

Canadian Security Guide Book

2005 EDITION

An Update of Security Problems in Search of Solutions

**Standing Senate Committee
on National Security and Defence**

December 2004

MEMBERSHIP

38th Parliament – 1st Session

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE

The Honourable Colin Kenny, *Chair*

The Honourable J. Michael Forrestall, *Vice-Chair*

and

The Honourable Senators:

The Honourable Norman K. Atkins

The Honourable Tommy Banks

The Honourable Jane Cordy

The Honourable Joseph A. Day

The Honourable John Lynch-Staunton

The Honourable Michael A. Meighen

The Honourable Jim Munson

*The Honourable Jack Austin P.C. (or the Honourable William Rompkey, P.C.)

*The Honourable Noël A. Kinsella (or the Honourable Terry Stratton)

**Ex Officio Members*

Other Senators who participated during the 38th Parliament – 1st Session:

The Honourable Senators:

The Honourable Terry M. Mercer

The Honourable Wilfred P. Moore

The Honourable Pierre Clause Nolin

The Honourable William Rompkey

The Honourable Peter A. Stollery

The Honourable Marilyn Trenholme Counsell

Membership

MEMBERSHIP

37th Parliament – 3rd Session

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE

The Honourable Colin Kenny, *Chair*

The Honourable J. Michael Forrestall, *Vice-Chair*

and

The Honourable Senators:

The Honourable Norman K. Atkins

The Honourable Tommy Banks

The Honourable Jane Cordy

The Honourable Joseph A. Day

The Honourable Michael A. Meighen

The Honourable Jim Munson

The Honourable David P. Smith, P.C.

*The Honourable Jack Austin P.C. (or the Honourable William Rompkey, P.C.)

*The Honourable John Lynch-Staunton (or the Honourable Noël A. Kinsella)

**Ex Officio Members*

MEMBERSHIP

37th Parliament – 2nd Session

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE

The Honourable Colin Kenny, *Chair*

The Honourable J. Michael Forrestall, *Vice-Chair*

and

The Honourable Senators:

The Honourable Norman K. Atkins

The Honourable Tommy Banks

The Honourable Jane Cordy

The Honourable Joseph A. Day

The Honourable Michael A. Meighen

The Honourable David P. Smith, P.C.

The Honourable John (Jack) Wiebe

*The Honourable Sharon Carstairs P.C. (or the Honourable Fernand Robichaud, P.C.)

*The Honourable John Lynch-Staunton (or the Honourable Noël A. Kinsella)

**Ex Officio Members*

Membership

MEMBERSHIP

37th Parliament – 1st Session

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE

The Honourable Colin Kenny, *Chair*

The Honourable J. Michael Forrestall, *Vice-Chair*

and

The Honourable Senators:

The Honourable Norman K. Atkins

The Honourable Tommy Banks

The Honourable Jane Cordy

The Honourable Joseph A. Day

The Honourable Laurier L. LaPierre

The Honourable Michael A. Meighen

The Honourable John (Jack) Wiebe

*The Honourable Sharon Carstairs P.C. (or the Honourable Fernand Robichaud, P.C.)

*The Honourable John Lynch-Staunton (or the Honourable Noël A. Kinsella)

**Ex Officio Members*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1	1
Introduction	1
Reading the Report.....	17
CHAPTER 2	19
Border Crossings.....	19
Problem 1: Poor Threat Identification at the Border	19
Problem 2: Long Canadian Security Intelligence Service Processing Times	23
Problem 3: Undertrained Part-Time Customs Staff.....	27
Problem 4: Unsafe Border Posts	29
Problem 5: Arm Customs Officials?.....	31
CHAPTER 3	33
Coasts	33
Problem 1: Canada’s Vulnerable Coasts.....	33
Problem 2: Coastal Radar - Off the Government’s radar?.....	35
Problem 3: Inadequate Short-Range Coastal Patrols	37
Problem 4: Inadequate Long-Range Coastal Patrols	39
Problem 5: Canada’s Toothless Coast Guard	41
Problem 6: No Notification Prior to Arrival	43
Problem 7: Taking Incoming Vessels at Their Word	45
Problem 8: Need Network for Maritime Warnings	47
Problem 9: Unannounced Vessels.....	49
Problem 10: Transponders for Smaller Vessels.....	51
Problem 11: Dangerous Containers	53
Problem 12: Lack of Border Officials Abroad	55
Problem 13: Great Lakes Surveillance	57
Problem 14: Surveillance of Coasts, Lakes and Rivers	61
Problem 15: Training Delays	63

**Canadian Security Guide Book
2005 Edition**

CHAPTER 4	65
Canadian Forces.....	65
Problem 1: Budget Cuts	65
Problem 2: Capital Acquisitions Falling Behind	69
Problem 3: Overheated Operational Tempo	71
Problem 4: Too Few Personnel – Too High Tempo	75
Problem 5: Overdue Defence Policy Review	79
Problem 6: Lack of Large-Scale Training Exercises	81
Problem 7: The Slow Move to Wainwright.....	83
CHAPTER 5	85
Structure and Coordination of Government.....	85
Problem 1: Need for Muscle at the Top.....	85
Problem 2: Need for A Strong Team	89
Problem 3: Coordination at the Top.....	91
Problem 4: The Missing National Security Policy	93
Problem 5: Need for Crisis Command Centres	95
Problem 6: Need for Canada-U.S. Coordination	97
Problem 7: Slow Progress at Information-Sharing	99
Problem 8: Lack of Surveillance Coordination	101
Problem 9: Intelligence Community Understaffed.....	105
Problem 10: Weak Overseas Intelligence	109
Problem 11: Information Fusion Failures	111
Problem 12: Lack of Oversight.....	113
Problem 13: Coordination Lacking In Coastal Defence.....	117
Problem 14: Allocations of Proceeds of Crime	119
Problem 15: Canada Too Inward Looking.....	121
CHAPTER 6	65
Ports.....	123
Problem 1: Vulnerable Ports.....	123

Problem 2: Organized Crime in Ports	125
Problem 3: Port Perimeters	129
Problem 4: Insufficient Police at Ports	131
Problem 5: Inadequate Container Screening.....	133
Problem 6: Inadequate Container Supervision	137
Problem 7: Fragile Ferries.....	139
CHAPTER 7	141
Airports	141
Problem 1: Screening Checked Baggage.....	141
Problem 2: Inadequate Background Checks.....	145
Problem 3: No Leadership on Airside Passes	149
Problem 4: Unprepared Air Crews	153
Problem 5: Armed Pilots?	155
Problem 6: Alerting Air Crews	157
Problem 7: Role of Aircraft Protection Officers.....	159
Problem 8: Vulnerable Cockpit Doors.....	161
Problem 9: Security Training for Maintenance Workers.....	163
Problem 10: Responsibility for Airport Security Needs Clarifying – Who’s in Charge?.....	165
Problem 11: Known Shipper Makes Aircraft Insecure.....	167
Problem 12: Lack of Security at Fixed-Base Operations	169
Problem 13: Small Airports are Weak Links in the Aviation Security	173
Problem 14: Access to Restricted Areas.....	175
Problem 15: Airmail and Cargo Goes Unchecked.....	179
Problem 16: The Canadian Air Transport Authority Intelligence Gap	183
Problem 17: Airport Policing is Inadequate.....	185
Problem 18: Lack of Transparency for Security Improvements	189
Problem 19: Air Travellers’ Security Charge	191
Problem 20: Unnecessary Secrecy	193

**Canadian Security Guide Book
2005 Edition**

Problem 21: Lack of Financial Transparency	197
CHAPTER 8	199
Emergency Preparedness	199
Problem 1: Lack of Emergency Management	199
Problem 2: Emergency Ad Hockery	201
Problem 3: Inability to Deploy Police in an Emergency	203
Problem 4: No Role for Reserves	205
Problem 5: No Domestic Role for the DART	209
Problem 6: Emergency Caches Mismanaged	211
Problem 7: Lack of Equipment for First Responders	213
Problem 8: Institutional “Lessons Learned” Memory Blank.....	215
Problem 9: Lack of Centralized Health Protection	217
Problem 10: Poor Collaboration	219
Problem 11: Emergency Public Communications	221
Problem 12: Poor Communications Equipment	225
Problem 13: First Responders Out of Loop	227
Problem 14: Weak Central Knowledge Base on Critical Infrastructure.....	229
Problem 15: Lack of Leadership on Best Practices	231
Problem 16: Large Cities Should Be Helping Regions	233
APPENDIX I	235
Corrections, and Omissions	235
APPENDIX II	239
Order of Reference	239
APPENDIX III	241
Who the Committee Heard From.....	241
APPENDIX IV	287
Biographies of Committee Members	287
APPENDIX V	299
Biographies of Committee Secretariat	299

APPENDIX VI.....	307
Index of Recommendations	307

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

“Thinking the worst is not defeatist. It is the best way to avoid defeat. Nor is it defeatist to concede that terror can never be entirely vanquished. Terrorists will continue to threaten democratic politics wherever oppressed or marginalized groups believe their cause justifies violence. But we can certainly deny them victory. We can continue to live without fear inside free institutions. To do so, however, we need to change the way we think, to step outside the confines of our cozy conservative and liberal boxes.”¹

Michael Ignatieff
“Lesser Evils”
The New York Times Magazine
2 May 2004

This is the first national security report that the Committee has published since the recent federal election. The Committee has published nine reports in the three years leading up to the election. Eight of these reports were released during the Chrétien government, and one during the Martin government.²

The book is closed on the Chrétien government’s national security legacy. For the most part, that era was marked by spending restraint and Canada’s military was hit particularly hard by cost-cutting. The Committee continues to examine many of the security-related problems that began to alarm us late in the Chrétien mandate as well as events that have transpired since the Martin mandate began.

Mr. Chrétien’s successors have now had time to begin tackling national security issues. To its credit, the new government has introduced some significant reforms,

¹ Michael Ignatieff, “Lesser Evils,” *The New York Times Magazine* (3 May 2004), <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/02/magazine/02TERROR.html> (accessed: 3 May 2004).

² The committee released eight reports during the Chrétien administration, they were: *Commemorative Activities* (November 2003); *Canada’s Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World* (October 2003); *Occupational Stress Injuries: The Need for Understanding* (June 2003); *Fixing the Canadian Forces’ Method of Dealing with Death or Dismemberment* (April 2003); *The Myth of Security at Canada’s Airports* (January 2003), *For an Extra \$130 Bucks.....: Update On Canada’s Military Financial Crisis: A VIEW FROM THE BOTTOM UP* (November 2002); *Defence of North America: A Canadian Responsibility* (September 2002); and, *Canadian Security and Military Preparedness* (February 2002). It has released one report since Prime Minister Paul Martin took office, it was: *National Emergencies: Canada’s Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy* (March 2004).

most notably the consolidation of much of the security file under the Deputy Prime Minister and the release of the national security policy.

Politicians and bureaucrats at the federal level deserve a measure of credit for introducing these improvements to security for Canadians in recent years. That being said, there are many important security issues that still need to be addressed. This is the Committee's challenge to the government:

You have made useful adjustments; there is a great deal still to be done; our strong advice is to treat security and defence as major issues and get on with the job.

The Committee acknowledges that a number of measures have been taken over the past three years in an attempt to revamp Canada's approach to national security. However, it is the Committee's contention that the government has, in many cases, fallen short in its response to both the increased and changing nature of man-made and natural threats to Canadians and has not sustained the kind of focus that it will need to mitigate these threats.

Successes and Failures

A Few Examples of Success

There have been some successes, including:

- The creation of the office of Deputy Prime Minister Responsible for Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness. One of our key recommendations last fall was that the position of Deputy Prime Minister be made permanent and be given the national security portfolio.

Security issues now have an influential advocate with direct access to the Prime Minister. Progress has not been perfect, but we will address that in Chapter 5.

- The release of the National Security Policy ended the government's habit of addressing security problems in a scattered, *ad hoc* fashion. It represents a good start, setting out goals and a rational process for achieving them.

It remains a work in progress. So far all we have is a skeleton here. Sinew and muscles will have to be added.

- The Committee recommended that the government focus on coastal security by, amongst other things, establishing multi-departmental operations centres, modernizing surveillance technologies and doing more to identify ships heading to Canada. There has been some progress in each of these areas. Operations Centres and new surveillance technologies are on the way. New regulations are in place to help identify ships heading to Canada.

But much more must be done. Responsibility for the coasts remains split between too many departments. Both the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Canadian Coast Guard could be playing much more useful roles in guarding our coasts. Nowhere is Canada more vulnerable.

- The government has finally acknowledged that the resources of the Canadian Forces have been drastically overstretched in recent years, and that deployments are going to have to be reduced while the Forces restore their capabilities (see Chapter 4, Problems 1 and 2, on pages 65-70). When the Committee first asserted that the forces were being drastically under-funded and badly overused and provided details, we were accused of exaggerating. When we insisted that our forces should be pulled back to give time for rehabilitation and rejuvenation, we were ridiculed. Now we sound middle-of-the-road on these issues.

Several military analysts have called for a baseline increase to the defence budget that over time works out to a number similar to our recommendation of \$4 billion dollars plus inflation increases.² What's intriguing is that we have all come to an increase of a similar order of magnitude coming at it from different angles and using different methodologies. There now appears to be a consensus about the level of military funding necessary for a country of Canada's size, wealth and interests.

The federal government has yet to respond with anything resembling an adequate increase in defence spending. But in April, David Pratt, then Defence Minister, voiced the need to end the frantic cycle of deployments: "There comes

² Among these institutions are the Defence Management Program at Queen's University, the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs, the Conference of Defence Associations and the Office of the Auditor General.

a point where you have to say for the sake of your troops that we're going to take a rest for a while."³ There are signs that the government is starting to understand the seriousness of the problem.

Maybe it is a stretch to categorize acknowledgement of this problem by the government as a success. However the Committee believes that because of the size of the problem, acknowledging it is a necessary precursor to meeting the challenge.

A Few Examples of Failure

It should not be surprising – given decades of neglect – that the Committee's list of problems that remain unsolved is longer than its list of problems on the road to solution. Just a few samples of problems that the government has yet to address adequately:

- The Committee recommended that the Department of National Defence get a permanent immediate increase of \$4 billion to its baseline budget, with future increases geared to inflation. Though the 2003 and 2004 Federal Budgets did increase Defence's budget, and provide one-time funding for operations and contingencies, these infusions amounted to a few small drops in a very large bucket.

National Defence is still overstretched and resources continue to deteriorate. There are plenty of worthy causes lined up to take advantage of recurring federal surpluses. Given Canada's inability to protect its citizens and the country's fast-evaporating influence in world affairs, one would think that national security would be placed at the head of the line. This has not been the case.

- The government has unaccountably failed to initiate a judicial inquiry into the potential security risk posed by the presence of organized crime in Canadian ports. This is a multi-disciplinary, multi-jurisdictional problem and only an inquiry will get to the bottom of it. Port authorities are well aware that their facilities are riddled with criminals whose mission it is to open up holes for smuggling. A vulnerability to criminals is, by definition, a vulnerability to terrorists. Does the government believe that an inquiry would be embarrassing?

³ CBC News Online, "Minister Says Canada's Soldiers Are 'Going to Take a Rest,' (Monday 19 January 2004), <http://www.cbc.ca/stories/2004/01/16/pratt040116> (accessed: 30 October 2004).

It wouldn't be nearly as embarrassing, damaging – or deadly – as a terrorist attack.

- There has been no response to the Committee's recommendations that mail be screened as a matter of course, or that fixed-based aviation operations (the area used for corporate, charter and pleasure aircraft) attached to major airports be subject to the same security checks as those imposed on commercial terminals. The front door has pretty well been closed to terrorists at Canadian airports. The back door is wide open.

Moreover, there has been an inadequate response to the Committee's recommendations that airport workers be searched before entry into restricted areas of airports. It seems the side doors are open too.

National Priorities

It is no secret that both the Chrétien and Martin governments have been preoccupied with eliminating budgetary deficits and reducing the national debt. This is commendable. Nobody wants to leave future generations with a huge debt load run up by today's politicians.

But there is more to governing than frugality. Sound accounting is important. But most important is a sound analysis of a country's current needs, mixed with a vision for success in the future.

At the most practical level, a nation has a responsibility to defend its citizens from physical harm – that is the very essence of nationhood. The first national imperative is the same as the first human imperative: survival.

Beyond self-defence, it is in no nation's interest to shrink on the world stage. Loss of influence not only means loss of respect; it means loss of political influence and economic opportunities. With the emergence of new global powers like China and India, the world stage is growing. Canada can't afford to shrink on that stage if it is to advance the interest of Canadians. But that is what is happening, because when global problems need contributions from all significant players, too often all Canada has to offer are words.

Kind thoughts and diplomatic gestures cannot replace a country's capacity to help out when the world needs help. Tyranny, turmoil and natural disasters demand an immediate response. We Canadians are quickly losing our capacity to respond.

The Committee believes that the federal government must come up with a more intelligent balance between fiscal prudence and the expenditures essential to protecting and strengthening Canada's future. Canada is the only G-7 country currently running a budgetary surplus.⁴ To a degree, that is something Canadians should be proud of. But smart countries, like smart businesses, save money where it needs to be saved, and spend money where it needs to be spent.

There is, and has been, money available to upgrade something as crucial as our national security. The federal government has run surpluses for eight straight years, and used most of the leftover money to pay down debt.⁵ Canada's national debt has been reduced by an astounding \$61.4 billion over the past seven years, and the ratio of debt to GDP has dropped from its peak of 68.4 per cent (1995-1996) to 41.1 per cent.⁶ A wise man pays off his mortgage quickly, but also spends money to fix his roof when it begins to leak. Otherwise, all those mortgage payments will have been for nothing.

Health Care and National Security

Beyond debt reduction, Canada has been faced with two outstanding challenges over the last decade. The first was to reform the country's health care system. The second was to reform the country's national security system. The new government has already made a major commitment to the provinces to meet the health care challenge. The jury is still out on the security challenge.

Reforming Canada's health care system is a much greater priority for most Canadians because health problems come up regularly and repeatedly – it's a rare day that average Canadians aren't fretting about their own health problems, or the problems of relatives, friends and neighbours.

Catastrophic events, such as terrorist attacks and natural disasters, don't come around often enough for many Canadians to turn their attention to the need to be

⁴ Government of Canada, *Annual Financial Report of the Government of Canada Fiscal Year 2003-2004* (Ottawa: Department of Finance), 8, <http://www.fin.gc.ca/afr/2004/AFR2004-e.pdf> (accessed: November 10, 2004).

⁵ Government of Canada, *Annual Financial Report*, 8.

⁶ Government of Canada, *Annual Financial Report*, 8.

prepared to deal with them. This may seem strange, given that nearly everyone insures his or her house against the rare possibility of fire, but this doesn't seem to translate to the broader picture. Despite the profound implications for performance failure in the event of a natural or man-made disaster, when it comes to national security and defence most of us tend to trust in luck. And luck is notoriously untrustworthy.

The Marginalization of National Security

The body of this report will itemize some measures that the current government has taken to upgrade Canada's security and defense capability. These measures are certainly not inconsequential. Still, given the imperative of improving Canada's capacity to defend itself and achieve its objectives in world affairs, it is fair to say that the new government has yet to demonstrate that it is prepared to match its resources with its stated objectives.

There are always issues that intelligent people within government know are important, but which end up getting marginalized anyway. Why? Because national governments are faced with hundreds of issues affecting millions of people every day. They cannot focus on hundreds of issues – or even scores of issues – at the same time. So governments push most issues off their main agenda for as long as they can. And it isn't always the least important ones that get pushed.

There are many ways to marginalize an issue – confuse it, delay it, undermine the credibility of those who say it is important, promise half-measures to address it (usually at some point in the hazy future), promote other issues as far more urgent, or simply take advantage of public forgetfulness. To repeat, the issues that get marginalized are not always the ones that *should* get marginalized. They are often the issues that governments believe they can delay without paying a huge political price.

Military preparedness – indeed, preparedness for all manner of man-made or natural disasters – is that kind of issue. If Canadians had demanded that national security be given the attention that has been given to health care or deficit and debt reduction, there is no way that Canada's armed forces could have atrophied so dramatically over the last decade of the 20th century.

Canadians do not want to think about going to war. They do not want to think that it is quite possible that something like 9/11 could happen here or that SARS or

Mad Cow Disease may be just the tip of the iceberg. They do not want to think that our economy could grind to a halt because security concerns shut our border.

The fact that governments over the past three decades have been able to preside over the emaciation of the Canadian armed forces without political penalty – despite endless news stories about Sea King helicopters being unable to perform, military families forced to go to food banks, troops having to “hitch-hike” to war zones – should tell you how easily this issue is shunted to the sidelines.

Putting national security in its appropriate place on the country’s political agenda will not be easy. But the security of citizens is the primary role of government. It is why governments were first created. No government can abrogate this core responsibility. In order to maintain our integrity as a nation, we must understand the importance of ensuring the security of our citizens. It must become an issue of public debate. *It is a moral imperative.*

Why This Report?

If the Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence has one watchword, it is perseverance. We regard the need to optimize the security of Canadians, and the need for Canadians to play a useful role in world affairs, as two of the country’s greatest needs.

There are many reasons why our Committee should persist in calling governments to account on how intelligently and diligently they are pursuing those goals. Two great reasons are: (a) our successes; (b) our failures.

We persist because we are encouraged that over the past year the federal government has shown that it has understood the merit of some of our recommendations, and moved to respond to them. By rough count, there has been good progress made on approximately half of the problems the Committee has identified in the past three years.

We also persist because so many of our recommendations – well-received by the public, most military analysts, the media, and members of the Canadian Forces themselves – have been ignored, delayed or dealt with in other unsatisfactory ways by government.

We would be the last to argue that this Committee represents the font of all wisdom on how the government can best defend Canadians and contribute to a just and stable world. But we work hard at assembling good evidence, checking its veracity, debating its worth in solving the challenges at hand, doing the triage that is necessary in deciding what should be the priorities and what shouldn't, and in communicating our findings to the government and the Canadian public.

The Public and the Politicians

We are trying our best to be demanding – demanding of both the Government of Canada and the Canadian public.

Our demands of the Government of Canada are simple:

If the government finds our reasoning to be sound, it should act to implement our recommendations. Otherwise, it should explain – publicly – why it either finds our logic flawed on particular issues, or why it cannot respond to sound logic because its hands are tied in some way.

Our demands of Canadians themselves are also simple:

We want a public debate on important issues of national security. Apathy is anathema to us. If Canadians do not supply sufficient pressure on governments to act on important issues, all too often those governments do not act.

The Need for Public Debate

“Don’t accept anyone telling you that secrecy requires keeping details of a security system secret. I’ve evaluated hundreds of security systems in my career, and I’ve learned that if someone doesn’t want to disclose the details of a security system, it’s usually because he’s embarrassed to do so. Secrecy contributes to the “trust us and we’ll make the trade-offs for you” mentality that ensures sloppy security systems. Openness demystifies; secrecy obscures.”⁷

Bruce Schneier
*Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly about
Security in an Uncertain World*, page 278

During the three years in which our Committee produced its nine reports, members were constantly shushed when we started asking what proved to be the right questions about national security. We were not only shushed, we were scolded for having the reckless temerity to ask specific questions on security measures in public.

“The terrorists will find out where the holes are! Canadian lives will be put at risk because a group of lunatic senators were grandstanding in forbidden territory! The sky is falling!”

We were too often told that information could not be made public, when, in fact, it was already public. In fact, in some cases, we were denied information that was readily available to tens of thousands of Canadians even remotely familiar with the military, or airports, or border crossings.

Governments have, from time immemorial, developed systems to centralize power and hoard information. The Martin government has promised to be much more open and democratic. We hope it will be. And yet, our Committee continues to face a seemingly endless array of barricades in attempting to answer simple questions – questions that too many cabinet ministers don’t appear to be asking themselves.

⁷ Bruce Schneier, *Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly about Security in an Uncertain World* (New York: Copernicus Books, 2003), 278.

Over the summer, the past and current Chair of the Committee sought out relevant departments and agencies in his capacity as a Parliamentarian, as is his right, and asked each what progress they had made in dealing with the Committee's recommendations. He first mailed them on July 22nd, 2004, requesting their response by September 15th, 2004. That first correspondence was followed up with another letter on August 20th, 2004. He was repeatedly reassured that work was underway on his questions and that the government was preparing a "coordinated response." As of November 26, 2004, he had received only five responses.⁸ We know that responses have been prepared by agencies and departments across the government, but there appears to be a blockage at the centre.

Stonewalling is not new to the Committee. In response to *Canadian Security and Military Preparedness*, one of the Committee's earlier reports, the government tabled a response in Parliament. We challenge anyone interested to find much substance in that response. We couldn't.

Timeline of an Inquiry Frustrated

Over the summer the past and current Chair of the Committee, as an individual parliamentarian, contacted relevant departments and agencies to get an update of what progress they were making on the Committee's recommendations. He received an unsatisfactory amount of responses.

July 22: 16 departments and agencies were contacted and asked each to detail progress they had made in dealing with the Committee's recommendations. Requested response date: September 15th.

August 20: Follow up contact made, again requesting information.

September 27: Assurances received from the Privy Council Office that a "coordinated response" was being prepared.

As of November 26: Only five replies had been received.

Those that replied (in order):

- Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission
- Canadian Security Intelligence Service
- Department of National Defence
- Citizenship and Immigration Canada
- Privy Council Office

⁸ The departments and agencies that replied were, in order, the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission on October 7, 2004, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service on October 12, 2004, the Department of National Defence on November 3, 2004, Citizenship and Immigration on November 12, 2004, and the Privy Council Office on November 26, 2004.

During our third set of hearings, Thursday, July 19, 2001, witnesses from the government's Office of Critical Infrastructure and Emergency Preparedness (OCIPEP) tried to sell us the line that in terms of the federal government's ability to respond to disasters, everything was fine. Trust us. Everything was not fine. Events like the Eastern Ontario power blackout of August 2003 soon demonstrated otherwise.

When the Committee was examining airport security, officials refused to respond to our allegations that there were huge problems, maintaining that it was illegal for them to discuss such issues under secrecy provisions of the *Transportation Act*. To be open with us would play into the hands of terrorists.

Nonsense. Every airport employee, their spouses and their friends and anyone else who frequented a coffee shop anywhere near the airport knew the security systems were porous, that airport personnel was infiltrated with members of organized crime, and that organized criminals were acting like football linemen for would-be terrorists – opening up huge holes for anyone with a mission to run through.

When ministers and bureaucrats failed Canadians, we went to people on the ground and asked them to testify. They came through. Pilots, flight attendants, union leaders, maintenance people, some police representatives (the ones who didn't have a vested interest in toadying to airport authorities) told us the truth.

At first, this led to denial. David Collenette, Minister of Transport at the time, dismissed our report as a collection of anecdotes.⁹ He missed one small point: when you accumulate enough anecdotes, you have a story.

The Media

The Committee is not in a position to make demands of the Fourth Estate, and rightly so. Indeed, independent thinking is at the heart of a free press, just as it is at the heart of a free society.

Thankfully, the Canadian news media have been exceptionally helpful to the Committee in bringing our work to the attention of both the federal government

⁹ Tonda MacCharles, "Report finds huge gaps in air safety; Senate committee says system still very vulnerable; Box-cutters left on seat plane one very scary example," *Toronto Star*, (January 22, 2003): A4.

and the Canadian public. Over the past three years, the Committee's work has appeared in close to 1500 media stories.¹⁰

Not only have media outlets disseminated our findings and recommendations, they have gone on to do something equally important: they have helped to validate them. The Committee doesn't ask the public to trust that its recommendations are founded on hard truths, any more than the Committee itself was willing to trust government officials when they tried to silence our questions by saying: "*trust us, everybody is safe, we know what we're doing, we just aren't at liberty to tell you for security reasons.*"

The Committee said Canadian airports were not secure. *The Globe and Mail* went out and scrutinized the situation itself. In a four-part feature it ran almost a year after the publication of *The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports*, the *Globe* referred repeatedly to our conclusions and provided new evidence to validate them.¹¹

The *Globe's* series is but an example. The Committee's reports have been used by newspapers across the country in a similar fashion. A representative sample of those papers includes the *Calgary Sun*, the *Edmonton Journal*, the *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, the *London Free Press*, the *Ottawa Citizen*, the *National Post*, the *Vancouver sun* and the *Winnipeg Free Press*.

Again, the Committee does not pretend to sit at the pinnacle of Mount Olympus when it comes to pronouncing on military matters. But – so far at least – the media has tested us, and found our concerns legitimate. It has also alerted the public, without whose support there can be no significant change.

¹⁰ The committee's work has appeared in 1484 media stories between October 2001 and September 2004 according to a Senate estimate. Over the same period, the Committee's website received 457,466 hits, more than any other Senate committee.

¹¹ The December 2003 *The Globe and Mail* series "Pearson Airport: Security Alert" included the following four stories: Christine Boyd and Timothy Appleby, "Drug rings pierce airport security" (December 18, 2003); Timothy Appleby and Michael Den Tandt, "Pearson workers corrupted by easy money, lax screening" (December 19, 2003); Michael Den Tandt and Timothy Appleby, "Ground crews take security shortcuts" (December 20, 2003); Michael Den Tandt and Timothy Appleby, "Delays plague efforts to improve airports' safety, critics say" (December 22, 2003).

How the Tide Turned

And it wasn't just the Canadian media who backed up our conclusions. It took quite a while, but, one after another, Canadian military personnel began to step up and acknowledge that we had uncovered some hard truths.

In November 2002, the Committee recommended that all Canadian military forces be withdrawn from overseas duty as soon as current tours expire, that no forces be deployed overseas for a minimum of 24 months thereafter. There were howls of protest. A spokesman for then Defence Minister John McCallum dismissed a hiatus in deployments as not an option.¹² "An unacceptable option," criticized Opposition Leader Steven Harper.¹³ "Not realistic," stated retired colonel Alain Pellerin, Executive Director of the Conference of Defence Associations.¹⁴ "It's very naïve and irresponsible," said then Alliance defence critic Leon Benoit.¹⁵

Our military leaders remained silent, for months. But in late May 2003, in a retirement address, Lt.-Gen Mike Jeffrey, then Chief of the Land Staff, said he was worried about the army's future, pointing out that the commitment of two six-month rotations of about 1,800 soldiers to Afghanistan meant about a third of the army's deployable forces were committed internationally.¹⁶

One month later, Rear Admiral Glenn Davidson, then Commander of Maritime Forces Atlantic (now Vice-Admiral and Canada's Military Representative to NATO in Brussels), admitted that the navy needed some down time after sending 15 of its 18 major warships into the Arabian Sea on 16 deployments (one went twice) in the wake of September 11, 2001.¹⁷ "We're just taking a pause here," he said. "If we are required to deploy off for another international operation or emergency somewhere, which would really skew things, that would be really difficult."¹⁸

The Committee was not surprised that the government did not order a total shutdown of Canadian military deployments. But it was pleased to see that the

¹² Paul Samyn, "'We can't afford a war,' Senate report says Canada should recall all troops, stay away from Iraq," *Winnipeg Free Press*, (November 13, 2002) A1.

¹³ Samyn, "'We can't afford a war,' Senate report says."

¹⁴ Samyn, "'We can't afford a war,' Senate report says."

¹⁵ Stephen Thorne, "Troops should be kept home for 2 years, report says," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, November 13, 2002) A1.

¹⁶ "Are we really playing our part," *Winnipeg Free Press*, May 31, 2003: A15.

¹⁷ Department of National Defence, email to researcher (November 19, 2004).

¹⁸ Daniel Leblanc, "Worn-out navy says it's taking a 'pause' for a year," *The Globe and Mail* (June 30, 2003): A1.

essence of our message finally got through: Canada's Armed Forces, depleted and run ragged, was becoming like a rubber band that has been stretched too often – sooner or later they break. It was past time for a strategic retreat, the better to fight again.

Moving Forward With Renewed Hope

This is a benchmark report. Before the last federal election, the Committee decided to publish the report as a scorecard – a rating of the Chrétien government's progress, and lack of progress, in response to our earlier recommendations. The draft of that report was something of a bleak read.

When the government changed, and there started to be hints of progress in at least some of the problem areas in which the Committee had made recommendations, we decided to do some more research on where there had been progress and where there had not, and to redraft the report as more of a challenge to this new government to expand its efforts, rather than what would have amounted to a rather general condemnation a year earlier.

The Committee hopes that progress will continue to be made, and that it will be made with an increased sense of urgency. If that doesn't happen, our restrained sense of hope may be battered enough that we will go back to the scorecard, where warts stand out more than beauty marks every time.

We encourage the new government to look at what this Committee still believes needs to be done, and respond publicly. This is too important an issue to either dawdle on, or try to hide in the shadows.

“Obviously it's a good idea to keep recipes for ricin off government-financed research Web sites, and it's not a good idea to have target detail on critical infrastructure available for download. But adversarial review...can't work if ordinary citizens are denied the information they need.”¹⁹

Michael Ignatieff
“Lesser Evils”
The New York Times Magazine
2 May 2004

¹⁹ Michael Ignatieff, “Lesser Evils,” *The New York Times* (3 May 2004), <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/02/magazine/02TERROR.html> (accessed: 3 May 2004).

Reading the Report

The Committee has attempted to set out each recommendation it tackled in a simple format with four headings:

1. Problem

It will not come as a shock to the reader that a wide variety of problems have manifested themselves over the past decade with respect to Canada's capacity to deal with crises at home and abroad. This section outlines the problems as the Committee assessed them.

2. Committee's Recommendation

The Committee made recommendations as to how the federal government should deal with these problems. This section restates the recommendation or recommendations the Committee made. The recommendations have been rephrased for tense and readability.

A few of the Committee's recommendations from the past three years were not included in this report – in retrospect they either seemed inconsequential or just plain wrong. They are described at the end of the report on page 235.

3. Government Response

This section highlights government statements or actions that the Committee has identified as being pertinent to the recommendation it suggested. In an effort to portray the most accurate government response possible, the Committee undertook to identify government responses in three ways: first, the past and current Chair of the Committee wrote relevant departments and agencies in July 2004 and requested pertinent information; second, Committee staff sought out information from publicly available statements and websites; and third, in some cases, Committee staff asked specific detailed questions of the departments and agencies to clarify their public statements.

In some cases the government has taken measures to address the problems the Committee identified, and in several of those cases the government proceeded in a manner either identical or very close to what the Committee recommended.

Whether the government followed the Committee's recommendations in these cases, or whether it figured out solutions on its own, really doesn't matter. What matters is whether the government has addressed these problems and moved quickly to fix them. In too many other cases it has not.

4. Challenge to the Government

This section sets out the goals that the government has yet to accomplish to solve the problem the Committee identified. In cases where the government has addressed a problem, or appears to be well on the way to addressing the problem, the Committee has attempted to give credit where credit is due. In cases in which the government has given no indication that it has addressed a problem, the Committee has challenged the government to do so, or explain to Canadians why it can not or should not.

CHAPTER 2

Border Crossings

Problem 1: Poor Threat Identification at the Border

Officials from the Canada Border Services Agency—formerly part of the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency and Citizenship and Immigration Canada—do not have adequate tools or training to identify persons who constitute a threat to Canada.

The potential damage to the Canadian economy and other consequences that would come with allowing a terrorist to infiltrate the U.S. through Canada are massive. The Government has acknowledged this in its April 2004 National Security Policy.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

That by June 30, 2003, Canada Customs and Revenue Agency and Immigration Canada offer substantive evidence that they have addressed the Auditor General's recommendations to improve training to help airport personnel identify persons "likely to engage in criminal activities or endanger the safety of Canadians."

They should also demonstrate that they have moved to gain access to police databanks that would assist in such identification, and provide their employees with the training and technology required to take advantage of these databanks. (Report: *The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports*, January 2003, #I. 2)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

Accessing Databanks

The government introduced Integrated Primary Inspection Line (IPIL) technology to airports. The system is an automated support tool used by border officials to scrutinize entrants by scanning both Canada Border Services Agency and Citizenship and Immigration Canada enforcement databanks. In May 2003, the Office of the Auditor General called the introduction of Integrated Primary

Inspection Line technology a significant improvement because it greatly increased how often officials checked a person's identity against those databanks.²⁰

However, the Integrated Primary Inspection Line system is not perfect. The Auditor General's March 2004 report was heavily critical of the "watch lists" the inspection line is supposed to query. The Auditor General cited numerous examples of duplication, missing names, classification errors, and even names appearing that should have been removed.²¹

In that March 2004 report, the Auditor General recommended that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the Canada Border Services Agency, and the Passport Office exercise better management and co-ordination of watch-listing efforts and that they enhance quality control over the exchange of data.²²

In response, the Canada Border Services Agency stated that as part of the improvements to the system by the Spring 2005 "All air passengers' names (and eventually all sea passengers') will be searched against CPIC [the Canadian Police Information Centre] for outstanding warrants prior to their arrival in Canada."²³

Training

Making progress on training border officials is another matter. In May 2003, the Office of the Auditor General found that the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency had made only "slow" progress in addressing its recommendations and that it had concerns with regards to the adequacy and effectiveness of training, especially with regards to student workers.²⁴

In September 2003, the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency reported to the Committee that it had trained approximately 3,000 customs personnel, at 45 sites including all major airports, on the use of the new inspection line technology.²⁵

²⁰ Office of the Auditor General of Canada, "Chapter 2: Canada Customs and Revenue Agency—Managing the Risks for Non-Compliance for Customs," *Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons, May 2003*, 12. [http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html/20030502ce.html/\\$file/20030502ce.pdf](http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html/20030502ce.html/$file/20030502ce.pdf) (accessed November 7, 2004).

²¹ Office of the Auditor General of Canada, "Chapter 3: National Security in Canada – The 2001 Anti-Terrorism Initiative," *Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons, March 2004*, 32. [http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html/20040303ce.html/\\$file/20040303ce.pdf](http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html/20040303ce.html/$file/20040303ce.pdf) (accessed November 7, 2004).

²² Office of the Auditor General of Canada, "Chapter 3," 33.

²³ Office of the Auditor General of Canada, "Chapter 3," 33.

²⁴ Office of the Auditor General of Canada, "Chapter 2," 15-16.

²⁵ Correspondence with Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, September 5, 2003.

The Canada Border Services Agency has yet to announce that all customs officers – including part-timers – will receive the full amount of training that the Agency obviously believes that full-time officers need to perform their duties.

Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Judy Sgro wrote to one Committee member that “All officers working at airports and land borders are trained to access police databanks in Canada (CPIC) and the United States (NCIC).”²⁶

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

- **Continue to upgrade information sharing at the primary inspection line**

Creating the Integrated Primary Inspection Line represents progress, but it needs to be more sophisticated. The Auditor General reported in March 2004 that the primary inspection line was not lined to the RCMP’s database of outstanding Canada-wide arrest warrants.²⁷ It should be.

Furthermore, the information system used on the primary inspection line cannot distinguish between active and deactivated passports (reported lost or stolen). It must. The RCMP has identified the latter as a serious security vulnerability.

- **More trained inspectors needed**

Clearly more fully trained inspectors are needed to provide more time for individual inspections that arise from the increased use of the Integrated Primary Inspection Line technology.

²⁶ Honourable Judy Sgro, “Letter to Senator Colin Kenny,” (November 12, 2004): 2.

²⁷ According to the Auditor General, “the automatic computer checks at the primary inspection lines and computer checks made against passenger lists in advance of international flights cannot flag persons wanted under Canada-wide warrants.” The report did note that the Canada Border Services Agency was planning a pilot project with the RCMP to have a direct link to the RCMP Interpol database that would allow for daily access to new Interpol notices. The Committee was not able to determine the status of this project prior to releasing its report. Office of the Auditor General of Canada, “Chapter 3: National Security in Canada – The 2001 Anti-Terrorism Initiative,” Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons, March 2004, 31. [http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html/20040303ce.html/\\$file/20040303ce.pdf](http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html/20040303ce.html/$file/20040303ce.pdf) (accessed November 7, 2004).

Problem 2: Long Canadian Security Intelligence Service Processing Times

Refugee and immigration claims are delayed for up to two years because the Canadian Security Intelligence Service does not have the resources to quickly process the files it receives from Citizenship and Immigration Canada. Because Canada does not keep close tabs on refugee claimants or applicants for immigration, a person who poses a threat to Canada could disappear into the country long before anyone knew.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that sufficient resources be allocated to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service to deal with them. (Report: *Canadian Security and Military Preparedness*, February 2002, #17 A)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

In October 2002, the government said the Canadian Security Intelligence Service budget had been increased by 30 per cent, in part “to assist Citizenship and Immigration Canada in dealing with the increased screening responsibilities related to overseas immigrants and refugees.”²⁸

The Canadian Security Intelligence Service reported to the Committee in September 2003 that technical improvements were reducing turnaround times.²⁹ The Security Intelligence Review Committee’s 2003-2004 Annual Report showed that this is true in certain screening cases, but not in others. The determinant factors are case type (Refugee Front End Screening Program or Application for Permanent Residence), where the case originated (inside or outside Canada), in what form it was first received (hard copy or electronic) and whether CSIS had an objection to the application.

The Security Intelligence Review Committee praised the Service for its Front End Screening of Refugees Program—a program under which the Canadian Security

²⁸ Government of Canada, *The Government’s Response to the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence* (Ottawa: Government of Canada, October 2002), 8. http://www.psepc-sppcc.gc.ca/publications/national_security/pdf/Kenny_report_e.pdf (accessed May 10, 2004).

²⁹ “Canadian Security Intelligence Service, “Letter to Senator Colin Kenny”, (September 18, 2003).”

Intelligence Service prioritizes screening of some refugee claimants in the initial phases of the refugee determination process.³⁰ In 2003-2004, there were 22,681 applicants screened through the program. The median turnaround time for cases that raised no security concern was 31 days. Where there were security concerns, the median turnaround time took approximately 7 to 10 times longer (depending on the type of concern raised).³¹

The screening request turnaround time is largely dependent on how the request is received. Electronic applications take about a third as long to process as hard copy applications (42 days vs. 133 days in application for permanent residency cases received in Canada with no security objections).³²

However, there has been no significant improvement in the turnaround time for screening permanent residency requests where there is a security concern. In 2004, the review committee reported that the median turnaround time was 14 to 20 months,³³ compared to the 15-month turnaround time it had reported in 2003.³⁴

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

- **Increase staff**

More **personnel** are needed, not only in the Canadian Security Intelligence Service but also at Citizenship and Immigration Canada. People are not the only solution but they are part of the solution.

³⁰ Security Intelligence Review Committee, *Security Intelligence Review Committee 2003-2004 Report* (Ottawa: October 2004), 7.

³¹ The median turnaround time for inadmissible briefs (provided when the Service has concluded an applicant meets inadmissibility criteria) was 224 days and 332 days for information briefs (provided when the Service has relevant security related information about an applicant but it does not have enough, or the right sort of, information to deem the applicant inadmissible). Security Intelligence Review Committee, *Security Intelligence Review Committee 2003-2004 Report* (Ottawa: October 2004), 44 and 46.

³² Security Intelligence Review Committee, *Security Intelligence Review Committee 2003-2004 Report* (Ottawa: October 2004), 44-45.

³³ Security Intelligence Review Committee, *Security Intelligence Review Committee 2003-2004 Report* (Ottawa: October 2004), 45.

³⁴“Security Intelligence Review Committee, *Security Intelligence Review Committee 2003-2004 Report* (Ottawa: October 2004), 45. Security Intelligence Review Committee, “Statement from the Committee,” *Security Intelligence Review Committee Annual Report 2002-2003*. http://www.sirc-csars.gc.ca/annual/2002-2003/intro_e.html (accessed May 4, 2004).”

- **Go Electronic**

Electronic applications move much quicker than paper applications. There should be a concerted effort to make more widespread use of electronic applications.

- **Implement the Safe Third Country Agreement and report on its effects**

The Safe Third Country Agreement, negotiated between Canada and the United States in 2002, will dramatically reduce the number of asylum seekers that arrive in Canada and thereby reduce burden on the screening system.

Implementation of the agreement is awaiting the final publication of regulations in both Canada and the United States. Statements by Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge indicate that this process may be moving forward.³⁵

Under the agreement, asylum seekers in Canada and the United States would have to make their claims in whichever country they entered first, preventing them from using either country as a conduit into the other.

In 2003, 34% of the asylum seekers that came to Canada made their first claims at land border crossings with the U.S. (approximately 10,900 people out of 32,100).³⁶ Had Safe Third Country been in place, it would have meant that most of those claimants would have been processed by the U.S. in the U.S. and would not have added to the backlog in our immigration and intelligence community.

³⁵ Tonda MacCharles, "Canada, U.S. in refugee deal" *The Toronto Star* (15 October 2004): A06.

³⁶ Briefing material provided to the Committee by the Privy Council Office prior to the Committee's fact-finding trip to Washington, D.C. in March 2004.

Problem 3: Undertrained Part-Time Customs Staff

HIGH PRIORITY

Frontline border agents are clearly key components in our border security system. The judgments they make on behalf of several departments, from Citizenship and Immigration Canada to Agriculture Canada to Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, are critical to Canada's national security.

Students and other temporary workers do not now receive adequate training and are not required to pass the same tests as full-time officers.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that all personnel on the primary inspection line be trained to the highest standard, without exceptions for short-term staff. (Report: *Canadian Security and Military Preparedness*, February 2002, #15. A)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

In September 2003, the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency told the Committee that "ALL Customs officers, including students, receive the training and the tools that they require to perform their duties effectively and efficiently."³⁷

The Customs Excise Union (CEU) disagrees. According to CEU National President Ron Moran, "Students are not at all fully trained...They don't have to pass rigorous testing like professional officers, and are therefore not supposed to do the full job...but they often do."³⁸

The Canada Border Services Agency has yet to demonstrate that it has enough customs officers to assure consistent, year-round, professional staffing.

³⁷ Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, Email to researcher, September 5, 2003.

³⁸ Customs Excise Union, "Staffing crisis at Canada Customs endangers economy and national security, says Customs Excise Union" (July 18, 2003). <http://www.ceuda.psac.com/english/english.html> (accessed March 11, 2004).

Claims that students don't need as much training because they do different jobs and are supervised by full-time officers are simply not credible. For example, during one 24 hour period at the Rainbow Bridge in Ontario this summer, the border crossing staff consisted of 16 full-time officers and 39 students.³⁹ Students served on the primary inspection line as well as the secondary line.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

- **Full Training for All Agents**

If part-time workers are to be used, there is no justification for having a less well-trained person on any line at any given moment. Either more full-time officers must be hired, or part-time officers must receive identical training.

³⁹ Information was provided to the Chair of the Committee in a private meeting.

Problem 4: Unsafe Border Posts

Border posts are understaffed. Too many posts are staffed by one person, who has little or no hope of getting quick support from police or other border officers when there is an emergency or a surge in traffic.⁴⁰ The practice of leaving customs officials alone is risky for the officials and risky for Canadian security.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) ensure that no customs officers work alone at posts. (Report: *Canadian Security and Military Preparedness*, February 2002, #15. B)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

Border officials still work alone at most border crossings. According to a Border Services Agency document leaked to the *National Post* in November 2004, after the on-the-job death of a border official working was alone, 103 of Canada's 160 land and maritime border crossings are classified as "work-alone sites."⁴¹

Moduspec Risk Management Services conducted a job hazard analysis in 2002 on behalf of the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, now the Canada Border Services Agency, part of which addressed the issue of agents working alone.

Moduspec recommended that the Canada Border Services Agency develop a strategy to mitigate the risk associated with working alone. The Canada Border Services Agency developed that strategy and it is now under consideration by an internal committee of management and union officials.

The Committee has not been made aware of the contents of the job hazard analysis.

⁴⁰ Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *Canadian Security and Military Preparedness* (Ottawa: Senate of Canada, February 2002), 121.

⁴¹ Brian Hutchinson, "Lone Officer Guards Most Borders," *National Post* (6 November 2004): A4.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

- **Release the job hazard analysis**

Canadians need to know what change is necessary and what pressure they need bring to bear to see that changes are made.

- **Deploy more officers, ensure no officials work alone**

That the border services agency is developing a strategy to mitigate the risks of working alone is encouraging, but this process is taking far too long. By this time it should be apparent whether there is some new technology available that would make a lone customs officers both safe and effective. If there isn't, hire more people. More customs officers should be hired.

Problem 5: Arm Customs Officials?

Some border officials want to carry arms. Union officials stated that border officials needed personal weapons in order to back up their designated authority. The union argues that customs officers need weapons for their self-protection.

The Committee has received contrary evidence from some individual officers.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee has not been persuaded that Customs Officers should be armed. The Committee's feeling at the moment is that guns often create more problems than they solve. However, the Committee continues to monitor this issue. (Report: *Canadian Security and Military Preparedness*, February 2002, #16)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The government has continued to maintain that customs officers should not be armed.⁴²

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

- **Continue to Assess**

The government should not arm customs officials unless new evidence emerges suggesting that the benefits would outweigh the risks.

The Committee would **welcome any further evidence** the government or others might be able to provide on the pros and cons of arming customs officers. It will address this issue further if it receives new evidence.

⁴²Mark Connolly, Proceedings of Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Hearing Transcript, September 22, 2003, Issue 22, 37th Parl., 2nd, Sess.. URL: http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/2/parlbus/commbus/senate/Com-e/defe-e/22evb-e.htm?Language=E&Parl=37&Ses=2&comm_id=76 (accessed November 10, 2004).

CHAPTER 3

Coasts

Problem 1: Canada's Vulnerable Coasts

Canada has thousands of kilometres of coastline and hundreds of harbours that go unwatched. Limited patrols, such as Aurora maritime patrol aircraft over-flights, occur on an infrequent, *ad hoc* basis. This lack of maritime domain awareness makes it easier for organized crime to traffic contraband, harder for officials to separate commercial and pleasure vessels from legitimate threats, and especially difficult for Canada to assert its sovereignty claims over remote areas, like the arctic.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that the issue of the security of Canada's coastline be examined, and a plan developed to broaden and tighten its security. (Report: *Canadian Security and Military Preparedness*, February 2002, #10)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The government's April 2004 National Security Policy outlines a six-point plan for strengthening marine (including coastal) security.⁴³ While short on specifics, deliverables and cost projections, the goals it sets out are good ones. They include:

- Clarifying responsibility for coastal defence;
- Establishing Marine Security Operations Centres;
- Increasing coastal patrols;
- Improving inter-fleet communications;
- Collaborating more closely with the United States; and,
- Securing the St. Lawrence Seaway.

⁴³ Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy* (Ottawa: government of Canada, April 27, 2004), 38.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

- **Make the Words Come Alive**

Good start. But the recommendation was made in 2002, and it is now almost 2005. There are indications that programs to fulfil some of these commitments are on their way. The government needs to translate goals into action faster.

Problem 2: Coastal Radar - Off the Government's radar?

Surveillance of the waters off Canada's coasts is patchy—most of the time the government does not have a good idea of what is going in Canada's territorial waters. The lack of a real time electronic picture makes it difficult for officials to distinguish between legitimate vessels and those that are potential threats.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended at least eight and possibly more High Frequency Surface Wave Radar (HFSWR) sites be installed to monitor areas of heavy traffic on Canada's coasts, plus other coastal sites that terrorists might target as alternates to high-traffic ports.⁴⁴ (Report: *Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World*, October 2003, #2.1)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

Department of National Defence officials told the Committee two High Frequency Surface Wave Radar systems in Newfoundland will complete the transformation from test to operational installations in August 2004.⁴⁵ In November 2004, Minister Graham wrote to one of the Committee's members and said that the two sites are expected to be operational in Fall 2004.⁴⁶

National Defence officials stated that five or six more surface wave radar installations are planned and the Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group has allocated \$43.1 million from the Marine Security Contingency Fund to cover the cost of the new sites.⁴⁷ The new sites will come online as they are built and the network "should" be fully operational in Fall 2007.⁴⁸

⁴⁴ High Frequency Surface Wave Radar is a type of radar that, unlike traditional microwave radar systems, can detect targets over-the-horizon out to a distance of approximately 150-200 miles.

⁴⁵ Department of National Defence, Email to researcher, February 24, 2004.

⁴⁶ The Honourable William Graham, "Letter to Senator Colin Kenny" (November 3, 2004): 2.

⁴⁷ Department of National Defence, Email to researcher, May 3, 2004.

⁴⁸ Department of National Defence, Email to researcher, May 5, 2004.

The Department of National Defence stated that together the completed High Frequency Surface Wave Radar sites will provide radar coverage of the “key” maritime approaches to Canada.⁴⁹

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

Life in the Senate seems positively electric compared to the pace at which Canada is moving to upgrade its coastal surveillance. National Defence has been testing High Frequency Surface Wave Radar since the late 1990s. A projected deployment date is positive but 2007 is a long way off. The government should install the additional sites sooner.

⁴⁹ Graham, “Letter to Senator Colin Kenny” (November 3, 2004): 2.

Problem 3: Inadequate Short-Range Coastal Patrols

Canada has thousands of kilometres of coastline that are not adequately patrolled from the sky. The Canadian Forces has been forced to reduce the number of flying hours of its Aurora patrol aircraft. Neither the Navy nor the Canadian Coast Guard have adequate resources to maintain an effective surveillance framework on our maritime approaches.

The Committee makes a distinction between small tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and larger strategic drones based on the different roles they would play in coastal surveillance and the pricetags they carry.⁵⁰ Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicles are a proven commodity that could and should be deployed to monitor Canada's ports and coastal approaches right away.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

Tactical drones (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles – UAVs) should be introduced as surveillance aids on both coasts. (Report: *Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World*, October 2003, #2.2)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

No tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicles have been deployed to monitor Canada's coasts, and there are no plans to deploy them.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

- **Acquire Tactical Drones to Monitor Coasts**

The government should instruct the Department of National Defence to select the most effective tactical UAVs to defend Canada's vulnerable coastlines and acquire it today. For a relatively small price tag, they could fill in the gaps in our surveillance framework by our overburdened and carry some of the load that Aurora patrol aircraft are not.

⁵⁰ The Canadian Forces now refer to Unmanned Aerial Vehicles as Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles.

Problem 4: Inadequate Long-Range Coastal Patrols

Again, Canada has thousands of kilometres of coastline that it is not adequately patrolling by Coast Guard or Naval vessels, nor Aurora patrol aircraft. There are sovereignty issues as well as security issues here. Canada has a responsibility over vast, and remote, areas of land and ocean off both coasts and in the north. It has a duty to monitor and enforce Canada's laws and treaty commitments in those areas. The Government does not have the resources, in terms of Coast Guard vessels and Aurora airplanes, to conduct these patrols regularly.

While tactical drones would seem to be the most sensible option for improving surveillance, strategic drones might be more useful over long distances.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

That the government conduct a study to ascertain whether the use of higher-cost strategic drones should be introduced into Canada's surveillance matrix in the Arctic, as well as the east and west coasts. (Report: *Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World*, October 2003, #2.3)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The government has been studying the use of strategic drones for a number of years. The Department of National Defence ran tests on what it calls Medium Altitude Long Endurance Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles in August and September 2004.⁵¹

According to the Department of National Defence, "these experiments have significantly advanced the Department's understanding of beyond line of sight Uninhabited Aerial Vehicle operations and the procedures and processes that could lead to increased force effectiveness by using network-enabled operations."⁵²

⁵¹ Graham, "Letter to Senator Colin Kenny" (November 3, 2004): 3. The tests were part of the Canadian Forces Atlantic Littoral Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance Experiment (ALIX). As part of the tests "experimental tests took place over arctic terrain, the Gulf of St. Lawrence, CFB Gagetown and the Grand Banks."

⁵² Graham, "Letter to Senator Colin Kenny" (November 3, 2004): 3.

The Canadian Forces Experimentation Centre, which conducted the tests earlier this fall, is not expected to make a recommendation back to the Department's Joint Capabilities Requirement Board until the second quarter of 2005.⁵³

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

- **Move Faster on Strategic Drones**

The tests are step in the right direction. If the tests prove to be effective, as expected, the government should make money available immediately.

⁵³ Sharon Hobson, "Canada to test Predator B variant," *Jane's Defence Weekly* (February 18, 2004), online, url: <http://www.janes.com> (accessed: November 1, 2004).

Problem 5: Canada's Toothless Coast Guard

HIGH PRIORITY

The Coast Guard cannot contribute to Canada's national security in a significant way because it lacks the mandate, the experience, the equipment, and the institutional focus to do so.

Security is but one among several of the Canadian Coast Guard's priorities, along with protection of the environment, support of scientific research, facilitation of trade and commerce, navigation safety and emergency response.

The Coast Guard does not have a constabulary function, it is not armed, and it reports to the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, all of which contribute to a focus away from coastal security.

Despite its name, the Coast Guard doesn't play a serious role in guarding our coasts.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that the federal government take immediate steps to transform the Canadian Coast Guard from an agency that reports to the Department of Fisheries and Oceans to an independent agency responsible to Parliament. It should continue to carry out its duties – search and rescue, ice-breaking, navigational aids, buoy tending, boat safety, fisheries and environment protection – and take on new responsibilities for national security. On security assignments, the Coast Guard would come under the direction of Department of National Defence coastal operations centres (Trinity and Athena). (Report: *Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World*, October 2003, #4.1)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

There has been no clear structural or policy shift within the government with regards to giving the Coast Guard national security functions.

The government failed to make the Coast Guard an independent agency. The organizational changes to the Canadian Coast Guard announced by the government in December 2003 will not affect its mandate with respect to marine or national security.⁵⁴

The government did announce in its April 2004 National Security Policy that it would increase on-water patrols by the RCMP, the Coast Guard, and the Canadian Forces. The Committee has found no evidence that the pace of patrols has increased.

The government also named the Minister of National Defence as the lead minister “for the coordination of on-water response to a marine threat or a developing crisis.”⁵⁵ The Coast Guard will come under the direction of the Department of Defence, through the new Marine Security Operations Centres, when undertaking a security-related mission.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

- **Properly fund on-water patrols and demonstrate that the pace of patrols has increased**

The government must turn its promises into action and provide the funds and personnel to increase on-water patrols.

- **Move the Coast Guard into the Deputy Prime Minister’s Portfolio**

The Committee becomes more and more convinced the Coast Guard should report to Parliament through the Deputy Prime Minister.

- **Refocus the Coast Guard’s Mandate Toward Security.**

The Deputy Prime Minister’s central role with regards to security and borders would assist in refocussing the Coast Guard on security-related responsibilities.

⁵⁴ Prime Minister’s Office, “Changes to government” (December 12, 2003), http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/chgs_to_gov.asp (accessed November 1, 2004). Correspondence with Department of Fisheries and Oceans officials, February 24 and March 15, 2004. The organizational changes announced will make the Coast Guard a special operating agency within the Department of Fisheries and Oceans. They do not give the Coast Guard any more national security functions and do little more than transfer the Coast Guard’s marine security regulatory setting functions to Transport Canada.

⁵⁵ Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society*, 38.

Problem 6: No Notification Prior to Arrival

The government has had little information about the ships approaching Canada's coasts. This lack of information has made it extremely difficult to separate commercial and pleasure vessels from legitimate threats.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that all vessels (of a displacement to be determined by Canadian regulators) planning to enter a Canadian port be required to notify Canadian port authorities 48 hours prior to arrival. (Report: *Defence of North America: A Canadian Responsibility*, September 2002, #6)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

Transport Canada requires vessels of greater than 100 gross tonnes report detailed information to Canadian authorities at least 96-hours before arriving in Canadian waters.⁵⁶ Ship owners face monetary penalties if they fail to comply. The new permanent regulations came into effect on July 1, 2004, and are part of the government's implementation of the International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) Code.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

The government's program represents genuine progress. The Committee continues to recommend a similar regulation apply to vessels on the Great Lakes.

The Committee will monitor the implementation of the regulations to determine whether they are being enforced, and how well 96-hour notification data is integrated into the new Marine Security Operations Centres.

⁵⁶ An interim version of the 96-hour rule has been in effect since October 11, 2001. The regulations that came into effect in July will make the reporting schedule permanent. The temporary Notice to Mariners describing the rule is available here: <http://www.notmar.gc.ca/eng/services/notmar/96hour.pdf> (accessed April 14, 2004).

Problem 7: Taking Incoming Vessels at Their Word

The 96-hour warning will help, but Canadian officials need more than the approaching ship's word as to its nature and intentions. Canadian officials need information about ships before they leave foreign ports so that they can help determine which may be a threat and if necessary, either conduct a closer inspection or ask for assistance in preventing a ship from heading out.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that all vessels (of a displacement to be determined by Canadian regulators) planning to enter Canadian waters be required to file reports from their departure harbour as to their Canadian destination and estimated time of arrival, with periodic updates during their voyage and upon arrival. (Report: *Defence of North America: A Canadian Responsibility*, September 2002, #5)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The Canada Border Service Agency's Advance Commercial Information (ACI) program largely complies with this recommendation.⁵⁷ It requires that vessels of greater than 100 gross tonnes bound for Canada notify the Canada Border Services Agency 24 hours before loading vessels. Notification must include detailed information about both cargo and crew.⁵⁸ Shippers that fail to report face monetary penalties.⁵⁹

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

Again, clear evidence of progress. The Committee will monitor implementation of the program.

⁵⁷ ACI does not specifically require mid-course updates. However, two other initiatives—the 96-hour notification rule and the introduction of Automatic Identification Systems—will cover the same ground.

⁵⁸ government of Canada, Canada Gazette, Vol. 138, No. 14 (Ottawa: April 3, 2004). <http://canadagazette.gc.ca/partI/2004/20040403/html/regle6-e.html> (accessed April 14, 2004).

⁵⁹ Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, Customs Notice N-542 (Ottawa: October 7, 2003). <http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/E/pub/cm/cn542/cn542-e.pdf> (accessed April 1, 2004).

Problem 8: Need Network for Maritime Warnings

Like-minded nations worry about global maritime security, yet rarely act in common cause. Ships travel the world's oceans with little monitoring or oversight from the countries they dock in. Canadian officials largely rely on ocean carriers and freight forwarders to provide information about the goods and people they are shipping.⁶⁰

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that Canada negotiate reciprocal arrangements with other Maritime nations to provide each other with advance information on vessels, crews, and cargo, including indicators of which cargo items they have already inspected and in what ways. (Report: *Defence of North America: A Canadian Responsibility*, September 2002, #4; expanded and reiterated in *Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World*, October 2003, #6.3)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The government has not moved to negotiate reciprocal bilateral agreements. It has instead signed on to the International Maritime Organization's International Ship and Port Security Code, and undertaken to work through the G-8 and the World Customs Organization to create a global container security regime.⁶¹

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

- **Reciprocal agreements would be advantageous**

Creating a global container security regime is a wise move. The only danger is that – like many international regimes – it will slip towards the lowest common denominator for regulations. Further, creating a global regulatory regime will likely take a long time. Working on the multi-lateral framework could turn into an excuse for inaction.

⁶⁰ Canadian officials will continue to rely on shippers even after International Ship and Port Security Code provisions that require more detailed reporting come into effect in 2004.

⁶¹ Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society*, 40.

The government should work quickly towards the most comprehensive reciprocal agreements possible with its important maritime trading partners, thereby setting the bar for the next global regulatory regime higher, while giving Canadians the security they deserve sooner.

Problem 9: Unannounced Vessels

Canadian authorities should also have the capacity to track unannounced vessels whose captains may voice one intention, while planning something else. The government lacks the capacity to quickly identify vessels approaching unannounced.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that vessels (of a displacement to be determined by Canadian regulators) intending to enter Canadian waters be required to have working transponders that would permit electronic tracking of all approaching vessels. (Report: *Defence of North America: A Canadian Responsibility*, September 2002, #7)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

All passenger ships, ocean-going cargo ships of 300 gross tonnage and more, and domestic cargo vessels of 500 gross tonnage and more will be required to carry Automatic Identification System (AIS) transponders by December 31, 2004.⁶² Fishing boats and pleasure craft will be excluded from these requirements. These regulations bring Canada in line with the new International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) Code.

The Coast Guard is in the process of installing equipment at radio centres on the east and west coasts as part of the base station onshore component of the Automatic Identification System. It does not expect to complete this project until 2006-2007.⁶³

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

Our compliments. The government is meeting this challenge. Slowly, but surely.

⁶² Transport Canada, Email to researcher, March 30, 2004.

⁶³ http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/est-pre/20042005/FO-PO/FO-POr4501_e.asp#Maritime_safety

Problem 10: Transponders for Smaller Vessels

Equipping vessels with transponder technology, an essential step in creating a comprehensive maritime surveillance framework, is currently size- and cost-prohibitive on smaller vessels.

Class A transponders (capable of both transmitting and receiving location data) cost in the neighbourhood of \$10,000-\$12,000, installed. Class B transponders are now being developed. These transponders will be able to transmit, but not receive. The cost is expected to be much lower than that of Class A transponders – perhaps half the price.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that Transport Canada require all vessels of more than 15 tonnes to be equipped with transponders of at least Class B⁶⁴ capacity by 2008. (Report: *Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World* October 2003, #2.4)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The government has not announced any plans requiring vessels to carry Class B transponders.

International technical standards for Class B transponders are not finalized.⁶⁵

⁶⁴ A Class B transponder is able to transmit but not receive. Class B transponders are expected to be smaller, more limited, lower-cost alternatives to Class A transponders. A description of the differences between Class A and Class B Automatic Identification Systems is available from the US Coast Guard here: United States Coast Guard, "Types of Automatic Identifications Systems" (27 January 2004). http://www.navcen.uscg.gov/enav/ais/types_of_AIS.htm (accessed September 30, 2004).

⁶⁵ The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) is responsible for setting international standards for Class B transponders. July 31, 2004 was the target date for a committee draft with vote on Class B transponder standards. Progress on Class B transponder standards is available here: <http://www.iec.ch/cgi-bin/procgi.pl/www/iecwww.p?wwwlang=E&wwwprog=pro-det.p&He=IEC&Pu=62287&Pa=&Se=&Am=&Fr=&TR=&Ed=1> (accessed November 1, 2004).

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

- **Be ready to move on cheaper transponders**

Once standards are in place, the government should act quickly to implement the Committee's recommendation.

Problem 11: Dangerous Containers

The government has a hit-and-miss container targeting system, which could be significantly improved if a more layered approach were taken. Canada has a very small overseas intelligence capacity and none in the world's major ports, which limits early identification of containers of interest.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that significant numbers of Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) personnel be posted to major world ports to gather maritime intelligence. (Report: *Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World*, October 2003, #2.7)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

While the government has not said that it has increased the overseas deployment of CSIS personnel to the world's major ports, it has acknowledged that an enhanced role for CSIS abroad is required and that additional funds have been allocated for this purpose.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

It is in Canada's interest to identify and assess threats to it as far from Canada as possible, as early as possible, and as quickly as practicable.

Properly defining government intelligence requirements with regard to maritime security, coupled with appropriate funding for CSIS, the RCMP, and other agencies operating abroad, will enhance the capacity of these agencies to identify and forewarn of threats to Canadian security.

Problem 12: Lack of Border Officials Abroad

The Canada Border Services Agency had not stationed personnel anywhere outside North America to monitor ports that ship to Canada and/or to identify suspicious cargo.⁶⁶

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that Canada Border Services Agency personnel be relocated from the U.S. ports of Newark and Tacoma to major world ports, where the likelihood of terror-related embarkations headed to Canada is much more likely. (Report: *Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World*, October 2003, #2.6)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

On October 14, 2004, Deputy Prime Minister McLellan announced Canada's intention to deploy Canada Border Services Agency officials to one, as yet unnamed, foreign marine port by April 2005 to assist in the targeting and verification of shipping containers destined to North America.⁶⁷

In a written follow-up to his appearance before the Committee, Canada Border Services Agency CEO Alain Jolicoeur told the Committee that he believes keeping border officials in Tacoma and Newark is valuable and that "one program need not result in the cancellation of another."⁶⁸

⁶⁶ Mark Connolly, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Hearing Transcript, 23 February 2003, Issue 1, 37th Parl., 3rd Sess., http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/3/parlbus/commbus/senate/Com-e/defe-e/40647-e.htm?Language=E&Parl=37&Ses=2&comm_id=76 (accessed April 1, 2004).

⁶⁷ Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, "McLellan and Ridge Highlight Progress on Smart Border Action Plan – News Release" (October 14, 2004), http://www.psepc-sppcc.gc.ca/publications/news/20041014_e.asp.

⁶⁸ Alain Jolicoeur, Letter to Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, March 10, 2004 (Exhibit 5900-3.37/N2-SS-1, 2, "9").

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

- **Deploy border officials to more overseas ports**

The Deputy Prime Minister's announcement is insufficient. A deployment of officers to just one location overseas is little more than an exercise in maintaining appearances. The Committee notes that the Canada Border Services Agency has posted Migration Integrity Officers (immigration officials who help verify a traveller's documentation) to 38 international locations.⁶⁹ The government should move faster to implement a program of at least similar scope to verify cargo container shipping.

- **The Border Agency should reconsider its priorities**

The Committee stands behind its recommendation that border officials be moved from ports in the United States to ports overseas because it feels the risk of national security-related smuggling occurring from the United States to Canada is remote. Leaving agents in the United States does not appear consistent with the government's goal of working with the United States to create smart border security for all of North America.

⁶⁹ Honourable Judy Sgro, "Letter to Senator Colin Kenny" (November 12, 2004).

Problem 13: Great Lakes Surveillance

HIGH PRIORITY

No continental effort for securing the Great Lakes exists. The Great Lakes represent the single largest gap in bilateral cooperation to secure the Canada-U.S. border.

The Great Lakes water system is a vital economic artery for both Canada and the United States. Millions of people live around their edges and the lakes are not secure if officials are not sure what boats are on them and where they are going.

Efforts to date to secure the Great Lakes – especially in terms of assigning responsibilities, providing adequate resources for information fusion and maritime patrols, and cooperating with the United States – didn't come close to measuring up to the threat.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended new security measures on the Great Lakes including:

- Mandatory reporting for all vessels (of a displacement to be determined by Canadian regulators) to Canadian authorities 24 hours prior to anticipated entry into Canadian Great Lakes ports
- Equipping all vessels (of a displacement to be determined by Canadian regulators) intending to operate in the Great Lakes region with transponders to permit electronic tracking by Canadian authorities (this requirement would have the added benefit of greatly improving the precision of search and rescue)
- Mandatory daily reporting to Canadian authorities for all vessels (of a displacement to be determined by Canadian regulators) operating in Canadian national waters

- Designating Canada's Great Lakes reporting stations responsible for receipt and coordination of these reports and for communication with policing agencies. (Report: *Defence of North America: A Canadian Responsibility*, September 2002, #8)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The joint Canada-U.S. authorities that manage the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Seaway system⁷⁰ mandated that large ships be equipped with transponders as of March 31st, 2003.⁷¹ The joint authorities require that these vessels maintain contact with call-in points at least every four hours.

According to the Department of National Defence, the Maritime Forces Atlantic Area includes the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence Seaway system. Commercial vessel movement information contributes to the surveillance picture maintained by the Canadian Forces Operations Centre in Halifax.⁷²

The government's January 2004 update on the maritime security initiatives does not focus extensively on the Great Lakes.⁷³

Securing the St. Lawrence Seaway, and its approaches, was one of the six priorities for strengthening marine security outlined by the government in its April 2004 National Security Policy.⁷⁴

The Department of National Defence is in discussions with the U.S. Coast Guard District to exchange liaison officers at their operations centres to aid in cross-border coordination.⁷⁵

⁷⁰ The Seaway System, 2,038 nautical miles in length, encompasses the St. Lawrence River and the five Great Lakes, and extends from the Gulf of St. Lawrence at the Atlantic Ocean to the western end of Lake Superior at the twin ports of Duluth, Minnesota, and Superior, Wisconsin.

⁷¹ The St. Lawrence Seaway Management Corporation. "Seaway Notice No. 3 – 2003 Automatic Identification System (AIS)," (6 March 2003), <http://www.greatlakes-seaway.com/en/navigation/notice20030306b.html> (accessed 2 April 1, 2004). The rule applies to commercial vessels that require clearance and weigh 300 gross tonnage or greater, have an overall length of more than 20 meters (66 feet), or carry more than 50 passengers, as well as dredges and floating plants and towing vessels more than 8 meters (26 feet) in length, are required to comply.

⁷² Graham, "Letter to Senator Colin Kenny" (November 3, 2004): 1.

⁷³ Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group, *Enhancing the Security of Canada's Marine Transportation System* (Ottawa: January 2004), http://www.tc.gc.ca/vigilance/sep/marine_security/enhancing/menu.htm (accessed 2 November 2004). The document describes efforts to pre-screen vessels before they arrive in the Great Lakes/St. Lawrence seaway system but it does not outline any efforts to monitor them once they are already on the lakes.

⁷⁴ Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy* (Ottawa: government of Canada, April 27, 2004), 38.

⁷⁵ Graham, "Letter to Senator Colin Kenny" (November 3, 2004): 1.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

- **Make the security for the Great Lakes a higher priority**

Canadian authorities on the Great Lakes still do not have a real time common operating picture of what vessels are operating on the Great Lakes.

- **Beware smaller vessels**

Seaway security regulations should be extended to smaller vessels when Class B transponder standards have been set because the current regulations do not address the problem of tracking smaller craft, like pleasure boats.

Problem 14: Surveillance of Coasts, Lakes and Rivers

Significant vulnerabilities exist along Canada's maritime approaches and major inland waterways. Responsibility for security is confused and security is weak in many places and non-existent in others. A short-staffed RCMP must rely on a volunteer-based coastal watch program in Nova Scotia, which makes sense. What does not make sense is that the RCMP has only 13 officers to perform its own duties in monitoring 7,400 kilometres of coast,⁷⁶ as well as trying to ensure that the volunteer program plays a useful role.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that the RCMP conduct a risk / threat assessment to determine the personnel, equipment, and financial resources it needs to re-establish the Marine Division and to police the St. Lawrence Seaway, St. Lawrence River, Great Lakes, the Fraser and Skeena Rivers, and inland waterways identified as high risk. The Committee also recommended that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) report its findings to the public by March 31, 2004 and have an operational plan ready for March 31, 2005, and that the government be prepared to fund the stated requirements. (Report: *Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World*, October 2003, #4.3 and #4.4)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

In March 2004, the RCMP reported to the Committee that it supported these recommendations and that it is currently conducting a risk and threat assessment of the various waterways.⁷⁷

An outside consultant prepared an internal interim report in conjunction with RCMP, which was to have been followed by a final report in August 2004.⁷⁸ The Committee has not been made aware of the results of either the interim or final report.

⁷⁶ Ian Atkins, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Hearing Transcript, September 22, 2003, Issue 22, 37th Parl., 2nd Sess., http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/2/parlbus/commbus/senate/Com-e/defe-e/22evb-e.htm?Language=E&Parl=37&Ses=2&comm_id=76 (accessed May 8, 2004).

⁷⁷ Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Email to researcher, March 11, 2004.

⁷⁸ Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Email to researcher, March 11, 2004.

The RCMP stated that it will put in place an operational plan by March 31, 2005 based on the threat assessment, and that it will use the assessment to determine the requirements for personnel, equipment, and financial resources to adequately address these recommendations.⁷⁹

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

- **Release the Assessment**

The RCMP appears to be addressing this issue. But an internal report is not enough. The RCMP needs to publicly identify the resources it needs to adequately protect Canada's Great Lakes, rivers, seaways, and inland waterways.

It is the Committee's experience that the RCMP often underestimates the resources it needs to perform various security functions. It should not in this case – the Great Lakes security problem is huge. Canadians need an honest assessment of what it will take to do the job, so that they can apply political pressure to ensure that it is done.

⁷⁹ Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Email to researcher, March 11, 2004.

Problem 15: Training Delays

Customs officials are Canada's first line of defence against smugglers and terrorists. The Committee was told that they were insufficiently trained and did not know how to operate some of the equipment they needed to do their job - especially newer equipment for searching cargo containers.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that Canada Customs & Revenue Agency (CCRA) – since replaced by the Canada Border Services Agency – ensure that there are adequate trained personnel to operate the new technology introduced at Canadian ports. (Report: *Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World*, October 2003, #2.9)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

Alain Jolicoeur, the Canada Border Services Agency's CEO, told the Committee, on 23 February 2004, that the human factor and the training factor are more limiting to the deployment of new technology than the need for more machines.⁸⁰ Since 1 April 2003, twenty-one hundred agency personnel have been trained on new contraband detection equipment. Since December 2002, three hundred and sixty-three have been trained on Vehicle and Cargo Inspection Systems (VACIS).⁸¹

⁸⁰ Alain Jolicoeur, *Proceedings*.

⁸¹ Training on Vehicle and Cargo Inspection Systems (VACIS) is divided between training on Mobile and Pallet systems. Mobile VACIS has been in use by the Canada Border Services Agency longer than Pallet VACIS. Since December 2002, two hundred and fifty-nine officers have been trained on the Mobile type of VACIS. Training on Pallet VACIS only began in March 2004. Since then, one hundred and four officers have been trained to use Pallet VACIS. See: Canada Border Services Agency, Email to researcher, November 16, 2004.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

- **Let border officials catch up with the technology**

The Canada Border Services Agency needs to speed up and augment its training, and do so quickly. Technologies like VACIS are only useful if there are enough agents on the ground who are proficient at using them.

- **More personnel are needed**

Technology obviously helps, but it doesn't reduce the need for people. Officers need to be trained and retrained to keep up with technology. Sufficient numbers of people must be hired to ensure that there are always enough personnel available to keep the system working well.

CHAPTER 4

Canadian Forces

Problem 1: Budget Cuts

HIGH PRIORITY

The Canadian Forces budget was cut by **approximately 30%** between 1988 and 2000; many of the cuts occurred between 1994 and 1998. This year Canada will spend around 1.2 per cent of its GDP on defence. Despite NATO's recent expansions, Canada remains mired third last among the twenty-six member countries, ahead of only Luxembourg and Iceland (which has no armed forces).⁸²

Over the same time frame, the operational tempo of the Canadian Forces has increased (see Chapter 4 Problem 3, page 71). The budgetary cuts have had severe consequences. All the services are now short of personnel. Capital purchases have been delayed. Older equipment – most notably the Sea King Helicopters and the Hercules Transport Aircraft – is becoming increasingly unusable. Large-scale training has been postponed.

Recent studies by the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs, the Auditor General of Canada, the Conference of Defence Associations and the Defence Management Program at Queen's University have all called for budget increases that correlate over time to significant sustained resource commitments to the Canadian Forces.

⁸² International Institute for Strategic Studies, "International Comparisons of Defence Expenditure and Military Manpower in 2001, 2002 and 2003," *The Military Balance 2004*, Vol. 104, No. 1 (Oxford University Press, 2004), 353. Available from: Ingenta Select (date accessed: 5 November 2004). Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has grown from 16 to 26 member countries, adding 3 in 1999 (Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic) and 7 earlier this year (Lithuania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia). Canada's military spending, as a percentage of its GDP, has consistently ranked it third from the bottom of NATO countries since before the 199 expansion.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATIONS

The Committee recommended an immediate increase to the Department of National Defence baseline budget of \$4 billion and future annual budget increases adjusted for inflation. (Report: *Canadian Security and Military Preparedness*, February 2002, #2 and #3)

Nine months later, the Committee reiterated that the \$4 billion dollar increase in defence spending recommended in the earlier report was the MINIMUM required, and that the full increase was required immediately. (Report: *For an Extra 130 Bucks...Update on Canada's Military Financial Crisis, A View from the Bottom Up*, November 2002, #1)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The Department of National Defence's 2004 budget was approximately \$13.28 billion according to the Government's Main Estimates for 2004-2005. That budget is approximately \$1.45 billion more than the Department's budget when the Committee made its first recommendation on the subject.⁸³ However, that is not to say that the Government is almost half way to meeting the Committee's recommendation of a \$4 billion increase.

The Budget 2004 number is slightly misleading because it reflects additional funds committed to the Department for deployed operations (Afghanistan and Haiti) and does not take into account the \$144 million taken away from the Department as part of the government-wide reallocation initiative.

Moreover, had the Government raised the Department's baseline budget by \$4 billion when the Committee recommended, and then followed up that increase with subsequent inflation-based increases, the Department's budget would now be approximately \$17.3 billion. This would **still** only raise Canada's level of military spending as a percentage of its GDP to 21st out of the 26 NATO member countries. The government notes that, in terms of raw military expenditures, Canada ranks 6th on the list of NATO countries, but many of the countries on that list have far smaller GDPs.

⁸³ According to the Government's Main Estimates of 2002-2003 and 2004-2005.

Since December 2003, the government has pledged to spend more than \$7.7 billion on equipment for the Canadian Forces, including:

- the Maritime Helicopter Project,
- the Mobile Gun System,
- Joint Support Ships, and
- Fixed-Wing Search and Rescue Aircraft.⁸⁴

The vast majority of the promised capital money will not be spent for five years, or in the case of the Joint Support Ship, ten years. Experience has shown, however, that money promised frequently does not materialize. Moreover, the only new money the Department of National Defence is getting is for the Fixed Wing Search and Rescue budget. The funds for the other three projects are going to have to be scraped out of the current DND budget.

The government's limited funding increases have not been enough to stop the deterioration of the Forces' equipment and the wear and tear on the personnel.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

- **Increase National Defence's base line budget**

The budget of the Department of National Defence should be increased by \$4 billion for fiscal year 2005-2006. There should be increases each year thereafter tied to inflation.

⁸⁴ Office of the Prime Minister, "Address by Prime Minister Paul Martin at CFB Gagetown, New Brunswick" (April 14, 2004), <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news.asp?id=172> (accessed: November 16, 2004).

Problem 2: Capital Acquisitions Falling Behind

A decade of cuts to the Canadian Forces has postponed critical military acquisitions. Not only does the Department of National Defence need a cash infusion (as described in Problem 1 above), it needs yearly funding increases to allow it to create a reliable capital acquisition process that will put an end to recurring equipment crises.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended future annual budget increases [that] were realistic, purpose-driven and adjusted for inflation. (Report: *Canadian Security and Military Preparedness*, February 2002, #3)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The government has not announced any plans for sustained budget increases to ensure that the funding going forward maintains its purchasing power. It did promise funding for specific new projects such as new Search and Rescue aircraft, Joint Support Ships, Maritime Helicopters, and Mobile Gun Systems.

Currently, capital expenditures account for around 15% of the Department of National Defence's budget.⁸⁵ The government has done little to increase to capital expenditures to a level sufficient to guarantee properly equipped Forces.

The Minister of National Defence wrote to one of the Committee's members in November 2004 in response to this recommendation that "it is premature to speculate on the level of funding that Defence requires" until the government's International Policy Review is completed.⁸⁶

⁸⁵ Department of National Defence, *Making Sense Out Of Dollars 2003-4* (August 2004), 46.

⁸⁶ Honourable William Graham, "Letter to Senator Colin Kenny" (November 3, 2004): 4.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

- **Stop using the International Policy Review as cover for inaction**

Because of the aging nature of the military's equipment and the large capital expense of the Department, Defence will require inflation-based increases every year regardless of the outcome policy review. It is wrong to hold back this necessary commitment any longer.

- **Introduce inflation-based budget increases**

Boosting National Defence's baseline budget was only Step 1 in solving the military's financial problems. Without inflation-based increases in subsequent budgets, there can be no sustained commitment to revitalization. Had the Government raised the Department's budget by \$4 billion and then followed it with subsequent inflation-based increases as recommended, the Department's budget would now be where it should be approximately \$17.3 billion.

- **Prioritize the capital expenditure account**

The capital expenditure account must be moved higher on the list of priorities for National Defence. It cannot continue to be the fund made up of what's left over. Budgeting 15% of the DND budget for capital expenses for the next five years will not address rust out of current capital equipment, let alone provide funds for new emerging capabilities. The Department must ensure that a minimum amount of its budget is earmarked for capital expenditures. That amount should be between \$2 and \$2.5 billion per year.

Problem 3: Overheated Operational Tempo

The number of tasks demanded of the Canadian Forces increased significantly during the 1990s, despite deep budget cuts. The combination of cuts and increased operations created an as yet unresolved three-fold crisis: too few effective personnel are being ordered to do too many tasks with too little training and obsolescent or non-existent equipment. A budget increase alone will not fix this problem.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended healing time – that all Canadian military forces be withdrawn from overseas duty when current tours expired.⁸⁷ The Committee recommended that no forces be deployed overseas for a minimum of 24 months thereafter. This amounted to a recommendation for a 30-month moratorium on deployments. (Report: *For an Extra 130 Bucks...Update on Canada's Military Financial Crisis, A View from the Bottom Up*, November 2002, #2 A and B)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The government, in its October 2002 official response to the Committee's first report, stated that it had addressed the impact of operational tempo by limiting the duration of some foreign deployments and reducing overseas commitments.⁸⁸ One of the commitment reductions the government's response highlighted was its decision not to replace the Canadian Battle Group in Afghanistan.

In fact, the government kept up the pace of deployments until recently. Canadian troops were, for example, back in Afghanistan in August 2003 on another significant mission. The Government has also deployed large forces to Haiti and to the waters off Southwest Asia, and maintained standing commitments, including those in the Golan Heights and (until recently) in Bosnia.

⁸⁷ The Committee made an exception in its recommendation for recurring commitments such as military attaches, military staff at NATO and SACLANT Headquarters, NORAD-assigned Military Staff (which would now also include members of the bi-national planning group) and the NATO AWACS units at Geilenkirchen, Germany.

⁸⁸ Government of Canada, *Canadian Security and Emergency Preparedness - The Government's Response to the Report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence (2002)* (October 2002), 11.

The pace has taxed the Forces. Between 2001 and 2003, for example, the Navy deployed 15 of its 18 major warships, and 95 percent of all its 4,100 sailors, into the Arabian Sea on 16 deployments (one ship went twice).⁸⁹

However, over time, it became clear to the government that its policies were unsustainable and since 2003, senior military and political leaders have begun conceding the need for a significant pause. A *de facto* pause is now underway.

Lieutenant General MacDonald, then Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, told the Committee in February that starting in August 2004, the Canadian Forces would be entering “a period of recuperation, a strategic pause, as you would say, to ensure that we can ultimately return to a steady state level of deployment in the subsequent year.”

As of October 15, 2004, the government has withdrawn all but 1,633 of the 4,500 military personnel that were overseas a year ago.

February 23, 2004 Committee proceedings excerpt

Senator Atkins:

So considering our international obligations, we are just stretched too thin?

LGen. MacDonald:

We have been over the last few years, yes.⁹⁰

The Department of National Defence describes the current situation as an “operational pause.”⁹¹

However, some deployments continue. In August, another rotation of almost a thousand personnel headed out to Afghanistan. In May, approximately 80 Canadian Forces personnel deployed to the Golan Heights for the 80th consecutive rotation of Canada’s mission there. Yes, we have been in the Golan Heights for 30 years, representing generations of soldiers. Then, as recently as early October,

⁸⁹ General Ray Henault, Speech to the Conference of Defence Associations Institute (February 26, 2004), url: http://www.cds.forces.gc.ca/pubs/speeches/26-Feb-04_e.asp (accessed November 1, 2004).

⁹⁰ Department of National Defence, E-mail to researcher, November 19, 2004.

⁹¹ Honourable William Graham, “Letter to Senator Colin Kenny” (November 3, 2004): 5.

Canada deployed two Aurora Maritime Patrol aircraft and approximately sixty-five personnel to Italy to aid in a NATO operation as part of the Campaign Against Terrorism.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

- **Continue slowed tempo of deployments**

The decision to slow the pace of deployments was a politically difficult decision, but a sound one. But if Canada's military is going to focus on the retraining, rehabilitation and re-equipping that will be needed to create modern, effective armed forces, the government needs to stay the course and continue to slow the tempo of overseas deployments.⁹²

- **Resist inevitable pressures to deploy**

The government must resist the inevitable calls over the next few months for new or additional deployments before the soldiers, sailors, and air and ground crews are rested, retrained and augmented with new recruits.

There will always be demands for deployment of Canadian troops somewhere in the world – from our allies, from NATO, from the U.N., and from political constituencies within Canada. It will take a very astute and courageous federal government to say “No – we are going to stay off the merry-go-round to fix this.” The challenge: *muster the courage, and get on with the job.*

How long the government must continue to resist those calls is dependent on how many of the troops are brought home. If the government is not going to bring home all the troops – and there are still 1,633 personnel overseas – then the reduced tempo is going to have to last longer than the 24 months first recommended. This is particularly true in light of the need to train 5,000 Regular and 3,000 Reserves Forces personnel promised by the government.

⁹² There were still 1,633 Canadian Forces personnel overseas as of October 15, 2004.

Problem 4: Too Few Personnel – Too High Tempo

HIGH PRIORITY

The Canadian Forces' strength declined from almost 90,000 in 1990-91, to 73,219 in 1994-95, to 62,145 in October 2004. Meanwhile, the operational tempo increased.⁹³ Of the 62,145 personnel that make up the total current force strength, the heavy burden of fulfilling the government's commitments falls to just 53,183 effective personnel.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that to sustain the level of tasking required of them over the last eight years, the Canadian Forces need at least 75,000 trained effective personnel. (Report: *Canadian Security and Military Preparedness*, February 2002, #1)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

As of 4 October 2004, the Canadian Forces Regular Force strength was 62,145, the trained effective strength was 53,183, and the number available for tasks was 51,615.⁹⁴

The government has committed to increase the size of the regular force by 5,000 personnel. According to the Minister of National Defence, "the increase will go a long way toward alleviating the problems associated with the high operational tempo of our military in recent years."⁹⁵

The details of the force expansion are unclear. Rumours persisted in the early fall that the new personnel would be trained for a niche role such as peacekeeping. It was also rumoured that, while new personnel would be recruited, the government would not provide new money to pay their salaries. This seems far-fetched, given

⁹³ 1994-1995 figures: Department of National Defence, *1994-95 Estimates: Part III, Expenditure Plan*, (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1994) 22, 212. 2004 figure: Department of National Defence, "Current Operations," http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/operations/current_ops_e.asp (accessed: March 11, 2004).

⁹⁴ Department of National Defence, email to researcher, November 4, 2004.

⁹⁵ Honourable William Graham, "Letter to Senator Colin Kenny" (November 3, 2004): 5.

the pledge of the Minister of National Defence, “the Government is committed to giving the Canadian Forces the resources required to do their jobs.”⁹⁶

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

- **Increase trained, effective personnel to 75,000**

The government’s promise of more personnel constituted a step in the right direction, but only a small step. First, the government needs to follow through by providing sufficient additional resources to pay for the new personnel, and by training them to be completely combat capable.

Secondly, the government must commit to expanding the Forces for each of three subsequent years until the Forces reach a level of 75,000 trained effective, as recommended by the Committee, and as outlined in the following chart:

	Net Increase to be added	Total - Canadian Forces Trained Effective Personnel
Current	n/a	53,183
2004 – 2005	5,000	58,183
2005 – 2006	5,000	63,183
2006 – 2007	6,000	69,183
2007 – 2008	6,000	75,183

The Committee proposal is for a “net increase” of personnel, which does not account for normal attrition through retirement, nor for possible training releases. Thus, the number of recruits to be taken into the Canadian Forces each year must be closer to 9,000 to end up with our net numbers above.

- **Accept the scope of the problem ahead**

The challenge is far greater than simply adding the additional personnel. The government will have to tackle the aging demographic problem facing the military in the coming years at the same time it is increasing the size of the Forces.

⁹⁶ Honourable William Graham, “Letter to Senator Colin Kenny” (November 3, 2004): 5.

- **Create innovative solutions to retain specialized skill sets**

The problem is further complicated by the need for personnel with specialized skills. The government will have to fund innovative incentive programs to retain a number of trades longer than they would normally stay in the service in order to allow the new recruits to acquire necessary competencies.

- **Continue to decrease deployments and over all operational tempo until manpower shortage is resolved**

Training so many new recruits will be a large undertaking. The government must ensure that it has experienced troops on hand to train the new recruits. This will require a significant long term commitment. The training of these troops will have implications for deployments through at least 2008.

Problem 5: Overdue Defence Policy Review

Canada's defence policy as outlined in the *1994 White Paper on Defence* is irrelevant and outdated. It became irrelevant and outdated when the federal government failed to provide the funding necessary to allow the Canadian Forces to fulfil the roles as defined in the policy.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that the government conduct a defence policy review as soon as possible, but since defence policy is predicated on foreign policy, it not do so without first reviewing Canada's foreign policy. (Report: *Canadian Security and Military Preparedness*, February 2002, #4)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The Government has been promising a comprehensive review of foreign and defence policy for years. There have been suggestions that elements of it will be released for comment by Parliament later this fall. The review itself will not be completed until the fall of 2005.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

- **Table clear defence policy, based on clear foreign policy**

Foreign policy and defence policy reviews are long overdue. In the weeks preceding the publication of this report, the expected delivery date for the International Policy Review was pushed back by a month. Further, even at this late stage, it is not clear whether the review will consist of a Green Paper, providing options for debate, or a White Paper, stating a definitive policy.

It is time to get on with the process. The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence and the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs have undertaken to get on with their own reviews and will consider the government's paper, if and when it is made public.

Problem 6: Lack of Large-Scale Training Exercises

The Canadian Forces has had to set aside most collective, joint and large-scale training due to lack of money and personnel. Training occurs principally at the individual and small unit level. This is to the detriment of military effectiveness and the safety of Canadian Forces personnel.

As Colonel Jocelyn P.P.J. Lacroix, then Commander of the 5th Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group, testified to the Committee in September 2003, “We have had to spread out and often do less collective training, which was conducted annually at all levels. So it is harder to build cohesion now than it was previously...we lack the resources to build that cohesion through collective training.”⁹⁷

It is difficult to fault National Defence for not providing appropriate training when its resources are so over-stretched in the field.

It is not difficult to blame National Defence’s political masters.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that battalion or battle group-level exercises – particularly those permitting Canadian and American troops to function jointly – be re-instituted as quickly as possible to permit Canada’s army to work in harmony with the armies of its allies. (Report: *Defence of North America: A Canadian Responsibility*, September 2002, #1)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The Canadian Army has not engaged in any combined or joint brigade or battalion-level exercises with U.S. military since September 2002 because of the high operational tempo of both militaries, according to the Minister of National Defence.⁹⁸

⁹⁷ Colonel Jocelyn P.P.J. Lacroix, “*Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Hearing Transcript, September 24, 2003, Issue 1, 37th Parl., 2nd Sess., Issue 23, http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/2/parlbus/commbus/senate/Com-e/defe-e/23eva-e.htm?Language=E&Parl=37&Ses=2&comm_id=76 (accessed May 8, 2004).

⁹⁸ Honourable William Graham, “Letter to Senator Colin Kenny” (November 3, 2004): 5.

The Canadian Forces did conduct its own brigade-level exercise in April 2003 under the title of Exercise Resolute Warrior. The 27-day exercise brought together over 4400 Canadian troops, and fighters from the Montana Air National Guard. Resolute Warrior was DND's largest training exercise since 1992. It cost the Army 45% of its 2003 training budget.

According to National Defence, Exercise Resolute Warrior "marked the Army's return to combined arms training at the formation level."⁹⁹

The Canadian Forces did not undertake a similar-sized exercise in 2004. The Forces are planning to conduct a Brigade Training Event in Fall 2005. National Defence estimates that the exercise, referred to as Phoenix Ram, will involve approximately 4,000 soldiers and take place at the Land Force Western Area Training Centre Wainwright.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

- **Conduct more frequent large-scale training exercises**

The Canadian Forces cannot expect to maintain cohesiveness and interoperability while undertaking only one large-scale training exercise every two years.

⁹⁹ National Defence, Brigade Training Event Backgrounder (April 6, 2003), url: http://www.army.dnd.ca/LFCA_HQ/LFCA/BTE/english/newsroom/BTE_Backgrounder.doc (Accessed November 1, 2004).

Problem 7: The Slow Move to Wainwright

The establishment of the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre at Canadian Forces Base Wainwright has been painfully slow. The Centre should be up and running by now.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended in 2002 that the construction of the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre at Wainwright – then not even contracted and far behind schedule – be expedited and that the facility be prepared for large-scale training exercises of Canadian Forces troops no later than the summer of 2004. (Report: *Defence of North America: A Canadian Responsibility*, September 2002, #2)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The government failed to meet the Committee's Summer 2004 deadline for completion. The stand-up of the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre will be phased in through 2005. Training is scheduled to commence at Wainwright in 2006. According to National Defence, this opening date is consistent with the original timeline for the creation of the centre.¹⁰⁰

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

- **Ensure the Centre is operational in 2006**

The Canadian Forces cannot train adequately without the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre. This should have been a greater priority. All that is left now is to try to ensure that “slow” doesn't become “slower yet.”

¹⁰⁰ Honourable William Graham, “Letter to Senator Colin Kenny” (November 3, 2004): 6.

CHAPTER 5

Structure and Coordination of Government

Problem 1: Need for Muscle at the Top

National Security issues are important enough to demand full day-to-day attention of someone very senior in the cabinet, someone capable of driving the government's agenda across multiple departments and with a powerful voice at the cabinet table.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that the position of Deputy Prime Minister become a permanent component of the federal political structure and that the Deputy Prime Minister be assigned permanent responsibility for Canada's U.S. file, borders, national security issues, natural and man-made disasters and coasts. (Report: *Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World*, October 2003, #5.2)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

Overall

The new government went a long way toward filling this void when it followed the Committee's recommendation and made the new Deputy Prime Minister responsible for public safety and emergency preparedness.

The government centralized the responsibility for most of national security and emergency preparedness portfolios in the hands of the Deputy Prime Minister in December 2003, clearly making the position the lead Minister of a strong department with broad duties and responsibilities (though not broad enough).

The Canada-U.S. File

The current Deputy Prime Minister no longer has the same responsibility for managing the Canada-U.S. file that former Deputy Prime Minister John Manley did. However, not only was she not given the U.S. file, but the Prime Minister's Office does not even list her as a member of the Cabinet Committee on Canada-U.S. relations.¹⁰¹

Responsibility for the Canada-U.S. file is now more complex than it was under Deputy Prime Minister Manley. The Prime Minister has engaged in the file through the creation of a cabinet committee on Canada-U.S. relations which he chairs; as has the centre of government, through the creation of a Canada-U.S. Privy Council Office Secretariat; and on top of that, there have been two successive Parliamentary Secretaries to the Prime Minister appointed with special emphasis on Canada-U.S. relations.¹⁰²

The government has not demonstrated that there is a clear effective lead on this critical file.

Coastal Security

The government announced in its April 2004 National Security Policy that it was “clarifying and strengthening accountability for marine security.”¹⁰³ In the policy it then assigned lead roles for different aspects of marine security to three Ministers: Transport (marine safety and security policy co-ordination), National Defence (co-ordination of on-water response to a marine threat or a developing crisis), and the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness (enforcement and policing of marine security).¹⁰⁴

Furthermore, the Coast Guard still reports to the Department of Fisheries and Oceans. Transport Canada also retains responsibility for the Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group.

¹⁰¹ Office of the Prime Minister, “Cabinet Committees Mandates and Membership” (25 October 2004), http://www.pm.gc.ca/grfx/docs/Cab_committee-comite.pdf (accessed 10 November 2004).

¹⁰² Currently, Marlene Jennings is Parliamentary Secretary to the Prime Minister with special emphasis on Canada-U.S. relations. See Prime Minister's Office, “Parliamentary Secretaries” (July 23, 2004), http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/new_team_1.asp (accessed October 20, 2004).

¹⁰³ Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society*, 38.

¹⁰⁴ Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society*, 38.

Making the Position Permanent

The government introduced legislation in October 2004 to formalize the creation of the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness.¹⁰⁵ It does not permanently tie the new Department to the position of Deputy Prime Minister.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

Good progress has been made, but there is work left to be accomplished.

- **Give the Deputy Prime Minister the U.S. file**

The Deputy Prime Minister should be given the U.S. file, should be brought on board the Cabinet Committee on Canada-U.S. relations and should, in fact, chair that Committee.

- **Give the Deputy Prime Minister the tools needed to do the job**

The Deputy Prime Minister should also be given additional tools in order to round out her portfolio's responsibility for Canada's security infrastructure, including oversight of:

- An armed Coast Guard with constabulary authority
- Canadian Air Transport Security Authority
- Canadian Food Inspection Agency
- Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group

- **Make the position permanent**

The legislation creating the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness should tie the position to the role of Deputy Prime Minister.

¹⁰⁵ In the first session of the 38th Parliament that legislation is *Bill C-6 – An Act to establish the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness and to amend or repeal certain Acts*.

Problem 2: Need for a Strong Team

The Deputy Prime Minister does not receive adequate support to perform her security functions.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that the Deputy Prime Minister be provided with adequate bureaucratic support within a branch of the Privy Council Office to fund and direct a structure for maritime security, in addition to other responsibilities (which the Committee recommended include the Canada-U.S. file, borders, national security issues, and natural and man-made disasters in Recommendation #5.2, Chapter 5, Problem #1 above). (Report: *Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World*, October 2003, #5.3)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

Deputy Prime Minister McLellan was not given responsibility for either coastal security or the Canada-U.S. file as part of her portfolio.

Minister McLellan receives senior level support support for her national security responsibilities from within the Privy Council Office from the Prime Minister's National Security Advisor, Robert Wright, who serves as one of her Deputy Ministers.¹⁰⁶ Wright's position was created as part of the same set of changes to the structure of government that created Minister McLellan's portfolio.

No structure dedicated to maritime security has been created within the Privy Council Office.

A new Canada-United State Privy Council Secretariat was established to support the Cabinet committee on Canada-U.S. relations. Minister McLellan is not a member of that committee.

¹⁰⁶ Robert Wright was appointed to the new position of National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister in December 2003. In addition to that role, Wright is the Associate Secretary to the Cabinet Committee on Security, Public Health & Emergencies, Privy Council Office Security and Intelligence Coordinator and Deputy Minister to the Deputy Prime Minister.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

- **Concentrate responsibility for maritime security**

Responsibility for Canadian maritime security is diffused among various federal agencies and departments, meaning that the responses to crises are unlikely to be crisp and focused. The Deputy Prime Minister should be put in charge of coordinating maritime security efforts among the many departments involved. Some departments should get out of the security business.

- **Get Transport Canada out of security**

Transport Canada has responsibility for marine safety and security policy coordination, including the Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group.¹⁰⁷ It should not.

The Deputy Prime Minister's department should take over leadership of the Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group and the government should get on with important reforms like moving the Canadian Coast Guard out of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans and giving it a constabulary role in defending our coasts.

¹⁰⁷ Transport Canada, "Frequently Asked Questions: Roles and Responsibilities – Vessel and Port Facility Security," (September 10, 2004), http://www.tc.gc.ca/vigilance/sep/marine_security/faq.htm (accessed October 20, 2004).

Problem 3: Coordination at the Top

HIGH PRIORITY

Lack of Cabinet-level coordination and oversight of national security issues has in the past undermined the government's ability to drive its security agenda and guarantee the safety of Canadians. A more focused and coordinated structure was required to ensure implementation of priority policies.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that a national security structure containing the following be established:

- A permanent Cabinet committee chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister
- The Cabinet Committee would include the following ministers:
 - Foreign Affairs
 - Defence
 - Solicitor General
 - Health
 - Finance
 - Justice
 - Immigration
 - Others as required
- An additional Secretary to the Cabinet as its senior official.
- A permanent Secretariat within PCO dedicated to national security issues
- The Secretariat within PCO would include sufficient senior officials who have a good understanding of government capabilities, together with a grasp of issues and interests of importance to Canada.
- A restructuring of current procedures to permit this Secretariat to address issues of national security and common US/Canada security issues.

(Report: *Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World*, October 2003, #5.4)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The government responded by creating a variation of this structure two months after the Committee made its recommendation.

The most important component of the structural changes was the formation of a permanent Cabinet Committee on Security, Public Health, and Emergencies, chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister and including all the ministers recommended above (with the exception of Finance). It also includes additional members the Committee did not think were necessary, namely the Ministers of the Environment, Agriculture and Agri-Food, and Fisheries and Oceans, and the Ministers of State for Multiculturalism and Public Health.¹⁰⁸

The Prime Minister also appointed Rob Wright, a senior public servant, to serve as his National Security Advisor and as secretary to that committee. Wright described the creation of his position, and the structural changes to government as part of an attempt to, “ensure that all the arms of government, the spaghetti, were connected toward that common purpose.”¹⁰⁹

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

The government should be commended for adopting a variation of the Committee’s recommendation. The Committee will continue to investigate as to whether personnel shortages in this vital area have been adequately addressed.

¹⁰⁸ See Privy Council Office, “Information Resources – Cabinet Committee Membership,” (September 2004), http://www.pm.gc.ca/grfx/docs/Cab_committee-comite.pdf (accessed October 20, 2004).

¹⁰⁹ Robert Wright, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Hearing Transcript, February 23, 2004, Issue 1, 37th Parl., 3rd Sess., http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/3/parlbus/commbus/senate/Com-e/defe-e/01evb-e.htm?Language=E&Parl=37&Ses=3&comm_id=76 (accessed October 20, 2004).

Problem 4: The Missing National Security Policy

Canada has long been in need of a comprehensive and integrated national security policy. Without a coherent road map, programs get muddled in their planning and execution. Without a policy, it is all but impossible to evaluate whether programs are meeting the government's goals.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

Given the importance of issues of national security, and the need to have policies and procedures in place when crises arise, the Committee recommended that a study be undertaken to develop a National Security Policy, a study that would examine the proper roles of all levels of government, their departments and agencies. (Report: *Canadian Security and Military Preparedness*, February 2002, #19)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

In April 2004 the government announced a National Security Policy proposing a government-wide framework for responding to threats to Canada and outlining the integrated security system the government will build.¹¹⁰

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

The National Security Policy is in place and it represents a positive step forward.

- **Flesh out the plan further with more detailed goals and timelines**

There are over fifty projects that come out of the National Security Policy.¹¹¹ The Committee believes that the next step in the process is to outline the deliverables for each of those priorities in a way that gives Canadians a clear sense of what has been accomplished, and what is left to be done.

¹¹⁰ Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society*, iii-iv.

¹¹¹ Rob Wright, "The New Security Environment in Canada: Are we getting it right?" (Speech presented at the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies Annual Conference, October 14, 2004).

- **Undertake further departmental and agency responsibilities shifts**

The policy is a constructive starting point but it missed key changes to the national security responsibilities of three parts of the government that the Committee believes are necessary, including: Transport Canada (which should have a reduced role), the Privy Council Office (which should have a greater role), and the Canadian Coast Guard (which should have a constabulary role, be armed and be moved into the Deputy Prime Minister's portfolio).

Problem 5: Need for Crisis Command Centres

The Privy Council Office and the Prime Minister's Office lack adequate facilities – including redundant backup power and communications systems – to manage national crises.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that the government immediately begin work on creating a National Operations Centre. Recommendations included:

- The establishment of a permanent secretariat to support the Deputy Prime Minister within two months, with operations to be set up in a temporary government facility until the permanent national operations centres could be built.
- The construction of a National Operations Centre, with redundant power supplies and communications systems, easily accessible by the Privy Council Office, with a senior level "situation room" that would permit a permanent secretariat to continuously monitor international and national events.
- The construction of an alternate, identical operations centre utilizing different power and communications systems.
- The design and construction schedule be such that these operations centres be fully operationally capable by 1 February 2005.

(Report: *Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World*, October 2003, #5.5, 5.6, 5.7, and 5.8)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The government announced in the April 2004 National Security Policy that it would create a Government Operations Centre which would “provide stable, round-the-clock co-ordination and support across government and to key national players...and will provide leadership in emergencies of national importance.”¹¹² It allocated \$15 million to establish and operate the centre.

¹¹² Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society*, 24.

The Government Operations Centre described in the policy has been established and is housed at Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada. It is fully operational and conducts operations on a 24/7 basis, 365 days a year, according to its Director Craig Oldham.¹¹³ The Centre is undergoing further developments to enhance its capabilities.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

The government's decision to create a Government Operations Centre signals progress.

However, the time between the statement of the government's intent to create the centre and its Director's contention that it is "fully operational" is remarkably short. The Committee is skeptical about what "fully operational" means. The centre is a significant ways from completion in terms of having all the infrastructure, procedures and personnel it needs in place to match the government's pledge.

- **Paint a realistic picture about what is left to be done**

The Committee will focus on the Government Operations Centre's actual capabilities in the future.

¹¹³ Public Security and Emergency Preparedness, E-mail to researcher (November 25, 2004).

Problem 6: Need for Canada-U.S. Coordination

HIGH PRIORITY

Canada and the United States share a duty to defend North America. They have jointly monitored and defended North America's airspace through the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) for decades. No comparable formal structure exists for maritime and land defence.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATIONS

The Committee recommended the establishment of a Canadian-U.S. joint operational planning group that would include representatives of the Canadian Navy, the Canadian Coast Guard, the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Coast Guard. The Committee said this unit of approximately 50 people should be located at Colorado Springs, in proximity to NORAD planning staff. (Report: *Defence of North America: A Canadian Responsibility*, September 2002, #1)

The Committee recommended that a joint Canada-U.S. land force planning unit be established to allow the armies of the two neighbouring countries to plan for potential disasters – natural or otherwise – that jointly threaten the two countries. This unit of approximately 25 people would also be located at Colorado Springs, in proximity to NORAD facilities and the recommended Maritime planning staff. (Report: *Defence of North America: A Canadian Responsibility*, September 2002, #3)

The Committee recommended that both U.S. and Canadian governments address the work of the planning groups seriously and provide the necessary personnel to do it. (Report: *Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World*, October 2003, #6.1)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

In 2002, Canada and the United States established the Bi-National Planning Group with the responsibility for exploring ways of enhancing military-to-military land and civil contingency planning, decision-making and intelligence sharing arrangements, and maritime surveillance.¹¹⁴

¹¹⁴ Honourable William Graham, "Letter to Senator Colin Kenny" (November 3, 2004): 7.

The group is staffed with approximately 50 people (including 29 Canadian Forces officers and one representative from the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness). It is co-located with North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) headquarters in Colorado Springs.

Defence officials have repeatedly emphasized to the Committee the importance of the Planning Group in modernizing continental security and defence structures.¹¹⁵

The Bi-National Planning Group provided a set of recommendations on its future to the Permanent Joint Board on Defence in March 2004, which have not been made public.¹¹⁶

The Bi-National Planning Group's original two-year mandate was extended until May 2006 in late November 2004.¹¹⁷

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

- **Create a permanent land, maritime, and civil defence coordination structure**

The government's recent extension of the Bi-National Planning Group's mandate was a sound decision. However, the Bi-National Planning Group does not represent an adequate permanent structure for Canada-U.S. land, maritime and civil defence cooperation. The government should replace Bi-National Planning Group with a permanent structure for land, maritime and civil defence coordination that builds on the experience of NORAD and the Bi-National Planning Group.

- **Incorporate the new structure into the NORAD treaty renewal process in 2006**

The government should replace the Bi-National Planning Group with a more robust and more permanent structure before the 2006 NORAD treaty renewal and incorporate it into the renewal process.

¹¹⁵ Lieutenant General George MacDonald, *Questions Taken on Notice from the Appearance of LGen Macdonald from the Department of National Defence*, February 23, 2004 (Exhibit 5900-3.37/N2-SS-1, 2, "6").

¹¹⁶ Department of National Defence, Email to researcher, April 30, 2004.

¹¹⁷ Department of National Defence, "News Release – Canada and United States Commit to Renewed Defence Cooperation" NR – 04.093 (November 29, 2004),

http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1529 (Accessed: November 30, 2004).

Problem 7: Slow Progress at Information-Sharing

The government has many maritime assets, including ships, satellites, and fisheries patrols, but it has not developed a comprehensive way of integrating the information these assets collect.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that the government treat the quick introduction of the Maritime Information Management & Data Exchange Study (MIMDEX) information-sharing system as a priority. (Report: *Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World*, October 2003, #3.4)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group named the Maritime Information Management & Data Exchange (MIMDEX) Study project one of its priority initiatives. MIMDEX accounts for almost half of the funds in the Maritime Security Coordination Fund, and it is moving forward.¹¹⁸ According to Defence officials, MIMDEX is tentatively scheduled to become fully operational in March 2007.¹¹⁹

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

- **Complete the Maritime Information Management & Data Exchange (MIMDEX) Study project sooner than 2007**

¹¹⁸ MIMDEX will account for \$7.4 million of the \$16.2 million Marine Security Coordination Fund between now and 2007. Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group, *Enhancing the Security of Canada's Marine Transportation System*, and Department of National Defence, Email to researcher, April 8, 2004.

¹¹⁹ Department of National Defence, Email to researcher, April 8, 2004.

Problem 8: Lack of Surveillance Coordination

Departments that track vessels approaching Canada's coasts have not adequately coordinated their frontline efforts with one another and with our American allies. If a country is trying to defend its coasts, it needs to know what vessels are out there. Officials do not yet have a clear picture of what vessels are sailing off of Canada's coasts at any given time.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATIONS

The Committee recommended the coordination and utilization of the government's numerous monitoring resources, including a shipping position reporting system, Canadian Navy assets, satellite tracking resources, Aurora flights, Department of Fisheries and Oceans patrols and intelligence, Canadian Coast Guard patrols and intelligence, and RCMP patrols and intelligence. (Report: *Defence of North America: A Canadian Responsibility*, September 2002, #2)

The Committee recommended the creation of multi-departmental operations centres capable of collecting and analyzing maritime intelligence at Halifax and Esquimalt. These would provide a combined operational picture for all government agencies that deal with incoming vessels to help them address coastal threats to North America and design procedures to deal with all anticipated threats. (Report: *Defence of North America: A Canadian Responsibility*, September 2002, #3)

The Committee expanded on its recommendation that multi-departmental operations centres be established, by further recommending in October 2003 that the U.S. government be invited to place liaison officers at East Coast, West Coast and Great Lakes multi-departmental operations centres where intelligence is fused and analyzed if and when the Government of Canada sees fit to establish those centres. (Report: *Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World*, October 2003, #6.2)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

In its April 2004 National Security Policy, the government acknowledged that effective multi-departmental cooperation on the coasts was important. It announced its intention to establish one Marine Security Operations Centre on each

coast to improve coastal security efforts, especially data sharing and resource coordination.¹²⁰

It is moving to create those centres. However, no fully integrated multi-departmental operational picture exists yet. Only a basic capability to share data about the coasts has been accomplished thus far.

The government plans to complete the operations centres by co-locating a limited number of personnel from the RCMP, Transport Canada, the Canadian Coast Guard, and Canadian Border Services Agency at existing Canadian Forces naval facilities, Trinity in Halifax, N.S., and Athena in Esquimalt, B.C.¹²¹

Data from commercial vessels on the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence Seaway contributes to the Maritime Forces Atlantic surveillance picture maintained in Halifax.¹²²

The government's new multi-departmental Marine Security Operations Centre on the East Coast will continue to receive Canadian Coast Guard data from the Great Lakes / St. Lawrence Seaway. The information the Committee has received from the Department of National Defence does not make it clear that this centre will be responsible for on-water operations on the Great Lakes / St. Lawrence Seaway in the medium and long-term.

Discussions are under way between the Canadian Forces and the U.S. Coast Guard to create reciprocal Liaison Officer positions at each others' operations centres.¹²³

Implementation of the Marine Security Operations Centres' full operational capabilities will take about five years.¹²⁴

¹²⁰ Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society*, 38, and Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group, *Enhancing the Security of Canada's Marine Transportation System* (Ottawa: January 2004), 11, http://www.tc.gc.ca/vigilance/sep/marine_security/enhancing/menu.htm (accessed October 24, 2004).

¹²¹ Department of National Defence, E-mail to researcher, (October 28, 2004).

¹²² Honourable William Graham, "Letter to Senator Colin Kenny" (November 3, 2004): 1.

¹²³ Honourable William Graham, "Letter to Senator Colin Kenny" (November 3, 2004): 1.

¹²⁴ Department of National Defence, E-mail to researcher, (October 28, 2004).

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

- **Accelerate the development of the Marine Security Operations Centres**

The government's commitment to develop better awareness of activity on Canada's coasts and the establishment of multi-departmental Marine Security Operations Centres represents progress. However, the centres should be completed before 2009.

The Committee will examine the centres and the quality of operating picture as they develop.

- **Incorporate Marine Security Coordination into the 2006 renewal of NORAD treaty**

The government needs to continue its efforts to improve marine security coordination through the Bi-National Planning Group. However, it should also use seize NORAD treaty renewal process in 2006 to integrate marine security coordination into the formal continental defence structures either through a permanent NORAD-like structure, or an expanded NORAD.

Problem 9: Intelligence Community Understaffed

HIGH PRIORITY

The government reduced the size of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service between 1993 and 2002 by approximately 25%, as part of a wave of cuts that affected most actors in the intelligence community. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service has started to expand again and new hiring will raise personnel levels to an estimated 2,397 persons in 2007.¹²⁵ However, even then it will still be smaller than it was in 1992 when it had approximately 2,760 personnel.¹²⁶

Given that intelligence is at the heart of Canada's national security efforts, and given the length of time it takes to train intelligence officers, the cuts of the 1990s were unwise.

The Canadian intelligence community is understaffed for the post 9/11 security environment. It needs more people. The next generation of recruits needs more education and must come from a more diverse set of backgrounds than is traditional for the Service.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATIONS

The Committee recommended that the government expand its cadre of intelligence analysts in the wake of reports that too few people have been assigned to do too much critical work.

The Committee also recommended that the government move immediately to upgrade its recruitment of intelligence officers from Canadian universities and other institutions outside the public service, and that those universities and institutions make wider use of instructors from outside Canada with insights into other cultures.

¹²⁵ Canadian Security Intelligence Service, *2003 Public Report* (28 October 2004), [http:// www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/eng/publicrp/pub2003_e.html](http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/eng/publicrp/pub2003_e.html) (accessed: 15 November 2004).

¹²⁶ Canadian Security Intelligence Service, *2002 Public Report* (5 June 2003), [http:// www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/eng/publicrp/pub2002_e.html](http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/eng/publicrp/pub2002_e.html) (accessed: 15 November 2004).

Finally, the Committee recommended that the government increase funding for the training of people with the kinds of language and cultural skills that the Canadian intelligence community needs to draw from. (Report: *Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World*, October 2003, #3.1, 3.2, and 3.3)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The April 2004 National Security Policy pledged an additional \$137 million to support the enhancement of intelligence capabilities and up to \$30 million over five years to establish the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre.¹²⁷

The Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the Communications Security Establishment and the Intelligence Assessment Staff at the Privy Council Office have increased recruitment efforts since receiving funding after September 11, 2001.

The Canadian Security Intelligence Service

The Service reported to the Committee in April 2004 that it planned to use part of the budget increase it received in December 2001 to expand its personnel level by roughly 10% between 2002 and 2007.¹²⁸ The Service has largely completed its expansion.¹²⁹

The Communications Security Establishment

The Communications Security Establishment has approximately added 250 employees since September 11th, 2001.¹³⁰ The Communications Security Establishment had about 1,000 personnel in 2002.¹³¹

¹²⁷ Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society*, 17.

¹²⁸ Ward Elcock, "Letter to Senator Colin Kenny," (April 13, 2004).

¹²⁹ Canadian Security Intelligence Service, *2003 Public Report* (October 28, 2004), http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/eng/publicrp/pub2003_e.html (accessed November 8, 2004). According to its 2003 annual report, the Service grew by over two hundred personnel between 2001 and 2003 (the latest date for which public figures are available), and it will add less than a hundred more between 2004 and 2007.

¹³⁰ Communications Security Establishment, Email to researcher, (April 30, 2004).

¹³¹ Communications Security Establishment, "Corporate Information - Administration and Resources," (September 10, 2004), http://www.cse-cst.gc.ca/en/about_cse/resources.html, (accessed November 2, 2004). The Communications Security Establishment receives considerable operational assistance from the Department of National Defence.

The International Assessment Staff

The Privy Council Office's International Assessment Staff (formerly the Intelligence Assessment Secretariat) has doubled in size to over 40 people.¹³²

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

- **The intelligence community must grow to meet Canada's security threats**

Growth in the intelligence community must not stop. In fact it must continue on a far larger scale than it has to date given that:

1. virtually all of Canada's national security programs are intelligence-driven;
2. it takes a long time to train intelligence officers; and,
3. the security environment is not likely to become more stable at any time soon.

- **Stop cutting corners on intelligence**

Even with marginal expansion recently, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service is not back to the staffing levels it was at pre-1993. The International Assessment Staff (formerly the Intelligence Assessment Secretariat) currently has 40-50 analysts.

Intelligence is key to Canada's national security. The Committee will continue to monitor whether the Canadian government is putting sufficient resources into this vital area.

¹³² Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society*, 16.

Problem 10: Weak Overseas Intelligence

Canada has limited resources for national security. The best way to apportion them is through some system of risk management. The most important step in determining risks is intelligence. The sooner we can identify a threat, and the further away from Canada we can deal with it, the safer Canadians will be. Increasing Canada's overseas intelligence gathering capacity is the best way of using limited resources to discern threats as early and as far away from Canada as possible.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that the Canadian Security Intelligence Service should be instructed to upgrade its intelligence operations overseas. (Report: *Canadian Security and Military Preparedness*, February 2002, #17.B)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The Canadian Security Intelligence Service has noted that "as expertise has grown, CSIS' foreign operations have expanded to include, amongst others, such techniques as: tasking human sources to travel abroad, recruiting foreign sources, meeting those sources in third countries."¹³³

However, the Prime Minister has indicated that he is open to reconsidering the amount of overseas intelligence Canada deploys. As he said at a town hall meeting in February, "I'm not sure that outside of our country that we do as much as we should."¹³⁴

The Prime Minister's National Security Advisor Robert Wright took the Prime Minister's comments one step further and said that "Over the coming years, I wanted to increase the proportion of existing effort that is focused on security needs... That would argue for a capacity for CSIS to continue to adapt its role overseas."¹³⁵

¹³³ Canadian Security Intelligence Service, "Operations Abroad," (May 2004), http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/eng/backgrnd/back16_e.html, (accessed October 29, 2004).

¹³⁴ Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, "Your Turn with the Prime Minister," *The National*, Transcript (4 February 2004).

¹³⁵ Robert Wright, Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Hearing Transcript, February 23, 2004, Issue 1, 37th Parl., 3rd Sess.,

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

- **Expand foreign intelligence operations further**

The Service has become considerably more active outside Canada in recent years, however, increased asymmetric risk at home and abroad continues to require an expansion of the Service's foreign operations. That expansion should come both through increased cooperation with allied foreign governments, and also through the increased deployment of clandestine Canadian intelligence officers.

The government needs to provide the direction, resources and the personnel to assure that this activity increases substantially.

Problem 11: Information Fusion Failures

Many witnesses have told the Committee that the government fails to bring together and share intelligence adequately.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that the government expand information-sharing among departments, agencies, police forces and the military, recognizing some potential limitations required by the Charter of Rights and Freedoms as well as confidentiality guarantees sometimes required by foreign intelligence sources.

(Report: *Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World*, October 2003, #3.5)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The government's April 2004 National Security Policy recognizes the lack of information fusion and pledges to create a "new" Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC) to put together a comprehensive threat picture for Canada.¹³⁶ The Integrated Threat Assessment Centre represents the next generation of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service's Integrated National Security Assessment Centre (INSAC).

The government has created a Government Operations Centre to communicate and coordinate with federal departments, provincial and municipal authorities, and allies like the U.S.¹³⁷

The government will create two Marine Security Operations Centres by transforming existing Canadian Forces facilities on the east and west coasts and linking those in with the Government Operations Centre.¹³⁸

¹³⁶ Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society*, 11.

¹³⁷ Public Security and Emergency Preparedness E-mail message to researcher, (October 25, 2004).

¹³⁸ Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society*, 38-39.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

While some steps have been taken, all of the government's initiatives seem to be at least a year away from completion. Meanwhile, the Committee continues to hear complaints about the adequate sharing of intelligence.

Problem 12: Lack of Oversight

At least eight departments and agencies are involved in intelligence collection. They require independent oversight to ensure they are doing an adequate job of protecting Canadians while at the same time respecting their civil liberties. Only the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and the Communications Security Establishment are currently subject to review.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommends that there be an investigation to determine which, if any, additional government departments or agencies besides the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and the Communications Security Establishment require oversight bodies. (Report: *Canadian Security and Military Preparedness*, February 2002, #18)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

In its October 2002 response to this Committee's first report, the government stated that it "is confident that the review and accountability requirements of the security and intelligence community are being met and the interests of the Canadian public continue to be well-served in this regard."¹³⁹

The government's April 2004 National Security Policy outlined four bodies it claimed were necessary to improve review mechanisms in the security and intelligence community.¹⁴⁰ All are still in the planning stages, including:

- An independent arm's length review mechanism for the RCMP's national security-related activities.¹⁴¹ The review body will be based in part on recommendations from Mr. Justice Dennis R. O'Connor's examination of the Maher Arar affair.¹⁴²

¹³⁹ Government of Canada, "Canadian Security and Emergency Preparedness - The Government's Response to the Report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence (2002)," (Ottawa: October 2002) 11.

¹⁴⁰ Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society*, 18.

¹⁴¹ Prime Minister's Office, "Changes to Government" (December 12, 2003), http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/chgs_to_gov.asp (accessed October 24, 2004).

¹⁴² Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society*, 19.

- A National Security Committee made up of Parliamentarians, the structure, role, and responsibilities, powers, and independence of which are still to be determined.

Over the summer of 2004, the Government sought advice from an ad hoc working group of Parliamentarians on how to create the National Security Committee of Parliamentarians, based on a discussion paper it prepared. The working group was made up of members from both chambers of Parliament and from all parties. The group's work has yet to be made public and legislation creating the Parliamentary Intelligence Committee has yet to be tabled. Three members of our Committee were on the working group.

- A cross-cultural roundtable that will give groups the opportunity to dialogue with the government on national security and how it affects diverse populations. It has yet to be established.
- A National Security Advisory Council made up of security experts external to the government. It too is still in the consultation stage.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

The change in the government's position between being satisfied with existing review mechanisms in October 2002 and proposing four new additional bodies just over a year later suggests that the government's initial response was over-optimistic at the very least.

- **Ensure adequate oversight of the RCMP**

The government's commitment to create a mechanism to review the national security functions of the RCMP is a step forward. The Committee will assess the review body when it is proposed, as well as any measures needed to bolster RCMP security capacity, in future reports.

- **Table the Report of the Interim Committee of Parliamentarians on National Security**

The government should release the October 2004 report of the Interim Committee of Parliamentarians on National Security. This Committee made detailed recommendations toward establishing a Parliamentary Intelligence Committee. Releasing the report would increase public debate as to how best to get Parliament involved in enhancing national security.

- **Establish the Parliamentary Intelligence Committee**

The government should follow through on its promise and introduce legislation in Parliament to create a Parliamentary Intelligence Committee.

- **Create the Cross-Cultural Roundtable and the National Security Advisory Council**

Neither a cross-cultural roundtable nor an expert advisory council on national security had been established when this was written, although the government was accepting applications for membership on both before October 2004.¹⁴³ These important advisory bodies should be created without further delay.

¹⁴³ Privy Council Office, “Government of Canada Invites Applications for Advisory Council on National Security,” (September 29, 2004), http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/default.asp?Language=E&Page=PCOsSecretariats&sub=si&doc=20040929_pr_e.htm, (accessed November 2, 2004); Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, “Government of Canada Extends Deadline for Nominations to Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security,” (September 20, 2004), http://www.psepc-sppcc.gc.ca/publications/news/20040920_e.asp, (accessed October 20, 2004).

Problem 13: Coordination Lacking In Coastal Defence

Canada and the United States have long coast lines that abut in the Atlantic, the North Pacific and the Beaufort Sea. Close cooperation between the two countries is needed at each of these junctures.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

In order to improve defence of Canada's territorial waters, the Committee recommended greater cooperation and coordination with U.S. counterparts. (Report: *Defence of North America: A Canadian Responsibility*, September 2002, #3)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The government has reached numerous cooperation agreements with the U.S. government since the Committee's recommendation, on:

- The creation of the military-to-military Bi-national Planning Group to address issues of maritime, land and civil defence coordination and contingency planning;
- The screening of shipping containers by operating joint customs teams at major ports;
- The pre-screening of ships at the port of Montreal before they arrive in the Great Lakes/St. Lawrence Seaway system; and
- Transport Canada and the U.S. Coast Guard have been working closely to coordinate and harmonize the marine security regimes so that Canadian-flagged ships that meet Canadian security requirements can enter U.S. harbours and U.S.-flagged vessels that comply with American requirements can enter Canadian ports.

The government stated in the April 2004 National Security Policy that it is pursuing negotiations on the next phase of the Smart Borders Action Plan with the governments of the U.S. and Mexico;¹⁴⁴

¹⁴⁴ Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society*, 46.

Canada and the U.S. have established Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETS) at 15 geographic regions across the border to jointly investigate cross-border criminal and terrorist activity.¹⁴⁵

Canada and U.S. law enforcement intelligence officers from Integrated Border Enforcement Teams will be co-located at two locations in Canada and two locations in the U.S. to share intelligence on a daily basis. The co-located intelligence centres at the Pacific Corridor and Red River IBETs are operational; those at the Central St. Lawrence Valley and Windsor-Detroit IBETs are expected to be up and running by March 2005.¹⁴⁶

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

- **Keep up momentum of Canada-U.S. cooperation**

The government has done well to date but this challenge will be ongoing. There are a number of projects in this file that require attention. The principle one of which is the renewal of the NORAD Agreement in 2006. The renewed agreement should include a maritime component.

¹⁴⁵ Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, "Backgrounder: Canada - United States Smart Border Declaration And Action Plan," attachment to "McLellan and Ridge Highlight Progress on the Smart Border Action Plan," (October 14, 2004), http://www.psepc-sppcc.gc.ca/publications/news/20041014_e.asp, (November 2, 2004).

¹⁴⁶ Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, "Canada and the United States Strengthen Partnerships to Tackle Cross-Border Crime," (October 22, 2004), <http://www.news.gc.ca/cfmx/CCP/view/en/index.cfm?articleid=104279>, (accessed October 28, 2004).

Problem 14: Allocations of Proceeds of Crime

The government departments and agencies involved in policing and border security cannot sell confiscated items to pay for service upgrades. The funds revert to the Consolidated Revenue Fund.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that goods confiscated by the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) and Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) in conducting their normal duties be auctioned off and the funds raised be reinvested in the upgrading of policing capabilities. (Report: *Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World*, October 2003, #2.10)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The government has not announced any plans to allow CBSA or RCMP the right to auction off the goods they confiscate to raise capital.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

The Committee is cognizant that many of its recommendations carry price tags. The Members believe this recommendation might aid the other side of the ledger.

Problem 15: Canada Too Inward Looking

Canada does not have to reinvent the wheel on every issue. It can learn valuable lessons about maritime and port security by studying the approaches of other countries, such as the U.S. and The Netherlands.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that the Government of Canada commission a report on how other countries are upgrading their maritime security, with particular reference to the use of coast guards and anti-crime and anti-terrorism methodology at sea ports and airports. (Report: *Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Border in the World*, October 2003, #6.4)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The government has not commissioned a study of how other countries are upgrading their maritime security.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

- **Identify best practices abroad and apply them in Canada**

It would cost very little to study the best security ideas being implemented around the world. And the payoff could be huge. Do the study.

CHAPTER 6

Ports

Problem 1: Vulnerable Ports

HIGH PRIORITY

Canada's ports are insecure and the extent of their vulnerability to crime makes them a target for terrorists. The Organized Crime Agency of British Columbia has found that there are 48 members or associates of the Hells Angels working on Vancouver's docks. The Agency's report, quoted in the *Globe and Mail*, "identifies members of East European, Indo-Canadian, Columbian, Mexican [and] triad organized-crime syndicates working on the port." An even greater concern is the so-called 'unholy alliance' between organized crime and terrorist networks.¹⁴⁷

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommends that a public inquiry, under the *Inquiries Act* into significant ports be established as soon as possible, with a mandate that would include:

- a) a major review of overall security at the ports and the development of a national approach to recruiting, training, and the retention of security personnel;
- b) examination of the degree of control that organized crime has over Canadian sea port operations, as well as the relationship between such control and threats to national security;
- c) an assessment of the potential for the use of Canadian ports to further terrorism;

¹⁴⁷ Victor Malarek, "Port Security: Organized Crime Feared Colluding with Terrorists on Waterfront Despite the Lessons of Sept. 11, Canada's Ports Still Wide Open," *The Globe and Mail* (August 31, 2002): A4.

- d) a comprehensive review of the customs, policing and security resources, including the role of private security agencies, which are required at ports;
- e) a review of the effectiveness of customs inspections of vessels and cargo arriving at Canadian ports; and
- f) a review of hiring practices at Canadian ports.

(Report: *Canadian Security and Military Preparedness*, February 2002, #8, The Committee reiterated the need for an inquiry in *Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World*, October 2003, recommendations #4.2)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The government has not created a public inquiry as recommended.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

- **The public needs to know**

Ports are central to Canadians' economic lives. Reform comes slowly at ports – there are so many vested interests resisting change that change becomes difficult. It would be less difficult if the public were given insights into the problems at Canada's ports, which would surely elicit pressure for the necessary reforms to assure appropriate national security.

Problem 2: Organized Crime in Ports

HIGH PRIORITY

The presence of organized crime in Canada's ports and airports leaves Canada's security perimeter vulnerable to both smuggling and terrorist infiltration. The Committee heard in 2002 that an estimated 15% of longshoremen and 36% of checkers at the Port of Montreal have criminal records, that out of a sample of 500 longshoremen at the Port of Halifax, 39% had criminal records, and that 28 out of a sample of 51 workers at the Port of Charlottetown (almost 54%) had criminal records.¹⁴⁸

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended the introduction of a compulsory background screening system at all major ports to assess whether employees or candidates for employment pose a security risk. (Report: *Canadian Security and Military Preparedness*, February 2002, #6)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

On 22 January 2003, Transport Canada announced a \$15.4 million program to tighten access to ports, which was to include RCMP and CSIS background checks on employees working within secure areas.¹⁴⁹ This program affected only a small percentage of workers in ports.

In May 2004, the government announced the \$115 million Marine Security Contribution Program to help marine facility owners and operators to enhance port security to a level comparable to airports and border crossings. The contribution program will come into force of Section 11.1 of the *Marine Transportation Security Act*, which is expected on December 1, 2004.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁸ Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *Canadian Security and Military Preparedness*, (Ottawa: February 2002): 44, 48, 112.

¹⁴⁹ Transport Canada, "News Release No. GC001/03: Government of Canada announces up to \$172.5 million in new marine security projects" (22 January 2003), <http://www.tc.gc.ca/mediaroom/releases/nat/2003/03-gc001.htm> (accessed October 30, 2004).

¹⁵⁰ Transport Canada, "Marine Security Contribution Program," (October 19, 2004), http://www.tc.gc.ca/vigilance/sep/marine_security/contribution/menu.htm, (November 1, 2004).

In a 15 September 2004 speech, Transport Canada Minister Lapierre said that his department was working with labour and industry on a system of mandatory background security checks of marine facility workers who have access to certain restricted areas or who are in designated positions.¹⁵¹ Consultations began in September and Transport Canada hopes to have the new regulations in place by early 2005.¹⁵²

Transport Canada said in September 2004 that it could security clear about 10,000 marine workers annually. These security clearances are called for under the proposed Marine Facilities Restricted Area Access Clearance Program and would include background checks. Since about 30,000 employees are expected to require Transportation Security Clearances, the Department is planning to phase-in the Clearance Program by security clearing some workers in later years.¹⁵³

Transport Canada Minister Jean Lapierre has said that port security in Canada needs to be tightened. "It's clear that Canadian ports cannot remain sieves," he said. "We have to tighten the screw." When asked for clarification, the Minister said he was quoting from the Committee's 2002 report that discussed port security as well as other areas of national security.¹⁵⁴

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

The Committee supports this program. Although Transport Canada's program has not been implemented, the Committee is prepared to give the Department the benefit of the doubt. The Department appears to be doing something similar to the Committee's recommendation.

¹⁵¹ Honourable Jean-C. Lapierre, "Speech at the 3RD Annual U.S. Maritime Security Expo & Conference New York, New York," (September 14, 2004), <http://www.tc.gc.ca/mediaroom/speeches/2004/2004-09-14.htm>, (accessed October 26, 2004).

¹⁵² Julia Kuzeljevich, "Transport Canada begins consultations on marine transport security," Canadian Transportation and Logistics, (September 17, 2004), http://www.ctl.ca/article.asp?catID=561&id=34844&story_id=&issue=&btac=no, (accessed October 30, 2004).

¹⁵³ Transport Canada, "Restricted Areas and Marine Facilities Restricted Area Access Clearance Program (MFRAACP) Implementation at Canadian Ports and Marine Facilities," (September 24, 2004), http://www.tc.gc.ca/vigilance/sep/marine_security/regulatory/mfraacp.htm#MFRAACP%20Implementation%20Strategy, (accessed 10 November 2004).

¹⁵⁴ Sylvain Larocque, "Canadian ports are 'sieves' says Transport Minister Jean Lapierre" *Canadian Press NewsWire* (October 8, 2004), <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdlink?RQT=309&VInst+PROD&VName=PQD&VType=PQD&sid=1&index=17&SrchMode=3&Fmt=3&did=00000714534281&clientId=3485> (accessed November 15, 2004).

- **Security clearances welcome**

The Minister of Transport Canada has made positive steps toward requiring that background checks be conducted on marine facility workers in our ports. The proposal to security clear 10,000 workers annually until the process is complete is welcome. The government appears to be approaching this issue in a responsible manner.

Problem 3: Port Perimeters

The perimeters of Canadian ports are badly protected and this provides opportunities for smuggling and the infiltration of terrorists.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommends a full review of the fencing and entry/exit security systems currently in place at Canada's significant ports to determine their adequacy. This review should consider the introduction of national standards for port security systems. (Report: *Canadian Security and Military Preparedness*, February 2002, #5)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

Transport Canada and local ports conducted fencing reviews as part of a mandatory two-stage International Ship and Port Facility Security Code certification process. Stage Two involved onsite reviews of port facility security plans. Canada began enforcing the ISPS Code on July 1, 2004. About 98% of affected marine facilities in Canada have complied with the ISPS Code.¹⁵⁵

Transport Canada released information on a \$115 million Marine Security Contribution Program in May 2004 to help marine facility owners and operators enhance port security. The contribution program is conditional upon the coming into force of Section 11.1 of the *Marine Transportation Security Act*, which is expected on December 1, 2004.¹⁵⁶

Projects eligible for funding under the Marine Facility Security Contribution Program include:

- surveillance equipment, including cameras and closed-circuit TV systems
- improvements to dockside and perimeter security and access control, such as fencing, gates, signage and lighting

¹⁵⁵ Honourable Jean-C. Lapierre, "Speech at the 3RD Annual U.S. Maritime Security Expo & Conference New York, New York," (September 14, 2004), <http://www.tc.gc.ca/mediaroom/speeches/2004/2004-09-14.htm>, (accessed October 26, 2004).

¹⁵⁶ Transport Canada, "Marine Security Contribution Program," (October 19, 2004), http://www.tc.gc.ca/vigilance/sep/marine_security/contribution/menu.htm, (November 1, 2004).

- command, control and communications equipment, such as portable and vessel-to-shore radios
- infrastructure security protective measures, such as security guards and arrangements with local police departments¹⁵⁷

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

- **Fund these improvements quickly**

Implementing the International Ship and Port Security Code is a real start. The Marine Security Contribution Program is promising. The government is addressing this recommendation. The challenge to the government is to ensure that port facility owners and operators receive the funding they need expeditiously.

Funding available under the Marine Facility Security Contribution Program makes no specific mention of water-borne threats – the emphasis seems to be on protecting the ports from the land sides. All sides are vulnerable to terrorist attacks.

Once the Committee's current work is complete, it may chose to examine whether the International Ship and Port Security Code provides Canadian ports with the security they need.

¹⁵⁷ Transport Canada, "Backgrounder - Marine Security Transport Canada," (May 2004), <http://www.tc.gc.ca/mediaroom/releases/nat/2004/04-gc005ae1.htm>, (accessed November 3, 2004).

Problem 4: Insufficient Police at Ports

From the point of view of security, the devolution of ports and airports to local communities has failed. Security forces at ports and airports are under-manned and ill-prepared to deal with organized crime and terrorism. There is a need for specialized police in unique environments, and ports and airports clearly qualify as unique environments. For example, The Netherlands has about 350 police permanently stationed just in the Port of Rotterdam.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) be designated as the lead police force at all Canadian air and sea ports with adequate funding to combat security breaches caused by the presence of organized crime at those ports. (Report: *Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World*, October 2003, #2.5)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

RCMP National Port Enforcement Teams have been established at Halifax, Montreal, and Vancouver to investigate federal statute offences, such as those involving national security. There are only these three National Port Enforcement Teams and the officers involved are not specialized in port security. At most ports basic security functions, such as access control, are the responsibility of the Port Authorities and police forces of jurisdiction, which provide standard police services / law enforcement at the ports. 158

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

- **Port policing is a national responsibility**

If the federal government recognizes that it needs to supervise security screening at ports, it should also recognize the responsibility to take charge of port policing. This is a national responsibility. From a security point of view, these two processes are joined at the hip.

¹⁵⁸ Royal Canadian Mounted Police, "RCMP Fact Sheets - RCMP National Ports Strategy," (September 7, 2004), http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/factsheets/fact_national_ports_e.htm, (accessed October 29, 2004).

- **RCMP should be in charge**

The RCMP is Canada's national policing organization. Mandating it take charge of policing related to security at ports would bring consistency to purpose, strategy and application across the country.

Currently the RCMP has not been adequately funded to assign a sufficient number of officers to the ports of Halifax, Montreal, and Vancouver. This needs to be rectified and National Port Enforcement Teams should be created and deployed to other Canadian ports.

Problem 5: Inadequate Container Screening

HIGH PRIORITY

Border officials can only inspect a very small percentage of shipping containers. They have not done satisfactory sensitivity testing to ensure optimal inspection levels. Ports have lacked sufficient intelligence and technology to improve the odds that the containers chosen for inspection are the ones most likely to pose a threat.

Of course container inspection is only a small part of a layered approach to marine security – far better to detect problems off Canada’s shores than in ports. Still, dealing with threats once they have landed is better than not dealing with them at all. And not dealing with them in port will not earn us the cooperation of countries to which these containers may be trans-shipped, notably the United States.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that in Canada’s ports, the Canada Border Services Agency:

- A. conduct sensitivity analysis to determine what level of examination of containers will provide effective security; and
- B. receive the funding necessary to equip significant ports and major border crossings with X-Ray machines and other appropriate technology to inspect high-risk containers.

(Report: *Canadian Security and Military Preparedness*, February 2002, #7)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The government has increased the use of inspection equipment including Vehicle and Cargo Inspection Systems (VACIS).¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁹ Other technology investments have included gamma-ray systems, ion mobility spectrometers, and trace detection systems.

In its *2004-05 Report on Plans and Priorities*, the Canada Border Services Agency said it had purchased 11 mobile Vehicle and Cargo Inspection Systems to search for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive threats in cargo.¹⁶⁰ It has also installed 3 Pallet Vehicle and Cargo Inspection Systems – which are self-contained scanning systems that capture images of large pieces of freight – at marine container examination facilities in Burnaby, British Columbia, Montreal, Quebec and Dartmouth, Nova Scotia.¹⁶¹ These systems were fully operational by September 2004.

The Canada Border Services Agency uses a risk management-based approach to determine which containers to call “high risk.”¹⁶² Canada Border Services Agency claims it has the resources to scan and / or inspect all containers it deems “high risk.”¹⁶³ But they do not say how many containers that equates to. Officials in Halifax told the Committee in September 2003 that new technologies, like Vehicle and Cargo Inspection Systems, had allowed them to triple the overall inspection rate in their port. According to the officials, between January and June 2003, 8% of the containers that came through the port (around 9000 containers) were inspected.¹⁶⁴ They also reported that there were “some challenges” with the crane-mounted radiation detection systems then being tested.¹⁶⁵ But in February 2004, Canada Border Services Agency officials reported much lower national inspection numbers. They said national inspection rates were closer to 4%.¹⁶⁶ Canada Border Services Agency President Alain Jolicoeur told the Committee in February 2004

¹⁶⁰ Canada Border Services Agency, *2004-05 Report on Plans and Priorities*, (September 27, 2004), http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/est-pre/20042005/BSA-FEA/BSA-FEAR4501_e.asp, (accessed October 30, 2004).

¹⁶¹ Canada Border Services Agency, “Fact Sheet – Pallet Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System,” (July 2004), <http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/newsroom/factsheets/2004/0727vacis-e.html>, (accessed October 30, 2004).

¹⁶² Graham Flack, *Proceedings of Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Hearing Transcript, February 23, 2004, Issue 1, 37th Parl., 3rd Sess., http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/3/parlbus/commbus/senate/Com-e/defe-e/01evb-e.htm?Language=E&Parl=37&Ses=3&comm_id=76 (accessed October 30, 2004).

¹⁶³ Canada Border Services Agency, Email to researcher, (March 2, 2004).

¹⁶⁴ Robert Russell, *Proceedings of Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Hearing Transcript, September 22, 2003, *Issue 22*, 37th Parl., 2nd, Sess., http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/2/parlbus/commbus/senate/Com-e/defe-e/22evb-e.htm?Language=E&Parl=37&Ses=2&comm_id=76 (accessed October 25, 2004).

¹⁶⁵ Mark Connolly, *Proceedings of Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Hearing Transcript, September 22, 2003, *Issue 22*, 37th Parl., 2nd, Sess., http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/2/parlbus/commbus/senate/Com-e/defe-e/22evb-e.htm?Language=E&Parl=37&Ses=2&comm_id=76 (accessed November 10, 2004).

¹⁶⁶ Canada Border Services Agency, Email to researcher, March 5, 2004. According to CBSA officials, the 4% inspection rate breaks down like this: 1% tailgate, 2% full de-stuff and 1% VACIS screening.

that Canada Border Services Agency was not limited in searching containers by the number of machines it has.¹⁶⁷

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

- **Be straightforward**

The Canadian Border Services Agency needs to give a straightforward accounting of how many containers it searches, by which methods, and at which ports. The Committee believes, and will continue to believe until it is shown otherwise, that the agency's reluctance to provide specifics is less about operational necessity and more about protecting a sub-par system.

- **Expand scanning capacity**

The Committee does not have confidence that the Canadian Border Services Agency has the capacity to search all the containers it should. Installing just 14 Vehicle and Cargo Inspection Systems to deal with approximately 2.5 million containers shipped to Canadian ports every year falls short of reasonable coverage. Most of these containers will have had moments of vulnerability in the international logistics chain. The Canadian Border Services Agency relies heavily on its container-targeting regime to recognize suspicious containers because it does not have the capacity to scan, or open and inspect, anything more than a token percentage of containers.

- **Give Canadians reason to be confident**

The government has not yet demonstrated to the Committee that Canadians should have confidence because it appears that it:

1. Relies heavily on past shipping behaviour and has little margin for identifying unexpected threat characteristics;
2. Allows inspection capacity, not risk analysis, to determine risk tolerance.

¹⁶⁷ Alain Jolicoeur, *Proceedings of Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Hearing Transcript, February 23, 2004, Issue 1, 37th Parl., 3rd Sess., http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/3/parlbus/commbus/senate/Com-e/defe-e/01evb-e.htm?Language=E&Parl=37&Ses=3&comm_id=76 (accessed October 25, 2004).

Canadian Border Services Agency has not provided any acceptable set of criteria, stated in quantifiable terms, for evaluating the adequacy of its container-screening program.

Problem 6: Inadequate Container Supervision

The loading of maritime shipping containers is under-supervised. Canada's economy cannot function properly if people do not have confidence in its container security regime.

A system is needed to monitor the integrity of the contents of containers. Containers are shipped many hundreds of kilometers before reaching port, and the ports are useful chokepoints to check containers entering and leaving the country.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended examination of the Flynn model – in which containers are loaded under secure conditions and provided with monitors to record attempts to tamper with their seals – for improving container security at Canadian ports. (Report: *Canadian Security and Military Preparedness*, February 2002, #9)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

There is no indication that Canadian officials or the Canadian government have considered the Flynn model for enhancing container security.

However, the government has taken some encouraging steps toward practices suggested by the Flynn Model.

The government has implemented the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code, a different port and ship security model.¹⁶⁸ The International Ship and Port Facility Security Code came into effect on 1 July 2004.

The government stated in the April 2004 National Security Policy that it will work with its G8 partners and the World Customs Organization to establish “an integrated container security regime that enhances the level of security of intermodal containers globally.”¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁸ Developed by the International Maritime Organization, the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code is a new internationally recognized standard for maritime security. Many countries, including the U.S. have signed on to the ISPS Code.

¹⁶⁹ Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy*, (Ottawa: April 2004) 40.

The Canadian Border Services Agency's *2004-05 Report on Plans and Priorities* said that Canada "will work with our international partners to identify and implement new technologies, such as electronic seals, global positioning system tracking, and embedded computer chip technology, to signal breaches of the physical integrity of shipping containers whether at a port, or on a truck, ship, or train."¹⁷⁰

In October 2004, the government agreed to Canada's participation in the U.S. Container Security Initiative, where Canada Border Services Agency agents would be deployed to a foreign marine port by April 2005 to search shipping containers bound for North America.¹⁷¹

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

The Committee believes the government needs to undertake a further examination and evaluation of the Flynn model and release its findings publicly.

¹⁷⁰ Canada Border Services Agency, *2004-05 Report on Plans and Priorities*, (September 27, 2004), http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/est-pre/20042005/BSA-FEA/BSA-FEA4501_e.asp, (accessed October 31, 2004).

¹⁷¹ Government of Canada, "McLellan And Ridge Highlight Progress on the Smart Border Action Plan," Ottawa, (October 14, 2004), <http://www.news.gc.ca/cfmx/CCP/view/en/index.cfm?articleid=102759&categoryid=1>, (accessed October 29, 2004).

Problem 7: Fragile Ferries

The vulnerability of cruise ships and ferries to acts of terrorism necessitates vigilance by the government in a fashion similar to what is in place for aircraft.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that all cruise ships, ferries and other vessels approaching Canadian ports be required to provide information on passengers and crew comparable to that provided to immigration officials at Canadian airports under the Advance Passenger Information/Personal Name Record Program. (Report: *Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World*, October 2003, #2.8)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

Government witnesses referred to a “ferry security benchmarking exercise” in 2002. The Committee believes that this refers to Canadian cooperation with U.S. authorities on the tracking of suspicious persons, but it does not appear that the exercise approached anything as comprehensive as airline tracking.¹⁷²

To the Committee’s knowledge, the government has not launched a program to collect detailed information from ferry and cruise ship passengers / crew comparable to its identification program for air passengers.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

- **Recognize that ferries are soft targets**

Canadians expect that security is in place for all modes of transportation, including the screening of cruise ship passengers and crew. There is no reason to restrict passenger scrutiny to aircraft. At the heart of asymmetrical warfare is the concept of attacking where attacks are least expected. Terrorists move from hardened targets to softer targets. Passenger ferries should receive the same attention as passenger aircraft.

¹⁷² Robert Wright, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Hearing Transcript, February 23, 2004, Issue 1, 37th Parl., 3rd Sess., http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/3/parlbus/commbus/senate/Com-e/defe-e/01evb-e.htm?Language=E&Parl=37&Ses=3&comm_id=76, (accessed October 30, 2004).

The February 2004 Abu Sayyaf attack on a large ferry in the Southern Philippines which killed at least 100 people highlights this threat.

The Committee intends to revisit this issue.

CHAPTER 7

Airports

Problem 1: Screening Checked Baggage

All checked baggage is not being comprehensively screened for explosives. Given that terrorists have proven themselves willing to commit suicide in order to achieve their goals, more rigorous inspection of checked baggage is required.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATIONS

The Committee recommended that equipment be installed at airports to be designated by Transport Canada to ensure that all baggage and passengers are screened for weapons and explosives and that, as reliable equipment capable of detecting the presence of chemical or biological or bacteriological agents becomes available, it also be installed. (Report: *Canadian Security and Military Preparedness*, February 2002, #12)

The Committee recommended that CATSA should implement full multi-layer screening (vapour detection supplemented by x-rays and other kinds of searches) of all checked baggage, mailbags and cargo by January 1, 2004. (Report: *The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports*, January 2003, # III.2)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

Checked Baggage

The Canadian Air Transport Security Authority's goal is to screen all checked baggage by the end of December 2005.¹⁷³ According to its Director of Operations, the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority currently screens all baggage once every three days. It claims to be "well on the way" to meeting its objective.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷³ Canadian Air Transport Security Authority, Annual Report 2002-2003, 31.

¹⁷⁴ Mark Duncan, "Focus on Security Operations — Summaries of Presentations," (July 13, 2004), <http://www.tc.gc.ca/CivilAviation/SystemSafety/CAESN/Apr2004/security/duncan.htm>, (accessed October 31, 2004).

According to the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority, Explosives Detection Systems have been deployed to most of Canada's largest 89 airports (which handle 99% of Canadian air passenger traffic).¹⁷⁵

The Canadian Air Transport Security Authority would not specify how many airports do not have Explosives Detection Systems for checked baggage screening. The reason given was that disclosure of that information would be detrimental to air transport security.¹⁷⁶

Air Mail and Cargo

Transport Canada has yet to demonstrate to the Committee that cargo and mail is being checked at all.

The Chairman of the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority's Board of Directors said in November 2003 that CATSA "handles the screening of checked baggage while the airlines are responsible for cargo."¹⁷⁷ This appears to still be the case for air mail as well.

Transport Canada has stated, in its *2004-2005 Report on Plans and Priorities*, that it has initiated "a policy review of air cargo and airmail security assess vulnerabilities, threat and risk levels, industry best practices, training, and the harmonization of Canada's approach with that taken by its trading partners."¹⁷⁸ And the government stated, in its April 2004 National Security Policy, that it "will identify strategies to enhance the security of air cargo."¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁵ Explosives Detection Systems generally comprise several components, including x-rays that identify baggage contents, and can screen both carry-on and checked baggage. Canadian Air Transport Security Authority, "CATSA Purchases Advanced Explosives Detection Systems and Security Equipment for Use at Canadian Airports," (June 17, 2002), http://www.cats-acsta.gc.ca/english/media/rel_comm/2002-06-17.htm, (accessed November 3, 2004).

¹⁷⁶ Canadian Air Transport Security Authority, E-mail message to researcher, (November 12, 2004).

¹⁷⁷ Brian Flemming, "Remarks to AVSEC World: Canada's Unique Approach to Air Transport Security: Integrating People and Technology," (November 19, 2003), http://www.catsa-acsta.gc.ca/english/media/speech_discours/2003-11-19.htm, (accessed November 3, 2004).

¹⁷⁸ Transport Canada, *Report on Plans and Priorities 2004-2005* (Ottawa: 2004) 40, http://www.tc.gc.ca/Finance/rpp/04-05/en/RPP_2004_05_Eng.pdf, accessed November 4, 2004).

¹⁷⁹ Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society*, 38.

Passengers and Cabin Baggage (Pre-Board Screening)

All passengers at designated airports are screened for weapons in pre-board screening. The Canadian Air Transport Security Authority installed improved X-Ray technology and explosives detection equipment at all pre-board passenger screening stations by the end of December 2003.¹⁸⁰

In October 2004, Transport Canada and the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority announced they will introduce new document screening equipment that will test for traces of explosives on passenger documentation such as boarding passes. Operational trials began in Ottawa later that month.¹⁸¹

Chemical, Biological, and Bacteriological Threats

In June 2004, the head of the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority acknowledged the growing threat posed by chemical, biological and bacteriological agents.¹⁸² It is unclear whether Transport Canada or the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority has made progress in confronting this threat.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

- **Give the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority the task of screening the mail and air cargo**

Mail and cargo screening needs to be tightened to the same standards as pre-board and checked baggage screening. Leaving this vulnerable defeats the logic of searching hand and passenger baggage. Responsibility for this process must be clarified and given to the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority.

¹⁸⁰ Canadian Air Transport Security Authority, *Working Together – Annual Report 2004*, (2004), http://www.catsa-acsta.gc.ca/english/about_propos/rep_rap/pdf/2004.pdf, (accessed November 3, 2004).

¹⁸¹ Transport Canada, “News Release No. H058/04 – Biometrics to be used at Canadian Airports – Launch of Two Enhanced Security Projects,” (15 October 2004), <http://www.tc.gc.ca/mediaroom/releases/nat/2004/04-h058e.htm> (Accessed: 10 November 2004).

¹⁸² Jacques Duchesneau, “Aviation Report Overview - International Association of Seaport and Airport Police,” (June 21, 2004), http://www.catsa-acsta.gc.ca/english/media/speech_discours/2004-06-21.htm, (November 3, 2004).

- **Accelerate progress on checked baggage screening**

The Canadian Air Transport Security Authority has made progress towards screening all checked baggage. Yet it will still be at least a year before all checked baggage that goes on an aircraft is screened for explosives.

- **Turn words into programs**

Canadian Air Transport Security Authority CEO Jacques Duchesneau's comments were a positive acknowledgement of the problem. It is now up to Transport Canada and the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority to design and introduce programs to reduce threats posed by chemical, biological and bacteriological agents.

Problem 2: Inadequate Background Checks

Background checks of airport employees who receive passes into restricted areas have been too cursory and infrequent to prevent criminality in airports.

The Auditor General's March 2004 report echoed the Committee's concern about the amount of criminality at airports. According to the report, approximately 3.5 percent of employees at the five airports examined had criminal records, and about 5.5 per cent of clearance holders hired between January 2001 and May 2003 had criminal records.¹⁸³

The checks currently being conducted have limitations. According to the Auditor General's report, the RCMP "provides only information on whether a person has been charged or convicted of a criminal offence—information that does not identify for Transport Canada whether a person has associations with organized crime or is a refugee claimant."¹⁸⁴

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATIONS

The Committee recommended that more rigorous security and police checks be undertaken for all prospective pass recipients. (Report: *Canadian Security and Military Preparedness*, February 2002, # 11.C)

The Committee recommended that the current 5-point background check for restricted area passes – Canada Police Information Centre (for criminal record), CSIS (for potential security threats), and Transport Canada (domicile, employment background and credit records) – should be conducted every three years, replacing the current schedule of every five years. (Report: *The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports*, January 2003, # IV.5)

¹⁸³ The report stated that the trend is of concern. Auditor General of Canada, "Chapter 3 — National Security in Canada — The 2001 Anti-Terrorism Initiative," *2004 Report of the Auditor General of Canada*, (March 30, 2004) paras. 3.144, 3.150, <http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html/20040303ce.html>, (accessed November 12, 2004).

¹⁸⁴ Auditor General of Canada, "Chapter 3 - National Security in Canada - The 2001 Anti-Terrorism Initiative," *2004 Report of the Auditor General of Canada*, (March 31, 2004), <http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html/20040303ce.html>, (accessed November 13, 2004) 3.140.

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

David Collenette, then Minister of Transport Canada, wrote to the Committee in December 2003 that background checks are conducted every five years and that this practice is “aligned with time periods used for granting security clearances to federal employees, including employees in departments that deal with sensitive national security matters.”¹⁸⁵

The government announced in its April 2004 National Security Policy that improvements to background checks are planned. According to the policy, “the Government is moving to screen individuals for links to organized crime and other criminal associations.”¹⁸⁶ No announcements following up on the pledge have been made by Transport Canada since the release of the policy.

In October 2004, Transport Canada stated that airport employees will, “continue to be subject to ... background security checks” as part of the restricted areas pass issuing process.¹⁸⁷ It is unclear to the Committee whether those checks are the same limited checks criticized by the Auditor General or whether they represent something new.

If they do not represent anything new, then they are not nearly as comprehensive as the full field investigations conducted to provide government officials with security clearances.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

- **Act on the pledge**

The Committee supports the government’s pledge to strengthen background checks by looking for links to criminal associations and organized crime. The government must now deliver a program that puts a more rigorous checking regime in place.

¹⁸⁵ Honourable David Collenette, Letter to Senator Colin Kenny, December 11, 2003.

¹⁸⁶ Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy* (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2004), 36.

¹⁸⁷ Transport Canada, “Backgrounder - Launch of Two Enhanced Security Projects,” attached to “Biometrics to be used at Canadian Airports - Launch of Two Enhanced Security Projects,” (October 15, 2004), <http://www.tc.gc.ca/mediaroom/releases/nat/2004/04-h058e.htm>, (accessed November 3, 2004).

- **Address the issue of frequency**

The government must increase the frequency of the background checks. The government needs to address this problem because much can change with an individual over 5 years.

Problem 3: No Leadership on Airside Passes

Canada needs a national system of electronic passes for ground crew and aircrew that is cancellable, incorporates biometrics, and can prevent access to restricted zones beyond the employee's workplace.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATIONS

The Committee recommended that a nation-wide system of electronic identification (smart passes) be introduced to control the movement through high-risk security areas. (Report: *Canadian Security and Military Preparedness*, February 2002, #11.A)

The Committee recommended that a review be conducted of the entry and exit control systems that monitor the movement within secure areas of terminals and airport perimeters. (Report: *Canadian Security and Military Preparedness*, February 2002, #11.B)

The Committee recommended that CATSA issue national passes for aircrew and all other persons who fall more naturally under a national – rather than a regional – jurisdiction. If local airport authorities are permitted to continue to issue passes allowing access to restricted areas at their airports, these local passes should be:

- of national, uniform design, based on national configurations defined by the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority;
- cancellable by Canadian Air Transport Security Authority; and
- validated through Canadian Air Transport Security Authority's national database.

All Canadian airports should, by 31 December 2003, introduce new electronic airside access passes containing biometric identifiers, that:

- are encoded to prevent access to zones beyond any employee's work area;
- expire automatically after three years; and
- can be deactivated by a central control mechanism at any time.

The Committee recommended that CATSA be the issuing authority for passes for all employees, contract workers, other personnel and vehicles that operate airside. (Report: *The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports*, January 2003, # IV.1, # IV.2, # IV.3)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The Canadian Air Transport Security Authority was assigned responsibility for the implementation of an enhanced restricted area pass system for Canadian airports November 2002. Its mandate was essentially to improve the existing system for the management of the restricted area passes.

The Canadian Air Transport Security Authority is in the process of deploying a new system for managing access to restricted areas based on what it calls Restricted Area Identification Cards. The project will use biometrics technology (fingerprint and iris scanners) to support the issuing, verification, cancellation, and tracking of the cards. Doors giving access to restricted airport areas will have biometric smartcard readers installed that can recognize fingerprint and iris information.¹⁸⁸

The first operational trials began in August 2004 at the Vancouver and Kelowna airports. According to Transport Canada and the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority, they will expand to Montreal and Charlottetown shortly.¹⁸⁹

The Canadian Air Transport Security Authority will distribute the Restricted Area Identification Cards at Canada's 29 largest airports over the next several months.¹⁹⁰

The new system is limited in that it provides only a single layer of security for restricted areas...

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

While the Committee's deadline for action has not been met, the move to implement the Restricted Area Identification Card system appears to be a sign of progress. The Committee will monitor the implementation of the program. The following significant concerns remain:

¹⁸⁸ Transport Canada, "Backgrounder – Launch of Two Enhanced Security Projects," attached to "Biometrics to be Used at Canadian Airports – Launch of Two Enhanced Security Projects," (October 15, 2004), <http://www.tc.gc.ca/mediaroom/releases/nat/2004/04-h058e.htm>, (accessed November 3, 2004).

¹⁸⁹ Transport Canada, "Backgrounder – Launch of Two Enhanced Security Projects," attached to "Biometrics to be Used at Canadian Airports – Launch of Two Enhanced Security Projects," (October 15, 2004), <http://www.tc.gc.ca/mediaroom/releases/nat/2004/04-h058e.htm>, (accessed November 3, 2004).

¹⁹⁰ Transport Canada, "Launch of Two Enhanced Security Projects," backgrounder to "Biometrics to be Used at Canadian Airports – Launch of Two Enhanced Security Projects," (October 15, 2004), <http://www.tc.gc.ca/mediaroom/releases/nat/2004/04-h058e.htm>, (accessed November 18, 2004).

- **The Canadian Air Transport Security Authority must be the issuing authority for Restricted Area Identification Cards nationwide**

The government needs to assign operational control of the **Restricted Area Identification Cards** to the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority to ensure the program's standardized implementation. The new appropriate hierarchy for assigning authority at airports puts security first, not profits. If local airport authorities are allowed to retain control over issuing passes, the Committee is concerned that the interest of airport stakeholders could well trump security concerns.

- **Restrict access by zones**

One of the weaknesses of the Restricted Area Pass system is that once people access a restricted area, they are relatively free to roam within it. Also, because the passes are not linked to an employee's work schedule, they have access to restricted areas at any time, day or night. Technology exists that would allow the validity of a pass to be limited to certain areas of an airport at certain times. This is important because the Committee has taken evidence that some employees have used their passes to smuggle contraband after working hours.

Transport Canada should require the introduction of this technology as part of the next set of improvements to the Restricted Area Pass system.

Problem 4: Unprepared Air Crews

The September 2001 attacks dramatically altered the aircraft hijacking paradigm. The attacks demonstrated that significant numbers of hijackers were willing to commit suicide in the course of taking over an aircraft.

Canadians depend on flight crews to alert them to problems and to help protect them from dangers. However, three years after the September 11, 2001 attacks, these personnel had not received a significant upgrade to their anti-terrorist training.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that by 31 March 2003, Transport Canada finalize and issue training standards programs to equip cabin crews to deal with terrorists and/or terrorist materials. All flight crews would complete training by 30 September 2003. (Report: *The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports*, January 2003, # I.1)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

It took Transport Canada more than two years to develop new security guidance material and it was another year before that material was formally adopted.

Transport Canada updated security guidance material for flight crew member training in the fall of 2003. The guidance material described new procedures and training requirements for flight crew members to deal with, among other things, hijackers and chemical / biological threats, and the presence of aircraft protective officers on board the aircraft.¹⁹¹

The guidance material was formally adopted in late February 2004. Air carriers have until February 2005 to implement their training programs.¹⁹²

¹⁹¹ Transport Canada, "Transport Minister Announces Updated Standards for Training of Flight Crews," (February 24, 2004), <http://www.tc.gc.ca/mediaroom/releases/nat/2004/04-h005e.htm>, (November 4, 2004).

¹⁹² Transport Canada, "Aircraft Security Operations Working Group Recommendations: Status Report 2004-05-31," (July 20, 2004), <http://tc.gc.ca/CivilAviation/International/WGRec.htm> (November 18, 2004).

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

- **Put professionals in charge**

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police, not Transport Canada, should be responsible for setting security policy at airports.

Problem 5: Armed Pilots?

U.S. legislation subsequent to 9/11 granted pilots the right to carry guns, sparking a debate in Canada as to the best way to defend pilots against hijackers.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that Canadian pilots should not be armed. (Report: *The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports*, January 2003, # II.4)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

There are no plans to arm pilots.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

The government is doing the right thing. It should continue along this course.

Problem 6: Alerting Air Crews

Not all aircrew members are informed when an undercover armed law enforcement official (Aircraft Protection Officer) is on board.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that all flight crew should be informed when an Aircraft Protective Officer (APO) is on board. (*Report: The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports*, January 2003, # II.1)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

According to Transport Canada, the air carrier, pilot-in-command and lead flight attendant ("the in charge") are always advised that RCMP officers will be on board. It is up to the air carrier's internal procedures to delineate whether this information will be disclosed to other crewmembers. According to Transport Canada, "the point of this provision is that the airline has some discretion."¹⁹³

A representative of the Canadian Union of Public Employees informed the Committee that it is policy at Air Canada and Air Transat to inform all flight crew members whenever an APO is on board.¹⁹⁴

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

- **Require pre-brief for whole flight crew**

All crew members need to know if an Aircraft Protection Officer is on board, and there should be a pre-flight briefing of the crew on what to do in the event of an emergency.

The Committee does not believe that such a briefing would risk exposing the Aircraft Protection Officer. The flight crew and flight attendant in charge need to work as a team with regard to security just as they work as a team to provide comfort and safety.

¹⁹³ Transport Canada, E-mail message to researcher, May 3, 2004.

¹⁹⁴ Canadian Union of Public Employees, Fax to researcher, (November 23, 2004).

Problem 7: Role of Aircraft Protection Officers

Aircraft Protection Officers are instructed to remain in their seats except when an attempt is made to take control of the aircraft. The Committee was concerned that it was inappropriate for an armed law enforcement official not to react in the event that a passenger or crew member is physically attacked.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that the RCMP should instruct Aircraft Protection Officers to be prepared to intervene in violent disruptions in passenger cabins, and certainly to be prepared to intervene if crew or passengers' lives are clearly in danger, and not necessarily to restrain themselves until the very moment that any assault is launched on the cockpit. (Report: *The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports*, January 2003, # II.3)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

According to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Aircraft Protection Officers are trained and will respond according to threats of death or grievous bodily harm onboard an aircraft.¹⁹⁵

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

Challenge met. This only makes sense. These trained officers are intelligent enough to get involved only when it appears that lives are at stake.

¹⁹⁵ Royal Canadian Mounted Police, E-mail to researcher, March 3, 2004.

Problem 8: Vulnerable Cockpit Doors

Double cockpit doors offer one of the best means of preventing cockpit intrusions such as those that occurred on 11 September 2001. Pilots often leave the cockpit during flights. With a traditional door system, they make themselves and the aircraft vulnerable every time they do. Effective and inexpensive double-door systems are available and would reduce the risk. It is possible that, if double-doors were installed on Canadian aircraft, the need for Aircraft Protection Officers might be decreased except for mandated U.S. flights.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that by 30 June 2003 Transport Canada require design completion of a double door system or systems to protect cockpits, and order air carriers to complete the installation of such systems by 31 December 31 2004. (Report: *The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports*, January 2003, # II.2)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The government is still studying the matter of double doors.¹⁹⁶ It has thus far not moved beyond requiring the fortification of cockpits through the installation of reinforced cockpit doors.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

- **Install double cockpit doors on all aircraft that can accommodate them**

Double cockpit doors would allow pilots to go to the galley and the washroom without creating a vulnerability aboard the aircraft.

¹⁹⁶ Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society*, 36.

Problem 9: Security Training for Maintenance Workers

Maintenance employees working on the airside at airports have not received significant upgrades in security training to identify threats since the September 11th, 2001 attacks. These employees perform key functions all around the aircraft and have access to all its vital areas. With additional training, maintenance workers could become a greater asset to the airport security system.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that by 30 September 2003 Transport Canada ensure that all Canadian passenger airlines are providing training courses to maintenance personnel and other personnel working in proximity to aircraft to help them identify potentially dangerous situations and materials. (Report: *The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports*, January 2003, # I.3)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

There is no indication that the government has finalized new guidance material for the enhanced security training of maintenance and other groundside workers.

On 11 December 2003, then Transport Minister David Collenette wrote to the Committee that the Department's Civil Aviation and Security directorates have "begun an examination of security training requirements and guidance material for other groups of employees, such as ticket agents and maintenance workers, based on preliminary feedback received from industry stakeholders."¹⁹⁷

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

Transport Canada is taking far too long to implement this recommendation.

¹⁹⁷ Honourable David Collenette, "Letter to Senator Colin Kenny" (December 11, 2003).

Problem 10: Responsibility for Airport Security Needs Clarifying – Who’s in Charge?

Given the security threats of the 21st century, it is imperative that the government claw back some of the responsibility for airports that it devolved to local authorities in the 1990s. Responsibilities at Canadian airports are far too diffused. Sam Landry, a Royal Canadian Mounted Police Inspector detailed to Lester B. Pearson Airport in Toronto, testified that there were 82 departments or agencies of government that had enforcement or regulatory responsibilities at Pearson.¹⁹⁸

Too much responsibility is being shared between Transport Canada (the aviation security regulatory authority), the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority (the agency that implements air security programs), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (which enforces federal statutes everywhere and provides policing services in three airports¹⁹⁹), and local Airport Authorities (which operate individual airports).

Testimony before the Committee made it clear that responsibility for airport security rests in too many places for it to be managed effectively.

Air security demands a more focused approach.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATIONS

The Committee recommended that a federal agency be created to take responsibility for selection, training, and supervision of persons and systems responsible for passenger and baggage screening at airports, and that this agency report to the RCMP. (Report: *Canadian Security and Military Preparedness*, February 2002, #13)

The Committee also recommended that the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority should be responsible for the design and delivery of all mechanisms and training to assure air travel security, including the management and security

¹⁹⁸ Sam Landry, Hearing Transcript, June 24, 2002, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Issue 18, 37th Parl., 1st Sess. http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/Com-e/defe-e/18evd-e.htm?Language=E&Parl=37&Ses=1&comm_id=76 (accessed: 10 November 2004).

¹⁹⁹ The Royal Canadian Mounted Police is the police force of jurisdiction at the Halifax, Edmonton and Vancouver airports.

screening of the restricted areas of the airport and the security screening of all persons and things boarding aircraft in Canada. (Report: *The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports*, January 2003, # VIII.2)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

Both recommendations remain unfulfilled.

The Canadian Air Transport Security Authority came into being in 2002 and is mandated to perform pre-board screening of passengers and their belongings and checked baggage screening. However, it reports to Transport Canada. It does not report to the RCMP.

Roles with respect to aviation security have not changed dramatically since the Committee made its recommendations in January 2003. The **Canadian Air Transport Security Authority** is the delivery agency for most aviation security programs. It conducts pre-board screening of passengers and baggage (not including air cargo and air mail); manages programs to monitor and limit access to restricted areas; funds the Aircraft Protective Officers program; and contributes funds to local airport authorities for contracts with local police. **Transport Canada** sets the rules by which it administers those programs. **Local airport authorities**, in most cases, contract with local police forces for airport policing functions.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

- **Change who the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority reports to**

The Canadian Air Transport Security Authority should report to Parliament through the Deputy Prime Minister and be under the operational control of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Such a move would foster the security-based culture that is emerging at the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority and provide for a more effective working relationship between the two organizations.

- **Make the RCMP responsible for aviation security**

Transport Canada needs to get out of the security field entirely and focus on other areas in which it has competence.

Problem 11: Known Shipper Makes Aircraft Insecure

HIGH PRIORITY

Rigorous screening of all cargo passing through Canadian airports is the only way to assure the optimal security for passengers and crews. The Committee has recommended full screening. However, until full screening is implemented, the government should discontinue its program designating certain shippers as “safe” shippers, who can get parcels onto aircraft quickly without screening. There is no such thing as a safe shipper, particularly when requirements that these designated shippers screen their staff and customers are virtually non-existent.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that the practice of offering blanket security shortcuts for “known shippers” should be discontinued. The Committee encourages the development of a protocol for shippers based on proven capacity to assure security, similar to the one currently being introduced under the Smart Borders arrangement with the United States. (Report: *The Myth of Security at Canada’s Airports*, January 2003, # III.3)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

It is unclear whether the “known shipper” shortcut has been discontinued. Little progress appears to have been made on improving air cargo security.

The Government stated, in its April 2004 National Security Policy, that it “will identify strategies to enhance the security of air cargo.”²⁰⁰ It stated those strategies would be based on, among other factors, the voluntary Partners in Protection program for identifying trusted shippers.

In December 2003, then Transport Minister David Collenette wrote to the Committee in response to a question about progress on this recommendation that his department had “initiated a comprehensive review of air cargo and airmail

²⁰⁰ Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society*, 38.

security to consider possible enhancements.”²⁰¹ One year later, that review has not been completed. Transport Canada stated in its *2004-2005 Report on Plans and Priorities* that it has initiated “a policy review of air cargo and airmail security access vulnerabilities, threat and risk levels, industry best practices, training, and the harmonization of Canada’s approach with that taken by its trading partners.”²⁰²

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

- **Stop reviewing air cargo security and take action.**

Almost two years after the Committee’s recommendation, the government is still studying the issue of airmail and cargo security. By the time the April 2004 national security policy came out, it had been under study for six months. At what point does “comprehensive review” become a synonym for “inaction”?

- **Detail strategies for cargo security**

The government’s acknowledgement of air cargo security as an issue is a step forward, but only a small one. The Committee will examine the government’s proposals when it realizes a more detailed framework for enhancing air cargo.

The limited information available in the National Security Policy suggests however that if the government plans to introduce a program based solely on voluntary buy-in and best practices. If so, there will still be more work to be done.

²⁰¹ Honourable David Collonette, Letter to Senator Colin Kenny, December 11, 2003.

²⁰² Transport Canada, *Report on Plans and Priorities 2004-2005* (Ottawa: 2004) 40, http://www.tc.gc.ca/Finance/rpp/04-05/en/RPP_2004_05_Eng.pdf, (accessed November 4, 2004).

Problem 12: Lack of Security at Fixed-Base Operations

HIGH PRIORITY

Fixed-Base Operations – essentially private airfields attached to major airports for the use of charter aircraft, executive jets and pleasure aircraft – are subject to almost no scrutiny. Fixed-Base Operations need to be screened by the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority because a large private or charter aircraft could be used as a missile and cause massive damage and loss of life.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that Transport Canada require that private aircraft departing airports under the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority's supervision should not leave until aircraft, passengers and their baggage have been screened. Private aircraft departing from any air facility not supervised by CATSA should be searched on arrival, whether they arrive from private airfields in Canada or any locations in foreign countries in order to ensure the integrity of security at Canadian airports. (Report: *The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports*, January 2003, # V.1)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The government's response is revealed in this February 2004 hearing excerpt involving Senator Colin Kenny (Committee Chair), Gerry Frappier (Director General, Security and Emergency Preparedness, Transport Canada) and Marc Grégoire (Assistant Deputy Minister, Safety and Security Group, Transport Canada):

The Chairman: Yes. We have had requests from fixed-base operators that there be security there. You can get on any charter plane at a base without going through any of the CATSA procedures... We do not see much change in the testimony year to year from your department.

Mr. Frappier: As you mentioned, and I agree 100 per cent, there is no screening by CATSA. of charter operations and private aircraft at the FBOs [fixed-based operations].

The Chairman: These are big planes.

Mr. Frappier: Yes, these are big planes.

The Chairman: If they flew into a building, the same kind of damage could be done that we saw happen to the twin towers.

Mr. Frappier: I would not disagree with that.

The Chairman: We are not doing anything about it. Correct?

Mr. Frappier: Right now, we have some awareness programs for the management of FBOs. We have placed a greater emphasis on checking for the appropriate identification of pilots. If you are asking us whether there is a federal screening program associated with it, no, there is not.

The Chairman: We are describing a huge hole, a part of the airport from which people can take off and do all kinds of damage. Yet you are sitting there in front of our Committee saying that everything is fine. It is not fine. You have a problem.

Mr. Grégoire: We are not saying that everything is fine.

The Chairman: You are not saying that you have a program to fix it.

Mr. Grégoire: We do not have a program to fix it. That is what we are saying. However, we are addressing the matter of our program. We are developing our program based on a risk approach. We do not feel this is where the risk is highest at this time.²⁰³

²⁰³ Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *Issue 2*, 3rd Sess., 37th Parl., (February 25, 2004), http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/3/parlbus/commbus/senate/Com-e/defe-e/02eva-e.htm?Language=E&Parl=37&Ses=3&comm_id=76, (accessed November 6, 2004).

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

- **Design and implement a screening program for all fixed-based operations**

Fixed-Base Operations on the periphery of airport terminals present the same danger as passenger and cargo terminal operations. As such, they should be a higher government priority than the government has made them. That Transport Canada has not moved to address security fixed-based operations is completely unacceptable given the current security environment.

Problem 13: Small Airports are Weak Links in the Aviation Security

Air cargo originating from less secure local airports is not checked upon arrival at any of the 89 Designated Airports under the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority's responsibility. Canada has 1,419 airfields or airports in total. Cargo from these flights needs to be screened upon arrival at designated airports because dangerous goods could be transported to the airport undetected and used there or in the city served by the Designated Airport.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

People, cargo and aircraft coming from small airports without sophisticated screening systems should receive a full screening when they arrive at a Designated Airport under the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority's jurisdiction. (Report: *The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports*, January 2003, # III.4)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

Transport Canada has reported to the Committee that "passengers arriving at designated airports from non-designated airports must be screened prior to boarding flights destined for another designated airport or a foreign location. Air carriers are required to apply established cargo security requirements to these flights, such as safeguarding of cargo, training for persons accepting it for transport, searching of cargo in certain circumstances, provision and verification of associated documentation and conditions under which it may be accepted."²⁰⁴

Passengers and cargo that arrive at Designated Airports from non-Designated Airports and who then leave the airport area are not screened.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

The Committee notes that useful procedures have been put in place to screen passengers arriving at Designated Airports from small airports. In this sense, the challenge has been largely met.

²⁰⁴ Transport Canada, E-mailmessage to researcher, March 12, 2004.

- **Address cargo security**

Relying on established cargo security requirements is insufficient considering the state of cargo security generally (see Chapter 7, Problem 16). Transport Canada must address the issue of cargo transferred into designated airports from smaller airports.

Problem 14: Access to Restricted Areas

Restricted areas of airports are vulnerable and can be exploited by criminals and terrorists. Restricted areas offer access to passenger baggage and air cargo, to critical equipment, and to the cabins and holds of aircraft. Hundreds of people – and in some airports thousands – work in and around restricted areas. The Committee found these people could enter and leave at will without being searched.

The Committee received testimony about how organized criminal groups have penetrated the Lester B. Pearson airport to further their activities.²⁰⁵

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority be responsible for assuring that all persons and vehicles are physically searched on entry to restricted areas at Canada's airports. Persons and vehicles leaving these areas should be searched on a random basis, with provision for more extensive exit searches whenever extraordinary threats are perceived. (Report: *The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports*, January 2003, # IV.4)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The government announced the Non-Passenger Screening program in February 2004. The program will not be fully implemented until 2005. It consists of random, irregular, spot checks at entry points to, and different locations within, restricted areas.²⁰⁶

Transport Canada, the department that set the regulations which constrain the scope of the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority's program, has yet to demonstrate that this non-passenger screening will be effective.

²⁰⁵ Sam Landry, Hearing Transcript, June 24, 2002, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Issue 18, 37th Parl., 1st Sess., http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/Com-e/defe-e/18evd-e.htm?Language=E&Parl=37&Ses=1&comm_id=76, (accessed November 8, 2004).

²⁰⁶ Transport Canada, "Government of Canada Implements New Airport Screening Program," *News Release*, (February 16, 2004), <http://www.tc.gc.ca/mediaroom/releases/nat/2004/04-h004e.htm>, (accessed November 6, 2004).

The Committee tried to clarify its questions with Marc Grégoire, Assistant Deputy Minister of Safety and Security Group at Transport Canada, in February 2004, and as the following testimony excerpt demonstrates, the results were less than satisfactory:

Sen. Cordy: When we talk about random searches, how often is ‘random’?

Mr. Grégoire: Random is as often as required. We can crank it up to 100 per cent, if we think it is necessary for specific reasons or threats. We would have the capacity to raise it to 100 per cent.

Sen. Kenny: “...On the matter of ‘random,’ the Committee feels great scepticism when you say that you can move it up to 100 per cent. Simply put, I find it difficult to believe that you have the capacity to search 100 per cent of the airside workers at Pearson on any given day. Pick a day when you could search 100 per cent of the workers and vehicles, and we will come down to see it happen. Until we see it happen, we simply do not believe that that is a possibility. We do not think you have the capability to do it, and we do not understand why you come before us and suggest that ‘random’ means you can go up to 100 per cent.”²⁰⁷

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

- **Make non-passenger screening mandatory upon *entry* to a restricted area**

The current system has more public relations than security value. Transport Canada has not demonstrated that the random checks will take place frequently, with sufficient unpredictability, and with enough personnel to test whole airports. Employees have found ways to avoid the few random spot checks in the past, for instance some have alerted co-workers via cellular telephones. Terrorists could too.

²⁰⁷ Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *Issue 2*, 3rd Sess., 37th Parl., (February 25, 2004), http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/3/parlbus/commbus/senate/Com-e/defe-e/02eva-e.htm?Language=E&Parl=37&Ses=3&comm_id=76, (accessed November 6, 2004).

- **Institute random non-passenger screening upon *exit* from a restricted area**

Screening of non-passengers should also take place on a random basis upon exit from restricted areas.

The Committee recognizes the inconsistency in recommending mandatory inspections entering and only random inspections exiting. However, the issue on entry is one of national security, preventing terrorists from getting themselves, or damaging materials, onto aircraft. The issue on exit is primarily one of crime, preventing airport workers from taking advantage of access to restricted areas to smuggle contraband.

Problem 15: Airmail and Cargo Goes Unchecked

HIGH PRIORITY

Mail that travels on passenger planes from Canadian airports is not being inspected.

Canada Post ships approximately 15% of the mail it carries everyday by air (approximately 2.5 million pieces), mostly on passenger planes. Its employees are on the lookout for suspicious parcels but do not scan any of them.²⁰⁸

Airlines, Transport Canada and the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority do not scan mail either.²⁰⁹

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATIONS

The Committee recommended that the movement of mail and parcels at airports be reviewed to ensure adequate security inspection. (Report: *Canadian Security and Military Preparedness*, February 2002, #14).

Dedicated and trained personnel should immediately begin carrying out random and targeted screening of all checked baggage, parcels, mailbags, and cargo. (Report: *The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports*, January 2003, # III.1)

²⁰⁸ Bob Stiff, Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Issue 20, 37th Parl., 1st Sess., (August 20, 2002), http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/Com-e/def-e.htm?Language=E&Parl=37&Ses=1&comm_id=76, (Accessed November 17, 2004). In September 2004, an official from Canada Post told *Global News National* that it does not scan packages and depends on employees to notice if a package looks unusual. Graham Richardson, "Security at Canada's Airports," *Global National*, transcript (broadcast date: September 24, 2004).

²⁰⁹ It should be noted that screening inbound international mail is under the jurisdiction of the Canada Border Services Agency.

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

Checked Baggage

The Canadian Air Transport Security Authority's goal is to screen all checked baggage by the end of December 2005.²¹⁰ According to its Director of Operations, the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority currently screens all baggage once every three days. It claims to be "well on the way" to meeting its objective.²¹¹

Air Mail and Cargo

Transport Canada has yet to demonstrate to the Committee that the cargo and mail is being checked at all.

William Elliott, then the Assistant Deputy Minister, Safety and Security Group at Transport Canada, testified in May 2003, that "generally speaking there is not widespread searching of cargo except for cause."²¹²

The Chairman of the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority's Board of Directors said in November 2003 that CATSA "handles the screening of checked baggage while the airlines are responsible for cargo."²¹³ This appears to be the case for air mail as well.

In December 2003, then Minister of Transport David Collenette wrote to the Committee in response to a question about progress on this recommendation that his department had "initiated a comprehensive review of air cargo and airmail security to consider possible enhancements."²¹⁴ One year later, that review has not been completed.

²¹⁰ Canadian Air Transport Security Authority, Annual Report 2002-2003, 31.

²¹¹ Mark Duncan, "Focus on Security Operations — Summaries of Presentations," (July 13, 2004), <http://www.tc.gc.ca/CivilAviation/SystemSafety/CAESN/Apr2004/security/duncan.htm>, (accessed October 31, 2004).

²¹² William Elliott, Hearing Transcript, May 5, 2003, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Issue 16, 37th Parl., 2nd Sess., http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/2/parlbus/commbus/senate/Com-e/defe-e/16evb-e.htm?Language=E&Parl=37&Ses=2&comm_id=76, (accessed November 5, 2004).

²¹³ Brian Flemming, "Remarks to AVSEC World: Canada's Unique Approach to Air Transport Security: Integrating People and Technology," (November 19, 2003), http://www.catsa-acsta.gc.ca/english/media/speech_discours/2003-11-19.htm, (accessed November 3, 2004).

²¹⁴ Collenette, Letter to Senator Colin Kenny, December 11, 2003.

Transport Canada stated in its *2004-2005 Report on Plans and Priorities*, that it has initiated “a policy review of air cargo and airmail security assess vulnerabilities, threat and risk levels, industry best practices, training, and the harmonization of Canada’s approach with that taken by its trading partners.”²¹⁵

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

- **Stop reviewing air cargo security and take action**

Almost two years after the Committee’s recommendation, the government is still studying the issue of airmail and cargo security. By the time the April 2004 national security policy came out, it had been under study for six months. At what point does “comprehensive review” become a synonym for “inaction”?

²¹⁵ Transport Canada, *Report on Plans and Priorities 2004-2005* (Ottawa: 2004) 40, http://www.tc.gc.ca/Finance/rpp/04-05/en/RPP_2004_05_Eng.pdf, (accessed November 4, 2004).

Problem 16: The Canadian Air Transport Security Intelligence Gap

The Canadian Air Transport Security Authority does not have the capacity or connections to other parts of the security and intelligence community that it needs to protect travellers in Canada's airports and on its airlines.

The Committee felt that the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority needed to be able to process finished intelligence product about past terrorist events and future threats, and then also have the procedures in place to share warnings and lessons learned to personnel working on the front lines.

The Canadian Air Transport Security Authority needs an intelligence capability for its training of pre-board screeners and non-passenger screeners. If the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority is to stay a step ahead of terrorists and criminals, its training needs to be shaped, or at least informed, by sound and up-to-date intelligence.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

The Canadian Air Transport Security Authority should develop an intelligence capability in order to effectively carry out its responsibilities. (Report: *The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports*, January 2003, # VIII.3)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

Transport Canada and the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority have not demonstrated to the Committee that the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority has the well-developed intelligence linkages and processing capacity that it needs.

In its 2004 Annual Report, the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority implicitly accepted the Auditor General's criticisms of March 2004 which said the security and intelligence community had poor information-sharing between agencies and departments. The Canadian Air Transport Security said that it was trying actively to increase the sharing of information and experiences both domestically and internationally.²¹⁶

²¹⁶ Canadian Air Transport Security Authority, *Annual Report 2004*, (Ottawa: 2004), 16.

In explaining its layered approach to its “security network,” the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority described intelligence as one of the key elements to security. It also stated that its principal relationship in this network is with its regulator, Transport Canada.²¹⁷ It made no mention of relationships with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or the government’s new Integrated Threat Assessment Centre.

It is clear that Transport Canada represents a security bottleneck in communicating necessary intelligence to the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority and in permitting it to effectively use the intelligence it receives.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

The government has not implemented the Committee’s recommendation.

- **The Canadian Air Transport Security Authority should be directed and funded to create a capability to process and use intelligence relevant to its capabilities.**

²¹⁷ Canadian Air Transport Security Authority, *Annual Report 2004*, (Ottawa: 2004), 16.

Problem 17: Airport Policing is Inadequate

After the airport authorities assumed control of their airports, many airports greatly reduced the size of their police contingents. For example, at the Pearson International Airport in Toronto, the number of officers declined from 290 in 1995 to 162 in January 2003.²¹⁸

At the same time, organized crime has a significant presence there. Royal Canadian Mounted Police Inspector Sam Landry, the officer in charge of the airport's RCMP detachment, testified to the Committee that "criminal activity at Toronto airport that been linked to criminal organizations such as traditional organized crime, Eastern European-based organized crime, Asian-based organized crime and outlaw motorcycle gangs."²¹⁹

Not only is the number of police at airports inadequate, but policing services at airports are too fragmented. Currently, the physical security of airports is the responsibility of the airport authorities, police forces of local jurisdiction enforce the *Criminal Code* and provincial statutes, and, with the few exceptions in which it is the police force of jurisdiction, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police enforces federal statutes at all airports.

The RCMP does not have overall responsibility for security at airports. Right now, no one is in charge.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATIONS

The Committee recommended that all airport policing directly related to air travel security be removed from the airport authorities and assigned exclusively to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, who can in turn contract parts of it to the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority.²²⁰

²¹⁸ Sam Landry, Hearing Testimony, June 25, 2002, Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and defence, Issue 18, 37th Parl., 1st Sess., http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/Com-e/defe-e/18evd-e.htm?Language=E&Parl=37&Ses=1&comm_id=76, (accessed November 18, 2004).

²¹⁹ Sam Landry, Hearing Testimony, June 25, 2002.

²²⁰ After printing, the Committee discovered that the original version of Recommendation VII. 1 was printed in error and did not reflect its views. The original Recommendation VII. 1 reads: "All airport policing directly related to air travel security be removed from the airport authorities and assigned exclusively to the RCMP under contract to CATSA."

The Committee recommended that the RCMP be given the authority to contract the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority to supervise all security policing at airports as it relates to passenger, cargo, aircraft and airside security.²²¹ (Report: *The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports*, January 2003, # VII.1 and # VIII.4)

The Committee recommended that local police forces and security guards contracted by airport authorities be responsible for criminal offences that are not related to air travel security. (Report: *The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports*, January 2003, # VII.2)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The government has not significantly restructured the reporting relationships between airport authorities, the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police since the Committee's recommendations.

The situation with regards to security remains complex.

The **Canadian Air Transport Security Authority** does not report to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. It is the delivery agency for most aviation security programs. It conducts pre-board screening of passengers and baggage (not including air cargo and air mail); manages programs to monitor and limit access to restricted areas; funds the Aircraft Protective Officers program; contributes funds to local airport authorities for contracts with local police. **Transport Canada** sets the rules by which it administers those programs.

Physical security at Canadian airports remains the responsibility of **airport authorities**. Police forces of local jurisdiction have the responsibility to enforce the Criminal Code and provincial statutes at each airport.²²² In most cases, **local airport authorities** contract with local police forces for additional police presence. The **Canadian Air Transport Security Authority** subsidizes these contracts in some airports.

²²¹ After printing, the Committee discovered that Recommendation VIII.4 was printed in error and did not reflect its views. The original Recommendation VIII. 4 reads: "CATSA should be given the authority to contract the RCMP to supervise all policing at airports as it relates to passenger, cargo, aircraft and airside security."

²²² The Royal Canadian Mounted Police has a contract with the airport authorities at the Halifax, Edmonton, and Vancouver international airports to enforce the Criminal Code and support the airports in their responsibility for the physical security of the airport.

The RCMP is responsible for the enforcement of federal statutes at all airports, which includes conducting national security investigations and organized smuggling operations.²²³

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

- **Put the RCMP on the case**

The RCMP should be running security at Canadian airports. It should have the authority to designate appropriate security measure and delegate responsibility for implementing those measures to agencies like CATSA. Airport policing, like port policing, requires specialized knowledge and skills that can only be developed over time. The RCMP has a long history and extensive experience in airport policing and has the capacity for this type of specialization to be developed within the force.

Airport Authorities have not demonstrated any particular competence or inter-authority cooperation in this area, resulting in a hodge-podge of systems with each authority trying to reinvent the wheel. The RCMP knows all the spokes on the wheel and how to tighten them.

- **Suspicious aroused**

During the Committee's investigations, it was noted on occasion that all might not be entirely proper in the dealings between some airport authorities and the outside world. While the Committee has no evidence of any misdoings, it believes that the Standing Senate Committee on Transport and Communications may wish to investigate whether a study of such relations might be warranted.

²²³ Royal Canadian Mounted Police, "RCMP Roles and Responsibilities at Airports," (April 6, 2004) attached to G. J. Loeppky, Letter to Senator Colin Kenny, April 14, 2004.

Problem 18: Lack of Transparency for Security Improvements

The Canadian Air Transport Security Authority has not provided a full accounting of the money it spends. The implementation of airport security enhancements must take place openly and transparently. The need to keep certain issues secret must be balanced with the equally legitimate right of Parliament and Canadians to know how their money is used. The government has this balancing act wrong and has tilted toward too much secrecy with too little openness.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority fully report the amounts that it is spending on its internal administration and report annually how much it has spent at each airport for: passenger screening, mail and cargo screening, airside searching of non-passengers, policing. (Report: *The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports*, January 2003, IX. 3)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The Canadian Air Transport Security Authority (CATSA) reported that, for the fiscal year ending March 31, 2004, it will spend \$152,540,000 on internal administration, security, non-passenger screening, the enhanced restricted area pass system, and explosive detection systems. It will pay pre-board screening operators—sub-contractors—a further \$125,245,000. CATSA's total operating budget for the fiscal year was \$ 277,785,000.²²⁴

The Canadian Air Transport Security Authority does not publicly break down its expenditures on a per airport basis.

²²⁴ Canadian Air Transport Security Authority, *2003/04-2007/08 Corporate Plan Summary and 2003/04 Capital Budget and 2003/04 Operating Budget*, (February 3, 2004) 20, http://www.catsa-acsta.gc.ca/english/about_propos/pub/plan_2003.pdf (accessed November 6, 2004).

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

- **Increase transparency by breaking down expenditures and costs on a per-airport basis**

“Following the money” gives the clearest indication of what government departments and agencies are actually doing, as opposed to what they say they are doing. Looking at how they spend also gives Canadians an opportunity to compare the effort the government is making at one airport as opposed to another. Without a more detailed breakdown of spending, there is no way of telling whether monies have been spent properly or effectively.

- **Release detailed data on a delayed schedule**

The secrecy concerns about reporting spending (like security concerns with regard to testing screening addressed in Chapter 7, Problem 21) can be addressed by providing for a delay mechanism – of say a year – giving the government an opportunity to mitigate. For example, initially reports relating to fiscal year 2003-2004 could be made public in 2005-2006.

Problem 19: Air Travellers' Security Charge

Canadians do not know whether the amount of the Air Travellers Security Charge is appropriate, whether the revenue generated has been well spent, and/or whether it has been entirely spent on airport security.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that the Government of Canada detail how much money is being collected from the \$12 Air Travellers Security Charge – better known as the departure tax – and from which airports.

The Committee also recommended that the Government of Canada account for how much of the \$12 Air Travellers Security Charge is being spent by the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority and how much is being spent by other departments and agencies and how much is being spent at each airport, and for what. (Report: *The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports*, January 2003, IX. 1 and IX. 2)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The government provides aggregate data about the revenues it collects from the departure tax monthly and annually (for example, it collected \$430 million in 2002-2003).²²⁵ It does not provide a detailed, airport-by-airport, breakdown about how much money it collects.

The government reduced the Air Travellers Security Charge in both its 2003 and 2004 budgets. In 2003, the charge on domestic travel was lowered to \$7 for one-way travel; the charge for trans-border (passing through Canada only) and international travel remained the same. In 2004, the charge was lowered to \$6 per flight segment to a maximum of \$12 per ticket, \$10 for trans-border travel, and \$20 for international travel. Accompanying both reductions were annexes to the government's budget that outlined revenue and expenditure models explaining the reduction.

²²⁵ This data is available through the Department of Finance's publication *The Fiscal Monitor*. It is available here: <http://www.fin.gc.ca/purl/fiscmon-e.html> (accessed November 6, 2004). The data includes a monthly summary, a year to date calculation, and a comparison of both to the same period in the previous year. Aggregate totals have also been available in Budget 2002, Budget 2003, and Budget 2004.

The Department of Finance conducted a review of the Air Travellers Security Charge in late 2002 to “ensure that revenue remains in line with the costs of enhanced security.”²²⁶ Included in this review was public consultation, and independent studies of both air travel demand elasticity and the charge’s effect on low-cost and regional air carriers.

In Budget 2004, the government said that it will no longer review the Charge annually, but instead on the basis of a rolling five-year period. The next review will not take place until around 2010.

In Budget 2004 the government also asked the Office of Auditor General to undertake an audit of the Air Travellers Security Charge. The Auditor General’s Office undertook a “financial audit” of the charge which it released shortly before this report went to press.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

- **Itemize revenues and expenditures airport by airport**

The Canadian public needs to know. The reports in each of the last two Federal Budgets did provide a general accounting for the Air Travellers Security Charge, but they do not allow the public to easily draw the relationship between the charge and the security that it is paying for on a per airport basis.

- **Continue annual reviews of the security charge**

The Committee believes that the government needs to evaluate the Air Travellers Security Charge every year. Since introducing the Air Travellers Security Charge in Budget 2001, the government has felt the need to alter the amount of the Air Travellers Security Charge twice.

The government should continue to report annually on the appropriateness of the level of the charge until it can demonstrate over a period of multiple years that it has achieved the right level for the charge.

²²⁶ Department of Finance, “Air Travellers Security Charge - Background” (January 14, 2004), http://www.fin.gc.ca/news02/data/02-091_1e.html (accessed November 4, 2004).

Problem 20: Unnecessary Secrecy

HIGH PRIORITY

Unnecessary secrecy hides inefficiencies, provides cover for poor administration, and generally fosters weak security.

In early testimony, the Committee was appalled at the way officials from Transport Canada used the need for secrecy in matters of security as a shield against questions designed to determine whether the government was taking appropriate action to safeguard the travelling public. The Committee finally turned to people who worked at airports, who knew what the thousands of their colleagues knew: the security the government was assuring the public was largely an illusion.

Security that relies on secrecy is weak because as soon as someone inevitably publishes the secret, the security that depended on the secret is forever breached. As Bruce Schneier points out in his book *Beyond Fear*, the security of a house lock depends on thieves not knowing that the owner keeps a key under the doormat. Once they know...

At Canada's airports, we discovered that everybody and their brother knew where the keys were hidden, and which locks were vulnerable. Organized crime long ago opened up huge security gaps at airports that the government said it was filling. We discovered that it wasn't. Once that secret was out of the bag, security began to improve, although it still has a long way to go.

Secrecy won't fix security problems. It will delay them getting fixed.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

The federal government should design and implement air travel security measures that provide transparency and full financial accountability to the Canadian public. Airport authorities and the airlines must recognize that security of air travel is the public's business and be forthright in explaining the measures they are taking to protect against terrorist or criminal activity, on the ground, and in the air. (Report: *The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports*, January 2003, X.1 and X.2)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The government's reviews of the Air Travellers' Security Charge in 2002, 2003 and 2004 added a measure of accountability to Canada's security expenditures. The government's Budget 2004 request that the Office of Auditor General conduct an audit of the Air Travellers' Security Charge and the expenditures for the air travel security system was also a positive step.²²⁷

However, Transport Canada has not shown that it has overcome the culture of secrecy. Basic data is unavailable. Such as:

- the success and failure rates of screening machines,
- which airports are especially problematic, and
- the results of internal tests to penetrate the security.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

“Don't accept anyone telling you that secrecy requires keeping details of a security system secret. I've evaluated hundreds of security systems in my career, and I've learned that if someone doesn't want to disclose the details of a security system, it's usually because he's embarrassed to do so. Secrecy contributes to the “trust us and we'll make the trade-offs for you” mentality that ensures sloppy security systems. Openness demystifies; secrecy obscures.”²²⁸

Bruce Schneier
*Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly about
Security in an Uncertain World*, page 278

- **Show us, don't tell us. “Trust me” is a bad mantra**

The government should publish more data on the efficacy of its aviation security initiatives so that Canadians can know advocate for their improvement and have faith in the system.

²²⁷ The government requested the audit in the 2004 Budget.

²²⁸ Bruce Schneier, *Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly about Security in an Uncertain World* (New York: Copernicus Books, 2003), 278.

It should start by describing what initiatives it has undertaken to test pre-board screening and those procedures' failure rates. Canadians need to be kept up to date on how wisely their money is being spent. They aren't.

- **Publish the results of tests to the airport security system without undermining security**

The major concern the government has expressed about releasing this type of data is that it would give terrorists and criminals an edge in attempting to penetrate the aviation security system.

It is possible to provide transparency without undermining security. For example, data could be released after an appropriate delay (12 – 18 months). Such a delay would give the government the necessary opportunity to fix whatever problems emerge, while also keeping the public informed.

Problem 21: Lack of Financial Transparency

The Auditor General lacks the authority to audit the security expenditures of individual airport authorities.²²⁹

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATIONS

The Committee recommended that the Government of Canada introduce legislation providing the Auditor General of Canada with the power to audit each airport authority for accuracy, and value received for all security revenues and expenditures made by the authority, which would complement ongoing auditing and supervision by Transport Canada of security expenditures by airport authorities.

The Auditor General of Canada should conduct audits – including value for money audits – of security expenditures both by the federal government and airport authorities (the Minister of Transport should make this possible through new legislation). (Report: *The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports*, January 2003, IX.4 and VIII.5)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The Office of the Auditor General lacks the authority to audit airport authorities.²³⁰

In its 2004 Budget, the government requested that the Office of Auditor General conduct an audit of the revenue from the Air Travellers Security Charge and the expenditures for the air travel security system.²³¹

The Office of the Auditor General plans to release a report in the spring of 2005 on security issues, part of which covers aspects of air transport security. The “financial audit” was completed shortly before this report went to print.

²²⁹ The Committee found it curious that Vancouver Airport Services, a subsidiary of the Vancouver Airport Authority, currently manages 15 airports in 6 countries (Cuba, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Turks / Caicos, Egypt, and Canada locations).

²³⁰ Office of the Auditor General, E-mail message to researcher, December 10, 2003.

²³¹ The government requested the audit in the 2004 Budget.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

- **Enact legislation granting the Auditor General the authority to audit airport authorities**

Legislation granting the Office of the Auditor General the necessary authority to audit airport authorities is long overdue.

CHAPTER 8

Emergency Preparedness

Problem 1: Lack of Emergency Management

Federal government departments are not being tested to ensure that continuity of operation is possible during and following a disaster or emergency. The problems encountered during the central and eastern Canadian August 2003 Blackout serve as a classic example. The Prime Minister's Office was working by candlelight.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness conduct evaluations to ensure that all federal departments and agencies are able to continue to operate during a crisis and that their preparedness plans are in effect.²³² (Report: *National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy*, March 2004, #17 A)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The government stated in its April 2004 National Security Policy that the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness will be designated the body responsible for the testing and auditing federal departments' and agencies' key security responsibilities and activities, including their emergency plans.²³³

Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada plans to begin auditing Business Continuity Plans of almost all government departments and agencies in the first quarter of 2005.²³⁴

²³² This sub-recommendation is a part of a larger recommendation that is dealt with below. The sub-recommendation is separated here because of its importance.

²³³ Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy*, (Ottawa: April 2004), 13.

²³⁴ Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, E-mail message to researcher, (November 9, 2004). Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness will begin the process of auditing those department and agencies subject to the Government Security Policy. Very few departments or agencies are excluded from the Government Security Policy.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

- **Start the audits**

Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada has not concluded its discussions with the Treasury Board Secretariat about the transfer of responsibility for this function.²³⁵ Furthermore, whether Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada will receive resources to complete the task is still an open question.²³⁶

The Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness and Treasury Board need to conclude the transfer of the responsibility for auditing continuity plans.

The Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness should be given the resources it needs to undertake the project, either through a resources transfer from Treasury Board that correlates with the responsibility transfer or from new funding.

- **Present progress reports for each department to Parliament annually**

The Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness should table an annual report in Parliament on the adequacy or deficiency of the preparations made by each department and agency to provide transparency in the government's emergency preparedness efforts. Progress made (or lack thereof) in developing and improving business continuity plans for federal department and agencies is important to Canadians.

²³⁵ Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, E-mail message to researcher, (November 9, 2004).

²³⁶ Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, E-mail message to researcher, (November 9, 2004).

Problem 2: Emergency Ad Hockery

Six micro-organisms pose the greatest risk to Canadians: smallpox, anthrax, plague, botulism, tularemia and hemorrhagic fever. With the exception of smallpox, Health Canada does not have a comprehensive emergency response plan in place to deal with any of them.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended Health Canada develop a national plan to counteract potential outbreaks of anthrax, plague, botulism, tularemia and hemorrhagic fever and that it report to Parliament and the public by 31 March 2005 that this is completed. (Report: *National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy*, March 2004, #1)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

Neither Health Canada, nor the new Public Health Agency of Canada, have demonstrated to the Committee they have up-to-date infectious disease outbreak management plans for the range of threats the Committee highlighted.²³⁷

Health Canada's generic infectious-disease containment plan, called the *Canadian Contingency Plan for Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers and Other Related Diseases*, is outdated.²³⁸ It makes no mention that potential infectious disease outbreaks could be deliberately caused as an act of terrorism.

²³⁷ Health Canada, "Pharmaceuticals being purchased for the National Emergency Stockpile System (NESS)," (October 2001), http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/english/media/releases/2001/2002_110ebk6.htm, (accessed November 11, 2004).

²³⁸ The document "specifically addresses evolving issues related to viral hemorrhagic fevers; however, it could also be applied to international outbreaks of other dangerous communicable diseases." See Health Canada, "Canadian Contingency Plan for Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers and Other Related Diseases, *Canadian Communicable Disease Report*, Vol. 23S1 (January 1997), <http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/publicat/ccdr-rmtc/97vol23/23s1/index.html>, (accessed November 14, 2004).

The focus of preparations for infectious disease outbreaks has been on the purchase of medicine to be used in case of emergency. The federal government 2004 budget provided \$40 million over two years for strengthening preparedness against infectious diseases. Health Canada has been purchasing antibiotics that can be used to treat exposure to biological agents including anthrax, plague and tularaemia.²³⁹

The Canadian Food Inspection Agency is responsible for food inspection and food safety in Canada, and it seeks to protect consumers from some of the micro-organisms listed above, such as botulism.²⁴⁰

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

- **Release the National Outbreak Management Plans by 31 March 2005 or sooner**

The purchase of medicines is a step in the right direction but the government should prepare and publicize up-to-date responses plans that reflect current circumstances.

- **Get the Public Health Agency connecting**

The government should also ensure that the new Public Health Agency of Canada becomes more than a name. The new agency should become fully functional, connecting with, and responding to, the needs of provinces and first responders across the country.

²³⁹ Health Canada, “Pharmaceuticals being purchased for the National Emergency Stockpile System (NESS),” (October 2001), http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/english/media/releases/2001/2001_110ebk6.htm, (accessed November 11, 2004). A spokesman for Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada was quoted in the *National Post* on November 10, 2004, saying that Health Canada has stockpiles of medicine and a strategy in place to deal with outbreaks of anthrax, smallpox, botulism or bubonic plague. The committee could not confirm his statements before this report went to press.

²⁴⁰ Government of Canada, “Canada Health Portal: Targeting Health,” (November 2, 2004), http://chp-pcs.gc.ca/CHP/index_e.jsp/pageid/4005/odp/Top/Health/Conditions_and_Diseases/Botulism, (accessed November 2, 2004).

Problem 3: Inability to Deploy Police in an Emergency

There are agreements in place with eight out of ten provinces (the exceptions being Ontario and Quebec) that would permit the RCMP to redeploy resources anywhere in Canada in an emergency.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that Canada's Minister for Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness negotiate agreements with the governments of Ontario and Quebec to ensure that the citizens of all provinces in Canada have timely access to additional police to deal with any incident designated by provincial authorities to be an emergency. (Report: *National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy*, March 2004, #2)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

None evident.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

- **Get all provinces involved**

Canada needs a national approach to emergency preparedness. The lack of agreements on emergency policing assistance between the RCMP and the provinces of Ontario and Quebec is a gap in the emergency preparedness system. Federal leadership is needed.

Problem 4: No Role for Reserves

The Canadian Forces Regular Force and Reserves are not involved in federal emergency preparedness planning.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATIONS

The Committee recommended that the Canadian Forces should enhance their capabilities to respond to national emergencies by:

- a. ensuring that the Regular Forces are equipped and trained to deal with significant emergencies in Canada and that they are involved in regional emergency planning;
- b. expanding the role of the Militia to be a civil defence force capable of quickly aiding local authorities in the event of a national emergency;
- c. equipping and training the Militia for emergency preparedness operations.
- d. involving the Militia in emergency planning and training in conjunction with municipalities across the country.

Further, the Committee recommended that the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness should:

- include the Canadian Forces Militia in the national inventory of emergency preparedness resources; and
- provide first responders with details of the Militia's assets and capabilities.

(Report: *National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy*, March 2004, #3, 10, 11)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The government has announced several initiatives which could increase the capacity of the Canadian Forces, regular and reserve, to respond to national emergencies. They include:

- examining ways, under the Land Force Reserve Restructure program, to develop dual-role capabilities for the reserves – such as CBRN defence – that could also be used to deal with domestic threats;²⁴¹
- increasing the Canadian Forces’ holdings of nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) medical countermeasures and improving maintenance of existing countermeasure stocks;²⁴²
- enhancing the Disaster Assistance Response Team domestic capabilities, especially those it could use in remote regions and in cold weather;²⁴³
- promising to increase the size of the Reserves by 3,000;²⁴⁴
- deploying Community-based Contingency Planning Officers from the Reserve Force to unit and formation headquarters to work with local officials to facilitate inclusion of military support in emergency planning;²⁴⁵
- upgrading and coordinating the facilities that provide training, advice and technological support to the Canadian Forces, first-responders, and other government departments;²⁴⁶
- directing reserve units to develop plans to form platoon-sized groups (called Security Platoons) in preparation for short-notice humanitarian assistance deployments within Canada;²⁴⁷
- enhancing signals intelligence and computer network defence.²⁴⁸

²⁴¹ Honourable William Graham, “Letter to Senator Colin Kenny,” (November 3, 2004): 9.

²⁴² Department of National Defence, “Public Security,” (April 14, 2004), http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/reports/preparing_trans/pubsecurity_e.asp, (accessed October 28, 2004). Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society*, 23.

²⁴³ Department of National Defence, E-mail message to researcher, (November 8, 2004). A study of how the DART can best complement the first responders is on-going. Additional personnel will need to be assigned to DART and DART will need to acquire new equipment before an enhanced DART is ready for domestic employment.

²⁴⁴ Honourable William Graham, “Speech to the Royal Canadian Military Institute Conference,” (September 22, 2004), http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1456, (accessed October 29, 2004).

²⁴⁵ Honourable William Graham, “Letter to Senator Colin Kenny,” (November 3, 2004): 9..

²⁴⁶ Department of National Defence, “Public Security,” (April 14, 2004), http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/reports/preparing_trans/pubsecurity_e.asp, (accessed October 28, 2004). Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society*, 23.

²⁴⁷ Honourable William Graham, “Letter to Senator Colin Kenny,” (November 3, 2004): 9.

²⁴⁸ Department of National Defence, “Public Security,” (April 14, 2004), http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/reports/preparing_trans/pubsecurity_e.asp, (accessed October 28, 2004).

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

- **Must provide adequate support for current role**

The government should provide the Department of National Defence with the resources necessary to fund the last 40 reserve Contingency Planning Officer positions.

- **Increase the role of the Reserves**

The government should increase the future domestic emergency capacity of the Reserves and provide them with the training and resources to fulfil that role.

Problem 5: No Domestic Role for the DART

The Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) focuses on overseas rather than domestic emergencies, leaving Canada without a military rapid-disaster response capability to handle crises. Even in its overseas role, the DART is clearly underemployed – it has been deployed abroad only twice since its creation in 1996.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that the focus of the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) be changed to domestic disaster assistance, and that to increase its effectiveness all of its personnel should be stationed at a single location. (Report: *National Emergencies: Canada’s Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy*, March 2004, #4)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The Minister of National Defence wrote to one of the Committee’s members that the Team is expanding its capabilities to respond to domestic incidents, particularly in remoter regions of the country and in cold weather.²⁴⁹

Its enhanced domestic capabilities are not fully operational. Additional personnel and cold weather equipment still need to be acquired.²⁵⁰

The government has not demonstrated that it can deploy the DART from its Ontario bases to remote parts of the country quickly.

²⁴⁹ Honourable William Graham, “Letter to Senator Colin Kenny,” (November 3, 2004): 9.

²⁵⁰ Department of National Defence, E-mail message to researcher, November 8, 2004.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

- **Provide airlift for quick DART deployment**

The government is moving in the right direction, but the lack of lift capacity in the Canadian Forces makes the use of the DART problematic, both in Canada and abroad.

Canada did not send the DART to Haiti in September 2004, in the wake of the devastating tropical storm Jeanne, even though Haiti was having major problems providing its citizens with potable water, and water purification is one of the DART's areas of expertise. The government maintained at the time that deploying the DART would be too expensive, which sounds like the requirement to purchase lift capacity was part of the problem.

It costs money to train and equip Canada's Disaster Response Team. It would be money well spent if the DART showed up at domestic and international emergencies in a hurry and played a helpful role. If the DART isn't going to be deployed when emergencies arise, what is the point of having it?

The government should ensure that the DART always has easy access to lift capacity and that adequate funds are set aside to move this team when it needs to move.

Problem 6: Emergency Caches Mismanaged

Health Canada's emergency caches are not helpful to local first responders. First responders usually don't know where they are or what is in them. First responders are not consulted on whether the contents of the caches match what they need or duplicate what they already have.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that Health Canada overhaul the way it administers and manages the emergency caches it controls, with the aim of more efficiently and effectively aiding first responder agencies to help Canadians across the country. The overhaul should ensure, among other things, that local officials are:

- a. made aware of the locations of any caches in their vicinity;
- b. advised how to access the caches in emergencies;
- c. given a role in determining caches' contents; and
- d. encouraged to include the caches in their planning and training.

(Report: *National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy*, March 2004, #5)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The April 2004 National Security Policy states that the National Emergency Stockpile System (the technical name for the caches) will be replenished and updated. It also stated that the national inventory of drugs will be updated.²⁵¹ It makes no mention of correlating the caches with the needs of first responders.

According to the new Public Health Agency of Canada, it is implementing a short-term (stock replenishment) modernization process and working on a longer term vision. An internal Strategic Review Workgroup is working on the long-term

²⁵¹ Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society*, 32.

review. The Workgroup is looking at all aspects of the National Emergency Stockpile to ensure it meets a new Risk and Threat Assessment.²⁵²

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

- **Address the recommendation**

The government has not addressed any of parts A, B, C or D of the recommendation. Local authorities need to be made aware of the caches locations in their vicinity; advised on how to access the caches in case of emergencies; given a role in determining the contents of the caches; encouraged to include the caches in their planning and training.

²⁵² Public Health Agency of Canada, E-mail message to researcher, (November 1, 2004).

Problem 7: Lack of Equipment for First Responders

In Budget 2001, the government provided six years of funding for chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) training, but only two years of funding for necessary equipment purchases.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

The federal government should provide four additional years of funding (\$5 million per year) for the purchase of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear protection equipment. (Report: *National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy*, March 2004, #6)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The government has not pledged a sustained commitment to first responders for necessary chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) equipment purchases and training. Independent sources have told the Committee that it is unclear what will happen to this capability when the funding from Budget 2001 runs out.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

- **Equipment purchases require funding**

The government must ensure that first responders have sufficient money to buy CBRN equipment and that equipment funding matches training funding.

- **Funding must continue past 2007**

The training of first responders to properly use chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear equipment should continue to be a government priority after 2007. Funding for training cannot dry up or first responders' hard-acquired readiness to respond will rapidly diminish.

Problem 8: Institutional “Lessons Learned” Memory Blank

HIGH PRIORITY

Knowing how to act quickly and appropriately in trying circumstances is at the heart of disaster response. Being aware of “lessons learned” in other disasters is one of the keys to quick and appropriate response.

The Committee received testimony from government officials that the government’s “lessons learned” archive was incomplete – it didn’t even contain lessons from major disasters and the information it contains is not being disseminated to first responders.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

The Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness must structure its “lessons learned” archive so that it is:

- up to date and historically deep; and
- accessible and helpful to First Responders.

(Report: *National Emergencies: Canada’s Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy*, March 2004, #7)

The Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness should:

- act as a clearinghouse to assist other orders of government by distributing provincial / territorial and municipal “lessons learned” to other jurisdictions as required; and
- prepare and publish a preliminary public report within sixty (60) days of the emergency followed by a formal public report within one year of any national emergency outlining “lessons learned” from the emergency and various responses to it.

(Report: *National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy*, March 2004, #17E and #18 G(i))

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

There is no indication that the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness is making a concerted effort to package and disseminate a Canadian “lessons learned” package that would provide object lessons to heighten the awareness of first responders across the country as to how to react in various types of emergencies.

The government has acknowledged that all orders of government have a role in developing and sharing best practices and lessons learned.²⁵³

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

- **Address the recommendation**

The Department should treat the assembly of an up-to-date “lessons learned” archive as priority, and then move quickly to disseminate a “lessons learned” package that would help prepare first responders across the country for various types of emergencies.

²⁵³ Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, “Government of Canada Position Paper on a National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure Protection,” (November 2004), http://www.ociepep.gc.ca/critical/nciap/positionpap_e.asp#_Toc84996305, (accessed November 12, 2004).

Problem 9: Lack of Centralized Health Protection

There has been a lack of centralized focus on how to prepare for and respond to emergencies that threaten the lives of large numbers of Canadians. This void was documented by the National Advisory Committee on SARS and Public Health (the Naylor Committee), which made a series of recommendations following the SARS epidemic.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee endorsed the recommendations of the Naylor Committee, and recommended that the government implement them. (Report: *National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy*, March 2004, #8)

The Naylor Committee's most important recommendation was that:

A new agency, to be called the Health Protection and Promotion Agency (HPPA), be created, and that it be headed by the Chief Health Protection and Promotion Officer of Canada (CHPPO). The HPPA would be a legislated service agency that reports to the federal Minister of Health.

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

On 24 September 2004, Prime Minister Paul Martin created a new Public Health Agency of Canada and announced the appointment of the country's first Chief Public Health Officer (CPHO). The creation of the Agency and this appointment were key Naylor committee recommendations.²⁵⁴

The agency appears to be developing international links as recommended by the Naylor Committee.²⁵⁵

²⁵⁴ Prime Minister's Office, "Government of Canada appoints first Chief Public Health Officer to head Public Health Agency of Canada," (September 24, 2004), <http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/news.asp?id=270>, (accessed October 28, 2004).

²⁵⁵ Health Canada, "Minister Carolyn Bennett and Chief Public Health Officer of Canada Participate in Launch of European Public Health Agency," News Release 2004-48, (September 27, 2004), http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/english/media/releases/2004/2004_48.htm, (accessed October 28, 2004).

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

Challenge met. Good progress is being made in this area and it is a hopeful beginning.

The Committee will examine the new Public Health Agency of Canada's national security and emergency preparedness related functions soon.

Problem 10: Poor Collaboration

The level of inter-jurisdictional information sharing, collaboration and co-operation among different orders of government in Canada is inadequate. The 2003 SARS crisis underlined the fact that this problem was especially pronounced in public health agencies. Provinces, territories, and communities are not being sufficiently included in strategic emergency planning and management.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness negotiate memoranda of understanding between the federal government and the provinces and territories that detail inter-jurisdictional responsibilities for both emergency preparedness and response. (Report: *National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy*, March 2004, #9)

The Committee recommended that the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness ensure that new effective data-sharing protocols and mutual assistance agreements between federal, provincial, territorial and municipal governments be implemented.

Further, the Committee recommended that Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, in cooperation with municipal emergency response units, provincial and federal governments, and relevant federal departments, develop a set of “best practices” for potential natural and man-made disasters.²⁵⁶ (Report: *National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy*, March 2004, #18 B, C)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The government, in its April 2004 National Security Policy, stated that federal-provincial-municipal cooperation on emergencies was important. It proposed a federal-provincial-territorial forum on emergencies, and stated that the federal government was committed, where practical, to co-locating emergency preparedness facilities within provincial and territorial facilities.²⁵⁷

²⁵⁶ The remainder of this recommendation is dealt with in Problem 16.

²⁵⁷ Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society*, viii.

The senior level forum has not been created yet, but there is progress. At their last meeting in May 2004, the federal/ provincial / territorial deputy ministers responsible for emergency management were supportive of holding regular meetings involving deputy ministers and ministers. They also agreed in principle on draft Terms of Reference for Deputy Ministers and Ministers Fora.

The federal-provincial-territorial ministers responsible for emergency management have not met since 1993. A meeting of federal / provincial / territorial ministers responsible for emergency management is currently planned for January 23-25, 2005, in Ottawa.²⁵⁸

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

- **Convene the forum and turn statements into agreements**

The government's commitment to working with other orders of government is a positive step forward. The government should convene its proposed forum soon, and work towards the agreements the Committee recommended.

The government should also ensure that the new Public Health Agency of Canada is establishing fully functional links with provincial and territorial counterparts, and that municipalities and first responders fully understand the responsibilities of all orders of governments and their agencies in responding to emergencies.

²⁵⁸ Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, E-mail message to researcher, (November 9, 2004).

Problem 11: Emergency Public Communications

With the exception of Alberta, the provinces and territories have difficulty disseminating emergency-related information to citizens within their jurisdiction.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that, in order to ensure that authorities have the power and the capability to interrupt radio and television broadcasts during emergencies:

- Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness design standards for the establishment of emergency public warning systems for all provinces and territories;
- the Governor in Council, by order, direct the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) to introduce such regulations as necessary to ensure that all public and private broadcasters are required to cooperate in the establishment of provincial / territorial and national public warning systems; and
- a national emergency website with links to provincial and territorial emergency websites be established so that emergency information and instructions can quickly be communicated via the Internet during a national emergency.
- Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness encourage the installation of a system like “Reverse 911®” in all municipalities, funding at least a third of the cost, with remaining costs to be divided between the provinces / territories and municipalities.²⁵⁹

(Report: *National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy*, March 2004, #12 and 13)

²⁵⁹ “Reverse 911®” is an example of a community notification system that uses database and geographic information technologies to saturate specific areas with up to 1,000 calls an hour.

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

There is no evidence that the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness has designed standards for emergency public warning systems for all provinces and territories.

The Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission has not been directed by Cabinet to introduce new regulations in response to Part B of the first recommendation. However, the CRTC notes that section 26 (2) of the *Broadcasting Act* allows the Governor-in-Council, by order, to direct the CRTC to issue a notice to licensees throughout Canada to broadcast any program considered to be of urgent importance. In addition, the Commission has made provision for emergency radio simulcasts on AM and FM stations in section 14 (2) of the *Radio Regulations, 1986*. Further, the *Emergencies Act* gives the Minister of Industry Canada the ability to take control of broadcast facilities and transmissions to disseminate public warning in the event that a public emergency be declared by the Governor in Council.²⁶⁰

The government's Safe Canada Web Portal provides Canadians access to postings on alerts and advisories with regards to a range of critical incidents.²⁶¹ It also provides access to regional emergency information and a comprehensive set of links of provincial and territorial emergency preparedness websites.

There is no indication that the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness has encouraged installation of a "Reverse 911 ®" type system in all municipalities.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

The Committee accepts that most of the authority to create the emergency public communications systems it recommends exists. However the system itself remains to be created and that presents three challenges.

²⁶⁰ Charles M. Dalfen, "Letter," (October 7, 2004): 1.

²⁶¹ Advisories available on the Safe Canada web portal can be found here:

http://www.safecanada.ca/advisories_e.asp. The website links to sites maintained by a variety of government departments.

- **Transfer authority to disseminate public warnings on radio and TV to the Minister of Public Safety**

The Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness should not have to seek permission from the Minister of Industry Canada to disseminate public warnings via TV and radio. The Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness should be in charge of this function because a situation could arise where there was not time for inter-departmental discussions during a major emergency.

- **Develop policies and procedures to delegate that authority to other orders of government**

The Deputy Prime Minister needs to be able to delegate responsibility for taking over the air waves to disseminate public warnings to provincial, regional, and municipal levels as the situation dictates.

- **Tackle the technical challenges**

Problem 12: Poor Communications Equipment

The first responder community often does not have reliable communications devices for use in times of emergency. Such systems need to be put in place by all orders of government.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATIONS

Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness should enter into negotiations to equip the entire first responder community nationwide with handheld communications devices, with the federal government funding at least a third of the cost, with remaining costs to be divided between the provinces / territories and municipalities. Each order of government should create the capacity to communicate with its first responders, within itself and with other orders of government. All systems should have wireless back-ups.²⁶² (Report: *National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy*, March 2004, #14 and 15)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

None evident.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

The federal government should work with the other orders of government to ensure that the entire first responder communities have hand-held communications devices and that they can communicate internally and with the other orders of government. Good communications are essential to effective emergency response.

²⁶² Any crisis that involves a loss of electricity rules out some forms of communications.

Problem 13: First Responders Out of Loop

Many first responders – including fire fighters, police officers, and emergency health care workers – believe that the federal government does not adequately consult them and does not understand what they need on the ground to do their jobs effectively.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness:

- develop a greater sensitivity to the differing needs of the First Responders in communities across Canada;
- restructure the national emergency preparedness system so that local concerns and needs form the core of preparedness planning and structures.

(Report: *National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy*, March 2004, #16)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The government acknowledged, in its April 2004 National Security Policy, that “first line responders lie at the heart of our emergency management system.”²⁶³ It went on to state that it intended to “launch a process” on how to modernize national system of emergency management. Details were not outlined.

In May 2004, Anne McLellan, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, said that government and municipalities “just have to work a lot more closely together and we have to get a lot more information flowing both up and down in terms of levels of government so that we know our state of preparedness.”²⁶⁴

²⁶³ Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society*, 22.

²⁶⁴ Anne McLellan, “Address to Federation of Canadian Municipalities 67th Annual Conference and Municipal Expo,” Edmonton, Alberta, (May 28, 2004), http://www.psepc-sppcc.gc.ca/publications/speeches/20040528_e.asp, (accessed October 28, 2004).

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

- **Turn words into programs**

Statements in the National Security Policy and the Deputy Prime Minister's comments demonstrate that the government is aware of the problem.

Government needs to provide tangible evidence, in terms of programs, that it is listening to first responders across the country, and that it is responding to them.

Problem 14: Weak Central Knowledge Base on Critical Infrastructure

The federal government does not have a central clearinghouse for critical infrastructure protection and emergency preparedness information for communities, and for federal departments and agencies.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness be required to:

- compile and maintain in cooperation with every municipality in Canada lists of the perceived vulnerabilities, emergency response assets, and shortfalls in assets and capabilities;
- hold meetings with provincial / territorial counterparts to discuss the deficiencies revealed as a result of recommendation (b) above; and
- conduct national emergency exercises in cooperation with other orders of government and prepare analyses on the “lessons learned”.

(Report: *National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy*, March 2004, #17 B, C, D)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The government has acknowledged the need to create a more effective framework for critical infrastructure protection, and the need to do so with consultation from provincial and territorial authorities.²⁶⁵

The Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness recently released a Position Paper on a National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure Protection

²⁶⁵ Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society*, 26.

(November 2004). The paper represents an early stage in developing a Critical Infrastructure Policy. The policy is to be completed in the Fall of 2005.²⁶⁶

In that paper, the government states that it will identify and assess its own critical infrastructure and that it will work with other levels of government and the private sector to ensure that processes are in place to identify their critical infrastructures.²⁶⁷

The government's April 2004 National Security Policy stated that the national emergency management system requires a modern legislative foundation informed by consultations with the provinces, territories, communities, first responders, and industry. It stated that to this end, the *Emergency Preparedness Act* would be reviewed and likely modernized.²⁶⁸

The National Security Policy also highlighted "regular national and international exercises...to assess the adequacy of the national system against various emergency scenarios" as a strategic priority.²⁶⁹

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

- **Finalize the National Critical Infrastructure Policy on schedule by Fall 2005**

The government's commitment to develop a critical infrastructure policy is a step forward, as is its publication of the position paper. The work needs to be completed quickly.

²⁶⁶ Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, *Government of Canada Position Paper on a National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure Protection*, (November 2004), 6, http://www.ociepep.gc.ca/critical/nciap/NSCIP_e.pdf (accessed November 12, 2004).

²⁶⁷ Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, *Government of Canada Position Paper on a National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure Protection*, (November 2004), 8, http://www.ociepep.gc.ca/critical/nciap/NSCIP_e.pdf (accessed November 12, 2004). As of November 2004, no legislation amending the *Emergency Preparedness Act* had been introduced.

²⁶⁸ Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society*, 24.

²⁶⁹ Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society*, 27.

Problem 15: Lack of Leadership on Best Practices

The federal government has largely neglected first responders and is not playing a lead role in developing “best practices” within the first responder community.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that the Minister and Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness:

- Ensure that Canadian communities are fully informed about the availability of training programs and other resources to help them prepare to respond to emergencies;
- Facilitate and finance a peer review system among emergency managers and first responders to ensure that “best practices” are being implemented and to foster greater interoperability;
- Ensure that all agreements to provide funds to provincial and territorial governments disclose what percentage of those funds will be given to first responders in the municipalities; and
- Prepare and publish an annual report to Parliament on all its activities. This report should emphasize the measures that Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness has taken to upgrade Canada’s capacity to respond to national emergencies and the perceived shortfalls between assets and capabilities of first responders.

(Report: *National Emergencies: Canada’s Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy*, March 2004, #18 A, D, E, F, and G(ii). Parts B, C, and G(i) of recommendation #18 are addressed elsewhere Chapter 8)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The Public Health Agency of Canada website includes an “Emergency Preparedness & Response Training Catalogue” that lists the federal, provincial and territorial programs directed at emergency preparedness and response. It also indicates the language(s) of availability.²⁷⁰

The government acknowledged the need to enhance first responders training opportunities. Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Anne McLellan has said that her Department is developing a national training program that will be delivered across the country.²⁷¹

There is no indication that all agreements with provinces involving municipal emergency preparedness itemize how much funding will be earmarked for the first responders.

The Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness has not tabled in Parliament a detailed account of perceived shortfalls in Canada’s emergency preparedness capabilities.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

- **Ensure that financial assistance goes to first responders**

When negotiating agreements with the provinces, the government must itemize exactly which funds are to go first responders. This is needed to ensure that money intended for local officials actually reaches them.

²⁷⁰ Public Health Agency of Canada, “Emergency Preparedness & Response Training Catalogue,” (Fall 2003), <http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/eprtc-cfmiu/index.html>, (November 11, 2004).

²⁷¹ Anne McLellan, “Speech at the Joint Emergency Preparedness Program -- Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) Funding Recognition Event,” (September 2, 2004), http://www.psepc-sppcc.gc.ca/publications/speeches/20040902_e.asp, (November 2, 2004).

Problem 16: Large Cities Should Be Helping Regions

Large cities possess the majority of the nation's resources for dealing with emergencies. Few of them have a system in place to provide preparedness assistance to surrounding regions.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that commensurately more funding should be provided to the larger communities in return for their agreeing to provide regional assistance. (Report: *National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy*, March 2004, #19)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The government has allotted \$3 million to increase Heavy Urban Search and Rescue (HUSAR) capacities in major Canadian cities.²⁷²

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

- **Provide additional funding to large cities on the agreement that they be prepared to provide certain specialized functions to nearby communities**

Because emergency preparedness resources are limited, the federal government should develop and implement a plan that creates agreements with large cities wherein they receive additional resources for expensive specialized first responder capabilities in exchange for making the capability available to other communities in their region.

The federal government should provide incentives to stimulate cooperative effort on the part of large cities. This should be achievable through the provision of continuous funding that is conditional on those cities developing, assisting, and maintaining regional preparedness networks.

²⁷² Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, "Government of Canada Announces \$8 Million to Strengthen Canadian Emergency Preparedness," in Edmonton, (7 May 2004). Available at: http://www.psepc-sppcc.gc.ca/publications/news/20040507_e.asp Last visited: 27 September 2004.

APPENDIX I

Corrections and Omissions

The Committee made more than a hundred and twenty recommendations over the course of its six reports. Of those, two recommendations were printed incorrectly and it has chosen to withdraw one of them. The withdrawn and incorrect recommendations are explained below.

Further, the Committee has decided not to deal with two broad recommendations that it made in its second report because they are covered by more specific recommendations in the same report. Following that report, the Committee discontinued the practice of making broad and then specific recommendations. Those recommendations are also set out below.

OLD RECOMMENDATION

Transport Canada should continue to be responsible for the development of policy and standards for aircraft and airport security and should be responsible for verification that security policies are being implemented to its standards by the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority, airport authorities, airlines, and police or other security personnel. (Report: *The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports*, January 2003, # VIII.1)

COMMITTEE COMMENT

Upon review, the Committee believes this recommendation confuses instead of clarifies. It withdraws this recommendation. The Committee is of the view that Transport Canada should not be involved in security issues. It should be involved in other air transportation related regulations, such as airworthiness, but not security. The Committee believes that responsibility for the security of aircraft and the restricted areas of airports should be transferred to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (See Chapter 7, Problem 18, pages 189-190).

Corrections

After initial printing of its January 2003 study of airport security, *The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports*, the Committee realized that it had printed two of its recommendations incorrectly. The wording of the text of the recommendations was inconsistent with the rest of the report. Below are the recommendations as initially printed and as corrected.

#1

RECOMMENDATION VII.1 AS PRINTED

All airport policing directly related to air travel security be removed from the airport authorities and assigned exclusively to the RCMP under contract to CATSA. (Report: *The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports*, January 2003, # VII.1)

RECOMMENDATION VII.1 AS CORRECTED

The Committee recommends that all airport policing directly related to air travel security be removed from the airport authorities and assigned exclusively to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, who can in turn contract parts of it to the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority.

#2

RECOMMENDATION VIII.4 AS PRINTED

CATSA should be given the authority to contract the RCMP to supervise all policing at airports as it relates to passenger, cargo, aircraft and airside security. (Report: *The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports*, January 2003, # VIII.4)

RECOMMENDATION VII.4 AS CORRECTED

The Committee also recommends that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police be given the authority to contract the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority to supervise all security policing at airports as it relates to passenger, cargo, aircraft and airside security.

In *Defence of North America: A Canadian Responsibility*, the Committee's second report, the Committee made three broad thematic recommendations. It followed them up with eight more specific recommendations, covering essentially the same ground.

The Committee has decided to not to address the first two of the broad recommendations from that report in this report and will instead assess those responses only in terms of the more detailed recommendations.

The Committee did examine the third thematic recommendation (Chapter 5, Problem 13, pages 117-118) because it addresses an issue not represented in the more specific recommendations. The original broad recommendations are below.

With regard to improved defence of Canada's territorial waters, the Committee recommends:

1. Adoption of a layered approach of reporting and monitoring to provide timely warning of vessels approaching Canadian waters.
2. The Coordination of all Canadian resources - including Navy, Coast Guard, Air Force, Army, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, police forces and agencies responsible for intelligence and satellite surveillance - to improve defence of Canada's coastlines.
3. Greater cooperation and coordination with U.S. counterparts.

(Report: *Defence of North America: A Canadian Responsibility*, September 2002, #1, 2, and 3)

APPENDIX II

Order of Reference

Extract from the *Journals of the Senate* of Friday, February 13, 2004:

THAT the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence be authorized to examine and report on the national security policy of Canada. In particular, the Committee shall be authorized to examine:

(a) the capability of the Department of National Defence to defend and protect the interests, people and territory of Canada and its ability to respond to and prevent a national emergency or attack, and the capability of the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness to carry out its mandate;

(b) the working relationships between the various agencies involved in intelligence gathering, and how they collect, coordinate, analyze and disseminate information and how these functions might be enhanced;

(c) the mechanisms to review the performance and activities of the various agencies involved in intelligence gathering; and

(d) the security of our borders and critical infrastructure.

THAT the papers and evidence received and taken during the Thirty-seventh Parliament be referred to the Committee;

THAT the Committee report to the Senate no later than March 31, 2006 and that the Committee retain all powers necessary to publicize the findings of the Committee until May 31, 2006.

The question being put on the motion, it was adopted.

Paul Bélisle

Clerk of the Senate

APPENDIX III

Who the Committee Heard From

Adams, Superintendent Bill
Federal Services Directorate
RCMP
June 9, 2003

Adams, Mr. John
Commissioner
Canadian Coast Guard
May 5, 2003

Adams, Corporal Terrance
CFB Borden Technical Services
CFB Borden
June 25-27, 2002

Addy, Major General (ret'd) Clive
National Past Chairman
Federation of Military and United
Services Institutes of Canada
October 15, 2001

Alarie, Master Corporal Bernadette
Canadian Forces Dental Services School
CFB Borden
June 25-27, 2002

Allan, Major Murray
Deputy Commanding Officer
Royal Regina Rifles
January 27, 2003

Allard, The Honorable Wayne
Ranking Member (Republican –
Virginia), U.S. Senate Armed Services
Committee
February 05, 2002

Allen, Mr. Jon
Director General, North America
Bureau
Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade
January 28, 2002, March 17, 2003

Amos, Chief Warrant Officer Bruce
423 Maritime Helicopter Squadron, 12
Wing Shearwater
January 22-24, 2002

Andrash, Mr. P. (Duke)
Sergeant 481, Vancouver Police
Department
November 18-22, 2001

Alexander, Dr. Jane
Deputy Director
U.S. Defence Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA)
February 04, 2002

Arcand, Chief Warrant Officer Gilles
5th Combat Engineer Regiment
CFB Valcartier
September 24, 2003

Atkins, Chief Superintendent Ian
Criminal Operations Officer, H
Division, RCMP
January 22-24, 2002, Sept. 22-23, 2003

Atkinson, Ms. Joan
Assistant Deputy Minister, Policy and
Program Development
Department of Citizenship and
Immigration
January 28, 2002

Audcent, Mr. Mark
Law Clerk and Parliamentary Counsel
Senate of Canada
December 2, 2002

Avis, Captain Peter
Director of Maritime Policy, Operations and
Readiness
Department of National Defence
April 7, 2003

Baltabaev, M.P., Mr. Tashpolot
Kyrgyz Republic
May 12, 2003

Axworthy, Dr. Thomas
Chairman, Centre for Study of Democracy
Queen's University
September 29, 2003

Badger, Captain Chris J.
Vice President, Operations, Vancouver
Port Authority
November 18-22, 2001

Baird, Master Corporal Keith
Bravo Squadron
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Baker, Mr. Mike
Vice-President, Corporate Management
Canadian Air Transport Security
Authority
November 25, 2002

Baker, Lieutenant-Colonel Roy
Wing Logistics and Engineering Officer
CFB Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Balnis, Richard
Senior Research Officer
Canadian Union of Public Employees
November 18, 2002

APPENDIX III
Who the Committee Heard From

Barbagallo, Lieutenant Jason
The Black Watch
November 5-6, 2002

Barrett, Major Roger R.
Operational Officer, 2 RCR
CFB Gagetown
January 22-24, 2002

Barrette, Mr. Jean Director
Security Operations, Safety and
Security Group
Transport Canada
Nov. 27, 2002 / Dec. 2, 2002

Bartley, Mr. Alan
Director General, Policy Planning and
Readiness, Office of Critical
Infrastructure Protection and
Emergency Preparedness
July 19, 2001

Basrur, Dr. Sheela
Medical Officer of Health
City of Toronto
October 30, 2003

Bastien, Major-General Richard
Deputy Commander of Air
Assistant Chief of the Air Staff
Department of National Defence
December 3, 2001

Bastien, Commander Yves
Formation Administration Officer
Maritime Forces Atlantic
January 22-24, 2002

Baum, Major Nigel
J4
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Bax, Ms. Janet
Director General, Programs
Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection
and Emergency Preparedness
October 20, 2003

Beattie, Captain Davie
Canadian Parachute Centre Adjutant
CFB Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Beattie, Lieutenant-Colonel Mark
Senior Staff Officer, Canadian Forces
Support Training Group, CFB Borden
June 25-27, 2002

Beazley, Chief Frank
Halifax Regional Police
Halifax Regional Municipality
September 23, 2003

Beers, Master Corporal Robert
Canadian Forces School of Electrical and
Mechanical Engineering
CFB Borden
June 25-27, 2002

Begin, Mr. Robert
Regional Director, Quebec
Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection
and Emergency Preparedness
October 27, 2003

Begley, Inspector J.J. (Jim)
Federal Policing Service
RCMP
November 18-22, 2001

Belcourt, Chief Warrant Officer Mario
12th Canadian Armoured Regiment
5th Canadian Mechanized Brigade
CFB Valcartier
September 24, 2003

Bell, Mr. Peter
Intelligence Analyst
Organized Crime Agency of British
Columbia
November 18-22, 2001

Belzile, Lieutenant-General (ret'd)
Charles
Chairman
Conference of Defence Associations
October 15, 2001

Bercuson, Dr. David J.
Director, Centre for Military and
Strategic Studies
University of Calgary
April 19, 2004

Bernier, Warrant Officer Michel
5th Military Police Platoon
CFB Valcartier
September 24, 2003

Berry, Major David
Canadian Parachute Centre Training Officer
Commander
CFB Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Berthiaume, Mr. Tim
Deputy Fire Chief
City of Windsor
February 10, 2003

Bildfell, Mr. Brian
Director, Ambulance Services
City of Windsor
February 27, 2003

Bilodeau, Mr. Ronald
Associate Secretary to the Cabinet,
Deputy Minister to the Deputy Prime
Minister and Security and Intelligence
Coordinator
Privy Council Office
February 24, 2003

APPENDIX III
Who the Committee Heard From

Bishop Jr., The Honorable Sanford D.
(Democrat – Georgia)
U.S. House Select Committee on
Intelligence
February 05, 2002

Bissonnette, Captain J.R.A.
Commander, 5th Military Police
Platoon
CFB Valcartier
September 24, 2003

Black, Mr. Bob
Director, Office of Emergency
Preparedness
City of Edmonton
January 28, 2003

Black, Lieutenant Colonel Dean C.
Commanding Officer, 403 Squadron
CFB Gagetown
January 22-24, 2002

Blackmore, Mr. David
Director of Building and Property,
Emergency Operations Centre Manager
City of St. John's
March 31, 2003

Blair, Master Warrant Officer Gérald
Canadian Forces School of Communications
and Electronics
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Blanchard, Master Corporal Piette
Canadian Forces Dental Services School
CFB Borden
June 25-27, 2002

Blanchette, Lieutenant-Colonel Michael
Commander, Canadian Parachute School
CFB Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Bland, Professor Douglas
Chair of Defence Management
Program, School of Policy Studies
Queen's University
October 29, 2001 / May 27, 2002

Blight, Master Corporal
8 Air Maintenance Squadron
8 Wing Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Boisjoli, Lieutenant-Commmander
André
Commanding Officer, HMCS Glace
Bay, Maritime Forces Atlantic
January 22-24, 2002

Bolton, Lieutenant Colonel Bruce D
Commanding Officer
The Black Watch, Royal Highland
Regiment of Canada
November 5-6, 2001

Bon, Mr. Daniel
Director General, Policy Planning,
Assistant Deputy Minister, Policy
Department of National Defence
July 18, 2001

Bonnell, Mr. R.J. (Ray)
Superintendent, Officer in Charge,
Protective Services Branch, RCMP
December 2, 2002

Boswell, Lieutenant-Colonel Brad
Acting Director of Army Doctrine
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Bourgeois, Mr. Terry
District Chief, Rural District 3,
Communications, Fire and Emergency
Service, Halifax Regional Municipality
September 23, 2003

Boutilier, Dr. James A.
Special Advisor (Policy), Maritime
Forces, Pacific Headquarters
Department of National Defence
June 9, 2003

Bradley, Corporal John
Imagery Technician
17 Wing Imaging and Associate Air
Force Historian, 17 Wing Winnipeg
November 18-22, 2001

Bramah, Mr. Brian
Regional Director
Transport Canada
November 18-22, 2001

Brandt, Mr. Brion
Director, Security Policy
Transport Canada
May 5, 2003

**Brochet, Inspector Pierre, Chief of
Operation, Planning Section, Montreal
Police Service, City of Montreal**
September 26, 2003

Brodie, Ms. Ingrid
Acting Director, Public Safety
Initiatives, Policing and Victim
Services Division, Nova Scotia
Department of Justice
September 23, 2003

Brooks, Captain Melissa
CFB Petawawa
June 25-27, 2002

Brown, Major Chris
424 Squadron
CFB Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

APPENDIX III
Who the Committee Heard From

Bryan, Mr. Robert
Emergency Planning Coordinator City
of Vancouver
January 30, 2003

Buck, Vice-Admiral Ron
Chief of the Maritime Staff
Department of National Defence
December 3, 2001, August 14, 2002,
April 7, 2003

Buenacruz, Corporal
Wing Administration
8 Wing Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Bullock, Ms. Margaret
Manager, Security Awareness, Policy
and Regulatory Corporate Security, Air
Canada
November 18-22, 2001

Burke, Captain (N) Greg
Chief of Staff, Maritime Forces
Atlantic
Department of National Defence
January 22-24, 2002

Burke, Mr. Sean
Research Associate, National Security
Studies, Council on Foreign Relations
February 04, 2002

Burrell, Mr. Bruce
Assistant Deputy Chief Director,
Halifax Regional Fire Service
Halifax Regional Municipality
September 23, 2003

Calder, Mr. Kenneth
Assistant Deputy Minister, Policy
Department of National Defence
November 26, 2001, August 14, 2002,
April 26, 2004

Cameron, Captain Keith
CFB Petawawa
June 25-27, 2002

Cameron, Colonel Scott
Director of Medical Policy on the staff
of the Director General Health Services
(DGHS)
Department of National Defence
December 10, 2001

Campbell, Anthony
Vice-President, Canadian Association
for Security and Intelligence Studies
June 3, 2002

Campbell, Lieutenant-General Lloyd
Commander of Air Command and Chief
of the Air Staff
Department of National Defence
December 3, 2001

Campbell, Master Corporal Steve
426 Training Squadron
8 Wing Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Caouette, Sergeant Denis, Operational
Planning Section, Montreal Police
Service, City of Montreal
September 26, 2003

Caron, Corporal Denis
National Support Arrangements
Coordinator, Coast and Airport Watch
National Coordinator, Organized Crime
Branch, RCMP
April 7, 2003

Castillo, Corporal Marvin
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Castonguay, Staff Sergeant Charles
Unit Commander
RCMP
November 5-6, 2001

Cellucci, H.E. Paul
Ambassador, Embassy of the United States of
America to Canada
August 15, 2002

Cessford, Lieutenant-Colonel Michael
Acting Commader, Canadian Forces Joint
Operations Group, CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Chapin, Mr. Paul
Director General, International Security
Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs
and International Trade
February 23, 2004

Charette, Mr. Serge
National President, Customs Excise
Union Douanes Accise (CEUDA)
January 22-24, 2002

Chartier, Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel
Victor G., OMM, CD.
The Black Watch
November 5-6, 2002

Chartrant, Lieutenant-Commander
Yves
Acting Commanding Officer, HMCS
Huron, Maritime Forces Pacific
November 18-22, 2001

Chow, Lieutenant Commander Robert
Commanding Officer, HMCS *Unicorn*
(Saskatoon)
January 27, 2003

Cirincione, Mr. Joseph
Senior Director, Non Proliferation
Project, The Carnegie Foundation
February 05, 2002

Clapham, Superintendent Ward D.
Officer in Charge
RCMP
November 18-22, 2001

APPENDIX III
Who the Committee Heard From

Clark, Captain Robert
CO BW No.2497 Cadet Corps
Head Librarian, Law Library
McGill University
November 5-6, 2002

Clarke, Master Corporal James
Gulf Squadron
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Clarke, Mr. Shawn
Acting Regional Director, PEI, Office
of Critical Infrastructure Protection and
Emergency Preparedness
October 27, 2003

Coble, The Honorable Howard
Ranking Member (Republican, North
Carolina)
U.S. House Judiciary Committee
February 07, 2002

Collenette, P.C., M.P., The
Honourable David Michael
Minister of Transport
December 2, 2002

Connolly, Mr. Mark
Director General, Contraband and
Intelligence Services Directorate,
Customs Branch
Canada Customs and Revenue Agency
February 10, 2003, September 22, 2003

Connolly, Mr. Mark
Customs Contraband, Intelligence and
Investigations, Canada Border Services
Agency, February 23, 2004

Conyers, Jr., The Honorable John
Ranking Member Democrat-Michigan,
U.S. House Judiciary Committee
February 07, 2002

Cooper, First Officer Russ
Toronto Representative, Security
Committee
Air Canada Pilots Association
November 4, 2002

Corcoran, Mr. James
Former Deputy Director, Operations
Canadian Security and Intelligence
Service
October 01, 2001

Cormier, Master Seaman Michael
Canadian Forces Military Police Academy
CFB Borden
June 25-27, 2002

Cormier, Captain Michael P.
Deputy Harbour Master
Vancouver Port Authority
November 18-22, 2001

**Canadian Security Guide Book
2005 Edition**

Côté, Mr. Bertin
Deputy Head of Mission
Canadian Embassy (Washington)
February 04-07, 2002

Côté, Master Corporal Claude
Bravo Squadron
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Côté, Mr. Yvan
Investigator, Organized Crime Task
Force, Montreal Urban Community
Police Department
November 05-06, 2001

Coulter, Mr. Keith
Chief, Communications Security
Establishment
February 24, 2003

Couture, Lieutenant-General Christian
Assistant Deputy Minister (Human
Resources – Military)
Department of National Defence
December 10, 2001

Creamer, Mr. Dennis
Vice-President, Finance and
Administration, Halifax Port Authority
January 22-24, 2002

Crouch, Dr. Jack Dyer
Assistant Secretary of Defence,
International Security Policy
Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defence
February 06, 2002

Croxall, Corporal Kevin
CFB Borden Administration Services, CFB
Borden
June 25-27, 2002

Cushman, Dr. Robert
Chief Medical Officer of Health, City
of Ottawa
February 3, 2003

D'Avignon, Mr. Michel
Director General, National Security,
Policing and Security Branch, Solicitor
General Canada
July 19, 2001

D'Cunha, Dr. Colin
Commissioner of Public Health, Chief
Medical Officer of Health, Ministry of
Health and Long-Term Care, Ontario
October 30, 2003

**Daigle, MSC, CD, Major-General
Pierre**
Special Advisor to the Chief of Defence
Staff, Department of National Defence
March 17, 2003, February 23, 2004

Dallaire, Gabriel
Gulf Squadron, CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Daniels, Private Jason
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

APPENDIX III
Who the Committee Heard From

Davidson, Rear-Admiral Glenn V.
Commander, Maritime Forces Atlantic
Department of National Defence
September 22, 2003

Davies, Ms. Krysta M.
Intelligence Analyst Specialist
KPMG Investigation and Security Inc.
October 01, 2001

Davis, Chief Petty Officer First Class Kim
Formation Chief Petty Officer
Maritime Forces Pacific
November 18-22, 2001

Dawe, Mr. Dick
Manager, Personnel Support
Programmes, Maritime Forces Pacific
November 18-22, 2001

DeCastro, Second Lieutenant. Rod
The Black Watch
November 5-6, 2002

DeCuir, Brigadier-General Mike
Deputy Regional Commander
Canadian NORAD Region Headquarters
November 18-22, 2001

Deemert, Mr. Rob
Cabin Security, International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers
August 15, 2002

Dempsey, Mr. Lawrence
National Secretary Treasurer
Canadian Merchant Service Guild
September 22, 2003

Deschamps, Col. André
Director, Continental Operations
Department of National Defence
May 6, 2002

Desrosiers, Chief Warrant Officer
Christian
5th Canadian Light Artillery Regiment
September 24, 2003

Devlin, Mr. W.A. (Bill)
Hub Development, Vancouver
International Airport, Air Canada
November 18-22, 2001

Dewar, Captain (N) (Ret'd) John
Member, Maritime Affairs
Navy League of Canada
May 12, 2003, June 2, 2003

Dickenson, Mr. Lawrence T.
Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet,
Security and Intelligence
Privy Council Office
October 29, 2001, February 24, 2003

Dietrich, Chief Warrant Officer Dan
Chief Warrant Officer
One Canadian Air Division
November 18-22, 2001

De Riggi, Mr. Angelo
Intelligence Officer
Organized Crime Task Force - RCMP
November 5-6, 2001

Dion, Corporal Yves
Canadian Forces Fire Academy
CFB Borden
June 25-27, 2002

Ditchfield, Mr. Peter
Deputy Chief Officer
Organized Crime Agency of B.C.
November 18-22, 2001

Doge, Ms. Trish
Director, Risk and Emergency
Management, City of Vancouver
January 30, 2003

**Dowler, Chief Petty Officer First Class
George**
Maritime Forces Atlantic
January 22-24, 2002

Downton, Master Corporal Doug
426 Training Squadron
8 Wing Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Doyle, Lieutenant Colonel Bert
Commanding Officer, 402 Squadron
17 Wing Winnipeg
November 18-22, 2001

Droz, Superintendent Pierre
Criminal Operations
RCMP
November 5-6, 2001

Duchesneau, Mr. Jacques
President and Chief Executive Officer
Canadian Air Transport Security
Authority
November 25, 2002

Dufour, Major Rénald
Commander, 58th Air Defence Battery
CFB Valcartier
September 24, 2003

Dufresne, Corporal
Canadian Forces Postal Unit
8 Wing Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Duguay, Mr. Yves
Senior Director
Corporate Security Risk Management
Air Canada
November 18-22, 2001

Duncan, Mr. Mark
Vice-President, Operations, Canadian
Air Transport Security Authority
November 25, 2002

Dunn, Major General Michael
Vice Director, Strategic Plans and
Policy
The Pentagon
February 06, 2002

APPENDIX III
Who the Committee Heard From

Durocher, Captain Pascal
Deputy Commanding Officer,
2EW Squadron, CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Earnshaw, Commander Paul F.
Commanding Officer TRINITY, Joint
Ocean Surveillance Information Centre
Department of National Defence
September 22, 2003

Edmonds, Captain (N) David
Chief of Staff Personnel & Training,
Naval Reserve
Department of National Defence
September 25, 2003

Elcock, Mr. Ward
Director
Canadian Security Intelligence Service
August 14, 2002, February 17, 2003

Elliott, Mr. William
Assistant Deputy Minister, Safety and
Security Group
Transport Canada
November 27, 2002, December 2,
2002, May 5, 2003

Ellis, Captain Cameron
CFB Petawawa
June 25-27, 2002

Enger, Inspector T.G. (Tonia)
Operations Officer
RCMP
November 18-22, 2001

Erkebaev, M.P., The Honourable
Abdygany
Speaker of the Legislative Assembly
Kyrgyz Republic
May 12, 2003

Evans, Ms. Daniela
Chief, Customs Border Services
Canada Customs and Revenue Agency
November 18-22, 2001

Fadden, Mr. Richard
Deputy Clerk, Counsel and Security
Intelligence Coordinator
Privy Council Office
October 29, 2001, January 29, 2002,
August 14, 2002

Fagan, Mr. John
Director of Intelligence and
Contraband, Atlantic Region
Canada Customs and Revenue Agency
January 22-24, 2002

Falconer, Captain Vic
Formation Drug Education
Coordinator, Formation Health
Services (Pacific)
Maritime Forces Pacific
November 18-22, 2001

Falkenrath, Mr. Richard
Senior Director
U.S. Office of Homeland Security
February 07, 2002

Fantino, Chief Julian
Toronto Police Service
May 6, 2002

Farr, Mr. Bruce
Chief and General Manager, Toronto
Emergency Medical Services
City of Toronto
October 30, 2003

Farmer, Mr. Rick
Area Manager, Ontario East Port of Entries
Citizenship and Immigration Canada
May 7-9, 2002

Fernie, Iain
Regional Security Operations Manager
Air Canada
June 24, 2002

Ferguson, Mr. Brian
Assistant Deputy Minister, Veterans
Services
Veterans Affairs Canada
January 22-24, 2002

Fields, Fire Chief Dave
Fire Department
City of Windsor
February 27, 2003

Fisher, Second Lieutenant Greg
The Black Watch
November 5-6, 2002

Fisher, Captain Kent
J8
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Flack, Mr. Graham
Director of Operations, Borders Task
Force
Privy Council Office
March 17, 2003, February 23, 2004

Flagel, Mr. Brian
Director, Airport Operations
Canada Customs and Revenue Agency
November 18-22, 2001

Fleshman, Larry
General Manager, Customer Service
Toronto
Air Canada
June 24, 2002

Flynn, Commander Steven
U.S. Coast Guard and Senior Fellow
National Security Studies, Council on
Foreign Relations
February 04, 2002

Fonberg, Mr. Robert
Deputy Secretary to the cabinet,
Operations
Privy Council Office
March 17, 2003

APPENDIX III
Who the Committee Heard From

Forcier, Commodore Jean-Yves
Chief of Staff J3, Deputy Chief of the
Defence Staff, Department of National
Defence
July 18, 2001

Forgie, Mr. John
Enforcement Supervisor, Vancouver
Citizenship and Immigration Canada
November 18-22, 2001

Fortin, Lieutenant-Colonel Mario
Acting Commanding Officer, 426 Squadron
CFB Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Foster, Lieutenant-Colonel Rob
Acting Commanding Officer, 8 Air
Maintenance Squadron
CFB Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Fox, Mr. John
Regional Representative, Nova Scotia
Union of Canadian Transportation
Employees
September 22, 2003

Francis, Warrant Officer Charles
Bravo Squadron
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Frappier, Mr. Gerry
Director General, Security and
Emergency Preparedness and Chair of
Interdepartmental Marine Security
Working Group, Transport Canada
April 7, 2003, June 2, 2003, February
25, 2004

Frappier, Lieutenant-Colonel Jean
Commander, 12th Canadian Armoured
Regiment, 5th Canadian Mechanized
Brigade, CFB Valcartier
September 24, 2003

Fraser, Rear-Admiral Jamie D.
Commander
Maritime Forces Pacific
November 18-22, 2001

Fraser, Ms. Sheila
Auditor General of Canada
December 10, 2001

Frederick, Corporal
8 Air Maintenance Squadron
8 Wing Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Frerichs, Private Travis
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Fries, Mr. Rudy
Emergency Management Coordinator,
London-Middlesex Community
City of London
March 31, 2003

Froeschner, Major Chris
Acting Commanding Officer, 429 Squadron
CFB Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Gadula, Mr. Charles
Director General, Fleet Directorate,
Marine Services, Department of
Fisheries and Oceans Canada
April 7, 2003

Gagnon, Major Alain
Commanding Officer, Canadian Forces
Recruiting Centre, Montreal
June 25-27, 2002

Gagnon, Mr. Jean-Guy, Deputy
Director, Investigations Department,
Montreal Police Service, City of
Montreal
September 26, 2003

Gardner, Major Craig
Mechanized Brigade Group
CFB Petawawa
June 25-27, 2002

Garnett, Vice-Admiral (Ret'd) Gary L.
National Vice-President for Maritime
Affairs, Navy League of Canada
May 12, 2003

Garnon, Lieutenant-Commander
Daniel
Comptroller
Department of National Defence
September 25, 2003

Gauthier, Corporal
2 Air Movement Squadron
8 Wing Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Gauvin, Commodore Jacques J.
Acting Assistant Chief of the Maritime
Staff
Department of National Defence
December 03, 2001

Gauvin, Major Bart
Directorate of Army Training 5
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Giasson, Mr. Daniel
Director of Operations, Security and
Intelligence
Privy Council Office
January 8, 2002 / January 29, 2002

APPENDIX III
Who the Committee Heard From

Gibbons, The Honorable Jim
Member (Republican – Nevada)
U.S. House Select Committee on
Intelligence
February 06, 2002

Giffin-Boudreau, Ms. Diane
Acting Director General, Atlantic
Region, Department of Citizenship and
Immigration Canada
September 22, 2003

Gilbert, Chief Warrant Officer Daniel
Department of National Defence
December 03, 2001

Gilbert, Staff Superintendent Emory
Operational Support Services, Toronto
Police Services, City of Toronto
October 30, 2003

Giroux, Master Corporal
Canadian Parachute Centre
8 Wing Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Glencross, Captain, Reverend Bruce
Regimental Padre Minister
The Black Watch
November 5-6, 2002

Goatbe, Mr. Greg
Director General, Program Strategy
Directorate
Canada Customs and Revenue Agency
January 28, 2002

Goetz, Captain J.J.
Mechanized Brigade Group
CFB Petawawa
June 25-27, 2002

Goodall, Superintendent Bob
Bureau Commander, Field and Traffic
Support Bureau
Ontario Provincial Police
October 30, 2003

Goss, The Honorable Porter
Chair (Republican - Florida)
U.S. House Select Committee on
Intelligence
February 06, 2002

Gotell, Chief Warrant Officer Peter
Operations
12 Wing Shearwater
January 22-24, 2002

Goupil, Inspector Pierre
Direction de la protection du territoire,
Unité d'urgence, région ouest, Sûreté
du Québec
November 5-6, 2001

Graham, Master Corporal
8 Air Maintenance Squadron
8 Wing Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Graham, Erin
Manager Safety, Capital District Health
Halifax Regional Municipality
September 23, 2003

Granatstein, Dr. Jack
Chair, Council for Defence and Security in
the 21st Century
May 27, 2002, April 28, 2004

Grandy, Mr. Brian
Acting Regional Director, Atlantic
Region
Canada Customs and Revenue Agency
January 22-24, 2002

Gray, P.C., Right Honourable Herb
Chair and Commissioner, Canadian
Section,
International Joint Commission
March 29, 2004

Green, Major Bill
Commanding Officer, Saskatchewan
Dragoons (Moose Jaw)
January 27, 2002

Grégoire, Mr. Marc
Assistant Deputy Minister, Safety and
Security Group
Transport Canada
February 25, 2004

Gregory, Leading Seaman
Wing Administration Human Resources
Department
8 Wing Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Grue, Superintendent Tom
Edmonton Police Services
City of Edmonton
January 28, 2003

Guevremont, Benoît
Gulf Squadron
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Guindon, Captain (N) Paul
Submarine Division
Maritime Forces Atlantic
January 22-24, 2002

Gutteridge, Mr. Barry
Commissioner, Department of Works
and Emergency Services
City of Toronto
October 30, 2003

Haack, Lieutenant Colonel Ken F.
Commandant of Artillery School IFT
CFB Gagetown
January 22-24, 2002

Hall, Major Steve
Deputy Commandant, Canadian Forces
School of Communications and Electronics
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

APPENDIX III
Who the Committee Heard From

Hamel, MWO Claude
Regimental Sergeant-Major Designate
The Black Watch
November 5-6, 2002

Hammond, Major Lee
Artillery
CFB Petawawa
June 25-27, 2002

Hansen, Superintendent Ken
Director of Federal Enforcement
RCMP
April 7, 2003, June 9, 2003

Hapgood, Warrant Officer John
Canadian Parachute Centre
8 Wing Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Harlick, Mr. James
Assistant Deputy Minister, Office of
Critical Infrastructure Protection and
Emergency Preparedness, Department
of National Defence
July 19, 2001, October 20, 2003,
October 27, 2003

Harrison, Captain (N) R.P. (Richard)
Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations,
Maritime Forces Pacific
November 18-22, 2001

Hart, Corporal
Wing Administration Human Resources
Department, 8 Wing Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Haslett, Lieutenant Adam
Logistics Officer & Course Commander, The
Black Watch
November 5-6, 2002

Hatton, Commander Gary
Commanding Officer, HMCS Montreal
Maritime Forces Atlantic
January 22-24, 2002

Haydon, Mr. Peter T.
Senior Research Fellow, Center for
Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie
University
April 28, 2003

Hazelton, Lieutenant Colonel Spike
C.M.
Commandant of Armour School C2
SIM, CFB Gagetown
January 22-24, 2002

Hearn, Brigadier-General T.M.
Director General, Military Human
Resources Policy and Planning
Department of National Defence
December 10, 2001

Hébert, Barbara
Regional Director, Customs, Canada
Customs and Revenue Agency
June 24, 2002

Heimann, Dr. Alan
Medical Officer of Health
City of Windsor
February 27, 2003

Heisler, Mr. Ron
Canada Immigration Centre, Halifax
Department of Citizenship and
Immigration Canada
September 22, 2003

Hendel, Commodore (Retired) Hans
Consultant, Canadian Forces Staff
College
April 28, 2003

Henderson, Major Georgie
Deputy A3
CFB Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Henneberry, Lieutenant-Commander,
HMCS Nanaimo
Maritime Air Force Command Pacific
November 18-22, 2001

Henry, Dr. Bonnie
Associate Medical Officer of Health
City of Toronto
October 30, 2003

Henschel, Superintendent Peter
Federal Services Directorate
RCMP
June 9, 2003

Herbert, Mr. Ron
Director General, National Operations
Division
Veterans Affairs Canada
January 22-24, 2002

Hickey, Captain (N) Larry
Assistant Chief of Staff Plans and
Operations (for Maritime Forces
Atlantic)
Department of National Defence
June 16, 2003

Hildebrand, Sergeant F.D. (Fred)
"H" Division, Criminal Operations
Branch, RCMP
September 22, 2003

Hildebrandt, Captain Gerhard
Canadian Parachute Centre
8 Wing Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Hill, Mr. Dave
Chair, Capital Region Emergency
Preparedness Partnership
City of Edmonton
January 28, 2003

Hincke, Colonel Joe
Commanding Officer
12 Wing Shearwater
January 22-24, 2002

APPENDIX III
Who the Committee Heard From

Hines, Colonel Glynne
Director, Air Information Management,
Chief of the Air Staff, Department of
National Defence
July 18, 2001

Horn, Lieutenant-Colonel Bernd
CFB Petawawa
June 25-27, 2002

Hornbarger, Mr. Chris
Director
U.S. Office of Homeland Security
February 07, 2002

Hounsell, Master Corporal Scott
Canadian Forces School of Electrical and
Mechanical Engineering, CFB Borden
June 25-27, 2002

Howe, Corporal Kerry
CFB Borden Technical Services
CFB Borden
June 25-27, 2002

Hunt, Mr. Baxter
Embassy of the United States of America to
Canada
August 15, 2002

Hunter, The Honorable Duncan
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Military Procurement (Republican –
California)
U.S. House Armed Services Committee
February 06, 2002

Hupe, Master Corporal Bryan
426 Training Squadron
8 Wing Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Idzenga, Major Ray
Commanding Officer, Gulf Squadron
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Inkster, Mr. Norman
President, KPMG Investigation and
Security Inc.
Former Commissioner, RCMP
October 01, 2001

Innis, Captain Quentin
Instructor, Canadian Parachute Centre
8 Wing Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Issacs, Sergeant Tony
Search and Rescue Technician
Maritime Forces Atlantic
January 22-24, 2002

Jackson, Major David
J3
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Jackson, Ms. Gaynor
Manager, Military Family Support
Centre
Maritime Forces Pacific
November 18-22, 2001

Janelle, Private Pascal
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Jean, Mr. Daniel
Assistant Deputy Minister, Policy and
Program Development, Department of
Citizenship and Immigration Canada
March 17, 2003

Jeffery, Lieutenant General M.K.
Chief of the Land Staff
Department of National Defence
December 3, 2001 / August 14, 2002

Jenkins, Wilma
Director, Immigration Services
Citizenship and Immigration Canada
June 24, 2002

Johns, Fred
General Manager, Logistics and Processing
Strategies
Canada Post
August 15, 2002

Johnson, Captain Don
President
Air Canada Pilots Association
November 4, 2002

Johnson, Captain Wayne
J7, CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Johnston, Rear-Admiral (Retired)
Bruce
April 28, 2003

Johnston, Chief Cal
Chief of Police
City of Regina
January 27, 2003

Jolicoeur, Mr. Alain
President, Department of Public Safety
and Emergency Preparedness Canada
Canada Border Services Agency
February 23, 2004

Joncas, Chief Petty Officer First Class
Serge
Maritime Command Chief Petty
Officer, Department of National
Defence
December 03, 2001

Jurkowski, Brigadier General (ret'd)
David
Former Chief of Staff, Joint Operations
Department of National Defence
October 01, 2001

Kasurak, Mr. Peter
Principal, Office of the Auditor
General of Canada
December 10, 2001

Kavanagh, Paul
Regional Director, Security and
Emergency Planning, Transport Canada
June 24, 2002

APPENDIX III
Who the Committee Heard From

Keane, Mr. John
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
Western Hemisphere Affairs
U.S. Department of State
February 06, 2002

Kee, Mr. Graham
Chief Security Officer
Vancouver Port Authority
November 18-22, 2001

Kelly, Mr. James C.
May 26, 2003

Kelly, Chief Warrant Officer Michael
The Black Watch
November 5-6, 2002

Kelly, Lieutenant Colonel W.J.
Force Planning and Program
Coordination, Vice Chief of the
Defence Staff Department of National
Defence
July 18, 2001

Kennedy, Mr. Paul
Senior Assistant Deputy Solicitor
General, Solicitor General of Canada
January 28, 2002, February 24, 2003

Kerr, Captain Andrew CD
The Black Watch
November 5-6, 2002

Khokhar, Mr. Jamal
Minister-Counsellor (Congressional
Affairs)
Canadian Embassy (Washington)
February 04, 2002

Kiloh, Insp. D.W. (Doug)
Major Case Manager, RCMP
November 18-22, 2001

King, Lieutenant-Colonel Colin
Commanding Officer, Royal Regina
Rifles (Regina)
January 27, 2003

King, Vice-Admiral (Ret'd) James
May 12, 2003

Kloster, Mr. Deryl
Emergency Response Department
City of Edmonton
January 28, 2003

Knapp, Corporal Raymond
CFB Borden Technical Services
June 25-27, 2002

Kobolak, Mr. Tom
Senior Program Officer, Contraband
and Intelligence
Canada Customs and Revenue Agency
April 7, 2003

Koch, Major Pat
J5, CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Koop, Mr. Rudy
Research Adviser, Canadian Section
International Joint Commission
March 29, 2004

Kubeck, Commander Kimberley
Naval Control of Shipping Intelligence,
Department of National Defence
September 25, 2003

Kurzynski, Major Perry
Search and Rescue Operations Centre
Maritime Forces Atlantic
January 22-24, 2002

Kwasnicki, Corporal Anita
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Lachance, Mr. Sylvain
A/Director General, Fleet
Canadian Coast Guard
February 17, 2003

Lacroix, Colonel Jocelyn P.P.J.
Commander, 5th Canadian Mechanized
Brigade Group, CFB Valcartier
September 24, 2003

Laflamme, Mr. Art
Senior Representative
Air Line Pilots Association, International
August 14, 2002

LaFrance, Mr. Albert
Director, Northern New Brunswick
District
Canada Customs and Revenue Agency
January 22-24, 2002

Lafrenière, Major Luc
Commander, Headquarters and Signal
Squadron, CFB Valcartier
September 24, 2003

Laing, Captain (Navy) Kevin
Director, Maritime Strategy, Chief of
Maritime Staff, Department of National
Defence
July 18, 2001

Landry, Chief Warrant Officer André
1st Battalion, 22nd Royal Regiment
CFB Valcartier
September 24, 2003

Landry, Inspector Sam
Officer in Charge, Toronto Airport
Detachment
RCMP
June 24, 2002

Langelier, Mr. André
Director, Emergency and Protective
Services, City of Gatineau
February 3, 2003

APPENDIX III
Who the Committee Heard From

Laprade, Chief Warrant Officer
Daniel
Headquarters and Signal Squadron
CFB Valcartier
September 24, 2003

Larrabee, Mr. Bryan
Emergency Social Services
Coordinator, Board of Parks and
Recreation, City of Vancouver
January 30, 2003

Leblanc, Ms. Annie
Acting Director, Technology and
Lawful Access Division, Solicitor
General of Canada
July 19, 2001

Lefebvre, Denis
Assistant Commissioner, Customs
Branch
Canada Customs and Revenue Agency
May 6, 2004, February 10, 2003

Lefebvre, Mr. Paul
President, Local Lodge 2323
International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers
August 15, 2002

Leighton, Lieutenant-Commander John
J1
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Lenton, Assistant Commissioner W.A.
(Bill)
RCMP
January 28, 2002, June 9, 2003

LePine, Mr. Peter
Inspector, Halifax Detachment
RCMP
September 23, 2003

Lerhe, Commodore E.J. (Eric)
Commander, Canadian Fleet Pacific
Maritime Forces Pacific
November 18-22, 2001

Lester, Mr. Michael
Executive Director, Emergency
Measures Organization, Nova Scotia
Public Safety Anti-Terrorism Senior
Officials Committee
September 23, 2003

Levy, Mr. Bruce
Director, U.S. Transboundary Division
Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade
January 28, 2002

Lichtenwald, Chief Jack
Regina Fire Department
City of Regina
January 27, 2003

Lilienthal, Lieutenant-Colonel Mark
Senior Staff Officer
Canadian Forces Support Training Group
CFB Borden
June 25-27, 2002

Loeppky, Deputy Commissioner Garry
Operations
RCMP
October 22, 2001 / December 2, 2002

Logan, Major Mike
Deputy Administration Officer, Canadian
Forces Support Training Group
CFB Borden
June 25-27, 2002

Lucas, Major General Steve
Commander One Canadian Air
Division, Canadian NORAD Region
Headquarters
November 18-22, 2001

Luciak, Mr. Ken
Director, Emergency Medical Services
City of Regina
January 27, 2003

Luloff, Ms. Janet
A/Director, Regulatory Affairs, Safety
and Security Group, Transport Canada
November 27, 2002, December 2, 2002

Lupien, Chief Petty Officer First Class
R.M.
Canadian Forces Chief Warrant Officer
Department of National Defence
December 03, 2001

Lyrette, Private Steve
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Macdonald, Lieutenant-General George
Vice Chief of the Defence Staff
Department of National Defence
January 28, 2002, May 6, 2002, August
14, 2002,
February 23, 2004

Mack, Rear Admiral Ian
Defence Attaché
Canadian Embassy (Washington)
February 04, 2002

MacKay, Major Tom
The Black Watch
November 5-6, 2002

MacKenzie, Major-General (ret'd)
Lewis
May 3, 2004

APPENDIX III
Who the Committee Heard From

MacLaughlan, Superintendent C.D.
(Craig), Officer in Charge, Support
Services "H" Division, RCMP
September 22, 2003

MacLeod, Colonel Barry W.
Commander 3 Area Support Group
CFB Gagetown
January 22-24, 2002

Macnamara, Brigadier-General (ret'd)
W. Don, President, Conference of
Defence Associations Institute
May 3, 2004

MacQuarrie, Captain Don
J6
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Maddison, V.Adm.Greg
Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff
Department of National Defence
May 5, 2002

Maher, Lieutenant Earl
4 ESR
CFB Gagetown
January 21-24, 2002

Maillet, Acting School Chief Warrant Officer
Joseph
Canadian Forces School of Communications
and Electronics, CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Maines, Warren
Director, Customer Service
Air Canada
June 4, 2002

Maisonneuve, Major-General J.O.
Michel
Assistant Deputy Chief of Defence
Staff
October 22, 2001

Malboeuf, Corporal Barry
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Malec, Mr. George
Assistant Harbour master
Halifax Port Authority
January 22-24, 2002

Mallory, Mr. Dan
Chief of Operations for Port of Lansdowne
Canada Customs and Revenue Agency
May 7-9, 2002

Mandel, Mr. Stephen
Deputy Mayor and Councillor
City of Edmonton
January 28, 2003

Manning, Corporal Rob
CFB Borden Technical Services
CFB Borden
June 25-27, 2002

Manuel, Mr. Barry
Emergency Measures Organization
Coordinator
Halifax Regional Municipality
September 23, 2003

Martin, Mr. Ronald
Emergency Planning Coordinator
City of Vancouver
January 30, 2003

Mason, Lieutenant-Colonel Dave
Commanding Officer, 12 Air Maintenance
Squadron, 12 Wing Shearwater
January 22-24, 2002

Mason, Mr. Dwight
Joint Chief of Staff, U.S. Chair,
Permanent Joint Board on Defence
The Pentagon
February 06, 2002

Mason, Ms. Nancy
Director, Office of Canadian Affairs,
U.S. Department of State
February 06, 2002

Mason, Lieutenant Colonel Dave
Commanding Officer, 12 Air
Maintenance Squadron,
12 Wing Shearwater
January 22-24, 2002

Massicotte, Ms Olga
Regional Director General/Atlantic
Veterans Affairs Canada
January 22-24, 2002

Matheson, Corporal
2 Air Movement Squadron
8 Wing Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Mattie, Chief Warrant Officer Fred
12 Air Maintenance Squadron
12 Wing Shearwater
January 22-24, 2002

Maude, Master Corporal Kelly
436 Transport Squadron
8 Wing Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

McCoy, Chief Warrant Officer Daniel
Support Unit, 430th Helicopters
Squadron
CFB Valcartier
September 24, 2003

McDonald, Corporal Marcus
Canadian Forces Medical Services School
CFB Borden
June 25-27, 2002

McIlhenny, Mr. Bill
Director for Canada and Mexico
U.S. National Security Council
February 07, 2002

McInenly, Mr. Peter
Vice-President, Business Alignment
Canada Post
August 15, 2002

APPENDIX III
Who the Committee Heard From

McKeage, Mr. Michael
Director of Operations, Emergency
Medical Care
Halifax Regional Municipality
September 23, 2003

McKerrell, Mr. Neil
Chief, Emergency Management
Ontario
Ontario Ministry of Community Safety
and Correctional Services
October 30, 2003

McKinnon, Chief David P.
Chief of Police
Halifax Regional Police Force
January 22-24, 2002

McLean, Corporal
Wing Operations
8 Wing Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

McLellan, Mr. George
Chief Administrative Officer
Halifax Regional Municipality
September 23, 2003

McLeod, Mr. Dave
Lead Station Attendant
International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers
August 15, 2002

McManus, Lieutenant-Colonel J.J.
(John), Commanding Officer, 443
(MH) Squadron,
Maritime Air Force Command Pacific
November 18-22, 2001

McNeil, Commodore Daniel
Vice Chief of the Defence Staff
Department of National Defence
July 18, 2001

Mean, Master Corporal Jorge
Canadian Forces School of Aerospace
Technology and Engineering
June 25-27, 2002

Meisner, Mr. Tim
Director, Policy and Legislation,
Marine Programs Directorate
Canadian Coast Guard
February 17, 2003, April 7, 2003

Melis, Ms. Caroline
Director, Program Development,
Department of Citizenship and
Immigration Canada
March 17, 2003

Mercer, Mr. Wayne
Acting First Vice-President, Nova Scotia
District Branch, (CEUDA)
January 22-24, 2002

Merpaw, Ms. Diane

Acting Deputy Director, Policy
Development and Coordination
Department of Citizenship and
Immigration Canada
April 7, 2003

**Michaud, Mr. Jean-Yves, Deputy
Director, Administrative Support
Directorate, City of Montreal**
September 26, 2003

Middlemiss, Professor Danford W.
Department of Political Science
Dalhousie University
May 12, 2003

Miller, Mr. Frank
President's Adviser on Military Matters
U.S. National Security Council
February 07, 2002

Minto, Mr. Shahid
Assistant Auditor General
Office of the Auditor General of
Canada
December 10, 2001

Mitchell, Mr. Barry
Director, Nova Scotia District
Canada Customs and Revenue Agency
January 22-24, 2002

Mitchell, Brigadier General Greg
Commander
Land Forces Atlantic Area
January 22-24, 2002

Mogan, Mr. Darragh

Director General, Program and Service
Policy Division, Veterans Services
Veterans Affairs Canada
January 22-24, 2002

Morency, André

Regional Director General, Ontario
Region, Transport Canada
June 24, 2002

Morris, Ms. Linda

Director, Public Affairs
Vancouver Port Authority
November 18-22, 2001

**Moutillet, Lieutenant-Commander
Mireille**

Senior Staff Officer Policy
Department of National Defence
September 25, 2003

Mulder, Mr. Nick

President, Mulder Management
Associates
June 9, 2003

Munger, Chief Warrant Officer JER
Office of Land Force Command
Department of National Defence
December 3, 2001

Munroe, Ms. Cathy

Regional Director of Customs for Northern
Ontario
Canada Customs and Revenue Agency
May 7-9, 2002

APPENDIX III
Who the Committee Heard From

Murphy, Captain (N) R.D. (Dan)
Deputy Commander, Canadian Fleet
Pacific
Maritime Forces Pacific
November 18-22, 2001

Murray, Ms. Anne C.
Vice President
Community and Environmental Affairs
Vancouver International Airport
Authority
November 18-22, 2001

Murray, Major James
Commandant, Canadian Forces Fire
Academy, CFB Borden
June 25-27, 2002

Murray, Admiral (ret'd). Larry
Deputy Minister
Veterans Affairs Canada
January 22-24, 2002

Mushanski, Lieutenant Commander Linda
Commanding Officer
HMCS *Queen* (Regina)
January 27, 2003

Narayan, Mr. Francis
Detector Dog Service
Canada Customs and Revenue Agency
November 18-22, 2001

Neville, Lieutenant-Colonel Shirley
Wing Administration Officer, Acting
Wing Commander, 17 Wing
17 Wing Winnipeg
November 18-22, 2001

Nelligan, Mr. John Patrick
Senior Partner, Law Firm of Nelligan
O'Brien Payne LLP, Ottawa
December 2, 2002

Neumann, Ms. Susanne M.
Compliance Verification Officer
Customs – Compliance Mgt. Division
Canada Customs and Revenue Agency
November 18-22, 2001

Newberry, Mr. Robert J.
Principal Director, Territorial Security
The Pentagon
February 06, 2002

Newton, Captain John F.
Senior Staff Officer, Operations
Maritime Forces Atlantic
January 22-24, 2002

Niedtner, Inspector Al
Vancouver Police, Emergency
Operations and Planning Sector
City of Vancouver
January 30, 2003

Nikolic, Mr. Darko
District Director, St. Lawrence District
Canada Customs and Revenue Agency
May 7-9, 2002

Noël, Chief Warrant Officer Donald
5th Field Ambulance
CFB Valcartier
September 24, 2003

Nordick, Brigadier-General Glenn
Deputy Commander, Land Force Doctrine and
Training Systems, CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Normoyle, Ms. Debra
Director General, Enforcement Branch
Department of Citizenship and
Immigration Canada
April 7, 2003

Normoyle, Ms. Debra
Head, Immigration Enforcement
Canada Border Services Agency
February 23, 2004

Nymark, Ms. Christine
Associate Assistant Deputy Minister
Transport Canada
January 28, 2002

O'Bright, Mr. Gary
Director General, Operations
Office of Critical Infrastructure
Protection and Emergency
Preparedness
July 19, 2001, October 20, 2003

O'Hanlon, Mr. Michael
Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies
The Brookings Institution
February 05, 2002

O'Shea, Mr. Kevin
Director, U.S. General Relations
Division, Department of Foreign
Affairs and International Trade
January 28, 2002

Olchowiecki, Private Chrissian
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Orr, Major Ken
Senior Staff Officer, Attraction Canadian
Forces Recruiting Group
CFB Borden
June 25-27, 2002

Ortiz, The Honorable Solomon P.
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Military Readiness (Democrat – Texas)
U.S. House Armed Services Committee
February 06, 2002

Ouellet, Chief Warrant Officer J.S.M.
5th Canadian Mechanized Brigade
Group, CFB Valcartier
September 24, 2003

Ouellet, Major Michel
A/Commanding Officer, 5th Canadian
Service Battalion, CFB Valcartier
September 24, 2003

Ouellette, Lieutenant-Colonel Bernard
Commander, 2nd Battalion, 22nd
Royal Regiment, CFB Valcartier
September 24, 2003

Parker, Major Geoff
Infantry
CFB Petawawa
June 25-27, 2002

APPENDIX III
Who the Committee Heard From

Parks, Lieutenant-Commander Mike
Directorate of Army Training 5-4
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Pasel, Mr. William
Emergency Measures Coordinator,
Hamilton Emergency Services
Department, City of Hamilton
March 31, 2003

Pataracchia, Lieutenant (N) John
Representing Commanding Officer, Canadian
Forces Recruiting Centre, Halifax
CFB Borden
June 25-27, 2002

Paulson, Captain (N) Gary
Commanding Officer of HMCS Algonquin
Maritime Forces Pacific
November 18-22, 2001

Payne, Captain (N) Richard
Commanding Officer, Fleet
Maintenance Facility Cape Scott
Maritime Forces Atlantic
January 22-24, 2002

Pearson, Lieutenant Colonel Michael
Commandant of Infantry School SAT
CFB Gagetown
January 22-24, 2002

Pelletier, France
Legislative and Regulatory Affairs,
Airline Division
Canadian Union of Public Employees
November 25, 2002

Pellerin, Colonel (ret'd) Alain
Executive Director
Conference of Defence Associations
October 15, 2001, April 19, 2004

Penner, Lieutenant-Colonel Doug
Commanding Officer, North
Saskatchewan Regiment (Saskatoon)
January 27, 2003

Peters, Colonel William
Director, Land Strategic Planning,
Chief of the Land Staff, Department of
National Defence
July 18, 2001

Pettigrew, Master Corporal Robert
Canadian Forces School of Administration
and Logistics, CFB Borden
June 25-27, 2002

Pharand, M. Pierre
Director, Airport Security, Montréal
Airports
November 5-6, 2001

Pichette, Mr. Pierre-Paul
Assistant Director, Montreal Urban
Community Police Department
November 5-6, 2001,
September 26, 2003

Pigeon, Mr. Jacques
Senior General Counsel and Head,
Department of Justice, Legal Services
Transport Canada
December 2, 2002

Pigeon, Mr. Jean François
Acting Director, Security, Montreal
Airports
November 5-6, 2001

Pile, Captain (N) T.H.W. (Tyron)
Commander, Maritime Operations
Group Four, Maritime Forces Pacific
November 18-22, 2001

Pilgrim, Superintendent J. Wayne
Officer in Charge, National Security
Investigations Branch, Criminal
Intelligence Directorate, RCMP
July 19, 2001

Pilon, Mr. Marc
Senior Policy Analyst, Security Policy
Division, National Security Directorate
Office of the Solicitor General
February 24, 2003

Pinsent, Major John
Canadian Parachute Centre, 8 Wing Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Pitman, Mr. B.R. (Brian)
Sergeant, Waterfront Joint Forces
Operation, Vancouver
Royal Canadian Mounted Police
November 18-22, 2001

Plante, Master Corporal
8 Air Maintenance Squadron
8 Wing Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Poirier, Mr. Paul
Director, Intelligence and Contraband
Division (Northern Ontario Region)
Canada Customs and Revenue Agency
May 7-9, 2002

Polson, Captain (N) Gary
Commanding Officer
HMCS Algonquin
Maritime Forces Pacific
November 18-22, 2001

Potvin, Corporal
8 Air Maintenance Squadron
8 Wing Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

APPENDIX III
Who the Committee Heard From

Poulin, Corporal Mario
Canadian Forces Military Police Academy
CFB Borden
June 25-27, 2002

Preece, Captain (N) Christian
Maritime Forces Atlantic
January 22-24, 2002

Préfontaine, Colonel Marc
Comd 34 Brigade Group Executive
The Black Watch
November 5-6, 2002

Primeau, M. Pierre
Investigator
Organized Crime Task Force – RCMP
November 5-6, 2001

Proulx, Assistant Commissioner
Richard
Criminal Intelligence Directorate
RCMP
October 22, 2001

Purdy, Ms. Margaret
Associate Deputy Minister
Department of National Defence
August 14, 2002

Quick, Mr. Dave
Co-ordinator, Emergency Planning
City of Regina
January 27, 2003

Quinlan, Grant
Security Inspector
Transport Canada
June 24, 2002

Raimkulov, M.P., Mr. Asan
Kyrgyz Republic
May 12, 2003

Rapanos, Mr. Steve
Chief, Emergency Medical Services
City of Edmonton
January 28/003

Rathwell, Mr. Jacques
Manager, Emergency and Protective
Services, City of Gatineau
February 3, 2003

Read, Mr. John A.
Director General, Transport Dangerous
Goods, Transport Canada
February 25, 2004

Reaume, Mr. Al, Assistant Chief of
Fire and Rescue Services, Fire
Department, City of Windsor
February 27, 2003

Reed, The Honorable Jack
Chair (Democrat – Rhode Island), U.S.
Senate Armed Services Committee
February 05, 2002

**Canadian Security Guide Book
2005 Edition**

Reid, Chief Warrant Officer Clifford
Canadian Forces Fire Academy
CFB Borden
June 25-27, 2002

Reid, Lieutenant Colonel Gord
Commandant, Canadian Forces Air
Navigation School (CFANS)
17 Wing Winnipeg
November 18-22, 2001

Reid, Warrant Officer Jim
Air Defence Missile
CFB Petawawa
June 25-27, 2002

Renahan, Captain Chris
Armour
CFB Petawawa
June 25-27, 2002

Richard, Chief Warrant Officer
Stéphane, 5th Canadian Service
Battalion, CFB Valcartier
September 24, 2003

Richmond, Mr. Craig
Vice President, Airport Operations
Vancouver International Airport
November 18-22, 2001

Riffou, Lieutenant-Colonel François
Commander, 1st Battalion, 22nd Royal
Regiment, CFB Valcartier
September 24, 2003

Rivest, Master Corporal Dan
Canadian Forces School of Aerospace
Technology and Engineering, CFB Borden
June 25-27, 2002

Robertson, Rear-Admiral Drew W.
Director General, International Security
Policy Department of National Defence
February 23, 2004

Robertson, Mr. John
Chief Building Inspector
City of Vancouver
January 30, 2003

Robinson, Second Lieutenant. Chase
The Black Watch
November 5-6, 2001

Rose, Mr. Frank
International Security Policy
The Pentagon
February 06, 2002

Ross, Major-General H. Cameron
Director General, International Security
Policy
Department of National Defence
January 28, 2002

Ross, Master Warrant Officer Marc-
André, 58th Air Defence Battery
CFB Valcartier
September 24, 2003

APPENDIX III
Who the Committee Heard From

Rossell, Inspector Dave
Inspector in charge of Operations-
Support Services, Windsor Police
Services City of Windsor
February 27, 2003

Rudner, Dr. Martin
Director, Centre for Security and
Defence Studies, Carleton University
June 3, 2004

Rumsfeld, The Honorable Donald
U.S. Secretary of Defense
February 06, 2002

Rurak, Ms. Angela
Customs Inspector
Canada Customs and Revenue Agency
May 7-9, 2002

Russell, Mr. Robert A., Assistant
Commissioner, Atlantic Region,
Canada Customs and Revenue Agency
September 22, 2003

Rutherford, Master Corporal Denis
Canadian Forces Fire Academy
CFB Borden
June 25-27, 2002

Samson, Chief Warrant Officer Camil
2nd Battalion, 22nd Royal Regiment
CFB Valcartier
September 24, 2003

Samson, Brigadier-General P.M.
Director General, Intelligence
Department of National Defence
October 22, 2001

Salesses, Lieutenant Colonel Bob
Logistics Directorate for Homeland
Security
The Pentagon
February 06, 2002

Saunders, Corporal Cora
16 Wing
CFB Borden
June 25-27, 2002

Saunders, Captain Kimberly
Disaster Assistance Response Team
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Savard, Lieutenant-Colonel Danielle
Commander, 5th Field Ambulance
CFB Valcartier
September 24, 2003

Schmick, Major Grant
Commanding Officer, Canadian Forces
Recruiting Centre, CFB Borden
June 25-27, 2002

Scofield, Mr. Bruce
Director, Refugees Branch
Department of Citizenship and
Immigration Canada
March 17, 2003

Scott, Dr. Jeff
Provincial Medical Officer of Health
Halifax Regional Municipality
September 23, 2003

Scott, Captain John
Canadian Parachute Centre
8 Wing Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Sensenbrenner, Jr., The Honorable F. James, Chair (Republican – Wisconsin)
U.S. House Judiciary Committee
February 7, 2002

Shapardanov, Mr. Chris
Counsellor, Political
Canadian Embassy (Washington)
February 04, 2002

Sharapov, M.P., Mr. Zakir
Kyrgyz Republic
May 12, 2003

Sheehy, Captain Matt
Chairman, Security Committee
Air Canada Pilots Association
November 4, 2002

Sheridan, Norman
Director, Customs Passenger Programs
Canada Customs and Revenue Agency
June 24, 2002

Sigouin, Mr. Michel
Regional Director, Alberta, Office of
Critical Infrastructure Protection and
Emergency Preparedness
October 27, 2003

Simmons, Mr. Robert
Deputy Director, Office of European
Security and Political Affairs
U.S. Department of State
February 06, 2002

Sinclair, Ms. Jill
Director General, International Security
Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs
and International Trade
Jan 28 & Aug 14, 2002, Mar. 17, 2003

Sirois, Lieutenant-Colonel Sylvain
Commander, 5th Combat Engineer
Regiment, CFB Valcartier
September 24, 2003

Skelton, The Honorable Ike
Ranking Member (Democrat Missouri),
U.S. House Armed Services Committee
February 06, 2002

Skidd, Officer Cadet. Alden
The Black Watch
November 5-6, 2002

Skidmore, Colonel Mark
Commander, 2 Canadian Mechanized
Brigade Group, CFB Petawawa
June 25-27, 2002

APPENDIX III
Who the Committee Heard From

Slater, Ms. Scenery C.
District Program Officer
Metro Vancouver District
Canada Customs and Revenue Agency
November 18-22, 2001

Smith, Corporal
Canadian Postal Unit
8 Wing Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Smith, Mr. Bob
Deputy Chief, Vancouver Fire and
Rescue Services, City of Vancouver
January 30, 2003

Smith, Mr. Doug
Engineering Department
City of Vancouver
January 30, 2003

Smith, Master Corporal Terry
436 Transport Squadron
8 Wing Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Snow, Master Corporal Joanne
Canadian Forces School of Administration
and Logistics, CFB Borden
June 25-27, 2002

Spraggett, Ernest
Director, Commercial Operations
Canada Customs and Revenue Agency
June 24, 2002

Stacey, Corporal Derrick
CFB Borden Administration Services
CFB Borden
June 25-27, 2002

Starck, Mr. Richard
Senior Counsel, Quebec Regional
Office, Department of Justice
November 5-6, 2001

Stark, Lieutenant-Commander Gary
Commanding Officer, HMCS
Whitehorse, Maritime Forces Pacific
November 18-22, 2001

St-Cyr, Lieutenant-Colonel Pierre
Commander, Support Unit, 430th
Helicopters Squadron, CFB Valcartier
September 24, 2003

Stevens, Pipe-Major Cameron
The Black Watch
November 5-6, 2002

Stewart, Warrant Officer Barton
Canadian Forces School of Communications
and Electronics, CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Stewart, Mr. James
Civilian Human Resources
Maritime Forces Atlantic
January 22-24, 2002

Stewart, Chief William
Fire Chief and General Manager,
Toronto Fire Services, City of Toronto
October 30, 2003

Stiff, Mr. Bob
General Manager, Corporate Security
Canada Post
August 15, 2002

St. John, Mr. Peter
Professor (retired), International
Relations, University of Manitoba
November 25, 2002

St. John, Dr. Ron
Director, Emergency Preparedness and
Response Health Canada
February 10, 2003

Stone, Master Corporal
Canadian Parachute Centre
8 Wing Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

St-Pierre, M. Jacquelin
Commanding Officer, Post 5, Montreal
Urban Community Police Department
November 5-6, 2001

Stump, The Honorable Bob
Chair (Republican – Arizona)
U.S. House Armed Services Committee
February 06, 2002

Szczerbaniwicz, Lieutenant-Colonel
Gary
Commanding Officer, 407 Squadron
Maritime Air Force Command Pacific
November 18-22, 2001

Tait, Mr. Glen
Chief, Saint John Fire Department,
City of Saint John
March 31, 2003

Tarrant, Lieutenant-Colonel Tom
Deputy Director of Army Training
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Tatersall, Lieutenant-Commander John
Directorate of Army Training 3
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Taylor, The Honorable Gene
Subcommittee on Military Procurement
U.S. House Armed Services Committee
February 06, 2002

Taylor, Inspector Robert
Vancouver Police Department
November 18-22, 2001

Theilmann, Mr. Mike
Acting Director, Counter-Terrorism
Division, Solicitor General Canada
July 19, 2001

APPENDIX III
Who the Committee Heard From

Thibault, Master Corporal Christian
Gulf Squadron
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Thomas, Mr. John F.
Partner
BMB Consulting
June 9, 2003

Tracy, Ms. Maureen
Director, Policy and Operations
Division
Canada Customs and Revenue Agency
April 7, 2003

Tremblay, Colonel Alain
Commander, Canadian Forces Recruiting
Group, CFB Borden
June 25-27, 2002

Tremblay, Lieutenant-Colonel Eric
Commander, 5th Canadian Light
Artillery Regiment, CFB Valcartier
September 24, 2003

Tremblay, Captain (N) Viateur
Deputy Commander, Naval Reserve
Department of National Defence
September 25, 2003

Trim, Corporal
8 Air Maintenance Squadron, 8 Wing Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Tulenko, Mr. Timothy
Political-Military Officer, Office of
Canadian Affairs, U.S. Department of
State
February 06, 2002

Ur, Corporal Melanie
16 Wing, CFB Borden
June 25-27, 2002

Verga, Mr. Peter F.
Special Assistant for Homeland
Security, The Pentagon
February 06, 2002

Wamback, Lieutenant-Commander
Arthur
Commanding Officer, HMCS Windsor
Maritime Forces Atlantic
January 22-24, 2002

Ward, Master Corporal Danny
Canadian Forces School of Aerospace
Technology and Engineering, CFB Borden
June 25-27, 2002

Ward, Officer Cadet. Declan
Student
McGill University
November 5-6, 2002

Ward, Colonel Mike J.
Commander Combat Training Centre
CFB Gagetown
January 22-24, 2002

Ward, Master Corporal
Wing Operations
8 Wing Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Wareham, Corporal
8 Air Maintenance Squadron
8 Wing Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Wark, Professor Wesley K.
Associate Professor in the Department
of History, Trinity College
University of Toronto
October 01, 2001, May 5, 2003

Warner, The Honorable John
Ranking Member, U.S. Senate Armed
Services Committee
February 05, 2002

Warren, Mr. Earle
Director General, Major Projects Design and
Development Directorate, Customs Branch
Canada Customs and Revenue Agency
February 10, 2003

Watt, Major John
Commanding Officer, Bravo Squadron
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Watts, Chief Warrant Officer Ernest
3 Area Support Group
CFB Gagetown
January 22-24, 2002

Weighill, Mr. Clive
Deputy Chief of Police
City of Regina
January 27, 2003

Weldon, The Honorable Curt
Chair, Subcommittee on Military
Procurement, Republican-
Pennsylvania
U.S. House Armed Services Committee
February 06, 2002

Wells, Corporal Corwin
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Whalen, Private Clayton
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Whitburn, Lieutenant Colonel Tom
Squadron 435
17 Wing Winnipeg
November 18-22, 2001

White, Lieutenant (N) Troy
J2
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Wing, Mr. Michael
National President, Union of Canadian
Transportation Employees
September 22, 2003

APPENDIX III
Who the Committee Heard From

Williams, Captain (N) Kelly
Former Commanding Officer, HMCS
Winnipeg
Department of National Defence
September 22, 2003

Williams, Col. Richard
Director, Western Hemisphere Policy
Department of National Defence
May 6, 2002, March 17, 2003

Wilmink, Mr. Chuck
Consultant
November 4, 2004

Wilson, Mr. Larry
Regional Director, Maritimes
Canadian Coast Guard
September 22, 2003

Wolsey, Chief Randy
Fire Rescue Services, Emergency
Response Department
City of Edmonton
January 28, 2003

Woodburn, Commander William
Submarine Division
Maritime Forces Atlantic
January 22-24, 2002

Woods, Corporal Connor
Canadian Forces Medical Services School
CFB Borden
June 25-27, 2002

Wright, Mr. James R.
Assistant Deputy Minister, Global and
Security Policy, Department of Foreign
Affairs and International Trade
February 23, 2004

Wright, Robert
Commissioner
Canada Customs and Revenue Agency
May 6, 2002

Wright, Mr. James R.
Assistant Deputy Minister, Global and
Security Policy, Privy Council Office
February 23, 2004

Young, Major Marc
J4
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Young, Dr. James
Assistant Deputy Minister, Public
Safety and Commissioner of Public
Security, Ontario Ministry of
Community Safety and Correctional
Services
October 30, 2003

APPENDIX IV Biographies of Committee Members



The Honourable NORMAN K. ATKINS, Senator

Senator Atkins was born in Glen Ridge, New Jersey. His family is from Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, where he has spent a great deal of time over the years. He is a graduate of the Appleby College in Oakville, Ontario, and of Acadia University in Wolfville, Nova Scotia, where he studied economics and completed a Bachelor of Arts programme in 1957. (Senator Atkins subsequently received an Honourary Doctorate in Civil Law in 2000, from Acadia University, his old “alma mater”.)

A former President of Camp Associates Advertising Limited, a well-known Toronto-based agency, Senator Atkins has also played an active role within the industry, serving, for instance, as a Director of the Institute of Canadian Advertising in the early 1980’s.

Over the years, Senator Atkins has had a long and successful career in the field of communications – as an organizer or participant in a number of important causes and events. For instance, and to name only a few of his many contributions, Senator Atkins has given of his time and energy to Diabetes Canada, the Juvenile Diabetes Foundation, the Dellcrest Children’s Centre, the Federated Health Campaign in Ontario, the Healthpartners Campaign in the Federal Public Service as well as the Chairperson of Camp Trillium-Rainbow Lake Fundraising Campaign.

Senator Atkins was also involved with the Institute for Political Involvement and the Albany Club of Toronto. (It was during his tenure as President in the early 1980’s that the Albany Club, a prestigious Toronto private club, and one of the oldest such clubs across the country, opened its membership to women.)

Senator Atkins has a long personal history of political involvement. In particular, and throughout most of the last 50 years or so, he has been very active within the Progressive Conservative Party – at both the national and the provincial levels. Namely, Senator Atkins has held senior organizational responsibility in a number of election campaigns and he has served as an advisor to both the Rt. Hon. Brian

Mulroney and the Rt. Hon. Robert L. Stanfield, as well as the Hon. William G. Davis.

Norman K. Atkins was appointed to the Senate of Canada on June 29, 1986. In the years since, he has proven to be an active, interested, and informed Senator. In particular, he has concerned himself with a number of education and poverty issues. As well, he has championed the cause of Canadian merchant navy veterans, seeking for them a more equitable recognition of their wartime service. Senator Atkins served in the United States military from September 1957 to August 1959.

Currently, Senator Atkins is the Chair of the Progressive Conservative Senate Caucus, and a member of Internal Economy, Budgets and Administration, the National Security and Defence Committee and the Veterans Affairs Subcommittee. He is also the Honourary Chair of the Dalton K. Camp Endowment in Journalism at Saint-Thomas University in Fredericton, New Brunswick and Member of the Advisory Council, Acadia University School of Business.



The Honourable TOMMY BANKS, Senator

Tommy Banks is known to many Canadians as an accomplished and versatile musician and entertainer. He is a recipient of the Juno Award, the Gemini Award and the Grand Prix du Disque.

From 1968 to 1983 he was the host of The Tommy Banks Show on television. He has provided musical direction for the ceremonies of the Commonwealth Games, the World University Games, Expo '86, the XV Olympic Winter Games, various command performances and has performed as guest conductor of symphony orchestras throughout Canada, the United States, and in Europe.

He was founding chairman off the Alberta Foundation for the Performing Arts. He is the recipient of an Honourary Diploma of Music from Grant MacEwen College, and Honourary Doctorate of Laws from the University of Alberta, and of the Sir Frederick Haultain Prize. He is an officer of the Order of Canada, and a Member of the Alberta Order of Excellence.

Tommy Banks was called to the Senate of Canada on 7 April 2000. On 9 May 2001, Senator Tommy Banks was appointed Vice-Chair of the Prime Minister's Caucus Task Force on Urban issues.

He is currently a member of the Committee on National Security and Defence, Chair of the Committee on Energy, the Environment and Natural Resources, and chair of the Alberta Liberal Caucus in the Parliament of Canada.

A Calgary-born lifelong Albertan, he moved to Edmonton in 1949 where he resides with Ida, as do their grown children and their families.



The Honourable JANE CORDY, Senator

An accomplished educator, Jane Cordy also has an extensive record of community involvement.

Senator Cordy earned a Teaching Certificate from the Nova Scotia Teacher's College and a Bachelor of Education from Mount Saint Vincent University.

In 1970, she began her teaching career, which has included stints with the Sydney School Board, the Halifax County School Board, the New Glasgow School Board, and the

Halifax Regional School Board.

Senator Cordy has also served as Vice-Chair of the Halifax-Dartmouth Port Development Commission and as Chair of the Board of Referees for the Halifax Region of Human Resources Development Canada.

Senator Cordy has also given generously of her time to numerous voluntary organizations. She has been a Board Member of Phoenix House, a shelter for homeless youth; a Member of the Judging Committee for the Dartmouth Book Awards; and, a volunteer with her church in Dartmouth.

Senator Cordy is a native of Sydney, Nova Scotia.

Currently, she is a member of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence and the Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology. She is Chair of the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association and Vice-Chair of the Canadian Branch of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association.



The Honourable JOSEPH A. DAY, Senator

Appointed to the Senate by the Rt. Honourable Jean Chrétien, Senator Joseph Day represents the province of New Brunswick and the Senatorial Division of Saint John-Kennebecasis. He has served in the Senate of Canada since October 4, 2001.

He is currently a Member of the following Senate Committees: National Security and Defence; the Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs, National Finance and Internal Economy Budgets and Administration. Areas of interest and specialization include: science and technology, defence, international trade and human rights issues, and heritage and literacy. He is a member of many Interparliamentary associations including the Canada-China Legislative Association and the Interparliamentary Union. He is also the Chair of the Canada-Mongolia Friendship Group.

A well-known New Brunswick lawyer and engineer, Senator Day has had a successful career as a private practice attorney. His legal interests include Patent and Trademark Law, and intellectual property issues. Called to the bar of New Brunswick, Quebec, and Ontario, he is also certified as a Specialist in Intellectual Property Matters by the Law Society of Upper Canada, and a Fellow of the Intellectual Property Institute of Canada. Most recently (1999-2000) he served as President and CEO of the New Brunswick Forest Products Association. In 1992, he joined J.D. Irving Ltd., a conglomerate with substantial interests in areas including forestry, pulp and paper, and shipbuilding, as legal counsel. Prior to 1992 he practiced with Gowling & Henderson in Kitchener-Waterloo, Ogilvy Renault in Ottawa, and Donald F. Sim, Q.C. in Toronto, where he began his career in 1973.

An active member of the community, Senator Day recently chaired the Foundation, and the Board of the Dr. V.A. Snow Centre Nursing Home, as well as the Board of the Associates of the Provincial Archives of New Brunswick. Among his many other volunteer efforts, he has held positions with the Canadian Bar Association and other professional organizations, and served as National President of both the Alumni Association (1996) and the Foundation (1998-2000) of the Royal Military Colleges Club of Canada.

Senator Day holds a Bachelor of Electrical Engineering from the Royal Military College of Canada, an LL.B from Queen's University, and a Masters of Laws from Osgoode Hall. He is a member of the bars of Ontario, Quebec and New Brunswick.



The Honourable J. MICHAEL FORRESTALL, Senator

The Honourable J. Michael Forrestall was born at Deep Brook, Nova Scotia on September 23, 1932. After an early career as a journalist with the Chronicle Herald and airline executive, he entered politics and was first elected to the House of Commons in the General Election of 1965.

The Honourable J. Michael Forrestall was subsequently re-elected to the House of Commons in 1968, 1972, 1974, 1979, 1980, and 1984. He first became Official Opposition Defence Critic in 1966, and challenged the government of Prime Minister Pearson on the Unification of the Canadian Forces. Senator Forrestall subsequently served as Defence Critic from 1966-1979 and served over that period of time as a member of the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs.

From 1979-1984, the Honourable J. Michael Forrestall served as a member or alternate to the North Atlantic Assembly. During that period of time he also served as General Rapporteur of the North Atlantic Assembly's Military Committee and presented the committee report entitled Alliance Security in the 1980's. In November of 1984, Senator Forrestall led the Canadian delegation to the 30th Annual Session of the North Atlantic Assembly.

In 1984, the Honourable J. Michael Forrestall was appointed Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Transport, and in 1986, the Minister of Regional Industrial Expansion and the Minister of State for Science and Technology. He was a candidate in the 1988 General Election and defeated. In 1989, Senator Forrestall was appointed to the Board of Directors of Marine Atlantic, and then in 1990, appointed to the Veterans Appeal Board.

On September 27, 1990, the Honourable J. Michael Forrestall was appointed to the Senate of Canada. From 1993-1994 he was a member of the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Canada's Defence Policy and serves to this day as Defence critic in the Senate. Senator Forrestall is currently Deputy Chair of the Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence, a Member of the Interim Committee on National Security, and a member of the Joint Committee on the Library of Parliament. The Honourable J. Michael Forrestall has, in the past, served as a member of the Senate Special Committee on the Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia, Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Senate Sub-Committee

on Veterans Affairs and Deputy Chair of the Standing Senate Committee on Transport and Communications and Chair of the Special Senate Committee on Transportation Safety and Security.

The Honourable J. Michael Forrestall is currently a member of the NATO Parliamentary Association, Canada-Europe Parliamentary Association, Inter-Parliamentary Union, Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, Canada-U.S. Inter-Parliamentary Group and the Royal Canadian Legion and a Director of the North Atlantic Council of Canada.



The Honourable COLIN KENNY, Senator

Career History

Sworn in on June 29th, 1984 representing the Province of Ontario. His early political career began in 1968 as the Executive Director of the Liberal Party in Ontario. From 1970 until 1979 he worked in the Prime Minister's Office as Special Assistant, Director of Operations, Policy Advisor and Assistant Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, the Right Honourable Pierre Trudeau.

Committee Involvement

During his parliamentary career, Senator Kenny has served on numerous committees. They include the Special Committee on Terrorism and Security (1986-88) and (1989-91), the Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy (1994), the Standing Committee on Banking Trade and Commerce, the Standing Committee on National Finance, and the Standing Committee on Internal Economy, Budgets and Administration.

He is currently Chair of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence. The Senator is also currently a member of the Steering Committee of the Standing Senate Committee on Energy, the Environment and Natural Resources.

Defence Matters

Senator Kenny has been elected as Rapporteur for the Defence and Security Committee of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Prior to that he was Chair of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Subcommittee on the Future Security and Defence Capabilities and Vice-Chair of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Subcommittee on the Future of the Armed Forces.

EMAIL: kennyco@sen.parl.gc.ca

Website: <http://sen.parl.gc.ca/ckenny>



The Honourable JOHN LYNCH-STAUNTON, Senator

Born in Montréal, Québec, the Honourable John Lynch-Staunton was summoned to the Senate on September 23, 1990 by the right Honourable Brian Mulroney and represents the Senatorial district of Grandville.

The Senator was named Deputy Leader of the Government in the Senate, in September 1991 and then Leader of the Opposition in the Senate from December 1993 to September 2004.

He was Leader of the Conservative Party of Canada from December 2003 to March 2004.

The Senator has also served as member of the Montreal City Council, 1960-1974 and Vice-Chair of the Executive Committee 1970-1974.

He has been involved in many charitable undertakings and was Co-Chair of the United Way Campaign in 1991.

In his private career, Senator Lynch-Staunton has been President of the Canadian Club of Montréal 1976-1977, and the Montréal Board of Trade, 1985-1986.



The Honourable MICHAEL A. MEIGHEN, Senator

Appointed to the Senate in 1990, the Honourable Michael Meighen serves on various Senate Standing Committees including Banking Trade and Commerce, Fisheries, National Security and Defence, and chairs the Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs. He has also served on the Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy and the Special Joint Committee on a Renewed Canada.

In his private career, Senator Meighen practiced litigation and commercial law in Montreal and Toronto. He is Counsel to the law firm Ogilvy Renault, and was Co-Legal Counsel to the Deschênes Commission on War Criminals. He sits on the Boards of Directors of Paribas Participations Limited, J.C. Clark Ltd. (Toronto), and Sentry Select Capital Corp. (Toronto).

Senator Meighen's present involvement in community service includes the Salvation Army (Past Chair), Stratford Festival (past Chair), Prostate Cancer Research Foundation (Director), Atlantic Salmon Federation - Canada (President), University of King's College (Chancellor), University of Waterloo Centre for Cultural Management (Chair, Board of Governors), McGill University (Governor).

Senator Meighen is a graduate of McGill University and Université Laval and was awarded Honorary Doctorates in Civil Law from Mount Allison University in 2001 and from University of New Brunswick in 2002. He lives in Toronto with his wife Kelly and their three sons.



The Honourable JIM MUNSON, Senator

Jim Munson is best known to Canadians as a trusted journalist and public affairs specialist. He was nominated twice for a Gemini in recognition of excellence in journalism.

As a journalist, he reported news for close to thirty years, more recently as a television correspondent for the CTV network. During those years he applied his knowledge, his skills and his wit as an acute observer of people and politics to write and deliver compelling television stories and reports from all parts of Canada and around the world for Canadian viewers. He covered national events such as election campaigns and the governments of Pierre Trudeau, Joe Clark and Brian Mulroney, as well as international events such as the Iran-Iraq war, the Gulf War and the Tiananmen Massacre in Beijing on June 4, 1989.

After a brief period of consulting with the Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs, he joined the Prime Minister's Office, first as a Special Communications Advisor before being promoted to Director of Communications.

Jim Munson was called to the Senate of Canada on 10 December 2003, to represent the province of Ontario.

He is currently a member of the Committee on National Security and Defence, Internal Economy, Budgets and Administration, and the Committee on Official Languages.

Born in Woodstock, New Brunswick, Jim Munson and his wife Ginette live in Ottawa with their two sons.

APPENDIX V

Biographies of Committee Secretariat



MAJOR-GENERAL (Ret'd) G. KEITH MCDONALD

MGen McDonald grew up in Edmonton, attended College Militaire Royal in St. Jean and Royal Military College in Kingston (RMC), graduating in 1966 and being awarded his pilot wings in 1967.

MGen McDonald operationally flew the Tutor, T-33, CF5, CF104 and CF18 aircraft accumulating over 4000 hours of pilot in command throughout his 37-year career in the Air Force, Canadian Forces.

He held staff positions at the Royal Military College, in Baden Soellingen Germany, at National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa and at the North American Aerospace Command in Colorado Springs. Command positions include CF18 Squadron Commander, Base and Wing Commander in Baden Soellingen, Germany.

Major General McDonald ended his military career as the Director of Combat Operations at Headquarters North American Aerospace Defence Command at Colorado Springs, USA.

After leaving the military in 1998, General McDonald served a period of “conflict of interest” prior to joining BMCI Consulting as a Principal Consultant in the Aerospace and Defence Division. He left BMCI in 2002 to set up his own consulting company, KM Aerospace Consulting.

Major General McDonald has a degree in Political and Economic Science (Honours Courses) from the Royal Military College. He has completed Canadian Forces staff school, the Royal Air Force (England) Staff College, the National Security studies course, Post Graduate Courses in Business at Queens University, Electronic Warfare Courses at the University of California Los Angeles, the Law of Armed Conflict at San Remo, Italy, and numerous project management courses.

General McDonald is married to the former Catherine Grunder of Kincardine, Ontario, and they have two grown daughters, Jocelyn and Amy.



CAPTAIN (N) K.R. STEWART, Director Asia Pacific Policy

Captain (N) Kenneth R. Stewart joined the Canadian Forces in 1971 as a reservist, first as a Private with the Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment and then as an Ordinary Seaman with HMCS CARLETON. In 1973, Captain (N) Stewart enrolled in the Regular Force and attended *Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean* until 1976 when he transferred to the Royal Military College in Kingston, Ontario. Captain (N) Stewart graduated in 1978 with a commission as a Sub-Lieutenant and a Bachelor's degree in Engineering Physics.

Throughout his career, Captain (N) Stewart has served in a variety of shore and sea appointments. He has completed several tours of duty with the Maritime Staff in Ottawa as a staff officer in a range of responsibilities including force development, requirements and operations. He has served with COS J3 staff in the DCDS group and was the Staff Officer for the VCDS. At sea Captain (N) Stewart served in HMCS Ships OTTAWA (DDH 229) and SKEENA (DDH 207) as Watchkeeper, Deck Officer, Weapons Director, Anti-Submarine Air Controller, and Combat Officer. He was Executive Officer in HMCS FREDERICTON (FFH 337) during her deployment to the Adriatic Sea in support of Op SHARPGUARD. He has been in command of HMC Ships COWICHAN (PB 162), FUNDY (PB 159), and REGINA (FFH 334). Captain (N) Stewart attended the Canadian Forces Command and Staff College in Toronto, and is a recent graduate of the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. He assumed his appointment as Director Asia Pacific Policy in August 2003.

Captain (N) Stewart is native of Belleville, Ontario and has been married to the former Peggy Paradis of Dartmouth, Nova Scotia since 1981. They have two very active teenage sons.

BARRY A. DENOFSKY

Barry Denofsky recently retired after having completed 35 years with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). Mr. Denofsky joined the RCMP in January 1969 and worked as a peace officer in Saskatchewan, Alberta, and Quebec. In 1972, he was transferred to the RCMP Security Service where he was involved in a variety of national security investigations. With the creation of CSIS in 1984, Mr. Denofsky maintained his interest and involvement in matters of national security with the new Service.

Mr. Denofsky held a variety of operational and senior management positions with CSIS which have included the following: Chief, Counter Intelligence, Quebec Region, Deputy Director General Operations, Ottawa Region, Deputy Director General Counter Terrorism, Headquarters, Ottawa, and Director General Counter Intelligence, Headquarters, Ottawa. On retirement from CSIS, Mr. Denofsky was the Director General, Research, Analysis and Production, Headquarters, Ottawa. In that capacity, he was responsible for the production and provision to government of all source analytical products concerning threats to the security of Canada

Mr. Denofsky also represented CSIS for many years at meetings of the NATO Special Committee in Brussels, Belgium. The Special Committee is an organization of security and intelligence services representing all member nations of NATO. In 2002, Mr. Denofsky was the Chair of the NATO Special Committee Working Group.

Mr. Denofsky is a graduate of the University of Toronto, and holds a graduate Diploma in Public Administration from Carleton University in Ottawa. He is a member of the Council of Advisors, the Canadian Centre of Intelligence and Security Studies, (CCISS), Carleton University. He is married and has two children.



Dr. GRANT DAWSON

Grant Dawson joined the Parliamentary Research Branch of the Library of Parliament in March 2003. He serves as the Research Officer for the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence.

Dr. Dawson received his Double Honours B.A. (History and English) and M.A. (History) from the University of Manitoba, and his Ph.D. in History from Carleton University, Ottawa. His dissertation is the first critical examination of the Canadian government's decision-making in relation to its contribution of troops to the Somalia peace operations in 1992. Dr. Dawson's academic research interests include Canadian diplomatic and military history, peace history (especially the writings of Jean de Bloch), peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Dr. Dawson has published in the "Journal of Contemporary History" (lead article in January 2002), "International Journal" (Spring 2000), and the 2001 and 2003 editions of the foreign policy essay collection "Canada Among Nations."

Dr. Dawson has lectured for the Royal Military College, Kingston, and was a recipient of a Department of National Defence / Security and Defence Forum Ph.D. Fellowship in 2001-02 and 2002-03.



F. William Price

F. William Price joined the Parliamentary Research Branch of the Library of Parliament in January 2004. He serves as a Research Officer for the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence.

Mr. Price received a *cum laude* Bachelor of Science Foreign Service in International Politics Security Studies from Georgetown University in Washington, DC, and a Masters of Literature in International Security Studies from the University of St. Andrews in Scotland. At Georgetown, Mr. Price completed a certificate in International Business Diplomacy and co-designed a course on the Idea of Canada in a Globalizing World; also he earned the Learning, Peace and Freedom and Krogh Medals, and was selected to be a speaker at Convocation.

Mr. Price's recent studies have included work on post-positivist international relations theory, military responses to terrorism and the emergence of Private Military Companies in Sierra Leone.



DANIEL CHARBONNEAU

Dan joined the Senate Committees Directorate as a committee clerk in 2001 and has worked on several committees including: National Security and Defence, Social Affairs, Science and Technology, Agriculture and Forestry and Illegal Drugs.

Dan graduated from Laurentian University with an Honours B.A. in Political Science specializing in Canadian Government. As a student, he was active on campus and held several key positions in the *Association des étudiantes et étudiants francophones* (AEF) including president and C.E.O. He served on the university's academic Senate and several of its committees. Following graduation, he continued his involvement as a board member of the Laurentian University Alumni Association.

From 1995 to 2000, Dan worked as a Special Assistant and a Senior Outreach Officer for a member of the House of Commons.

Currently, he is a part-time student at Algonquin College studying to become a sommelier.

APPENDIX VI Index of Recommendations

CHAPTER 2, BORDER CROSSINGS

PROBLEM 1, Poor Threat Identification at the Border, p. 19
The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports, January 2003, #I.2

PROBLEM 2, Long Canadian Security Intelligence Service Processing Time, p. 23
Canadian Security and Military Preparedness, February 2002, #17.A

PROBLEM 3, Under-Trained Part-Time Customs Staff, p. 27
Canadian Security and Military Preparedness, February 2002, #15.A

PROBLEM 4, Unsafe Border Posts, p. 29
Canadian Security and Military Preparedness, February 2002, #15.B

PROBLEM 5, Arm Customs Officials?, p. 31
Canadian Security and Military Preparedness, February 2002, #16

CHAPTER 3, COASTS

PROBLEM 1, Canada's Vulnerable Coasts, p. 33
Canadian Security and Military Preparedness, February 2002, #10

PROBLEM 2, Coastal Radar – Off the Government's Radar, p. 35
Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World, October 2003, #2.1

PROBLEM 3, Inadequate Short-Range Coastal Patrols, p. 37
Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World, October 2003, #2.2

PROBLEM 4, Inadequate Long-Range Coastal Patrols, p. 39
Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World, October 2003, #2.3

PROBLEM 5, Canada's Toothless Coast Guard, p. 41
Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World, October 2003, #4.1

PROBLEM 6, No Notification Prior to Arrival, p. 43
Defence of North America: A Canadian Responsibility, September 2002, #6

PROBLEM 7, Taking Incoming Vessels at Their Word, p. 45
Defence of North America: A Canadian Responsibility, September 2002, #5

PROBLEM 8, Need Network for Maritime Warnings, p. 47
Defence of North America: A Canadian Responsibility, September 2002, #4
Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World, October 2003, #6.3

PROBLEM 9, Unannounced Vessels, p. 49
Defence of North America: A Canadian Responsibility, September 2002, #7

PROBLEM 10, Transponders for Smaller Vessels, p. 51
Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World, October 2003, #2.4

PROBLEM 11, Dangerous Containers, p. 53
Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World, October 2003, #2.7

PROBLEM 12, Lack of Border Officials Abroad, p. 55
Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World, October 2003, #2.6

PROBLEM 13, Great Lakes Surveillance, p. 57
Defence of North America: A Canadian Responsibility, September 2002, #8

PROBLEM 14, Surveillance of Coasts, Lakes and Rivers, p. 61
Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World, October 2003, #4.3 and 4.4

PROBLEM 15, Training Delays, p. 63

Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World, October 2003, #2.9

CHAPTER 4, CANADIAN FORCES

PROBLEM 1, Budget Cuts, p. 65

Canadian Security and Military Preparedness, February 2002, #2, #3

PROBLEM 2, Capital Acquisitions Falling Behind, p. 69

Canadian Security and Military Preparedness, February 2002, #3

PROBLEM 3, Overheated Operational Tempo, p. 71

For an Extra \$130 bucks...Update on Canada's Military Financial Crisis, A View from the Bottom Up, November 2002, #2 A and B

PROBLEM 4, Too Few Personnel – Too High Tempo, p. 75

Canadian Security and Military Preparedness, February 2002, #1

PROBLEM 5, Overdue Defence Policy Review, p. 79

Canadian Security and Military Preparedness, February 2002, #4

PROBLEM 6, Lack of Large-Scale Training Exercises, p. 81

Defence of North America: A Canadian Responsibility, September 2002, #1, p. 21

PROBLEM 7, The Slow Move to Wainwright, p. 83

Defence of North America: A Canadian Responsibility, September 2002, #2

CHAPTER 5, STRUCTURE AND COORDINATION OF GOVERNMENT

PROBLEM 1, Need for Muscle at the Top, p. 85

Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World, October 2003, #5.2

PROBLEM 2, Need for a Strong Team, p. 89

Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World, October 2003, #5.3

PROBLEM 3, Coordination at the Top, p. 91

Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World, October 2003, #5.4

PROBLEM 4, The Missing National Security Policy, p. 93

Canadian Security and Military Preparedness, February 2002, #19

PROBLEM 5, Need for Crisis Command Centres, p. 95

Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World, October 2003, #5.5, 5.6, 5.7, and 5.8

PROBLEM 6, Need for Canada-U.S. Coordination, p. 97

Defence of North America: A Canadian Responsibility, September 2002, #1

Defence of North America: A Canadian Responsibility, September 2002, #3

Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World, October 2003, #6.1

PROBLEM 7, Slow Progress at Information-Sharing, p. 99

Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World, October 2003, #3.4

PROBLEM 8, Lack of Surveillance Coordination, p. 101

Defence of North America: A Canadian Responsibility, September 2002, #2

Defence of North America: A Canadian Responsibility, September 2002, #3

Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World, October 2003, #6.2

PROBLEM 9, Intelligence Community Understaffed, p. 105

Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World, October 2003, #3.1, 3.2, and 3.3

PROBLEM 10, Weak Overseas Intelligence, p. 109

Canadian Security and Military Preparedness, February 2002, #17.B

PROBLEM 11, Information Fusion Failures, p. 111

Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World, October 2003, #3.5

PROBLEM 12, Lack of Oversight, p. 113
Canadian Security and Military Preparedness, February 2002, #18

PROBLEM 13, Coordination Lacking in Coastal Defence, p. 117
Canadian Security and Military Preparedness, February 2002, #3

PROBLEM 14, Allocations of Proceeds of Crime, p. 119
Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World, October 2003, #2.10

PROBLEM 15, Canada Too Inward Looking, p. 121
Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World, October 2003, #6.4

CHAPTER 6, PORTS

PROBLEM 1, Vulnerable Ports, p. 123
Canadian Security and Military Preparedness, February 2002, #8
Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World, October 2003, #4.2

PROBLEM 2, Organized Crime in Ports, p. 125
Canadian Security and Military Preparedness, February 2002, #6

PROBLEM 3, Port Perimeters, p. 129
Canadian Security and Military Preparedness, February 2002, #5

PROBLEM 4, Insufficient Police at Ports, p. 131
Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World, October 2003, #2.5

PROBLEM 5, Inadequate Container Screening, p. 133
Canadian Security and Military Preparedness, February 2002, #7

PROBLEM 6, Inadequate Container Supervision, p. 137
Canadian Security and Military Preparedness, February 2002, #9

PROBLEM 7, Fragile Ferries, p. 139

Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World, October 2003, #2.8

CHAPTER 7, AIRPORTS

PROBLEM 1, Screening Checked Baggage, p. 141

The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports, January 2003, #III.2

PROBLEM 2, Inadequate Background Checks, p. 145

Canadian Security and Military Preparedness, February 2002, #11.C

The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports, January 2003, #IV.5

PROBLEM 3, No Leadership on Airside Passes, p. 149

Canadian Security and Military Preparedness, February 2002, #11.A

Canadian Security and Military Preparedness, February 2002, #11.B

PROBLEM 4, Unprepared Air Crews, p. 153

The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports, January 2003, #I.1

PROBLEM 5, Armed Pilots?, p. 155

The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports, January 2003, #II.4

PROBLEM 6, Alerting Air Crews, p. 157

The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports, January 2003, #II.1

PROBLEM 7, Role of Aircraft Protection Officers, p. 159

The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports, January 2003, #II.3

PROBLEM 8, Vulnerable Cockpit Doors, p. 161

The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports, January 2003, #II.2

PROBLEM 9, Security Training for Maintenance Workers, p. 163

The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports, January 2003, #I.3

PROBLEM 10, Responsibility for Airport Security Needs Clarifying –
Who's in Charge, p. 165

Canadian Security and Military Preparedness, February 2002, #13

- PROBLEM 11, Known Shipper Program Makes Aircraft Insecure, p. 167
The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports, January 2003, #III.3
- PROBLEM 12, Lack of Security at Fixed-Base Operations, p.169
The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports, January 2003, #V.1
- PROBLEM 13, Small Airports are Weak Links in the Aviation Security, p. 173
The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports, January 2003, #III.4
- PROBLEM 14, Access to Restricted Areas, p. 175
The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports, January 2003, #IV.4
- PROBLEM 15, Air Mail and Cargo Goes Unchecked, p. 179
Canadian Security and Military Preparedness, February 2002, #14
The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports, January 2003, #III.1
- PROBLEM 16, The Canadian Air Transport Authority Intelligence Gap, p. 183
The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports, January 2003, #VIII.3
- PROBLEM 17, Airport Policing is Inadequate, p. 185
The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports, January 2003, #VII.1, #VIII.4
The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports, January 2003, #VII.2
- PROBLEM 18, Lack of Transparency for Security Improvements, p. 189
The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports, January 2003, #IX.3
- PROBLEM 19, Air Travellers' Security Charge, p. 191
The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports, January 2003, #IX.1, #IX.2
- PROBLEM 20, Unnecessary Secrecy, p. 193
The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports, January 2003, #X.1, #X.2
- PROBLEM 21, Lack of Financial Transparency, p. 197
The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports, January 2003, #IX.4, # VIII.5

CHAPTER 8, EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

PROBLEM 1, Lack of Emergency Management, p. 199

National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines - An Upgrade Strategy,
March 2004, #17.A

PROBLEM 2, Emergency Ad Hockery, p. 201

National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines - An Upgrade Strategy,
March 2004, #1

PROBLEM 3, Inability to Deploy Police in an Emergency, p. 203

National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines - An Upgrade Strategy,
March 2004, #2

PROBLEM 4, No Role for Reserves, p. 205

National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines - An Upgrade Strategy,
March 2004, #3, 10, 11

PROBLEM 5, No Domestic Role for the DART, p. 209

National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines - An Upgrade Strategy,
March 2004, #4

PROBLEM 6, Emergency Caches Mismanaged, p. 211

National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines - An Upgrade Strategy,
March 2004, #5

PROBLEM 7, Lack of Equipment for First Responders, p. 213

National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines - An Upgrade Strategy,
March 2004, #6

PROBLEM 8, Institutional "Lessons Learned" Memory Blank, p. 215

National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines - An Upgrade Strategy,
March 2004, #7

PROBLEM 9, Lack of Centralized Health Protection, p. 217

National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines - An Upgrade Strategy,
March 2004, #8

PROBLEM 10, Poor Collaboration, p. 219

National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines - An Upgrade Strategy,
March 2004, #9

National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines - An Upgrade Strategy,
March 2004, #18.B, C

PROBLEM 11, Emergency Public Communications, p. 221

National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines - An Upgrade Strategy,
March 2004, #12, #13

PROBLEM 12, Poor Communications Equipment, p. 225

National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines - An Upgrade Strategy,
March 2004, #14, #15

PROBLEM 13, First Responders Out of Loop, p. 227

National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines - An Upgrade Strategy,
March 2004, #16, #18.A

PROBLEM 14, Weak Central Knowledge Base on Critical Infrastructure, p. 229

National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines - An Upgrade Strategy,
March 2004, #17.B, C, D

PROBLEM 15, Lack Of Leadership on Best Practices, p. 231

National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines - An Upgrade Strategy,
March 2004, #18.A, D, E, F, and G(ii)

PROBLEM 16, Large Cities Should be Helping Regions, p. 233

National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines - An Upgrade Strategy,
March 2004, #19

Canadian Security Guide Book 2005 Edition

An Update of Security Problems in Search of Solutions

Information regarding the Committee can be obtained through its web site:
www.sen-sec.ca

Questions can be directed to:
Toll free: 1-800-267-7362

Or via e-mail:
The Committee Clerk: defence@sen.parl.gc.ca
The Committee Chair: kennyco@sen.parl.gc.ca

Media inquiries can be directed to:
[**ckres2@sen.parl.gc.ca**](mailto:ckres2@sen.parl.gc.ca)

