Backgrounder on Amendments to the Nuclear Security Regulations
On August 29, 2006, amendments to the Nuclear Security Regulations were approved
by Governor in Council. The amendments will come into force on November 27,
2006.
The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC), which regulates the use of
nuclear energy and materials to protect health, safety, security and the environment,
and respect Canada’s international commitments on the peaceful use of
nuclear energy, is the federal body responsible for the enforcement of the
Nuclear Security Regulations.
Following September 11, 2001, the CNSC issued two
orders requiring licensees to implement specific physical protection measures to strengthen
security at their facilities. The CNSC also undertook a complete review of
the Nuclear Security Regulations, which were enacted in May 2000 under the
Nuclear Safety and Control Act. After discussions and consultations with various
stakeholders, the CNSC proposed amendments to the Nuclear Security Regulations to:
- enhance regulatory requirements for security by putting into regulations
the requirements of CNSC Order Number 01-1 and Designated Officer Order Number
01-D1;
- bring Canada’s nuclear security requirements in line with international
nuclear security recommendations and practices; and
- demonstrate that the
protection of the Canadian public is a vital concern to the Government
of Canada, the CNSC and the operators of affected facilities.
The principal security requirements resulting from the amendments are listed
below and are applied depending on the type of licensee:
- On-site nuclear response force – to establish an armed response
force available at all times and capable of making an immediate and effective
intervention
to counter threats to nuclear facilities and nuclear substances.
- Predetermination
of trustworthiness – to require unescorted employees
to have a security clearance or an authorization appropriate to their level
of access.
- Responsibility for granting authorizations – to require
licensees to grant certain access authorizations (transferred this responsibility
from
the
CNSC, recognizing that the licensee is responsible for nuclear security).
- Access control – to have appropriate procedures and devices in place
to positively identify and screen persons entering a nuclear facility.
- Design
basis threat analysis –to take account of, in the design of
a licensee’s physical protection system, the national threat established
by the CNSC, to protect against the unauthorized removal of nuclear substances
and sabotage of nuclear facilities and nuclear substances.
- Threat and risk
assessment – to identify local threats to a licensee’s
facility and to take any credible threats into account in the design of their
physical protection system.
- Identification and protection of vital areas – to
identify and apply physical protection measures to areas which contain equipment,
systems or
devices, or nuclear substances where sabotage could directly or indirectly
lead to unacceptable
radiological consequences.
- Uninterrupted power supply (UPS) – to have
an uninterrupted power supply (i.e., back-up battery power) in place to maintain
the operation of
alarm systems,
alarm assessment systems and the various essential monitoring functions of
the security monitoring room.
- Contingency planning, drills and exercises – to
test physical protection systems through regular drills, and develop and
exercise contingency plans
to manage anticipated security related emergencies.
- Vehicle barriers and
portals – to take measures to reduce the risk
of forced vehicle penetration into a nuclear facility.
- Supervisor awareness
program – to train supervisors to recognize
behavioural changes in all facility personnel, including contractors, that
may indicate
an increase in risk to the security of the facility.
- may indicate an increase
in risk to the security of the facility.
The amendments to the Nuclear Security Regulations are available
at http://canadagazette.gc.ca/partII/2006/20060907-x4/html/extra-e.html.
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