3. High levels of compliance with the regulatory
framework
Total Financial Resources ($000's) |
Main Estimates |
Planned Spending |
Total Authorities |
Actual Spending |
28,377 |
28,462 |
30,484 |
34,004 |
Total Human Resources (FTE) |
Main Estimates |
Planned Spending |
Total Authorities |
Actual Spending |
232.7 |
230.8 |
230.8 |
252.1 |
The CNSC rigorously enforces its regulatory requirements through a variety of
measures. Licensee compliance is verified through inspections, reviews, audits
and assessments. The CNSC requires any licensee found to be non-compliant with
either its licence conditions or the regulatory requirements to resolve the
issue and demonstrate improvement by a specified deadline, or face enforcement
action.
During the reporting year, the CNSC continued to conduct its compliance
program that involved ongoing monitoring of the production, use, storage and
flow of nuclear material at Canadian nuclear facilities, and the maintenance of
a national nuclear materials accountancy system. CNSC staff report on licensee
operations through mid-term performance reports, status reports, significant
development reports and annual industry reports. This is in addition to
performance information provided in licensing hearings, transcripts of which are
available to the public along with records of proceedings. The CNSC Annual
Industry Report on the Safety Performance of the Canadian Nuclear Power Industry
is prepared on an annual basis, and contains the Report Card on Nuclear Power
Plant Performance. The most recent Report Card is an evaluation of safe and
secure installations, and is available in Section IV
. CNSC
staff observed, through inspections and reviews, that the power reactor industry
operated safely in 2004. No worker at any power reactor station or member of the
public received a radiation dose in excess of the regulatory limits.
Compliance planning and management
Designed to administer, promote and assess compliance, the CNSC has commenced
the use of risk-informed formulas to determine inspection frequency and resource
requirements. The CNSC is implementing the new Type I and Type II 2
inspection planning program, along with associated compliance tools,
working cooperatively with licensees to improve transparency, communication,
performance and safety. During the reporting year, the CNSC also conducted
extensive training of staff in the various facets of the new risk management
program, reviewed the risk-profile of certain nuclear facilities, and revised
baseline compliance plans.
In March 2004, the CNSC initiated the Power Reactor Regulation Improvement
Program (PRRIP), intended to ensure a power reactor regulation program delivers
the best possible performance for licensees and the public. The PRRIP will
achieve this by examining and improving all relevant aspects of the regulation
program, from planning and problem-solving to communication and management
methods. The goal of the PRRIP is to facilitate the CNSC’s management of the
risk to public health, safety, security and the environment arising from the
operation of nuclear power reactors in Canada. For more information see "An
Improved Program for Regulating Power Reactors" .
2 *Type I inspections are on-site
audits and evaluations of a licensee’s programs, processes and practices. Type
II inspections are routine (item-by-item) checks and rounds that typically focus
on the outputs, or performance of licensee programs, processes and practices.
Findings from Type II inspections play a key role in identifying where a Type I
inspection may be required to determine systemic problems in licensee programs,
processes or practices.
Nuclear security
CNSC staff continued to monitor potential threats to Canadian nuclear
facilities, and inspected and evaluated licensees’ physical security programs,
placing priority on higher-risk facilities. Specifically, security inspections
were conducted at nuclear power plants, nuclear research facilities, fuel
fabrication and tritium processing facilities, radioisotope facilities and waste
management areas. Security inspections of other facilities such as hospital and
university laboratories that use, process or store high-risk radioactive sources
were also conducted and resulted in measures to improve security. Overall, CNSC
staff were satisfied that licensees are taking appropriate measures to meet the
requirements for physical protection of their facilities.
Radiation protection for carriers
During the reporting year, the CNSC continued to actively promote the new
international requirements for radiation protection for licensed and
non-licensed carriers, which came into effect in June 2004. These requirements
improve radiation safety of transport carriers and other stakeholders. To build
awareness of the new requirements, the CNSC prepared a supporting guide (G-314)
to help carriers establish their own radiation protection programs. It also
undertook numerous activities such as conducting awareness sessions and
encouraged carriers to submit their radiation protection programs to the CNSC
for review and follow up as to whether or not their programs will meet the new
requirement if subjected to a compliance inspection.
As of May 31, 2004, carriers not licensed by the CNSC were required to have
work procedures and a radiation protection program in place based on the risk of
worker exposure to radiation. Visits to approximately 30 transport companies
were conducted to promote compliance with this new requirement and Transport
Type I inspections have been conducted at approximately 10 sites. Implementation
of the Radiation Protection Program for these transport carriers not licensed by
the CNSC is underway.
Sealed source tracking
The CNSC played a significant role in developing the IAEA Code of Conduct
on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources , which has been endorsed
by the Government of Canada. It also played a significant role in developing the
IAEA Technical Document 1344 entitled The Categorization of Radioactive
Sources .
In support of this Code of Conduct , the CNSC began to build a
national sealed source registry database and tracking system for high-risk
radioactive sources. Under the new system, radioactive sources are ranked and
assigned to one of five categories to provide an internationally-harmonized
foundation for making risk-informed decisions. Implementation of tracking the
highest risk categories is scheduled for January 2006. The completed system will
enhance the CNSC’s regulatory control of radioactive sources used in medical,
industrial and research activities throughout Canada. The system will be
available to stakeholders through a Web-enabled user interface. Licensees will
update inventory data electronically, enabling the CNSC to track the movement of
high-risk sources.
Safeguards, non-proliferation and the Nuclear
Material Accounting System
In response to safeguards measures introduced in Canada in 2000, IAEA
verification objectives have undergone a major shift including extension to
include facilities not previously subject to safeguards requirements. To
establish national-level safeguards in Canada, the CNSC has worked
collaboratively with the IAEA in areas such as:
- Installation of new safeguards equipment at facilities.
- Implementation of an enhanced nuclear material accounting system allowing
licensees to make submissions electronically and allowing the CNSC to meet
its international non-proliferation and safeguards obligations more
effectively.
- Development of a new safeguards approach at Canada’s uranium refining
and conversion sites.
- Exchange of bilateral nuclear inventory reports with other countries, and
reconciliation of inventories with them. Such activity ensures that
international transfers of nuclear items are for peaceful purposes only, and
in accordance with Canada’s bilateral and multilateral nuclear
non-proliferation obligations.
- Provision to the IAEA of periodic nuclear material accounting reports and
other information required under Canada’s Safeguards Agreement and
Additional Protocol with the IAEA
- Facilitation of access by IAEA safeguards inspectors to nuclear facilities
and other locations in Canada.
In a major effort by the CNSC to ensure that Canadian uranium conversion and
refining facilities conform to new safeguards requirements, the CNSC conducted
ongoing negotiations with the IAEA and industry to establish a system of
accountancy for nuclear material and a plan for IAEA verification of initial
inventories in mid-2005 at refining facilities.
Safety culture and management
The CNSC encourages licensees to embrace a safety culture that results in
behaviour that exceeds expectations of the regulator. Safety culture refers to
the characteristics of the work environment, such as the values, rules, and
common understandings that influence employees’ perceptions and attitudes
about the importance that the organization places on safety. During the
reporting year, the CNSC participated in workshops in Canada and internationally
on safety culture and management. This involvement allows the CNSC to influence
the direction of the nuclear industry on safety culture at home and abroad, and
to adopt successful practices deployed elsewhere.
The CNSC held a safety culture symposium for industry in 2004. The workshop
highlighted the significant progress the industry has made in the area of safety
culture and the recognition of its importance. For example, some facilities have
developed safety culture frameworks, while others have developed and piloted
evaluation methods for performing safety culture self-assessments. The CNSC has
been developing a safety management program that will address information
requirements to be presented to the Commission Tribunal, providing a complete
picture of operators’ performance and safety trends.
Other compliance-related initiatives:
- The CNSC conducted compliance inspections of high- and moderate-risk
licensed activities, which included 959 of the 2380 planned inspections of
medical, academic and industrial licensees. In the 2005-2006 fiscal year,
the CNSC will be requesting additional resources to enable us to ensure an
appropriate level of compliance inspections while handling to an increase in
regulatory workload. Compliance efforts identified and responded to 117
reportable occurrences, of which 10 involved the transportation of nuclear
substances, 27 involved the recycling industry and 24 involved lost or
stolen material. The reportable occurrences in these activity areas resulted
in the issuance of four orders related to health and safety and six
incidents of exceeding dose limits to nuclear energy workers.
- The CNSC continued to emphasize integrated audits at licensed facilities.
Multi-disciplinary teams carrying out audits of more than one safety area
can identify more comprehensively potential risks to workers, the public and
the environment, and set priorities for remedial actions.
An Improved Program for
Regulating Power Reactors
Initiated in March 2004, the Power Reactor Regulation Improvement Program
(PRRIP) is intended to ensure the power reactor regulation program
delivers the best possible performance by licensees, of the regulatory
fundamentals. The PRRIP will achieve this by examining and improving all
relevant aspects of the regulation program, from planning and
problem-solving to communication and management methods.
The improved power reactor program will include:
- Regulatory activity based on a formal, well-articulated risk
management approach;
- Clearer roles and accountabilities for all stakeholders in the
process;
- A single point of contact for licensees;
- Consistency of regulatory approach within and across all power
reactor licensees;
- Clear and documented processes defining how the various contributors
can work together in the most coordinated and efficient way; and
- A streamlined information management system that supports the
CNSC’s business.
The Power Reactor Service Line (PRSL) group was re-aligned during the
reporting year to enhance effectiveness and efficiency, and to meet
changing demands. By providing a sharper focus, reducing duplication, and
creating more appropriate lines of authority and accountability, the
realigned organization structure improves clarity by consolidating
specialist functions, such as quality assurance, radiation protection,
environmental protection, personnel certification and event analysis into
specialist divisions focused on these areas of responsibility. |
4. CNSC cooperates and integrates its activities in
national/international nuclear fora
Total Financial Resources ($000's) |
Main Estimates |
Planned Spending |
Total Authorities |
Actual Spending |
9,428 |
14,635 |
15,675 |
15,360 |
Total Human Resources (FTE) |
Main Estimates |
Planned Spending |
Total Authorities |
Actual Spending |
61.0 |
91.3 |
91.3 |
96.1 |
The CNSC works cooperatively on an ongoing basis with a number of national
and international organizations to advance nuclear safety and security at home
and abroad, and to provide benchmarking information.
The President of the Commission Tribunal is an active member of the Tribunal
Heads, a group consisting of 22 federal tribunals, as well as the Council of
Canadian Administrative Tribunals. In addition, she is a member of the Heads of
Agencies steering committee and co-chair of the Heads of Agencies Governance
sub-committee. The work has enhanced the visibility of the Commission and its
image as a leader among Canadian administrative tribunals.
Cooperative frameworks
The CNSC developed a framework for establishing and reviewing domestic
cooperative arrangements with federal and provincial organizations, departments
and agencies. The framework enhances cooperation and integration ensuring that
administrative arrangements are consistent with the CNSC mandate and remain
effective.
The CNSC also developed a framework for tracking and coordinating Memoranda
of Understanding, cooperative undertakings with foreign governments/agencies and
international organizations, and a framework for assessing the value of
participating in international activities and subsequently evaluating the
results. Targeted involvement with international fora is essential to achieving
the CNSC’s commitment to promote nuclear safety, non-proliferation and
safeguards objectives in Canada and worldwide.
International nuclear non-proliferation activities
In Canada, the CNSC is responsible for implementing the international nuclear
non-proliferation obligations agreed to by Canada. It does so through its
regulatory programs under the Nuclear Control and Safety Act (NSCA) and
through its participation in multilateral non-proliferation initiatives on
behalf of the Government of Canada. The CNSC acted as technical advisor to the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 2004 Preparatory Committee and inactively
preparing for the May 2005 Review Conference.
The CNSC advised the Vienna Permanent Mission to the IAEA, Foreign Affairs
Canada and other Canadian stakeholder organizations in order to advance Canadian
positions on safeguards, export controls and non-proliferation with a view of
strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
The CNSC also held consultations on the implementation of bilateral
non-proliferation trade agreements with Argentina, Australia, Brazil, EURATOM,
the Russian Federation, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States for the
purpose of assuring that Canadian exports of nuclear items are for peaceful
purposes only, and to contribute to the international non-proliferation regime.
For example, in 2004, the CNSC amended an Administrative Arrangement with the
Russian Federation to assure adequate non-proliferation verification measures
are in place for Canadian transfers of uranium to Russia.
The CNSC continued its ongoing international work on multilateral guidelines
with the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the 35-nation NPT Exporters (Zangger)
Committee to toughen nuclear export controls, particularly in response to
emerging non-proliferation challenges.
IAEA Safeguards - Domestic and international
In 2004-2005, the CNSC participated in numerous activities with the IAEA to
address domestic safeguards challenges and provide support for strengthened IAEA
safeguards. Key cooperative activities included:
- Participation in a major international review of the IAEA’s safeguards
system to provide recommendations aimed at maintaining the credibility of
the safeguards system and enhancing its effectiveness and efficiency.
- Continued installation of new, technologically advanced safeguards
equipment at Canadian nuclear facilities, to be completed at all locations
by the end of 2005. Assistance has been provided at Pickering and Gentilly-2
to replace aging video surveillance systems with digital ones that include
remote surveillance capabilities. Assistance was also provided to the IAEA
to find secure, cost-effective methods to gain remote access to safeguards
data collected at facilities. This cooperation with the IAEA in both
planning and funding, and the ability to remotely monitor activities
relevant to safeguards, are crucial to establishing a state-level safeguards
approach in Canada.
- Completed a major software upgrade to the equipment used by the IAEA to
remotely monitor the discharge of spent fuel from CANDU reactors. The
ability to collect and review this data at the IAEA offices reduces expense
and disruption at the facilities and also allows the IAEA to review and
analyze data more quickly.
- Continued work with the Swedish nuclear regulator on improvements to the
Digital Cerenkov Viewing Device used by the IAEA to verify long-cooled, low
burn-up fuel held in storage pools. It is a more cost-effective technology.
- Co-operation with the IAEA and its member states to improve safeguards
implementation by providing input into the IAEA revision of a safeguards
publication on State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear
Material (SSAC) guidelines.
- Ongoing formal consultations with the IAEA and the Canadian nuclear
industry on a Canadian integrated safeguards approach.
Other cooperative activities
- Consultation with other government stakeholders to develop mechanisms that
support efficient, effective and accountable assessment and licensing of
applications for the import and export of controlled nuclear and
nuclear-related dual-use substances, materials, equipment and technology.
- Provision of technical support for a major G8 initiative aimed at
preventing the acquisition of weapons and materials of mass destruction by
terrorists or those who shelter them.
- Publication in 2004 of Canada’s Third Report on the Convention on
Nuclear Safety by the CNSC in consultation with industry representatives and
other Government of Canada departments. In April 2005, the President and CEO
of the CNSC, Ms Linda J. Keen, will preside over the Third Review Meeting of
the IAEA Convention on Nuclear Safety, the first Canadian to chair a nuclear
safety convention review meeting.
- As President of the Commission Tribunal, Ms. Keen was active in many
international nuclear fora during the reporting period, including the
International Nuclear Regulators’ Association meetings in Japan, the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) International Conference on
Topical Issues in Nuclear Installation Safety in Beijing, the IAEA
International Conference on Nuclear Security in London, a visit to the
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in Washington, D.C., the Global
Nuclear Energy Summit 2004 in Toronto, the G8 Heads of Regulators Meeting in
Moscow and the Nuclear Energy Agency’s Regulatory Forum in Paris.
Domestic cooperation
- The hosting of a three-day annual meeting of the Federal Provincial
Territorial Radiation Protection Committee, whose purpose is to harmonize
regulation and standards across the industry by sharing progress, new ideas
and priorities.
- The co-hosting of a Canadian forum on the 2005 International Committee on
Radiation Protection (ICRP) Recommendations, attended by the public industry
and other regulatory and government bodies. Such activities provide the CNSC
with the opportunity to communicate regularly with various government and
industry stakeholders and ensure that Canadian needs and viewpoints are
taken into account in developing international standards. They also allow
the CNSC to influence the development and application of international
standards and to adopt best practices from our peers around the world.
Nuclear Emergency Management
The CNSC is employing a collaborative approach in developing a new Nuclear
Emergency Management (NEM) policy and upgraded programs. It is being developed
in partnership with external stakeholders, and has included extensive
consultations with licensees, provincial, municipal and federal government
organizations involved in emergency preparedness management.
The CNSC NEM policy provides the foundation for all CNSC emergency management
activities. Specifically, it outlines responses consistent with the risks at
hand, clarifies roles and responsibilities, and helps maintain current capacity
while taking future requirements into account. The policy will be adopted
following public consultation.
In addition to developing the policy, key elements of an improved nuclear
emergency management program have been identified and updated emergency plans
and procedures are under development.
In addition, the CNSC Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) has been redesigned
and reorganized to increase reliability and functionality and enhance back-up
resources. Extensive training on roles, responsibilities, procedures and
emergency response to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear-related
events has been conducted for staff and other Government of Canada departments.
A wide variety of activities have been undertaken, ranging from creating a
federal-provincial-territorial committee on radiological/nuclear emergencies to
the installation of an emergency power generator at CNSC headquarters to
maintain the CNSC’s capacity in the event of an outage.
Strengthening Safeguards
The verification approaches and measures utilized by the IAEA to verify
that nuclear material is not diverted from peaceful uses to nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, are commonly referred to as
‘safeguards’. In 1972, Canada was the first country to bring into
force a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA for such
verification as required by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
The CNSC also is cooperating with the IAEA in developing new safeguards
approaches for Canadian facilities and contributes to efforts to
strengthen safeguards internationally. Through its regulatory process, the
CNSC ensures that all relevant licensees have in place policies and
procedures that include the reporting and monitoring of nuclear material
and nuclear activities and the provision of access to nuclear facilities
for IAEA safeguards inspectors. The CNSC performs compliance and auditing
activities to ensure that these policies and procedures remain sufficient
to meet safeguards requirements. Through its Safeguards Support Program,
the CNSC also assists the IAEA in developing advanced safeguards equipment
or techniques aimed at strengthening the effectiveness and efficiency of
safeguards implementation. The Program also supports domestic needs in
resolving specific safeguards issues related to Canadian nuclear
facilities and the use of nuclear material.
At all stages of the nuclear cycle, from uranium refining and
conversion sites to nuclear power plants and waste management facilities,
the CNSC has been actively working with the IAEA to design better
approaches for meeting Canada’s international obligations.
For example, since 2002, as a result of strengthened safeguards, there
has been a dramatic increase in the resources required to track transfers
of spent fuel to dry storage at multi-unit power reactor sites in Canada.
To address this issue, the CNSC collaborated with the IAEA and Ontario
Power Generation on a successful field trial at the Pickering reactor site
in April-May 2004 to test a more cost-effective approach to track
transfers of spent fuel to dry storage. All participants agreed that the
trial provided a feasible approach that could be implemented at any
multi-unit CANDU station.
The CNSC’s experience in this area led to an invitation to
participate in a similar field trial in April 2005 at a single-unit CANDU
station in the Republic of Korea. Participation in this field trial
reflects the CNSC’s ongoing efforts to optimize the national and
international implementation of safeguards. |
|