%	21%	15%	<b>15%</b>
Answers received*	101%	100%	100%	101%	99%	100%	100%	<b>100%</b>
Size of group	75	67	62	49	60	56	27	<b>396</b>
Answers received	75	64	58	43	59	56	27	<b>382</b>
Unavailable information	0	3	4	6	1	0	0	<b>14</b>

\* As a result of a rounding of fractions, the percentages can be greater than or less than 100 %.

Table 6 reveals a slight shift in the trends relating to the academic background of deputy ministers: while the level of people with university degrees increased, the proportion of those holding a doctorate is on the decline since the 1977-1988 decade, dropping from 30% to 21%, then to 15%. This could be due to the new challenges inherent to the position, as well as to the new professional profile of the incumbents. In an increasingly complex society where scientific advances are witness to an increase in specialized knowledge, no one can claim to know the entire field covered by a department. We are no longer searching for the super specialist as head of a department, but for an experienced manager. We no longer expect the deputy minister to act as the ultimate referent of knowledge in a given field, but expect him or her to manage as best possible the convergence of knowledge between specialists in order to achieve the departmental agenda.

Given the context, deputy ministers are looking less for a post-graduate scientific specialization than for training through the multiplicity and diversity of their assignments. Undoubtedly, we are less and less likely to rely mainly on a highly specialized education to become a deputy minister.

As the holder of an undergraduate specialist diploma (accounting, law, pure or applied sciences) or a general one (administration, literature, human sciences), a young professional wants to make decisions that will help manage his/her career in the best way possible. Is it better to get a master's in a field of specialization or in management? Must one give up

evenings and week-ends for graduate studies or accept professional assignments so demanding that they do not allow him/her to concurrently pursue graduate studies? Since 1967, half of the deputy ministers have at least an undergraduate background. The proportion of those who have studied at the master's level (completed or not), is continuously increasing. Therefore, this field seems to be developing less than before in a world of specialists or scientists, and increasingly through a variety of management positions held after obtaining an undergraduate or graduate degree. Young managers aiming at higher positions seem to be making career decisions leading them to taking on management positions rather than investing in post-graduate studies.

### *Fields of Study*

The 30 deputy ministers in office on June 16, 2003 had each studied in one to two fields of studies. Within these fields, a deputy minister may have studied up to four subjects. Amongst the 30 ministers, 87% received their initial education in the humanities. The most important fields of study are: political science (30%) and economics (15%). Only 6% of deputy ministers received their initial education in law and the same proportion received their initial education in hard sciences. Six deputy ministers in office on June 16, 2003 pursued a second field of education in management, four in a school of public administration and two in a school of business administration. Only two deputy ministers studied law and only one studied

**TABLE 7.**  
Fields of Study

	PERIOD OF TAKING OFFICE							
	1867-1917	1917-1947	1947-1967	1967-1977	1977-1987	1987-1997	1997-2003	1867-2003
None	47%	33%	5%	2%	0%	2%	0%	15%
Law	29%	14%	34%	14%	18%	20%	12%	18%
Economics	1%	8%	18%	28%	33%	36%	11%	14%
Management	0%	8%	13%	21%	31%	11%	14%	9%
Science & Technology	17%	25%	25%	23%	31%	7%	7%	17%
Literature & Humanities**	15%	19%	38%	42%	45%	45% (20)	78% (37)	26%
Answers received*	109%	107%	133%	130%	158%	121%	122%	99%
Size of group	75	67	62	49	60	56	27	396
Answers received	75	63	56	43	54	56	27	374
Unavailable information	0	4	6	6	6	0	0	22

\* As a result of a rounding of fractions, the percentages can be greater than or less than 100 %.

\*\* For example, political science.

economics.

Table 7 shows that in the last 15 years, these trends have been confirmed given the strong presence of economists and the decline in scientific and technological education. Amongst the recruits after 1997, 78% have an education in literature or the humanities. Basic education leads these young people to a career in the public sector, and then they complete their training in public administration or management.

### Career: Age on Assuming Office

Deputy ministers in 2003 had all received their first appointment between the age of 40 and 59, and half

between the age of 40 and 50. Before 1997, only one person was appointed for the first time at the age of 39. The average age for assuming the office of deputy minister for the first time between 1997 and 2003 is 51.

Since 1967, the percentage of first appointments before the age of 50 was around 63%. This level dropped to 30% in the 1997-2003 period. Since 1867, the average age at first appointment is 47.6 years. Table 8 shows that the distribution of this average continues to narrow around this average age. Before 1947, many deputy ministers were under 40 and some were over 60. Now, it takes longer to reach the top because of increase in the number of public servants and the diversity of the required professional knowledge. The very demanding rhythm of work and

# 8

**TABLE 8.**  
Age of Assuming Office

	PERIOD OF TAKING OFFICE							
	1867-1917	1917-1947	1947-1967	1967-1977	1977-1987	1987-1997	1997-2003	1867-2003
Age 30 to 39 Years	23%	16%	7%	7%	7%	2%	0%	<b>11%</b>
Age 40 to 49 Years	50%	43%	52%	58%	56%	55%	30%	<b>50%</b>
Age 50 to 59 Years	27%	33%	31%	30%	37%	41%	70%	<b>35%</b>
Age 60 to 69 Years	0%	8%	10%	5%	0%	2%	0%	<b>4%</b>
Answers Received	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	<b>100%</b>
Size of Group	75	67	62	49	60	56	27	<b>396</b>
Answers Received	74	63	58	43	59	56	27	<b>380</b>
Unavailable Information	1	4	4	6	1	0	0	<b>16</b>

# 9

**TABLE 9.**  
Location of the Last Position Held before Taking Office

	PERIOD OF TAKING OFFICE							
	1867-1917	1917-1947	1947-1967	1967-1977	1977-1987	1987-1997	1997-2003	1867-2003
Same Department	54%	36%	54%	23%	29%	25%	26%	<b>37%</b>
Federal Public**	28%	42%	39%	58%	63%	70%	70%	<b>50%</b>
Other Public***	10%	10%	2%	12%	2%	5%	0%	<b>6%</b>
Private	8%	13%	5%	7%	7%	0%	4%	<b>7%</b>
Answers Received*	100%	101%	100%	100%	101%	100%	100%	<b>100%</b>
Size of Group	75	67	62	49	60	56	27	<b>396</b>
Answers Received	74	62	56	43	59	56	27	<b>377</b>
Unavailable Information	1	5	6	6	1	0	0	<b>19</b>

\* As a result of a rounding of fractions, the percentages can be greater than or less than 100%.

\*\* Federal departments and agencies

\*\*\* Municipal or provincial administrations

the tension to which senior officials must submit makes it more difficult to learn the trade after 60.

### *Immediate Origin of the Deputy Ministers*

The deputy ministers in office on June 16, 2003 all came from the federal Public Service, except for one who came from the private sector. Almost a quarter of the deputy ministers held an associate or assistant deputy ministers' job in the same department. The others came from another federal department or agency.

The federal senior public service's tradition of internal recruitment, established in 1947, continues to maintain itself. Table 9 shows that immediate recruitments are increasing since the 1917 group<sup>2</sup> and that the efforts of the Mulroney government to recruit outside the public service were stalled.

Recruiting from within the federal Public Service continues to increase, while the recent more systematic management of associate and assistant-deputy ministers' assignments (e.g., The Leadership Network) seems to focus on increasing recruits from within the same department. In many cases, everything takes place as if the last assignment at that level was used to prepare the new generation, or as if, when it is impossible to find candidates outside the department, it

was deemed easier or less risky to provide a first assignment in a familiar department. Maintaining this trend would be similar to the vertical hierarchical practices of the 1960s as it was for the 1947-1967 group. The major difference is now that the position prior to that of Assistant Deputy Minister (ADM) would be the only position originating immediately from the same department. Therefore, Associate Deputy Minister assignments would become more or less a gradual position takeover. If this trend is maintained, it would become like the vertical hierarchical practices in the 1960s, as it was for the 1947-1967 group, the major difference now being that only the last assignment would originate immediately in the same department: associate deputy minister assignments would be like a gradual taking over of a position.

### *The Deputy Ministers' career*

Table 10 illustrates the average number of years of career required before becoming a deputy minister in the Government of Canada. Since 1947, incumbents have had a shorter career before their first appointment, but now it has gone up from 22 to 28 years for the 1987-1997 and 1997-2003 groups. Since 1997, the 27 recruits had an average of 28 years of career before their first appointment. The spread of the career shows increased diversification within the federal public sector, at the expense of career profiles showing experience within the same department, the

# 10

**TABLE 10.**  
Average Length of Career before the First Appointment

	PERIOD OF TAKING OFFICE								2003*
	1867-1917	1917-1947	1947-1967	1967-1977	1977-1987	1987-1997	1997-2003	1867-2003	
Years in same Department	12	8	8	4	3	3	6	6	4
Years in Public Federal	7	8	11	13	14	14	19	12	16
Years in Public/Other	2	4	3	3	3	2	1	3	2
Years in Private	6	8	5	4	3	3	2	4	2
Total Years of Career	27	28	27	24	23	22	28	24	24
Size of Group	75	67	62	49	60	56	27	30	30
Answers Received	48	48	53	37	56	54	26	30	30
Unavailable Information	27	19	9	12	4	2	1	0	0

\* In office June 16, 2003.

private sector and other public sectors.

The careful review of the résumés of deputy ministers appointed after 1997 shows that almost all of them held a senior management position at PCO during the ten years preceding their appointment. This observation follows the trend of previous studies, such as the 1991 study and that of Zussman and Varette (1996). However, today, it applies to almost all the cases; we noticed that a period at the Treasury Board Secretariat has been less frequent in the last several years. These internships at PCO vary from two to five years. Only professional recruiting or regional career requirements have been exceptions to this practice, now an informal rule, underlining how important corporate coordination has become. We need incumbents who know and understand the operations of central agencies and who can interact functionally with them. This strong trend also reflects that the “rising stars”, identified early in their career, become the government’s corporate resources. These incumbents understand that they do not owe their career to an intra-departmental network, as might have been the case in the 1970s.

### *Career within the Deputy Ministers’ Community*

Table 11 presents the number of positions held by one individual in the course of her or his career as Deputy Minister. The data from the 1997 group cannot be taken into consideration since we cannot predict their career.

Since 1867, the multiplicity of the assignments projects a clear image: almost 30% of deputy ministers had more than two assignments. Some even had up to five assignments at this level during a period of approximately 15 years. As decades go by, the

proportion of those who received only one assignment as deputy minister has been decreasing: it was the case of 91% of those appointed before July 1, 1917 but the proportion fell to 48% for those who became deputy minister after 1967.

Furthermore, the propensity to give multiple assignments (more than two) has increased: from five percent of cases before 1967 to 17% between 1967 and 1977. The 1977-87 decade lagged slightly behind the trend. Three changes in governing parties could have had somewhat of an impact on career continuity within the community.

These observations grant a lot of importance to corporate rather than departmental loyalty and have an impact on the mobilization challenges of each and every one: how to be well perceived by an organization in which you have not grown and in which the members know that you will not end your career.

Zussman and Jabes (1989) described certain scepticism amongst the 1985 employees who were used to the vertical appointments of sectoral specialists. They took for granted that senior managers would demonstrate unconditional solidarity towards them since they came from their own ranks. Today, deputy ministers arrive in a department to accomplish a certain mandate, often inspired by corporate thinking. They take into account corporate expectations conveyed by the Clerk. Furthermore, the ability of a deputy minister to achieve his/her mandate, and be perceived as doing so by his or her peer group at the Committee of Senior Officials (COSO) in the Public Service, will influence her or his chances of gaining new assignments within the community.

**TABLE 11.**

Number of Assignments of the Incumbents as Deputy Minister\*\*

	PERIOD OF TAKING OFFICE							
	1867-1917	1917-1947	1947-1967	1967-1977	1977-1987	1987-1997	1997-2003	1867-2003
1 Assignment	91%	84%	76%	48%	60%	50%	59%	<b>69%</b>
2 Assignments	8%	12%	19%	29%	26%	27%	33%	<b>20%</b>
3 Assignments	1%	5%	5%	17%	9%	14%	8%	<b>8%</b>
4 Assignments	0%	0%	0%	2%	5%	5%	N/A	<b>2%</b>
5 Assignments	0%	0%	0%	4%	0%	4%	N/A	<b>1%</b>
Answers Received*	100%	101	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	<b>100%</b>
Size of Group	75	67	62	49	60	56	27	<b>396</b>
Answers Received	75	67	62	49	60	56	27	<b>396</b>

\* As a result of a rounding of fractions, the percentages can be greater than or less than 100%.

\*\* Includes deputy ministers in office on June 16, 2003.

## Length of Time in Office

The deputy ministers in office on June 16, 2003 had been incumbents in this position for an average of 3.4 years. This average rises to 5.5 years if we do not take into account those who have received their first appointment. Compared to the weak average of 1.8 years observed and denounced by Osbaldeston in 1989, this average seems quite high, particularly as we cannot predict the total length of the incumbents' assignments at this stage in the study.

Table 12 reflects the length of time spent in the community and in the same position as deputy minister, according to the decennial groups of first appointments.

Deputy Ministers in office on June 16, 2003 (first appointments) spent an average of 1.3 years holding

the same position.

The length of time in office represents, within this table and discussion, the length of time a person was a deputy minister in the Government of Canada. This length of time includes all consecutive assignments as deputy minister that one person may be given. The calculation ends even if the person remains employed by the federal government as a diplomat, special advisor or head of a Crown corporation. This length of time bears witness to the mutual attachment between the centre of the corporation and the individual.

The length of time spent in the same position represents the continuous time one person held the same departmental appointment as deputy minister within this study. Interim appointments, which are in fact very rare, are integrated into the calculation when they precede an appointment in the same assignment.

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**TABLE 12.**  
Length of Time in Office and Time Spent Holding  
the Same Position (Number of Years)\*

	PERIOD OF TAKING OFFICE							
	1867-1917	1917-1947	1947-1967	1967-1977	1977-1987	1987-1997	1997-2003	1867-2003
In Office	13.3	9.5	7.2	6.8	6	6.76	3.3	<b>8</b>
Same Position as DM	12.2	8.7	5.9	4.1	2.3	4	3.3	<b>6</b>
Size of Group	75	67	62	49	60	56	27	<b>396</b>
Answers Received	75	67	62	48	56	40	5	<b>353</b>
Unavailable Information	0	0	0	1	4	16	22	<b>43</b>

\* Does not include deputy ministers in office on June 16, 2003.

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**TABLE 13.**  
Age upon Leaving Office \*\*

	PERIOD OF TAKING OFFICE							
	1867-1917	1917-1947	1947-1967	1967-1977	1977-1987	1987-1997	1997-2003	1867-2003
Under 50 Years	16%	14%	21%	19%	52%	14%	20%	<b>22%</b>
Age 50 to 59 Years	16%	30%	43%	60%	45%	67%	80%	<b>42%</b>
Age 60 to 69 Years	45%	52%	36%	21%	4%	19%	0%	<b>31%</b>
Age 70 and Older	23%	3%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	<b>6%</b>
Answers Received*	100%	99%	100%	100%	101%	100%	100%	<b>101%</b>
Size of Group	75	67	62	49	60	56	27	<b>396</b>
Answers Received	74	63	58	42	59	43	5	<b>344</b>
Unavailable Information	1	4	4	7	1	13	22	<b>52</b>

\* As a result of a rounding of fractions, the percentages can be greater than or less than 100%.

\*\* Does not include deputy ministers in office on June 16, 2003.



The length of time as a deputy minister measures the career at that level, while the length of time in an assignment accounts for the mobility of deputy ministers.

The length of time in the position was reduced by almost half between 1967 and 1997, from 13.3 years to 6.76 years. The growth of the gap between the length of an assignment and the overall functions of this level bears witness to the multiplicity of the assignments received over the decades. These assignments have become more numerous, but also shorter. Those who took office after 1997 had, at the time of the study, held only one deputy minister position. The length of time in office was reduced by two thirds between 1867 (12 years) and the 1967 decade (four years). It was reduced by three quarters (three years) during the decade that started in 1977, which had several governments and prime ministers.

### Age upon Leaving Office

Deputy Ministers, as indicated in Table 13, are leaving the community more and more at around 50 to 59 years of age. They leave later if they received their first appointment at an advanced age and if they had several appointments.

Since 1947, no deputy minister has remained in office past the age of 70 because of the progression in the challenges and the availability of a more generous pension plan. The level of departures after 60 has been decreasing constantly since 1917, except for the decade from 1987-1997 when a fairly large number of

incumbents between the ages 50 and 59 were appointed. Since 1967, except for the 1977-1987 decade, maybe because of three changes in governing parties, departures before the age of 50 have become more and more rare. In the preceding study, it was noted that deputy ministers appointed between 1977 and 1988 left their position at 52.4 years of age and it was hard to imagine how this average could drop still further. In fact, the increase in the age at appointment, the stability of the governing team and improved recruitment within the public service contributed to this increase in the departure age between 1987 and 1997.

Some people would be quick to point at the politicization of the public service. This is not our opinion. It is important to distinguish between the politicization of appointments and departures and the administrative effects of departmental instability. Though in both cases there is sensitivity to political changes, the former leads to firing those who lack commitment and hiring those who sympathize. The latter phenomenon makes the conditions of fulfilling one's duties even more difficult (insecurity, adaptations, changing agendas, changing styles, cancellation of projects already well advanced, etc.), without there necessarily being any political partisanship surrounding arrivals and departures. One must be trained in cohabitation with the political world and have a personal public service ethic to choose to remain in government under circumstances of such multiple political changes. This is why those coming from the outside stayed in the community for a shorter length of time during that decade.

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TABLE 14.

Activity upon Departure from Office \*\*

	PERIOD OF TAKING OFFICE							
	1867-1917	1917-1947	1947-1967	1967-1977	1977-1987	1987-1997	1997-2003	1867-2003
Retirement / Death	72%	46%	16%	3%	3%	14%	20%	<b>27%</b>
Demotion	5%	16%	10%	13%	17%	5%	0%	<b>11%</b>
Same Type of Position	3%	11%	34%	44%	47%	44%	80%	<b>26%</b>
Provincial Public Service	3%	0%	8%	5%	2%	3%	0%	<b>3%</b>
Private Sector	9%	18%	22%	26%	20%	23%	0%	<b>23%</b>
Other***	7%	9%	10%	10%	12%	11%	0%	<b>10%</b>
Answers Received*	99%	100%	100%	101%	101%	100%	100%	<b>100%</b>
Size of Group	75	67	62	49	60	56	27	<b>396</b>
Answers Received	58	56	50	40	60	43	5	<b>312</b>
Unavailable Information	17	11	12	9	0	13	22	<b>84</b>

\* As a result of a rounding of fractions, the percentages can be greater than or less than 100%.

\*\* Does not include deputy ministers in office on June 16, 2003.

\*\*\* Political or judicial activities, international organizations.

## Post-Career

The post-career indicator retained is the first activity held by an ex-deputy minister upon leaving office. It obviously depends on the age and the state of health of that person, as well as the quality and constraints of the pension fund, which is no longer an obstacle today. The follow-up to the career also depends on what the government as a corporation can and wants to offer each of its former deputy heads. It hinges on the access to a pool of positions of heads of organizations, ambassadors and Canadian representatives heading international institutions, which creates possibilities. The reasons and conditions of the termination of the mandate also play a role in the likelihood of obtaining a new assignment in the federal senior public service. It finally depends on the contacts a person can make outside the federal Government and the person's will to invest in strenuous activities in a new environment following a career that was already very demanding.

Table 14 demonstrates that immediate retirement has become almost nonexistent since 1947, due to acceleration in retirement age. On the other hand, cases of demotion have increased since the 1977-1988 decade in which there were three changes in governing parties. However, this proportion remains low. Only nine individuals out of the 60 who departed during this period were demoted. The increase in lateral assignments is witness to the structuring and coherence of the Government corporation. Positions that are sometimes less demanding, or not in the periphery of constraints because of political proximity and central agencies, are offered to experienced managers who wish to postpone their retirement.

The detailed study of résumés and some interviews indicate however that the pool of available positions does not seem sufficient to ensure anyone more than one assignment upon leaving the career. This situation visibly disappointed several members of the community in their fifties or early sixties who thought they deserved to have their mandate renewed or receive a new assignment.

The private sector offers growing opportunities at the end of a career. Some deputy ministers become self-employed consultants or consultants for a prestigious firm. Others accept a senior management position in a prestigious corporation. This shift to the private sector demonstrates the acknowledgment of the significant qualities of these managers as well as the usefulness of their knowledge of the logic and the twists and turns of political-administrative procedures. The impacts of the *New Public Management*, which establishes a closer link in the contacts and methods of

the private and public sector managers, will likely reinforce this trend.

## POLITICIZATION

Appointments to DM positions attract attention for three reasons: the deputy minister is the highest authority within a department after the minister. He or she is in constant contact with political figures such as the minister and the members of the minister's office (notably the very influential Prime Minister's Office), and the position is filled in a discretionary manner by a political body, the Cabinet. A constitutional convention gives the Prime Minister the privilege of appointing deputy ministers (according to an order in council that goes back to Laurier in 1896). Deputy ministers in the federal government are therefore appointed by order in council, initiated by the Prime Minister and signed by three other ministers. Therefore, conditions are combined in a manner that leads some people to call it a political appointment.

On a purely institutional basis, it is in fact a political appointment aimed at providing the government, which has the trust of the House, with the possibility of choosing a reliable person capable of extending the actions of the minister and the government actions, of providing them with advice and ensuring the implementation of their policy decisions. The degree of trust, which the discretionary character of the appointment justifies, is a crucial contribution to the operations of democratic institutions. States staff the most senior officer in departments in a discretionary manner and reserve the staffing privilege for the Executive Branch.

Politicization has been given bad press because of the two-fold assumption that the appointment is unfair and the incumbent is incompetent and seems to be sanctified. In certain systems of government, because of their political relationships, some less competent candidates are granted senior management positions. Today we acknowledge that certain people hired politically can have adequate professional preparation and that political commitment does not necessarily make someone incompetent. The bad reputation of politicized appointments comes mostly from the possibility of arbitrary, biased and partisan decisions they could generate. The State would become a class that would first claim the instruments of power and eventually its fruits. Canada has always praised its public service as being apolitical and professional. In the case of the Canadian federal administration, it would be impossible to think appointments and departures were subject to partisan politics. This would be the case if appointments or dismissals helped a

political party to win or maintain power. This would also be the case if the positions were used to gratify partisans or to introduce systems that provide privileges in the awarding of contracts, favours to friends of the party or questionable access to jobs in the public service. To date, none of these practices have ever been specifically linked to an incumbent deputy minister.<sup>3</sup>

In everyday life, deputy ministers assume the inevitable functional politicization of their duties to the extent that the quality of their work makes a department or government look good. As employees and servants of the State, they accept that the only way to serve the State is to serve the current government, loyally and in the strict respect of the law. This involves preparing decision files according to the directions given by the ministers, advising ministers and ensuring that the department provides, through predetermined communication procedures, all of the information deemed useful to the ministers.

The loyalty of senior public servants has political effects, but is administrative in nature. It is expressed by the "preventative role" they play. They must offer the minister the best advice possible, provide all of the necessary information and produce all of the relevant comments, in a timely manner, to forewarn the minister when needed and bluntly warn the minister of possible bad news. Because they "tell the truth to those in power", they enjoy some of the independence required to do their work, and we expect their work to follow best practices. In Canada's case, senior public servants must reconcile at times several competing loyalties that lead them to make delicate choices and motivates them to consult their colleagues. They are both the minister's main advisor and advisors to the Government, the Clerk and members of a very active community of peers.

If deputy ministers strayed from government policies or opposed the minister's legitimate decisions, they would be exercising a bureaucratic power by substituting themselves to the elected representatives thus making political programming decisions in their place. This is why deputy ministers are appointed in a discretionary manner, chosen by the Prime Minister, and appointed during pleasure, meaning that their assignment can be cancelled for no specific reason.

In the last few years, it seems that Canada has become quite a unique case, some say *anachronistic*, due to the apolitical character of its senior officials. The United States have a spoils system for Deputy Secretaries' positions (and the six levels immediately below; Hecllo, 1977). France uses a system of internal lists of public servants for the positions of chiefs of staff, Secretaries General and several Director General

positions (Bodiguel & Quermonne, 1983; Bodiguel & Rouban, 1991; Bourgault, 1997a). Socialist States insist on the necessary politicization of the administration provided by the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, because of the role of the State in the class struggle.

Only countries that use the Whitehall model (Westminster political system) practice a certain separation between administration and politics at the senior levels. New public management, implemented in Australia, New Zealand and Great Britain, recommends a greater dependency of the administration on political leaders, in the name of greater democracy and efficiency. This manifests itself by a more political selection of incumbents, the contractualization of hiring, and performance contracts with large financial bonuses<sup>4</sup>. None of this seems to have really disrupted the Canadian practice. Nevertheless, several specialists continue to doubt the practicability of this separation of administration and politics (Aberbach et al., 1981; Campbell, 1988).

We generally judge the politicization of an appointment through direct observation: a given person is a card-carrying member of a given party, works at the party headquarters, follows its activities, represents the party during an election or officially works to help elect a party or one of its candidates. However, political commitment can evolve over time: some members of ministers' offices moved away from the party they adhered to, others changed ideologies and relations. In short, political commitment labels soon become obsolete. Several members of ministers' offices were able to integrate or reintegrate the Canadian Public Service and, in so doing, restrict the scope of their political partisan action. Direct observation shows that political commitment has been quite rare in Canada, as demonstrated in the 1991 study. The current update allows us to extend this conclusion, at least concerning political partisan commitment prior to the appointment.<sup>5</sup>

The checking of political commitment involves an indirect deductive method of observation of the politicization of appointments. In an administrative culture where the politicization of public servants is not going well, we would see an informal politicization of appointments. It would be a matter of appointing or forcing the departure of "discrete partisans", meaning people who never committed politically in public. This observation is based on four criteria:

- 1) the new government makes certain incumbents leave as soon as it comes into power (e.g., the spoils system);
- 2) the government recruits replacements outside the public service;

- 3) deputy ministers who lose their jobs are “expelled” from the public service (no other position is offered);
- 4) the period of time in office of those appointed by the outgoing governing party is lower than the overall average of the incumbents during the same period.

On the contrary, there is no partisan politicization of appointments and departures when a change in the governing party is not accompanied by important changes in deputy ministers; when new arrivals have no partisan affiliations and come from within the Public Service; and when individuals leaving a deputy minister position remain in place at the same level in the Public Service.

Some partisan politicization tests were conducted in the past. The Bourgault and Dion study (1991) shows that since the 20th century, there has been no direct and official involvement of the incumbents in political life before their appointment. The study also shows that mobility at the head of the departments did not increase when the new governing party came to power. Those who left their position during a government change did not have more of a career outside the Public Service than the ones who left in a period of continuity. Finally, the new appointments came almost exclusively from within the Public Service where the new appointees spent most of their career.

Did the most recent governing party change maintain this tradition? In 1993, a majority of mps from the Liberal Party of Canada were elected to the House of Commons and Prime Minister Jean Chrétien formed a government that replaced the Conservative Party. This transition deserves to be examined to assess if the conclusions reached in the previous studies can be maintained.

When Prime Minister Jean Chrétien formed his new government in October 1993, he inherited 28 deputy ministers appointed by his Conservative predecessors<sup>6</sup>. These incumbents were in office, on average, since one year and eight months. The major ministerial shuffle by the Conservative Party that took place in June 1993, lowered this average which otherwise would have been established at two years and two months. Despite the change in governing party, deputy ministers remained in the same position for three years and six months, an average that is comparable to the length of time in office when there were no changes in government. In 1993, the Liberals found 16 incumbents, having held office for an average of two years and four months and who had already received more than one deputy minister assignment.

The 28 incumbents appointed by the Liberals to replace them came from within the federal public sector, except for two who came from the provinces. Twelve had more than one assignment. They accumulate an average of two assignments at the deputy minister level and two years and four months in office. Ten were promoted from assistant deputy minister and four others came from federal bodies or an ambassadorial position.

The rhythm of the changes of deputy ministers can convey political sensitivity. In 1993, the first change in deputy ministers came after two months. After six months, six deputy ministers had left, three of which had gone to occupy positions at the same level. After eight months, 10 deputy ministers had left, only three of which had permanently left the government. After a year, more than two thirds of the deputy ministers had changed jobs (13 out of 18), most for assignments at the same level in the federal government. After two years, 22 of the 28 deputy ministers had changed jobs, which indicates in the case of this transition, a certain sensitivity of the administrative machine to changes in the governing party, but expressed in small doses over a period of two years. A review of these changes revealed a power takeover strategy (Bourgault & Nugent, 1995) devised by the new government, like the Conservative Party had previously done within a “transition strategy”. Changes during the first year were made largely in the central agencies (PCO, TBS, and PSC) and certain horizontal departments (Foreign Affairs). Rather than act at the level of sectoral appointments, the new political power acted in a more strategic way by installing, at the centre of the executive machine, top public servants who bore witness to the change in style and became involved in the implementation of its agenda. For example, the success of the implementation of the ambitious reform of the Program Review (1994-1997) owed much to the leadership demonstrated by these same senior officials in the central agencies. However, a newly appointed clerk may, for strategic reasons, make changes to deputy minister positions.

The destination of those who leave can speak for itself on the willingness of the new political masters to get rid of someone they do not trust. Nevertheless, this indicator can be misleading because it includes officials at the end of their career, departures on account of illness or better career opportunities in the private sector. Several departures would have occurred even without a change in government, the transition becoming simply a conjunctural trigger. However, the more the departure coincides with the arrival of the new government, the more likely it is to be a departure of convenience. Of the 28 incumbents in office on October 1993, four retired, four left for the private sector and

three went on to less important assignments in central agencies. Out of the 11 departures from the Public Service, seven took place during the first eighteen months after the change in government; two of the four retirement cases, three of the four cases of individuals going into non-governmental employment and two of the three cases of deputy ministers put on the sidelines took place during the first eighteen months after the change in government, that is a total of seven out of 11 departures from the public service. However, 13 of the 1993 incumbents were granted positions as deputy ministers or as heads of agencies and four other received diplomatic postings. These data lead us to believe that departures of convenience were very limited between 1993 and 1994.

Table 15 shows that the deputy ministers' official political engagement has decreased constantly since the beginning of the Confederation and that this involvement was the most often subsequent to the holding the position of deputy minister. Canadian prime ministers have been deputy ministers, such as Mackenzie-King and Pearson; ministers have been deputy ministers, such as Drury, Sharp, etc. More recently, Marcel Massé was a Liberal minister for fourteen years after having been the most senior officer under a conservative government! It seems that personal relationships that develop over the years between senior civil servants and ministers can lead to believe there are cases of politicization. The willingness to hold a position of power, for a party whose vision is compatible to one's own as to the role of the State, is a stronger factor than partisan affiliation in the decision to run for office. Incidentally, the *Public Service Employment Act* is the most rigorous that we know in this regard. It forces public servants to seek authorization before making any campaign promise (an authorization denied to deputy ministers) and deems that any public servant elected at federal or provincial

elections must resign her or his position.

Some informal affinities are at play concerning the choice or rejection of an individual, according to the person's affinity with the Conservatives or the Liberals. In the period from 1987 to 2003, there were seven such cases out of 72. One is said to have been a friend of the Prime Minister, another of a minister and yet another seems to have become an ally of a future Prime Minister. Another was considered Liberal for having previously held sensitive jobs closely related to politics in a province. This is rather a marginal phenomenon and takes place in a discrete manner. In this regard, the Canadian senior public service seems unique because of its partisan detachment when compared, for the same time period, to France, the United States or Great Britain.

Among the 30 deputy ministers in office in June 2003, therefore appointed by the Liberals, seven had been chiefs of staff to ministers in the Mulroney government (Conservative). Another was a chief of staff in a province. Six out of seven were career public servants in the federal government before taking this position. Therefore, these are not individuals coming from a party as chiefs of staff to be "blanketed"<sup>7</sup> within the public service, according to the meaning of the American practice. In France, according to Gournay (1967), Peters (1978) and Siwek-Pouydesseau (1973), as of 1960s, these transitions through ministers' offices became career springboards.

However, a transition through a minister's office seems to be on the rise. As these incumbents previously had a career in the public service, it represents the introduction of a British practice into Canada in the 1970s. This practice did not deprive Great Britain's senior public service of its reputation of political neutrality. The British perceived a transition through a minister's office as the opportunity for professional training and for becoming sensitive to the

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**TABLE 15.**  
Deputy Ministers' Official Political Involvement

	PERIOD OF TAKING OFFICE							
	1867-1917	1917-1947	1947-1967	1967-1977	1977-1987	1987-1997	1997-2003	1867-2003
None**	65%	78%	87%	92%	88%	86%	85%	<b>82%</b>
Cabinet Only	11%	13%	3%	4%	10%	14%	15%	<b>10%</b>
Explicit**	24%	9%	10%	4%	2%	0%	0%	<b>9%</b>
Answers Received*	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	<b>101%</b>
Size of Group	75	67	62	49	60	56	27	<b>396</b>
Answers Received	75	67	62	49	60	56	27	<b>396</b>

\* As a result of a rounding of fractions, the percentages can be greater than or less than 100%.

\*\* This category includes cases in which no relevant information was found.

constraints of the departmental life, governed by a tradition of restraint in the partisan commitment towards the minister. Finally, given the contacts involved, the high visibility and accelerated learning, the chief of staff position can increase the speed of the senior servant's career progression.

## CONCLUSION

This study confirms the major trends underlined by Bourgault and Dion in 1991. It confirms certain specific factors regarding the Canadian senior public service: a non-elitist and quite diversified recruitment, professionalism, prestige linked to the career, internal recruitment, mobility within the community, non-partisan politics and the importance of belonging to the community of deputy ministers.

Compared to the 1991 data, we see certain mutations in the preparation to holding the position and the intensification of certain trends, such as the level of graduate education, the fields of study and the increase of assignments in central agencies.

Finally, the study emphasizes certain recruitment challenges in order to maintain and develop its characteristics of a representative bureaucracy: the representativeness of Francophones, women, visible minorities and the access to people from the peripheral regions of Canada. These challenges should prompt the Canadian administration to maintain monitoring systems that are adapted to its tradition and values.



## INTERNATIONAL ELEMENTS OF COMPARISON

### NOTES ON METHODOLOGY

An international comparison allows us to explore the specific socio-political character of Canada's senior public service. There is an obstacle, however. The morphology of the senior public services presents extremely heterogeneous characteristics, since senior public service systems vary from one country to another. Moreover, studies on the subject seem quite incongruous:

- 1) periods of time (years) vary from one study to another;
- 2) many researchers included officers of the second and sometimes third echelon in their sampling, rather than concentrating on only one chief of administration in a department;
- 3) the indicators by which age, social origin, length of time in office and field of study are measured vary from one study to another.

These particularities constitute as many reservations that limit the scope of the comparison that follows. The goal of this purely descriptive study is to compare the socio-political profiles of those at the highest levels in the administrative hierarchy of certain countries that are members of the OECD, to better highlight the specificity of Canada's case. The targeted countries were chosen based on the availability of the literature and with the desire to only study countries that are comparable to Canada.

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**TABLE 16.**  
Description of Highest Ranking Public Servant by Country

Country / title	Description
<b>Australia</b> Departmental Secretaries	The Australian departmental secretaries are appointed by the Prime Minister following a notice from the secretary of the Prime Minister Department or the commissioner (when it is an appointment within the Department of the Prime Minister) for a maximum contract of five years (Australian government, 1999, §58).
<b>Belgium</b> President (président des services publics fédéraux)	In Belgium, since the 2000 reform, the position of Secretary General of a department was replaced by the président des services publics fédéraux (SPF). <sup>*</sup> The presidents are chosen by their minister for a renewable six-year mandate (except for the président de la Chancellerie mandate which is limited to four years). The presidents are chosen from a list of internal or external candidates, appointed by the Selection Office in charge of recruiting officers (SELOR), by an external consultant on the basis of assessment tests, and after an interview with the minister of the relevant service (Van Hoegaerden, 2002: 16).
<b>Denmark</b> Department Heads (tjenestemoend)	The Danish department heads are appointed by the minister following a notice from the Department of Finance and the selection of the most qualified candidate. They are designated for a fixed term. However, to avoid political interference, they are gradually appointed on a permanent basis (EIPA, 1998: 31).
<b>Finland</b> Permanent Secretaries (kansliapaallikko)	The Finnish Council of State or president appoints the permanent secretaries through open competitions. They are appointed for a determined or indeterminate period. The determined nature of a contract depends on the services and duties that must be carried out, or on the operations of the relevant agency. In Finland, positions with determined contracts represent only 10 % of the employees of the State. (Liuksia, 2000: 1)
<b>France</b> Secretary General and Director General	The French Cabinet, following the approval of an appointment made by the concerned minister, appoints the secretaries general and directors general. Since 2000, an order in council limits holding these positions to 3 years, renewable only once (Godbert, 2003).
<b>Germany</b> Secretary of State (abteilungsleiter)	The German permanent secretaries of state are appointed by the ministers for an indeterminate period on a proposal made by the Personnel and Selection Criteria Directorate (Bossaert et al., 2001: 282).
<b>Ireland</b> Secretary	Irish secretaries are appointed for a seven-year mandate by the government from a list of three recommendations made by an independent committee, the Top Level Appointments Committee (Millar and McKeivitt, 2001: 40).
<b>Italy</b> Secretary General and Department Head (dirigenza)	The Italian Cabinet, after deliberation and following a ranking determined according to the results of competitions and examinations, appoints secretaries general of departments and department heads (Bossaert et al., 2001: 309). Since 2000, the secretary general positions are limited to a maximum of three years. Ten percent of these positions can be allocated to people outside of the administration (Cassese, 2002: 678)
<b>Netherlands</b> Secretary General or Departmental Secretary	Dutch secretaries general (or departmental secretaries) are appointed at pleasure by a royal decree on the recommendation of the Office of Senior Public Service, for a seven-year term (Koesoemo-Joedo, 2003).
<b>Spain</b> Secretary of State, Secretary General, Deputy Secretary and Director General	The Spanish Cabinet appoints Secretaries of State ( <i>secretario de estado</i> ), Secretaries General ( <i>secretario general</i> ), Deputy Secretaries ( <i>subsecretario</i> ) and Directors General at pleasure. The secretaries of state and the secretaries general are not necessarily career officers. They can be recruited from outside the Public Service. The non-public servants appointed to these highest echelons have political duties, they are cargos politicos. In Spain, it is only since the end of the 1990's that deputy secretaries are recruited from amongst career public servants. (Parrado-Diez, 2001: 3)
<b>Sweden</b> Under-Secretary of State (statssekreterare, bitradande)	The Swedish government appoints the under-secretaries of state following the recommendations of the General Secretariat and the Minister of Finance. These appointments at pleasure are generally limited to six years. (Larsson, 2001: 6).
<b>Switzerland</b> Secretary General and Department Head	The Swiss government Cabinet appoints the secretaries general and department heads for a determined period of no more than five years (after five years, the working relationships are deemed to be for an indeterminate period according to the <i>Loi sur le personnel de la Confédération</i> , § 2: 9).
<b>USA</b> Deputy Secretary and Assistant Secretary	American deputy secretaries and assistant secretaries can be career appointees from the Senior Executive Service that reach the top echelon through merit. They can also be political appointees appointed by the president.
<b>United Kingdom</b> Permanent Secretary	The British Prime Minister appoints the permanent secretaries for an indeterminate period once their file has been reviewed by the Senior Appointments Selection Committee and upon the recommendation of the Civil Service Commissioner. (OECD, 1997: 24).

\* Please note that the data in this study makes reference to the Belgian Secretaries General and Directors General in office before the Copernic reform of 2000.



In each country, we studied the most senior officers working within the national administration (ministries, departments, directorates or agencies), holding a managerial or business position, dealing directly with the elected officials and likely to help the political head of their organization in his/her managerial tasks. The study has no other objective than to emphasize the similarities and differences, without getting involved too deeply in the classification of causes or explanations.

## FIELDS OF STUDY

This study deals with a number of so-called “developed” countries for which operational documents exist: Germany, Australia, Belgium, Denmark, the United States, Spain, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Sweden and Switzerland. Table 16 provides the respective titles given to the most senior public servants in each country, as well as the procedure by which they reach the top of their administration.

### *Administrative Models*

There are three underlying principles in the public service generally: citizens’ equality before the law, universal access to the public service and fairness of treatment. Neutrality of all the officers administering programs is also required in all constitutional States. The general rule is that the public service must be apolitical. However, high-ranking officers occupy a middle ground between politics and the administration. Their duties consist in ensuring the conversion between the political power and the implementing administration. Each country resolves in its own way the relationship between administration and politics. Therefore, the degree of separation between administration and politics varies from one administration to another. This relative separation is a result of different political developments, reflects specific social values and varied administrative traditions and emerges from various legal and constitutional systems. In some countries, the highest-ranking people in the administration are apolitical. In others, the government recruits them on a political basis and they play an informal political role. These differences make the comparative analysis of administrative models difficult.

To facilitate the comparison, we have, in line with the works of Hojnacki (1996), grouped the administrations according to three general administrative models, using three variables. The first variable is justified by the so-called historical neo-institutionalist theory and deals with the historical role played by the public service throughout national

political developments. The second variable deals with the definition and boundaries of politicization. Finally, the third variable deals with the constitutional and legal features of the institutions in which the senior public service works (role of the executive in a unitary, federal, centralized and decentralized State).

Neo-institutionalist theories assert that political institutions contribute in determining political action and are instrumental in the stability of the political system (March & Olsen, 1989: 52). These theories are expressed through three problematics: the definition of the institutions, the influence the institutions have on action or behaviour, and the manner in which the institutions are created and modified (Freymond, 2003: 17; Hall & Taylor, 1996: 469; Lecours, 2002: 1). Historical neo-institutionalism sees institutions as the fruit of an historical process. According to this approach, the birth of institutions can be understood in terms of balance of power during a culminating moment in history (Lecours, 2002: 5). This approach uses the “critical situation” concept in order to explain the moments in which important institutional changes took place (Hall & Taylor, 1996: 476). Historical neo-institutionalism explains institutional stability using the “path dependency concept”, meaning that institutional reproduction is ensured by power structures that give the institutions a constantly increasing legitimacy. The supporters of this approach contend that certain institutions are so “embedded” that they escape all direct reappraisal and that, as collective structures, they cannot be transformed by a simple individual action (Hall & Taylor, 1996: 474). According to Hall and Taylor (1996: 471), institutions shape the behaviour of their members. The restrictive role institutions play with their members leads them to strengthen the institutions, participate in their reproductions, and therefore in their stability.

Politicization is often presented as an infringement on the principle of neutrality. Aberbach et al. (1981) define it as the overall political activities and behaviours deemed appropriate or not in a given administration. In this sense, it includes two dimensions. The first includes activities carried out by senior officials in order to influence policy development: cumulating positions, running for office, canvassing for a political candidate. The influence exerted on the senior officials is the second dimension of politicization: this is the capacity of the political power to influence the behaviour of the senior officials through discretionary appointments, possible dismissal, transfers and bonuses. Aberbach et al. (1981), identify four types of “images” to illustrate the relationship between political leaders and senior officials: the perfect separation of roles, when the minister develops the policies and makes decisions and the deputy minister implements them all loyally; the

sharing of expertise and political sensitivity, in which the deputy head participates in the emergence of policies by providing facts and knowledge, while the minister contributes values, ideology and sensitivity according to the desires of the population; role sharing between the energy coming from the political environment and the balance stemming from administrative continuity, in which politicians and bureaucrats seem to be actively committed in the political process; and finally, the perfect symbiosis of roles, in which the minister and senior officials play undifferentiated roles in policy development and management.

Collin Campbell (1989) built on the Aberbach et al. images (1981) by adding three categories between the expertise sharing image and the role-sharing image: the reactive career bureaucrat, a career civil servant who pursues his or her own project while participating in the development of government policies; the proactive senior official who does not belong to a political party, but resolutely associates him or herself with the political leaders to advance his or her own policy preferences and the development of her or his own career; and finally, the administrative-political amphibian, who is not necessarily a public servant, but belongs to a party and participates in the development of policies by playing a formal role in the process for which he or she demonstrates much talent.

According to the type of model used, encouraged or tolerated, we can see a larger level of involvement of the senior officials in politics or in the area of political activities traditionally reserved for the minister. These levels of political involvement correspond to the level of politicization of senior officials.

In practical terms, it is possible to identify three politicization models by referring to many countries that practice them with a certain authenticity. There is the Canadian system, based on apolitism and a career-oriented public service, the American spoil system, where political appointees and career appointees hold comparable jobs according to a representation rule (90% of the highest ranking positions go to political appointees)<sup>8</sup>. The French model combines the career system with its political list system of senior officials characterized and transferred according to their perceived leanings towards parties, schools of thought or political figures. For the purpose of this study, we have identified three models<sup>9</sup>, the Weberian or Westminster model (Whitehall), the traditional model practiced in continental Europe and the American model.

## THE WEBERIAN MODEL

The Weberian model is characterized by the strong distinction it maintains between the political and administrative sphere. It is built on two basic principles: the political neutrality of the public servants and the difference between political staff and career public servants (Ziller, 1993: 426). The system is also called the Westminster model because the United Kingdom has the most similar model. Whitehall refers to the characteristics of the Executive Branch within the Westminster model.

In keeping with Honjnacki (1996: 144), the importance granted to a neutral public service is the historical consequence of the relationships between the administration and the political power. According to a neo-institutionalist interpretation, the United Kingdom State rapidly reached political stability throughout its history. The public service would have become the instrument of political power, supporting broad practices of patronage<sup>10</sup> at the beginning of the democratization process in the country and up to the Northcote-Traveleyan report in 1843. This patronage experience within the administration of the United Kingdom created a narrow concept of politicization, similar to that of violating the principle of neutrality. It is in reaction to this politicization that the Whitehall model was created, according to which incumbents holding the highest administrative rank had to serve with loyalty and vigour, no matter their political affiliation (Ziller, 1993: 232). Australia, Belgium, Ireland, Finland, the Netherlands and Canada's public services were inspired by this model.

In these countries, the highest-ranking positions in the administration are granted through political appointments. However, the tradition requires that partisan preferences will not colour the recruitment systems. At the lower administrative levels, the promotion processes are managed or controlled by independent bodies (public service committees or commissions) and are based on seniority and merit criteria. According to this model, the administration is isolated from politics and senior officials consequently have less political action freedom. The senior public servant's role consists in managing and coordinating policies as well as advising the minister in a non-partisan manner. The Whitehall model is based on a professional (career-oriented), competent (recruited, promoted and paid on merit), neutral (non-partisan), loyal (that offers non-biased advice to the ministers) and anonymous public service (the minister is the administration's flagship) (Bourgault, 1997a: 109).

## THE TRADITIONAL MODEL

In the so-called traditional model, the boundary between politics and administration is not as clear as in the preceding model. This system is also called the Continental Europe model because France and Germany were the first countries to use it.

According to the neo-institutional analysis, the political history of France and Germany provides an explanation of the relationships that developed between the public service and the political power. These States had long periods of political instability in the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries (Hojnacki, 1996: 144). Their public services became stabilizing forces, particularly by maintaining some distance from the political players, exercising their professional responsibilities and initiating policies. (Hojnacki, 1996: 144). In France, the public service is a social system that has remained coherent despite the changes in regimes after 1789, which does not exclude the fact that those with positions at the top of the administration were sensitive both to the changes in regimes and to changes in political leadership within each regime. However, patronage was never an important area of concern for these public services that were historically independent of the political power. Consequently, these countries do not mistrust politicization as the United Kingdom does, the appointments at several senior level of administrative officers being at the government's discretion. A special status allows the allocation of senior hierarchical positions outside of the normal promotion mechanisms of the career public service (Ziller, 1993: 321). The countries that have the most similar models are Austria, Denmark, Spain, Italy,

Sweden and Switzerland.

In these countries, the senior officials become actively involved in the development and promotion of government policies. Two types of civil servants can be seen: technical advisors recruited for their expert knowledge, and political advisors recruited from within the administrative machinery whom their boss can rely on (Bourgault, 1997a: 110-111). The vague separation between politics and administration is such that the experience of holding a political office often helps in the highest administrative functions. Contrary to the Westminster model, the civil servants in the traditional model can exercise political duties without losing too many professional privileges<sup>11</sup>. In France, a transition through a minister's office often has a career-accelerating effect (Meininger, 2001: 207). This fact implies that there is a strong ratio of public servants amongst the parliamentarians. As a benchmark, 50% of the German parliamentarians and 34% of the Austrian parliamentarians are public servants (Kuegkm, 1998: 200). In this model, promotions within the administration often depend on the parties. Consequently, in 1990, 100% of the Swedish under-secretaries of state belonged to a political party (Larsson, 2001: 12). In 1992-1993, 71.4% of Swiss senior officials claimed to be affiliated with a political party (Roth, 1994: 27); and in 1987, 57% of the German secretaries general and department heads were members of a political party (Derlien, 1995: 87). Despite the politicization of the positions at the highest administrative echelons, the majority of incumbents remain career public servants. In these countries, the dictates of career and political belonging are quite easily reconciled. However, it is rare that positions at

**TABLE 17.**  
Ratio of Women Compared to Other Countries

	COUNTRY									
	Germany† 1999	Spain 1982-1991	USA‡ 1991-1992	France 2000	Ireland 1995	Italy 1989	UK 1995	Sweden 2001	Switzerland 1991	Canada 1987-2003
Women	8.6%	9.2%	11%	17.6%	4%	1.5%	5.3%	40%	3.8%	21%
Men	91.4	81.8	89	82.4	96	98.5	94.7	60	96.2	80
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number	139	N/A	N/A	176	25	N/A	38	27	127	83

- \* As a result of a rounding of fractions, the percentages can be greater than or less than 100%.
- † The data for Germany was taken from two studies carried out by Derlien (1995, 2003) whose sample includes secretaries of state (Abteilungsleiter), divisional managers (Ministerialdirektor) and subdivision heads (Ministerialdirigent). This sample is not homogeneous since, due to the possibility of cumulating functions, parliamentarians are also included, unidentified by the author (Derlien, 2003: 404).
- ‡ The data for the United States comes from spot samples (1970's, 1986-87 and 1991-92) established by Aberbach and Rockman (2000). These samples include a certain number of career senior public servants holding the most senior position in their administrative unit and come under the political appointees. The sample taken from the 1970's includes supergrade civil servants, while the samples from 1986-87 and 1991-92 include members of the Senior Executive Service (2000, 60).
- Source:** Germany (Derlien, 2003: 405); Spain (Parrado-Diez, 1996); United States (Rockman, 2000: 63); France (Kessler, 2003: 84); Ireland (Millar and Mckevitt, 2001: 46); Italy (Lewansky, 2001: 217); the United Kingdom (Fry, 2001: 25); Sweden (Larsson, 2001: 9); Switzerland (Roth, 1994: 18).

the top are granted to people from outside of the public service. In Sweden (2001), only 7% of the undersecretaries of state were from the private sector (Larsson, 2001: 13). In France (1993-1994), 18% of directors general came from outside of the public service (Rouban, 2001: 30). Spain (1996) has the largest proportion of these outsiders. Almost 25% of the *cargos políticos* are recruited from outside the public service (Parrado-Diez, 2001: 6).

## THE AMERICAN MODEL

The distinctive features of the American model stem from its Constitution, the separation of powers and from its impact on the Executive Branch of which the president is the only person accountable. Unlike the United States, most democracies are based on a parliamentary regime on which the Executive depends. In the United States, Congress plays a check and balance role with regard to the presidency. In order to do so, it is equipped with an impressive staff and huge autonomy that allows its members to acquire a deep understanding of the technical details of the policies. As a result, the American senior officials were invited to play a more political role as lawyers, political entrepreneurs and even as political supporters, which is not the case with their foreign counterparts (Aberbach et al., 1991: 211).

In the 1970s, a survey showing the tendency amongst career public servants to be more liberal than the Republican Party in power contributed in creating a hostile relationship between career public servants and the presidency (Aberbach et al., 1991: 212). This strengthened the American presidents' determination as to their right to leave their imprint on the administration. In the United States, several political appointees embody the agenda of the president's

administration within departments. The goal of this system is to guarantee the loyalty of the public servants and to implement the democratic will of the people. Consequently, positions formerly reserved for career public servants were granted to people from the outside, the political appointees. Today, the president or one of his political appointees routinely announces political initiatives without having first consulted a career senior official in the relevant agency (Hojnacki, 1996: 153). Senior political officers can profit from the vast experience in the public administration. The latitude of the Executive as to the appointment of its members means that they are more representative of the socio-economic characteristics of the population. There are more women and ethnic minorities as political appointees than career senior officials. (Hojnacki, 1996: 153).

The first amendment of the American Constitution, which protects freedom of expression, means that public servants do not all experience the same restrictions regarding political activities. A number of regulations restrict their right to be politically active (Hojnacki, 1996: 153). Usually, the top-ranking individuals in the administration are part of the presidential administration's party (Rockman, 1995: 232). With this model, partisan secretaries and assistant or deputy secretaries have roles as similar as their political affiliation (Bourgault, 1997a: 109). In the United States, the line between politics and administration is clearer than anywhere else while the senior public service is highly political due to the power of the president over appointments (Rockman, 1995: 232).

## RATIO OF WOMEN

Table 17 shows that the public service profession is

# 18

**TABLE 18.**  
The Father's Social Category Compared to other Countries

	COUNTRY							
	Germany 1990	USA 1991-1992	Finland 1984	France 1993-1994	Netherlands 1988	UK 1945-1995	Switzerland 1991	Canada 1987-1997
Upper Class	20%	49%	52%†	45%	2%	29%	16%	26%
Middle Class	56%	26%	N/A	20%	83%	61%	59%	59%
Popular	7.5%	24%	44%†	8.8%	15%	10%	25%	14%
Not Applicable	16.5%	0%	4%	26.2%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Total*	100%	99%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	99%
Number	N/A	49	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	104	49

\* As a result of a rounding of fractions, the percentages can be greater than or less than 100%.

† Mid-upper class and Popular-middle class.

**Source:** Germany (Derlien, 1995: 73); the United States (Aberbach and Rockman: 2000, 62-63). Finland (Tiihonen, 1998:183); France (Rouban, 1996: 30), the Netherlands (Van Der Meer and Raadschelders, 1998: 242); the United Kingdom (Barberis, 1996: 115); Switzerland (Roth, 1994: 31).

dominated, if not monopolized everywhere by men. In Germany, the first woman Secretary of State was appointed in 1998 (Derlien, 2003: 405). In Finland, it was in 1995 that the two first women were appointed in the highest administrative echelon. In Denmark, the first woman head of a department was appointed in 1953 and since, only five women have held this position (Jensen, 2001: 91). In the United Kingdom, between 1970 and 1998, only five women were permanent secretaries (Rhodes, 2001: 115). Only Sweden seems to be an exception to the rule. In the Swedish administration, gender equality makes it possible to depart from the recruitment rules based only on competency criteria. For example, when a position that was generally dominated by men becomes vacant, it must be filled by a woman of equal or lesser competency (Larsson, 2001: 9).

On this subject, Canada looks good by ranking second behind Sweden with a ratio of 21% women deputy ministers between 1997 and 2003. The feminization of the senior public service seems very advanced when compared to France, which in 2000 had 17.6% of women directors, secretaries general, and interdepartmental deputies. Women represented 8.6% of the permanent secretaries in Germany in 1999; 5.3% of the permanent secretaries in the United Kingdom in 1995; 4% in Ireland; 3.8% in Switzerland; and 1.5% in Italy. While the feminization process in Canada seems relatively advanced, there have been no sustained promotions since the 1980s. The 1988 study (Bourgault & Dion, 1991: 37) revealed that 23%

of deputy ministers were women. Today, their proportion is 26%. In the last fifteen years, Canada has done little to make the senior public service more accessible to women.

## SOCIAL ORIGIN

The distribution by class varies greatly from one study to another and it is difficult to identify comparable codes. Table 18 must be considered with much precaution, particularly as the sections of years are not the same and the samples from certain countries may include public servants at lower levels. In order to make the different available data compatible, we have grouped the information in larger categories.

In 1991, we observed that the theory of bureaucratic reproduction (a tendency of senior officials to be the children of parents who work or worked in the public sector) hardly works for Canadian deputy ministers (Bourgault & Dion, 1991: 38). The proportion (30%) of deputy ministers whose father works or worked in the public sector was not exceptional, when considering how many people the State employed from the middle class. The same phenomenon was seen in the United Kingdom, Switzerland and France, where on average, 30% of the senior officials are sons of public employees. Only Germany and Italy were different. In those two countries, more than 40% of the administrative elite comes from a public servant father (Derlien, 1995: 73; Lewansky, 2001: 224). In the United

# 19

**TABLE 19.**  
Degrees Compared to Other Countries

	COUNTRY						
	Germany 1990	Australia 1991-1992	USA 1984	UK 1993-1994	Sweden 1988	Switzerland 1991	Canada 1987-2003
No University Diploma	3.1%	0%	8%††	3%	19%	5.7%	2%
University Studies**	96.6%†	100%‡	76%	N/A	52%	50.5%	78%(19)
Doctorate	71%	N/A	17%	N/A	3%	43.8%	19%
Not Applicable	0%	0%	0%	97%	26%	0%	0%
Total*	100%	100%	101%	100%	100%	100%	99%
Number	N/A	10	53	38	N/A	105	83

\* As a result of a rounding of fractions, the percentages can be greater than or less than 100%.

\*\* Includes a master's degree.

† Includes doctorate.

†† College diploma.

‡ 40 % post-graduate.

Source: Germany (Derlien, 2003: 405); the United States (Aberbach and Rockman, 2000: 69); the United Kingdom (Knapp, 1995: 134); Sweden (Larsson, 2000: 15); Switzerland (Roth, 1994: 21-22).

States, Aberbach & Rockman (2000: 62) noted that senior public servants are mainly from upper class families. The preceding table suggests that it is the same in France.

As for geographical origin, it seems that the situation observed in Canada (over-representation of the central regions near the capital) also exists in other countries. In Spain (1996), 34.7% of the *cargos politicos* were born in the region surrounding Madrid and 73.5% already worked in the capital before their appointment (Parrado-Diez, 2001: 20). In the United Kingdom, more than 50% of the senior officials grew up in London or in its surrounding area (Wilson & Barker, 2003: 355). In Sweden, the majority of the senior officials come from Stockholm (Ehn et al., 2003: 436). In the Netherlands, most of the senior officials were recruited in the area where the government resides (The Hague), that means in the western regions (Van Der Meer & Dijkstra, 2000: 176). To be precise, in this country, the social divisions are based on religious affiliation. The majority of Catholics are concentrated in the southern provinces. Consequently, the recruitment in the western regions created an under-representation of the Catholic senior officials compared to Protestants. In Germany, where Protestants and Catholics represent a third of the population respectively,<sup>12</sup> there is also an imbalance in religious representation. The administrative elite is substantially more Protestant than Catholic (Derlien, 2003: 405). In Italy, 62.2% of directors general come from the South's middle class, 24.4% from the Centre and only 11% from the North (Lewansky, 2001: 218). The administrative elite reflects the economic imbalance between the regions. For the populations in under-developed regions, the entry into public administration is considered an opportunity to work nearby (most jobs are concentrated in the southern regions) and to have a stable source of income (Righettini, 1995:195).

As in Canada, Belgium has more than one official language: French, German and Flemish. There is also a long history regarding linguistic representation, which represents an important social issue. In Brussels, since 1966, the senior officials are divided into two equal and distinct groups (walloon and flemish). This parity was introduced in order to stabilize the power relationship between the two linguistic groups. However, this division does not represent Belgium's demographic reality, which is 58% Flemish. The over-representation of Francophones comes from the fact that they are committed to parity, which they consider as a protection of their minority status (Hondeghe, 2001: 136-137).

Several countries, as in the United States (Aberbach & Rockman, 2000: 60), the Netherlands (Van Der Meer & Dijkstra, 2000: 176) and the United Kingdom, have taken steps to improve the

representation of minority groups within the administration. In the United States, the hiring of women and ethnic minorities in high-ranking positions has exceeded male recruitment since the 1970s (Aberbach & Rockman, 2000: 59). However, Aberbach (2003: 378) estimates that efforts to increase the presence of minorities in top positions will not be visible for another twenty years, the time it takes for recruits to reach the top of the administration. While waiting for the results of these various measures, minority groups remain largely under-represented and are sometimes completely absent from the senior levels in the countries that were studied.

Progress, however, has been made as to the representativeness of senior officials in the last three decades. A study by Aberbach et al. (1981) in the early 1970s revealed that in terms of demography and social origin, senior officials were largely non-representative of the population they served. In all the countries without distinction,<sup>13</sup> women represented hardly 1% of the administrative elite, the majority of the senior officials were the cream of the society crop, and most came from urban regions often near the national capital (Aberbach et al., 1981: 47, 56, 66). Only Italy distinguished itself with a strong presence of *dirigenti*, born in rural areas and educated in urban areas (Aberbach et al., 1981: 67). The authors (1981: 81) considered that the elite in America was more egalitarian than in Europe, in light of its social and educational profile and its access to a more liberal education system.

The Canadian senior public service has features in common with the other democracies studied. From the point of view of representativeness, women and ethnic minorities remain largely under-represented. Recruitment in peripheral regions of the capital remains insufficient with regard to regional representation. As in Belgium, Canada is concerned with balancing the proportion of senior officials who speak one of the official languages. Despite certain shortcomings in the level of representation, the Canadian senior public service seems more open to social mobility than the average in other countries. In general, more women reach the top and a large majority of deputy ministers are from the middle and working classes.

## EDUCATION

Aberbach et al. (1981: 50) already demonstrated in the early 1970s that a university degree was a virtual necessity to accomplish the duties at the top of the administrative hierarchy. Today, a university degree is a fundamental condition to becoming part of the senior Public service in all of the developed countries. In

Germany and Spain, a post-graduate degree is required to fulfill the duties equivalent to those of a Canadian deputy minister (Bossaert et al., 2001: 291; Derlien, 2003: 406). In Belgium, most of the senior management have a university degree; but it is not a formal condition, and incumbents can reach higher levels by performing well in exams for promotions (Bossaert et al., 2001: 271). In Finland, a master's degree is required to be admitted to the upper echelons (Bossaert et al., 2001: 339). In France, the public servants at the senior levels have generally graduated from the *Grande École d'Administration* (Bossaert et al., 2001: 296). In Italy, a doctorate or a post-doctorate degree is mandatory when a candidate is hired from outside the Public service (Bossaert et al., 2001: 309). In the United States, access to jobs at the senior level often only requires a college diploma (Aberbach, 2003: 379). However, the president often names political appointees who are prominent people in the fields of business, university, law or research (Kelly, 1996: 62). In Canada, there is no particular requirement. However, it was noted that Canadian deputy ministers, 19% of which have a PhD, are probably among those who attend the fewest years in university, ahead of the United States (17%), but behind Switzerland (43.8%) and Germany (71%) (Derlien, 1995: 76).

Canadian deputy ministers acquired their degrees in various universities across Canada and even abroad. In Germany, the administrative elite comes from the universities of Berlin (22%), Munich (20%), Bonn (16%), Cologne (12%), Freiberg (11%), and Gottingen (10%) (Derlien, 1995: 78). No school or university is singled out as supplying a larger quota of senior officials in Sweden, Switzerland and Denmark (Larsson, 2001: 10; Roth, 1994: 25; Jensen, 2001: 87-88). In contrast, three schools provide the largest quota of directors general in France: the *École nationale d'administration* (ENA), the *École polytechnique* and the *École normale supérieure*<sup>14</sup>. France's recruiting procedures for the Public service systematically assumes having studied at a *grande école*, designated as such by the state<sup>15</sup>. The future French senior official is recruited by one of these establishments by way of competition. Once admitted, he or she receives a salary and enjoys a public servant status; her or his education and grades will lead to an assignment in a particular body (Suleiman & Mendras, 1995: 27). Between 1993 and 1994, 52.3% of the French directors general came from the ENA, 9.3% from the Polytechnique and only about a quarter had never attended a *grande école* (Rouban, 1996: 27). In the United Kingdom, Oxford and Cambridge produce the largest portion of permanent secretaries. In 1998, 65% of the permanent secretaries came from one or the other of these universities (Rhodes, 2001: 115-117). In the United States, approximately 30% of the career public servants at the

top echelons studied in a prestigious university like Harvard, Yale and Princeton (Aberbach, 2003: 383; Aberbach & Rockman, 2000: 70).

## ACADEMIC PROFILE

Table 20 demonstrates the importance that certain senior public services place on a particular specialization, rather than general education. Canadian deputy ministers have diversified skills, a little like British Permanent Secretaries who have, for the most part, an education in humanities that is general and non-judicial. In Canada as in the United Kingdom, no discipline dominates another. In the United States, social and natural sciences represent 80% of the subjects studied by career senior officials: 33% studied natural sciences, 45% studied social sciences, and 22% studied law. In Spain, Italy, Switzerland, Denmark and Belgium, training in law is definitely ahead of other subjects amongst public servants at the higher echelons. In Italy, in the 1950s and 1960s, the percentage of directors general who were law graduates was higher than 70% (Righettini, 1995: 197). In the mid 1960s, 72% of the German administrative elite had an education in law (Derlien, 1995: 77). In the Netherlands, the proportion of lawyers amongst the bureaucratic elite is usually around 50%.

All of the studies dealing with the 1990s confirm the decline in lawyers in favour of economists and managers. Economics has taken over from law as the top field of education for senior officials in the Netherlands (De Vries, 2001: 46). In Denmark, lawyers made up 62% of the administrative elite in the 1970s, but dropped to 39% in the 1990s (Jensen, 2001: 88).

Between 1995 and 1999, 75% of the Australians, 50% of the Danish, 41% of the British and 28.6% of the Dutch at the top of the administrative hierarchy had a degree in economics (Rhodes & Weller, 2001: 233). In Denmark, as we have observed in Canada, 16 Jensen (2001, 90) noted a new trend at the end of the 1990s, that is the empowerment of political scientists as senior officials, as was the case with economists in the 1960s.

For several years, the training of Public service managers has taken a central position in the policies of States' administrations that are members of the European Union (Bossaert et al., 2001: 115). Education focuses on preparing current or future managers to fulfill the responsibilities that require the skills of a facilitator, a leader and a manager. In Finland and Switzerland, the Departments of Finance developed various training programs for the senior officials (IEAP, 1998: 80). In the Netherlands, the Senior Public Service Office developed a training program for senior management (IEAP, 1998: 80). France and Germany are equipped with a very structured curriculum. In France, the framework exists through the ENA, which prepares for senior management. In Germany, the *Bundesakademie* offers ongoing management training to public servants who already hold a managerial position. Italy applies the course-competition method, through the *Scuola superiore della pubblica amministrazione e della presidenza del consiglio dei ministri*. This method aims at filtering the access of senior management to training through the organization of competitions. In the United Kingdom, ongoing training is ensured in no

# 20

**TABLE 20.**  
Fields of study Compared to other countries

	COUNTRY									
	Germany 1999	Belgium 1980- 1989	Denmark 1990	USA 1991- 1992	Spain 1996	France 1984- 1994	Netherlands 1988	UK 1965- 1994	Switzerland 1991	Canada 1987- 2003
Law	52.7%	33%	39%	22%	46.6%	24%	29.4%	N/A	36%	16%
H&S sciences**	25.1% (19.8)	50% (23)	N/A	45%	26% (15)	48.7%	47.9% (12)	84%*	27% (8.6)	77% (27)†
Natural sciences	1.5%	17%	N/A	33%	23%	13.9%	21.5%	16%	23%	7%
Not applicable	20.7%	0%	61%	0%	4.4%	13.4%	1.2%	0%	14%	0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number	139	N/A	N/A	49	N/A	N/A	N/A	141	105	83

\* Include law.

\*\* Human and social sciences including economics.

† Political science is 25%.

**Source:** Germany (Derlien, 2003: 405); Belgium (Hondeghem, 2001: 135); Denmark (Jensen, 2001: 87); the United States (Aberbach and Rockman, 2000: 72). Spain (Parrado-Diez, 2001: 5); France (Elgie, 2001: 17); the Netherlands (Van Der Meer and Dijkstra, 2001: 175); the United Kingdom (Barberis, 1996: 98); Switzerland (Roth, 1994: 21).



small part by the Civil Service College (part of the CMPS, reporting to the Cabinet Office). Canada is also equipped with a central training framework for senior officials through the Canadian Centre for Management Development (now known as Canada School of Public Service). In Ireland, as in Canada and the United States, the training system is based on university structures that develop bachelor's degrees in public administration or encourages senior officials to complete a master of science in strategic management, organized by Dublin University (Bossart et al., 2001: 115).

## CAREER DEVELOPMENT

Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman (1981: 67) identified two systems for recruiting elites: the guild system and the entrepreneurial system. In the first one, a long period of training within an institution is required to reach the top of the ladder. In the 1970s, Italy, with its sclerotic bureaucratic elite and its gerontocracy, was the country that was the closest to it (Aberbach et al., 1981: 70). This system ensures a more experienced elite that is integrated into institutional standards. This type of recruitment maximizes the integration within the circle of the elite. The entrepreneurial system is

characterized by a high lateral level of entry. This method makes it possible to benefit from the new ideas and experiences developed in other institutions. The entrepreneurial system promotes the integration of the elite into other parts of society. According to Amberbach et al. (1981: 71-72), the best representative of this type of recruitment in the 1970s was Germany.

There are different ways of establishing a pool of candidates that can accomplish functions equivalent to that of Canadian deputy ministers: competitions (Italy, the Netherlands), competition and schooling (France), by an independent commission (United Kingdom, Ireland), a Civil Service Act (Sweden) or open recruitment (Germany).

Canada, just like Germany, Austria, Spain, the United States, France, Ireland and Italy, manages its Public service by following the career system. Laforte (1997: 5) defines the career Public service as depending on a public machinery whose overall structure and operations are planned by its managers as a service rendered to the State rather than to the government. In this system, effectiveness is a product of the respect of the processes and the goal is to reach harmonious organizational operations. In countries that apply this system, public servants take on a career of serving the state. They enter into the service of the administration by an access job, at the lowest level of the career for which they were trained and have sufficient knowledge. They are then promoted on the basis of a system that is regulated in a precise manner (Bossart et al., 2001: 88). In these countries, the career of a public servant generally lasts until retirement.

In Denmark, Australia, the United States, the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland and the United Kingdom, the recruiting procedures are "open". Senior officials are recruited for a precise job instead of a specific career. In this case, we are speaking of an employment Public service, focused on qualities, skills and individual performance (Laforte, 1997: 5). This system is flexible, not very regulated and believes that overall good performance depends on the skills of its managers (Laforte, 1997: 6). In this system, the Public service serves a government that is viewed more as a Board of Directors of a company, in this case the State, obliged to deliver dividends to its shareholders, the taxpayers (Laforte, 1997: 6). In countries that apply this system, candidates can enter the Public service in a managerial position at 40 years of age, after 15 years of career elsewhere. Candidates applying for a position equivalent to that of a deputy minister must meet the conditions set by the relevant department or agency. An open recruitment process involves

# 21

**TABLE 21.**  
Average Age upon Entering  
and Leaving Office:  
Country Comparison

Country	Period	Entrance	Departure	Number
Germany	1949-1984	52.7	57.3	N/A
Australia	1983-1996	47.1	51.8	45
Belgium	1990-1999	55	N/A	N/A
Denmark	1990-1998	46	50	23**
USA	1991-1992	52.3	57	N/A
Spain	1996	46.1	N/A	N/A
France	1984-1994	47	50.6	N/A
Netherlands	1996	51.6	55	N/A
UK	1998	53.9	60	20
Sweden	2001	41-50	N/A	27
Switzerland	1991	52.3	N/A	105
Canada	1987-2003	50	*	83

\* See Table 13.

\*\* 16 in office

**Source:** Germany (Derlien, 2003: 407); Australia (Weller, 1999: 23); Belgium (Hodengeghem, 2001: 130); Denmark (Jensen, 2001: 88); the United States (Aberbach and Rockman, 2000: 74); Spain (Parrado-Diez, 2000: 18); France (Rouban, 1996: 20); the Netherlands (Van Der Meer and Dijkstra, 2001: 166); the United Kingdom (Rhodes, 2001: 115); Sweden (Larsson, 2001); Switzerland (Roth, 1994: 21).

selection methods similar to those in the private sector (Bossaert et al., 2001: 87-92).

Generally, countries that apply the Westminster system are more likely to give themselves a centralized management of the senior management group. In Canada, the Public Service Commission (PSC), is the independent organization responsible for protecting the merit principle, by building the hiring of senior managers on the preservation of values that characterize a professional, competent, impartial and representative Public service. The Australian equivalent of the PSC is the Public Service Commissioner of the Senior Executive Service. Since the 1978 reform, the United States has created an Office of Personnel Management. In the Netherlands, there is a Senior Public Service Office (under the authority of the Department of the Interior), and the United Kingdom has the Senior Civil Service Group and the Civil Service Commissioner. In Belgium, since the Copernic reform, there is SELOR (*Bureau de sélection de l'Administration fédérale pour le personnel de l'État belge*).

In Australia, Sweden, Denmark and Spain, the majority of the heads of agencies are recruited relatively young, before their 50th anniversary. Canadian deputy ministers are slightly below the average, with an average age of 50 upon entrance into office. In general, career development is slower in countries that practice a model similar to the Westminster model. Canadian deputy ministers wait longer than their Spanish, French and Swedish counterparts before reaching the top of the ladder and have on average more seniority in the Government. The general trend is that the heads of agencies are appointed at a younger age, remain in office for a shorter time and leave office earlier. Canada is no exception.

Mobility is generally considered a quality in a Public service system: it provides officers with both better motivation and useful renewal of their skills (Ziller, 1995, 421). In Canada, interdepartmental mobility

seems high with three quarters of deputy ministers coming from a department other than the one from which they were recruited, and half having held office in at least two departments<sup>17</sup>. In the United Kingdom, permanent secretaries acquire their experience on average in three departments and are encouraged to sign up for apprenticeships in the private sector (Barberis, 1996: 172; eipa, 1998: 63). In France, the système de corps is a system of autonomous organizational units that lend some of their members (Bourgault, 1997a: 109). In that country, the system separating rank and employment provides greater mobility within the Public service, the rank corresponding to a position in the hierarchy that is not linked to a specific job (eipa, 1998: 38).

Efforts are being made to facilitate mobility in Belgium, the United States, Italy and Finland. However, in these countries, a career is built within a given department (Lewansky, 2001: 226; Tiihonen, 1998: 181). This is also true for Australia. However, since 1999, fixed term appointments for departmental secretaries have become part of the approach to improve mobility (eipa, 1998: 16). Sweden and Belgium rely on the same fixed term appointment principle to provide more mobility to the senior officials' group. In the Netherlands, the Senior Public Service Office offers several activities to promote mobility and improve the quality of its senior Public service. (eipa, 1998: 59). In the United States, the career public servants at the top of the echelon spend on average 19 years in the same department (Aberbach & Rockman, 2000: 74). Aberbach & Rockman explain that a participatory system oversees career senior officials, while the entrepreneurial system is adapted to political appointees (2000: 73). According to the authors (2000: 77), the 1978 reform can help improve mobility of senior officials. However, the different presidential administrations must develop this potential by using their power of appointment.

The German case distinguishes itself from the other countries studied. In Germany, there is great mobility between the Public service and the private sector. The

22

**TABLE 22.**  
Number of Years into the Career before the First Appointment

	COUNTRIES					
	Belgium 1990-1999	USA 1991-1992	Italy 1990-1999	Netherlands 1995	UK 1993	Canada 1987-2003
Number of years	25	22.54	20	16	24.8	25
Number	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	38	80

Source: Belgium (Hondeghem, 2000: 130); the United States (Aberbach and Rockman, 2000: 72); Italy (Lewansky, 2001: 227); the Netherlands (Van Der Meer and Dijkstra, 2000: 165); the United Kingdom (Knapp, 1995: 150).

majority of the German administrative elite enjoys some experience acquired outside of the administration. Only 47% of the senior officials start their career in the Public service (Goetz, 2001: 78). Several public servants also acquire experience during their service in the public sector. Almost 15% interrupt their career to work with parliamentarians (Goetz, 2001: 78). Derlien (2003: 407) contends that in 1999 senior officials who did not interrupt their career represent the exception among the young generations of administrative elite.

The fact that the majority of Canadian deputy ministers acquired experience in central agencies (Privy Council Office or Treasury Board) is also seen in other administrations that follow the Westminster model. In the United Kingdom, a transition through the Treasury or the Cabinet Office is a necessary condition to becoming a permanent secretary (Rhodes, 2001: 117). According to Wilson and Barker (2003: 355-356), only a third of the senior officials did not have that experience. In 1998, 45% and 40% (respectively) of permanent secretaries acquired this experience (Rhodes, 2001:116). In Australia (1996-1998), almost 50% of the departmental secretaries acquired experience either in the Department of Finance, in Treasury, the Privy Council Office or the Public Service Office (Weller, 1999: 30).

Various degrees of tenure exist depending on the national Public service and the needs of the situations. Five levels of tenure can be identified: job connection (only with the employer), level of salary (a demotion is possible without a cut in salary), ranking (manager for life), ranking level (hierarchy within a body) and position (e.g., judges). The higher positions in an administration are traditionally permanent. This is the case in Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. In these countries, the liberty to dismiss a high-ranking official, be it rarely applied or not, implies a lateral transfer or a promotion abroad. In Australia, Finland and Switzerland, tenure is quietly being replaced by fixed term contracts. In Australia, departmental secretaries are appointed for five years (Weller & Young, 2001: 160), and in Sweden appointments are generally fixed at six years (Larsson, 2000: 12). In France, since the 2000 order in council, the length of the assignments for secretaries general, deputy directors, department heads and project directors has been limited to three years, renewable only once. In Belgium, since the Copernic reform, presidents, who have replaced secretaries general, are appointed for a renewable six-year mandate.

Senior officials are leaving the office at an increasingly younger age. Departures because of retirement are increasingly rare. For example, only 2%

## 23

**TABLE 23.**  
Origin before the First Appointment

	COUNTRY						
	Germany 1990	Australia 1991-1992	USA 1984	UK 1993-1994	Sweden 1988	Switzerland 1991	Canada 1987-2003
General public administration	N/A*	67.2%	N/A	0%	0%	26%*†	0%
Same department	20%	N/A	85%	40%	85%	7%	25%
Other department	N/A	N/A	N/A	33 %	7%	41%	74 %
Private sector	N/A	24.1%	N/A	20%	8%	7%	1%
Politics	N/A	8.7%	N/A	N/A	0%	N/A	0%
Other	N/A	0%	N/A	7%	0%	19%	0%
Not applicable	80%	0%	15%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number	45	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	27	83

\* Category not used by the author.

† This proportion includes public servants from agencies as well as from local and regional governments.

**Source:** Australia (Weller, 1999: 28); Spain (Parrado-Diez, 2000: 26). the United States (Aberbach and Rockman, 2000: 75-76); France (Rouban, 1996: 23); the Netherlands (Van Der Meer and Dijkstra, 2000: 167); Sweden (Larsson, 2000: 14).

(1984-1994) of French directors retired at the end of their mandate, a fifth moved to the private sector and the others remained in the administration (Rouban, 1996: 30). Lateral promotions towards a same type of job are a very popular method to let go a senior official whose services are no longer wanted. In Spain, between 1982 and 1991, 66.5% of the senior officials left their position for another in the Public service, 10.6% were demoted, 20.4% moved to the private sector, and 27% entered politics (Parrado-Diez, 2001: 28). Transfers abroad and recycling into diplomacy are very popular in certain administrations. In Denmark, almost 70% of the departmental secretaries found a job in diplomacy (Jensen, 2000: 92). In Australia, out of the 45 departmental secretaries appointed between 1983 and 1996, almost a tenth retired, while the same proportion entered the diplomatic corps. A quarter chose similar functions, a fifth left voluntarily and the same amount finally saw their term come to an end (Weller, 1999: 25). In Germany, permanent secretaries and other heads of agencies are expected to retire before 60, even though the retirement age is established at 65 (Derlien, 2003: 407). This early retirement is temporary and generally leads to a second and even third career (Derlien, 2003: 407). Canada follows the trend. After their mandates, only 15% to 20% of Canadian deputy ministers take their occupational pension, almost half are promoted to a similar job within the administration or abroad, almost a quarter move to the private sector and a minority is demoted.

## CONCLUSION

In the early 1980s, Aberbach et al. (1981: 81) concluded that the administrators at the top of the echelon came from a small minority of the population. In all of the countries studied, senior officials were urban university-educated males, from the middle to upper classes and focused on public affairs. In fact, despite some improvements in the level of representation, the conclusions made by Aberbach,

Putnam and Rockman remain valid.

With this study, we can come to the following conclusions. The Canadian senior Public service is not politicized, contrary to the majority of countries in which recruitment (Germany, Italy) or careers are politicized (Germany, France). The proportion of women at the top of the Canadian echelon is distinctly superior to the average in European countries (France, Italy, the United Kingdom and Ireland). The social origin of Canadian deputy ministers is more egalitarian than in Europe and the United States. The diversity of the university pool and the fields studied by the deputy ministers reflect a senior Public service that is more heterogeneous than elsewhere. France and the United Kingdom, on the other hand, have an elitist Public service, given the importance placed on prestigious training schools whose competitive entrance examinations result in a strong social selection. The French, Spanish, Italian and British public service are also more homogeneous since they belong to a common socio-cultural environment or a common transition through elite schools (Suleiman and Mendras, 1995).

The 1991 study (Bourgault & Dion, 1991) had seemed to demonstrate that deputy ministers formed a group of relatively young administrators, subject to an exceptionally rapid career rhythm. The last decade brings us to qualify these conclusions. Canadian deputy ministers are generally recruited in their early 50s, unlike their Australian, Swedish, Danish, Spanish and French counterparts, who are recruited in their 40s. Their career rhythm is slightly below average. Despite all of this, the study reveals that the mobility of deputy ministers is very appropriate in Canada compared to the other countries.

There is a variety of public service systems and governmental institutions. Each country's system is built on different histories, traditions, political structures (federal State, unitary State) and institutional structures (decentralized, centralized State). These factors define a specific Public service profile that oversees and influences the profile of each senior Public service. The

# 24

**TABLE 24.**  
Length of Time in Office Compared to Other Countries

	COUNTRY									
	Germany 1949-1984	Australia 1983-1996	Denmark 1990-1998	Spain 1982-1991	USA 1991-1992	Finland 1990-1999	France 1984-1994	Netherlands 1996	UK 1979-1994	Canada 1987-2003
Years	4.6	5	3.3	4.1	3.81	8	3.6	3.3	3.7	5.5
Number	N/A	45	23/16*	664	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	66	45

\* Numbers in parentheses refer to individuals still serving.

**Source:** Germany (Derlien, 2003: 407); Australia (Weller, 1999: 23); Spain (Parrado-Diez, 2001: 27); the United States (Aberbach and Rockman, 2000: 74); Finland (Tiihonen, 1998: 182); the Netherlands (Van Der Meer and Dijkstra, 2000: 166); France (Rouban, 1996: 19); Denmark (Jensen, 2001: 88); the United Kingdom (Barberis, 1996: 185).

results of this study must be considered thoughtfully, keeping in mind the specific conditions of each Public service system.

## ENDNOTES

1. We must be weary of simplifying labels: merchants may have revenues and standards of living that are more modest than certain farm operators.
2. Granatstein (1982) gives the background of some of the recruiting in the period from 1917 to 1957,
3. At the time of writing this study, June 16th, 2003.
4. See Barzelay (1992), Halligan et al. (1996), Hennessey (1986), Hood & Peters (1994), and Pollitt et al. (1999).
5. Several Canadian Prime Ministers and Ministers had a prior administrative career that culminated, before their election, in holding one or several Deputy Minister positions (e.g., Pearson, Mackenzie King, Drury, Sharp, and Massé)
6. Kim Campbell and Brian Mulroney's Progressive Conservative Party formed a government during the ten consecutive years before the arrival of Jean Chrétien's Liberal Party.
7. According to the expression made famous by Hugh Heclo in 1977 in *A Government of Strangers*.
8. The percentage may vary depending on the level of positions. Percentages drop as one descends the hierarchic pyramid. The president can name up to 10% of non-civil servants at any level of the Senior Executive Service (Rockman, 2000: 253)
9. The socialist state model was not considered for this study.
10. Patronage practices were also observed in the Thatcher era.
11. In Germany as in France, the high ranking in administration can run for all types of office, keep their title and reintegrate the body when they wish.
12. Statistisches Bundesamt, figures from December 31st, 1998.
13. The study conducted by Aberbach et al. (1981) dealt with the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the United States.
14. Together, the *École d'application administrative, des Mines, des Ponts* and the *École des Télécommunications* educate between 10 and 15% of the directors general (Rouban, 1996: 27).
15. On June 30, 2003 the *Conférence des Grandes Écoles de France* had almost 250 members. To see a list of the *Grandes Écoles*, go to [http://www.cge.asso.fr/cadre\\_ecole.html](http://www.cge.asso.fr/cadre_ecole.html).
16. In Canada, 30% of the deputy ministers received an initial education in political science. See Table 6 in the first section of this document.
17. See Table 9.



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## APPENDIX: LIST OF DEPUTY MINISTERS FROM 1867 TO 2003



### **Agriculture and Agri-Food, Department of**

#### Department of Agriculture

(Deputy Minister)

Taché, Joseph-Charles  
(29.05.1868 - 11.07.1888)

Lowe, John (11.07.1888 -  
01.12.1896)

Scarth, William Bain (01.12.1896 -  
20.05.1902)

O'Halloran, George Finley  
(20.05.1902 - 19.05.1919)

Grisdale, Joseph Hiram  
(19.05.1919 - 08.10.1932)

Barton, George Samuel Horace  
(08.10.1932 - 01.03.1949)

Taggart, James Gordon  
(01.03.1949 - 01.01.1960)

Barry, Sydney Clifford  
(01.01.1960 - 31.12.1966)

Williams, Sydney Blewitt  
(17.01.1967 - 31.03.1975)

Hudon, L. Denis  
(01.04.1975 - 01.01.1977)

Lussier, Gaétan  
(18.04.1977 - 30.04.1982)

Connell, James Peter (30.04.1982  
- 02.05.1986)

Noreau, Jean-Jacques  
(05.05.1986 - 06.10.1992)

Wright, Robert A  
(07.10.1992 - 30.05.1994)

#### Department of Agriculture and Agri-Food

(Deputy Minister)

Protti, Raymond J.  
(31.05.1994 - 11.06.1996)

Claydon, Frank A.  
(11.06.1996 - 09.04.2000)

Watson, Samy  
(10.04.2000 - )

#### **Titles:**

1868: Department of Agriculture.

1995: Department of Agriculture and Agri-Food.

## Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency

(President)

McPhail, Don  
(05.06.1987 - 31.08.1989)

Lesaux, Peter  
(01.09.1989 - 24.06.1993)

Gusella, Mary  
(25.06.1993 - 03.07.1995)

Spector, Norman  
(04.07.1995 - 26.08.1996)

Nicholson, David J.  
(24.09.1996 - 31.03.1999)

Horgan, Michael J.  
(01.04.1999 - 04.09.2001)

Wallace, Dennis  
(04.09.2001 - 31.05.2003)

Collette, Monique  
(31.05.2003 - )

**Note:** An interim president managed the agency between August 26, 1996 and September 24, 1996.

## Auditor General

(Auditor General)

McDougall, John Lorn  
(01.08.1878 - 31.07.1905)

Fraser, John  
(01.08.1905 - 28.02.1919)

Sutherland, Edward Davenport  
(05.03.1919 - 08.01.1923)

Gonthier, Georges  
(18.01.1924 - 20.11.1939)

Sellar, Robert Watson  
(25.03.1940 - 05.08.1959)

Stevenson, Ian (Act.) (06.08.1959  
- 29.02.1960)

Henderson, Andrew Maxwell  
(01.03.1960 - 23.03.1973)

MacDonell, James Johnson  
(01.07.1973 - 12.09.1980)

Rayner, Michael H. (Act.)  
(13.09.1980 - 30.03.1991)

Desautel, Denis  
(01.04.1991 - 30.05.2001)



## Canada Customs and Revenue Agency

### Department of Customs

(Deputy Minister)

Bouchette, Robert Shore Milles  
(29.05.1868 - 31.12.1874)

Johnson, James  
(01.01.1875 - 02.12.1872)

### Customs Office

(Assistant Commissioner)

Johnson, James  
(03.12.1872 - 01.05.1896)

McDougald, John  
(01.05.1896 - 28.06.1897)

### Department of National Revenue

(Deputy Minister)

Parmelee, William Grannis  
(01.03.1892 - 31.12.1892)

Worthington, Thomas  
(29.05.1868 - 05.05.1871)

Brunel, Alfred  
(05.05.1871 - 02.12.1872)

### National Revenue Office

(Assistant Commissioner)

Brunel, Alfred  
(03.12.1872 - 28.06.1897)

Miall, Edward  
(26.01.1883 - 26.06.1897)

### Department of Customs and National Revenue

(Deputy Minister, Customs)

McDougald, John  
(29.06.1897 - 01.07.1919)

(Deputy Minister of National Revenue)

Miall, Edward  
(26.06.1897 - 06.06.1901)

Gerald, William John (06.06.1901  
- 01.10.1912)

Himsworth, William  
(01.10.1912 - 28.10.1914)

Vincent, Joseph Ulric (28.10.1914  
- 31.05.1920)

Farrow, Robinson Russell  
(01.07.1919 - 31.03.1921)

### Department of Customs and Excise

(Deputy Minister)

Farrow, Robinson Russell  
(04.06.1921 - 31.03.1927)

### Department of National Revenue

(Deputy Minister, Customs and Excise)

Breadner, Robert Walker  
(01.04.1927 - 30.12.1933)

Taylor, George Wilson  
(01.04.1927 - 01.10.1932)

Scully, Hugh Day  
(01.10.1932 - 21.07.1943)

Sim, David  
(24.07.1943 - 05.01.1965)

Laberge, R.C.  
(05.01.1965 - 07.06.1972)

Bennett, Gordon Lloyd  
(08.06.1972 - 21.10.1975)

Connell, James Peter (21.10.1975  
- 30.04.1982)

Giroux, Robert Jean Yvon  
(12.07.1982 - 19.08.1986)

Huneault, Louis R.  
(25.08.1986 - 20.05.1988)

Hubbard, Ruth E.  
(13.06.1988-30.09.1992)

Gravelle, Pierre  
(01.10.1992-11.05.1994)

(Deputy Minister, Taxation)

Walters, Chester Samuel  
(01.04.1927 - 24.07.1932)

Elliott, Colin Fraser  
(24.07.1932 - 31.08.1946)

Brown, Frank Herbert (01.12.1946  
- 30.10.1947)

Scully, Vincent William Thomas  
(01.02.1948 - 01.08.1951)

Gavsie, Charles  
(01.08.1951 - 06.07.1954)

McEntyre, John Gear (06.07.1954  
- 01.11.1966)

Sheppard, David Herbert  
(01.11.1966 - 31.12.1969)

Cloutier, Sylvain  
(01.03.1970 - 01.09.1971)

Armstrong, Elgin B.  
(01.09.1971 - 28.12.1974)

Hodgson, John Syner (28.12.1974  
- 01.07.1977)

Macdonald, Bruce A. (01.07.1977  
- 03.04.1984)

Rogers, Harry G.  
(03.04.1984 - 03.07.1987)

Gravelle, Pierre  
(10.07.1987 - 30.09.1992)

### Department of Customs, Excise and Taxation

(Deputy Minister)

Gravelle, Pierre  
(12.05.1994 - 20.01.1997)

Wright, Robert A.  
(20.01.1997 - 02.06.2003)

Nymark, Alan  
(02.06.2003 - )

**Note:** on November 1, 1999 the  
Department of National Revenue  
became the Canada Customs and  
Revenue Agency.

### **Canadian Centre for Management Development**

(President)

Dewar, Daniel Bevis (09.10.1990 -  
17.09.1992)

Ingstrup, Ole  
(18.09.1992 - 15.10.1995)

Smith, Janet R.  
(16.10.1995 - 17.01.1999)

Bourgon, Jocelyne  
(18.01.1999 - 16.06.2003)

Cochrane, Janice  
(16.06.2003 - 05.2005)

### **Canadian Heritage, Department of**

(Deputy Minister)

Rochon, Marc W.  
(25.06.1993 - 10.07.1995)

Hurtubise, Suzanne  
(10.07.1995 - 01.06.1999)

Himelfarb, Alexander (01.06.1999  
- 13.05.2002)

Larocque, Judith Anne  
(13.05.2002 - )

**Note:** Between 1993 and 1995, the  
Department of Communication,  
Culture and Citizenship was in charge  
of Heritage.

### **Canadian International Development Agency**

(President)

Catley-Carlson, Margaret Y.  
(01.09.1983 - 24.07.1989)

Massé, Marcel  
(01.09.1989 - 28.02.1993)

Bourgon, Jocelyne  
(01.03.1993 - 25.06.1993)

Labelle, Huguette  
(25.06.1993 - 25.10.1999)

Good, Leonard M.

(26.10.1999 - 05.05.2003)

Thibault, Paul  
(05.05.2003 - )

### **Citizenship and Immigration, Department of**

#### Department of Immigration and Colonization

(Deputy Minister)

Cory, W.M.  
(30.12.1918 - 30.06.1921)

Black, William J.  
(07.09.1921 - 10.10.1923)

Egan, William J.  
(10.10.1923 - 22.03.1934)

Magladery, Thomas  
(22.03.1934 - 01.12.1936)

#### Department of Citizenship and Immigration

(Deputy Minister)

Fortier, Laval  
(18.01.1950 - 25.04.1960)

Davidson, George Forrester  
(26.04.1960 - 31.01.1963)

Isbister, Claude Malcolm  
(04.11.1963 - 23.12.1965)

#### Department of Manpower and Immigration

(Deputy Minister)

Kent, Thomas Worrall  
(01.01.1966 - 15.07.1968)

Couillard, Joseph Louis Eugène  
(15.07.1968 - 07.04.1972)

Desroches, Jacques Marcel  
(07.04.1972 - 19.04.1973)

Gotlieb, Allan E.  
(15.05.1973 - 31.05.1977)

#### Department of Employment and Immigration

(Deputy Minister)

Manion, John L.  
(01.07.1977 - 31.08.1979)

Love, James Douglas  
(01.10.1979 - 30.12.1981)

Lussier, Gaétan  
(30.04.1982 - 06.09.1988)

Kroeger, Arthur  
(16.09.1988 - 30.09.1992)

Hubbard, Ruth E.  
(01.10.1992 - 09.02.1993)

### Department of Multiculturalism and Citizenship

(Deputy Minister)

Gusella, Mary M.  
(26.04.1991 - 24.06.1993)

### Department of Citizenship and Immigration

(Deputy Minister)

Mulder, Nick  
(10.02.1993 - 24.06.1993)

Noreau, Jean-Jacques  
(25.06.1993 - 03.11.1993)

Cochrane, Janice  
(27.11.1995 - 08.04.2001)

Dorais, Michel A.  
(09.04.2001 - )

**Note:** In 1993, the Department of Multiculturalism and Citizenship integrated the Department of Communications, Multiculturalism and Citizenship, then the Department of Canadian Heritage.

#### **Titles:**

1917: Department of Immigration and Colonization.

1936: Abolition of the Department of Immigration and Colonization.

1950: Department of Citizenship and Immigration.

1966: Department of Manpower and Immigration.

1977: Department of Employment and Immigration.

1993: Department of Citizenship and Immigration.

## Communications, Department of

(Deputy Minister)

Gotlieb, Allan E.  
(01.04.1969 - 14.05.1973)

Yalden, Maxwell Freeman  
(15.05.1973 - 31.01.1978)

Ostry, Bernard  
(01.02.1978 - 31.03.1980)

Juneau, Pierre  
(01.04.1980 - 31.07.1982)

Rabinovitch, Robert  
(15.11.1982 - 08.01.1985)

Marchand, J.C. De Montigny  
(08.01.1985 - 18.08.1985)

Gourd, Alain  
(19.08.1985 - 29.10.1992)

Rochon, Marc W.  
(30.10.1992 - 25.06.1993)

#### **Titles:**

1969: Department of Communications.

1993: Department of Communications, Multiculturalism and Citizenship.

1995: A portion of the Department was folded into the Department of Canadian Heritage.

## Consumer and Corporate Affairs, Department of

### Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs

(Ministère de la Consommation et des

Corporations)

(Deputy Minister)

Miquelon, Jean  
(01.10.1966 - 15.09.1967)

Grandy, James Frederick  
(21.12.1967 - 11.08.1971)

Osbaldeston, Gordon Francis  
(01.03.1972 - 01.02.1973)

Pitfield, Peter Michael  
(01.03.1973 - 31.12.1974)

Ostry, Sylvia  
(19.02.1975 - 31.01.1978)

Post, George  
(02.03.1978 - 30.04.1985)

### Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs

(Ministère des Consommateurs et des Sociétés)

(Deputy Minister)

Daniels, Mark R.  
(01.05.1985 - 20.03.1987)

Clark, Ian Douglas  
(30.03.1987 - 11.01.1989)

### Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs

(Ministère de la Consommation et de Corporations)

(Deputy Minister)

Clark, Ian Douglas  
(30.03.1987 - 11.01.1989)

Bourgon, Jocelyne  
(01.11.1989 - 17.06.1991)

Anthony-Hughes, Nancy  
(17.06.1991 - 25.06.1993)

### Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs

(Deputy Minister)

Anthony-Hughes, Nancy  
(17.06.1991 - 25.06.1993)

Smith, Janet R.  
(10.02.1993 - 24.06.1993)

**Note:** On June 25 1993, the Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs merged with the Department of Industry, Science and Technology and became the Department of Industry and Science.

#### **Titles:**

1967: Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs (Ministère de la Consommation et des Corporations)

1985: Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs (Ministère des Consommateurs et des Sociétés)

1988: Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs (Ministère de la Consommation et des Corporations)



Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs

## Economic and Regional Development, Ministry of State for

(Deputy Minister)

Osbaldeston, Gordon Francis  
(19.12.1978 - 12.01.1982)

Teschke, Bill  
(12.01.1982 - 01.07.1983)

Kroeger, Arthur  
(04.07.1983 - 31.07.1984)

## Economic Development Agency of Canada for the Regions of Quebec

(President)

Lebel, Jean Claude  
(31.07.1989 - 16.06.1992)

Goulet, Lorette  
(30.10.1992 - 20.02.1995)

Caron, Renaud  
(20.02.1995 - 26.05.1999)

Gladu, André  
(26.05.1999 - 11.04.2003)

Lafrenière, Marc  
(11.04.2003 - )

**Note:** Until June 4, 1992, this agency was part of the Department of Industry and its president had the rank of Deputy Minister.

## Environment, Department of

(Deputy Minister)

Shaw, Robert Fletcher  
(11.06.1971 - 31.12.1974)

Seaborn, James Blair  
(31.12.1974 - 20.12.1982)

Gérin, Jacques  
(20.12.1982 - 15.08.1985)

Sainte-Marie, Geneviève A.  
(19.08.1985 - 14.05.1989)

Good, Leonard M.  
(15.05.1989 - 24.06.1993)

Mulder, Nick  
(25.06.1993 - 08.05.1994)

Cappe, Mel  
(09.05.1994 - 02.07.1996)

Glen, Ian  
(15.08.1996 - 16.08.1998)

Good, Leonard M.  
(21.09.1998 - 26.10.1999)

Nymark, Alan  
(26.10.1999 - 02.06.2003)

Hurtubise, Suzanne  
(02.06.2003 - )

### Titles:

1971: Department of the Environment and Fisheries

1976: Department of the Environment.

## External Affairs, Department of

(Under Secretary of State)

Pope, Joseph  
(02.06.1909 - 31.03.1925)

Skelton, Oscar Douglas  
(01.04.1925 - 28.01.1941)

Robertson, Norman Alexander  
(29.01.1941 - 26.09.1946)

Pearson, Lester Bowles  
(27.09.1946 - 10.09.1948)

Heeney, Arnold Danford Patrick  
(15.03.1949 - 01.04.1952)

Wilgress, Leolyn Dana  
(01.06.1952 - 01.08.1953)

Wrong, Humphrey Hume  
(01.08.1953 - 01.01.1954)

Léger, Jules  
(07.08.1954 - 15.10.1958)

Robertson, Norman Alexander  
(20.10.1958 - 21.02.1964)

Cadieux, Marcel  
(07.05.1964 - 31.01.1970)

Ritchie, Albert Edgar  
(31.01.1970 - 06.12.1974)

Robinson, H. Basil  
(09.12.1974 - 27.04.1977)



Gutlieb, Allan E.  
(16.05.1977 - 30.12.1981)

## Finance, Department of

(Receiver General)

Harrington, Thomas Douglas  
(29.05.1868 - 01.08.1878)

Dickinson, William  
(29.05.1868 - 31.12.1874)

(Deputy Minister)

Langton, John  
(29.05.1868 - 31.07.1878)

Courtney, John Mortimer  
(01.08.1878 - 01.11.1906)

Boville, Thomas Cooper  
(01.11.1906 - 31.03.1920)

Saunders, John C.  
(01.04.1920 - 04.04.1930)

Sellar, Robert Watson  
(04.04.1930 - 24.10.1932)

Clark, William Clifford  
(24.10.1932 - 27.12.1952)

Taylor, Kenneth Wiffin  
(01.01.1953 - 30.06.1963)

Bryce, Robert Broughton  
(01.07.1963 - 31.03.1970)

Reisman, Sol Simon  
(01.04.1970 - 31.03.1975)

Shoyama, Thomas Kunito  
(01.04.1975 - 31.01.1979)

Hood, William Clarence  
(01.02.1979 - 01.09.1979)

Reuber, Grant L.  
(15.09.1979 - 25.03.1980)

Stewart, Ian Affleck  
(25.03.1980 - 31.10.1982)

Cohen, Marshall A.  
(01.11.1982 - 31.08.1985)

Hartt, Stanley H.  
(01.09.1985 - 30.04.1988)



Gorbet, Frederick  
(01.05.1988 - 31.07.1992)

Dodge, David A.  
(01.08.1992 - 14.07.1997)

Clark, Scott C.  
(14.07.1997 - 20.03.2000)

Lynch, Kevin G.  
(20.03.2000 - )

**Titles:**

1867: Department of Finance.  
1879: Department of Finance and  
Receiver General of Canada.  
1969: Department of Finance.

**Fisheries and Oceans,  
Department of**

Department of Marine and  
Fisheries

(Deputy Minister)

Smith, William  
(29.05.1868 - 30.06.1884)

Department of Fisheries

(Deputy Minister)

Tilton, John  
(01.07.1884 - 30.06.1892)

Department of Marine and  
Fisheries

(Deputy Minister)

Smith, William  
(01.07.1892 - 25.04.1896)

Gourdeau, François Frederic  
(26.04.1896 - 26.10.1909)

Desbarats, George Joseph  
(27.10.1909 - 08.06.1910)

Department of Marine Services

(Deputy Minister)

Desbarats, George Joseph  
(08.06.1910 - 31.12.1922)

Department of Fisheries and  
Oceans

(Deputy Minister)

Johnston, Alexander  
(08.06.1910 - 30.06.1928)

Found, William Ambrose  
(01.07.1928 - 31.12.1938)

Department of Marine

(Deputy Minister)

Johnston, Alexander  
(14.06.1930 - 14.08.1935)

Smith, Robert Knowlton  
(14.08.1935 - 01. 11.1936)

Department of Fisheries

(Deputy Minister)

Finn, Donovan Bartley  
(15.02.1940 - 31.12.1946)

Bates, Stewart  
(15.01.1947 - 08.12.1954)

Clark, George Russell  
(08.12.1954 - 26.02.1963)

Needler, Alfred Walker  
Hollinshead  
(26.02.1963 - 01.04.1969)

Department of Fisheries and  
Oceans

(Deputy Minister)

Tansley, Donald D.  
(02.04.1979 - 01.10.1982)

May, Arthur William  
(01.10.1982 - 02.01.1986)

Meyboom, Peter  
(02.01.1986 - 26.11.1990)

Rawson, Bruce S.  
(26.11.1990 - 09.05.1994)

Rowat, William A.  
(09.05.1994 - 25.08.1997)

Wouters, Wayne G.  
(02.09.1997 - 13.05.2002)

Harrisson, Peter  
(13.05.2002 - 22.05.2003)

Murray, Larry E.  
(22.05.2003 - )

**Titles:**

1868: Department of Marine and Fisheries.  
1884: Department of Fisheries.  
1892: Department of Marine and Fisheries.

1914: Department of Naval Service.  
1920: Department of Marine and Fisheries.  
1930: Department of Fisheries.  
1936: The Department of Marine became  
the Department of Transport.  
1969: Department of Fisheries and  
Forestry.  
1971: Abolition of Fisheries and Forestry  
which was replaced by the  
Department of the Environment.  
1979: Department of Fisheries and  
Oceans.

**Foreign Affairs and  
International Trade,  
Department of**

External Affairs

(Deputy Minister)

Osbaldeston, Gordon Francis  
(12.01.1982 - 27.10.1982)

Massé, Marcel  
(27.10.1982 - 01.09.1985)

Marchand, J.C. De Montigny  
(12.01.1982 - 08.01.1985)

Smith, Gordon Scott  
(08.01.1985 - 14.08.1985)

Taylor, James Hutchings  
(01.09.1985 - 01.12.1989)

Marchand De Montigny  
(01.01.1990 - 02.12.1991)

Morden, Reid  
(23.09.1991 - 15.08.1994)

Foreign Affairs

(Deputy Minister)

Smith, Gordon  
(15.08.1994 - 04.08.1997)

Campbell, Donald W.  
(04.08.1997 - 18.08.2000)

Lavertu, Gaëtan  
(21.08.2000 - 16.06.2003)

Harder, Peter Vernon  
(16.06.2003 - )

International Trade

(Deputy Minister, Under  
Secretary of State, Coordinator of  
International Economic  
Relations)

Johnstone, Robert  
(07.12.1982 - 02.01.1984)

Ostry, Sylvia  
(02.01.1984 - 08.01.1985)

Richardson, Robert L.  
(08.01.1985 - 14.08.1986)

Shannon, Gerald Edward  
(25.08.1986 - 01.11.1989)

Campbell, Donald W.  
(16.10.1989 - 02.11.1993)

Kilpatrick, Robert Allen  
(02.11.1993 - 18.12.1995)

(Deputy Minister)

Wright, Robert G.  
(18.12.1995 - 01.06.2001)

Leonard, J. Edward  
(11.06.2001 - )

**Titles:**

1909: Department of External Affairs.  
1982: Department of External Affairs and  
International Trade.  
1995: Department of Foreign Affairs and  
International Trade.

## Forestry, Department of

### Department of Forestry

(Deputy Minister)

Harrison, John Darley Braithwaite  
(26.11.1960 - 31.07.1962)

Rousseau, Louis Zéphérin  
(31.07.1962 - 30.09.1966)

### Department of Forestry and Rural Development

(Deputy Minister)

Rousseau, Louis Zéphérin  
(01.10.1966 - 30.08.1967)

Couillard, Joseph Louis Eugène  
(01.09.1967 - 15.07.1968)

Kent, Thomas Worrall  
(15.07.1968 - 01.04.1969)

### Department of Fisheries and Forestry

(Deputy Minister)

Needler, Alfred W.H.  
(01.04.1969 - 30.02.1971)

Shaw, Robert Fletcher  
(01.03.1971 - 01.06.1971)

Department of Forestry  
(Deputy Minister)

Mercier, Jean-Claude  
(23.02.1990 - 24.06.1993)

**Note:** In 1993, the Department of  
Forestry was integrated into the  
Department of Natural Resources.

**Titles:**

1960: Department of Forestry.  
1966: Department of Forestry and Rural  
Development.  
1969: Department of Fisheries and  
Forestry.  
1971: The responsibilities of the  
Department of Fisheries and  
Forestry were transferred to the  
Department of the Environment and  
Fisheries.  
1976: The responsibilities of the  
Department of the Environment  
were transferred to the Department



of the Environment.  
1990: Department of Forestry.

## Human Resources Development, Department of

(Deputy Minister)

Noreau, Jean-Jacques  
(25.06.1993 - 01.07.1996)

Cappe, Mel  
(02.07.1996 - 17.01.1999)

Morris, Claire  
(18.01.1999 - 13.05.2002)

Wouters, Wayne G.  
(13.05.2002 - )

**Note:** In 1993, the Department of  
Human Resources Development  
integrated the Department of Labour  
and a part of the Department of  
Employment and Immigration.



## Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Department of

(Deputy Minister)

Vankoughnet, Lawrence  
(08.07.1880 - 02.10.1893)

Reed, Hayter  
(02.10.1893 - 18.06.1897)

Smart, James Allan  
(01.07.1897 - 21.11.1902)

Pedley, Francis  
(21.11.1902 - 11.10.1913)

Scott, Duncan Campbell  
(11.10.1913 - 13.10.1932)

McGill, Harold Wigmore  
(13.10.1932 - 01.12.1936)

Keenleyside, Hugh Llewlyn  
(18.01.1950 - 24.09.1950)

### Department of Resources and Development

(Deputy Minister)

Young, Hugh Andrew  
(01.10.1950 - 14.11.1953)

### Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources

(Deputy Minister)

Robertson, Robert Gordon  
(16.12.1953 - 30.06.1963)

Cote, Ernest Adolphe  
(01.07.1963 - 30.09.1966)

### Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development

(Deputy Minister)

Côté, Ernest Adolphe  
(01.10.1966 - 29.02.1968)

Macdonald, John Allan  
(01.03.1968 - 15.01.1970)

Robinson, H. Basil  
(01.03.1970 - 09.12.1974)

Kroeger, Arthur  
(20.12.1974 - 01.10.1979)

Tellier, Paul M.  
(01.10.1979 - 01.11.1982)

Lafontaine, Maurice A. J.  
(01.11.1982 - 08.01.1985)

Rawson, Bruce S.  
(08.01.1985 - 31.07.1987)

Swain, Harry S.  
(09.10.1987 - 17.09.1992)

Goodleaf, Dan E.  
(18.09.1992 - 15.07.1995)

Serson, Scott  
(05.09.1995 - 31.05.1999)

Serafini, Shirley  
(01.06.1999 - 31.05.2001)

Lafrenière, Marc  
(11.06.2001 - 12.08.2002)

Jolicoeur, Alain  
(12.08.2002 - )

**Note:** Before 1966, the responsibilities of the Superintendent General of Indian Affairs were assigned to various ministers, particularly the Secretary of State, the Minister of the Interior, the Minister of Mines and Resources, the Minister of Resources and Development, and the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration.

**Titles:**

1966: Official creation of the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development.

## Industry, Science and Technology, Department of

(Deputy Minister)

Beaulnes, Aurèle  
(01.09.1971 - 09.09.1974)

Leclair, J. Maurice  
(09.09.1974 - 15.12.1976)

Hudon, L. Denis  
(01.01.1977 - 01.06.1983)

Berlinguet, Louis  
(01.06.1983 - 08.01.1985)

Collin, Arthur Edwin  
(08.01.1985 - 01.12.1986)

Howe, Bruce  
(01.12.1986 - 16.09.1988)

Rogers, Harry  
(16.09.1988 - 18.09.1992)

Swain, Harry S.  
(18.09.1992 - 16.10.1995)

Lynch, Kevin G.  
(16.10.1995 - 20.03.2000)

Harder, Peter Vernon  
(20.03.2000 - 16.02.2003)

Villiard, Jean-Claude  
(16.02.2003 - )

**Titles:**

1971: Ministry of State Science and Technology.

1990: Department of Industry, Science and Technology.

## Industry, Trade and Commerce, Department of

### Department of Commerce

(Deputy Minister)

Parmelee, William Grannis  
(01. 01. 1893 - 01. 08. 1908)

O'Hara, Francis Charles Trench  
(01. 08. 1908 - 12. 11. 1931)

Parmelee, James Grannis  
(12. 11. 1931 - 01. 10. 1940)

Wilgress, Leolyn Dana  
(01. 10. 1940 - 09. 02. 1945)

Mackenzie, Maxwell Weir  
(01. 03. 1945 - 31. 03. 1951)

Bull, William Frederick  
(01. 04. 1951 - 01. 08. 1957)

Sharp, Mitchell William  
(01. 08. 1957 - 29. 05. 1958)

English, John Hascall  
(29. 05. 1958 - 03. 03. 1960)

Roberts, James Alan  
(03. 03. 1960 - 01. 09. 1964)

### Department of Industry

(Deputy Minister)

Golden, David Aaron  
(25. 07. 1963 - 03. 07. 1964)

Reisman, Sol Simon  
(03. 07. 1964 - 01. 04. 1968)

### Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce

(Deputy Minister)

Warren, Jack Hamilton  
(01. 09. 1964 - 11. 08. 1971)

Grandy, James Frederick  
(11.08.1971 - 31.03.1975)

Stoner, Oliver Gerald  
(01.05.1975 - 15.12.1976)

Osbaldeston, Gordon Francis  
(15.12.1976 - 19.12.1978)

Cohen, Marshall A.  
(01.02.1979 - 25.03.1980)

Johnstone, Robert  
(25.03.1980 - 12.01.1982)

Montreuil, Robert Clément  
(12.01.1982 - 01.07.1983)

Teschke, Bill  
(01.07.1983 - 30.06.1983)

### Department of Regional Economic Expansion

(Deputy Minister)

Kent, Thomas Worrall  
(01.04.1969 - 30.08.1971)

Love, James Douglas  
(01.09.1971 - 30.09.1979)

Montreuil, Robert Clément  
(01.10.1979 - 12.01.1982)

Teschke, Bill  
(01.07.1983 - 06.12.1983)

### Department of Regional Industrial Expansion

(Deputy Minister)

Teschke, Bill  
(01.07.1983 - 31.05.1985)

Kroeger, Arthur  
(15.08.1985 - 25.08.1986)

Hession, Raymond Vincent  
(25.08.1986 - 06.07.1987)

Rogers, Harry G.  
(06.07.1987 - 16.09.1988)

**Note:** In 1990, the Department became the Department of Industry, Science and Technology.

**Titles:**

1893: Department of Commerce.

1964: Department of Industry.  
1969: Department of Regional Economic  
Expansion.  
1983: Department of Regional Industrial  
Expansion.

## Intergovernmental Affairs, Department of

(Deputy Minister)

Bilodeau, Ronald L.  
(01.05.1994 - 08.08.1996)

Anderson, George R. M.  
(09.08.1996 - 13.05.2002)

Morris, Claire  
(13.05.2002 - )

## Interior, Minister of the

(Deputy Minister)

Meredith, Edmund Allen  
(29.05.1868 - 08.10.1878)

Buckingham, William  
(08.10.1878 - 14.11.1878)

Dennis, John Stoughton  
(14.11.1878 - 31.12.1881)

Russell, Lindsay  
(01.01.1882 - 30.06.1883)

Burgess, Alexander MacKinnon  
(01.07.1883 - 31.03.1897)

Smart, James Allan  
(01.04.1897 - 31.12.1904)

Cory, William Wallace  
(01.01.1905 - 31.03.1931)

Rowatt, Hugh Howard  
(01.04.1931 - 30.04.1934)

Wardle, James Morey  
(18.08.1935 - 30.11.1936)



## Justice, Department of

(Deputy Minister and Deputy  
Attorney General of Canada)

Ernard, Hewitt  
(29.05.1868 - 31.08.1876)

Lash, Zebulon Aiton  
(01.09.1876 - 22.05.1882)

Burbidge, George Wheelock  
(23.05.1882 - 30.09.1887)

Sedgewick, Robert  
(25.02.1888 - 17.02.1893)

Newcombe, Edmund Leslie  
(13.03.1893 - 19.09.1924)

Edwards, William Stuart  
(01.10.1924 - 30.09.1941)

Jackett, W.R.  
(01.05.1957 - 30.06.1960)

Driedger, Elmer  
(01.07.1960 - 28.02.1967)

Maxwell, D.S.  
(01.03.1967 - 28.02.1973)

Thorson, D.S.  
(01.03.1973 - 05.06.1977)

Tassé, Roger  
(18.07.1977 - 01.09.1985)

Iacobucci, Frank  
(30.09.1985 - 02.09.1988)

Tait, John Charles  
(03.10.1988 - 03.10.1994)

Thomson, George M.  
(03.10.1994 - 01.07.1998)

Rosenberg, Morris A.  
(01.07.1998 - )

**Note:** Between 1950 and 1952, the  
deputy minister was also the Solicitor  
General.



## Labour, Department of

(Deputy Minister)

King, William Lyon Mackenzie  
(15.09.1900 - 21.09.1908)

Acland, Frederick Albert  
(01.10.1908 - 01.09.1923)

Ward, Howard Hyland  
(01.09.1923 - 01.01.1934)

Dickson, William Murray  
(17.01.1934 - 01.11.1940)

Stewart, Bryce Morrison  
(01.11.1940 - 31.12.1942)

MacNamara, Arthur James  
(01.01.1943 - 05.03.1953)

Brown, Arthur Huntingdon  
(05.03.1953 - 28.02.1961)

Haythorne, George Vickers  
(28.02.1961 - 01.01.1969)

Love, James Douglas  
(01.01.1969 - 01.09.1971)

Wilson, Bernard  
(01.09.1971 - 22.11.1973)

Eberlee, Thomas Mckay  
(01.05.1974 - 01.08.1982)

M. Daniels, Mark R.  
(01.08.1982 - 01.05.1985)

McQueen Jennifer Robertson  
(01.05.1985 - 20.11.1990)

Protti, Raymond J.  
(20.11.1990 - 01.10.1991)

Capello, Gerald G.  
(28.11.1991 - 24.06.1993)

**Note:** In 1993, the Department was  
integrated into the Department of  
Human Resources Development.



## National Defence, Department of

### Department of Militia and Defence

(Deputy Minister)

Futvoye, George  
(29.05.1868 - 10.01.1875)

Panet, Charles Eugène  
(04.02.1875 - 22.11.1898)

Pinault, Louis Félix  
(07.12.1898 - 10.12.1906)

Fiset, Eugène  
(22.12.1906 - 31.12.1922)

Desbarats, George Joseph (Act.)  
(01.11.1922 - 31.12.22)

### Department of National Defence

(Deputy Minister)

Fiset, Eugène  
(01.01.23 - 31.03.1924)

Desbarats, George Joseph  
(01.04.1924 - 02.11.1932)

Lafèche, Léo Richer  
(03.11.1932 - 16.10.1940)

Desrosiers, Henri S.  
(01.09.1942 - 31.08.1945)

Mills, Wilfrid Gordon  
(15.01.1947 - 18.01.1949)

Drury, Charles Mills  
(19.01.1949 - 25.07.1955)

Miller, Frank R.  
(15.08.1955 - 31.05.1960)

Armstrong, Elgin B.  
(01.09.1960 - 31.08.1971)

Cloutier, Sylvain  
(01.09.1971 - 01.05.1975)

Nixon, Charles Robert  
(15.05.1975 - 01.11.1982)

Dewar, Daniel Bevis  
(01.11.1982 - 29.05.1989)

Fowler, Robert Ramsay  
(29.05.1989 - 25.06.1995)

Fréchette, Louise  
(26.06.1995 - 01.02.1998)

Judd, James A. J.  
(23.02.1998 - 13.05.2002)

Bloodworth, Margaret  
(13.05.2002 - )

**Note:** During war there was also a Deputy Minister of Naval Service and a Deputy Minister of War Service. Between 1940-1942 and 1945-1947, there were no civilian Deputy Ministers in the Department. Heading the Department were Lieutenant-Colonels, Colonels and Chiefs of Staff in charge of the army, the air force and the navy.

**Titles:**  
1868: Department of Militia and Defence.  
1923: Department of National Defence.

### National Health and Welfare, Department of

(Deputy Minister)

Montizambert, Frederick  
(14.01.1899 - 14.07.1919)

Amyot, John A.  
(14.07.1919 - 13.09.1933)

### Department of Pensions and National Health

(Deputy Minister)

Amyot, John A.  
(14.07.1919 - 13.09.1933)

Wodehouse, Robert Elmer  
(01.10.1933 - 18.10.1944)

### Department of National Health and Welfare

(Deputy Minister, National Health)

Chisholm, George Brock  
(03.11.1944 - 24.07.1946)

Cameron, George Donald West  
(24.07.1946 - 10.09.1965)

Crawford, John Neilson  
(10.09.1965 - 31.12.1969)

Leclair, J. Maurice  
(01.04.1970 - 09.09.1974)

Lupien, Jean  
(22.04.1975 - 18.11.1976)

(Deputy Minister, Welfare)

Davidson, George Forrester  
(03.11.1944 - 26.04.1960)

Willard, Joseph William  
(12.07.1960 - 01.02.1973)

Johnson, Albert Wesley  
(01.02.1973 - 15.08.1975)

Rawson, Bruce S.  
(15.08.1975 - 17.11.1976)

(Deputy Minister)

Rawson, Bruce S.  
(18.11.1976 - 20.09.1979)

McDougall, Pamela  
(20.09.1979 - 01.09.1980)

Fry, James Lawrence  
(01.09.1980 - 01.08.1983)

Kirkwood, David Herbert W.  
(01.08.1983 - 25.08.1986)

Law, Maureen Margaret  
(28.08.1986 - 25.07.1989)

Catley-Carlson, Margaret Y.  
(25.07.1989 - 10.07.1992)

Noreau, Jean-Jacques  
(10.07.1992 - 25.06.1993)

Jean, Michèle S.  
(25.06.1993 - 07.01.1998)

Dodge, David A.  
(07.01.1998 - 02.01.2001)

Green, Ian C.  
(02.01.2001 - )

**Note:** Between 1899 and 1928, the Department's responsibilities were administered by various Ministers.

**Titles:**  
1928: Department of Pensions and National Health.  
1944: Department of national Health and Welfare.

### **Natural Resources, Department of**

(Deputy Minister)

Low, Albert Peter  
(28.05.1907 - 31.12.1913)

Brock, Reginald Walter  
(01.01.1914 - 30.11.1914)

McConnell, Richard George  
(01.12.1914 - 08.06.1920)

Camsell, Charles  
(08.06.1920 - 31.12.1945)

Keenleyside, Hugh Llewlyn  
(15.03.1947 - 18.01.1950)

Boyer, Marc  
(18.01.1950 - 08.11.1962)

Van Steenburgh, William Elgin  
(04.02.1963 - 01.01.1966)

Isbister, Claude Malcolm  
(01.01.1966 - 18.05.1970)

Austin, Jacob  
(18.05.1970 - 01.09.1974)

Shoyama, Thomas Kunito  
(01.09.1974 - 01.04.1975)

MacNabb, Gordon Murray  
(01.04.1975 - 01.04.1978)

Cohen, Marshall A.  
(01.04.1978 - 01.02.1979)

Stewart, Ian Affleck  
(01.02.1979 - 25.03.1980)

Cohen, Marshall A.  
(25.03.1980 - 01.11.1982)

Tellier, Paul M.  
(01.11.1982 - 12.08.1985)

Marchand, J.C. De Montigny  
(19.08.1985 - 25.08.1986)

Kroeger, Arthur  
(26.08.1986 - 16.09.1988)

Howe, Bruce  
(16.09.1988 - 09.02.1993)

Bilodeau, Ronald L.  
(02.11.1993 - 09.05.1994)

McCloskey, Jean C.  
(09.05.1994 - 18.10.1999)

Harrison, Peter  
(18.10.1999 - 13.05.2002)

Anderson, Georges R. M.  
(13.05.2002 - )

#### Titles:

1907: Department of Mines.

1936: Department of Mines and Resources.

1950: Department of Mines and Technical Surveys.

1966: Department of Energy, Mines and Resources.

1993: Department of Natural Resources

Griffin, William Henry  
(30.05.1868 - 30.06.1888)

White, William  
(01.07.1888 - 30.06.1897)

Coulter, Robert Miller  
(01.08.1897 - 17.08.1923)

Gaboury, Louis Joseph  
(17.08.1923 - 14.08.1935)

Sullivan, John Alexander  
(14.08.1935 - 09.06.1945)

Turnbull, Walter James  
(09.06.1945 - 01.12.1957)

Boyle, George Andrew  
(01.12.1957 - 20.06.1961)

Wilson, William Hugh  
(20.06.1961 - 03.10.1968)

Faguy, Paul-André  
(03.10.1968 - 12.08.1970)

Mackay, John A.H.  
(12.08.1970 - 14.01.1974)

Mackay, John A.H.  
(08.04.1974 - 24.01.1977)

Corkery, James Caldwell  
(03.02.1977 - 15.05.1981)

**Note:** On October 16, 1981, the Post Office Department became a Crown Corporation: the Canada Post Corporation.

### Privatization and Regulatory Affairs, Department of

(Deputy Minister)

Smith, Janet R.  
(25.08.1986 - 01.11.1989)

Hugues-Anthony, Nancy  
(14.03.1990 - 17.06.1991)

### Privy Council Office

(Clerk and Secretary to the Cabinet)

Lee, William Henry  
(01.07.1867 - 30.06.1872)

Himsworth, William Alfred  
(02.07.1872 - 07.01.1880)

Côté, Joseph Olivier  
(13.01.1880 - 24.04.1882)

McGee, John Joseph  
(20.05.1882 - 05.05.1907)

Boudreau, Rodolphe  
(06.05.1907 - 09.06.1923)

Lemaire, Ernest Joseph  
(14.08.1923 - 01.01.1940)

Heenev, Arnold Danford Patrick  
(25.03.1940 - 14.03.1949)

Robertson, Norman Alexander  
(15.03.1949 - 31.05.1952)

Pickersgill, John Whitney  
(01.06.1952 - 11.06.1953)

Bryce, Robert Broughton  
(01.01.1954 - 30.06.1963)

Robertson, Robert Gordon  
(01.07.1963 - 15.01.1975)

Pitfield, Peter Michael  
(16.01.1975 - 04.06.1979)

Massé, Marcel  
(05.06.1979 - 10.03.1980)

Pitfield, Peter Michael  
(11.03.1980 - 09.12.1982)

Osbaldeston, Gordon Francis  
(10.12.1982 - 11.08.1985)

Tellier, Paul M.  
(12.08.1985 - 31.06.1992)

Shortliffe, Glen Scott  
(01.07.1992 - 27.03.1994)

Bourgon, Jocelyne  
(28.03.1994 - 17.01.1999)

Cappe, Mel  
(18.01.1999 - 13.05.2002)

Himelfarb, Alexander  
(13.05.2002 - )

(Deputy Minister to the Prime Minister and Associate Secretary to the Cabinet)

Bilodeau, Ronald L.  
(09.05.1994 - 02.06.2003)

Wright, Robert A  
(02.06.2003 - )



(Deputy Minister)

## Public Security

(Deputy Minister)

Harder, Peter Vernon  
(25.06.1993 - 05.11.1993)

**Note:** In 1993, the Department of Public Security merged with the Solicitor General.

## Public Service Commission

(President)

Roche, William James  
(09.10.1917 - 10.08.1935)

Bland, Charles Heber  
(10.08.1935 - 06.09.1955)

Nelson, Stanley Gilbert  
(06.09.1955 - 01.05.1957)

Heeney, Arnold Danford Patrick  
(01.05.1957 - 01.02.1959)

Hugues, Samuel Harvey  
Shirecliffe  
(01.07.1959 - 31.12.1962)

MacNeil, Robert  
(04.02.1963 - 06.10.1965)

Carson, John Jarvis  
(06.10.1965 - 01.07.1976)

Gallant, Edgar  
(01.07.1976 - 16.09.1985)

Labelle, Huguette  
(16.09.1985 - 09.10.1990)

Giroux, Robert Jean Yvon  
(10.10.1990 - 08.05.1994)

Hubbard, Ruth E.  
(09.05.1994 - 30.06.1999)

Serson, Scott  
(01.07.1999 - )

## Public Works and Government Services Canada

(Deputy Minister)

Trudeau, Toussaint  
(29.05.1868 - 22.09.1879)

Baillairgé, George Frederick  
(04.10.1879 - 18.12.1890)

Gobeil, Antoine  
(18.12.1890 - 01.07.1908)

Hunter, James Blake  
(01.07.1908 - 06.10.1942)

Murphy, Emmett Patrick  
(06.10.1942 - 15.11.1953)

Young, Hugh Andrew  
(15.11.1953 - 05.04.1963)

Lalonde, G. Lucien  
(19.09.1963 - 15.01.1970)

Macdonald, John Allan  
(15.01.1970 - 01.05.1975)

Boucher, Jean  
(01.05.1975 - 22.01.1976)

Williams, Gerald Bowen  
(22.01.1976 - 24.01.1977)

MacKay, John A.H.  
(24.01.1977 - 08.01.1985)

Lafontaine, Maurice A. J.  
(08.01.1985 - 19.08.1986)

Giroux, Robert L.  
(25.08.1986 - 10.10.1990)

O'Toole, Lawrence J.  
(10.10.1990 - 10.02.1993)


Quail, Randal Andrew  
(11.02.1993 - 09.04.2001)

Cochrane, Janice  
(09.04.2001 - 16.02.2003)

Marshall, David  
(16.02.2003 - )

### Titles:

1867: Department of Public Works.  
1993: Department of Public Works, Supply and Services.  
1996: Public Works and Government Services Canada.



## Canada, Department of the

(Under Secretary of State)

Parent, Etienne  
(30.05.1868 - 09.07.1873)

Langevin, Edouard Joseph  
(09.07.1873 - 25.01.1883)

Powell, Grant  
(25.01.1883 - 01.12.1889)

Catellier, Ludger Aimé  
(01.12.1889 - 25.04.1896)

Pope, Joseph  
(25.04.1896 - 01.06.1909)

Mulvey, Thomas  
(01.06.1909 - 31.08.1933)

Coleman, Ephraim Herbert  
(04.10.1933 - 19.01.1949)

Stein, Joseph Charles  
(19.01.1949 - 31.12.1961)

Miquelon, Jean  
(29.03.1962 - 15.05.1964)

Steele, Granville George Ernest  
(15.05.1964 - 15.11.1968)

Léger, Jules  
(15.11.1968 - 01.03.1973)

Boucher, Jean  
(01.03.1973 - 01.05.1975)

Fortier, André  
(24.11.1975 - 15.02.1978)

Juneau, Pierre  
(15.02.1978 - 01.04.1980)

Labelle, Huguette  
(28.08.1980 - 08.01.1985)

Rabinovitch, Robert  
(08.01.1985 - 25.08.1986)

Fournier, Jean T.  
(25.08.1986 - 30.08.1991)

Rochon, Marc W.  
(09.09.1991 - 29.10.1992)

Jean, Michèle S.  
(30.10.1992 - 24.06.1993)

Rochon, Marc W.  
(25.06.1993 - )

**Note:** In 1993, the Department merged with the Department of Citizenship and Immigration.

## Social Development, Ministry of State for

(Secretary of State)

Rawson, Bruce S.  
(19.06.1980 - 23.07.1981)

Smith, Gordon Scott  
(23.07.1981 - 31.07.1984)

**Note:** The Department was dissolved on September 1, 1984.

## Solicitor General of Canada

(Solicitor General)

Macdonald, Thomas Daniel  
(01.10.1966 - 14.12.1968)

Côté, Ernest Adolphe  
(14.12.1968 - 01.08.1972)

Tassé, Roger  
(01.08.1972 - 18.07.1977)

Bissonnette, Pierre André  
(28.11.1977 - 01.09.1982)

Gibson, Frederick E.  
(01.09.1982 - 25.08.1986)

Tait, John Charles  
(25.08.1986 - 03.10.1988)

Stanford, Joseph  
(01.11.1988 - 11.02.1993)

Harder, Peter Vernon  
(10.02.1993 - 05.11.1993)

Fournier, Jean T.  
(04.11.1993 - 19.06.2000)

Jauvin, Nicole  
(19.06.2000 - )

## Statistics Canada

(Chief Statistician)

Duffett, Walter Elliott  
(01.01.1957 - 01.06.1972)

Ostry, Sylvia  
(01.06.1972 - 19.02.1975)

Kirkham, Peter Gilbert  
(20.02.1975 - 31.03.1980)

Fry, James Lawrence  
(01.04.1980 - 30.11.1980)

Wilk, Martin Bradbury  
(01.12.1980 - 01.09.1985)

Fellegi, Ivan P.  
(01.09.1985 - )

## Supply and Services, Department of

### Department of Munitions and Supply

(Deputy Minister)

Sheils, George Kingsley  
(11.04.1940 - 31.12.1945)

Henry, Robert Alexander Cecil  
(01.10.1944 - 01.10.1945)

Scully, Vincent William Thomas  
(01.10.1945 - 01.02.1948)

Boyer, Marc (DM Reconstruction and Supply)  
(19.01.1949 - 17.01.1950)

Mackenzie, Maxwell Weir (DM Defence Production)  
(01.04.1951 - 01.05.1952)

Brophy, Reginald McLaren  
(01.05.1952 - 01.10.1954)

Golden, David Aaron (DM Supply and Defence)  
(01.10.1954 - 11.07.1962)

Hunter, Gordon Ward (DM Supply and Defence)  
(11.07.1962 - 31.03.1969)

### Department of Supply and Services

(Deputy Minister, Supply)

Hunter, Gordon Ward  
(01.04.1969 - 01.01.1970)

Boucher, Jean  
(01.01.1970 - 01.03.1973)

Desroches, Jacques Marcel  
(19.04.1973 - 13.09.1979)

D'avignon, Guy  
(13.09.1979 - 14.06.1982)

Hession, Raymond Vincent  
(12.07.1982 - 07.01.1985)

(Deputy Minister, Services)

Balls, Herbert Ryan  
(01.04.1969 - 31.03.1975)

Fry, James Lawrence  
(05.06.1975 - 01.09.1980)

Kirkwood, David Herbert W.  
(17.10.1980 - 01.08.1983)

Sicard, Pierre P.  
(01.08.1983 - 08.01.1985)

(Deputy Minister)

Hession, Raymond Vincent  
(07.01.1985 - 19.06.1986)

Wyman, Georgina  
(25.08.1986 - 20.11.1990)

Mulder, Nick  
(20.11.1990 - 11.02.1993)

Hubbard, Ruth E.  
(10.02.1993 - 11.02.1993)

**Note:** Between 1940 and 1969 the responsibilities of the Department of Munitions and Supply were carried out by the Department of Finance. During the war (1940-1945) the Department was called the Department of Reconstruction and Supply and the Department of Defence Production.

### **Titles:**

1969: Department of Supply and Services  
1993: The Department became the Department of Public Works and



Governmental Services Canada.

## Transport, Department of

### Department of Railways and Canals

(Deputy Minister)

Trudeau, Toussaint  
(22.09.1879 - 30.11.1892)

Schreiber, Collingwood  
(01.12.1892 - 30.06.1905)

Butler, Matthew Joseph  
(01.07.1905 - 27.01.1910)

Campbell, Archibald William  
(27.01.1910 - 22.06.1918)



Bell, Graham Airdrie  
(22.06.1918 - 13.01.1929)

Henry, Robert Alexander Cecil  
(04.02.1929 - 01.03.1930)

Smart, Valentine Irving  
(05.03.1930 - 03.12.1940)

Department of Transport  
(Deputy Minister)

Smart, Valentine Irving  
(05.03.1930 - 03.12.1940)

Edwards, Charles Peter  
(28.01.1941 - 31.01.1948)

Lessard, Jean-Claude  
(01.02.1948 - 31.12.1953)

West, Charles W.  
(01.01.1954 - 30.06.1954)

Baldwin, John Russel  
(01.07.1954 - 10.12.1968)

Stoner, Oliver Gerald  
(12.12.1968 - 22.04.1975)

Cloutier, Sylvain  
(01.05.1975 - 30.09.1979)

Kroeger, Arthur  
(01.10.1979 - 30.06.1983)

Withers, Ramsey Muir  
(04.07.1983 - 31.03.1988)

Shortliffe, Glen Scott  
(01.04.1988 - 09.10.1990)

Labelle, Huguette  
(09.10.1990 - 25.06.1993)

Bourgon, Jocelyne  
(25.06.1993 - 28.03.1994)

Mulder, Nick  
(09.05.1994 - 20.01.1997)

Bloodworth, Margaret  
(20.01.1997 - 13.05.2002)

Ranger, Louis  
(13.05.2002 - )

**Titles:**

1879: Department of Railways and Canals.  
1936: Department of Transport.

## Treasury Board, Office of the

(Secretary and Comptroller  
General)

Davidson, George Forrester  
(01.10.1966 - 01.04.1968)

Reisman, Sol Simon  
(01.04.1968 - 01.04.1970)

Johnson, Albert Wesley  
(01.04.1970 - 01.02.1973)

Osbaldeston, Gordon Francis  
(01.02.1973 - 15.12.1976)

LeClair, J. Maurice  
(15.12.1976 - 01.09.1979)

Manion, John L.  
(01.09.1979 - 02.06.1986)

Veilleux, Gérard  
(02.06.1986 - 31.10.1989)

Clark, Ian  
(01.11.1989 - 08.05.1994)

Giroux, Robert  
(09.05.1994 - 11.11.1995)

Harder, Peter  
(23.11.1995 - 19.03.2000)

Claydon, Frank  
(10.04.2000 - 30.04.2002)

Judd, James  
(13.05.2002 - )

## Urban Affairs, Ministry of



(Deputy Minister)

Oberlander, H. Peter  
(11.08.1971 - 24.01.1974)

Macneil, James W.  
(24.01.1974 - 15.06.1976)

Teron, William  
(15.06.1976 - 24.11.1978)

**Note:** The Department was dissolved  
on November 24, 1978.



## Veteran Affairs, Department of

(Deputy  
Minister)

Armstrong,  
Samuel Allan  
(02.03.1918 - 23.09.1918)

Healey, Frank Percival  
(23.09.1918 - 01.02.1919)

Robinson, Frederick Gerald  
(01.02.1919 - 15.04.1920)

Parkinson, Norman Frederick  
(15.04.1920 - 11.06.1928)

Woods, Walter Sainsbury  
(18.10.1944 - 15.07.1950)

Burns, Eedson Louis Millard  
(15.07.1950 - 04.12.1954)

Lalonde, G. Lucien  
(01.08.1955 - 19.09.1963)

Pelletier, Paul  
(19.09.1963 - 01.03.1968)

Côté, Ernest Adolphe  
(01.03.1968 - 14.12.1968)

Hodgson, John Syner  
(14.12.1968 - 27.12.1974)

Brittain, William Bruce  
(22.04.1975 - 08.01.1985)

Sicard, Pierre P.  
(08.01.1985 - 06.03.1987)

Broadbent, David  
(09.03.1987 - 30.01.1991)

Nicholson, David J.  
(30.01.1991 - 11.02.1993)

Anthony- Hughes, Nancy  
(10.02.1993 - 09.05.1994)

Nicholson, David J.  
(09.05.1994 - 31.07.1999)

Murray, Larry E.  
(01.08.1999 - 22.04.2003)

Stagg, Jack  
(22.04.2003 - )

**Titles:**

1918: Department of Soldiers' Civil  
Reestablishment  
1919: Department of Soldier's Health and  
Civil Re-establishment



1928: Abolition of the department  
1944: Minister of Veteran Affairs  
1985: Department of Veteran Affairs

## **Western Economic Diversification,**

### Department of

(Deputy Minister)

Rawson, Bruce S.  
(28.08.1988 - 25.11.1990)

Kilpatrick, Robert Allen  
(26.11.1990 - 09.02.1993)

Howe, Bruce  
(10.02.1993 - 22.06.1993)

Smith, Janet R.  
(25.06.1993 - 15.10.1995)

McLure, John D.  
(29.01.1996 - 31.10.1997)

Lennie, Oryssia  
(01.11.1997 - )