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Judges of the Court
Remarks of the Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, P.C.
Protecting Constitutional Rights: A Comparative View of the United States
and Canada
April 5, 2004
Thank you for that kind introduction.
I found it quite reassuring, especially since judges of the Supreme Court
of Canada are frequently described in less flattering terms. One of the less
flattering descriptions came from the lips of my colleague, Ian Binnie, who,
at a cocktail to welcome our new law clerks, advised the assemblage that their
biggest challenge would be to get some fire out of the nine semi-dormant volcanos
they were charged with igniting.
Semi-dormant or not, it is a great pleasure to be with you here today to
share comparative perspectives on Canada and the United States, more particularly
the differences and similarities in how we approach constitutional rights.
This topic requires that I say quite a bit about the Canadian perspective,
so I would like to begin with a disclaimer: We Canadians are generally a shy
lot, not much given to talking about ourselves. The Canadian penchant for sticking
to our own business, narrowly defined, is well illustrated by a story -- true,
I have it on good authority -- of an event that occurred on a royal visit to
Canada many years ago, shortly after Elizabeth II came to the throne.
When our Queen comes to visit, we like to honour her with unique and useful
gifts that reflect the true Canadian character. Over the decades, Her Majesty
has become the proud recipient of innumerable native headdresses, dozens
of native talking sticks, a grizzly bear, an elk and two Canadian moose.
On this particular occasion, Her Majesty was given two specimens of our national
symbol – the beaver. The young Queen, not long married, was ushered into
the room containing the beaver tank. As beaver are wont to do, the creatures
seemed quite busy. Her Majesty gazed on the two splashing animals with some
curiosity. With a puzzled look she turned to the distinguished Canadian gentleman
at her side. “What ever are they doing?” The gentleman, with typically
Canadian laconism, replied, “Madam, I do not know. I am a bachelor”.
Which brings me to a second disclaimer. My knowledge of Canadian-US comparative
law, like the bachelor’s knowledge of beavers, is somewhat limited. Asked
to comment on the differences between our respective countries, I would probably
do better to say like our gentleman, “I do not know. I am a Canadian”.
Nevertheless, I begin with an anecdote cited by a leading Canadian lawyer,
Edward L. Greenspan, in an address some years ago in Washington, D.C. on freedom
of expression. Mr. Greenspan described how the American actor, Michael Moriarty,
the former star of T.V.'s "Law and Order" said he was so upset with
the United States government's interference in free expression, that he was
bidding adieu to the United States and moving to Canada. Mr. Greenspan went
on to express puzzlement at Mr. Moriarty's decision in these words:
...if Mr. Moriarty decided to come to Canada because Canada is a kinder,
gentler country, then he is coming to the right place. If he is coming to Canada
because
he wants to live in the United Nation's top 1995 pick as the best place in
the world to live, he is coming to the right place. If he has an inexplicable
urge to pay much higher taxes, he is coming to the right place. If he wants
much less crime, much more space, cleaner air and cleaner cities, he is coming
to the right place. If he wants much better whisky, better beer, Cuban cigars,
a much better view of Niagara Falls, he is coming to the right place. But
to rationalize coming to Canada because Canadians have more freedom of expression
than the Americans is ludicrous. Mr. Moriarty is coming to the right place
for absolutely the wrong reason.
Mr. Moriarty may indeed be mistaken. But on the principle (also cited
by Mr. Greenspan) that it is foolhardy to ignore anything an American actor
says because it may someday represent government policy, we must assume that
there is something about Canada's legal system in general and its treatment
of rights and freedoms in particular that Mr. Moriarty found attractive. And
on the assumption that you may be as interested as I to find out what it might
be, I invite you to follow me through a brief overview of some of the salient
differences between the legal systems of our two countries and how they treat
the constitutional rights of their respective peoples.
Canada, like the United States, is a federal democracy. We vote for our politicians
at federal and state (we call them provincial) elections and if we don't like
what they do, we vote them out the next time. Canada, like the United States,
has a constitution that guarantees the fundamental rights and freedoms of every
person in the country. Since 1982, these guarantees have been found in a constitutional
Bill of Rights, which is called the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
Canada, like the United States, has a system of courts staffed by an independent
judiciary and believes in the rule of law. Canada, like the United States,
has a jury system for criminal and sometimes civil trials. And many of the
rules of evidence and procedure applied by courts on both sides of the border
betray striking similarities.
This much the legal systems of our two countries share. Yet there is much,
too, that is different. For a start, our structures of government, which determine
how laws are made and administered are quite different. Canada, unlike the
United States, is a monarchy, headed by the Queen of England (we say the Queen
of Canada) and maybe, someday -- who knows-- King Charles the III. Because
our head of state is the Queen, when a criminal is indicted in Canada, it is
not the State against the accused, or the Commonwealth against the accused,
or the people against the accused -- it is the Queen against the accused. Or
if you want to sue the Canadian government or one of the provinces, you sue
the Queen. Although I doubt it causes her too much concern, the Queen is the
most litigious person in Canada by far.
Another difference in the legal structure of our countries is that Canada
has a Parliamentary system of government. The leader of the party holding the
majority of seats in the House of Commons is the Prime Minister. If he or she
loses the majority -- for example is defeated on a major bill like the annual
budget -- he or she must step down and the Governor-General, the Queen's representative,
calls on someone else, often following a new election, to form the government
and become Prime Minister. The Prime Minister chooses his executive -- his
cabinet -- from the elected members of the House of Commons, or sometimes members
of the appointed Senate. All this is very different from the American system
where the Chief Executive, the President, is elected in a separate election
and barring impeachment, death or Watergate, rides out his entire term with
a cabinet he chooses from anywhere he pleases.
For many people, these differences are cosmetic. Indeed, they may not translate
into radically different constitutional outlooks. But let me come to one
area where people of both countries not only see important differences
but are currently
engaged in a vigorous debate about which approach is preferable: I refer
to the fundamental freedoms protected by our respective constitutions.
The case
can be made that Americans and Canadians have different perceptions of the
relationship of the individual to the state and as a consequence, a quite
different approach to the fundamental freedoms and liberties our constitutions
guarantee
to each citizen.
To illustrate this difference in approach, I would like to briefly highlight
three aspects of the constitutional protection of fundamental freedoms in Canada:
First, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms contains an explicit recognition
that rights are subject to reasonable limits flowing from public or collective
interests. Second, the Canadian constitution guarantees rights that are intended
to recognize minority communities and enhance their vitality. In both respects,
the Canadian constitution is a product of Canada’s history. Third, many
rights and freedoms in Canada are subject to a legislative override, found
in the notwithstanding clause of section 33 of the Charter.
Let me turn, first, to the statement in our Constitution that rights are
subject to reasonable limits. To quote Mr. Greenspan yet again:
Our First Amendment -- we call it Section 1, our first words that set the
tone for all Canadians to rejoice in our essential freedoms, the words
we first read coming out of the starting gate are like a warning on a pack
of cigarettes
--Beware! These nice looking sticks kill! It says "People of Canada!
Don't get overly excited at what you are about to read. We know this is
our Charter
of Rights. Soon you will inhale a pack of rights that include freedom of
expression, freedom of press, right to a jury trial, the right to fundamental
justice (we
couldn't even bring ourselves to call it due process). But before you get
too excited, we want you to know that all of the so-called guaranteed rights
you
are about to read are subject to reasonable limits that may be imposed
by the government upon you in a free and democratic society.
To make all of this more concrete, let us consider the constitutional protection
of free speech in both countries. Canada, like the United States, has a constitutional
guarantee of free expression. Our Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees
freedom of expression, subject to such reasonable limits as are "demonstrably
justifiable in a free and democratic society". In other words, we have
free speech, but the state can limit it in reasonable ways. This may be contrasted
with the absolute language of the First Amendment of the United States Bill
of Rights, which states: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
freedom of speech or of the press." The words of the Canadian guarantee
acknowledge the state's right to limit free speech; the words of the American
guarantee forbid the state from doing so.
Of course, we all know that the American Supreme Court has not interpreted
the First Amendment literally. American rights, however absolutely stated in
the Bill of Rights, are in fact subject to limits imposed by the Courts as
they struggle to balance conflicting rights and situate them in a practical
working framework. Free speech is no exception. In 1952, Justice Hugo Black,
who insisted on reading the First Amendment literally, voted to strike down
a states' group libel law, stating that the First Amendment "absolutely
forbids such laws without any 'ifs' or 'buts' or 'whereases'." (Beauharnais
v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 275 (1952)). But he was in dissent and his view
has not prevailed.. It was Mark Twain who said of the United States, only partly
in jest, "It is by the goodness of God that in our country we have those
three unspeakably precious things: freedom of speech, freedom of conscience
and the prudence never to practice either of them."
This said, the explicit recognition that, in a democratic society, limits
may be imposed on fundamental freedoms means that free speech is more narrowly
conceived in Canada than in the United States, as is evidenced by our respective
positions on pornography, hate speech and defamation. While the American right
of free speech admits of some limits in the name of reason or practical necessity,
the fact remains that what would be counted as a reasonable limit on speech
in Canada would often amount to an unreasonable limit in the United States.
Take pornography, for instance. Much of it is made in the United States.
Some of it crosses the border and is sold in Canada. But there are limits to
what Canadians will tolerate as protected speech in this area. In 1992, the
Supreme Court of Canada in the Butler case upheld a section of the Canadian
Criminal Code which banned the publication and distribution of obscene material.
The law had been challenged on the ground that it infringed freedom of expression
in a way that was not justifiable under s. 1 of the Canadian Charter. The Supreme
Court disagreed. It unanimously held that freedom of expression was infringed
by this section of the Criminal Code, but added that the state had a right
to outlaw pornography which qualifies as an undue exploitation of sex, such
as where the portrayal of sex is coupled with violence, involves children,
or is degrading or dehumanizing. One of the key concerns was the risk that
such pornography may be harmful to women and children and to society generally.
In accepting generalized risk as a reasonable basis for limiting free expression,
Justice Sopinka of my Court quoted approvingly this conclusion from a House
of Commons Committee:
The effect of this type of material is to reinforce male-female stereotypes
to the detriment of both sexes. It attempts to make degradation, humiliation,
victimization and violence in human relationships appear normal and acceptable.
A society which holds that egalitarianism, non-violence, consensualism,
and mutuality are basic to any human interaction, whether sexual or other,
is clearly
justified in controlling and prohibiting any medium of depiction, description
or advocacy which violates these principles (R. v. Butler, 1992]
1 S.C.R. 452, at p. 494, citing the MacGuigan Report of 1978).
Some Canadians like the Butler decision, some don't. Mr. Greenspan calls
it a "tragedy" and laments by quoting Gershon Legman's observation
that "Murder is a crime. Describing murder is not. Sex is not a crime.
Describing sex is." In fact, a great deal of talk about sex, pornography
included, is legal in Canada, and for every dissenter from Butler, one can
find at least one or two supporters who feel the state has a legitimate interest
in controlling harmful portrayals of sex.
What may be more interesting than the debate itself is that the Supreme
Court of Canada's decision in Butler has caught the attention of the American
legal
and political world. We in Canada are not used to attention from those quarters,
so the ensuing debate on your side of the border about the Butler case came
to us as some surprise. Professor Catharine MacKinnon, who happened to teach
at Osgoode Law School in Toronto for a time, wrote and lectured extensively
in favour of American adoption of a test like that in the Canadian Butler case. Later and more significantly on the political front, we saw Senator
Bob Dole
and Attorney-General Janet Reno advocating a similar tightening of pornography
laws in the United States. But the big question remains, what would the Supreme
Court of the United States do with an American Butler? Accepting that anything
is possible in Washington, as in Ottawa, the fact remains that traditional
American First Amendment thinking is a very long way indeed from the sort
of risk of harm-based equality philosophy that prevailed in Canada in Butler.
Free speech plays out differently above and below the 49th parallel in other
less publicized yet significant ways. Hate speech finds significantly more
protection in the United States than in Canada. Provided hate propaganda laws
are tightly enough drafted, they pass muster under the Canadian Charter. In
the United States, by contrast, little short of incitement to violence can
be legally limited.
To take another example, it is easier to sue for libel in Canada than
it is in the United States. Application of the First Amendment's guarantee
of press freedom led in this country to New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (376
US 254 (1964)) which permits newspapers to publish false rumours and make false
statements about people with impunity so long as they do not do so intentionally
or recklessly. A few years ago, the Supreme Court of Canada in Hill v.
Church of Scientology expressly declined to adopt the Sullivan approach. As a result,
in Canada, newspapers print unverified material at peril of being sued for
libel. The Supreme Court considered the argument that a Sullivan approach was
required to prevent "chilling" the free dissemination of information
essential for the working of democracy. It concluded that any chilling effect
flowing from strong libel laws is outweighed by the importance of protecting
people's reputations against false and slanderous statements. Canadian law
accepts that the goal of getting at the truth may be served by free exchange
in the marketplace of ideas. But it also accepts that false words can do great
damage to individuals and groups, damage that cannot always be repaired by
debate and discussion.
I have spoken of some of the differences in the Canadian and American approaches
to the fundamental guarantee of free speech. To put it in a nutshell, we in
Canada are more tolerant of state limitation on free expression than are Americans.
Similar points can be made about other constitutional rights.
Indeed, in the case of each right guaranteed by our Charter, Canada is creating
its own unique jurisprudence. For instance, the Canadian approach is more nuanced
than that of the United States in relation to due process and the rights of
individuals in the law enforcement context. In the United States, evidence
obtained as the result of unlawful police conduct, whether direct or indirect,
usually cannot be used in the criminal process under the doctrine of the fruit
of the poisoned tree. In Canada, the test is more flexible; the evidence will
be excluded only where it would be unfair to allow it to be used against the
accused person, considering a variety of factors, including the effect on the
image of the administration of justice if the evidence were disallowed. Section
24 of the Charter expressly provides for this.
This brings me to the second difference between the American Bill of Rights
and the Canadian Charter. I mentioned earlier the explicit recognition in the
Canadian Charter of collective or group rights. Section 1 of the Charter, as
we have seen, sets the stage for a different approach to the constitutional
protection of rights, an approach that seeks a different balance between individual
rights and collective interests. This balance is also at play in the operation
of rights that are intended to recognize minority communities and enhance their
vitality.
One can already see a hint of this in the different treatment of freedom
of religion in the two countries, because the Canadian guarantee of freedom
of religion has a positive quality to it that the American guarantee lacks.
The United States constitution enunciates a doctrine of separation of church
and state which precludes the state from supporting any religion. The Canadian
guarantee protects the right of the individual to practice the religion of
his or her choice, but also permits the state to support religious groups --
indeed it requires the state to support minority Roman Catholic and Protestant
school systems in some provinces as a consequence of the concern of the fathers
of Confederation that minority religious rights be protected.
Similarly, Canada’s law of equality may be described as more robust
than that of the U.S. Canadian equality doctrine is expressly directed at combatting
discrimination and improving the position of members of disadvantaged groups.
The categories of discrimination are not limited and we do not accord lesser
levels of scrutiny to selected groups. While Americans continued to debate
the virtues of affirmative action programs as recently as last year (Grutter
v. Bollinger, 536 U.S. 306 (2003)), our Charter expressly affirms the constitutionality
of reverse discrimination entailed in affirmative action programs. Ironically,
there seem to be fewer affirmative action programs in Canada than in the United
States.
In addition to this robust conception of equality, the Canadian Constitution
also includes some guarantees whose communitarian dimension may seem peculiar
from an American perspective. The Canadian Constitution guarantees, for instance,
positive rights to minority language education in French and in English. It includes
an explicit recognition of the existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal
peoples of Canada. At the risk of over-generalization, it might be ventured that,
as a general rule, individual rights in Canada are more circumscribed, and collective
or “group” rights, protecting linguistic, religious or aboriginal
communities, are more generous than in the United States. In the United States
the ethic of the individual is foremost; in Canada there is more concern for
the general public welfare and members of disadvantaged groups.
The third major distinction in the way our respective constitutions treat
rights lies in the legislative override provision found in section 33 of the
Charter. Section 33 permits Parliament or a provincial legislature to “override” decisions
of the Supreme Court invalidating laws for violation of the Charter. This gives
an infringing government two lines of defence. First, the government can argue
that the infringement is justified under section 1 of the Charter, as I have
already discussed. Second, if that doesn’t work, the government may uphold
the infringement by so stipulating in a law. This applies to all rights, with
the exception of basic democratic rights, mobility rights and linguistic rights.
The override is effective for five years, but can be renewed.
At first impression, the Canadian override provision stands in stark contrast
to the absolute finality accorded to the constitutional pronouncements of the
United States Supreme Court. In fact, the actual situation in the two countries
is not dissimilar, thus far in any event. The section 33 override has only
seriously been invoked on one occasion, by the Province of Quebec, to maintain
language legislation the Supreme Court had found incompatible with the Charter guarantee of free expression. The Charter enjoys broad popular support, and
governments appear reluctant to be seen as depriving citizens of constitutional
rights. Only time will tell if section 33 represents, in fact, an important
qualification on Charter rights. But at least in theory, it supports the view
that the Canadian approach to rights is less individualistic, and more collective
and deferential to government, than the American.
I have been discussing three differences in the Canadian and American
approaches to the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual. What can
account for these differences? Why should two countries sharing the same continent
with roughly the same sorts of people and activities and industries and enjoying
an enormous amount of bilateral communication and trade, have a different view
of what is important, a different set of values? The answer lies in our distinct
national character, which in turn is based on our distinct histories and national
experience.
It may be said that a nation's law – particularly its law of rights
and liberties – expresses and reflects the fundamental social and moral
assumptions upon which the nation is founded, its national character. This
national character is not fixed, and is subject to constant redefinition within
public discourse. But the boundaries of this discourse are largely shaped by
a nation’s history. Canada and the United States have very different
histories for all their geographical proximity. Let me allude to three historical
differences that I think help explain how we have arrived at our respective
approach to the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual: (1) the
difference in how our countries attained independence; (2) the French-English
character of Canada; and (3) Canada’s position as a less populous, less
powerful nation poised between the United States on the one side and Europe
on the other.
The first difference relates to how our countries arose and attained their
liberty. The United States arose out of a revolution against colonial authority.
Canada, by contrast, arose by evolution. Canada never revolted against its
European colonial past, never defied the mother country. As a result the Canadian
attitude toward authority and the state is fundamentally different than the
American attitude toward authority and the state. Indeed, the different political
circumstances of creation of our respective nations are reflected in the tone
of our constitutions. The American Constitution begins with the words “We
the People...”. The people are virtually absent from the Canadian Constitution,
which opens with a formal “Whereas the provinces have expressed the desire
to be federally united into one Dominion”.
The heart of our 19th century constitution sets the rules of the game in
the allocation of responsibilities to the federal and provincial governments,
and there is little concern in there for the checks and balances through which
absolute power is constrained in the American Constitution. Canadians agree
that state power should be confined within proper bounds. But they do not fear
it as Americans do. Canadians did not, initially at least, see the state as
something distinct from them, as a locus of power that may be used against
them. Consequently, the need for checks and balances on offices of power is
not so keenly perceived in Canada as in the United States. For example, the
notion of the right to bear arms as the ultimate guarantee against state oppression
is mysterious to most Canadians.
This absence of revolutionary tradition is probably the primary reason why
Canadians waited more than one hundred years to adopt a bill of rights and
why we are comfortable with a Charter of Rights and Freedoms that begins
with an acknowledgement of the state's right to limit the basic rights and
freedoms.
It also explains why the balance between individual rights and the interests
of groups or society as a whole is achieved within a different process and
discourse.
To put it another way, the United States emerged from its colonial period
abruptly and bloodily, with a determination to protect the individual citizen
against the tyranny of the state. The individual and the state were – and
to some extent, continue to be seen – as potential adversaries whose
interests may come into conflict. By contrast, Canada emerged from its colonial
period later and more peacefully and gradually. State officials were never
cast as possible adversaries of the individual. The relationship between individual
and state is more symbiotic. The state is regarded as having the responsibility
to create the conditions for individual fulfilment to a greater degree than
in the United States. Hence, the Canadian universal medical scheme, widely
seen as a pillar of Canadian Confederation. Canadians are more willing than
Americans to trust the state, and more willing to blame the state if poverty
abounds or medical needs are not met.
The Canadian Charter, adopted only in 1982, represents Canada’s final
break with its colonial past. Its content reflects the need to balance collective
state interests with individual interests. While some Charter jurisprudence
slips into the imagery of the state and collectivity as the holder of power
which may threaten the individual, particularly in the area of criminal procedure
and the rights of the accused, the dominant theme remains that of the state
and individual locked in an inseparable symbiosis.
The second significant historical difference between Canada and the United
States is the pluralistic foundation of Canada as compared with the monolithic
aspirations of the United States. Canada was born of the union of two groups,
one French and one English. It was founded on the premise that both French
and English would be entitled to maintain their separate identities, their
separate culture, religion and language. The two groups, in conjunction with
aboriginals and immigrant communities that came thereafter, found strength
not in unity, but in harmonious coexistence. The State’s role in fostering
this diversity was ingrained in the text of the Constitution.
The United States, by contrast, was formed in the main from rather different
English colonies sharing one language, each seeking the freedom to dissent
from the Church of England. They sought strength in unity, and accommodated
diversity by committing to a neutral State which favoured no identifiable group.
While its peoples vary vastly nowadays (including important visible Black and
Hispanic minorities), and while many languages are spoken in the United States,
American society, particularly since the civil war, has embraced an ideal of
homogeneous citizenship not found in Canada. The United States is likened to
a melting-pot; Canada to a mosaic.
The Canadian emphasis on protection for group rights is thus an essential
part of our history. It has led to heightened protection for minority groups
and
contributed to making Canadians more receptive to the notion that sometimes
individual rights must give way to the need to protect the rights and the
identity of particular groups within society.
The third difference in Canadian history which has affected our notion of
individual rights is our position as a middle power, poised just to the north
of the most powerful nation on earth. As the smaller and weaker of the two
countries which occupy the North American continent, we tend to define ourselves
not only positively but negatively in terms of what we are not. We are comfortable
with ambiguity. We are less inclined to see issues in terms of irreconcilable
positions, more inclined to question and accommodate. We are deeply internationalist.
At the same time, our situation has induced zealous concern that we protect
our own distinctive culture and way of being. Canada, the small boy on the
block, suffers the small boy's apprehension. Not the apprehension of being
knocked off the block; our countries have a long history of peaceful coexistence.
Rather, the fear of economic and cultural absorption, of being swamped by the
larger, louder American forces to the south. All this has affected our conception
of rights. Our spiritual situation somewhere between the United States to the
south and the European tradition across the Atlantic is reflected in our Charter,
a melange of European and American notions.
You have graciously invited me to visit you, and you have come to this talk
and listened. It is my humble hope that I may leave you with at least one small
idea which may prove of interest. It is this. A nation's law is the sum of
its history; and a nation's judges give voice to the values that are the sum
of that history. I do not advocate that you adopt the Canadian approach to
individual rights; nor do I think we will adopt yours. Indeed, we could not
if we wished; for better or worse, Canada is a different country. Its national
character is shaped by different events and values. I can, however, assure
you of this. We will continue to study your jurisprudence, as you are beginning
to study ours, continue to learn from it, and continue to admire it as the
most absolute and articulate expression of individual rights the world has
yet seen.
Remarks of the Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, P.C.
Chief Justice of Canada
2nd Canadian Distinguished Annual Address
Center for the Study of Canada
Plattsburg State University
Plattsburg, New York
April 5, 2004
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