he expeditions led by
Frobisher were more challenging and dangerous than we can appreciate
today. Not for nothing did Queen Elizabeth name the region where
the first expedition halted "The unknown shore", for far
less was known about that part of the world than was known about
the Moon when astronauts first set foot there. The shape and
extent of the so-called "New World", particularly the
northern parts, were poorly understood. There were legends and
conjecture about a northwestern route around that obstacle separating
Atlantic and Pacific, but its cartographic
depiction was sketchy, theoretical, and unreliable.
England itself had no mapmaking tradition and relied on foreign
maps and globes. Their high cost meant that few Englishmen had any
education in geography; Michael Lok was an
exception. The maps used by Frobisher were probably those produced in the
years immediately preceding his first voyage, by Mercator (itself
based partly on an earlier map by Zeno) and Ortelius. As well,
one was drafted specifically for the first voyage
by William Borough, to compile all
of what was known - or surmised - about the North Atlantic; blank parts
were to be filled in by Frobisher or Hall as positional readings were taken.
Few Englishmen had sailed beyond European coastal waters. It was
the Spanish and Portuguese who had oceanic experience and a
superiority in maritime technology, and they who had addressed
navigational
challenges by finding a scientific way to calculate
latitude. However, in stormy or misty northern waters, the
necessary observations could be difficult to obtain. Accurate
determination of longitude remained beyond the abilities of
sixteenth-century science. This made it almost impossible to
plot an accurate course on a voyage to the northwest, crossing
lines of longitude. Even to estimate a ship's position it was
necessary to make careful and repeated measurements of direction
(determined by compass, but subject to magnetic variation)
and ship's speed; speed itself was difficult to measure,
navigators having little understanding of the effects of ocean
currents, which could slow or accelerate ships. The process
must have been especially difficult in rough seas or poor weather.
The potential for error was great. Much depended on the skill and
experience of ships' pilots and intelligent improvisation in
conditions of uncertainty.
Nor were English ships, although sturdy and
well-built, designed for the stormy and ice-laden waters of the Arctic.
The low losses in vessels on the three voyages is testament to the skills
and courage of their crews. The ships' hulls were not reinforced
against floating ice; crews hung planks, bedding or other
materials over the sides as improvised protection, and fended off
sharp ice floes using oars, pikes and poles. In 1576 the
Gabriel was knocked on its side by a fierce storm; only
quick action by its crew enabled it to be righted. The following
year the same ship's master and boatswain were washed overboard
(despite chest-high safety ropes rigged around the ship),
and the Aid's rudder broke, forcing sailors to dive
into the freezing waters to carry out repairs. In 1578 some ships
were temporarily trapped in the ice and their internal timbers
snapped under the strain. Had the ships sunk, their crews would
not have survived long in the cold, turbulent waters. It was at
that time that the Dennis was holed by an iceberg;
fortunately its crew was rescued before the ship sank.
The crews must frequently have been exhausted by the physical
hardships and psychological stress of the voyages. Nor was there
opportunity to rest upon reaching landfall, for
arduous work was
then required in mining ore from rocky and frozen ground and
loading it onto the ships. In this situation the lack of
experience in mounting Arctic expeditions again had an effect:
the victualling of the expeditions took into account daily
requirements in terms of health and energy needs, but the diet
was inadequate for the overwhelming physical demands and harsh
environmental conditions. On the third voyage, victuals were lost
when poorly-stowed casks were damaged during storms and when one
ship lost courage and fled back to England, taking a large portion
of the expedition's supplies. Fewer than 10% of the
participants died on that voyage, although many more returned to
England crippled from the back-breaking labours, injured through
frostbite, or ill with scurvy.
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A burial at sea, 1580
Photograph: Ben May
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Given the dangers involved in sending hundreds of men on a
trans-Atlantic journey, in what were by modern standards small
wooden vessels, with imperfect navigational techniques and little
knowledge of where precisely they were headed or what conditions
they would find upon arrival, it is a credit to the abilities of
the crews - not least Frobisher's personal courage and leadership
- that the fleets survived the experience and returned home.
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