Canada Gazette

As Canada's nuclear regulatory agency, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) regulates activities related to the use of nuclear energy and nuclear substances in Canada, including nuclear power reactors, non-power reactors, nuclear research and test facilities, uranium mines and mills, uranium refineries, nuclear substance processing facilities, medical and non-medical accelerators, and a wide variety of nuclear substances and prescribed equipment.

The Nuclear Safety and Control Act (NSC Act, the "Act") requires that persons or organizations be licensed by the CNSC to carry out nuclear-related activities in order to protect health, safety, security and the environment, and to respect Canada's international commitments on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The NSC Act gives authority to the Commission to make regulations to add details to the broader provisions of the Act. The Nuclear Security Regulations address the physical protection measures required to address security issues, including the unauthorized removal (which is broader and includes theft) of nuclear substances and/or the sabotage of nuclear facilities and substances. Amendments are being proposed to the Nuclear Security Regulations to strengthen the physical protection of nuclear facilities and nuclear substances in Canada.

As a result of the heightened threat posed to Canadian nuclear facilities following the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, the CNSC

CNSC Order Number 01-1 was issued to major licensees, those deemed as high-risk facilities (including nuclear power plants, and nuclear research and test establishments). Designated Officer Order Number 01-D1 was issued to a second group of facilities having a lower risk profile (including nuclear substance processing facilities, uranium refineries, and nuclear fuel fabrication facilities). These Orders required licensees to implement specific physical protection measures considered necessary to strengthen security at their facilities. Some of the requirements which apply to one or both orders, include

The proposed amended Nuclear Security Regulations address the results of this review and incorporate the requirements of CNSC Order Number 01-1 and Designated Officer Order Number 01-D1.

The existing Nuclear Security Regulations categorize nuclear material into three levels, according to the IAEA recommended guidelines [INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 (Corrected)]. Nuclear materials are categorized according to the potential risk of the material being used in a nuclear explosive device, with Category I nuclear materials being the highest risk and Category III nuclear material being the lowest risk. The same categorization is used in the proposed amended Regulations.

The proposed amended Nuclear Security Regulations are divided into two parts. Part 1 applies to

Part 2 applies to the nuclear substance processing facilities, uranium refineries and nuclear fuel fabrication facilities captured by DO Order Number 01-D1. The nuclear substances or materials processed, used, or stored at these facilities are of a lower security risk than the materials used at a high-security site and therefore require a lower level of physical protection than high-security sites.

The additional physical protection requirements for licensees, contained in the proposed amended Nuclear Security Regulations, touch on all aspects of physical protection. The principal requirements, listed below, are varied and are applied depending on whether the licensee operates a facility covered under Part 1 or Part 2 of the proposed amended regulations:

Three alternatives to amending the Nuclear Security Regulations were considered.

The status quo, which consists of using the existing Nuclear Security Regulations, the Orders of 2001 and licence conditions, was rejected. The existing Orders requiring enhanced security measures were prompted by the terrorist events of September 11, 2001. They were issued under subsection 47(1) of the NSC Act authorizing the Commission to make orders in the case of emergencies. Such orders are not meant to be permanent. However, the requirements found in these Orders need to be permanently established, as heightened security measures continue to be required to protect the public and the environment. Furthermore, the public should know that significant additional security measures have been put into place to give them assurance that they are adequately protected.

In addition, the status quo was rejected because other nuclear security enhancements, not included in the Orders, are required in order to bring CNSC requirements in line with international security practices.

The alternative of adding all of the proposed enhanced security-related requirements to individual licences as licence conditions was rejected. Since there are a number of requirements that are common to a set of facilities (i.e. high-security sites or Part 2 facilities), rather than repeating the same requirements in each and every licence as licence conditions, it is more effective to capture these as a minimum set of requirements in regulation. Any facility-specific requirements will be addressed through licence conditions. Licence conditions would also be used to capture the appropriate physical protection requirements of any new facilities that may not be identified in the proposed amended Regulations.

The alternative of voluntary compliance was rejected. It would not provide Canadians or the international community with the assurance that adequate physical protection measures have been taken to address threats to Canadian nuclear facilities and substances. Voluntary compliance implies that there is some discretion on the part of the licensee with respect to the implementation of physical protection measures and could potentially leave Canadian nuclear facilities vulnerable to attack. Voluntary compliance also includes the possibility of licensees having to justify investments in essential physical protection measures and could lead to a lack in consistency on how physical protection measures are addressed.

The proposed amendments to the Nuclear Security Regulations serve to strengthen the overall security at nuclear facilities. Canadians, as well as the international community, can be assured that Canadian nuclear facilities and nuclear substances are well protected, to the extent feasible, in accordance with international physical protection practices. The proposed amended Nuclear Security Regulations enhance Canadian nuclear security requirements to meet

Canada's amended Nuclear Security Regulations illustrates Canada's committed position and vital interest in

Further, the proposed amended Nuclear Security Regulations would make the general physical protection requirements for nuclear facilities and substances known to the public through publication of the Regulations as an unrestricted document. More specific security details are provided in regulatory documents that are not available to the public.

The physical protection requirements of CNSC Order Number 01-1 and of Designated Officer Order Number 01-D1 have been implemented. Licensees have already incurred considerable capital and ongoing costs to implement the requirements of these orders. Capital costs include costs for buildings, structures and additions, and for equipment and its installation. Ongoing costs include costs for wages and benefits of the additional nuclear security officers and technical persons to operate the facilities' physical protection systems and for equipment maintenance. These expenditures are justified on the basis of protecting the public and the environment against international terrorist threats which could involve radiological sabotage, or the unauthorized removal of nuclear substances which could be used to make nuclear weapons or radiological dispersal devices (dirty bombs).

A number of licensees, on their own initiative, have gone beyond the requirements to meet the current regulations and orders and are already implementing a number of additional requirements found in the proposed amended Nuclear Security Regulations.

While licensees have already expended the majority of costs through implementing the requirements of the 2001 CNSC orders, some licensees still have some outstanding expenditures. A cost breakdown is not included here due to the sensitivity of this security information. The total capital costs for all licensees to implement the physical protection requirements of the orders and the proposed amended Regulations are in the range of $300 million.

Annual recurring costs would be largely allocated to wages and benefits of employees who are directly involved in the security of nuclear substances and nuclear facilities. There would also be recurring costs required for equipment maintenance. Ongoing costs to all licensees will be in the range of $60 million per year.

The CNSC's Nuclear Security Division has had to increase its staff to ensure licensee compliance with the enhanced physical protection requirements specified by the 2001 CNSC orders. Further increases to the CNSC's Nuclear Security Division staff are expected to be required with the proposed amended Nuclear Security Regulations to ensure on-site armed response requirements are effectively monitored and evaluated for compliance. Compliance monitoring costs are recovered from licensees according to the CNSC Cost Recovery Fees Regulations. This will be a recurring cost for licensees for the foreseeable future to maintain the appropriate level of compliance monitoring to verify that licensees adequately meet their security obligations.

Consultation prior to the Canada Gazette, Part I, October 25, 2003 publication

The proposed amended Nuclear Security Regulations were developed as a direct response by the CNSC to the terrorist events of September 11, 2001. Increased consultation with stakeholders, primarily affected licensees and law enforcement agencies that support the licensees in terms of off-site emergency response, has been ongoing since September 2001.

Since September 11, 2001, CNSC staff has met on numerous occasions with the major licensees who had been issued CNSC Order Number 01-1 (those licensees that would be subjected to the high-security site requirements of the proposed amended Regulations). Meetings have been held with individual licensees and occasionally with groups of licensees (Inter-Utility Security Working Group Committee) to discuss the physical protection measures stipulated in the Order and their implementation. The Inter-Utility Security Working Group Committee is made up of Ontario Power Generation, Bruce Power, Hydro-Québec, New Brunswick Power and Atomic Energy of Canada Limited. During the implementation of the measures contained in the Order, CNSC staff significantly increased their contact with the affected licensees through the exchange of correspondence, attending meetings, conducting on-site inspections and reviews of physical protection systems and procedures. The CNSC used these opportunities to discuss, formally as well as informally, the proposed amendments to the Regulations.

On February 6, 2003, the Director of the CNSC's Nuclear Security Division and his staff met with the Inter-Utility Security Working Group Committee and provided an extensive formal briefing on the proposed amendments. A subsequent meeting with this Committee took place on July 24, 2003, at which clarification of some of the proposed amendments was provided. Follow-up conversations between CNSC staff and licensees indicated that the proposed regulatory amendments would be well received although concern was expressed with the overall costs of their implementation.

The physical protection measures set out in Designated Officer Order Number 01-D1, which are the framework for Part 2 of the regulatory amendments, were discussed with senior representatives of the affected nuclear facilities by both project licensing officers and members of the Nuclear Security Division. As with the licensees subject to CNSC Order Number 01-1, CNSC staff engaged in frequent dialogue with the individual licensees regarding the implementation of the measures as well as the need to formulate such measures into regulations.

On April 10 and 11, 2003, in Port Hope and Ottawa, CNSC staff held an in-depth formal briefing on the proposed amendments for the licensees subjected to Designated Officer Order Number 01-D1. While most of the proposed physical protection requirements were acceptable to these licensees, some licensees exhibited a reluctance to a few of the proposed measures based on the belief that their facilities and nuclear substances under their control were of little interest to either criminals or terrorists. It is believed that subsequent discussions with these licensees increased their acceptance of the need for strengthened physical protection; nevertheless, some of these licensees remained concerned with the cost of implementation as well as the possible disruption to ongoing operations.

At the request of one of the licensees subject to Designated Order Number 01-D1, on July 9, 2003, a briefing was provided on the proposed amendments to the Nuclear Security Regulations and their implementation as it may affect the licensee's operation. The briefing proved to be a good forum for the exchange of information and, as a follow-up, a CNSC staff visit to the licensee's facility clarified a few aspects of the proposed amendments.

In addition to dialogue with affected licensees, the CNSC President, senior officers and staff have met with other stakeholders regarding the use of armed response forces at major nuclear facilities (nuclear power plants and major research facilities) and the arming of qualified nuclear security officers. Involved in these talks were federal and provincial government departments and agencies in the provinces of Ontario, Quebec and New Brunswick. Extensive discussions took place with the Privy Council Office, senior representatives of the federal Departments of Justice, Natural Resources, and the Solicitor General as well as with the Canadian Firearms Centre and provincial Chief Firearms Officers. Numerous meetings were also held with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Ontario Provincial Police, the Sûreté du Québec and the Durham Regional Police Service and with their provincial government counterparts. Initially, a few of the provincial agencies expressed skepticism as to the need for armed response at nuclear sites. However, after considerable discussion, all agencies gave support for the strengthening of security requirements including the presence of armed response at certain nuclear facilities.

In summary, the affected licensees have been cooperative in implementing the physical protection measures required under CNSC Order Number 01-1 and Designated Officer Order Number 01-D1 and are generally receptive to the proposed amendments. Some licensees have expressed concern regarding the cost of implementation of the various measures but they also expressed an understanding of the necessity of ensuring to the extent feasible, the security of their nuclear facilities and nuclear substances in their possession.

The proposed amended Nuclear Security Regulations were published in the Canada Gazette, Part I, on October 25, 2003. Interested parties had 30 days in which to make comments. Comments could be provided to the CNSC by mail, facsimile, electronic mail or by telephone. All comments received were taken into consideration. Due to the extensive nature of the resulting changes of the proposed amended Regulations, it was decided to republish the regulations in the Canada Gazette, Part I, again.

Fifteen written submissions were received in response to the October 2003 publication, including eight from licensees. All licensees subject to the high-security requirements found in Part 1 of the proposed amended Regulations submitted comments. Three licensees subject to Part 2 of the proposed amended Regulations submitted comments. The remaining licensees subject to Part 2 were contacted by phone to confirm that they did not plan to submit comments.

Meetings or teleconferences were held with each of the licensees who submitted comments to make sure that their concerns were clearly understood, and to address any questions or misinterpretations. Subsequent to these meetings we received two letters from licensees, reiterating their main concerns.

The comments brought forward new perspectives and concrete suggestions. The CNSC's response to the significant comments received is discussed below. Some changes to the proposed amended Regulations were not as a result of a specific comment, but as a result of CNSC staff's overall review of the proposed amended and existing Regulations. Ten key issues/changes are summarized below:

Comment: Arguments were put forward that the requirements found in these Regulations should be performance-based rather than prescriptive. It was argued that prescriptive requirements were not appropriate nor in agreement with the Government of Canada's Regulatory Policy. The arguments indicated that, while a prescriptive approach may have been appropriate in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, for the Orders, the requirements found in these Regulations should be based on defining overall performance objectives, giving licensees the opportunity to consider alternate ways to comply with a given requirement.

Response: It is recognized that the IAEA physical protection guidelines, the Government of Canada's Regulatory Policy, the External Advisory Committee on Smart Regulation and the CNSC's regulatory approach all support performance-based regulations. The proposed amended Nuclear Security Regulations, however, are a mix of prescriptive and performance based requirements that combine to provide the minimum requirements to provide sound physical protection at Canadian nuclear facilities. While the CNSC recognizes that there are advantages to and a preference for performance-based requirements, performance-based requirements for physical protection measures are not well defined internationally. What is well defined internationally is a set of best practices and/or minimum standards with respect to specific physical protection measures, such as for fencing, lighting and the requirement for dual independent intrusion detection systems. In drafting these Regulations, the CNSC has chosen, where necessary, to specify the best international practices in order to ensure that Canada's physical protection requirements at nuclear facilities meet international expectations.

While the prescriptive requirements remain unchanged in the proposed amended Regulations, in a couple of instances, it was appropriate to provide licensees with some flexibility. In the instance of dual fencing requirements [subsection 9(3)], for new construction licences, the proposed regulations have been amended to give licensees flexibility to provide an alternate arrangement [paragraph 9(3)(b)]. Similarly, subsection 46(3) [and the new subsection for Category III nuclear material 7.1(2)], has been added to give licensees flexibility to provide alternate solutions with respect to detection devices.

The CNSC is confident that the proposed amended Regulations strike the right balance between prescriptive and performance-based requirements.

Comment: There was an argument put forward that there was no technical basis to consider all reactors above 10 MW(t) as being equivalent.

Response: The CNSC agrees that there is no technical justification to consider all reactors above 10 MW(t) as being equivalent. The 10 MW(t) criterion is in the current regulations and has been in place since the Atomic Energy Control Board's Physical Security Regulations came into force in 1983. It appears that this 10 MW(t) was a reasonable criterion to allow smaller non-power reactors to be excluded from the more onerous requirements that would apply to nuclear power plants. However, the use of 10 MW(t) as a cut-off level can be argued to be arbitrary and cannot be defended on a scientific basis.

The proposed amended Regulations have been changed, removing the reference to a 10 MW(t) criterion in paragraph 2(b) and replacing it with "nuclear power plant." Further to this, in order to be consistent in our approach to all reactors, the proposed amended Regulations were amended so that all reactors will now be covered by Part 1 (i.e. the only reactor subject to Part 2 was removed from Schedule 2). This will allow the proposed amended Regulations to capture all non-power reactors by the nature of the fuel they use (i.e. the Category of fuel they use, I, II or III). The Regulations represent the minimum physical protection requirements; any additional facility-specific requirements will be addressed through licence conditions.

Issue: The proposed Regulations published in the Canada Gazette, Part I, in October 2003, did not change the requirements for Category III nuclear material. Upon a review of the proposed amended Regulations, it was determined that the physical protection measures for Category III nuclear material were not appropriate, given the risks associated with this material.

Response: The proposed amended Regulations have been changed to add the appropriate physical protection requirements for Category III nuclear material (i.e. similar requirements for those nuclear facilities subject to Part 2 [new sections 7.1 and 7.2]).

4. Exclusions for used fuel dry storage (UFDS) and waste management (WM) areas

Comment: The Regulations published in the Canada Gazette, Part I, in October 2003, recognized the lower risk of UFDS and WM areas by providing exceptions for the requirements for dual personnel identity verification systems and for an on-site nuclear response force. There were comments made that UFDS and WM areas should also be provided exceptions for the requirements for dual fencing for new constructions and vehicle portals. It was argued that there were lower security risks associated with these facilities:

Response: While CNSC staff agrees that exceptions to certain physical protection requirements should apply to UFDS and WM areas, the proposed amended Regulations were changed by removing all references to exceptions for UFDS and WM areas. These exceptions will now be handled by the licensees applying for exemptions under section 7 of the NSC Act. Addressing the exceptions in this manner will allow the Commission to consider each facility on a case-by-case basis. This was considered to be important as future facilities may present different risks.

Comment: The definitions of "sabotage" and "vital area" are not expressly linked to damage and contamination arising from radiation. It was recommended that these definitions be replaced by the definitions found in the IAEA document INFCIRC/225/Rev.4. The IAEA definitions of these terms are clearly linked to radiological consequences.

Response: The definition of "sabotage" remains unchanged, while the definition of "vital area" has been amended to link it to "sabotage" and radiological consequences, to better comply with the IAEA definition.

It is the view of the CNSC that any act of sabotage at a high-security site would be unacceptable and that the CNSC should not limit its concerns to those actions that might result in radiological damage or contamination. The definition of "sabotage," therefore, remains the same.

The definition of "vital area" was changed to better comply with the IAEA definition. The "vital area" definition is now limited to those parts of a high-security site that, if sabotaged, could pose an unreasonable risk to the health and safety of persons arising from exposure to radiation.

Comment: The appropriateness of the CNSC having the authority to revoke authorizations issued by the licensee was questioned (section 22). It was suggested that this provision either be amended or deleted.

Response: Section 22 is repealed in the proposed amended Regulations. Provisions to accomplish the same end can be found in the NSC Act (power to issue orders and the opportunity to be heard). The CNSC is responsible for the regulation of the nuclear industry and must have the overriding authority to ensure that the intent of regulations are met. An order to revoke an authorization would be exercised in extreme circumstances, where it is felt that the licensee has failed to act appropriately or sensitive nuclear security information comes to the attention of the CNSC, requiring immediate action.

Note: The authority for licensees to revoke authorizations/ facility-access clearances can be found under sections 21 and 44 (new).

Comment: The requirement for a medical doctor's mental and physical fitness certificate is found in the existing Regulations. Concern, based on licensees' experience, was expressed over whether medical physicians would be willing, or able, to certify a person mentally fit. There was also concern that there are no standards or criteria by which medical doctors are to assess that persons are both mentally and physically fit.

Response: The requirement for a mental competency certificate has been removed from the proposed amended Regulations. Requirements relating to mental fitness will be handled through other instruments such as standards. Standards are being developed to establish the physical criteria against which doctors can assess physical fitness.

Comment: It was questioned whether the persons currently authorized to act as nuclear security guards under the existing Nuclear Security Regulations could be grandfathered to act as nuclear security officers under the amended Regulations.

Response: The current nuclear security guards will not be grandfathered to act as nuclear security officers. A new provision has been added, however, to allow for a one-year transition period for existing nuclear security guards to obtain the required security clearances for a nuclear security officer.

Comment: The proposed amended Regulations published in the Canada Gazette, Part I, October 2003, contained a requirement that if a person's personal history could not be established for the past five years, that a criminal records name check from their country of origin would be required in order to obtain a facility-access security clearance. There was concern that a criminal records name check may not be available or credible from some countries.

Response: The proposed amended Regulations changed the wording of this provision to give the licensee some flexibility in relation to the type of information relied upon to establish the trustworthiness of an individual [paragraph 42(1)(c)].

Issue: There were a number of comments received asking for clarification on a number of provisions.

Response: Modifications have been made to many provisions in an attempt to improve their clarity. These include

In summary, the proposed amended Nuclear Security Regulations have been revised taking into account the extensive comments received and a thorough CNSC review of both the proposed amendments and the existing Regulations. The proposed amended Nuclear Security Regulations, along with facility-specific licence conditions where appropriate, makes efficient use of the regulatory tools the CNSC has at its disposal.

Compliance with the new nuclear security requirements would be monitored under the CNSC's compliance program. CNSC inspectors and the staff of the Nuclear Security Division conduct inspections of the affected nuclear facilities to ensure compliance with the Nuclear Security Regulations and the effectiveness of their physical protection programs. The inspections include discussions designed to promote compliance. Licensees are required to take prompt action to correct any deficiencies or non-compliance items determined by the CNSC inspectors. Graduated enforcement actions may be used to enforce compliance, such as recommendations, written notices, written warnings, increased regulatory scrutiny, and licencing actions (such as suspending in whole or in part, amending, revoking or replacing a licence).

In addition, orders can be used to enforce compliance. They are issued for special circumstances. An order can be issued by a CNSC inspector or designated officer only when the conditions of subsection 35(1) or 35(2) of the NSC Act are met. Orders can also be made by the Commission in exceptional circumstances pursuant to subsection 46(3) and 47(1) of the NSC Act.

Provision 48(k) of the NSC Act states that any person who fails to comply with the Act or any regulation made pursuant to the Act commits an offence and is subject to the penalties provided by section 51.

Mark Dallaire, Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, 280 Slater Street, P.O. Box 1046, Station B, Ottawa, Ontario K1P 5S9, (613) 947-0957, 1-800-668-5284 (telephone), (613) 995-5086 (facsimile), reg@cnsc-ccsn.gc.ca (electronic mail).

Notice is hereby given that the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, pursuant to subsection 44(1) (see footnote a) of the Nuclear Safety and Control Act (see footnote b) and subject to the approval of the Governor in Council, proposes to make the annexed Regulations Amending the Nuclear Security Regulations.

Interested persons may make representations with respect to the proposed Regulations within 60 days after the date of publication of this notice. All such representations must cite the Canada Gazette, Part I, and the date of publication of this notice, and be addressed to Mark Dallaire, Director of Regulatory Affairs Division, Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, P.O. Box 1046, Station B, 280 Slater Street, Ottawa, Ontario K1P 5S9.

Persons making representations should identify any of those representations the disclosure of which should be refused under the Access to Information Act, in particular under sections 19 and 20 of that Act, and should indicate the reasons why and the period during which the representations should not be disclosed. They should also identify any representations for which there is consent to disclosure for the purposes of that Act.

1. The headings "INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION" and "Interpretation" before section 1 of the Nuclear Security Regulations (see footnote 1) are replaced by the following:

2. (1) The definitions "nuclear security guard", "response force" and "unobstructed area" in section 1 of the Regulations are repealed.

(2) The definitions "effective intervention", "inner area", "licensee" and "protected area" in section 1 of the Regulations are replaced by the following:

"effective intervention" means an intervention that is timely and powerful enough to prevent a person or group of persons, including those equipped with weapons or explosive substances, from committing sabotage or from removing Category I, II or III nuclear material otherwise than in accordance with a licence. (défense efficace)

"inner area" means an area inside a protected area that is surrounded by a barrier or structure that meets the requirements of section 13. (zone intérieure)

(a) in this section and sections 2 to 7.2, a person who is licensed to carry on an activity described in any of paragraphs 26(a), (b), (e) and (f) of the Act in relation to Category I, II or III nuclear material or a nuclear power plant;

(b) in sections 7.3 to 38, a person who is licensed to carry on an activity described in any of paragraphs 26(a), (b), (e) and (f) of the Act in relation to a high-security site; and

(c) in Part 2, a person who is licensed to carry on an activity described in any of paragraphs 26(a), (b) and (e) of the Act in relation to a nuclear facility set out in column 2 of Schedule 2. (titulaire de permis)

"protected area" means an area that is surrounded by a barrier that meets the requirements of section 9. (zone protégée)

(3) Section 1 of the Regulations is amended by adding the following in alphabetical order:

"design basis threat" means the characteristics of a potential adversary in respect of which countermeasures are incorporated into the design and evaluation of a physical protection system. (menace de référence)

(a) anything intended to be used to make a substance capable of producing an explosion, a detonation or a pyrotechnic effect;

(b) anything, or any part of any thing, used or intended to be used or adapted to cause, or to aid in causing, an explosion in or with a substance referred to in paragraph (a); and

(c) an incendiary grenade, firebomb, Molotov cocktail or other similar incendiary substance or device and a delaying mechanism or other thing intended for use in connection with such a substance or device. (substance explosive)

"high-security site" means a nuclear power plant or a nuclear facility where Category I or II nuclear material is processed, used or stored. (site à sécurité élevée)

"nuclear power plant" means a nuclear facility consisting of any fission-reactor installation that has been constructed to generate electricity on a commercial scale. (centrale nucléaire)

"nuclear security officer" means a person whose function is to provide security at a high-security site and to whom an authorization referred to in subsection 18(2) has been issued. (agent de sécurité nucléaire)

"off-site response force" means a local, provincial or federal police service or a Canadian Forces unit whose members are

(a) trained in the use of firearms, authorized to carry firearms in Canada and qualified to use them; and

(i) trained in the use of firearms, authorized to carry firearms in Canada and qualified to use them, and

(ii) permanently located at a high-security site; or

(b) a local, provincial or federal police service, a Canadian Forces unit or any other force

(i) under contract to a licensee,

(ii) whose members are trained in the use of firearms, authorized to carry firearms in Canada and qualified to use them, and

(iii) whose members are permanently located at a high-security site. (force d'intervention nucléaire interne)

"Personnel Security Standard" means the document entitled Chapter 2 - 4 — Personnel Security Standard, published by the Treasury Board Secretariat, as amended from time to time. (Norme sur la sécurité du personnel)

"physical protection measure" means an element or a combination of elements in place at a nuclear facility for its protection — or for the protection of nuclear substances at the facility — against potential adversaries. (mesure de protection physique)

"physical protection system" means all of the physical protection measures in place at a nuclear facility. (système de protection physique)

"physical protection system support person" means a person who carries out the design, implementation, maintenance or repair of a physical protection system at a high-security site or conducts training related to one or more of those activities. (préposé au soutien du système de protection physique)

"potential adversary" means any person — whether or not they have authorized access to a nuclear facility — who might attempt

"sabotage" means any deliberate act or omission, directed against a nuclear facility or nuclear substances, that

(b) results or is likely to result in contamination of the environment. (sabotage)

"threat and risk assessment" means an evaluation of the adequacy of an existing or a proposed physical protection system designed to safeguard against

(a) intentional acts that could pose a threat to the security of a high-security site; and

(b) the exploitation of weaknesses in the physical protection measures of a high-security site. (évaluation de la menace et du risque)

"vehicle portal" means a structure situated on the perimeter of a protected area that is enclosed on the sides and consists of two movable gates, separated by a space sufficiently large to accommodate land vehicles having an operational requirement to enter the area. (sas pour véhicule)

"vital area" means an area inside a protected area containing equipment, systems, devices or a nuclear substance, the sabotage of which would or would likely pose an unreasonable risk to the health and safety of persons arising from exposure to radiation. (zone vitale)

"weapon" means anything that could be used or is capable of being used to jeopardize the security of a nuclear facility or a nuclear substance or anything, including firearms, that is used, designed to be used or intended for use in causing death or injury to any person or for the purpose of threatening or intimidating any person. (arme)

3. The heading before section 2 of the Regulations is replaced by the following:

4. (1) The portion of section 2 of the Regulations before paragraph (a) is replaced by the following:

(2) Paragraph 2(a) of the English version of the Regulations is replaced by the following:

(a) a copy of the arrangements referred to in section 35 made with an off-site response force;

(2) Section 3 of the Regulations is amended by striking out the word "and" at the end of paragraph (e), by adding the word "and" at the end of paragraph (f) and by adding the following after paragraph (f):

4. An application for a licence in respect of Category III nuclear material, other than a licence to transport, shall contain, in addition to the information required by section 3 of the Nuclear Substances and Radiation Devices Regulations, a description of the measures to be taken to ensure compliance with subsection 7(3) and sections 7.1 and 7.2.

7. Paragraphs 5(e) and (f) of the Regulations are replaced by the following:

(e) the communication arrangements made among the licensee, the operator of the land vehicle transporting the nuclear material, the recipient of the material and any off-site response force along the route;

(f) the arrangements made between the licensee and any off-site response force along the route;

8. The heading "GENERAL OBLIGATIONS" after section 6 of the Regulations is replaced by the following:

9. Paragraphs 7(3)(b) and (c) of the Regulations are replaced by the following:

(c) an area to which access is controlled by the licensee and that is designed and constructed to prevent persons from gaining unauthorized access to the Category III nuclear material.

10. Section 8 of the Regulations and the heading before it and the heading "REQUIREMENTS CONCERNING PROTECTED AND INNER AREAS" after it are replaced by the following:

7.1 (1) Subject to subsection (2), if a licensee processes, uses or stores Category III nuclear material in an area referred to in paragraph 7(3)(c), the licensee shall ensure that the area is equipped with devices that

(d) when an event referred to in paragraph (a), (b) or (c) is detected, set off a continuous alarm signal that is both audible and visible to a person in the service of the licensee or of an alarm monitoring service under contract to the licensee.

(2) A licensee need not comply with subsection (1) if it takes physical protection measures in respect of the area that provide the same level of protection as the devices referred to in that subsection.

7.2 (1) Every licensee shall make or cause to be made written arrangements with an off-site response force that is capable of making an effective intervention at an area where Category III nuclear material is processed, used or stored.

(a) annual familiarization visits by members of the off-site response force to the area where the Category III nuclear material is processed, used or stored; and

(b) the joint development of a contingency plan by the licensee and the off-site response force to facilitate the force making an effective intervention.

(3) If a licensee does not have alarm monitoring capability, the alarm monitoring service under contract to the licensee shall notify the licensee and the off-site response force, immediately on receipt of an alarm signal from the area where the Category III nuclear material is processed, used or stored.

7.4 (1) The Commission shall establish a design basis threat analysis and periodically update it as necessary to incorporate changes to the design basis threat.

(2) The Commission shall provide the current design basis threat analysis to every licensee, who shall take that analysis into account in the design of their physical protection system and make modifications to that system as necessary.

7.5 (1) Every licensee shall conduct, at least once every 12 months, a threat and risk assessment specific to a facility where it carries on licensed activities in order to determine the adequacy of its physical protection system.

(2) Every licensee shall make modifications to its physical protection system, as necessary, to counter any credible threat identified as a result of the threat and risk assessment.

(3) Every licensee shall keep a written record of each threat and risk assessment that it conducts.

(4) Every licensee shall provide a copy of the written record, together with a statement of actions taken as a result of the threat and risk assessment, to the Commission within 60 days after completion of the assessment.

11. (1) The portion of subsection 9(2) of the Regulations before paragraph (a) is replaced by the following:

(2) Subject to subsection (3), the barrier shall be designed and constructed to inhibit any unauthorized entry into the protected area and must be one or a combination of the following structures:

(2) Subsections 9(3) and (4) of the Regulations are replaced by the following:

(3) For facilities in respect of which a construction licence is issued after March 1, 2006, the barrier must be designed and constructed to inhibit unauthorized entry into the protected area and must

(i) an exterior fence extending at least 3 m above grade and 60 cm below grade but otherwise constructed to the specifications set out in paragraph (2)(a),

(ii) an interior fence extending at least 2.4 m above grade but otherwise constructed to the specifications set out in paragraph (2)(a), and

(iii) an assessment zone that is not less than 5 m wide and not more than 15 m wide between the two fences and is free of obstructions other than guard posts, vehicle portals and intrusion detection and assessment devices; or

(b) consist of a structure that provides the same level of protection as the structures referred to in paragraph (a).

(4) Despite subsection (3), permanent security facilities such as guard posts and vehicle portals may join with the exterior and interior fences provided that a continuous barrier is maintained.

(5) The interior fence referred to in subparagraph (3)(a)(ii) is considered to be the perimeter of the protected area.

(6) Each gate, door, window or other means of entry or exit in the barrier shall be constructed so that it can be closed and locked.

(7) The means of entry or exit referred to in subsection (6) shall be kept closed and locked except when persons or land vehicles are entering or exiting the protected area under the direct visual surveillance of a nuclear security officer.

9.1 (1) Every licensee shall ensure that vehicle portals are used for the entry and exit of land vehicles into and from a protected area.

(2) The gates of a vehicle portal shall not be open at the same time, except if required in the event of an emergency.

(3) No licensee shall permit a land vehicle to enter a protected area unless there is an operational requirement for it to be there.

(4) Every licensee shall implement physical protection measures necessary to reduce the risk of forced land vehicle penetration of a protected area.

9.2 The barrier referred to in section 9 shall be continuously and uniformly illuminated at a minimum intensity of 5 lx measured horizontally, at ground level, with a uniformity ratio of maximum light intensity to minimum light intensity of not more than 6 to 1.

10. (1) Every protected area shall be surrounded by an unobstructed area located on both sides of the barrier described in section 9 that extends at least 5 m away from every point of the barrier.

(b) continuously and uniformly illuminated at a minimum intensity of 5 lx measured horizontally, at ground level, with a uniformity ratio of maximum light intensity to minimum light intensity of not more than 6 to 1.

(3) Section 10 of the Regulations is amended by adding the following after subsection (2):

(3) Paragraph (2)(a) does not apply to structures in place on March 1, 2006, provided that appropriate physical protection measures are taken to maintain the integrity of the barrier described in section 9.

14. (1) The portion of paragraph 11(a) of the French version of the Regulations before subparagraph (i) is replaced by the following:

(i) employ two independent systems using different technologies that detect the intrusion of any person, animal or thing,

(3) Paragraph 11(a) of the Regulations is amended by striking out the word "and" at the end of subparagraph (iii), by replacing the word "or" at the end of subparagraph (iv) with the word "and" and by adding the following after subparagraph (iv):

(v) in the event of the loss of power, maintain uninterrupted power supply for all devices related to intrusion detection and immediate assessment of the cause of an alarm — other than lighting as required by section 9.2 and paragraph 10(2)(b) — for a sufficient period to allow for an alternate continuous power supply to be implemented; or

(4) The portion of paragraph 11(b) of the Regulations before subparagraph (i) is replaced by the following:

(b) kept under the direct visual surveillance of a nuclear security officer who is equipped with a device that can set off a continuous alarm signal that

15. (1) The portion of subsection 13(1) of the Regulations before paragraph (b) is replaced by the following:

13. (1) Every inner area shall be totally enclosed by a structure or barrier that is designed and constructed to prevent, alone or in combination with other structures or barriers, persons from completing both of the following actions before an on-site nuclear response force can make an effective intervention:

(a) gaining unauthorized access to Category I nuclear material by using hand-held tools, weapons or explosive substances; and

(2) Subsection 13(2) of the French version of the Regulations is replaced by the following:

(2) La structure ou la barrière entourant la zone intérieure est situé à une distance d'au moins 5 m à partir de tout point de la barrière entourant la zone protégée.

(3) Each gate, door, window or other means of entry or exit in the structure or barrier that encloses an inner area shall be kept closed and locked with a device that, from outside the structure or barrier, can only be unlocked by two persons authorized under section 18, using two different keys or combinations at the same time.

(4) No person authorized to enter an inner area under section 18 shall enter that area unless at least one other person authorized to enter the area enters and remains in the area at the same time.

(5) No licensee shall permit a land vehicle to enter an inner area except when there is an operational requirement for it to be there.

16. (1) The portion of paragraph 14(a) of the French version of the Regulations before subparagraph (i) is replaced by the following:

(i) employ two independent systems using different technologies that detect the intrusion into, and the movement out of and within, the inner area of any person, animal or thing,

(3) Subparagraph 14(a)(iii) of the Regulations is replaced by the following:

(iii) when an event referred to in subparagraph (i) or (ii) is detected, set off two independent continuous alarm signals each of which is both audible and visible, one in the security monitoring room that can be stopped only from that room by a nuclear security officer, and the other in at least one other attended place outside the inner area that can be stopped only from that place by a person who is authorized to enter the inner area under section 18,

(4) Paragraph 14(a) of the Regulations is amended by replacing the word "or" at the end of subparagraph (iv) with the word "and" and by adding the following after subparagraph (iv):

(v) in the event of the loss of power, maintain uninterrupted power supply for all devices related to intrusion detection and immediate assessment of the cause of an alarm, for a sufficient period to allow for an alternate continuous power supply to be implemented; or

(5) The portion of paragraph 14(b) of the Regulations before subparagraph (i) is replaced by the following:

(b) kept under the direct visual surveillance of a nuclear security officer who is equipped with a device that can set off a continuous alarm signal that

14.1 Every licensee shall identify all vital areas and implement physical protection measures — including access control and measures designed to delay unauthorized access — taking into account the design basis threat and any other credible threat identified by a threat and risk assessment.

15. (1) Every licensee shall monitor all of the devices required by this Part from a security monitoring room, access to which is controlled by the licensee.

(b) designed, constructed and situated so as to reduce vulnerability to damage and to resist forced entry by the use of hand-held tools, weapons, explosive substances or land vehicles until the on-site nuclear response force can make an effective intervention;

(3) Subparagraphs 15(2)(c)(i) and (ii) of the Regulations are replaced by the following:

(i) a two-way radio that can be used to communicate with both the on-site nuclear response force and the off-site response force,

(ii) an alarm device that can be used at any time to alert the on-site nuclear response force and the off-site response force,

(4) Paragraph 15(2)(c) of the Regulations is amended by striking out the word "and" at the end of subparagraph (iii), by adding the word "and" at the end of subparagraph (iv) and by adding the following after subparagraph (iv):

(v) devices that, in the event of the loss of power, maintain uninterrupted power supply for all devices related to intrusion detection and immediate assessment of the cause of an alarm, for a sufficient period to allow for an alternate continuous power supply to be implemented;

(5) Section 15 of the Regulations is amended by adding the following after subsection (2):

(3) A licensee shall monitor the devices referred to in subsection (1) by using two systems, a primary system and a backup system. The backup system shall be designed to maintain the operation of the alarm assessment and monitoring function in the event of a failure of equipment, including key computer systems, essential to the functioning of the primary system.

15.1 (1) Every licensee shall maintain records of all devices, including keys and locks, whether electronic or manual, used to control access to protected, inner or vital areas or to Category I, II or III nuclear material.

(2) The records shall list all devices and their combinations, if any, that have been issued, the date of issue and the individuals to whom they were issued.

(3) If there are reasonable grounds to believe that any device or combination is defective or has been lost, stolen or unlawfully transferred or has otherwise become insecure, as the case may be, the licensee shall immediately take all measures necessary to restore the integrity of the device or combination believed to be affected.

(4) A licensee shall not issue a device or combination controlling access to a protected, inner or vital area or to Category I, II or III nuclear material to any person unless an authorization referred to in subsection 17(1) or 18(1), (2) or (3), as the case may be, has been issued to them and they are required to access that area in the performance of their duties.

20. (1) The portion of section 16 of the Regulations before paragraph (b) is replaced by the following:

16. Every licensee shall maintain a site plan that indicates the location and includes a description of the following, if applicable:

(3) Section 16 of the Regulations is amended by striking out the word "and" at the end of paragraph (e), by adding the word "and" at the end of paragraph (f) and by adding the following after paragraph (f):

17. (1) No person, other than a person to whom an authorization referred to in section 18 has been issued, shall enter a protected area without physical proof of the recorded authorization of the licensee.

(1.1) In this section, "site access security clearance" means a clearance granted by a licensee to a person based on a security assessment referred to in articles 2.3.3 and 3.4 of the Personnel Security Standard.

(2) Subsection 17(2) of the Regulations is amended by striking out the word "and" at the end of paragraph (d), by adding the word "and" at the end of paragraph (e) and by adding the following after paragraph (e):

(5) A licensee shall issue an authorization to enter a protected area for any term not exceeding five years and subject to any terms and conditions that are necessary to minimize the risk to the security of the area.

22. The heading before section 18 and sections 18 to 22 of the Regulations are replaced by the following:

17.1 On the entry into a protected area of a person to whom an authorization referred to in subsection 17(1) has been issued, that person's identity shall be verified by two separate personnel identity verification systems, one of which is an access card reader and the other, a biometric personnel identity verification device.

18. (1) Subject to subsection 20(1), no person shall enter an inner area without the recorded authorization of the licensee.

(2) Subject to section 18.6, no person shall act as a nuclear security officer without the recorded authorization of the licensee.

(3) Subject to subsection 20(2), no person shall act as a physical protection system support person without the recorded authorization of the licensee.

18.1 A licensee shall, before issuing an authorization referred to in subsection 18(1) or (3) to a person referred to in that subsection, perform a credit check in respect of the person, obtain the information and documents referred to in paragraphs 17(2)(a) to (e) and grant a security clearance to the person equivalent to a level II clearance referred to in article 2.2 of the Personnel Security Standard or higher.

18.2 A licensee, before issuing an authorization referred to in subsection 18(2) to a person referred to in that subsection, shall satisfy the conditions set out in section 18.1 in respect of the person — other than the condition set out in paragraph 17(2)(b) — and shall obtain from the person

(a) documentary proof that the person is a Canadian citizen or a permanent resident within the meaning of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act; and

(b) a medical certificate, signed by a doctor who is licensed to practice medicine in the province where the person will likely be assigned, certifying that the person is physically able to perform the tasks that are likely to be assigned by the licensee.

18.3 (1) An authorization referred to in subsection 18(2) or (3) includes an authorization to enter an inner area.

(2) An authorization referred to in section 18 includes an authorization referred to in subsection 17(1).

18.4 A licensee shall issue an authorization referred to in section 18 for any term not exceeding five years and subject to any terms and conditions necessary to minimize the risk to the security of the facility.

18.5 Every licensee shall give to a person for whom an authorization referred to in section 18 has been sought, at the person's request, a copy of any information or documents relating to the authorization in the licensee's possession that were submitted to the licensee by or on behalf of the person.

18.6 Despite section 18.2, a nuclear security officer need not be granted the security clearance referred to in section 18.1 until one year after the coming into force of this section if he or she was a nuclear security guard immediately before that coming into force.

19. (1) Every licensee shall establish and maintain a list of all persons to whom an authorization referred to in section 18 has been issued.

(2) Every licensee shall, upon request, provide the list to the Commission or a person who is designated as an inspector under section 29 of the Act.

20. (1) A person who does not have an authorization referred to in subsection 18(1) may enter an inner area if they do so for the purpose of performing duties required by the licensee and they have the written authorization of the licensee.

(2) A person who does not have an authorization referred to in subsection 18(3) may act as a physical protection system support person if they do so for the purpose of performing duties required by the licensee and they have the written authorization of the licensee.

20.1 A licensee shall, before issuing an authorization referred to in subsection 20(1) or (2), obtain the following information:

20.2 (1) A licensee shall, when issuing an authorization referred to in subsection 20(1), make it subject to the condition that the person must be escorted at all times within the inner area by two persons who have the authorization referred to in either subsection 18(1) or (2).

(2) A licensee shall, when issuing an authorization referred to in subsection 20(2), make it subject to the condition that the physical protection system support person must be escorted at all times

(a) within the protected area by a person who has the authorization referred to in subsection 18(3); and

(b) within the inner area, by two persons, one of whom has the authorization referred to in subsection 18(3) and the other of whom has the authorization referred to in subsection 18(1), (2) or (3).

(3) No licensee shall permit a person who has an authorization referred to in section 20 to enter or remain in an inner area or act as a physical protection system support person unless they are escorted at all times as required by subsection (1) or (2).

20.3 Except as otherwise provided in this Part, no licensee shall permit any person to enter or remain in a protected area or an inner area unless the person is a member of an off-site response force, a peace officer or a member of another external emergency response force who requires access to that area for the purpose of carrying out their duties.

21. (1) A licensee may revoke an authorization issued under section 17, 18 or 20 if

(a) there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person who has the authorization poses or could pose a risk to the security of a facility;

(b) the person is no longer employed by or otherwise under contract to the licensee;

(d) the authorization is no longer required by the person in order for them to perform their duties.

(2) Subject to subsection (3), a licensee shall immediately notify the Commission in writing of any revocation made under subsection (1) and the reasons for it.

(3) If a revocation is in respect of an authorization under section 17, a licensee need not inform the Commission of the revocation and the reasons for it unless the revocation was made because there were reasonable grounds to believe that the person to whom the authorization was issued posed or could have posed a risk to the security of the facility.

23. Section 25 of the Regulations and the heading before it are replaced by the following:

25. Every licensee shall ensure that weapons and explosive substances are not taken into a protected area or an inner area unless they are under the control of a nuclear security officer or a member of an on-site nuclear response force or an off-site response force.

24. (1) Paragraphs 27(1)(a) and (b) of the Regulations are replaced by the following:

(a) enter the area unless they allow a nuclear security officer to search them and everything in their possession, including any land vehicle, for weapons and explosive substances; and

(b) leave the area unless they allow a nuclear security officer to search them and everything in their possession, including any land vehicle, for Category I, II or III nuclear material.

(2) Subsections 27(2) and (3) of the Regulations are replaced by the following:

(2) Subject to section 27.1, no licensee shall permit any person to enter or leave a protected area or an inner area unless

(a) on entering the area, the person and everything in their possession, including any land vehicle, has been searched for weapons and explosive substances and, in the case of a land vehicle, for unauthorized persons, by a nuclear security officer, who is physically present using appropriate detection and screening devices; and

(b) on leaving the area, the person and everything in their possession, including any land vehicle, has been searched for Category I, II or III nuclear material by a nuclear security officer using devices capable of detecting that material.

(4) No licensee who has a reasonable suspicion that a person who is in a protected area or an inner area has in their possession weapons or explosive substances that are not under the control of a nuclear security officer or a member of an on-site nuclear response force or an off-site response force or has in their possession Category I, II or III nuclear material without the authorization of the licensee shall permit the person to remain in either area without the person and everything in their possession, including any land vehicle, being searched by a nuclear security officer for the weapons, explosive substances or nuclear material.

27.1 (1) The search requirements set out in subsection 27(2) do not apply to a nuclear security officer or a member of an on-site nuclear response force who requires emergency access to or egress from a facility, as the case may be, for the purpose of carrying out their duties, if they provide identification that satisfactorily establishes that they are a nuclear security officer or a member of that force.

(2) The search requirements set out in subsection 27(2) do not apply to a member of an off-site response force, a peace officer or a member of another external emergency response force who requires emergency access to or egress from a facility, as the case may be, for the purpose of carrying out their duties, if

(a) they provide identification that satisfactorily establishes that they are a member of an off-site response force, a peace officer or a member of another external emergency response force;

(b) the purpose of their emergency access to or egress from the facility is verified by a nuclear security officer; and

(a) take any weapons or explosive substances into a protected area or an inner area unless they are under the control of a nuclear security officer or a member of an on-site nuclear response force or an off-site response force; or

27. Section 29 of the Regulations and the heading before it and the headings after it are replaced by the following:

29. Sections 17, 18 and 20 do not apply to or in respect of an inspector who is designated under section 29 of the Act to carry out inspections at a high-security site.

28. The portion of section 30 of the Regulations before paragraph (d) is replaced by the following:

30. Every licensee shall at all times have available at a facility at which it carries on licensed activities a sufficient number of nuclear security officers to enable the licensee to comply with this Part and do the following:

(b) conduct searches of persons, materials and land vehicles for weapons, explosive substances and Category I, II or III nuclear material;

(c) conduct preventive foot and land vehicle patrols of the facility and the perimeter of the protected area to inspect for security breaches and vulnerabilities;

29. The heading before section 31 and sections 31 to 33 of the Regulations are replaced by the following:

31. Every licensee shall provide nuclear security officers with the equipment required to perform the duties set out in section 30, including

(a) a bullet-resistant vest providing a minimum level of protection of type II-A as described in chapter 6 of the Selection and Application Guide to Personal Body Armor, NIJ Guide 100-01, published by the United States Department of Justice in the version dated November 2001;

(b) portable communications equipment equipped with a device that can set off a continuous alarm signal that is both audible and visible in the security monitoring room referred to in paragraphs 11(b) and 14(b);

32. Every licensee shall at all times maintain an on-site nuclear response force that is capable of making an effective intervention, taking into account the design basis threat and any other credible threat identified by a threat and risk assessment.

(2) Every licensee shall, within the 30-day period before issuing an authorization referred to in subsection 18(2) to a person, examine the person's familiarity with the relevant and current security duties and responsibilities.

31. The headings before section 35, sections 35 and 36 of the Regulations and the heading after section 36 are replaced by the following:

35. (1) Every licensee shall make or cause to be made written arrangements with an off-site response force to provide for the protection of a facility at which it carries on licensed activities.

(a) to ensure that there is capability at all times for immediate communication among the security monitoring room, the on-site nuclear response force and the off-site response force;

(b) to ensure that the off-site response force can support the on-site nuclear response force in making an effective intervention when requested to do so by the licensee;

(c) for the installation of a two-way radio referred to in subparagraph 15(2)(c)(i) and an alarm device referred to in subparagraph 15(2)(c)(ii);

(d) for annual familiarization visits to the facility by members of the off-site response force; and

(e) for consultation among the licensee, the off-site response force and the Commission regarding the arrangements, the resources and the equipment available to the licensee and the off-site response force, and any other matter relating to the security of the facility.

36. (1) Every licensee shall develop and maintain or cause to be developed and maintained, in cooperation with the off-site response force referred to in subsection 35(1), a contingency plan to ensure that an effective intervention can be made, taking into account the design basis threat and any other credible threat identified by a threat and risk assessment.

(2) Every licensee shall conduct or cause to be conducted at a facility at which it carries on licensed activities, in cooperation with the off-site response force, at least one security exercise every two years to test the effectiveness of the contingency plan and of the physical protection system.

(3) Every licensee shall notify the Commission in writing of its intention to conduct a security exercise at least 60 days before the exercise date.

(4) Every licensee shall conduct a security drill at the facility at least once each 30 days to test the operation of one or more of its physical protection measures and the readiness of its security personnel.

32. Section 38 of the Regulations and the heading before it are replaced by the following:

38. Every licensee shall develop a supervisory awareness program and implement it on an ongoing basis to ensure that its supervisors can recognize behavioural changes in all personnel, including contractors, that could pose a risk to security at a facility at which it carries on licensed activities.

39. In this Part, "facility-access security clearance" means a clearance granted to a person by a licensee permitting access to a nuclear facility to which this Part applies.

40. (1) Subject to subsection (2), this Part applies in respect of a nuclear facility set out in column 2 of Schedule 2 that is

(b) at any time after being operated by a licensee referred to in paragraph (a), operated by another licensee.

(2) If the provisions of both Part 1 and this Part apply to a licensee, the provisions of Part 1 that relate to Category I and II nuclear material shall prevail to the extent of any inconsistency.

(3) Despite sections 7.1 and 7.2, this Part applies to a licensee that processes, uses or stores Category III nuclear material.

41. An application for a licence in respect of a nuclear facility shall contain, in addition to the information required by sections 3 to 8 of the Class I Nuclear Facilities Regulations, a description of the physical protection measures to be taken to ensure compliance with sections 42 to 48.

42. (1) Before granting a facility-access security clearance to a person, a licensee shall verify the following information:

(a) a record emanating from the Canadian Police Information Centre or from a police service serving the locality where the facility is located, showing the results of a criminal record name check on the person;

(b) the person's personal history, composed of their educational achievement, professional qualifications, employment history and character references, unless the person has been employed for more than 10 years at the facility; and

(c) if a person's personal history cannot be established for at least the last five years, information relating to the trustworthiness of the person including, where available, a criminal record name check on that person from each country in which the person has resided for one or more years in the last five years.

(2) No licensee shall permit any person to enter or remain in a nuclear facility unless the person has a facility-access security clearance or is

(a) escorted at all times by a person who has a facility-access security clearance;

(b) a member of an off-site response force, a peace officer or a member of another external emergency response force who requires access for the purpose of carrying out their duties at the site of the nuclear facility; or

(c) an inspector who is designated under section 29 of the Act to carry out inspections at a nuclear facility set out in column 2 of Schedule 2.

(3) A licensee shall grant a facility-access security clearance for any term not exceeding five years and subject to any terms and conditions necessary to minimize the risk to the security of the nuclear facility.

43. (1) Every licensee shall establish and maintain a list of all persons to whom a facility-access security clearance has been granted under section 42.

(2) Every licensee shall, upon request, provide the list to the Commission or a person who is designated as an inspector under section 29 of the Act.

(a) there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person who has the facility-access security clearance poses or could pose a risk to the security of a nuclear facility;

(b) the person is no longer employed by or otherwise under contract to the licensee;

(d) the facility-access security clearance is no longer required by the person in order for them to perform their duties.

(2) A licensee shall immediately notify the Commission in writing of any revocation made under paragraph (1)(a).

45. No licensee shall permit a land vehicle to enter a nuclear facility unless

(a) there is an operational requirement for it to be there and it is searched for explosive substances, weapons and unauthorized persons; or

(b) it is used by a member of an off-site response force, a peace officer or a member of another external emergency response force for the purpose of carrying out their duties.

46. (1) Every licensee shall process, use and store nuclear substances and other radioactive material in an area within a nuclear facility that is under the visual surveillance of the licensee, or is designed and constructed to prevent persons from gaining unauthorized access to those substances and that material.

(2) Subject to subsection (3), a licensee shall ensure that the area is equipped with devices that

(b) detect any tampering that may cause any of the devices to malfunction or cease to function; and

(c) when an event referred to in paragraph (a) or (b) is detected, set off a continuous alarm signal that is both audible and visible to a person in the service of the licensee or of an alarm monitoring service under contract to the licensee.

(3) A licensee need not comply with subsection (2) if it takes physical protection measures in respect of the area that provide the same level of protection as the devices referred to in that subsection.

47. (1) Every licensee shall make or cause to be made written arrangements with an off-site response force that is capable of making an effective intervention at the nuclear facility.

(a) annual familiarization visits to the nuclear facility by members of the off-site response force; and

(b) the joint development of a contingency plan by the licensee and the off-site response force to facilitate the force making an effective intervention.

(3) If a licensee does not have alarm monitoring capability, the alarm monitoring service under contract to the licensee shall notify the licensee and the off-site response force, immediately on receipt of an alarm signal from the nuclear facility or the area referred to in subsection 46(1).

48. Every licensee shall develop a supervisory awareness program and implement it on an ongoing basis to ensure that its supervisors can recognize behavioural changes in all personnel, including contractors, that could pose a risk to security at a nuclear facility at which it carries on licensed activities.

34. The italicized portion of the text in Schedule 1 to the French version of the Regulations is converted from italics to roman type.

35. The heading of column 5 of Schedule 1 to the Regulations is replaced by the following:

36. Schedule 1 to the Regulations is amended by adding the following after footnote 4:

5. Quantities less than the quantities set out in column 5 of Schedule 1 for Category III nuclear material and any quantities of natural uranium, depleted uranium and thorium should be protected at least in accordance with prudent security practice.

37. The Regulations are amended by adding, after Schedule 1, the schedule set out in the schedule to these Regulations.

38. The Regulations are amended by replacing the expression "the schedule" with the expression "Schedule 1" in the definitions "Category I nuclear material", "Category II nuclear material" and "Category III nuclear material" in section 1.

39. The Regulations are amended by replacing the expressions "nuclear security guard" and "nuclear security guards" with the expressions "nuclear security officer" and "nuclear security officers", respectively, wherever they occur in the following provisions:

40. The headings in small capitals before sections 3, 6 and 17 of the Regulations are converted to upper and lower case italics to conform with the format of the new Part headings enacted by these Regulations.

41. The headings in italics immediately before sections 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28 and 34 of the Regulations are converted to roman type to conform with the format of the new Part headings enacted by these Regulations.

42. These Regulations come into force 90 days after the day on which they are approved by the Governor in Council.