



HOUSE OF COMMONS  
CANADA

**FROM A MANAGEMENT CRISIS, TO BECOMING  
BETTER CRISIS MANAGERS:  
THE 2004 AVIAN INFLUENZA OUTBREAK IN  
BRITISH COLUMBIA**

**REPORT OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON  
AGRICULTURE AND AGRI-FOOD**

**PAUL STECKLE, M.P.**  
Chair

**April 2005**



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# **THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE AND AGRI-FOOD**

has the honour to present its

## **THIRD REPORT**

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), the Committee has undertaken a study on the Avian Flu. After hearing evidence, the Committee agreed to report to the House as follows:





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## CHAIR'S FOREWORD

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For sanitary reasons, it was not appropriate for the Standing Committee to travel to British Columbia during the avian influenza (AI) outbreak that affected the Fraser Valley region in February 2004. The Standing Committee did, however, hold a briefing session in March 2004 in Ottawa, and its agenda called for an eventual fact-finding mission to the region. When the Standing Committee reconvened at the beginning of the 38th Parliament, members unanimously agreed on 14 October 2004 to travel to British Columbia.

The Standing Committee held hearings on 18 and 19 January 2005 in Abbotsford on the devastating AI outbreak (see Appendix 1 for a chronology of events). Over 35 individuals, farming associations and officials from both federal and provincial governments appeared before the Standing Committee.

The fact-finding mission provided a public forum for stakeholders to discuss the lessons learned from the outbreak. Some analysts view that event as the possible precursor of an even more serious outbreak that could eventually have worldwide ramifications. The Standing Committee therefore believes that it is imperative that the lessons learned be well understood and put into action, rather than just being compiled in another bureaucratic document. They must become the basis for implementing an enhanced animal health crisis management system at the federal level, particularly considering that the increasingly integrated nature of animal and human health policies requires a renewed emergency preparedness level. The AI outbreak in British Columbia can be seen as a warning; serious new measures must be taken in anticipation of the “next time.”

The Standing Committee is pleased to present in these initial pages of its report some of the comments made by various stakeholders during the Abbotsford hearings:

The outbreak was a learning experience for Canada – why should the B.C. industry bear the brunt of inexperienced management? Hopefully the lessons learned, and the resulting changes in emergency management will prevent a similar experience from happening again! Our view is that the cost for this learning experience should be shared nationally.

Mr. Garnet Etsell, President  
B.C. Turkey Producers Association  
Hearings of the Standing Committee on  
Agriculture and Agri-Food on Avian  
Influenza  
Abbotsford, B.C.  
(Thereafter cited as “Hearings”)  
18 January 2005

It is the contention of the backyard farmers that the Avian Influenza outbreak and subsequent mutation from low to high pathogenic strain was a commercial industry problem with subsequent possible contamination of a single neighbouring backyard flock. Put in simple words, we believe that the backyard flocks have never been part of the problem but were made part of an inappropriate solution.

Barbara Fischer  
on behalf of the Committee of  
the Backyard Farmers Association  
Hearings, 18 January 2005

Proper management of AI is a public good as human and animal health authorities world-wide recognize the need to come to grips with AI. We believe one way Canada can act is by ensuring there are sufficient funds set aside to compensate for loss of birds and business interruption so nothing stands in the way of a quick, surgical pre-emptive cull.

Tim Lambert, Executive Director  
Canadian Egg Marketing Agency  
Presentation to the House of Commons  
Standing Committee on Agriculture and Agri-  
Food  
Abbotsford, B.C.  
18 January 2005

Proper management of AI is a public good as human and animal health authorities world-wide recognize the need to come to grips with AI. We believe one way Canada can act is by ensuring there are sufficient funds set aside to compensate for loss of birds and business interruption so nothing stands in the way of a quick, surgical pre-emptive cull.

Tim Lambert, Executive Director  
Canadian Egg Marketing Agency  
Hearings, 18 January 2005

It was not managed at the beginning as an emergency situation.

Don Beer, Fire Chief  
Hearings, 18 January 2005

Cleaning and disinfecting at CFIA requirements was a massive job at the charge of farmers, and these costs were not compensated.

Derek Janzen, President  
BC Egg Producers Association  
Hearings, 18 January 2005

Some of our breeding stocks that were depleted are irreplaceable.

Rob Donaldson  
Bradner Farms  
Hearings,  
18 January 2005

As far as the OIE and the European Union,(...) I would look at our outbreak and absolutely congratulate the CFIA for being able to do this in 90 days and not have it breach the valley. But I want you to know that the only reason that CFIA can declare victory is for two key events that happened. April 1st when the industry was invited to the table, there were 20 positive farms. It had breached the high-risk zone, it was out of control. The declaration of a provincial (pause)...getting a provincial emergency team totally changed the tide. We finally had a group of people that were in the business of managing outbreaks, or managing emergencies, and they started to rein this back in. But I want to tell you that the reason this was contained was because of this poultry industry, their dedication and commitment. They presented to CFIA a plan. The reason this was contained was because it was through their efforts of clearing the barns, of getting rid of the negative birds so the flu had nowhere to go, is the reason that this was contained, and I want to go on record as saying it was this industry that turned this around.

Dr. Victoria Bowes  
Hearings, 19 January 2005

If there is another outbreak? There should be a total lock-down – no movement of birds or manure. Compensation must be in place to allow drastic action.

Bruce Arabsky, Pollon Group  
On behalf of Primary Poultry  
Processors Association of BC  
Hearings, 19 January 2005

It is ludicrous that the disease was not contained in the Matsqui flat area. Again it is because of procrastination and lack of common sense. We spent a huge amount of time waiting for decisions to come from Ottawa, and most of the time local CFIA staff didn't know how to interpret those decisions.

Dr Neil Ambrose, DVM  
Hearings, 19 January 2005

The following report builds on these and many other practical suggestions, with the aim of preparing Canada to manage future animal health crises more effectively.

Paul Steckle  
Chair  
Standing Committee on Agriculture and Agri-Food

# **LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS**

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## **RECOMMENDATION 1**

**That an independent commission of inquiry be struck with the mandate to investigate the 2004 avian influenza outbreak in British Columbia. To prevent the reoccurrence of outbreaks, the commission must review the effectiveness of the emergency preparedness and implementation strategies that were deployed in British Columbia, regarding zoonotic diseases.**

## **RECOMMENDATION 2**

**That using the 2004 avian influenza outbreak in British Columbia as a benchmark, the Auditor General of Canada be asked to audit the effectiveness of various emergency preparedness strategies related to animal diseases, with an emphasis on strategies related to zoonotic diseases.**

## **RECOMMENDATION 3**

**That the Canadian Food Inspection Agency establish a “Special Animal Disease Response Team,” comprising CFIA, provincial and local experts, that can be quickly deployed with appropriate well-maintained equipment, and that is responsible for overseeing practices of emergency preparedness plans and procedures on a regular basis.**

## **RECOMMENDATION 4**

**That the Canadian Food Inspection Agency be required to present a cost-benefit analysis, by the end of 2005, on the need to have an increased number of Containment Level 3 facilities in Canada.**

## **RECOMMENDATION 5**

**That the Canadian Food Inspection Agency must ensure that its euthanasia techniques are compatible with internationally recognized humane best practices, and that its personnel conduct euthanasia exercises to remain well trained for carrying out these techniques.**

## **RECOMMENDATION 6**

**That, in its review of the existing compensation program under the *Health of Animals Act*, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency must ensure fairness and consistency among all types of production. In recognizing the intrinsic value of the genetic material so important to some industries, flexibility must be allowed in compensation. The Agency, in consultation with the affected industries, should also consider how equitable compensation might be offered for forgone income, and for one-time losses.**

## **RECOMMENDATION 7**

**That any industry recommendations/actions for a pre-emptive cull to limit the potential spread of an outbreak of animal disease must be submitted to the Canadian Food Inspection Agency. The Agency, in consultation with the affected provinces and industries, must be proactive and responsible for authorizing and supervising any such pre-emptive cull.**



# INTRODUCTION

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As a follow-up to the avian influenza outbreak of February 2004 in British Columbia's Fraser Valley, the B.C. Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries (BCMAFF), the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) and the B.C. poultry industry decided to organize a forum entitled "Avian Influenza — Lessons Learned and Moving Forward." On 27 and 28 October 2004, over 180 people participated in the Canadian Poultry Industry Forum in Abbotsford, B.C. They shared experiences and made recommendations covering four areas: the interface between animal and human health; biosecurity; enhanced emergency management; and industry and community economic recovery. The report on the Forum was tabled in December 2004 (see the list of recommendations in Appendix 2).

This comprehensive industry report and recommendations provide the basis for implementing new measures and policies aimed at improving the management of any eventual outbreak of animal disease in Canada. The report also served as a reference document for witnesses who appeared before the Standing Committee on 18 and 19 January 2005. By relating their own experiences to the information contained in the Forum report, witnesses were able to provide the Standing Committee with well-thought-out views that combined the immediacy of personal response with the advantages of hindsight and a broader context.

It became evident in the first hours of the hearings that two main themes would dominate the discussions. A large majority of witnesses raised these themes in relation to the role played by the CFIA during the AI outbreak:

- **Leadership** (or the lack thereof)
- **Communication** (or the absence of appropriate communication)

It was also evident that witnesses clearly understood that the Standing Committee, which has the mandate and powers to study and report on all matters relating to the mandate, management and operation of federal organizations concerned with agriculture and agri-food, was the appropriate open forum to continue the discussion on the role and approach of the CFIA throughout the outbreak.

If hindsight can provide a better view on a situation, it also offers more time to identify a target. For various reasons the CFIA has become that target. Many witnesses expressed to the Standing Committee — sometimes in a visceral way — their perceptions of various mismanagement practices during the crisis. For some, the management of the crisis became itself a management crisis. Already in the spotlight, the CFIA further exacerbated the debate by publishing on 17 January 2005 — the day before the Standing Committee hearings began in Abbotsford — its report entitled *Lessons Learned Review: The CFIA's Response to the 2004 Avian Influenza Outbreak in B.C.*<sup>1</sup> The report incorporates a series of commitments to respond to both the CFIA's internal review findings and those of the Canadian Poultry Industry Forum held in October 2004, and it offers a comprehensive and improved action plan for an enhanced emergency preparedness strategy. The timing of its release, however, has largely eclipsed its contents.

The objective of the present report is not to review the scientific issues of the outbreak or the entire list of “what went well and what went wrong,” but rather to concentrate on the most politically sensitive issues. The recommendations, therefore, mainly focus on the two themes most often mentioned by witnesses during the Standing Committee hearings.

## **LEADERSHIP**

### **A. Background**

The leadership issues raised during the Standing Committee hearings were closely related to jurisdictions — federal, provincial and local — and the relationship between officials of these jurisdictions.

Although it was recognized that the CFIA had the legal authority, scientific mandate and international responsibilities that qualified it to play the lead role and, as mentioned in the CFIA *Lessons Learned* document, that “the CFIA President had the ultimate accountability for the Agency's response to the outbreak,” many witnesses held that such a crisis should not have been managed from Ottawa. This centralization of decisions became a dominant theme during the hearings.

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<sup>1</sup> The report is dated 10 January 2005, but it was released one week later accompanied by a press release dated 17 January 2005.

## B. Leadership Means Being Prepared

British Columbia Minister of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries John van Dongen referred to the 2004 AI outbreak as the “Fraser Valley’s wildfire.” Canada had not responded to such a large-scale foreign animal disease outbreak (i.e., a disease that is not indigenous to Canada) since the 1952 foot and mouth outbreak. Federal-provincial response plans to animal health issues had become obsolete by 2004, and some witnesses saw this as the result of a lack of leadership over the years. In a world where public and animal health policies are closely related, public authorities must always be prepared to react quickly to animal diseases.

One of the lessons learned is clearly that “effective preparation for, and response to, foreign animal disease outbreaks in Canada must be seen as a shared responsibility.”<sup>2</sup> To identify and eradicate a disease, to compensate those affected by the outbreak, and to facilitate a quick return to normal operations require close collaboration between all levels of government, between agriculture and health authorities, and between industry and governments. Regular monitoring and updating of federal-provincial plans, such as the B.C. Foreign Animal Disease Eradication Support (FADES) plan, are imperative to ensure that shared responsibilities are well understood and respected. Management of a crisis such as the AI outbreak is a major challenge that requires decisive action by every stakeholder; focus and energy should not be dissipated through jurisdictional uncertainties.

Whether in responding to disease outbreaks, improving bio-security standards and their enforcement, or delivering economic recovery assistance, we need to strengthen partnerships, clarify mandates and accountabilities and align resources with objectives.

Rory McAlpine, Deputy Minister  
British Columbia Ministry of Agriculture,  
Food and Fisheries  
Hearings, 18 January 2005

Focus groups and participants who contributed to the CFIA *Lessons Learned* document<sup>3</sup> indicated that effective leadership was provided at multiple levels in the organization, and that one measure of effective leadership was the fact that the CFIA’s risk management decisions were supported by the industry.<sup>4</sup> But risk management leadership is not only a matter of making the right decisions during the course of a crisis; it is also, if not more, a matter of vision and preparedness. The

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<sup>2</sup> Rory McAlpine, Deputy Minister, British Columbia Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries, Hearings, 18 January 2005.

<sup>3</sup> Please consult Appendix 4 for an exhaustive list of participants.

<sup>4</sup> Canadian Food Inspection Agency, *Lessons Learned Review: The CFIA’s Response to the 2004 Avian Influenza Outbreak in B.C.*, Ottawa, 10 January 2005, p. 3.

relevant question to ask is then: if the CFIA had a lead role, why was the FADES plan, for instance, not up to date? The hearings did not provide a clear response to that question. Leadership, however, is a shared responsibility, and one may presume that both levels of government and, to a lesser extent, the industry, should bear part of the blame. This view is somewhat shared by the CFIA:

Recently we [the CFIA] have been criticized for our handling of the AI outbreak in BC. I am not going to deny that there were shortcomings which included the Agency. As I mentioned in Abbotsford, I think all those involved could have been better prepared.

Richard Fadden, President  
Canadian Food Inspection Agency  
Standing Committee on Agriculture  
and Agri-Food  
Meeting No. 21 — 15:35  
1st Session, 38th Parliament  
Ottawa, 8 February 2005

In its *Lessons Learned* document, the CFIA reviewed the following specific aspects of leadership: governance, collaborative arrangements, decision-making and accountability, which are exactly the same ones mentioned by witnesses before the Standing Committee. Furthermore, the following excerpt from the CFIA document, based on comments made by participants in the focus groups, also reflects in part the concerns and irritants described by witnesses to the Standing Committee:

Many participants felt that decision making could have been more localized and that the requirement for certain policy/strategic decisions to be made by the CFIA AI Executive group at headquarters impacted on the timeliness of decision-making. Others recognized that it was necessary for the AI outbreak to be managed as a national emergency with policy and domestic and international trade implications that extended beyond the province of B.C. Overall it was felt that the parameters around which decisions can be made locally (i.e. tactical) versus nationally (i.e. strategic) can be better defined. The lack of clarity may have contributed to the elevation of certain operational decisions to the national level.<sup>5</sup>

The CFIA *Lessons Learned* exercise resulted in three recommendations pertaining to leadership issues, to which the Agency responded.

- The first recommendation is on the review of protocols associated with the activation of local, area and national emergency response teams and on the roles and responsibilities, and decision-making accountabilities, at each level. The CFIA is currently reviewing the various levels of emergency response to

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<sup>5</sup> Ibid., p. 12.

ensure a consistent national approach, and it has invited Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada to participate in the review process. According to the CFIA, updated emergency response procedures and protocols should be recommended by the spring of 2005.

- The second recommendation is on the development of collaborative arrangements with Health Canada and the new Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) with the goal of increasing the federal capacity to respond to zoonotic<sup>6</sup> disease outbreaks. In its response, the CFIA mentioned that discussions have been launched with both Health Canada and the PHAC to develop an updated roles and responsibilities framework and a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on response to zoonotic disease outbreaks, including protocols for liaising with provincial health authorities. The framework and MOU will be ready by December 2005.
- Finally, the third recommendation concerns the ongoing development and practising of FADES plans in all provinces. The CFIA is committed to negotiating and finalizing agreements on this matter with all provinces and territories, and all FADES plans will contain a mandatory fixed schedule for their practice.

These three recommendations on the leadership issues, and the CFIA's responses, are certainly a step in the right direction. Unfortunately they are viewed as coming too late for the Fraser Valley poultry producers and citizens. Certainly, mistakes were made due to a certain lack of leadership during the 2004 AI outbreak in British Columbia. The Standing Committee hopes that the lessons learned will help avert similar mistakes in the future, because it is almost certain that there could be other outbreaks of animal diseases in the future. The main lesson learned by the people of the Fraser Valley is that proper management of AI, or other zoonotic diseases, is a matter of public health and safety, and it requires the proper reaction of public authorities. That realization prompted many witnesses at the hearings to request an independent inquiry into the mismanagement of the 2004 AI outbreak. Because of the integrated nature of human and animal diseases, and the high probability of other outbreaks, the Standing Committee endorses that request and therefore recommends:

## **RECOMMENDATION 1**

**That an independent commission of inquiry be struck with the mandate to investigate the 2004 avian influenza**

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<sup>6</sup> Zoonotic diseases are those transmissible from animals to humans.

**outbreak in British Columbia. To prevent the reoccurrence of outbreaks, the commission must review the effectiveness of the emergency preparedness and implementation strategies that were deployed in British Columbia, regarding zoonotic diseases.**

Furthermore, because it is important to look ahead and send guidelines to the government, the Standing Committee recommends:

## **RECOMMENDATION 2**

**That using the 2004 avian influenza outbreak in British Columbia as a benchmark, the Auditor General of Canada be asked to audit the effectiveness of various emergency preparedness strategies related to animal diseases, with an emphasis on strategies related to zoonotic diseases.**

### **C. Being Prepared Means Practising**

Conveners emphasized that there needs to be a collaborative approach to emergency management, that FADES plans need to be redesigned and there is a need to “Practice, Practice, Practice.”

Canadian Poultry Industry Forum report,  
*Avian Influenza — Lessons Learned and  
Moving Forward*, December 2004, p. 37

Another clear shortcoming that marked the AI outbreak is that some plans that were used had never been tested. The CFIA and the Province of British Columbia executed the existing emergency plans at the beginning of the outbreak, and the FADES was the plan that broadly guided the operations.

Many witnesses before the Standing Committee testified to a long list of situations that indicated a general lack of preparedness in the first, and most critical, days of the outbreak. For example: decisions were not always made based on science; infected carcasses were dumped in a large feed mixer not adapted to the disposal of such a volume of birds; infected carcasses were transported along a public road in unsealed containers; frequent delays in reaction worsened an already urgent situation; many vehicles left the high-risk zone without having their wheels sanitized. It was also mentioned that, while carbon dioxide (CO<sub>2</sub>) gas was chosen as the method of euthanasia for the first flock, a mobile electric stunning machine normally used for the euthanasia of spent commercial egg-laying hens was employed on the second farm. Some observers interpreted this as indicating that the CFIA was testing another method of euthanasia, and perceived it as a further sign of lack of preparedness.

A large majority of witnesses who appeared before the Standing Committee — many of whom had seen these questionable activities at first hand — stated that the beginning of the outbreak was marked by a series of decisions that revealed that emergency plans had not been practised for a while, if at all.

Despite the advantages of the quick diagnosis of AIV by the BCMAFF-AHC laboratory, the natural geographic boundaries (the index farm was bordered by a mountain and the Fraser River on two sides) and the on-farm provisions for self-quarantine, the authors speculate that biocontainment was not achieved due to the release of vast quantities of virus into the environment associated with the depopulation procedures employed and the delay in depopulating suspect positive farms until laboratory confirmation. Based on these observations, the depopulation methods employed during an outbreak of a highly infectious disease such as HPAI must not allow the opportunity for aerosol-assisted spread and the contamination of the environment, including roadways, people and vehicles.

Dave K. Loewen, Trevor R. De Jong  
Stewart J. Ritchie, Victoria A. Bowes  
*Brief Communication: A Producers Account  
of the Euthanasia and Depopulation  
Procedures at the First and Second Farms  
Diagnosed with Highly Pathogenic Avian  
Influenza in British Columbia in 2004.*  
Draft report tabled with the Standing  
Committee on Agriculture and Agri-Food,  
Abbotsford, B.C., 18 January 2005

Witnesses also raised questions in relation to the respective roles, responsibilities and decision-making accountabilities of the CFIA's area emergency response team (AERT), the national emergency response team (NERT), and the AI Executive group. There was evidence of confusion about which team had the lead and which decisions could be made locally as opposed to nationally. This lack of clarity also points clearly to a lack of practice.

When the lessons have been learned, the real test is yet to come. Exercises and dry runs must be part of an integrated emergency preparedness strategy, as recognized by the CFIA regarding the FADES plans (see Recommendation 3 in Appendix 3). The Canadian strategy in this matter should be inspired by the European Union, where simulation exercises within the framework of "avian pests" are regularly conducted using various methods of euthanasia on spent egg-laying flocks. During the Standing Committee hearings in Abbotsford, and later in Ottawa, the idea of a "Special Animal Disease Response Team" was raised. Such a team would not only be quickly operational when an outbreak occurs, but would also be in charge of conducting regular exercises with provincial partners to ensure that all those who may be called upon during an outbreak are well trained and that bureaucratic plans are in fact applicable. For instance, it was mentioned that February 2004 was the first time that the CFIA had used chemical euthanasia, in this case CO<sub>2</sub>, for a massive depopulation of birds in Canada. International scientific documents and field manuals all strongly recommend that chemical

euthanasia procedures be carried out only by trained individuals who are properly authorized to use the appropriate chemicals. The Standing Committee therefore recommends:

### **RECOMMENDATION 3**

**That the Canadian Food Inspection Agency establish a “Special Animal Disease Response Team,” comprising CFIA, provincial and local experts, that can be quickly deployed with appropriate well-maintained equipment, and that is responsible for overseeing practices of emergency preparedness plans and procedures on a regular basis.**

## **COMMUNICATION AND CONSULTATION**

### **A. The Overall Approach**

Many witnesses from the industry complained that the CFIA did not communicate information on protocols, procedures and compensation effectively to stakeholders. Another general complaint was that the CFIA excluded stakeholders and local authorities from discussions and meetings where important planning and logistics decisions were made that involved the poultry industry. The following excerpt from the CFIA *Lessons Learned* review reveals that focus groups consulted by the CFIA shared the same issues that witnesses raised before the Standing Committee:

As in most emergency response situations, the demand for information, briefings and reports quickly escalated throughout the *AI* outbreak. While protocols were in place to facilitate internal and external information flow, some focus group participants indicated that they were not satisfied with the timeliness and relevance of the information provided. In particular, laboratory testing results were identified as key information that was not being shared in a timely fashion. Problems with the *LSTS* (Laboratory Sample Tracking System) system described above and the requirement for laboratory results to be reported at the headquarters level prior to being forwarded to the local *EOC* (Emergency Operations Center) were identified as contributing to delays.

Overall it was recognized that a better anticipation of information needs and coordination of reporting activities could improve information flow. For example, the requirements of senior decision makers for information on the status of farms, number of birds depopulated, compensation costs etc. were entirely predictable. While situation reports were shared with federal and provincial partners, some felt that the information contained in these



reports was outdated. However, it was also noted that regular *AI* updates were being posted on the Agency's website.<sup>7</sup>

The shared jurisdiction and responsibility of the CFIA may be difficult to manage in some situations, and protecting the jurisdiction of one's organization is a normal reaction for a manager. However, at the same time, consultation and collaboration are imperative for a seamless strategy aimed at serving Canadians. As highlighted in its *Report on Plans and Priorities*, the CFIA recognizes the importance of a collaborative approach: "strong partnerships with other federal government departments, as well as provincial, territorial and municipal authorities are imperative to the Agency's success. All share responsibility for setting and/or enforcing standards that support the integrity of Canada's food safety, animal health and plant protection systems."<sup>8</sup>

The message heard by the Standing Committee in Abbotsford was that consultation and communication were problematic. For example, the CFIA did not always make adequate use of local resources such as veterinarians with vast expertise in poultry diseases, and it sometimes ignored industry suggestions on pre-emptive culls and disposal of carcasses.

The CFIA, however, told the Standing Committee that it consulted and communicated extensively. Agency officials stated that:

- The CFIA held 36 conference calls with the national and B.C. poultry associations between 9 March and 27 August 2004.
- The Agency held daily meetings with provincial and industry representatives at the Abbotsford Emergency Operations Centre, starting on 1 April 2004. As the pace of operations slowed, the meetings were reduced to three and two times per week until they were no longer necessary.
- Prior to April 1, several meetings on AI were held between the CFIA, BCMAFF and the industry.
- The industry and the province had representatives present in the CFIA's local Emergency Operations Centre in British Columbia from early April to late May.

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<sup>7</sup> Canadian Food Inspection Agency (2005), p. 15.

<sup>8</sup> Canadian Food Inspection Agency, *Report on Plans and Priorities 2005-2006*, Ottawa, p. 4.

- CFIA headquarters officials had eight face-to-face meetings with national and B.C. industry association representatives on a full range of issues, and responded to 118 letters and electronic messages from these groups. Several face-to-face sessions were also held in British Columbia with other levels of government, industry and the general public.
- The CFIA also held two open-house meetings in the Fraser Valley to promote understanding and provide practical demonstrations of biosecurity measures.<sup>9</sup>

Whether or not this is a dialogue of the deaf between the CFIA and stakeholders or, as stated by the CFIA President, “two ships passing in the night,” the CFIA has nevertheless recognized the communication and consultation issues and addressed them, notably in Recommendations 1 and 5 of the *Lessons Learned* review. The Committee is pleased with those recommendations, but will monitor their implementation in its future meetings with the CFIA.

## **B. Cooperation in Developing a Laboratory Network Within Canada**

During the AI outbreak in the Fraser Valley, samples were sent by plane to the Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health in Winnipeg. That Centre is located in Winnipeg precisely because it is approximately a midpoint in Canada. Although the Standing Committee recognized that this was probably the best approach during the outbreak, concerns were raised about the efficiency of such an approach, in terms of both cost and timing. At the Abbotsford hearings, an official from BCMAFF told the Standing Committee that the Ministry was in the process of upgrading its animal health laboratory to a Containment Level 3 facility. Three animal diagnosis laboratories are currently certified to work at Level 3 — Winnipeg, Nepean (Ottawa) and Lethbridge — and another is expected to be certified in Prince Edward Island.

The Standing Committee is aware that Level 3 facilities are very expensive to build. Maintenance costs are also high, not only for the infrastructure but also for the Level 3 operating process, especially if the facility is used just as a back-up in case of an emergency.

In its evaluation report on the outbreak, the European Commission recommended that:

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<sup>9</sup> Standing Committee on Agriculture and Agri-Food, Meeting No. 21 — 15:35, 1st Session, 38th Parliament, Ottawa, 8 February 2005.

The Central Competent Authority (CCA) should consider formalising the co-operation developed between the British Columbia Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and the National Centre for Foreign Animal Disease (NCFAD) and use this model to establish a laboratory network within Canada with the necessary capability to assist fully in any future outbreak of notifiable avian disease.<sup>10</sup>

In response to the EC recommendation, the CFIA noted that federal-provincial laboratory networks have been developed in Canada for federally reported diseases and for the purpose of information exchange among laboratory workers under the Canadian Animal Health Laboratorians Network. The CFIA also made a commitment in Recommendation 4 of its *Lessons Learned* review to improve its intelligence and information management capabilities “to ensure more timely and efficient management and transmission of field and laboratory data.” Since the CFIA’s Laboratory Sample Tracking System “crashed” several times during the AI outbreak, that recommendation is very appropriate. However, as mentioned in the foreword to this report, that outbreak might very well be followed by others in the near future. If so, an ever-tighter network of laboratories, including additional Level 3 facilities, might be required. Recognizing the importance of such a network, but also the potential costs associated with it, the Standing Committee recommends:

#### **RECOMMENDATION 4**

**That the Canadian Food Inspection Agency be required to present a cost-benefit analysis, by the end of 2005, on the need to have an increased number of Containment Level 3 facilities in Canada.**

#### **C. Allegations of Inhumane Treatment of Poultry**

During the Abbotsford hearings, some witnesses accused the CFIA of inhumane treatment of birds, either when euthanizing large groups of birds or when destroying backyard flocks. An incident involving the shooting of birds, and another one involving the clubbing of birds to death, were reported to the Standing Committee. Some witnesses also questioned the use of CO<sub>2</sub> on waterfowl such as ducks. According to a witness from the Specialty Birds Association, 100,000 ducks and geese were gassed with CO<sub>2</sub>, which the Association asserted was not an acceptable humane euthanasia method for waterfowl.

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<sup>10</sup> European Commission — Health and Consumer Protection Directorate General, *Final Report of a Mission Carried Out In Canada from 5 to 9 July 2004 Concerning the Control of the Avian Influenza Epidemic*, DGg(SANCO)/7323/2004-MR-Final, 3 November 2004, p. 21.

The CFIA President clarified these allegations in a subsequent appearance before the Standing Committee, at which he emphasized that CFIA veterinarians are trained to handle and euthanize animals humanely:

Throughout the entire crisis, we worked closely with the SPCA and provincial and private veterinarians. SPCA inspectors were regularly consulted and kept aware of the CFIA's challenges and decision-making. Various alternatives for depopulation were considered in consultation with the B.C. SPCA.

We determined that carbon [dioxide (CO<sub>2</sub>)] gas, an internationally recognized humane method for euthanizing large groups of birds, including ducks, would be [the] main method for depopulating.

It has been suggested that untrained agency staff shot peacocks. Unfortunately, peacocks that could not be caught and euthanized with CO<sub>2</sub> had to be shot. We made sure that this was done as humanely as possible, and these animals were killed only by properly trained provincial conservation officers.

It has also been suggested in the media that agency staff had been caught clubbing birds to death. I had this investigated. In fact, agency staff stopped contract employees doing this. They were stopped, and as a result, every euthanization operation subsequently had agency supervisors on site.

Richard Fadden, President  
Canadian Food Inspection Agency  
Standing Committee on  
Agriculture and Agri-Food  
Meeting No. 21 — 15:35  
1st Session, 38th Parliament  
Ottawa, 8 February 2005

While the above statement provides answers to some of the comments made by witnesses before the Standing Committee, the issue of the use of CO<sub>2</sub> as an appropriate humane euthanasia method on ducks remains unclear. The witnesses did not support their statements with precise scientific references, but the Standing Committee found various scientific sources, such as Dr. Mohan Raj, Senior Research Fellow at the Department of Clinical Veterinary Science, University of Bristol, that question the use of CO<sub>2</sub> on waterfowl. One source clearly states that CO<sub>2</sub> is not acceptable for waterfowl,<sup>11</sup> while the Scientific Committee on Animal Health and Welfare of the European Commission, in a report adopted on 23 June 1998, describes various methods using CO<sub>2</sub> as “unlikely to be acceptable on humanitarian grounds for ducks.”<sup>12</sup> The European Commission report mentions that

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<sup>11</sup> Center for Animal Welfare, College of Agricultural and Environmental Sciences, University of California, Davis, *Euthanasia of Poultry: Considerations for Producers, Transporters, and Veterinarians*, <http://animalwelfare.ucdavis.edu/publication/poultryeuth.html>.

<sup>12</sup> [http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/fs/sc/scah/out08\\_en.html](http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/fs/sc/scah/out08_en.html).

“there is evidence that Argon alone or Argon/ CO<sub>2</sub> mixtures may be used satisfactorily for domestic ducks.”

It is not the role of the Standing Committee to make a review of scientific literature; but clearly euthanasia techniques are changing over time, and some may become unacceptable and be replaced by new procedures as more scientific data are gathered and evaluated. In its AI policy comparison sent to the Standing Committee, the CFIA recognizes that “other gases and procedures will be tested for waterfowl to resolve the issue of ducks not responding well to CO<sub>2</sub>.” The Standing Committee is pleased with that approach but wants to ensure that continuous learning will be part of the action plan. The Standing Committee therefore recommends:

### **RECOMMENDATION 5**

**That the Canadian Food Inspection Agency must ensure that its euthanasia techniques are compatible with internationally recognized humane best practices, and that its personnel conduct euthanasia exercises to remain well trained for carrying out these techniques.**

## **ECONOMIC IMPACTS**

### **A. Overview**

The AI outbreak resulted in the slaughtering of approximately 17 million birds in the Fraser Valley, or 90% of the estimated population. As of December 2004, the Agency had received more than 1,130 requests for compensation and paid out about \$63.5 million. It is estimated that the loss of employment was roughly 3,000 full-time equivalent person years.

According to an economic impact study commissioned by the B.C. Poultry Industry Economic Impact Committee and conducted by Edmonton-based Serecon Management Consulting,<sup>13</sup> the depopulation of 125 poultry operations made up of commercial and backyard flocks of chickens, turkeys, ducks, geese, and other birds had dramatic impacts on both the short-term and long-term economic welfare of the industry and the provincial economy. Serecon divided the total impacts in three types:

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<sup>13</sup> Serecon Management Consulting Inc, *Economic Impacts on British Columbia Poultry Industry Due to the Avian Influenza Outbreak*, Final Report, Edmonton, 19 August 2004.

## **1. Direct Impacts**

Direct financial impacts on the entire poultry industry are estimated at \$216.9 million. This sum comprises loss in output (farm gate receipts) with respect to breeding and grower operations, plus the cost impacts on hatching and processing activities, as relevant, within each industry sector. These impacts occurred primarily in 2004, with some residual impacts to be felt in 2005 and 2006. Direct impacts in the first year (to the end of March 2005) were calculated at \$201.8 million, or 93% of the total direct impacts.

## **2. Secondary Impacts**

Secondary impacts are estimated at \$156.4 million. They have been determined using economic multipliers based on the poultry industry, developed from the B.C. government input-output model. They measure the impacts on wage re-spending and secondary impacts on other industries, both upstream and downstream in the economy.

## **3. One-Time Losses**

One-time losses total \$7.5 million. This amount reflects the industry's costs for cleaning and disinfecting, biosecurity, coordination and public relations.

The total economic impacts are the sum of these three types of costs, or \$380.8 million.

## **B. Review of Compensation Under the Health of Animals Act**

The amount of compensation allocated for destroyed animals or birds as a result of an outbreak was raised at the Standing Committee hearings of January 2005, in a recommendation of the Canadian Poultry Industry Forum of October 2004, and in a CFIA recommendation resulting from its *Lessons Learned* review.

The incapacity of the *Health of Animals Act* to distinguish between the specifics of different industries, the lack of recognition of the value of genetic material and rare breeding stocks, and the absence of compensation for forgone income, are not new issues to the Standing Committee. During the scrapie outbreak in 1998, the Standing Committee urged the Minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food to increase the maximum compensation for sheep in order to better reflect the market value of purebred animals. Other issues relating to regulations under the *Health of Animals Act*, such as the cost of cleaning and disinfection and the cost of maintaining animals while in quarantine, were raised in 1998 and appear to be as current now as they were then.

One witness before the Standing Committee claimed that the CFIA was reopening the specialty bird compensation file just because the Standing Committee had planned a fact-finding mission to Abbotsford. Notwithstanding that statement, the Standing Committee is certainly pleased to see that the CFIA is currently preparing to examine elements of the compensation program, including maximum compensation amounts and the periodic review of the schedule of values under the *Compensation for Destroyed Animals Regulations*. As in 1998, the Standing Committee is concerned that there be fair and consistent compensation among industries, and that the value of genetic material be recognized. The Standing Committee therefore recommends:

## **RECOMMENDATION 6**

**That, in its review of the existing compensation program under the *Health of Animals Act*, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency must ensure fairness and consistency among all types of production. In recognizing the intrinsic value of the genetic material so important to some industries flexibility must be allowed in compensation. The Agency, in consultation with the affected industries, should also consider how equitable compensation might be offered for forgone income, and for one-time losses.**

### **C. Pre-emptive Culls**

Another element related to government compensation pertains to pre-emptive culls recommended by some industries, notably the Canadian Egg Marketing Agency and the B.C. Specialty Birds Association. According to those organizations, protocols should allow pre-emptive culls even before tests are confirmed by a federal laboratory. Decisions on a pre-emptive cull would be based on symptoms in birds and the clinical experience of veterinarians.

One of the four Canadian Poultry Industry Forum recommendations that has been added to the CFIA's own list of recommendations concerns "the feasibility of establishing a pre-emptive cull program for suspect cases of AI to limit the potential spread of the disease." This would require amendments to the *Health of Animals Act* in terms of the threshold required to allow for the destruction of animals and the triggering of compensation. One major difficulty in amending the Act is that pre-emptive cull thresholds must be based on reasonable probabilities, in order to avoid undue waste of taxpayers' money every time an animal disease occurs in the country. The Standing Committee is, however, pleased to see that the CFIA and the industry are collaborating in examining proposals for pre-emptive slaughter, and that vaccination protocols are also being considered as an alternative to pre-emptive culls.

Pre-emptive culls are a controversial measure. The Standing Committee was made aware of allegations by the Vancouver Humane Society that the poultry industry had proposed to take responsibility for depopulating flocks without consulting the CFIA in the event of future outbreaks. For various ethical and legislative reasons, and in light of Canada's excellent international reputation regarding animal disease control, the Standing Committee cannot support such a unilateral approach to pre-emptive culls. The Committee therefore recommends:

## **RECOMMENDATION 7**

**That any industry recommendations/actions for a pre-emptive cull to limit the potential spread of an outbreak of animal disease must be submitted to the Canadian Food Inspection Agency. The Agency, in consultation with the affected provinces and industries, must be proactive and responsible for authorizing and supervising any such pre-emptive cull.**

## **CONCLUSION**

The CFIA has recognized that there were shortcomings in the handling of the 2004 AI outbreak in British Columbia. In fact, all stakeholders could have been better prepared. This situation, however, is typical of all kinds of crises: no matter how careful the preparation, there are always uncontrollable events.

Canada's comprehensive and responsive food safety system is well recognized on the international scene, and our country is respected for its capacity to address challenges to that safety system. This capacity is noted in the conclusion to the final report of the European Commission mission to Canada concerning the control of the avian influenza epidemic:

The effort made to control the AI outbreak has been considerable and great commitment/technical ability was demonstrated on-the-spot. Innovative measures and improved procedures were used that were not foreseen in the current contingency plan and a number of areas were identified that required improvement.

The Standing Committee is convinced that the stakeholders' input and recommendations that emerged from the Canadian Poultry Industry Forum held in Abbotsford on 27-28 October 2004, the CFIA's own *Lessons Learned* review, and the present report and its recommendations based on witnesses' comments during the Standing Committee's fact-finding mission to Abbotsford in January 2005, provide a comprehensive and effective list of measures that will help begin to build an even stronger emergency preparedness system. The Standing Committee believes that the best management approach to take for the CFIA, the provinces



and the industry is to keep learning, building on and, most of all, sharing what has been learned from the 2004 AI outbreak.



# APPENDIX 1

## CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS — AVIAN INFLUENZA OUTBREAK

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### February 2004

<i>16 February – First farm quarantined</i>	British Columbia Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries detects AI in a polymerase chain reaction (PCR) test and quarantines the farm.
<i>19 February – First case of AI confirmed</i>	The CFIA receives test results confirming the presence of AI on the farm. The entire flock, consisting of approximately 16,000 birds, is depopulated.
<i>20 February – Surveillance program established</i>	The CFIA launches a surveillance program of all poultry farms within a 5-km radius of the farm. The AI virus is identified as the low pathogenic form.

### March 2004

<i>9 March – Second farm quarantined</i>	Further tests reveal that both low and high pathogenic forms of the AI virus were present on the first farm. The CFIA announces the quarantine of a second farm where low levels of illness have been detected. The birds are depopulated three days later after the presence of AI is confirmed.
<i>11 March – Control Area established</i>	In an attempt to control the spread of AI, Bob Speller, the Minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food, designates the Fraser Valley south of the Fraser River as a Control Area. The Control Area consists of a High-Risk Region (approximately 5 km around the first two infected farms) and a Surveillance Region (approximately 10 km surrounding the infected farms). Controls are put on the movement of birds in captivity, products or by-products of birds, and anything that has been exposed to a bird, into or out of the Control Area.

<i>24 March – Flocks in High-Risk Region to be culled and outbreak declared an emergency</i>	Five commercial farms and two backyard flocks have been confirmed to have AI. The CFIA announces that it will depopulate all the flocks in the High-Risk Region of the Fraser Valley (275,000 birds) in an effort to control the spread of infection. The outbreak is declared an emergency.
<i>29 March – Farm outside High-Risk Region quarantined</i>	AI has been detected on six farms in the High-Risk Region. A farm outside the High-Risk Region is put under quarantine as a precautionary measure.
<i>31 March</i>	A total of 20 commercial farms and 6 backyard flocks have tested positive for AI within the Control Area.

#### **April 2004**

<i>5 April – All flocks in Control Area to be depopulated</i>	On the recommendation of the CFIA, the Province of British Columbia and the poultry industry, Minister Speller announces the depopulation of all commercial poultry flocks and other backyard birds in the Control Area (approximately 19 million birds). Birds from non-infected farms will be processed under full inspection and be made available for sale. Access to farms is further controlled.
<i>8 April – Movement restrictions changed to allow sale of non-infected birds</i>	Movement restrictions within the Fraser Valley Control Area are changed to allow products from the Control Area to be shipped across Canada. Poultry that tests negative for AI will be sent to market.
<i>29 April</i>	By this time, AI has been detected on 40 commercial farms and 10 smaller premises. Depopulation of poultry continues on a priority basis.

#### **May 2004**

<i>25 May</i>	AI has been detected on 42 farms and in 11 backyard flocks, all of which have been depopulated.
<i>28 May – Depopulation suspended</i>	The CFIA suspends depopulation after slaughtering approximately 17 million birds in the Fraser Valley (90% of the estimated population).

#### **June 2004**

<i>8 June – CFIA introduces a compensation package for birds that were depopulated</i>	Most of the birds that were slaughtered were able to go through normal commercial markets and receive market value. The CFIA introduces a compensation package for individuals who were unable to recover market value for their slaughtered birds.
<i>11 June – Containment phase concluded</i>	The initial containment response is concluded, and the response is now entering the recovery phase. Movement controls on birds and bird products are still in effect.
<i>21 June – Cleaning and disinfection of premises in the High-Risk Region completed, restocking outside of High-Risk Region is allowed</i>	All premises in the High-Risk Region have been cleaned and disinfected. Owners must wait 21 days before restocking their farms. Farms outside the High-Risk Region may be restocked.

#### **July 2004**

<i>9 July – All premises in the High-Risk Region are allowed to restock their farms</i>	
<i>26 July – The CFIA compensates owners of destroyed birds</i>	As of 14 December, the Agency had received more than 1,130 compensation requests and paid out approximately \$63.5 million.

#### **August 2004**

<i>18 August – Control Area eliminated</i>	The Control Area established to contain the outbreak of AI in the Fraser Valley has been eliminated and all domestic movement restrictions placed on birds and bird products have been lifted. Export restrictions remain in effect until further notice from importing countries.
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## APPENDIX 2

# SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE CANADIAN POULTRY INDUSTRY FORUM

36		REPORT ON THE CANADIAN POULTRY INDUSTRY FORUM
<p><b>Summary of Recommendations from the Forum</b></p> <p>The following recommendations were summarized during the Forum and presented to participants by Ross Husdon, Forum Coordinator. Participants agreed</p>		<p>that these were the necessary “next steps” in the four areas addressed by the panels. These recommendations will be further developed and implemented by individuals and teams in industry and government. Proposed “leads” for each project are noted in column two.</p>
<b>1. ANIMAL AND HUMAN HEALTH INTERFACE – ACTION</b>		<b>LEAD ORGANIZATION/S</b>
a. Convene first Animal Health/Public Health Forum		CFIA/Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC)
b. Animal and public health experts to combine capabilities to generate better integrated knowledge about zoonotic diseases		CFIA/PHAC
c. Establish protocols including occupational health measures that ensure animal outbreaks are investigated and controlled through a team approach encompassing animal and human health.		CFIA, PHAC, Health Canada (HC) Workplace Health and Public Safety Program (WHPSP) and Provincial agencies
<b>2. BIOSECURITY – ACTION</b>		
a. Establish a multi-stakeholder working group to develop national biosecurity standards and options for effective implementation		AAFC/Industry
b. Implement renewed biosecurity standards		Industry
c. Examine the feasibility of establishing a pre-emptive destruction policy and develop tools and approaches for rapid pre-emptive culls (BC Industry Emergency Response Plan)		CFIA, AAFC, Industry
<b>3. ENHANCED EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT – ACTION</b>		
a. Update FADES plan by implementing lessons learned and increasing emphasis on zoonotic potential of some diseases		BC Government/CFIA. CFIA to undertake with all provinces
b. Consult with BC Livestock Industries and other stakeholders to improve awareness of the FADES plan		CFIA and BC Government
c. Complete and adopt the Industry Emergency Response Plan		BC Industry
d. Develop a national mortality disposal strategy for all livestock specialties		CFIA/Industry
<b>4. INDUSTRY AND COMMUNITY ECONOMIC RECOVERY – ACTION</b>		
a. Undertake a review, in consultation with stakeholders, of the compensation policy available under the Health of Animals Act		CFIA
b. Maintain a periodic review process for the Health of Animals Act schedule of values including new types of farmed animals		CFIA
c. Government-Industry cooperation in the recovery phase to be enhanced by creating an integrated network of support services (financial, social, etc).		BCMAFF
d. Examine opportunities to mitigate community and allied trade economic impacts		BCMAFF
e. Develop and implement Industry Risk Management Insurance Plan		Industry

Source: Poultry Industry Forum, *Avian Influenza — Lessons Learned and Moving Forward*, Abbotsford (B-C), December 2004, p. 36.





## APPENDIX 3

# COMPLETE RECOMMENDATIONS AND CFIA RESPONSES

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The 12 recommendations and responses formulated in the CFIA's *Lessons Learned Review: The CFIA's Response to the 2004 Avian Influenza Outbreak in B.C.*, and the additional 4 recommendations and CFIA responses that emerged from the Canadian Poultry Industry Forum held on 27-28 October 2004 in Abbotsford, are as follows.

### CFIA Recommendations and Responses from the *Lessons Learned Review*

1. *The CFIA should review protocols associated with the activation of local, area and national emergency response teams and formalize the roles and responsibilities, and decision-making accountabilities at each level.*

**CFIA Response:** Activation protocols for the various levels of emergency response are currently being reviewed by the Agency to ensure a nationally consistent approach. The CFIA is also reviewing the structure and function of its area and national emergency response teams to more clearly define the roles, responsibilities and delegated decision-making authorities at all levels. Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada has been invited to participate in this review process. It is anticipated that updated emergency response structures and protocols will be recommended by the spring of 2005.

2. *The CFIA should develop collaborative arrangements with Health Canada and the new Public Health Agency of Canada to increase federal capacity to respond to zoonotic disease outbreaks.*

**CFIA Response:** The CFIA has initiated discussions with Health Canada and the new Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) regarding collaborative arrangements for response to zoonotic disease outbreaks. The Agency will work with both Health Canada and PHAC to develop an updated roles and responsibilities framework and a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) which will include an appendix considering response to zoonotic disease outbreaks, by December 2005. It is expected that this appendix to the MOU will also include protocols for liaising with provincial health authorities.

3. *The CFIA should engage stakeholders in the ongoing development and exercising of FADES plans in all provinces/territories.*

**CFIA Response:** The CFIA is currently developing a common template for FADES agreements which will be used to negotiate and finalize new or revised agreements with all provinces and territories. It is expected that the template will be completed by February 2005 and that consultations with partners and stakeholders will begin in March 2005. A fixed schedule for exercising the agreements will be a mandatory component of all FADES plans.

4. *The CFIA should develop the relevant IM/IT capabilities to ensure more timely and efficient management and transmission of field and laboratory data (including geographic information) during an animal disease response.*

**CFIA Response:** The CFIA will develop and implement an action plan that includes both short-term and longer-term IM/IT solutions to improve information management during emergency response situations. As an interim measure, the Agency has also developed partnerships with other departments and agencies to obtain GIS services.

5. *The CFIA should improve information flow during an emergency response by:*

- *Identifying a functional cell within the Agency's emergency response structure to anticipate and manage information needs and reporting;*
- *Developing and implementing protocols for the appropriate release of key information (e.g. laboratory results) at both the national and field level; and*
- *Addressing information sharing issues through pre-established agreements or protocols.*

**CFIA Response:** Based on the lessons learned from both avian influenza and BSE, the CFIA will be developing options to address information management and sharing issues. Protocols will be developed to improve both internal and external information flow. These protocols will be incorporated into new and updated FADES agreements as appropriate.

6. *The CFIA should review its emergency management approach to incorporate the lessons learned from AI and, where appropriate, best practices used by partner agencies (e.g. Incident Command System).*

**CFIA Response:** The CFIA is currently reviewing the structure and function of its area and national emergency response teams to incorporate lessons learned from both the avian influenza and BSE incidents. Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada has been invited to participate in this review process, which will include an evaluation of the Incident Command System (ICS) approach. It is anticipated that updated emergency response structures and protocols will be recommended by the spring of 2005.

7. *The CFIA should formalize the advance planning function within its emergency management structure and ensure the integration of disease control experts (including public health experts) within this planning cell.*

**CFIA Response:** The CFIA's upcoming review of its emergency management structures and protocols will address the identified need to formalize the Agency's advance planning function during an emergency response situation. The development of a framework with Health Canada and the new Public Health Agency of Canada regarding collaborative arrangements for response to zoonotic disease outbreaks will also help to ensure the integration of public health experts into this planning cell.

8. *The CFIA should clarify the respective bio-safety responsibilities of the Agency and public health authorities in the response to zoonotic disease outbreaks.*

**CFIA Response:** The CFIA will review the applicable occupational health and safety protocols which are designed to ensure the health and safety of CFIA employees and contracted staff. The CFIA will also work with Health Canada and the Public Health Agency of Canada to identify and address biosafety issues which impact on the broader community.

9. *The CFIA should encourage the poultry industry's development of bio-security programs.*

**CFIA Response:** The CFIA will assist the poultry industry in their development of biosecurity programs by providing a technical review and assessment of the industry's proposed standards and plans. The Agency will be meeting with representatives of the poultry industry in January 2005 to discuss progress and next steps.

10. *The CFIA should conduct a review of compensation policies under the Health of Animals Act.*

**CFIA Response:** The CFIA is currently preparing to conduct a review of elements of the compensation program, including maximum compensation amounts. It is anticipated that this review will be completed in 2005.

11. *The CFIA should maintain a periodic review process for the schedule of values included in the Compensation for Destroyed Animals Regulations.*

**CFIA Response:** The CFIA will conduct a review of elements of the compensation program in 2005. Included in this review will be an assessment of the periodic review process for the schedule of values included in the *Compensation for Destroyed Animals Regulations*.

12. *The CFIA should review the procedures for providing HR, finance, IM/IT and administrative support to EOCs and develop standard operating procedures to support each of these functions.*

**CFIA Response:** The CFIA's Human Resource and Corporate Services Branches have each initiated reviews of their emergency response support procedures. It is anticipated that both branches will have standard operating procedures in place by the spring of 2005.



### **Canadian Poultry Industry Forum Recommendations and CFIA Responses**

13. *Convene the first animal health/public health forum. (CFIA/Public Health Agency of Canada)*

**CFIA Response:** The CFIA supports this recommendation, and will be initiating discussions early in 2005 with the Public Health Agency of Canada to discuss this forum, develop objectives and proposed outcomes and determine how to organize.

14. *Implement a national AI survey for domestic poultry. Co-ordinate surveillance of wild fowl with the Canadian Wildlife Service. (CFIA/Canadian Wildlife Service)*

**CFIA Response:** The CFIA's development and implementation of a small scale AI surveillance plan is well under way. The expectation is that samples will be collected in the spring of 2005. The development of a longer term plan for the active and ongoing surveillance of the commercial poultry industry is also underway.

The CFIA will be undertaking consultations with the Canadian Wildlife Service, Parks Canada and the Canadian Cooperative Wildlife Health Center to define the potential costs and benefits of wildlife surveillance.

*15. Examine the feasibility of establishing a pre-emptive cull program for suspect cases of AI to limit the potential spread of the disease. (CFIA/Poultry Industry)*

**CFIA Response:** The CFIA will work with industry to examine proposals for pre-emptive slaughter. A preliminary meeting with national poultry representatives is scheduled for January 2005. The CFIA will also investigate vaccination protocols as an alternative to pre-emptive culls.

*16. Develop a national disposal strategy for all livestock species. (CFIA/Livestock Industries)*

**CFIA Response:** The CFIA will continue to work with provincial and territorial governments, AAFC and livestock industries towards the development of a national disposal strategy for all livestock species. Disposal options in all areas of Canada are currently being examined by a federal/provincial/territorial agri-food inspection committee. The findings of this committee will support the development of a national disposal strategy.



# APPENDIX 4

## LIST OF PARTICIPANTS TO THE CFIA LESSONS LEARNED REVIEW

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15 April 2005

### Focus Groups for the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) *Lessons Learned Review:* *The CFIA's Response to the 2004 Avian Influenza Outbreak in B.C.*

Eight focus group sessions were conducted in both Ottawa and British Columbia as part of the preparation of the *Lessons Learned Review*.

The following groups participated in the **Ottawa** focus group sessions:

- CFIA — Avian Influenza Executive Group (Section 1)
- CFIA — National Emergency Response Team (Section 2)
- Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (Section 3)
- National Poultry Industry Associations (Section 4)
- Laboratories — CFIA and B.C. Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries (Section 5)

The following groups participated in the **British Columbia** focus groups:

- CFIA — Area Emergency Response Team (Section 6)
- B.C. Poultry Industry Associations (Section 7)
- CFIA/Health Canada Joint Session with B.C. Partners (Section 8)

In addition to the focus groups, directed interviews were conducted with senior managers from the CFIA, as well as Health Canada and the Privy Council Office (Section 9).

**Avian Influenza Lessons Learned Initiative**

**Ottawa Focus Group with CFIA - AI Executive Group Invitees**

**Date: Monday Sept. 13, 2004**

**Location: CFIA HQ**

<b>Name</b>	<b>Title</b>
Richard B. Fadden	President, CFIA
Dr. André Gravel	Executive Vice-President
Dr. Brian Evans	Chief Veterinary Officer of Canada
Robert Carberry	Vice-President, Programs
Peter Brackenridge	Vice-President, Operations
Dr. Judith Bosse	Vice-President, Science
Sandra Lavinge	Executive Director, Public Affairs
Paul Haddow	Executive Director, International Affairs
Gloria Mintah	Legal Counsel, Legal Services
Fiona Spencer	Vice-President, Human Resources
Kristine Stolarik	Executive Director, Liaison, Preparedness and Policy Coordination
Bill Anderson	Acting Director, Animal Health and Production Division
Doug Steadman	Executive Director, Atlantic Area, Operations
Jim Clark	Senior Staff Veterinarian, Animal Health and Production
Marnie Ascott	Executive Assistant to President



**Avian Influenza Lessons Learned Initiative  
Ottawa Focus Group Invitees  
CFIA National Emergency Response Team (NERT)**

**Date: Friday Sept. 3, 2004**

<b>Representative</b>	<b>Branch/Title</b>
Jim Clark	Senior Staff Veterinarian, Program Network
Carolyn Inch	National Manager, Animal Health Program
Gary Thiessen	Acting Chief, Meat Programs
Doug Steadman	Executive Director, Atlantic Area, Operations
Shane Morris	Operations Coordination Officer, Operations Coordination
Denis Allard	Senior Medical Advisor, Science
Denis Guitor	Manager, Office of Emergency Management
Lorraine Maissonneuve (for Wayne Outhwaite)	Director, Human Resources Operations Division
Matt Gaetz	Administrative Coordinator, Operations Coordination
Steve Palisek	Operations Coordination Officer, Operations Coordination
Sophie Bainbridge (alternate for Gary Paradis)	Manager, Monitoring and Financial Policy
Christianne Poirier	Chief Information Officer
Ward Chickoski	Director, Corporate Communications: Public Affairs
Jane Dudley	Legal Counsel, Legal Services
Claudine Page	Bilateral Relations Officer, International Affairs
Gilles Dulac	Senior Veterinarian, Disease Control

**Avian Influenza Lessons Learned Initiative  
Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC)  
Focus Group Invitees**

<b>PSEPC Official</b>	<b>Title</b>
Cameron Bouchard	Geomatics Officer
Donovan Arnaud	Director, Plans and Readiness Division, Operations Branch
Natalie Dole	Analyst, Incident Analysis
Richard Sarabura	Senior Programs Officer
Paul Crober	A/ Regional Director

**Avian Influenza Lessons Learned Initiative  
National Industry Associations Invitees**

	<b>Representative</b>	<b>Organization</b>
1.	Kristine Stolarik	CFIA
2.	Paul Haddow	Executive Director, International Affairs
3.	Ed De Jong	Canadian Broiler Hatching Egg Marketing Agency
4.	Bryan Walton	Canadian Council of Grocery Distributors
5.	Peter Clarke	Canadian Egg Marketing Agency
6.	Giuseppe Caminiti	Canadian Poultry & Egg Processors Council
7.	Stephanie Jones	Canadian Restaurant and Food Services Association
8.	Phil Boyd	Canadian Turkey Marketing Agency
9.	Lisa Bishop	Chicken Farmers of Canada
10	Robert de Valk	Further Poultry Processors Association of Canada
11	Matt Taylor	Canadian Animal Health Coalition

**Avian Influenza Lessons Learned Initiative  
Laboratory Focus Group Invitees**

**Tuesday August 24, 2004  
10:30-1:00**

<b>Representatives</b>	<b>Organization/Branch</b>
Liz Singh	CFIA - Science, Laboratories Directorate
Paul Kitching	CFIA - National Center for Foreign Animal Disease
Peter Wright	CFIA - National Center for Foreign Animal Disease
Ron Lewis	Director, BC MAFF, Abbotsford
Grant Maxie	CFIA - Laboratories Directorate
Stephen Norman	CFIA - Science - Biosecurity/Transport
Gilles Dulac	CFIA - Programs
Christine Power	CFIA - Epidemiology
Stuart Wilson	CFIA, Operations
Denis Guitor	CFIA, Liaison, Preparedness and Policy Coordination
Alice Bouffard	CFIA, Vet Biologics

**Avian Influenza Lessons Learned Initiative  
British Columbia Focus Group Invitees**

**British Columbia Emergency Operations Centre (BCEOC)**

**Date: Thursday, Sep. 23, 2004  
Location: Garibaldi Room, R/O, Burnaby, BC**

	<b>Representative</b>	<b>CFIA Branch/Position</b>
1.	Phil Amundson	Operations - Executive Director
2.	Stuart Wilson	Operations - Regional Director
3.	Vance McEachren	Operations - Regional Director
4.	Dr. Ken Stepuchyn	Programs - Animal Health
5.	Dr. Wayne Lees	Programs - Epidemiologist
6.	Dr. Sandra Stephens	Programs
7.	Dr. Cornelius Kiley	Programs - Animal Health / Media Spokesperson
8.	Gaetan Levesque	Occupational Safety & Health
9.	Dr. Jim McClendon	Operations - Outbreak Field Manager
10.	Andrea Dropko	Duty Officer
11.	Bob Jackson	Duty Officer
12.	Bruce Clarkson	Operations - Field Supervisor
13.	Dave Zeust	Operations - Field Supervisor
14.	Gordon Zosiuk	Operations - Staff Coordination
15.	Dana Mosher	Operations - Lab logistics

**Avian Influenza Lessons Learned Initiative  
British Columbia Focus Group**

**British Columbia Industry Associations Invitees**

**Date: Thursday Sept. 23, 2004  
Location: CFIA Burnaby Regional Office**

	<b>Organization</b>	<b>Representative</b>
1	Fraser Valley Association of Specialty Bird Producers	Everet Van Den Born Ken Falk Rob Donaldson
2	Poultry Industry Liaison at BCEOC	Marvin Friesen
3	BC Poultry Council	Ray Nickel
4	BC Egg Producers	Peter M. Whitlock Derek Jensen
5	BC Hatching Eggs	Jeff Regier George Gray
6	BC Chicken Marketing Board	Bill Vanderspek
7	BC Turkey Marketing Board	Les Burn
8	BC Poultry Processors	Bruce Arabsky Neil Ambrose, DVM
9	Agriculture Agri-Food Canada	John Berry
10	CFIA - Liason, Preparedness and Policy Coordination	Kristine Stolarik
11	CFIA - BC Emergency Operations Center	Stuart Wilson Vance McEachren Jim McClendon, DVM Phil Owen, DVM Andrea Dropko

**Avian Influenza Lessons Learned Initiative  
British Columbia Focus Group**

**British Columbia Federal, Provincial, Municipal Partners  
(Joint Session with Health Canada)**

**Date: Friday, Sept. 24, 2004**

**Location: Radisson Hotel Burnaby, BC**

	<b>Name</b>	<b>Title</b>
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**Province of BC Ministry of Health**

1	Dr. Perry Kendall	Provincial Health Officer
2	Wayne Dauphinee	Executive Director, Emergency Management

**Province of BC Ministry of Solicitor General**

3	Scott Patch	Provincial Emergency Program
4	Cam Filmer	Deputy Director, Provincial Emergency Program

**Province of BC Public Affairs Bureau**

5	Michelle Stewart	Manager and PIO for Ministry of Health
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**BC Centre for Disease Control**

6	Dr. Danuta Skowronski	Epidemiologist
7	Aleina Tweed	Epidemiologist
8	Sally Greenwood	Manager, Public Information
9	Dr. Ray Copes	Medical Director, Environmental Health
10	Dr. Larry Copeland	Director, Food Protection Services

**BC Fraser Health Authority**

11	Dr. Andrew Larder	Medical Health Officer
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12	Christine Halpert	Public Health Nurse
13	Dave Burgess	Manager, Emergency Planning and Management

### Health Canada

14	Dr. Arlene King <u>HC Co-chair</u>	Director, Immunization and Respiratory Infectious Diseases Div.
15	Bill Douglas	Interim Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
16	Dr. Philip Prendergast	Occupational Health Physician
17	Harsh Thakore	Regional Manager, Workplace Health and Public Safety
18	Dr. Art Davies	National Medical Advisor
19	Blair Parkhurst	Regional Director, Communications
20	Betsy MacKenzie	Regional Director, Population and Public Health
21	Cathy Sabiston	Director General, Workplace Health and Public Safety
22	Dr. Theresa Tam	Medical Epidemiologist, Respiratory Diseases Div.
23	Claude Giroux	Senior Policy Advisor, Centre for Emergency Preparedness and Response
24	Jennifer Brioschi	Manager, Professional Services
25	Ruth Nicholson	Occupational Health Nurse

### HRSDC

26	Marlene Yemchuk	Health & Safety Officer
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### Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada

27	Paul Crober	Regional Director
28	Bill White	NCI Coordinator
29	Natalie Dole	Director, Operations Emergency Management and National Security



### City of Langley

30	Sheena Vivian	
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### City of Abbotsford

31	Don Beer	
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### BC Water, Land and Air Protection

32	Jennifer McGuire	Regional Manager
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### MAFF

33	Chris Zabek	Regional Agrologist, Fraser Valley North
34	Rick Van Kleeck	Waste Management Engineer, Abbotsford
35	Ron Lewis	Director, Animal Health Centre

### AAFC

36	John Berry	Regional Director
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### Canadian Food Inspection Agency

37	Philip H. Amundson <u>CFIA Co-chair</u>	Executive Director, Operations-Western Area
38	Stuart Wilson	Regional Director, BC Mainland / Interior
39	Dr. Wayne Lees	Animal Health Program
40	Dr. Sandra Stephens	Animal Health Program
41	Dr. Ken Stepushyn	Animal Health Program
42	Dr. Cornelius Kiley	Program Network - West
43	D. Jim McClendon	Animal Health Veterinarian
44	Bob Jackson	Duty Officer, Regional Coordinator, BC Mainland / Interior
45	Andrea Dropko	Duty Officer, Inspection Manager, Fraser

		East, Abbotsford
46	Gaetan Levesque	National Occupational Health and Safety Coordinator
47	Dr. Denis Allard	Senior Medical Advisor

**CFIA Avian Influenza Lessons Learned Initiative  
Other Directed Interviews**

<b>Name</b>	<b>Title</b>
<b>CFIA</b>	
Richard B. Fadden Dr. André Gravel	President Executive Vice-President
Dr. Bill Anderson Dr. Brian Evans	Director, Food of Animal Origin Division Chief Veterinary Officer
Doug Steadman Kathy Scott	Executive Director (Atlantic Area), Operations Operations Coordination
Phil Amundson and Stuart Wilson	Executive Director (Western Area) Operations Regional Director, (B.C.) Operations
Claudine Pagé	Bilateral Relations Officer, International Affairs

**EXTERNAL PARTNERS**

<b><u>Health Canada</u></b>	
Dr. Frank Plummer	Acting Chief Public Health Officer Population and Public Health Branch
Dr. Arlene King	Director Immunization and Respiratory Infections Division Population and Public Health Branch
<b><u>Privy Council Office</u></b>	
Anita Biguzs	Director of Operations
Ross Ezzeddin	Policy Analyst
<b><u>Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada</u></b>	
Gilles Lavoie	Senior Director General Operations Market and Industry Services Branch
<b><u>USDA</u></b>	
Dr. John Hahn and Barry Meade	
<b><u>International Trade Canada</u></b>	
Geoff Adams	Deputy Director Technical Barriers and Regulations



# APPENDIX 5

## PARTICIPANTS AT THE ABBOTSFORD (B.C.) INFORMAL STANDING COMMITTEE HEARINGS

Associations and Individuals	Date	Meeting
<p><b>B.C. Chicken Growers Association</b> Rick Thiessen, President</p> <p><b>B.C. Egg Producers Association</b> Derek Janzen, President</p> <p><b>B.C. Hatching Egg Association</b> Calvin Breukelman, President</p> <p><b>B.C. Poultry Association</b> Ray Nickel, President</p> <p><b>B.C. Turkey Association</b> Garnet Etsell, President</p> <p><b>Canadian Food Inspection Agency</b> Philip Amundson, Executive Director, Operations, Western Area Richard Fadden, President</p> <p><b>Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries of British Columbia</b> Victoria Bowes, Avian Pathologist Ron Lewis, Director, Chief Veterinarian Rory McAlpine, Deputy Minister</p> <p><b>As Individuals</b> Jeremy Johnston, Physician Stewart Ritchie, Veterinarian and Producer</p>	18/01/2005	1

<b>Associations and Individuals</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Meeting</b>
<b>B.C. Egg Marketing Board</b>	18/01/2005	2
David Taylor, Chair		
Peter Whitlock, Operations Manager		
<b>Backyard Farmers Association</b>		
Larry Blackhall		
Bob Bradley		
Jim Ferguson		
Barbara Fischer		
John Gilray		
Susan Gorris		
Paddy Head		
Michael Kluckner		
Louisa Nicholls		
Fred Reid		
<b>Bradner Farms Ltd.</b>		
Rob Donaldson		
<b>Canadian Egg Marketing Agency</b>		
Bernadette Cox, Manager, Corporate and Public Affairs		
Tim Lambert, Executive Director		
<b>Fairline Development Canada Ltd.</b>		
Allan Leung		
<b>Fraser Valley Duck and Goose</b>		
Ken Falk		
<b>As Individuals</b>		
Victoria Bowes, Avian Pathologist		
Peter Fricker		

<b>Associations and Individuals</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Meeting</b>
<b>Animal Nutrition Association</b> David Dyble, President Marvin Friesen, Clearbrook Milling Rob Jones, Marketing Manager	19/01/2005	3
<b>B.C. Turkey Association</b> Garnet Etsell, President		
<b>Loewen Acres</b> David Loewen Louise Loewen		
<b>Pollon Group</b> Bruce Arabsky		
<b>Primary Poultry Processors Ltd.</b> Clarence Jensen, Secretary-Manager		
<b>Sunrise Poultry Processors Ltd.</b> Neil Ambrose, Director, Veterinary Services		
<b>As Individuals</b> Victoria Bowes, Avian Pathologist Kathleen O'Lane Lynn Perrin		





## APPENDIX 6 LIST OF WITNESSES

<b>Associations and Individuals</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Meeting</b>
<b>Canadian Food Inspection Agency</b>	08/02/2005	21
Judith Bossé, Vice-President, Science		
Jim Clark, Senior Staff Veterinarian, Animal Health and Production Division		
Richard Fadden, President		
Theresa Iuliano, Manager, Corporate Program Administration		



A copy of the relevant Minutes of Proceedings (*Meeting n<sup>os</sup> 21, 32 and 34 including the present report*) is tabled.

Respectfully submitted,

Paul Steckle, M.P.  
*Chair*



## MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

Thursday, April 14, 2005  
(Meeting No. 34)

The Standing Committee on Agriculture and Agri-Food met *in camera* at 10:13 a.m. this day, in Room 307 West Block, the Chair, Paul Steckle, presiding.

*Members of the Committee present:* James Bezan, Claude Drouin, Roger Gaudet, Denise Poirier-Rivard, Gerry Ritz, Paul Steckle and Rose-Marie Ur.

*Acting Members present:* Peter Julian for Charlie Angus, Susan Kadis for Wayne Easter and Randy White for Larry Miller.

*In attendance: Library of Parliament:* Jean-Denis Fréchette, Principal.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), the Committee resumed its study of avian flu — follow-up of the fact-finding mission to Abbotsford .

The Committee resumed consideration of a draft report.

It was agreed, — That the report be entitled: *From A Management Crisis, To Becoming Better Crisis Managers: The 2004 Avian Influenza Outbreak in British Columbia.*

It was agreed, — That the draft report, as amended, be adopted.

It was agreed, — That the Chair, Clerk and researchers be authorized to make such grammatical and editorial changes as may be necessary without changing the substance of the report and that the Clerk inform the members of the final draft before it is tabled.

At 11:34 a.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Bibiane Ouellette  
*Clerk of the Committee*