

SERGE BERNIER AND JEAN PARISEAU



**French Canadians and  
Bilingualism in the Canadian  
Armed Forces**



**Volume II  
1969-1987**

**Official Languages: National Defence's Response  
to the Federal Policy**





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**Additional Reading**

*The Memoirs of General Jean V Allard* (written in cooperation with Serge Bernier), Vancouver: UBC Press, 1988.

René Morin, *DND Dependants' Schools, 1921-1983*, Ottawa: NDHQ, Directorate of History, 1986.



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*Colonel Armand Leveller, MBE, CD, was first appointed Director of the Bilingual Secretariat created by General J. V. Allard, Chief of the Defence Staff in 1967. He then became the first Director General, Bilingualism and Biculturalism, at National Defence Headquarters, remaining in that position from 1971 to 1977. As such he was responsible for the development of an official languages program and its detailed application in the Department of National Defence.*



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# Abbreviations

When appointments, institutions or agencies are seldom used in the text, their titles are given in full. When a title recurs again and again, however, it is abbreviated. Sometimes a term is followed immediately by its abbreviation, which is then used several times for a few pages; later, the same term will appear in full if it has not been used for some time; later still, both terms and abbreviation may reappear because of frequent use in a given section or chapter of the book. However, such titles as Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) or Director General Official Languages (DGOL), are abbreviated throughout.

ADC	Air Defence Command
ADGBB	Assistant Director General Bilingualism and Biculturalism
AIRCOMHQ	Air Command Headquarters
BCBB	Base Co-ordinator Bilingualism and Biculturalism
BLTP	Base Language Training Program
BPA/CP	Bilingualism Policy Adviser/Chief of Personnel
CCBB	Command Co-ordinator Bilingualism and Biculturalism
CCOL	Command Co-ordinator Official Languages
CDS	Chief of the Defence Staff
CDSAC	CDS Advisory Committee
CEGEP	<i>Collège d'enseignement général et professionnel</i> (in Quebec)
CFAO	Canadian Forces Administrative Order
CFC	Canadian Forces College
CFCC	Canadian Forces Communications Command
CFE	Canadian Forces in Europe
CFHQ	Canadian Forces Headquarters
CFLS	Canadian Forces Language School
CFOO	Canadian Forces Organizational Order
CFP	Canadian Forces Publication
CFSO	Canadian Forces Supplementary Order
CFSS	Canadian Forces Staff School
CFTI	Canadian Forces Technical Instructions
CGS	Chief of the General Staff
CLFCSC	Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff College
CLR	Co-ordinator Language Requirements
CMC	Canadian Military Colleges
CNS	Chief of the Naval Staff
COL	Commissioner of Official Languages
CP	Chief of Personnel

CPD	Chief of Personnel Development
CRD	Chief — Research and Development
CTS	Chief — Technical Services
D Ed	Director Education
DCBP	Director Civilian Bilingualism Program
DCER	Director Construction Engineering Requirements
DCNS	Deputy, Chief of the Naval Staff
DCPA	Director Civilian Personnel Administration
DCPHRP	Director Civilian Personnel Human Resources Planning
DDDS	Director Documentation and Drawing Services
DEO	Direct Entry officers
DEOP	Direct Entry Officer Program
DG Proc S	Director General Procurement and Supply
DGDAS	Director General Departmental Administrative Services
DGDEP	Director General Dependants Education Programs
DGES	Director General Evaluation Services
DGMEM	Director General Maritime Engineering and Maintenance
DGMU	Director General Manpower Utilization
DGOL	Director General Official Languages
DGOM	Director General Organization and Manpower
DGP	Director General Personnel
DGPC	Director General Posting and Careers
DGPP	Director General Plans and Programs
DGPS	Director General Personnel Services
DGRET	Director General Recruiting, Education and Training
DIBP	Director Implementation Bilingual Plans
DMC	Defence Management Committee
DMMD	Director Military Manpower Distribution
DMPC	Director Manpower Program Control
DND	Department of National Defence
DPCO	Director Personnel Careers — Officers
DPED	Director Professional Education and Development
DPRC	Director Personnel Requirements and Control
DPSCU	Director Procurement and Supply Common User
DRB	Defence Research Board
DRS	Director Recruiting and Selection
DT	Director Training
DTTC	Director Translation and Terminology Coordination
ELU	English Language Unit
ETAH	<i>Escadron tactique d'appui hélicoptéré</i>
FLU	French Language Unit
FMC	Mobile Command
FMCHQ	Mobile Command Headquarters

HMCS	Her Majesty's Canadian Ship
JAG	Judge Advocate General
LKC	Language Knowledge Credit
MARCOM	Maritime Command
MARCOMHQ	Maritime Command Headquarters
MARE	Maritime Engineering
MOC	Military Occupational Classification
MOLP	(Military) Official Languages Plan
MSLTP	Military Second Language Training Plan
NDHQ	National Defence Headquarters
NRG	National Representative Group
O&M	Operations and Management
OCTP	Officer Cadet Training Program
OLAO	Official Languages Administrative Organization
OLIF	Official Languages Information Form
OLIS	Official Languages Information System
ORAE	Operational Research Analysis Establishment
OSMET	On-site Manpower Evaluation Team
PABTD	Project Administrator Bilingual Technical Documentation
PCP	Program Change Proposal
PRB	Program Review Board
PS	Public Service
PSC	Public Service Commission
PSCLB	PSC Language Bureau
QR&O	Queen's Regulations and Orders
ROTP	Regular Officer Training Plan
SLT	Second Language Training
SSMO	Surface and Submarine Operations
SUEP	Subsidized University Education Plan
TAUM	<i>Traduction automatique à l'Université de Montréal</i>
TB	Treasury Board
TC	Training Command
UWF	Unit Working in French
VCDS	Vice Chief of the Defence Staff





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We hope the final product will reflect credit on all those who contributed to it including the translators, Frances Henderson, Patricia Solomon and Mike A. Johnston. The errors are the authors' entire responsibility.



# Foreword

Initially, this second volume of the history of Francophones and the French language in the Canadian Armed Forces was to cover the period 1969-1983. As we progressed, we agreed that 1987 would be a more realistic stopping place, since that year was the official deadline for the implementation in the Canadian Armed Forces of the official languages plan which had been introduced in 1972. This choice obviously meant accepting all the constraints of writing contemporary history.

We also chose to write a chapter (No. 18) on the history of official languages in the civilian part of the Department, which allows for comparisons with the military side of things.

The French Version of Volume II of this study did not appear until over three years after Volume I. We therefore thought it useful to recapitulate the main findings of Volume I in the presentation to chapters 9 and 10 of this present volume. We hope the background will enable a reader who has not read the earlier work to find his way into the modern story more easily.

Readers who have followed us from the very outset of our adventure will note that this volume differs somewhat in form from the earlier one. Several factors account for this, three of which deserve mention. First, this volume was mainly written by Serge Bernier, while Jean Pariseau wrote the bulk of the first volume. Secondly, following comments on our 1987 publication, we have adhered as closely as possible to a rule, explained on p. viii, designed to reduce the number of abbreviations in this text. Thirdly, the material on which this volume is based consists almost exclusively of unpublished archives which we have deliberately allowed to speak for themselves.

Our work is a first. To date, the Department of National Defence is the only federal department or public agency which has studied the lot of its Francophones and their language, and certainly no one has yet studied in depth how the Official Languages Act of 1969 was applied. Because of this, the story we present today should be of interest beyond the purely military framework within which we have for the most part worked. Perhaps one day it will be possible to compare the development of different departments' official languages programs.

This volume is also unique in offering a very concrete example through which to study how the DND personnel sector has managed one of the large-

scale programs for which it is responsible. All managers, in the various courses they take during their careers, deal with textbook cases, personnel management problems for which they must find solutions. Rarely do they have an opportunity to look deeper into the objectives and development of a major personnel management program. This, we believe, is another area where our small efforts could be of use. Should the past not be used to shed light on the future?

# **Part One**

## **DND's Response to the Official Languages Act**

*“The problem of Canadian union is merely a special case of the great world problem of our time, for mankind must learn to be equal without being identical, if it is to survive.”*

Mason Wade  
*French-Canadian Outlook*  
Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1946

*“The federal government must continue the process of being transformed into an institution which will serve French and English Canadians equally well.”*

Ramsay Cook  
*Canada and the French-Canadian Question*  
Toronto: Macmillan, 1966

In Volume I we have explained that several phenomena combined after 1763 to marginalize the French language and those who spoke it, in Canada's military institutions. The first was the transfer of the Canadian colony from the French to the British regime. The second was the somnolence into which the Canadian militia fell after 1815. When Canada began to set up its own regular forces, beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, it was British tradition, already firmly rooted, which prevailed. The language of work, customs and uniforms were English. At the outbreak of the First World War, two of Canada's twelve military districts were commanded by Francophones, while 10% of non-permanent militia officers and 20% of troops spoke French.

In the fall of 1914, the 22<sup>nd</sup> Battalion was formed. Beginning in the spring of 1915, as it became clear that the war was liable to last longer than expected, recruitment sources began to dry up. In 1917 these were found to be completely inadequate. This led the government to introduce conscription, which was despised by the vast majority of the population of Quebec.

Francophone participation in the fighting in the First World War can, at best, only be estimated. Clearly, however, Francophones were very under-represented, partly because the army they were asked to join was not a reflection of their history and culture.

In 1920, the 22<sup>nd</sup> Battalion — the French-speaking infantry unit born in the war — was placed on the list of permanent units. When the Second World War broke out, the Royal 22<sup>e</sup> Régiment numbered 184 on strength, while the total permanent force was 4,169. The non-permanent militia had gone on its English-speaking way as it had done before 1914. Need we say that the situation, far from ideal in the land army, was even worse in the air force and the navy, where no progress had been made? Defence, considered unimportant by Canadian politicians before 1914, had again sunk back into the shade a few months after the First World War ended. All that remained was a small standing force designed to provide officers to train volunteers in any subsequent war, an eventuality which seemed remote in the 1920s and the first part of the 1930s. There was no structure or will to welcome Francophone recruits and train them, in French, into artillerymen, sailors or airmen. September 1939 thus found Canada virtually as bereft of Francophones in the Forces as in 1914.

In spite of everything, it is fairly clear that French Canadians played a much greater role in the Second World War than the First. In the Canadian army, there were four French-speaking infantry units as well as one artillery and several auxiliary units, not to mention thousands of individuals serving everywhere else. In all, Francophones made up about 19% of the strength on

land, including territorial forces. This figure was well below the national percentage (about 29%), but well above the 1914-1918 figure. Naturally, the air force and navy lagged behind, with an estimated Francophone strength of 10% in both these services.

As for the status of French, it was correspondingly low. It was really only used within French-language units of the army, and only at the troop level. In battle, as soon as the use of various arms had to be co-ordinated (one or two armoured units and artillery supporting a company attack, for example), English was the sole language used. The Forces remained English in language, tradition and outlook.

When the Second World War ended, servicemen were demobilized abruptly, and the Forces returned to the concept that had prevailed until 1939: tiny standing forces ready to train any volunteers that might be raised some day. Brigadier J.P.E. Bernatchez, was instructed to study Francophone participation in the land army. His recommendations however, did not go far in the short term. As the saying goes, it is difficult to change the behaviour of victorious armies.

The Korean War and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization caused the Canadian Forces to expand after 1950. The decade that followed was marked by a series of studies on the treatment the three services accorded their Francophones. The findings were obvious enough to many, whether or not they served in the Forces. Those who had hitherto avoided thinking about this set of issues discovered that French Canadians perceived the Canadian Forces as an Anglophone bastion. No serious career would be possible in the Forces for someone who spoke only French, or even one whose mastery of English was not almost perfect. Transfers to different parts of Canada made having one's children's educated in French and leading a somewhat 'normal' family life a matter of chance, to say the least.

In the 1950s, changes designed to improve conditions for Francophones in the land army were shortsighted and made without conviction, and they came to very little. On the other hand, the opening of the *Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean* in Quebec, in 1952, for officer cadets in all three services, became an important part of the movement to include more Francophones. But although cadets spent their first three academic years in Saint-Jean, until the mid-1970s, they had to spend their last two at The Royal Military College in Kingston, using English only. For the most part, Francophone officer cadets took their summer military training in English.



In 1960, the army, where French Canadians were best represented and most successful, still drafted promotion examinations for officers in English and had them roughly translated into French. Answers written in French were also translated before being marked.

From the mid-sixties onward, the Forces showed they were ready to look seriously at the question of the place Francophones and their language could occupy in the Canadian Forces. Between 1964 and 1970 the Department was headed by two ministers, Paul Hellyer and Léo Cadieux, who wanted to improve the lot of Francophones. A French Canadian, General Jean V. Allard, became Chief of the Defence Staff in 1966. Until he left in 1969, he made the Francophone question a priority issue. He advanced on all fronts, setting ambitious objectives and creating more French-language units. The program he introduced was aimed at enabling Francophones to serve their country in their own language.

Allard left it to his successors to follow in his path. How and to what extent that was done is the subject of this volume. Part One, perhaps the most difficult for those new to the field, explains how the military planned the response they made to the government's strongly expressed desire to improve the lot of Francophones and their language in Canadian federal institutions.

The planners had many situations to deal with, ranging from personality clashes to not always innocent misunderstandings. In spite of all this, they believed by 1972 that they had set up mechanisms which would make a complete about-face possible within fifteen years. Revisions would, however, be made to the original plan, which might be called a flexible framework.

One of the ways identified to implement this plan in 1972 was to decentralize the advisory role played by the Director General Official Languages at National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa. Each of the functional Commands thus very rapidly acquired a special adviser on official languages. This initial decentralization was followed by another which gave the country's larger bases local co-ordinators in the same field. Chapter 10 gives an overview of this decentralization and focuses on significant aspects of its introduction.



# 9

## The Plan

### **The bilingualism program of 27 February 1970 and the Laurendeau-Dunton Commission recommendations**

On 10 June 1969, when Colonel Pierre Chassé submitted to General Allard the first draft of a directive on implementing bilingualism in the Forces, he was modest about the quality of this “basic document which, as well as replacing the Dare report, was designed to take into account our responsibilities under Bill C-120, which is now law”.<sup>1</sup> Restructured over the following three months, the directive was discussed on 9 September by the Defence Council, which accepted the basic principles while asking that it be revised in several respects.<sup>2</sup> A week later, General F.R. Sharp, who had just succeeded General Allard as Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), asked the Chief of Personnel (CP) to carry out the Council’s wishes<sup>3</sup>.

On 2 October, the Director Implementation of Bilingual Plans (DIBP), Colonel Chassé, submitted the directive, which had been revised according to the comments made by the Defence Council and the Minister on 9 September.<sup>4</sup> Between this date and 17 December 1969, when it was studied by the Defence Council, the text was reviewed by several persons without major changes being made to the basic content of this second version.<sup>5</sup> The form, however, did change. In October, it had been foreseen that twenty goals were to be achieved over two time periods: before 1975 and after 1975. When the CDS Advisory Committee discussed the text on 12 November 1969, this changed to ten objectives and, without anything essential being lost, they were all to be achieved before 1975; the second period, 1975 to 1980, was eliminated. Other minor changes were made between 12 November and the Defence Council’s discussion of the plan on 17 December 1969. At that time the Minister approved the terms. But he stressed that when the project was made public, its exact scope and the way in which it was to be implemented had to be submitted in terms easy to understand.<sup>6</sup>

On 30 December, the CDS wrote to the CP that the best way to promulgate this policy would be through a CDS directive.<sup>7</sup> Thus, on 27 February 1970, CDS directive P3/70, entitled “Bilingualism Policy for the

Canadian Armed Forces” was issued. Its text, published in both languages in the new side-by-side format, stated that the Forces were aiming to achieve four goals:

- to provide bilingual services to all its publics (internal or external);
- to reflect the linguistic and cultural values, as well as the proportional representation of the two language groups which made up the Canadian population;
- to create a climate in which all military personnel could seek to achieve common goals while using either of the two official languages;
- to provide instruction for learning a second language.

In order to attain these goals while avoiding unfairness and misunderstandings, progress was to be made in stages. These were not defined, but by 1975 the following were to be achieved:

- service to the public (internal or external) in both languages;
- judicious use of bilingual personnel;
- the designation of bilingual positions;
- an increase in opportunities for learning a second language;
- an increase as well in the number of bilingual officers chosen for staff colleges, whose personnel should increasingly be able to work in both languages;
- the offering of opportunities for linguistic refresher courses;
- the study of ways in which English and French documents could be published, side by side;
- inclusion in all military personnel files of the degree of competence rating in both official languages.<sup>8</sup>

The program was flexible; it could be continually updated and revised. It was also as vague as one could wish, which added to its flexibility.

It was only after battling with and conquering certain twinges of remorse that the CDS distributed this directive, to judge from an annotation he made to it and an accompanying note. Both these documents dated 22 January, were addressed to Deputy Minister Elgin Armstrong, but were never sent. On this date, the directive was ready for distribution,<sup>9</sup> the CDS, General Sharp, decided to put some misgivings on the record. Rereading the directive, he thought it suggested that there might well be bilingualism in places where it was not necessary; that is, in units not stationed in a bilingual district, or in which there were no Francophones. Moreover, the directive linked bilingualism with proportional representation. He was strongly in favour of creating conditions that would give equal opportunities to all, and he recognized that this would probably result in proportional representation. But this goal should not be included in a directive on bilingualism. In other words, if all military personnel were bilingual, “would we promote people so as to ensure proportional representation? Maybe we would, but it is not the present desire of the government that this be done”.<sup>10</sup>

Rather than signing and sending this memorandum, Sharp asked one of his assistants, Lieutenant-Colonel C. Tousignant, for his reactions to these comments. A copy of the directive annotated by the CDS, and Tousignant’s response, dated 26 January 1970, is filed in the Letellier Papers. It is three pages long: beside each one of Sharp’s remarks are comments from his subordinate and also a handwritten counter-reaction from Sharp.<sup>11</sup>

One of Sharp’s reflections is interesting. He wrote that the Secretary of State’s Advisory Committee on Bilingualism ought to approve the directive before it was published. In his response, Tousignant pointed out the implications if Sharp was to require that the directive be amended according to his comments. First, it had been approved by the authorities in question, and 7,000 copies had been made for distribution. Changes as requested by the CDS would mean that the document would have to be seen again by the Defence Council (which included the deputy minister to whom Sharp wanted to express his misgivings), our DND’S Department’s Advisory Committee on Bilingualism and the Secretary of State Department.

Secondly, after the Defence Council had approved the directive, the CP had clearly emphasized, in several meetings with his staff, that this was an official document. “In all fairness to [the CP], wrote Tousignant, I would like to suggest that you consult CP before writing to the DM on the subject.” Sharp’s final reaction was, “OK. Let’s carry on with distribution as planned, but let’s rewrite the directive to cover some of the points. For example, we are certainly not going to establish bilingual positions at Colorado Springs just to show the Americans that bilingualism is one of our characteristics”.<sup>12</sup>

In the end, the program itself was not changed. What changed between 26 January and 27 February 1970 was the covering letter. The draft of this letter, dated 6 February, tried to give the Sharp reinterpretation of what the policy meant. Between this time and 27 February, these explanations, which were intended to correct the spirit, if not the letter, of the law and of the Department's policy, were substantially watered down, so that one could say that the CDS did not win his case after all with regard to principles. The draft covering letter of 6 February restated, sometimes word for word, what the program said. After reflection, these redundancies were eliminated. Other paragraphs more revealing of what Sharp, and certainly other high officials, thought, were also deleted. Here is an example:

[...] To identify at all levels bilingual positions and appointments on a realistic basis means that in any particular office, such as a Directorate, the Director or the Deputy, or a Section Head or his Deputy must have the prescribed bilingual competence. It does not mean that a specific position, i.e. Director, will be bilingual but simply that one or the other should have this competence.<sup>13</sup>

This paragraph reflects exactly what Sharp had meant in his still-born memorandum of 21 January. Apparently, someone intervened to convince the CDS that there was a contradiction between what he wanted the policy to mean on this point and what the document actually said.

We shall discuss later some other significant parts of the draft of the letter dated 6 February 1970 or the covering letter itself, dated 27 February. For the moment, let us go back to the day the Defence Council adopted the bilingualism program for the Forces, 17 December 1969, which was marked in an important way by the tabling, in the House, of Volume III of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. Some of this volume's conclusions and recommendations (numbers 25 to 41) refer exclusively to the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). As we shall refer from time to time to any one of the recommendations by number, without giving its text, the reader can easily refer to Appendix B to find these recommendations.

On 15 December, Colonel Chassé sent preliminary comments to the Director General Education Programs (DGEP), in which he agreed to the broad outlines of the report. He noted, however, that too much was said about Francophones in the Forces and little about bilingualism. For his part, he preferred that bilingualism be the order of the day. He also remarked that no mention was made of the role of Anglophones in the Forces.<sup>14</sup>

On the same day, Deputy Minister Armstrong sent a memorandum to the Minister to make clear what was happening in the Department. The Honourable Donald S. Macdonald, Minister of National Defence since 26 September, had to be briefed on the tabling of Volume III of the Laurendeau-Dunton Report, which might well lead to questions in the House of Commons. Armstrong suggested that the military bilingualism program would be studied shortly and “will no doubt be approved and will be effective immediately”. The Deputy Minister also showed how the Department had already moved ahead on several of the fronts mentioned, and he outlined ideas that were to be looked at more formally over the months to come.<sup>15</sup>

On 15 January 1970, Chassé sent his reactions to each of the recommendations to the chairman of the Advisory Committee on Bilingualism, who was also the DGEP. His response was positive to all the report's recommendations except number 41, as the latter provided for the creation of the position of Chief of Linguistic Services at the same level as Chief of Personnel. This new service would be responsible for developing, implementing and co-ordinating the reforms made necessary by the other recommendations. Chassé noted, quite correctly, that his directorate partially filled the role of the proposed service; he had already put forward the same argument in his 15 December comments. In his view, it would be sufficient to expand his mandate to include, for example, research on evaluation and costs of second-language training. For the rest, he explained what the Forces had achieved in dealing with the problems which recommendations 26 to 40 intended to solve and which, in some cases, had already been eliminated. He suggested that a legal advisor be consulted before changing the National Defence Act as proposed in recommendation 25. Finally, recommendations 32, 33 and 36, which referred to Francophones and French Language Units — several of the latter were already in existence in the Forces — were acceptable in principle, but that these units should not be confined to Mobile Command.<sup>16</sup> On this last point, he was repeating exactly what CDS Allard had said to representatives of the Commission in January 1967. This meant that Chassé did not have to comment on recommendation 37, which said precisely that French Language Units should gradually be extended beyond Mobile Command. Chassé suggested that recommendation 40, concerning military colleges, should be amended. We shall examine this in Chapter 14.

On 19 January, using what Chassé wrote on 15 January, the Deputy Minister sent his preliminary comments to the Clerk of the Privy Council, R.G. Robertson. These were essentially the same as those of Chassé, but he did state that recommendation 25 was no longer necessary since the passing of the Official Languages Act. Recommendation 36 suggested that competent

Francophones be given accelerated promotions, when necessary. Armstrong simply reminded him that promotion was to be based on merit.<sup>17</sup>

On the heels of Volume III of the Laurendeau-Dunton Report, on 29 January and 5 February, the Privy Council Committee on Culture and Information adopted four documents aimed at directing and co-ordinating the efforts of departments to give the French language its proper place in the government. These were studied and accepted by Cabinet on 19 February, and National Defence received copies on the 27<sup>th</sup>, through the usual channels. When we look at the sections that dealt with the implementation of measures to achieve more bilingualism, it is surprising to see how closely they followed the program that National Defence had adopted in the same field in December. The majority of the program's elements, including the most important ones, had been put forward during the summer of 1969. As that had been approved by the Secretary of State — a Department which had contributed a great deal to the preparation of decisions by the Privy Council Committee on Culture and Information — we may wonder if the Forces' program in this area did not serve as a model to the public servants responsible for writing these documents.<sup>18</sup>

Chassé observed to the CP that these documents strengthened the bilingualism policy of the Forces, which had been prepared about six months before these Cabinet decisions. This showed “[TRANS] that we predicted incredibly accurately”.<sup>19</sup> The covering letter for the Forces' program, dated 27 February, stressed that it was approved (and obviously prepared) even before the tabling of Volume III.<sup>20</sup>

On 16 April, the Privy Council special committee that, in January and February, had been dealing with recommendations 1 to 5 of Volume III, which were of a general nature, presented another report to Cabinet on recommendations 6 to 57. With regard to the Forces (recommendations 25 to 41), the committee closely followed the comments made earlier by Chassé and passed on by Armstrong. Recommendation 25 was no longer necessary after passage of the Official Languages Act. With regard to recommendation 32, someone made the same mistake as Armstrong in saying that the Francophone sector had originated in 1969. In point of fact, 1914, the birthday of the *Royal 22<sup>e</sup> Régiment*, or 1968, referring to the reforms undertaken by Allard, would be more accurate dates. As for recommendation 33, one suspects that the writers of the report knew nothing about the Forces; they vaguely translated what Armstrong had sent to them by saying that “the Department is considering ... the possibility of creating two headquarters into French Language Units”. An official at Canadian Forces Headquarters CFHQ), perhaps Chassé, underlined this



sentence and wrote in the margin in red: “Since when?” Quite frequently in this document, one comes across the insistence of the B & B Commission, that French Language Units and Francophones, should be in Mobile Command. In the Department, this was everywhere replaced by “Canadian Armed Forces which is certainly more generous.”<sup>21</sup>

This document, received by Sharp on the 17<sup>th</sup>, was sent to Chassé on the 22<sup>nd</sup> through the chain of command. He made only brief annotations in the places already mentioned, among others. In May and June, the Cabinet Committee continued to study and discuss the matter before suggesting to Cabinet on 9 June that it give its approval to recommendations 26 to 40. Recommendations 25 and 41 were no longer necessary.<sup>22</sup> Cabinet agreed to this position on the 18<sup>th</sup>. Five days later, Prime Minister Trudeau made a lengthy speech in the House. Recommendations 25 to 41 were mentioned with the reservations already noted, while the others were accepted as a whole, although the Prime Minister added that changes of this magnitude would not be made overnight.<sup>23</sup>

### **The Bilingualism and Biculturalism Implementation Program — 12 February 1971**

A minor change took place on 1 January 1970. The Director Implementation Bilingual Plans became the Bilingualism Policy Advisor to the Chief of Personnel (BPA/CP.)<sup>24</sup> It was thus the Advisor’s office that distributed directive P3/70 and announced on 3 March, that large formations should receive a copy within a week; Commanding generals should see that it was widely distributed.<sup>25</sup> There does not seem to have been much reaction to this directive. One, however, should be mentioned. Lieutenant General Gilles Turcot, Commander of Mobile Command, wrote to the CP on 16 April to express regret that this program did not put enough emphasis on proportional representation of Francophones according to the Canadian population — the famous 28%.<sup>26</sup> Chassé had doubtless already had wind of this criticism, since he mentioned the matter in an 11 March memorandum to his superior, dismissing it because a sub-section of the program dealt with this area. Chassé added that this short sub-section was the subject of long and rather emotional debates.<sup>27</sup> He also remarked that the statement in question opened the door for later directives on this very subject.<sup>28</sup>

In fact, the next step planned at NDHQ was to prepare a program for implementation of B & B in the Forces that would allow a start to be made on clarifying the 28% issue.

We shall not dwell on the details of working out this program, which continued almost throughout 1970, or on the unflagging work by the BPA/CP, who circulated several drafts for comment to NDHQ and the Commands. The first of these was dated 24 April.<sup>29</sup> For the moment we merely note that on 21 December 1970 the BPA/CP sent a request to the Defence Council concerning increased bilingualism and biculturalism in the Forces. This plan obviously repeated several of the elements mentioned in the previous pages. Its scope, however, was wider: training, translation, information on the program, the percentage of Francophones, the need to project a bilingual image, human resources, location and use of units, financial implications, co-ordination and control were all requirements taken into consideration.

The Minister, Mr Macdonald, emphasized from the outset of the debates following this presentation that the subject of B & B would be for him, as it was for his predecessor, a matter of priority. He thus asked that the proposed program be reviewed from this perspective and also that the threatening aspect of a 1980 deadline be eliminated — 1980 was the date by which the Forces were to comprise 28% Francophones in all ranks and trades. On the other hand, he accepted immediately the principle of enlarging the BPA/CP office and guaranteed his support of the objectives accepted by his predecessor a year earlier.<sup>30</sup>

These decisions led to promulgation on 12 February 1971 of a program to increase B & B in the CAF, which was tabled in the House of Commons by the Minister on the 26<sup>th</sup>.<sup>31</sup> Despite its title, the accompanying letter signed by Major General M. Dare, Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff, on behalf of the CDS, stated clearly that the measures dealing with biculturalism had not yet been approved by the Defence Council and they would be the subject of subsequent directives. The document itself was divided into a program and an implementation plan.

The program, six pages long, more or less repeated the policy approved on 17 December 1969, stressing that institutional, not individual, bilingualism was what was being sought, even if bilingual persons would automatically, it was recognized, be of service to the institution. It was divided into five large parts. First it discussed certain requirements resulting from the bilingualism policy: the percentage of Forces personnel who should be bilingual from 1971 to 1980; the proportion of Francophones; bilingual positions; new French Language Units; allocation of funds to military personnel, when necessary, to ensure adequate education of their children. Next, the paper discussed personnel resources, stating that a serious evaluation of each person's second language knowledge would soon be undertaken and that priorities concerning the use of bilingual military personnel should be maintained. The document

went on to second-language instruction and explained the different methods already being used, or about to be, to promote this aspect of the program. Among other items, there were plans for refresher courses in French for Francophones who had not worked in French for years; Anglophones were guaranteed an opportunity not only to study French but also to use their new knowledge; and parameters for student selection were determined. Briefly noted were translation services, co-ordination of implementation, and the need for adequate information concerning these projects.

The plan (see Appendix C) divided the implementation of this program into 28 stages, all to be completed in 1980, although most of them were to be completed by the end of 1972. A very vague approach was still taken to the question of percentage of Francophones: until such time as there were 28% Francophones in the Forces, the objective was to approximate, in officer at ranks above the rank of captain and in men's ranks down to the rank of Corporal, the percentages of francophone officers and non-officers respectively in the Canadian Armed Forces.<sup>32</sup>

One could criticize these plans for not taking sufficiently into account the contingencies they created. It was necessary to identify precisely bilingual positions and the level of competence necessary before 1 September 1971, to test bilingual service personnel before December 1972, to develop the 28% Francophone structure before 1 April, and so on. In February 1971, the staff of the special office headed first by Letellier, and then by Chassé, still had only fourteen positions, some of which were not filled. Furthermore, certain important decisions had not yet been clarified. How was the 28% figure to be achieved? How soon? The huge amount of translation that all aspects of implementation would require was scarcely touched on. In the end, this plan was very unrealistic, thus repeating the mistake that Allard had made seventeen months earlier. Thus it was not until April 1972 that a method of achieving 28% Francophones in the Armed Forces was officially accepted.

Instead of pursuing this further, let us go back and, concentrate on some details that marked the long period of definitive formulation of the program.

First, the polishing of the original text. The very first draft of 24 April 1970, to which only Chassé and one of his officers were able to contribute since the rest of the staff were busy with other duties,<sup>33</sup> was 47 pages long. On the following 16 September, this text, pruned of many redundancies, was almost the same as the one that would be studied on 21 December, little more than ten pages altogether.

In the meantime, several committees and high-ranking military people had an opportunity to contribute to it. Discussions took place with the Public Service Commission, the Bilingualism Secretariat of the Secretary of State, the Treasury Board's Bilingualism and Biculturalism Committee and the Department's Advisory Committee on Bilingualism, which was on the verge of extinction, as we shall later see.

On 16 September 1970, the Proposed Program for the Implementation of Bilingualism and Biculturalism in the Canadian Armed Forces was sent to Commanding Generals for comment. Replies were due in Ottawa by 7 October<sup>34</sup>. On 26 October, Chassé prepared a summary of the remarks from the Commands for his superiors, even though one Command, HQ Canadian Forces in Europe, had not yet replied.

We shall look only briefly at this summary, although in later chapters we shall refer to some of the comments to illustrate various points. In any case, these reactions did not change anything of substance in the text.

In general, the Commands were favourable to the program despite certain quite legitimate misgivings as to proportional representation that can be summed up as how, and how soon, the 28% figure was to be achieved. The exception came from the Chief of Canadian Defence Educational Establishments (CDEE) in a memorandum signed by Commodore D.L. Hanington on behalf of Major-General W.A. Milroy, which dismissed out of hand the concept of 28% Francophones in the Forces<sup>35</sup>. The remarks, questions and suggestions that were gathered in October 1970 lead us to conclude, as they did Chassé, that nothing in them affected the program in progress, which was only a base on which to build. The problematic areas of implementation raised by the Commands were known to Ottawa, and solutions were in any case being developed or were on the point of being considered. But we must not conclude that the reactions had no importance; in fact, several of them were kept in mind for the future<sup>36</sup>.


After these comments, mostly from outside Ottawa, were compiled, other co-ordinating phases took place, including another presentation to the CDS Advisory Committee, on 4 November 1970. As at the time of the study by the Department's Advisory Committee in August, changes subsequent to the November meeting mainly affected the form of the document and the way it was presented to the Defence Council. The substance remained unaltered<sup>37</sup>.

One of the changes led to the addition of an appendix to the presentation made to the Defence Council in December 1970, in which a list of the program's general objectives was drawn up. These were then divided into

sub-objectives which had to be achieved after a certain number of activities had been carried out. These activities were in turn based on sub-activities, presented in Appendix C to the present book. This table, which can be easily and quickly referred to, was complemented by two columns headed Option A and Option B. Across from each activity was one cost under option A and another under B. The CDS explained to the Defence Council that Option A was the more expensive because it provided for all activities to be accomplished as quickly as possible. Option B, which was recommended, was less costly: this was the cautious route over the longer term, which would be followed through stages and constant revisions that would allow imponderables to be taken into account. Option A was estimated at \$4,465,000, Option B at \$2,477,400.

Studying these options, we can see that the difference in the estimates is centred on two of the 33 sub-activities listed: translation services at CFHQ, at Command Headquarters, in the schools and in certain formations, and extension of second-language courses to a large number of military personnel who had not studied a second language before. It is difficult to understand how these two sub-activities, which are largely based on acquiring new material (small language laboratories, for example) and hiring qualified personnel (translators and language teachers) could be less costly over the long term than in the short term. Inflation alone has to be taken into account. The Minister, Mr Macdonald, who introduced his remarks in the program on 21 December by saying that it was a priority matter, asked why Option B was being proposed when Option A seemed faster. The CP thought that B was more practical in the circumstances. There was a lack of translators, for example. The Minister was still not convinced that it was necessary to move slowly, even though he recognized there were problems of implementation. Finally, they agreed that implementation of the program would be a high priority. Consequently, a choice would not be made between the two options.<sup>38</sup> At this stage, it is interesting to note that the writers of the document proposed the slower course, while up to that point they had encouraged speed of execution. Thus on 22 October, Chassé, reacting to the remark by the Chief of Maritime Command that the suggested period for carrying out the program was optimistic, wrote that if implementation was extended for more than ten years, the Department would not be responding, as a federal institution, to the sense of urgency required.<sup>39</sup> At the time of the 4 November and 21 December presentations, one of the conclusions had been that the plan should be implemented quickly, since any delay could be harmful to the success of the whole.


One of the decisions taken on 21 December 1970 had to do with the enlargement of the BPA/CP's office. Several months elapsed before the desired expansion was achieved. BPA/CP, as we have seen, was the third title of the Bilingualism Secretariat created in 1967. While the burden of normal duties had increased (French correspondence for CFHQ, supervision of implementation of bilingualism programs and publication of a glossary) and expanded (formulation of directives), the number of positions had remained at fourteen since the beginning. In 1971, the organization chart of the office was as follows:



In all, seven military and seven civilian personnel were employed. But, out of three positions for majors, two were held by captains and the other was vacant; two civilian manager positions were also unfilled. Chassé thus had to rely on few people to carry out the work. It is not surprising in these circumstances that the proposed changes in his office had been accepted, especially if we add to these reasons recommendation 41 of the B & B Commission.

When the 24 April draft was presented, no mention was made of increasing the staff. In June this possibility was raised, although there were no firm details yet.<sup>40</sup> The September draft included restructuring of the BPA/CP, which would recognize the additional responsibilities that this assistant to the CP had in comparison with the 1967 Secretariat. At this stage it was suggested that this office, then headed by a Colonel, should become a Directorate General headed by the equivalent of a Brigadier-General. On 4 November 1971 it was named the Directorate General for Implementation of Bilingualism Plans. By the following 21 December the name had been

changed to the Directorate General of Bilingualism and Biculturalism (DGBB). Here is the general structure proposed at the time:



At the 21 December 1970 meeting of the Defence Council, there was agreement on this proposal, which recognized, among other things, that the Forces could not advance rapidly under the proposed plan without such an agency. In fact, the existence of the DGBB was justified by the necessity of implementing the program in as short a time as possible.<sup>41</sup> There was still the feeling of urgency mentioned earlier. Those who are interested in details of the return of Colonel Armand Letellier as a civilian to head this enlarged body as well as a more detailed organization chart may refer to Part Two of his memoirs.<sup>42</sup> Let us note briefly here that the DGBB, with 31 positions, was officially created by Treasury Board on 16 June 1971.\* The Assistant to the Director General was appointed on 28 June and the Director General, Armand Letellier, on the following 9 August.<sup>43</sup> One of the activities in the action plan made public in February 1971 was now achieved. It should be noted that the DGBB took its present title of Directorate General Official Languages (DGOL) on 17 October 1978.<sup>44</sup>

### **The Program to Increase Bilingualism and Biculturalism in the Forces, 29 September 1972**

Significant delays occurred in an extremely important activity of the February plan: the designation of 28% of positions for Francophones [s. 2f, Appendix C]. This can be explained in several ways. A first, minor reason is that 1971 was a very turbulent year for the DGBB, which officially came into being on 1 January 1971, although at that time its organization had not yet

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\* Treasury Board memo 704 250 approved the creation of DGBB under ten conditions. The 9<sup>th</sup> was that the position of Assistant Director General would be eliminated between 16 June 1972 and 16 June 1974. At the time of writing (i.e. January 1993) the position was still maintained.

been approved by Treasury Board. Colonel Chassé was very soon made Director of Recruiting and, until June, Lieutenant Colonel Jean Fournier occupied the post of Acting Director General at the head of a small staff which was to grow over the months.<sup>45</sup>

In the meantime, Treasury Board issued a circular on 9 March, with a list of the bilingualism objectives that all departments should work to achieve. It added that they were all requested to develop and present to TB their plans for achieving these objectives and to indicate their needs for supplementary resources.<sup>46</sup> In actual fact, as we shall see, the DGGB, which had been given the responsibility for implementing the February program, would make great efforts until April 1972 to reformulate this plan so as to meet Treasury Board criteria. In June 1971, for example, the Minister asked the DGGB to prepare a request which, after going through the normal stages at the Department, would go to Treasury Board for approval.<sup>47</sup> We shall note the pressures that were intermittently applied in this direction.

The question of the day, which would not be answered for months, was the representation of Francophones in the Forces. Closely related to this was another important aspect of the program, since certain basic principles concerning the existence of French Language Units would be discussed.

The 9 March circular stated that one of the objectives of the federal government was to achieve “adequate” representation of Francophones. The Forces’ plan was more restrictive: to achieve a proportional representation of 28% throughout the institution. Here again we shall not go into the merry-go-round of drafts and discussions concerning this matter. Rather, we shall deal with the main lines along which the activity was worked out, and with a few significant side issues.

On 8 March 1971, directive 42/71, issued by the CP, allocated the duties arising from the February plan among the various offices. According to this directive, the DGGB usually had to co-ordinate the work. It was also directly responsible for certain activities (ss. 2d, h, k, m, n, o, z, aa, and cc of Appendix C, for example).<sup>48</sup>

On 22 March, Commodore R.H. Falls of the CP’s office explained that setting aside 28% of positions in the Forces for Francophones did not mean that each unit should necessarily have this proportion of French Canadians. The percentage of Francophones would vary according to the nature of the unit, its location and its designation. Overall, the Forces should be made up of 28% Francophones.<sup>49</sup> This clarified interpretation, which came up very



early on in the wording of this part of the program, was a foretaste of what was to come.

The chronology shows us that a first draft of the directive concerning the 72/28 percentages, prepared by the Director General Organization and Manpower (DGOM), was completed on 8 March and was studied on the 15<sup>th</sup>, at a meeting of the DGBB and the DGOM. On the 16<sup>th</sup>, the CDS sent a message which asked, very briefly, that all recipients of the 12 February plan cross out three words in the first line of the English version of the implementation plans.<sup>50</sup> On the 22<sup>nd</sup>, Falls' memorandum, cited above, explained this change. On the 23<sup>rd</sup> the Acting DGBB and the DGOM attended another co-ordination meeting. From this it emerged that there were several points still to be covered: it would be necessary to take into account the percentage of Francophones leaving the Forces; to achieve greater fairness in the proportions of Francophones; and finally, to set a deadline for the 72/28 ratio to be reached.<sup>51</sup>

On 30 March, the work was still continuing, but the projects that were underway were not sufficiently detailed to work out management indicators, even though details of a B & B plan were supposed to be ready for 15 September. However, it was hoped that they could go to Treasury Board in early May, with a program that would have already begun to take shape.<sup>52</sup> This schedule was to undergo several drastic changes.

On 7 June, Lieutenant-General M.E. Pollard, Comptroller General (CG) and line superior of the DGOM, proposed to the CP that military positions be organized in a way that would reflect the 72/28 proportion. This draft was delayed because it was necessary to test mathematically the different directives underlying the work. What did they find? It was impossible to apply all the basic criteria at the same time.

Let us go over them briefly. First, there had to be 28% Francophones in all ranks, trades and classifications. Second, French Language Units (FLU) were to comprise 80% Francophones, while English Language Units (ELU) were to have 20%. We have already emphasized in Volume I (pp. 220-221) the impossibility of achieving these percentages of Francophones in FLUs and ELUs. Curiously, on 1 September 1970, the CDS again asked the CP and the CG to respect these parameters of 80% Francophones in FLUs and at least 20% Francophones in ELUs in the course of their calculations.<sup>53</sup> The mission, impossible in any case, became even more complex when two other factors were considered: the number of French Language Units had to be increased to allow Francophones to use their own language in almost all trades; furthermore, according to Pollard, it was obviously desirable to avoid having

small minorities in a majority environment. No mathematical model allowed these principles to be respected entirely. There were not and would never be enough French Canadians to do so, even when their full proportional strength was reached. Some of the criteria thus had to be changed, and the debate centred on this problem over the coming months.

Pollard and his team proposed a solution in June 1971. The 80% figure would be fully respected in FLUs, and the 72/28 ratio in the Forces in general and in every rank. However, certain trades and classifications would not include 28% Francophones, and English Language Units would not necessarily have 20% Francophones. Thus they arrived at 37% Francophones in the infantry, artillery and armoured units, and less than 28% everywhere else. Among air controllers, it would be possible to have a little more than 20% Francophones by having a French Language Unit with 80% and some English Language Units with 20%. By having 37% Francophones in the ground combat arms (infantry, artillery and armoured units), the figure of 80% Francophones could be attained in the FLUs of these arms while maintaining 20% Francophones in the corresponding English Language Units. A small problem would remain: in Europe, where it was important that the Forces ought to be representative of Canada, there were 22% Francophones throughout except in the 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion of the R22<sup>c</sup>R, which had 80%.

The letter of explanation from Pollard covered a draft document called “Implementation plan to apportion the Forces structure to reflect Anglophone/Francophone content”, which was a response to the CDS’s directive 51211-0, dated 12 February 1971. This plan proposed a list of FLUs almost identical to the one adopted later, which we shall discuss in Chapter 12. It also included groups, which would be considerably restructured, of units made up of the 72/28 ratio; and those whose linguistic composition would be representative of the environment (for example, CFB Montreal: 70% Francophones and 30% Anglophones; CFB Rockcliffe and Uplands at Ottawa: 62% Anglophones and 38% Francophones).<sup>54</sup>

Many activities hinged on this plan. They could not move forward as long as the method and deadlines for achieving the bicultural objectives were not fixed.<sup>55</sup> For his part, the Minister, in a letter to CDS Sharp on 25 June, repeated that in his view the B & B program was a very high priority. Consequently, the bicultural aspect of the question had to go to the Defence Council as soon as possible.<sup>56</sup> Yet it was not until 23 July that a memorandum from the CP’s military assistant to the CG commented on the June 7 document. In essence, it clearly implied that the 72/28 ratio had to be achieved everywhere, but over the long term. Some surprise was expressed at the fact that the Canadian Forces in

Europe were considered to be the only unit where French Canadians were over-represented in the combat arms and under-represented in all other types of occupations; they should have been proportionally represented in these other units. In general, Pollard's approach was accepted on the condition, as the CG suggested on 7 June, that it be revised to have 28% in each component when the overall 28% figure was near to being achieved. The ultimate goal, which was to give the same career opportunities to Francophones as to Anglophones, would not be achieved unless this condition was met.<sup>57</sup>

On 10 August, Pollard submitted a very full draft to the CP and attached a memorandum containing some interesting information. Pollard returned to the June arguments, emphasizing the importance of the CP and CG maintaining a united front when they went to the Defence Council. One of the bases on which this alliance depended had to be that the criteria which had accumulated over the years could not all be respected. Starting from his position, stated earlier, that it was impossible to achieve the 72/28 ratio everywhere, he repeated that some sectorial over- and under- representation would have to be accepted, while ensuring that no trade had less than 20% Francophones. He remained firm in his initial view of the question, and with good reason, because the CP had endorsed it. There must be 80% Francophones in FLUs and 20% in ELUs. He accepted the skewed figures thus created: 37% of the infantry would be Francophones; 39% of CF-104 pilots would be French Canadians when a squadron became an FLU. Many military occupations would, however, have a shortage of Francophones, especially in technical activities. On the question of representation in Europe he did not budge an inch. Finally, he confirmed that he would accept later revision of his plan.

As to the plan itself, the main object of the exercise, let us look at the essentials. With a total military force of 83,000, there would be 23,200 Francophones when the 28% figure was reached. The criteria were reviewed again to emphasize the glaring impossibility, of having 28% Francophones everywhere else if there were to be 37% in the infantry, armoured units and artillery. A list was made of existing and future FLUs with 80% Francophones and ELUs with 20% Francophones, and also a series of units that would have 28% Francophones, either because they offered services (the large Commands, the Canadian Forces in Europe and representation in NATO), or because, being more specialized units, such as the cartography service, they would allow Francophones to make careers even in sectors where the total number of military staff was low. Finally, certain units located in areas with a large Anglophone or Francophone minority had to have a percentage of Anglophones or Francophones equal to the local proportion of the official minority.

Leaving aside the long and changing list of units classed under the different headings, here is the distribution of Francophones proposed by the CG, in round numbers.<sup>58</sup>

Table 1

**DISTRIBUTION OF FRANCOPHONES ACCORDING TO THE  
COMPTROLLER GENERAL, 10 AUGUST 1971**

Type of Unit	Total number of military personnel	Number of Francophones
Units and establishments with 72/28	20,520	5,750
Units reflecting local percentages	2,370	1,230
English Language Units	51,485	10,300
French Language Units	6,820	5,460
Commands	1,775	450
	82,970	23,190

Armand Letellier, who had just come back to serve as DGBB, was not at all enthusiastic about this approach. After consulting the Pollard document, he wrote a note to two of his assistants asking them to prepare a memorandum for the CP that would take the following points into account:

- the Pollard document's "numbers game" distributed Francophone resources to their disadvantage and diminished the results expected from measures taken to date with regard to B & B;
- according to this "game" there would be too many Francophones in ELUs in relation to total Francophone resources (10,300 out of 23,190, or about 45%);
- these 10,300 would be used for ends contrary to the bilingualism and biculturalism directives already being followed in the Forces;
- in fact, Francophones would in this way continue to be assimilated, although more subtly and slowly;
- only 2% of the total number of Anglophones would have access to positions in FLUB;

- as an alternative solution, a large number of the 10,300 Francophones should be used to create other French Language Units and to fill positions designated for Francophones.<sup>59</sup>

On 18 August, Letellier was able to write to the Assistant Chief of Personnel (Military), Commodore Falls, that the objective of 80% Francophones in FLUs and 20% in their Anglophone counterparts could no longer be maintained without going counter to the principle of equal opportunity. If this plan was followed, only 2.2% of Anglophone military personnel (1,360) would serve in FLUs while 44.4% (10,300) of Francophones would be in ELUs. The old difficulties of Francophones being unable to work in their own language would thus remain. It was still not known what should take the place of 80/20. Those attending the next meeting of the Defence Council should be advised of these considerations and informed that, because alternatives had to be studied, no presentation could be made to them on 9 September as had been planned.<sup>60</sup>

Appendix A to this memorandum gave details of the DGBB's reasoning. He recognized, as did the CG, that the guiding principles issued separately over three years each had merit. On the other hand, when they were combined, it was impossible to respect them all. The proposal that the CG made after discovering this, valuable as it may have been, was looked at again and the DGBB wondered how it would allow the Department to fulfil one of its goals: equality of opportunity. Would it be attractive enough to encourage Francophones to stay in the Forces when almost all of them would have to learn English?

The Defence Council thus had to know that the many guiding principles could not all be followed. Most of them, as well as some of the objectives and activities that had been formulated very early in the current phase of working out B & B, should not be considered fixed when it was found, during a more in-depth study, that they prevented the flexibility necessary to achieving the goal of equal opportunities for members of both linguistic groups. It was thus more specifically recommended that:

- the 80/20 figure for FLUs and ELUs be changed;
- more FLUs be created to increase the number of positions available to bilingual Anglophones;
- the principle of 28% Francophones in all military activities ought to be applied as closely as possible, but it should be subordinate to having 28% Francophones at all levels.

These recommendations, if they were accepted, would call for revision of the existing 72/28 plan.

In Appendix A, the CG's figures were repeated to emphasize that 74.4% of Francophones would be serving in English (taking together the positions that would be reserved for them in ELUs, National Units with 72/28 and units where the local proportion of Francophones in the minority would be respected). Thus only 23.6% of Francophones could serve in their own language, while 44.4% of Anglophones would be guaranteed the chance to serve in English in ELUs.

Letellier and his group chose to dramatize the situation of the Francophones by supposing, with great logic resulting from long experience in the military, that all Francophones not in an FLU would work in English. They did not dare to do the same for Anglophones: they said nothing about the fact that, according to the CG's present model, where only 2.2% of Anglophones would work in French, 97.8% of Anglophones could work in their own language. No doubt they deemed it better not to dwell too much on the obvious unfairness to Francophones if Pollard's proposal were accepted.

Appendix B of that document lists the advantages and disadvantages of the CG's June proposal. They are summarized below:

### **Advantages**

- Francophones would learn English. They would have access, most often in English, to a large number of positions. They would often be transferred outside Quebec which would prevent them from being concentrated in that province.

### **Disadvantages**

- Without enough Anglophones in FLUs, few of them would be able to learn or keep their French. (About 1,760 positions were reserved for them in FLUs and in units located in regions where Anglophones were in the minority). This situation penalized Anglophones who, without a good command of French, would not have access to thousands of bilingual positions.
- In this event, all activities of the plan related to learning French would risk being self-defeating.<sup>61</sup>

We think it advisable to set out the arguments of Letellier, who, we recall, had only taken over the job nine days before this memorandum was signed. His long military experience, his knowledge of the first serious efforts of the Forces in the area of B & B in contemporary times, and finally his well-informed staff, allowed him to indicate very quickly that the CG's train was on the wrong track. This was only a start, since it would still be necessary to stop this train and head it in the right direction. The weeks to come would allow this dual operation to be carried out.

On 18 August, Letellier sent another significant memorandum, also to Falls, recalling L.B. Pearson's 1968 letter. Although the 80/20 principle had been imposed arbitrarily, it did not have any real impact at the time. Now that the plan was to keep 28% of positions for Francophones and at the same time guarantee that they would have the same career opportunities as Anglophones had always had, the 80/20 concept should be forgotten. Trudeau's 23 June 1970 statement, speaking of equality between the two large Canadian language groups, could be considered as taking precedence over Pearson's letter. According to the DGBB, the Department could thus proceed without again consulting the present Prime Minister.<sup>62</sup>

As has been noted, the Comptroller General's approach was different from that of the DGBB. The two agreed on the fact that full implementation of all the principles was impossible. However, the CG held more to the 80/20, and looked for flexibility in the 72/28 figure. The DGBB wanted more freedom on the 80/20 side, and to keep as strictly as possible to 72/28, believing that therein lay the key to equal opportunity. This, in essence, is what the CP transmitted to the CG on 24 August, in a note which also admitted, as did the CG, that some of the criteria on which the plan was based should be relaxed. Which ones? That question remained open, although the beginning of an answer is contained in a memorandum which argued that the plan should be revised by modifying the 80/20 proportion in ELUs and FLUs so as to achieve better 72/28 distribution in trades and classifications. This new plan would have to emphasize that it was the only way to achieve the government's objectives. In the circumstances, it was agreed to change the dates, without rescheduling them precisely, of presentations to the CDS Advisory Committee and the Defence Council. However, the CP suggested that work be done quickly, so as to avoid further delays.<sup>63</sup> Pollard's train, to continue with our metaphor, was thus stopped on this date. But it was not shunted onto the right track overnight.

In fact, it was not until 21 September that Letellier, after having learned from his superior that he could go ahead with his August proposals, wrote to Pollard's assistant. At this stage, it was agreed that the plan to be adopted

would have to take into account recent government directives and develop in its active phase over a period of 10 or 15 years. He recalled the long months since February 1971, as well as the pressure from the Minister. This time, he said, the opportunity must not be missed. The suggestion was to form a CG/CP working party which would lead matters to their logical conclusion.<sup>64</sup> However, it must be said that activities 2b (identification of bilingual positions), 2f (72/28) and 2w (designation of FLUs and ELUs), which were supposed to be completed by 1 September 1971, according to the February plan, were not completed then. What is more, no new timetable was set for them.<sup>65</sup>

The revision took place in an atmosphere of increasing pressure for it to be quickly completed. On 1 September, Sylvain Cloutier replaced Elgin Armstrong as Deputy Minister. On 24 September and again on 8 October, the CDS indicated to the CP, Lieutenant General J.A. Dextraze that the whole matter should be taken to the Defence Council as soon as possible.<sup>66</sup> It seems, in fact, that it was Cloutier who insisted to his colleague that the process, which had already gone on for some time, be accelerated. However, no term was fixed. Hence Cloutier had to remain equally vague when he wrote on 1 October to the Secretary of the Treasury Board, A.W. Johnston. In a letter of 4 August, Treasury Board had asked all departments to submit their plans for achieving the B & B management goals set out in the 9 March document. What was Cloutier's reply in October? He gave some excuses, which were certainly valid, but served mainly to cover up the false trail of 72/28. The Department's program, he wrote, had been delayed by a number of factors. The White Paper on Defence, for example, had only been made public on 24 August; the DGBB had not started work until August; the bilingual districts which had to be announced by the government were as yet unknown. However, the new Deputy Minister explained what he intended to do and announced, among other things, that certain Departmental B & B activities were to receive special funding from Treasury Board.<sup>67</sup>

On 15 October, Cloutier reminded his subordinates that a meeting would take place on 3 November so that specialists could bring B & B matters up to date at the Department. Among other things, he would like to review the reasons which, in December 1979, militated in favour of adoption of B & B objectives, and discuss possible new objectives that would be in greater harmony with those the government had adopted on 9 March as well as the five-year plan that the Department was now preparing to present to Treasury Board by May 1972.<sup>68</sup>

Ten days later, a proposal concerning the 72/28 ratio and designation of FLUs was ready. The DGBB suggested that Dextraze accept the text



approved by the CDS and the CG.<sup>69</sup> On 27 October, the proposed model was discussed by representatives from Personnel and the Comptroller General. Briefly, the aim of the new breakdown was to create new career opportunities for unilingual Francophones and to see that the Forces projected the bilingual character of the country. Command Headquarters were to reflect the linguistic composition of their units. At least 50% of Francophones would be able to work in French only, while 40% would hold bilingual positions where French would be used. Finally, about 5% of Anglophones would be able to work in a French atmosphere.<sup>70</sup>

The new approach was approved by those present, and on 5 November a brief was produced to be studied by the CDS Advisory Committee, on 17 November.

The 5 November memorandum recalled the various directives that had been issued over the last years: the 72/28 had been approved on 12 February 1971; the principle that the Canadian Forces had to represent Canada's bilingual character had been agreed upon in September 1970; FLUs and ELUs with 80% Francophones or Anglophones and 20% of the other group was a criterion found in a letter from the Minister to the CDS dated 11 April 1968; and according to a CDS directive of 1 September 1979, Francophones should have the same career opportunities as Anglophones had had in the past.

Following this enumeration, it was suggested that it would now be necessary to construct a model encompassing all the Forces and that this would mean all energies would be channelled into recruitment, selection, training, and designation of FLUs and ELUs. The CDS Advisory Committee was asked to approve new goals and objectives and a long-term plan which would later be submitted to the Defence Council. The inequalities which had been spoken of in August were looked at again mathematically. Then it was demonstrated how the different basic principles contradicted each other. Thus, if the principle of equality were accepted, 50% of Francophones or 50% of Anglophones would work in their own language, the others being distributed among national units. But, in so doing, it would be impossible to have 20% of the positions in ELUs reserved for Francophones and likewise, the 20% of Anglophones in the FLUs would have to decrease.

The brief continued by proposing a new set of criteria in the significant paragraph 19 of this memorandum. What did it say? That 28% of positions in the Forces at all levels of responsibility and in all trades and classifications were to be reserved for Francophones and at least 50% of Francophones were to serve in FLUs. In the national units (HQ, schools and special units or units outside of Canada), there would be 72% Anglophones and 28% Francophones.

FLUs would have no more than 20% Anglophones. As far as possible, units should reflect the composition of the local culture.

Finally, the last pages of the brief were devoted to a plan for designating FLUs that took all these data into account. The recommendation was that paragraph 19 be approved along with those resulting from it — paragraphs 20 to 30, which outline the distribution of personnel.<sup>71</sup>

The document was approved as written, and on 18 November it was sent to the Defence Management Committee, a body set up and chaired by Deputy Minister Cloutier to consider items before they came before the Defence Council. It was on Monday, 29 November that the Committee studied this matter. Preparing for the meeting, Mr Cloutier did his homework. He presided over the meeting in a very active way and intervened so that certain data were taken into account. Among these were the following:

- a. 50% of recruits would be Francophones until the 28% figure was achieved;
- b. national (or bilingual) units would have 28% Francophones;
- c. at least 50% of Francophones in the Forces would serve in “operational” FLUs in Canada. There were to be no more than 10% Anglophones in these units; and
- d. conversely, ELUs were not to have more than 10% Francophones.<sup>72</sup>

While fixing them more firmly, this intervention modified certain principles the CDS Advisory Committee had adopted twelve days earlier. At that time, for example, it was agreed that FLUs should have no more than 20% Anglophones.<sup>73</sup> After study by the Comptroller General and the Chief of Personnel, Cloutier’s requirements were slightly changed in December and January, but the essentials remained unchanged.<sup>74</sup> Finally, in a long letter dated 30 March 1972, the Deputy Minister asked the Minister to agree. The reasons given, for which the Minister asked, rested on the principle of equality, emphasized by Letellier and his team since August and held to be of supreme importance, among all the basic criteria. If the 80/20 ratio was maintained in designated ELUs and FLUB, only 20% of Francophones would serve in FLUB in their own language, while 80% of Anglophones could use English at work. Following the calculations made starting from 90/10 in these linguistic units, they arrived at the fact that approximately the same number of Anglophones (1,290) as Francophones (1,280) would serve in units of another language, while 50% of Francophones could work in French. The other

Francophones would be part of either ELUs or National Units. Without achieving the goal of perfect equality, this approach allowed the closest approximation.<sup>75</sup>

Cloutier's letter, which clarified a very important part of the new "Program to Increase Bilingualism and Biculturalism in the Canadian Armed Forces", and the program itself were part of a stack of documents that would be studied and approved by the Defence Council on 10 April 1972.

Let us now look at the fifteen months previous to 10 April 1972 from another angle. The February 1971 program was ambitious, as we have observed. It soon became obvious that it could not be achieved by the deadlines that had been set. Consider only the 72/28 distribution, to which was linked the linguistic designation of units. A directive from the CP, dated 12 November 1971, noted this delay as well as several others. It was agreed that it was necessary to reevaluate bilingualism plans and to ensure that the biculturalism plans then being developed were compatible with them. Directive 70/71 from the CP asked that a long-term schedule of activities be developed which would allow the Forces to achieve the government's B & B goals with available resources.

A series of criteria were taken into account.

- The 72/28 model, then being developed, would be the basis for all planning.
- The special nature of certain Forces activities compared to those of other departments was emphasized.
- The objectives should be achieved in a fifteen-year period, divided into three five-year plans (1972-1973 to 1976-1977, 1976-1977 to 1981-1982 and 1981-1982 to 1986-1987).
- Targets for each of these five-year periods would be realistically identified, with emphasis on the first, where the stages in each activity would be defined, especially as to costs and staffing.

The office with primary responsibility would be the DGBB, and the final plan would cover the following aspects:

- a minimum number of bilingual military personnel, Anglophones and Francophones, at each stage;

- proportionate representation and equal opportunities for members of both main linguistic groups in classifications, trades and ranks;
- language instruction, including training or recruitment of teaching staff;
- necessary measures to reach the recruitment numbers established, to provide adequate personnel for the FLUs identified, to manage personnel in these units effectively and to meet the total needs of the Forces with regard to translation, revision and terminology;
- measures at each stage to ensure effective communication between FLUs and other units with which they had to interact;
- socio-cultural activities, such as education of children of military personnel, community services, messes and CANEX.

The directive designated the offices that would have to collaborate to provide necessary information and asked each of them to appoint officers at a level to allow for effective and expeditious implementation of the plan, scheduled to be submitted to the CP on 15 December 1971.<sup>76</sup>

An interesting fact is that in 1970-1971 the Minister, Mr. Macdonald, had insisted that the plan not be tied up in deadlines. In November 1971 however, it was agreed that objectives achievable in 10 or 15 years were needed. At Dextraze's first meeting with Letellier on 9 August, he spoke in these terms.<sup>77</sup> In September, Letellier made it clear to those around him that it would be necessary to define a period for implementation of the future plan. No doubt he felt strongly supported by Treasury Board (inevitably involved in such an issue), which liked to quantify things, and by Sylvain Cloutier. Cloutier was well aware of how to deal with Treasury Board specialists, since before coming to Defence he had been Deputy Minister at the Department of National Revenue, where he had introduced a rigorous and demanding official languages program.<sup>78</sup> Another aspect arising from directive CP 70/71, which should be mentioned, was the form in which the plan was submitted. As we have said, in December 1970 the presentation made to Macdonald had been quite thoroughly worked out. In 1971-1972, when the new formulation was made, two critical path diagrams covering the first five-year phase and the fifteen-year period respectively were used. From 1972 to 1974 (when the DGBB moved to the new building at 101 Colonel By), the walls of the DGBB offices were papered with these diagrams.<sup>79</sup>

Be that as it may, an important working party was formed which met frequently between 17 November 1971<sup>80</sup> and 14 January 1972. Colonel Letellier has recalled very well how matters proceeded and the excellent co-operation he received both from Major-General Laubman, who had replaced Falls as Dextraze's assistant, and from all members of the working group who had been designated by the various special offices or were on strength at the DGBB.<sup>81</sup> The 15 December date was missed, partly because of changes that had to be made to the "numbers game" after the meeting with the Defence Management Committee on the morning of 29 November.<sup>82</sup> Such decisions called for reworking several interdependent documents constituting the basis of the plan to be carried out. But there was another reason, which Lieutenant-Colonel Tousignant made very clear in a memo: by 15 December, several of the specialists had not sent the DGBB the work they had been supposed to provide. Furthermore, some of the work sent in had been incomplete, especially with regard to very important costing estimates; the Department was at this time attempting to obtain from Treasury Board certain sums to be devoted solely to bilingualism. We shall deal with the question of funding in Chapter 16. Unfortunately, these delays and the reworking of the 72/28 figures brought about other delays since, in this area, texts prepared in different sectors were generally complementary.<sup>83</sup>

Finally, a new, more detailed formulation of the plan approved by Defence Council in December 1970 was ready to be presented to the CDS Advisory Committee on 7 February 1972. The whole plan was accepted without major changes.<sup>84</sup> A week later, the matter was submitted to the Defence Management Committee and the Program to Increase Bilingualism and Biculturalism in the Canadian Armed Forces was again approved. The Deputy Minister required, however, that certain changes and clarifications be made to the request that the Minister was preparing to send to Treasury Board to obtain additional funds and person-years, a request that was studied at the same time as the program. Finally, he asked that an activity be added to the program: an annual progress report to be prepared each December.<sup>85</sup>

The following 10 April, the Defence Council studied and approved three documents:

- a. The Deputy Minister's 30 March memorandum to the Minister explaining why FLUB and ELUs would have a 90/10 proportion rather than 80/20;
- b. the Program to Increase Bilingualism and Biculturalism in the Canadian Armed Forces;

- c. the request to Treasury Board, which summarized the program and asked for funds and person-years to allow it to be carried out.<sup>86</sup>

Decisions such as those made on 10 April 1972 are not reached without difficulty, as we have already seen. And we would add that at this time military personnel and civil servants in the Department were dealing with a new minister, the Honourable Edgar Benson. Some of his misgivings, which he stated at a closed meeting held on 20 March, led to the writing of the 30 March memorandum.<sup>87</sup> On 10 April, Benson was still cautious. He was afraid that the 72/28 criterion would have a divisive effect. He believed that Francophone/Anglophone percentages in units should not be publicized too widely because they would be misunderstood. However, all those who had worked on developing the plan, whether closely or at a distance, closed ranks, explained its rationale and won the day. One point remained on which the Minister remained firm and which would become a decision for the Defence Council: the fifteen-year term should not be an iron-clad deadline but rather a guide for those who would be implementing the plan.<sup>88</sup>

What was in this program? Essentially it was a more comprehensive statement of everything with which previous official documents had dealt. The most recent however, was the one which best reflected the full scope of the B & B question in the Forces. It finally addressed the anticipated impact of the Forces becoming 28% Francophone. It proposed designating new FLUs throughout the implementation period; that is, up to 1987. It predicted costs, in personnel and money, mainly for the years 1972-1977. It went into more detail about activities treated earlier and set deadlines for them: language training, translation and terminology services, military or staff colleges, identification of the files of military personnel as to the language of education desired for their children, bicultural services, an information program, B & B co-ordinators in each Command, and so forth. Canadian Forces units would be listed as either National, French or English Language. All positions would be identified as unilingual English, or French, or bilingual at various levels. Policies concerning military careers also had to be revised since 28% of positions now had to be Francophone.<sup>89</sup>

Here is the breakdown of Anglophones and Francophones that had been identified.

Table 2<sup>90</sup>

MODEL ARMED FORCES STRUCTURE			
Type of Units	Francophones	Anglophones	Total
National Units	10,340	26,593	36,933
French Language Units	11,620	1,290	12,910
English Language Units	1,280	31,877	33,157
TOTALS	23,240	59,760	83,000

This model is simpler than the one presented to the Comptroller General in the summer of 1971. Here, the National Units included the Commands, units and establishments with 72/28 percentages as well as the units that had been designated to reflect a local percentage in the previous table. Of particular note is that in August 1971 there were to be 5,460 Francophones serving in FLUs, while in April 1972 this number had more than doubled to 11,620. The number of Francophones that were supposed to serve in ELUs had dropped from 10,300 to 1,280. Letellier had succeeded in reaching a better balance. However, very probably a large majority of the 10,340 Francophones in National Units would have to work in English, the language of their 26,593 Anglophone colleagues. Complete equality was not to be achieved overnight.

During the summer of 1972, discussions took place between Treasury Board and Defence officials that would lead to several minor changes in the request presented in April concerning the number of person-years and the amount of additional funds requested by Defence (see Chapter 16).

Finally, on 29 September, Deputy Minister Cloutier received a letter from Treasury Board, signed by the assistant secretary, A. Kroeger, making official the approval given by Treasury Board to the Department's B & B plans at the 14 September meeting. The objectives of the program and the principle of fifteen years for implementation were completely accepted. The part covering the 1972-1973 to 1976-1977 period was also accepted in principle. The seven other components to be approved, specifically requested by the Department, were also ratified, some of them with slight amendments which we shall see later. There was nothing surprising to the Defence administrators since, over the course of the summer, their discussions with their counterparts at Treasury

Board had allowed them to work out the necessary consensus.<sup>91</sup> On the whole, it was a happy outcome which DGBB personnel welcomed with joy after months of hard work (August 1971 to February 1972) and waiting (April to September 1972).

### **Other tasks accomplished by the DGBB**

The description which follows will give the reader a better idea of the scope of the work accomplished by the DGBB in the last months before the crucial 10 April 1972 meeting.

Armand Letellier's memoirs eloquently describe the pressures on his office to finalize the plan. The preceding pages have shown something of its sometimes complicated progress.\* Time was short if Defence was to have access to the funds specially reserved for B & B by Treasury Board for the 1972-1973 financial year. And any major change required the amendment of dozens of pages of the draft program at a time when word processing was not yet in vogue. To be even partially prepared in February 1972, several members of the DGBB staff worked evenings and weekends to refine the program.

At the same time as this project of primary importance was occupying the Branch in 1971-1972, several other tasks were accomplished which took up much of the DGBB staff's time. One of them was to write the obligatory progress reports. The 23 February 1970 directive P3/70 from the CDS required quarterly reports to the CDS so that any problems in implementation that might arise could be brought promptly to his attention. There is no trace of written reports on implementation of the program before the summer 1970 report, written in response to a requirement by the Prime Minister. This report was deemed to be incomplete and the staff had to rewrite it. The revised text reached the Minister on 3 February 1971, after having been through several offices since 20 January. It reviewed what the Canadian Forces had accomplished in the B & B field over the five previous years. Because of decisions made by the Defence Council in December 1970, this document could now present the Forces' short- and long-term objectives. Finally, it noted that recommendations 26 to 40 of the B & B Commission had been pursued, while progress toward their implementation was also reported.<sup>92</sup>

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\* Researchers interested in further information should consult file 20-2 Vol. 1-20-B and B-2 Plans and Programs, in the Letellier, Papers at the Directorate of History.



Major-General J.E. Hanna was, as a Colonel, assistant to and a most valuable ally of Mr Letellier from 1971 to 1974. As a bilingual Anglophone, he played a very active role in the DGBB, before going on to new ranks and positions, among them military attaché to the Canadian Ambassador in Paris. (CFPU NB 79-298)



General F.R. Sharp, CMM, DFC, CD. As Chief of Defence Staff from 1969 to 1972, he gained Treasury Board approval for a very elaborate official languages program for the Canadian Armed Forces and put it into operation. (CZU/REP 72-104)

When the Deputy Minister read this report, he found it so interesting that he suggested that the Minister ask the CDS to provide similar reports on a quarterly basis dealing with the most significant activities in the program.<sup>93</sup> This suggestion seems to have been taken up, since on the following 15 March, Colonel A.C. Bowes, who was head of the Chief of Staffs office, sent a note to his counterpart at the CP's office in which he reiterated the contents of the program made public in February 1971. The CDS wanted quarterly reports, the first to cover the period starting 1 April 1971, which would contain good progress indicators. These periodic reports would go out with the signature of the CDS and be sent to the Minister, but via the Deputy Minister's office.<sup>94</sup> The first of these reports was sent to the Minister on 26 April, covering the months of January to March 1971.<sup>95</sup> This procedure was followed for several months, until the new program provided for an annual report to be presented in December.

Reports to be sent to higher authorities were difficult to obtain, it was found. Such was the case with those that were to be sent in every month to the DGBB from 1 April 1971, according to the CP's 8 March 1971 memo (mentioned above), by the various agencies at NDHQ involved in activities related to the plan published in February 1971. On 6 April, Lieutenant-Colonel Fournier had to send a reminder: according to the files, on this date, only one of the offices supposed to supply a report had done so.<sup>96</sup>

These documents to be received or sent occupied part of the DGBB members' attention. Other kinds of analyses were also necessary and required a great deal of work and co-ordination. Thus, on 1 October 1971, the DGBB's office — doubtless Colonel Hanna, Letellier's assistant, who was meticulous about this kind of work — sent a long memo to Major-General Laubman, assistant to CP Dextraze. He described the status of B & B programs at the Department remarkably well (what been done up to then and what remained to be done) after a brief, well-written historical preface.<sup>97</sup>

But more remained. In order to have adequate support for his actions and views during his many discussions relating to implementation of the plan, Letellier felt the need to make clear the priority of B & B at Defence. A memorandum of 28 September 1971 emphasized the high priority given to this matter at Defence, with supporting quotes from ministers and the CDS taken from minutes of meetings or from letters. For months, the DGBB carried this memo around with him, taking it out from time to time to show people with whom he might be speaking why he was pressing the matter.<sup>98</sup>

The Director General was also closely involved with all information given by the Department to the public or by the Minister in the House concerning

B & B at Defence. For example, responses to complaints from citizens to the Commissioner of Official Languages pointing out shortcomings in bilingualism in the Armed Forces were co-ordinated by the DGBB. It also provided the information needed to update the section on B & B in the Minister's briefing book.<sup>99</sup>

The DGBB had to be concerned with other areas. The fall of 1971 was marked by, among other things, the study carried out by a group of experts on the organization and structures of the Department's senior management, especially at NDHQ. Mr Macdonald had set up this group, headed by John Harbron, on the preceding 3 June. Colonel Hanna prepared the long and accurate documentation necessary for the research group; the roles of 'the DGBB and the direction in which the Department was moving with regard to B & B were very clearly explained. Hanna's oral presentation was to be on 4 November, and work on it began on 8 October. During this period, Letellier suggests, all the energies of his directorate general could have been better used to complete the plan.<sup>100</sup> This said, Harbron's recommendations resulted in a major reorganization of senior management at NDHQ in September 1972, although it had little effect on the DGBB. Essentially, the position of Deputy Minister took on a new dimension. The incumbent could in future be increasingly involved in the operation of the Armed Forces, a sector until then largely the domain of the CDS.<sup>101</sup>

In another quarter, on 15 March 1971, Treasury Board announced that Dr. Pierre E. Coulombe would be conducting an evaluation of the effectiveness of bilingualism programs in all departments since 1966.<sup>102</sup> A questionnaire from Coulombe's group arrived in August, which the DGBB had to complete by 30 September.<sup>103</sup> Obviously, as was to happen at other times, this questionnaire was addressed to civilians, which did not make it easy to gather responses concerning the military. In 1972, another questionnaire concerning the Department's bilingualism plans was sent by Treasury Board. For days, even weeks, staff at the DGBB and at Treasury Board were at loggerheads over equivalence of positions. At first, DGBB staff were even reluctant to fill out such a document addressed to bilingualism advisors. Some people considered it inadequate since at this time the Armed Forces had a program which no other department approached. Finally, bit by bit, replies were formulated.<sup>104</sup> At the end of 1971, another Treasury Board official contacted the DGBB in order to draw up a report for his superior on the extent to which the recommendations of Volume III of the B & B Commission had been implemented up to that time.<sup>105</sup> Also in regard to the Laurendeau-Dunton Commission, the DGBB was asked on 3 May 1971 to study the recommendations made to Cabinet with regard to certain parts of Volume V of the report, which had to do mainly with bilingualism in the National Capital

Region. The recommendations in question should not cause major problems for the Armed Forces, Fournier wrote to T.C. Morry, Assistant Deputy Minister (Personnel) (ADM (Per)), since the directives had already been approved and set in motion. In fact, what the Cabinet was going to study related to the equality of the two languages, the availability of bilingual services, bilingual signage and promoting proportional participation by the two main language groups in Canada. All these subjects had been covered completely by directive P3/70 of 27 February 1970.<sup>106</sup>

### **The 1980 revised plan**

Now let us look again at the plan accepted by the Defence Council in April 1972 and emphasize that, despite its scope, it left out an important historical aspect of Canadian military life: the Reserve forces. Letellier had been concerned about this since 9 September 1971.<sup>107</sup> Two months later, the assistant to the Chief of Operations and Reserves, Colonel D.R. Adamson, pointed out the same fact to the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff.<sup>108</sup> Letellier and Adamson both had the same complaint: the White Paper stated that bilingualism objectives were also to apply to the Reserves but, up to that date, nothing had been done in this area for this sector of the Forces. This aspect of the B & B question in the Department was not settled until 7 July 1976, with instruction 15/76 from the ADM(Per), which resulted in almost three years of haggling between the DGBB and those responsible for the 1<sup>st</sup> Reserves and the cadets. During these discussions, certain special characteristics of these groups were taken into account:

- static units;
- limited number of recruits in a defined territory;
- lack of mobility of personnel;
- the impossibility of setting quotas for language groups in local units.

Colonel Letellier describes in a few brief paragraphs of his memoirs how things were handled.<sup>109</sup> One of the results of the instruction was that units of the 1<sup>st</sup> Reserves could be classified into three categories according to some very precise criteria: English Language, French Language or National. The revised 1980 Official Languages Plan (Military) (MOLP) devoted a chapter to the B & B objectives for Reserves and cadets. National units would give way to Regional Units (RU), which better reflected the local character of Reserve units.<sup>110</sup>

In other areas, let us recall that from 1972, the DGBB headed a directorate responsible for the B & B program for the Department's civilians. We will speak of that again in Chapter 18.

From April 1972 the planning aspect took up less and less of their time, and DGBB staff concentrated most of their efforts on implementing the program. Reports, evaluations, corrections, clarifications regarding implementation, changes to the organization chart and the directions the work was taking according to governmental directives — such was the daily lot of the staff of the DGBB, which had its name changed to Directorate General of Official Languages (DGOL) in October 1978. In sum, the directorate general remained responsible for supervising implementation of the plan; in collaboration with other offices, it had to identify problems to be resolved and recommend solutions to senior authorities.<sup>111</sup>

No changes were made to the 1972 plan in the first years. Despite several difficulties and delays which we will speak of again, officials at the Department were convinced that B & B was progressing well. Disenchantment came in 1977, with the publication by the Commissioner of Official Languages (COL) of a special study on Defence which called the situation disastrous. Letellier was shattered, the more so because the Commissioner's Annual Reports had not given any indication of this. Clearly, the progress as it was perceived within the Department was much less visible to those coming from outside to analyse what was happening. Those mainly responsible for the program, with Letellier at the head, tried to do what they could, between July 1977 when they became aware of the Commissioner's recommendations and the following December when the document was published, to persuade the authors to moderate their tone and the scope of their judgments.<sup>112</sup> Thus Deputy Minister C.R. Nixon, on Letellier's advice, reacted quickly by writing that, in his opinion, the picture painted by Keith Spicer, who was preparing to leave his position at the time the report was published, was much darker than the reality. This was because the Commissioner had not understood the painful consequences resulting from application of the Defence programs.<sup>113</sup> Nixon and Letellier were supported in their position by the chief officers at NDHQ, who were all offended by what they called Spicer's lack of understanding.<sup>114</sup>

In December 1978, Nixon and Max Yalden (the new Commissioner of Official Languages) agreed that visits to military bases by officials from the Commissioner's office, accompanied by Defence officials, could be useful in alleviating some of the irritants. Defence embarked on a program of presentations to Yalden and his main associates. Some of the latter made a tour of major Canadian bases in Canada and abroad in May and June of 1979,

accompanied by Guy Sullivan, the new DGOL.<sup>115</sup> Subsequent to these visits, Yalden wrote to Deputy Minister Nixon on 13 July that the members of his office who had participated believed that Defence's efforts to implement the spirit and the letter of the law had been successful enough to serve as an example to be emulated elsewhere in the government. Despite this, several points still needed correction.<sup>116</sup> As these were generally sectoral in nature and quite easy to resolve, the Department attacked them at once.<sup>117</sup>

This said, the Commissioner's 1977 report recommended several times that the Department "revise its policy on official languages",<sup>118</sup> and "draw up by March 31, 1979, a comprehensive implementation plan".<sup>119</sup> These admonitions led the Department to undertake a reorganization. A request to Nixon from Michael Pitfield, Clerk of the Privy Council, to revise the 1972 program arrived more than a year after the revision process had begun.<sup>120</sup> For its part, Treasury Board sent directives in November 1978 asking, rather as Yalden had implied on 13 July 1979, that Defence produce a plan with long-term objectives to be achieved after a series of clear and achievable sub-objectives. It was necessary to define time limits for these activities and to ensure that progress could be made within the Department's annual budget.

The Department was pressured to rework the 1972 plan and make it a tool which could more easily be quantified, especially because only the first five-year period had been set out in detail in 1972, when it was presented to Treasury Board. The revision truly got under way on 10 February 1978 when, at the suggestion of Major-General H.C. Pitts, DGBB, Lieutenant-General James C. Smith, ADM(Per), suggested to Lieutenant-General K.E. Lewis, Vice Chief of the Defence Staff (VCDS), that the best way to proceed would be to create an Official Languages Co-ordinating Committee with representatives from several NDHQ offices.<sup>121</sup> Six days later, Lewis agreed to this suggestion.<sup>122</sup>

Apart from DGOL, whose Director General chaired the Committee, seven other NDHQ bodies, six of which were directorates general, were represented on the committee. After completion of the principal task, it was thought a good idea to maintain and enlarge the committee so as to provide the CDS and the Deputy Minister, through the ADM (Per), with advice on official languages programs and directives (see Appendix D for a definition of the committee's mandate). We may gather from the committee's formation and the fact that it was maintained that co-ordination concerning B & B would be more decentralized than in the past, when the DGBB had had the largest responsibility for formulation of directives and programs in this area. This diffusion would extend beyond NDHQ when, on 26 September 1978, the Committee addressed a letter to Commanders asking for their direct

contribution to the operation in progress. Provision was made for a chapter of the new plan to be reserved for each Command, which had to prepare its own B & B goals according to the large aims with which they were already familiar.<sup>123</sup> This was done. The Commands leaped at the chance to become involved more effectively than they had been up to that point.<sup>124</sup> For his part, the DGOL justified the Commands' involvement saying, on 26 June 1979, "The present (1972) program is still not implemented at all structural levels of the Department".<sup>125</sup> The writing of the Official Languages Plan (Military), as it would be called, would be an exercise that would be done mainly at the level of Command Headquarters, he added.<sup>126</sup>

When DGOL Guy Sullivan spoke those words, the new formulation of the plan was already completed. It had been worked on for months before it was presented to the Defence Management Committee on 16 and 19 January 1979, in order to gain approval for the principal considerations relating to the broad directives on which the new plan was founded. On the 16<sup>th</sup>, the DGOL discussed the complexity of the task at hand, which had to take into account:

- the objectives set in 1972;
- the status of the official languages within the Department at the beginning of 1979;
- Treasury Board directives (among others, those of 7 November 1978, which clearly implied that each department would in future have to support its official languages programs with its own resources).

On 19 January, the members of the Management Committee made a number of decisions (for example, recruiting quotas) which would allow the Co-ordinating Committee to accelerate its work.<sup>127</sup>

It was at the 294<sup>th</sup> meeting of the Defence Management Committee on 12 April that the final result was presented. The document was a complex and important one, said Major J. Barr (who made the presentation for his superior, Sullivan, who was present in the room), because it had to:

- replace the 1972 program;
- consolidate, as far as possible, all directives concerning official languages;
- respond when possible to the approximately 175 recommendations made by the COL after his December 1977 study.

This plan, it must be remembered, did not follow the usual military format because it had to be addressed to four sectors at the same time:

- Treasury Board;
- the COL;
- civilian and military staff at the Department;
- the general public.

The Co-ordinating Committee based all its actions on one principal statement, which read as follows:

In accordance with the Official Languages Act and Government Objectives, the Department will be Institutionally [sic] bilingual and representative of the two official language communities of Canada while maintaining a one-force concept.<sup>128</sup>

It can be seen that this foundation, on which the whole structure of official languages rested, repeated ideas already known, which will be amplified later. It speaks of maintaining a single force, for example, which takes us back to 1967, when the Minister, Mr Cadieux, said that it was necessary to avoid “segregationism”. This time the single force was explained thus:

The one-force concept implies that the security of the country and the safety of individual Service personnel cannot be jeopardized by allowing barriers to separate the CF into two linguistic components.<sup>129</sup>

Was this not a commonplace, since a value had always been placed on bilingualism, as a bridge between the two language groups? Could anyone seriously believe in 1979 that the 1972 plan had been so successful that it could lead to fears of that double-headed hydra, a parallel army? The next chapters will answer this question.

The Department took on the task of achieving three broad goals in 1979, stated as follows:

- to increase the capability to provide services to and communicate with both the public and CF personnel in accordance with the Official Languages Act;



- to provide to the maximum extent possible the opportunity for CF personnel to have a career and to work in the official language of their choice;
- to ensure that the CF would achieve an equitable participation of both official language groups, protect their linguistic rights, and reflect their cultural values.<sup>130</sup>

While these objectives in no way contradict those of 1972, the attentive reader will have noticed that the second goal puts special emphasis on “to the maximum extent possible”.

We will not go into details of the April 1979 presentation, especially since it treads in essence a path we have gone over many times. In 1979, as in the past and also as would happen in the future, there were strong links between all elements of the plan. Percentage of Francophones, FLUs, bilingual positions, French work tools and second language courses, all remained areas of importance. The 1971 Census results brought the target percentage of Francophones to 27, which, obviously, changed several figures and tables of the 1972 program without changing their substance.<sup>131</sup>

During the discussion which followed Major Barr’s presentation, it could be seen that only J.F. Anderson, the ADM (Pol), believed that the plan went beyond the government’s current intent, which was service to the public in their language of choice.<sup>132</sup> Lieutenant-General J.C. Smith, ADM (Per), and Deputy Minister C.R. Nixon implied that this program, a reformulation of the 1972 program, did not go too far even if, in the interim, new governmental directives on official languages had been implemented.

On the other hand, senior authorities were not satisfied with the current plan, because the goals were not presented in measurable terms with well-defined implementation deadlines as Treasury Board had requested. The Deputy Minister and the CDS were thus not comfortable as regards “accountability”. Nixon wanted the plan to set out clearly past achievements and the constraints that had hindered greater progress. The same kind of thing should be done for the future because, when Departmental resources were used for official languages, it must be very clear who would be responsible for the drop in effectiveness that would ensue. Admiral R.H. Falls, CDS since 1 July 1977, went further, saying that he and the Deputy Minister had to understand and believe in the plan in order to be able to defend it.

The ADM(Per) and his advisors seemed to contradict part of what Major Barr had said several minutes earlier when they:

revealed that the approach taken in developing the plan had been to consider, on a function by function basis, the observations of the Commissioner of Official Languages and to tailor the plan for departmental needs. During this process cognizance was taken of the TB Guidelines but it was acknowledged that the goals of the plan are not stated in terms of measurable results to be achieved by specific dates.<sup>133</sup>

Reading the minutes, we realize that no one was happy with the form of the document because no link existed between the goals stated and the activities and resources considered necessary to achieve them. The Management Committee thus came to the conclusion that the document needed to be revised by an independent agency. The Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, Lieutenant-General R. M. Withers, arranged this. It was clearly stated that they were not seeking to revise the thoughts of those who wrote the plan, but to determine the extent to which it complied with Treasury Board objectives, provided a satisfactory base to the Deputy Minister and the CDS so that they could be accountable for it, and was understood by the public. To sum up, it was necessary that the plan:

- give an appraisal of what had been accomplished, the long-term objectives and the necessary resources;
- make it obvious that progress was continuing to be made and that the Forces were making the best possible use of the slender resources at their disposal;
- have short-term, practical goals that could be evaluated;
- establish direct links between activities and resources by showing that its requirements were reasonable;
- deal explicitly with the resources necessary for evaluation of the program and indicate where they were to come from.<sup>134</sup>

Since Treasury Board expected action by 27 April 1979, the Management Committee asked Withers to give the Deputy Minister and the CDS on 25 April a report and recommendations regarding how to proceed.

The revision process, though rapid, did not allow the Department to meet the April deadline. The MOLP was not presented to Treasury Board until the following June.<sup>135</sup> Some weeks later it was followed by a request for the additional human and financial resources believed to be necessary.<sup>136</sup> On 4 June, the new plan was made public. As we have pointed out, it kept to the

1972 plan in maintaining the broad objectives defined eight years earlier. Written in the light of facts, the most recent plan abandoned 1987 as the deadline for implementation and by so doing followed the trend predicted by Minister Benson in 1972. The 1980 plan further divided the major objectives into many sub-activities while giving the Commands a major role in carrying out several of them. One of the big advantages, in comparison to the 1972 plan, was that it was available in French as well as in English. French as a language of work was making inroads, even at NDHQ.\*

As close to reality as the 1980 MOLP had sought to be, it was far from perfect. Appendix E, dealing with CANEX services, one of the most precise parts of the plan, shows that several of the activities were very vague.

On 11 March 1982, a Treasury Board evaluation report appeared. It concerned the language of work in Mobile Command and the 5<sup>e</sup> *Groupement de combat* in particular, the sector of the Forces where French was used most.<sup>137</sup> There was nothing to rejoice about in the findings. Among other things, it said that the contents of the MOLP had not been implemented. Lieutenant-Colonel G. Ouimet, Co-ordinator of Official Languages at Mobile Command HQ, prepared a response that his superior, Brigadier-General W.J. Dabros, signed and sent to the DGOL. Here is what it said concerning the 1980 plan:

This document is inadequate as a plan. At best it is a list of objectives that leaves out the concrete steps, deadlines and resources necessary to achieve them. Any criticism to the effect that it has not been implemented should be considered in the light of these facts.<sup>138</sup>

In 1979, the highest authorities in the Department made a careful study of the plan, reworked it and presented it to Treasury Board, which also accepted it. If there were faults, as Mobile Command asserted, who was ultimately responsible?

On 14 December 1982, a Treasury Board circular asked each department to produce an annual official languages plan.<sup>139</sup> On 31 March 1983, Defence sent its plan for the year 1983-1984. In its 44 pages it put great emphasis on the “key” accomplishments of 1982, eight in number. Among them was the publication of two information brochures and the fact that the “contact” level (bare minimum knowledge of the second official language) had been

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\* Even Major Barr’s presentation to the Defence Management Committee, in 1979, had been partly carried out in French.

eliminated from linguistic requirements of military positions. The rest was in the same vein.<sup>140</sup>

Treasury Board approved the objectives for the coming year on three conditions.<sup>141</sup> One was that more Anglophones become bilingual, which implied that in 1983, as in 1966 and before, bilingualism was a characteristic found mostly among Francophones. Part of Chapter 12 will be very clear on this subject.

The 1983-84 plan included the following:

As a means of assuring continued close cooperation between the Minister and the Treasury Board Secretariat a Special joint committee was formed in July 1982. This committee met ten times in 1982 and has submitted a number of items for action aimed at increasing mutual understanding, better management of the Departmental Official Languages program, as well as improving reporting and accountability in the Annual Plan.<sup>142</sup>

On page 26 of the same 1983-84 plan, in the chapter entitled “Management”, we also learn that:

The policy section of DGOL is reviewing the 1980 Official Language Plan (OLP) and has produced a completely revised edition, which reflects the departmental experience with the former plan and revises the goals and activities to reflect current needs of the Department. Publication timeframe is approximately 83/84.<sup>143</sup>

The mere fact that this new, revised plan existed, after all that we have just read, needs no comment. However, for those interested in this avalanche of programs and plans, revised or not, we would point out that on 13 March 1986, Lieutenant-General Paul Manson, ADM(Per), wrote that he had asked that the two official language plans (military and civilian) be consolidated into one simplified instrument that would enable the senior officials of the Department to better manage the official languages programs.<sup>144</sup>

In 1987, at the end of the period under study, this consolidation had not yet been achieved. Two elements should nevertheless be mentioned in closing this chapter. The first is that the Treasury Board changed the rules of the game somewhat by announcing on 31 October 1986 that departmental annual official language plans would in future be replaced by “letters of understanding”, which would last for a period of three years. Each deputy minister was thus required to come to an understanding with the Secretary of

the Treasury Board on identification of important matters, departmental initiatives, action plans, implementation stages and resource requirements.<sup>145</sup>

Some months later, the COL, D'Iberville Fortier, took the unprecedented step of bringing directly to the attention of the Governor in Council his very negative assessment of the Canadian Forces in the area of official languages. The specific elements of this report of the COL will be dealt with in the relevant chapters, as well as the painful summoning of the Department's senior officials before the Standing Joint Committee of the Senate and the Commons on Official Languages.

What we wish to point out for the moment is the change of tone in the Department in 1987, in comparison to that of 1977-1978, following Commissioner Keith Spicer's special report. While the much more realistic and positive approach of 1987 took some time to become established, when we read the minutes of the Defence Management Committee of 31 October 1987, Personnel Newsletter 7/87 and the letter from the Minister, Perrin Beatty, to Mr Fortier, we see that this time the DND was willing to accept the letter and the spirit of the COL's special report. What is more, it was determined to take action to revitalize the area of official languages.

In August 1987, Deputy Minister D.B. Dewar spoke of introducing radical changes and eliminating from his Department the appearance of resistance to change that outside observers seemed to perceive. He wanted staff to show leadership and an attitude that would make future initiatives successful. Identified objectives should be disseminated throughout the Forces, and the necessary means to measure progress should be adopted. The CDS, Paul Manson, immediately supported this, speaking again of the need to change attitudes toward official languages. It was no longer good enough, he stated, to justify shortcomings by saying that this kind of reform took a generation to become entrenched, especially since a generation had now passed. He added that, contrary to what had been asserted for too long, implementation of the Official Languages Act and operational effectiveness were not mutually exclusive. In point of fact, future progress in the area of official languages would have a positive impact on the Forces' performance. As to accountability, Manson stated his intention to institute a system to measure progress.

Lieutenant-General J.E. Vance, Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, also spoke at length about changing attitudes, especially given that the concept of a single force rested in large part on participation of the Reserve Forces, which constituted many unilingual Francophones. Dewar also referred to this, noting

that any serious mobilization plan should take this fact into account and conceptualize the idea of bilingual leadership.

But there was no need for the Forces to be too apologetic, according to Lieutenant-General J.A. Fox, Commander of Mobile Command. Dewar and Manson agreed. They wanted to carry on the dialogue already begun with Mr Fortier, so as to establish Defence's position.<sup>146</sup> As we shall see in the following chapters, DND had been reviewing critically since about 1985 the results achieved by the program launched in 1972.

Some time later, in Number 7 of the Canadian Forces' Personnel Newsletter, an article appeared entitled Official Languages Policy, signed by Manson and Dewar. In this article the recent criticisms about the Department and the tabling of Bill C-72 on the status and use of official languages in Canada were the two arguments used to revive the official languages issue at Defence: this time, service people and civilians would work hand in hand so that the Constitution of Canada would be fully respected.<sup>147</sup>

As for the Minister, he was able to write as follows to D'Iberville Fortier on 7 December 1987:

The Department recognizes the principle that the defence of the country depends on all Canadians, whatever their first official language. From this standpoint, the goals of operational effectiveness and language requirements are complementary. The Official Languages Plan will thus be designed so as to ensure follow-up through a management and accountability system similar to those used to control effectiveness and operational preparedness. This approach also fits in well with our plans to introduce the measures outlined in the White Paper on Defence which I recently released.

Further on, Perrin Beatty added:

Mr Fortier, I am very encouraged by the progress my principal advisors have reported to me. The Executive Committee on Official Languages, which comprises the heads of the main activity sectors, will continue to ensure that any new initiative which could contribute to the equality of the two official languages is implemented and followed up. As well as pursuing the activities already ongoing, we intend to develop over the coming months a very detailed master plan, with well-defined deadlines, to be followed up by the Department's Management Committee. I have also asked the Deputy Minister to send you under separate cover the measures which he and the

Chief of the Defence Staff discussed with you at your recent meeting. These activities are already the cornerstone of our renewed program.<sup>148</sup>

The renewed and consolidated program that had been discussed for several years would not be ready until 1989.





# 10

## Decentralized implementation

In a country as vast as ours, it is hard to control everything from Ottawa. In the case of the Canadian Forces, National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ), which is responsible for the basic thrusts of policy, leaves its Commands to implement them. But the Commands are almost as poorly positioned as NDHQ to check closely into how the directives they issue to their units or formations are followed. Let us take Mobile Command\*, for example, which must keep the land forces required to defend Canada ready for combat. In addition to its functional role, the Command has regional responsibilities in the Eastern Region,<sup>1</sup> which includes aid to the civil power, assistance to civil authorities, and survival operations. Its HQ, located at Saint-Hubert near Montreal, is responsible for formations and units stationed all over Canada. Maritime Command (MARCOM) in Halifax, Nova Scotia, has a similar role in regard to the country's naval forces. Its units are also widely scattered over Canada and the sea, although they are concentrated to some degree along our coasts. Air Command (Air Com), with its HQ in Winnipeg, and Communications Command, based in Ottawa, also have nation-wide responsibilities. Training Command (HQ at Trenton, Ontario) conducts courses and has bases from sea to sea.

Beginning in 1968, when the Forces took their first steps along the path of B and B, NDHQ had to rely on the cooperation of the Commands. As more activities were undertaken in this area, it became necessary to organize an official structure at the Command level to receive, interpret and apply directives. At first, local initiatives were enough. But after message DIBP of 29 August 1969 (see Vol I, pp 236-240), things began to change, for it became clear that much time had to be given to doing what this message asked. Major General D.C. Laubman, for example, who was then commanding the 1<sup>st</sup> Air Division in Europe, asked his units to recommend procedures and implementation schedules to him, especially for bilingual signage.

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\* Retitled *Land Force Command* (LFC) on 4 September 1992.

He designated a captain from his staff as a resource person and asked each unit to do the same.<sup>2</sup>

For the moment, such ad hoc organization was enough. When Colonel Chassé in Ottawa received the comments which he had requested from those who received his message of 29 August, however, he quickly understood that a better structure was needed. On 15 September 1969, when he summarized the reactions thus received for the CP, he recommended that a bilingual capability be created in each Command to help the commander (a general or an admiral) and his staff communicate in both languages. "A bilingual officer could offer this assistance."<sup>3</sup> At this stage, that officer would more or less act as an interpreter. In other recommendations, Chassé asked Commands to become involved in consolidating their units' financial requirements as regards bilingualism before forwarding them to Ottawa, and in setting up translation units, for there was an urgent need for this, both in the Commands and also in Ottawa.<sup>4</sup> No doubt Command staffs would have to spend some of their energy on bilingualism at first and, later, on everything relating to bilingualism and biculturalism in general. It is not surprising that this realization led to the view that a senior staff officer for B and B should be designated in each Command, as specified in the draft plan circulating in the fall of 1970. On this particular point, Maritime Command led the rest. Noting that implementation of B and B had become one of the Canadian Forces' and Marcom's biggest programs, Rear Admiral H. A. Porter observed:

The initiative was thus taken of creating a position in our staff to be filled by a bilingual officer of the rank of major. His duties would be to determine the implications of B and B directives for the Command, to co-ordinate and direct their implementation and to monitor their progress. We note that this is a recommendation in [your] study.<sup>5</sup>

When the Program and Implementation Plan to Increase Bilingualism and Biculturalism in the Armed Forces was approved by the Defence Council on 21 December 1970, it still contained plans for a senior officer assigned to B and B (see paragraph 2aa, Appendix C). On 30 December 1970, the CDS wrote a memorandum asking the VCDS and the CP to take the necessary steps to implement the decisions taken by the Council.<sup>6</sup>

On 26 January 1971, a message from NDHQ informed commanders that they would each soon have a lieutenant-colonel serving as advisor on the implementation of the B and B program at their HQ.<sup>7</sup> Immediately, Maritime Command asked permission to keep the major who had already been designated there. When he left the position at the end of the normal duration

of a posting, usually three years, he would be replaced by a lieutenant-colonel.<sup>8</sup> This was approved by Ottawa.<sup>9</sup>

On 1 March 1971, another message from NDHQ announced to all Commands that as of then, the lieutenant-colonel positions which had been announced were added to their strengths.<sup>10</sup> Meanwhile, Commands continued to plan for the future, as evidenced by a message from Mobile Command asking Ottawa to attach to its lieutenant-colonel a level 3 bilingual stenographer and implying that other requests might soon be sent to NDHQ.<sup>11</sup> Two days later, another message from Mobile Command made two suggestions. The first was that the lieutenant-colonels' mandates should be as similar as possible across all Commands. The second was that the term "senior staff officer B and B" should be replaced.<sup>12</sup> A meeting in Ottawa between 16 and 18 March of the Commands' B & B Staff officers who had already been designated, with members of the DGBB, helped to clarify these two points.<sup>13</sup> In the weeks that followed, it was agreed that the expression "staff officers B and B" would be replaced by "Command co-ordinators, bilingualism and biculturalism" (CCBB).<sup>14</sup>

In the summer of 1971, the first CCBBs officially took up their positions. In Ottawa, the establishment of the DGBB was in its final stages. Its first task, as we have seen, was to review and flesh out B and B plans. This was completed in April 1972. The substantial document which emerged emphasized that all Commands except Canadian Forces in Europe (CIE) had already received their co-ordinators.\* The mandate of CCBBs, as drafted, appears in Appendix F.<sup>15</sup> In brief, the CCBB combined the role of advisor, co-ordinator, public relations person and "evaluator" within his Command as regards the various activities relating to B and B. In addition, the CCBB was a very important link not only between Command HQ and the DGBB, but also between HQ and the units reporting to it.

The first years of implementation of the B and B plan adopted in 1972 absorbed the energies of all these new intermediaries in the process. The CCBBs were often hard at work in their Commands, providing explanations and information, obtaining reactions and passing them on to NDHQ. Questions flooded in to them from all sides. They had to respond to complaints, legitimate or otherwise, reassure people and prepare for information visits which DGBB members wished to make to bases. Often they had to accompany such visitors. In general, the impression emerges from the

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\* Northern Region HQ (created later) was never intended to have a CCBB.

documents we have consulted that CCBBs responded both to initiatives from NDHQ or the bases.

At the same time, rather incongruous developments occurred which were to affect the work of CCBBs, generally for the better. In April 1972, NDHQ asked the Commands to designate a local translation co-ordinator on each base where there was a need. In August 1973, bases were required to appoint co-ordinators for the language training they offered.<sup>16</sup> These tasks were considered secondary in the timetables of those selected. Early in 1973, following a study of bilingualism on the Bagotville base, the Commissioner of Official Languages suggested that a staff officer of senior rank assigned to Canadian Forces Base Bagotville be officially appointed as base bilingualism advisor or co-ordinator.<sup>17</sup> Later that year, another study at Uplands Base (Ottawa) prompted the Commissioner to make a similar recommendation.<sup>18</sup>

In fact, rather as had been seen at the Command HQ level between 1969 and 1971, an *ad hoc* organization had developed very early on in large Canadian bases to meet B and B requirements. By 1970, Camp Borden had a Francotrain officer position (see chapter 13). This officer served more or less as B and B co-ordinator from the first, according to a local memorandum.<sup>19</sup> The same situation existed elsewhere, sometimes more formally. Thus on 24 and 25 March 1973, the DGBB visited CFB Gagetown during a tour of information on B and B programs. This army training base, located in a primarily English-speaking part of New Brunswick, received, every year, many Francophone servicemen who had to be given training and services in French. What did the DGBB find? Gagetown had a full-time B and B co-ordinator. This officer, who reported to the base's administrative services, had a very specific job description written in both languages: he was responsible for language courses offered locally, the translation unit on the base and in general, anything relating to the implementation of B and B directives (bilingual signs and services, etc). The position was held by a lieutenant, assisted by a warrant officer, a corporal and a secretary. This configuration was reached after finding that it was impossible to cope with the multiple aspects of B and B by simply allocating them to various officers on the base who would perform them as secondary duties. The DGBB notes that this made for greater effectiveness.<sup>20</sup>

Overall, a system took shape. At first, various co-ordination functions may have been distributed among a few people on a base. Gradually, however, all these activities were usually concentrated in the hands of a single person who, with a few exceptions (such as Gagetown), was still reduced to

treating this area of his activity as quite secondary. One can easily imagine the results.

In 1976, the Commissioner of Official Languages undertook the study mentioned earlier regarding the status of B and B in the Department. One of the subjects it covered was the CCBB and the base co-ordinator (BCBB) networks. An initial scope assessment was thus made of these officers' role and work throughout the Canadian Forces. The COL's conclusions, dated December 1977, occasionally scathing, deserve attention: a summary follows.

The skills required of CCBBs were not very clearly defined, and at the time of this study, one co-ordinator spoke only English. The responsibilities assigned to them were very general in nature and suggest that these co-ordinators were to play an advisory role. CCBBs tended to take more interest in the less controversial aspects of their work, such as language training and signage, and in some cases, there were marked deficiencies in their relations with the DGBB.

Regarding the co-ordinators, the COL observed that with few exceptions, they were little concerned about anything other than an inventory of positions and language training.

[The appointment of] B & B Co-ordinator was for them just a tiresome secondary duty. The Base Commanders who appointed them had only a hazy idea of what they should expect of them. CCBBs did not seem to have much say in either the selection of Base B & B Co-ordinators or the assignment of duties. One CCBB told us that he was seldom consulted on these appointments; however, occasionally a Base Commander would discuss the nature of the duties with him without revealing the names of the candidates he had in mind. We found actual or potential conflicts of interest in the duties of Base B & B Co-ordinators: promoting English immersion and protecting the language rights of Francophones are hardly compatible, for example, when the former is the most important priority and has most of the co-ordinator's attention.

In short, the channels of communication and control from DGBB to units in the field are seriously out of order and need to be completely overhauled. DGBB must have at least the right to screen the candidates for CCBB positions and must provide them with thorough training to them before they undertake their duties, something which is really lacking at present. Similarly, both DGBB and CCBBs must participate in the appointment of Base B & B Co-ordinators and see to it that they receive training in their duties — training which includes an understanding of the Official Languages

Act and teaches them how to recognize and deal with situations which do not conform with it.<sup>21</sup>

Several of the COL's recommendations were based on these findings. They urged that the Department:

- a. revise, by June 30, 1978, the terms of reference of Command Co-ordinators for Bilingualism and Biculturalism (CCBB), Base Bilingualism and Biculturalism Co-ordinators and Regional Co-ordinators for Bilingualism and Biculturalism (RCBB) so as to transform their role into one of active management; set short- and medium-term official languages program objectives for each Command and Region, assign target dates for activities and identify performance indicators;
- b. provide adequate bilingual support staff to assist CCBBs, Base Bilingualism and Biculturalism Co-ordinators and RCBBs in their duties;
- c. establish, by June 30, 1978, a selection profile for CCBBs, Base Bilingualism and Biculturalism Co-ordinators and RCBBs which reflects this role and includes leadership, management skills, tact *and* fluency in both official languages; ensure that the official languages bureau is consulted in the appointment of CCBBs and RCBBs and the official languages bureau and CCBBs are consulted in the appointment of Base Bilingualism and Biculturalism Co-ordinators; give these co-ordinators full-time positions, wherever necessary to meet objectives and target dates;
- d. provide intensive training for CCBBs, Base Bilingualism and Biculturalism Co-ordinators and RCBBs which, among other things, explains the requirements of the Official Languages Act and particularly the concept of equality of status of the two official languages.<sup>22</sup>

Following this part of the Commissioner's report, the mandate of the Command co-ordinator official languages (CCOL), a term which replaced CCBB in October 1978<sup>23</sup>, became much broader in September 1983 at Mobile Command (see Appendix G).

From these attributions and those of other Commands which we were able to consult at the DGOL office, we may say that, as a general rule, co-ordinators inform and advise "decision-makers" and managers about the

official languages program and its implementation. As required, they investigate when violations of the Official Languages Act are reported to them. In addition, they supervise language identification of positions; they coordinate translation and language training activities; and they advise on linguistic aspects of military training for Francophones.

CCOLs were closely connected with the process of revising the 1972 plan. On 28 September 1978, the Official Languages Co-ordinating Committee, which had been reworking the plan for the past seven months, suggested that Commands contribute directly to this operation. On 1 December 1978, Mobile Command submitted a plan based on intensive staff work which became a model that other Commands chose to follow.<sup>24</sup>

The Co-ordinating Committee expressed satisfaction at the reaction of Commands to its request. This participation was believed to increase the document's credibility.<sup>25</sup> The cooperation took the following form. Commands received some simple and specific basic guidelines: the Department's objectives, some suggested goals and activities, and a review of the Commissioner's 1977 recommendations. From these they developed their goals and activities so that a similar approach was generally obtained, although a Command might have emphasized one aspect rather than another. Appendix H gives an idea of what Commands arrived at: it reproduces Chapter 12 of the 1980 plan for Communications Command.

One of the important points on which the CCOLs insisted was making base co-ordinator official languages (BCOL) positions permanent.<sup>26</sup> In 1980, this point was already won at NDHQ level. Nevertheless, the issue had its ups and downs, as we shall see later in this chapter. For the moment, let us confine ourselves to a few facts. As of 1980, 29 firm positions were to be created for BCOLs in the largest Canadian Forces bases (see list in Appendix I). When the duties of CBOLs are compared to those of CCOLs as they existed in 1983, we conclude that the former co-ordinators played, within their spheres, essentially the same role as the later.

In 1982, the COL undertook another study of the Department of National Defence. His first sectoral report, entitled *The System of Official Languages Co-ordinators*, was delivered to the Department in May 1984. It was quickly realized that the assessors were not completely satisfied with the progress made by the Department in implementing the recommendations made by their predecessors in 1977, especially as regards selection of CCOLs and

co-ordinators' duties. This said, the assessment was not wholly negative. But let the authors of the report speak for themselves.

The OCOL team pinpointed several problems including the diversity of the co-ordinators' duties, the absence of co-ordinators in key sectors and the overall lack of cohesion. The study underscores the need for the appointment of co-ordinators for National Defence Headquarters, the staff of the ADM (Materiel), the military colleges and the Reserves and Cadets sectors. It also suggests a review of the duties of co-ordinators and the role of the DGOL in order to ensure uniformity of the activities.

The team also noted some divergence in the implementation of the official languages programme, which was the result of varying levels of commitment on the part of those in positions of authority, as well as problems stemming from the lack of bilingual support staff.

The Commissioner suggests that the Department give special attention to the selection and training of its official languages co-ordinators. He believes that the system of co-ordinators has become essential to the implementation of the official languages programme. He sees it as the mainspring of the Department's programme because it affects the provision of services to the general public, as well as to military and civilian personnel and their dependants, in the language of their choice.

Moreover, the Department should modify the duties of official languages co-ordinators to emphasize the task of raising managers' and decision-makers' awareness of the official languages programme. It should also provide better training for the co-ordinators concerning the objectives of the Official Languages Act. Lastly, the Department should consider expanding the existing system and specifying the relationship between its various components.<sup>27</sup>

To arrive at these findings, the COL team analysed information gathered in the fall of 1982 from some fifteen co-ordinators and about ten officials working closely with them. In addition, one of the investigators attended meetings of Departmental official languages co-ordinators in Ottawa on 6, 7 and 8 October 1982.<sup>28</sup>

From this, they concluded:

As advisors to the commander, the CCOLs have to be well versed in all aspects of the official languages programme. However, a number of their duties seem excessive and merit attention: for example, advisory responsibilities relating to the military training of Francophones



(Francotrain), language teaching, testing and translation. On the other hand, we believe that the Department should insist more upon the CCOLs' role as auditors of the implementation of the official languages programme on behalf of their commanders.<sup>29</sup>

As for the base co-ordinators, in addition to the responsibilities outlined earlier, they performed some routine secondary duties. The COL found that in the case of their principal duties, BCOLs should:

place greater emphasis on the implementation of the official languages programme, the provision of information to managers, the identification of bilingual positions, the provision of bilingual services and, especially, the monitoring of the level of achievement of the objectives relating to service to the public.

On the sixteen military bases with language schools, the BCOLs are called upon to co-ordinate Phases I and II of the Continuous French Course; they devote between 50% and 80% of their time to this task. Their administrative activities range from the selection of teachers to the settling of staff relations problems. Our study also revealed various jurisdictional conflicts concerning the administration of the language schools, which affects the duties of the BCOLs. Ambiguous lines of authority between the language centres and the Canadian Forces Training System would appear to be the cause of these conflicts. The BCOLs' timetables should be adjusted so that more time is available for duties leading to the effective provision of services in both official languages by managers and staff alike<sup>30</sup>

The COL's observation as regards the role of the BCOLs gave rise to a disagreement within the Department which lasted for two full years. Following a meeting of the Official Languages Co-ordinating Committee on 1 May 1980, NDHQ produced draft terms of reference for BCOLs.<sup>31</sup> These were transmitted to Commands in English on 12 May and in French on 6 June.<sup>32</sup> They gave rise to much discussion, in particular between Training Command and NDHQ. The 1 May 1980 draft acknowledged one of the roles played by unofficial co-ordinators to that date; namely, managing local language training centres. The DGOL, no doubt recalling one of the recommendations in the Commissioner's 1977 report, reviewed this, preferring a formula which omitted this role so that BCOLs dealt with other aspects of implementing the plan rather than language centres, which were liable to monopolize considerable energy. In 1980, BCOLs had been given this role in all Training Command bases equipped with a training centre.<sup>33</sup> The debate continued so long that the draft terms of reference which applied to all were not formalized in 1987. But this does not mean that no action was taken.

Between 1982, when Commissioner of Official Languages staff found that in fact BCOLs spent too much of their time on language training programs, and 1984, when the report and the recommendation presented earlier were released, an important change occurred, making the recommendation almost pointless. Civilians at the LAT-02\* level were hired to work for the BCOL and supervise language training more specifically. This freed the co-ordinator to a considerable degree.<sup>34</sup>

The Commissioner's 1984 report touched on subjects other than CCOLs and BCOLs. It focussed on:

- a. regional co-ordinators linked with the Department's civilian program.
- b. "other" co-ordinators, in other words those located in Departmental offices or agencies which might have repercussions on the program (for example, the office of the Director Military Manpower Distribution at NDHQ or the official languages co-ordinator serving at the Royal Military College, Kingston);
- c. the role of the DGOL in the network;
- d. groups currently without a co-ordinator which should have had one; and
- e. relations between components of the network of CCOLs, BCOLs and Regional Official Languages Co-ordinators, (ROLCs) who are civilians and will be discussed in Chapter 18.

After the body of the study came nine recommendations, presented in Appendix J. The third was that the DGOL be given permanent responsibility for ensuring co-ordinators and other official languages officials acted in concert. During the investigation it was found that too often the CCOL tended to deal only with military personnel and left all the civilian side to the RCOL, without ever intervening in this aspect of official languages at DND. All these recommendations had already been, or were soon to be, gradually implemented. COL representatives were to make another spot audit one year after the study was delivered to the Clerk of the Privy Council.<sup>35</sup>

The final pages, in particular quotations from Commissioner of Official

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\* Language teacher level 2.

Languages reports, emphasized that there was no perfect harmony throughout the Forces when the time came to implement instructions. Let us enlarge a little on this point by recalling that Maritime Command had been able to keep a major in the position of CCBB for several years, even though it was a designated lieutenant-colonels position. Moreover, the Canadian Forces Base in Europe always had a major in the position of CCBB/CCOL.

A second noteworthy point is that, despite the 1972 common terms of reference, CCBB/CCOLs brought a highly personal viewpoint to their duties. The Commissioner was quite right to stress in 1977 and 1984 that co-operation between co-ordinators was not a strong point. Enough differences were recognized in 1980 that the new plan no longer contained the duties of CCOLs. A 1984 consultation at the DGOL's office of the mandates which the Commands had sent to him the previous years made this quite clear, although as a general rule co-ordinators had substantially the same roles.

At the same time, a visit to two Commands convinced us that there was a great difference in emphasis on priorities. We shall see later how a certain leadership came from the Mobile Command Co-ordinator in the 1970s and how his influence could be felt in the management of directives. The relevant files in Saint-Hubert and Ottawa reflect this role. At Training Command, entire filing cabinets are full of statistics pertaining to language training. The files are much thinner than at FMC when it comes to the implementation of B and B at the bases, although this does not mean that it was implemented any differently or less well than elsewhere in the Forces. Each CCBB/CCOL seems to have emphasized one part of his duties strongly, leaving other facets somewhat to one side. In essence, this is only another aspect of a certain rivalry which exists between Commands: there are jurisdictional conflicts which affect B and B, as we shall see.

Another interesting point is that, even today, very few files on B and B or official languages are written in French in either of the two Commands we visited. This suggests that those addressed by memoranda are not bilingual or that CCBB/CCOLs, who are very often Francophones, prefer to use English when they write. This alone may say a great deal about the acculturation process (from French to English) which continues to rage in our Forces. To some degree, a person who begins as a Francophone becomes bilingual-with-a-tendency-toward-English during a normal career.

CCBB/CCOLs in both the Commands in question have a program of visits to bases which report to their HQ. This activity seems to be well established. During his visit, the co-ordinator evaluates and assists the base in the use of official languages. The fact that this exercise is still necessary needs

no comment. Since 1981, Command co-ordinators have also organized conferences at which base co-ordinators gather to discuss the problems of the day and seek common solutions.

It cannot be denied that the CCOL network has succeeded over the years in winning a credibility which may have a strong impact on the DGOL. For example, making NDHQ recognize the need for BCOLs seems to have been a major victory for CCOLs; in this regard, the work of the Mobile Command co-ordinator is especially noteworthy.

As mentioned, Mr Letellier found a B and B co-ordinator at Gagetown: an outstanding local initiative, he called it. But it would have been premature to believe that other large bases would copy Gagetown, or that additional person-years would have been requested from Treasury Board. Nevertheless, Letellier went on to observe, if Mobile Command and other Commands requested person-years specifically to co-ordinate B and B in their large bases, he would have to study the question.<sup>36</sup>

This part of Letellier's message must have been transmitted verbally to base authorities and the CCBB of the Command who accompanied him. On 12 April, the Commander of Gagetown decided to propose officially to Mobile Command HQ that two military personnel (an officer and an NCO) and two civilians secretaries be added to his strength to deal exclusively with B and B questions.<sup>37</sup> This request was later discussed by the CCBB (LCol C. Bouffard) and DGBB Letellier before being partly refused on 2 May. The CCBB's reply after he consulted with NDHQ recognized that the request was well founded, but emphasized that no provision had been made for it in the 1972 program. The civilian positions were granted, however, since the support which the base had to give to the Combat Arms School could not be denied, and NDHQ could provide them from estimates that had been approved by Treasury Board and included in additional person-years on the civilian side.<sup>38</sup>

Another approach was made by Gagetown authorities in the fall of 1973 to Mobile Command HQ. After consulting with the DGBB, Major H.E. Saulnier, CCBB, informed his superior on 23 November that no military person-years were provided for B & B support in the 1973/74 budget and nothing was planned for 1974/1975. If Gagetown's unofficial organization were to be made official, this would have to be done by using the Command's internal capabilities.

On 23 January 1974, Brigadier-General James C. Smith of Mobile Command HQ wrote to the units in his Command that the 1972 plan provided for permanent B and B positions down to the Command level. At the time, it

was believed that the additional work created by B and B on the bases could be absorbed as secondary duties. Since then, three questions had become prominent: co-ordination of B and B, language training and translation. There was no means of dealing with these subjects that was common to all bases. Some commanders appointed one officer to deal with all three areas, others had three different officers.

Smith then briefly reviewed Gagetown's attempt (without naming the base) and emphasized that nothing was planned in 1972 and, according to the DGBB, no new permanent military position relating to B and B was planned for 1974-1975. This said, base commanders, despite occasional difficulties, should make every effort to maintain existing support for B and B.<sup>40</sup>

This state of affairs did not change until the fall of 1977, after Lieutenant-Colonel J.M.G. Ouimet took up the position of CCOL. In an October 1982 memorandum to two members of the Commissioner of Official Languages team conducting an audit, he recounted in no uncertain terms how, immediately after he was appointed to Saint-Hubert in July 1977, he realized he was talking to himself. No one on the Command's bases was seriously concerned with official languages. He alleged that total chaos reigned.<sup>41</sup>

As Ouimet was taking up his post, things were on the point of being organized at CFB Petawawa, where the need for French services increased rapidly after the Canadian Airborne Regiment, which includes the 1<sup>st</sup> Commando (Francophone), was assigned to this base. After the situation was analysed, it was soon concluded that human resources would have to be allocated to bilingualism in order to comply with the Official Languages Act.<sup>42</sup> Early in 1978, Petawawa followed Gagetown by designating an officer as permanent B and B co-ordinator. Later in the year, a master warrant officer in the Reserve who was on strength at Saint-Hubert was sent to support that officer. In addition, the DGBB succeeded in providing a secretary to the B and B module at Petawawa, thanks to his civilian person-day bank. The position of co-ordinator was officially recognized by NDHQ in summer 1978, but no additional person-year came from Ottawa. CFB Petawawa had to make do with the means it had, with the approval and assistance of Saint-Hubert.<sup>43</sup>

The idea that emerged at Petawawa at the time was different from what was to be found elsewhere, however. Around the cell consisting of the three people just mentioned, they sought to build a much larger cell which would unofficially encompass all bilingual personnel on the base or in the units stationed there. Their bilingualism skills could be used when needed.<sup>44</sup> This pilot project quickly achieved positive results; in fact, it actually began unofficially two months before the 1977 Commissioner's report was

published. LCol Ouimet wrote that as soon as approval was given for the cell, in October 1977:

I appointed a co-ordinator for official languages. Her name was Capt Tollas. A real tigre [sic] who had the backing of Gen Christie. She put the language program on the map. What was impossible with CANEX, administration section became possible. I helped her in the firing of the bank manager who resisted bilingual advertisings. In other words, she made her presence felt. She was not popular but she made real progress and was appreciated by the entire Francophone population. All sections, CE, Supply, Maintenance etc. danced to her music. Capt Tollas was a dynamic person who never took no for an answer.<sup>45</sup>

Ouimet was convinced of the success of the enterprise. At a conference of CCOLs and the DGOL, in Ottawa, on 15 and 16 August 1978, he got all the co-ordinators present to recommend that an officer be made responsible full-time for B and B on each major base.<sup>46</sup>

In August 1978, the situation was as follows: NDHQ acknowledged that Petawawa had to have a permanent B and B co-ordinator, but the positions of master warrant officer and secretary remained in suspended animation. Ouimet took up this cause by drafting a memorandum which was signed by his superiors and sent to the DGOL. He argued that B and B needed to be visible and prominent to lend credibility to the program. The CCOL insisted that NDHQ accept the other positions which had been left aside.<sup>47</sup> Since Ottawa remained inactive, Saint-Hubert created a position of warrant officer supporting the co-ordinator-captain in Petawawa on 14 December 1978. This was accepted by NDHQ but, once again, Mobile Command had to dig into its own resources.<sup>48</sup>

The matter did not end there. On 1 December 1978, in a letter accompanying the contribution which Mobile Command intended to make to the general plan which was being reformulated, Lieutenant-General Jacques Paradis, Commander of Mobile Command, suggested that bilingual cells be created not only in Petawawa. In fact, the second objective of the plan submitted by his Command was to acquire the capability to provide services to the public and its own personnel and to communicate with them in both official languages. Among the actions his Command planned to carry out along these lines was the obtaining of permanent co-ordinators on other bases belonging to the Command.<sup>49</sup>

On 20 February 1979, Lieutenant-General James C. Smith, who had become Assistant Deputy Minister (Personnel) at NDHQ, received this letter.

In his acknowledgment of receipt of the Mobile Command plan, he stated that he had read with interest the various suggestions in it, including that of base co-ordinators of official languages. All the questions raised would be studied and it should be possible to reply in late April.<sup>50</sup> On 6 March, Mobile Command, after careful preparation including the necessary consultations with base commanders, took the lead and asked for nineteen firm positions to serve on various bases either as co-ordinator or as support staff to the co-ordinator.<sup>51</sup> The intervention had positive results, even though the request was not entirely granted.

Thus on 12 April, in his presentation to the Defence Management Committee, Major Barr of the DGOL stated that his agency supported the CCOLs in their belief that there ought to be a captain position at each major base responsible for official languages. The CCOLs urged that priority in resource allocation should be given to official languages activities at bases. In all, 24 person-years for this activity appeared in the plan. According to Barr, “Mobile Command asked for three man-years for each of their bases — and while this may not be excessive, a request for one man-year per base was deemed to be more appropriate, at this time”.<sup>54</sup> For some reason unknown, however, NDHQ omitted the question of base co-ordinators when the time came to circulate the first draft of the revised plan. LGen Paradis reacted strongly in a rather sharp letter of 29 May 1979 to Smith, reminding him how his Command had supported him since September 1978 in reformulating the B and B plan. Paradis wanted in return the approval of the ADM(Per) for the nineteen positions at his bases. Experience at Petawawa had demonstrated the need for people fully committed to official languages outside Command HQ, he argued.<sup>53</sup>

NDHQ went back to what the Co-ordinating Committee had proposed on 12 April. At a meeting in Ottawa of CCOLs and the DGOL, on 26 and 27 June, it was announced that every major base would have its own official languages co-ordinator. Curiously, the only CCOL to be mildly opposed was Ouimet, who explained that his commander preferred the tried and true concept of a module built around three or four permanent staff.<sup>54</sup> On 28 June 1979, Ottawa officially decided to allocate five BCOL positions to Mobile Command.<sup>55</sup> On the following 20 July, Paradis replied that what his Command needed in this area was nineteen positions, not five.<sup>56</sup> A week earlier, in his letter to Deputy Minister Nixon mentioned earlier, the Commissioner of Official Languages, Max Yalden, dwelt on the fact that a base benefited enormously from someone entirely dedicated to promoting matters relating to official languages. He referred in particular to the case of the Lahr Base, where an officer firmly supported by his commander set many things in motion with a plan whose objectives were pursued energetically. Acknowledging the

difficulty of obtaining additional person-years and the fact that the revised Departmental plan provided for co-ordinator positions at bases, Yalden wrote that he was ready to give any assistance required by Defence so that Treasury Board would give it the resources it wanted. The problem of obtaining person-years was obvious but, in Yalden's eyes, the co-ordinators represented an investment which paid off handsomely.<sup>57</sup>

Smith gave Mobile Command a somewhat more satisfactory final reply on September 28. The Department would ask Treasury Board for ten base co-ordinator positions for the Command. The final request for all Commands included 29 positions, as stated earlier. What was striking here was the tone of Smith's letter, which implied that this "modest" request reflected his own wishes. In a period of restraint dictated by the government, he reasoned, it would hardly be politic to ask for more. Thus we have here a Department which censors itself even before presenting its case seriously to Treasury Board. One of Smith's arguments, which actually comes from the DGOL, deserves note: if all positions designated bilingual were adequately filled, the Forces would not need any permanent co-ordinator at the bases.<sup>58</sup> We shall have an opportunity in later sections and chapters to understand how and why this obvious truth of Smith's did not gain the day.

On 19 January 1980, the CDS, Admiral R.H. Falls, wrote to his commanding generals that the additional human resources requested from Treasury Board to support the plan had been granted. He added:

I believe that the program can be given considerable impetus and visibility in the field by the provision of Official Languages coordinators at our major bases. I have therefore directed that 29 military positions be established and manned in the summer of 1980.<sup>59</sup>

This result was transmitted by LGen Paradis to his units in a letter of 26 March 1980.<sup>60</sup> But as Ouimet points out:

DGOL has never agreed to provide supporting staff for those coordinators. The Command provided two more man-years to hire secretaries at Petawawa and Gagetown. For a total of 4 man-years out of Mobile Command resources.<sup>61</sup>

In spite of everything, the DGOL was pleased to speak before a committee of MPs and senators in November 1981 about the still recent initiative which led to the appointment of obtaining the 29 base co-ordinators, "in order to establish the success of implementation and to change whatever needs to be changed in the future, and especially to take local initiatives to



improve the lot of the minority at local level, whether the minority be French-speaking or English-speaking”<sup>62</sup> But when asked about the popularity of BCOLs, Sullivan replied that being people’s conscience is never the key to popularity.<sup>63</sup> There is probably a very close link between this statement of Sullivan’s, Ouimet’s comment on Tollas (cited earlier) and some of the observations made by COL representatives between 1982 and 1984 regarding BCOLs, in particular the fact that they spent most of their energy on managing language courses, the part of the program which carried the least risk of confrontation with colleagues or superiors.

This said, in the history of the BCOLs as reported earlier, we must acknowledge that Mobile Command, which had a very committed CCOL with the entire support of his commander, played a leading role. The follow-up of the Petawawa pilot project and experience elsewhere were thus at the root of a success which benefited everyone. In fact, several bases belonging to other Commands obtained such co-ordinators after 1980.

Mobile Command left its mark elsewhere as well. It provided leadership in the way it prepared for involvement in the revised plan. It is also known to have been in the forefront of the fight for permanent BCOLs. In other areas, which we shall have occasion to discuss further (for example, second language courses or bilingualism in general in the Forces), some of the questions it raised were crucial. This leads us to conclude that, in some respects, leadership in B and B probably passed from the hands of the DGOL in Ottawa to those of Mobile Command in Saint-Hubert at the beginning of the 1980s.

This does not necessarily mean that everything was perfect within that Command. In October 1982, for example, its CCOL announced that \$400,000 had been given to its bases to convert unilingual signs to a bilingual format.<sup>64</sup> The measure was one of the first emphasized by every B and B program approved since 1969. It is hard to believe that in the early 1980s it still needed attention.<sup>65</sup> In more general terms, we note that complaints to the COL or directly to the DGOL show that year after year, bases and Commands were still far from achieving full compliance with the Official Languages Act.

One aspect of the difficulties encountered in implementing the plan, and which arose because of decentralization deserves special note. Since 1972, Commands demonstrated an increasingly marked desire to be involved in decisions. This led to endless debates on distinguishing between each Command’s duties, or between those of the Commands and those of NDHQ, in particular as regards language training.



# **Part Two**

## **Key Sectors**

What hurts French Canadians most is that people pretend to disregard them, and speak and act as if they were not there... when they were the ones who discovered and colonized this country, and founded Québec a century and a half before the English took it over!... They will be less inclined to forget it to the extent that English Canadians still pretend to consider them inferior and intellectually backward, often alleging that most of them are Métis, or at least are barely educated, speak a dialect that has nothing in common with French, and are opposed to progress and only suited to occupy second-rate positions. In this connection, the English have constantly repeated... that French Canadians were only fit to be “hewers of wood and drawers of water”.

Georges Vattier  
*Essai sur la mentalité canadienne française*  
Paris: Honoré Champion, 1928, p 291.

As we observed in Chapter 9, proportional representation of Francophones in the Canadian Forces lay at the heart of the military official languages plan approved in 1972. Chapter 11 closely follows the progress of this thrust over the years and highlights some of the ill-feeling which accompanied its success. By 1987 Francophone military personnel filled more than their quota of military positions, but they were still seriously under-represented in some trades and several ranks.

As for French Language Units, which were discussed in Volume I, their numbers, roles and use of French all increased between 1969 and 1987. At the end of the period we are studying, however, the situation was still far from the ideal model which had been imperfectly defined at first by the Department, but was very clearly defined by Treasury Board from 1973 onward. Despite their title, French language did not always percolate through to these units, and in some cases was even spoken only briefly.



# 11

## Francophone representation

### The 28 percent principle

Many elements in the 1972 plan revolve around proportional representation of Francophones in the Canadian Armed Forces — one of the two basic objectives pursued then and maintained in the 1980 review.

In regard to this goal, some general considerations must be raised. The 28 percent Francophone target had been set in response to the results of the 1961 Census. Two later censuses caused the figure to be lowered to 27 percent and then 26 percent. There are several traps associated with a fixed percentage, especially if there is an insistence that this representation must be achieved in every military occupation and every rank.

In Chapter 9, we saw that Francophones were over-represented in the infantry in 1972 and under-represented almost everywhere else. With a military structure which provides for three infantry regiments, one of them French-language, it is hard to avoid this excess, especially because tradition is so firmly rooted in both the *Royal 22<sup>e</sup> Régiment* and in English speaking units. This makes it almost impossible for the principle of a larger number of Anglophones in the regiment's three battalions to be accepted.

Setting a percentage poses several other dangers. The first is the interpretation of census results. Some months after the 1972 plan was approved, it was decided to lower the proportion of Francophones to be attained in the Forces to 27 percent. Why? First, let us see what the Commissioner of Official Languages had to say:

This figure is based on the 1971 census, in which 26.9 per cent of Canadians stated that French was their mother tongue. The Department has deduced that the remaining 73 per cent must be Anglophones, whereas the census shows that only 60.2 per cent of Canadians stated that English was their mother tongue. The terms used by the Department are therefore somewhat misleading and, in the final analysis, serve to overestimate the number of Anglophones and thereby underestimate the number of Francophones. Even if it cannot be claimed that the 13 per cent of Canadians who stated that

neither French nor English was their mother tongue will choose French for their first official language, is it fair to consider them Anglophones whose mother tongue is English?<sup>1</sup>

What emerges from this quotation was discussed many times within the DGBB, when the time came to make the first revision of the 28 percent. As a result, the 27 percent figure acknowledges that some of the 13 percent of Canadians who have neither English nor French as their mother tongue use French more than English. This would represent roughly one percent of the total population of Canada.<sup>2</sup>

Added to this problem, which still persists, are others which were identified from the outset in regard to achieving 28 percent Francophones.

When Commands were consulted in the fall of 1970 on the draft plan, which was ultimately approved in December and made public in February 1971, Maritime Command said it would need more time than allowed to reach the 28 percent quota<sup>3</sup> because there were very few Francophones in the navy; they made up only about 7 percent of corporals and seamen. This problem had been anticipated earlier by Colonel Chassé, bilingualism advisor to the Chief of Personnel.<sup>4</sup> If this reminder by Maritime Command had been the only one, no one would have had to worry. But the arguments surrounding this objective went further, much further.

In the months that followed the publication of Volume III of the B and B Commission Report, E.B. Osly, MP for Winnipeg South Centre, wrote to Léo Cadieux, the Minister of Defence, that several recommendations in the volume threatened the unity of the Canadian Armed Forces.<sup>5</sup> Later, other people outside the Forces spoke out against the B and B program for the same reason.

Among military personnel themselves, people pretended to misunderstand so as to advance their own positions. While the draft program circulating in 1969 stated clearly that the aim was to produce by April 1971 a directive for implementing the 28 percent — not to implement the principle entirely, a process always supposed to be carried out over a long period for the sake of fairness — there was a storm of protest. According to Commodore D.L. Hanington, the principle was wrong because the aim was to achieve 28 percent of officers throughout the CF in under two years, starting from a base of 16 percent. This could be done at some levels, he wrote, but only by exceptionally rapid promotions, which would be unfortunate because they would destroy confidence in the system and disaffect many Anglophones. He urged that the 28 percent be



achieved by stages.<sup>6</sup> Chassé had no difficulty framing a reply because it was right in the draft.<sup>7</sup>

In Air Defence Command, Major-General M. Lipton made roughly the same comments, although he understood the 28 percent would only be attained in ten years. He thought even that was too short, however. During this period, the two language groups would not have the same opportunities, and this would divide them. He also repeated what airmen had stated before. Since 1939, according to Lipton, the Canadian Armed Forces had given all ethnic groups an opportunity to reach the highest positions. Personally, he favoured the present program, not because it sought to correct the percentage of Francophone representation, but because it enabled them to pursue a military career even if they had little English.<sup>8</sup> In Air Transport Command, it was understood that the 28 percent would be a long-term goal and thus acceptable.<sup>9</sup> Northern Region HQ also took the prescription well, while stressing that some disquiet had been aroused because it was not known what guidelines would follow the implementation of the 28 percent principle. Northern Region suggested stating that the objective would be achieved equitably and across the board.<sup>10</sup> Forces HQ in Europe agreed to the policy, but expressed fears regarding the 28 percent in all ranks, since it could be the end of promotions based on merit. If, however, the result was two separate promotion lists, that too would be divisive.<sup>11</sup>

This brief overview of reactions in the fall of 1969 is interesting in more than one respect. Let us go back over the main concerns. The first, which we saw very clearly earlier, in both Volume I and the present volume, stemmed from the fear that two armies would emerge in some form or other in Canada.

Would Francophones be liable to have less loyalty? Although this issue does not surface explicitly, we may wonder whether some military people thought along the same lines as Marc Lalonde. While he was an aide to Prime Minister Pearson, Lalonde wrote to him on 5 December 1967, after learning about General Allard's plans: "We should avoid very carefully the concentration of these French-speaking Forces inside Quebec.... We have to think here of the problems that such a concentration would cause in the event of a serious political uprising in Quebec.... I don't want to sound unduly pessimistic but we should avoid providing the Government of Quebec with a ready-made Army at its disposal."<sup>12</sup> Michael Pitfield, another Pearson aide, wrote on 1 March 1968 that Allard's proposals offered "one of the most potentially dangerous decisions the Federal government could ever take.... I submit that... unilingual French-Canadian units concentrated in Quebec could — in the circumstances of our times, and with the trends that are likely

to become even more powerful in the future — irrevocably lay the groundwork for an exceedingly dangerous situation.”<sup>13</sup>

Without sharing in the excesses of Lalonde and Pitfield, those responsible for implementing the plan perceived another danger, summarized by the DGOL in 1981 in these terms: the bicultural aspect of the 1972 program had been more successful than the bilingual aspect. As a result, according to this analysis, unilingual Francophones were isolated in Quebec. According to Sullivan, isolation had thus replaced assimilation. “The tenet of the one force concept seems to be the object of a gradual erosion, which could lead in the very near future to the existence of two autonomous forces divided by a linguistic barrier.”<sup>14</sup> This observation, whose accuracy the reader will judge by the end of this book, is primarily an expression of an attitude which began to be taken up by the main managers of the program in 1975, when General J.A. Dextraze retired as CDS (Letellier left in 1977). In 1972, equal opportunities for both language groups was emphasized. In 1980, a “single force” was emphasized, but without ever explaining how this concept would be undermined by treating Francophones fairly. Emerging strongly from the concept of a “single force” is that unilingual Francophones are perceived as being out of the mainstream.

What lies behind the comment by Guy Sullivan, DGOL, in March 1981? Complaints came to him from Mobile Command and Air Defence Command about Francophones whose careers were blocked because they were unilingual. He concluded that the bicultural aspect had functioned too well, and a working subgroup should be formed to draw up terms of reference for a study of English-language training for Francophones.<sup>15</sup> This seems to be an attempt to bring back a way of thinking that had prevailed before 1968 and had been amply proven inadequate, rather than focussing on the many objectives of the 1972 program which had not been met according to schedule by 1981.

### **Information and promotions by deviation**

To return to the comments made in the fall of 1970, a second problem deserves to be discussed here: information. As we have observed, part of the message associated with the 72:28 ratio was not perceived correctly. Yet everyone who commented on the draft program in the fall of 1970 agreed on one of its aspects, the proposed information component.<sup>16</sup>

The misunderstanding that 16 percent of the 1970 military population would very shortly hold 28 percent of officer positions could be attributed either to “selective amnesia” or to lack of information. Chassé responded to

this argument on both fronts. For example, when it was put forward by Air Defence Command HQ, his comment was justifiably caustic: the 28 percent would be pursued in the long term. As for the 16 percent Francophones, it was only 7 percent in the senior ranks Category (majors and above). Of course the injustice contemplated by the Command was not, he added, precisely what Francophones had been suffering from up to the present.<sup>17</sup>

What type of information program should be planned? Lieutenant-General Gilles Turcot of Mobile Command thought information should be addressed to the military and the general public, in particular French-speaking Canadians.<sup>18</sup> For his part, Brigadier-General Ramsay Withers, who thoroughly supported the program, suggested that its intentions, timetables and methods of proceeding should be presented so as to obtain total and heartfelt support by as many members of the Forces as possible. Perhaps thought should be given to a series of presentations at bases, each followed by a question period. Information was one of the last activities mentioned in the plan and, according to Withers, this made the activity less important than it ought to be.<sup>19</sup>

Let us go back a little way to the atmosphere of secrecy which had surrounded the investigation by Colonel Ross's working group in 1966-67. Some people had been annoyed by this initial lack of information, although this is what the politicians had wanted. After 2 April 1968, more information was available regarding objectives and the means used to achieve them. In the spring of 1968, for example, DGBB Letellier spoke on behalf of Allard to a social club in Vanier, a small French-speaking city adjacent to Ottawa. According to the title, his speech was about bilingualism or the development of French in the Armed Forces. What he in fact discussed was changes in the lot of Francophones and their language in the Forces, dwelling on the latest events.<sup>20</sup>

On 12 March, Allard himself spoke to Francophone recruiting officers in the morning, and Letellier to their Anglophone counterparts in the afternoon, about the background to the entire issue and the future as well. It is interesting to note the difference in tone between the two presentations. Letellier prepared a highly factual text. Allard, by contrast, made a heavily emotional appeal. He called it "a subject which lies close to my heart and affects all of you very closely."<sup>21</sup> Furthermore, in General Allard's interviews with the media, even before he became CDS, he expressed his simple but powerful ideas on this subject. These approaches to the Canadian public were sporadic, but there were others of the same sort. In 1975, for example, an appearance at the Biennial of the French-speaking community, in Chicoutimi, drew attention.<sup>22</sup> A brochure originally published in August 1982 outlined very broadly the goals of the military program,<sup>23</sup> it was


updated in 1987.<sup>24</sup> These public interventions with a few exceptions, were fairly well received by Canadians in general.

Information regarding the program also exists in other forms. It may relate to results, successes or failures, and a main vehicle for it is the annual report of the COL. It may also cover specific aspects of the program, through press releases announcing the introduction of new French Language Units (FLUs) or lauding the increased percentage of Francophones in the Forces. In this regard, the wish voiced by Turcot in 1970 was fulfilled. But we may well wonder what impact these poorly co-ordinated scraps of information actually had. After reading the files and consulting Departmental experts in this field, we conclude that no advertising campaign was directly geared to explaining to the Canadian public the complete B and B program and the direction which the Forces wanted it to take. Let us remember the case of the naval FLU in Halifax, where the naval officers concerned were divided about whether or not the issue should be publicized. The same had occurred in 1966, when Allard wanted to make public the investigation Ross was to conduct but the information experts and the Minister objected. This said, the program's results perhaps advertise it best — for better or for worse.

Now let us turn to the military public, to which most of the information was addressed. The 72:28 ratio and the information program are closely linked here. To understand this issue better, we must once again retrace our steps.

On 28 October 1970, Colonel Chassé wrote to the CDS that each general in charge of a Command would have to support wholeheartedly the program he was to establish. He went on to remark that all members of the Canadian Forces should be made aware of the urgent need for such a program.<sup>25</sup> It was understandable for Chassé to react in this way after receiving over many weeks considerable evidence that his program was misunderstood. His overture was not to bear fruit immediately. Under Chassé, the wish to inform the military population fully was never followed up, even though a Defence Council meeting on 21 December 1970 also concluded that the plan must be explained fully and carefully to the Forces.<sup>26</sup>

After climbing every rung of the military ladder during a long and distinguished career, General J.A. Dextraze, CC, CBE, CMM, DSO, CD, served at National Defence Headquarters as Chief of Personnel and from 1972 to 1975 as Chief of the Defence Staff, the second French Canadian, to hold this office. (UPFC/REP 72-195)



Sylvain Cloutier, Deputy Minister of National Defence from 1971 to 1975, supervised the final phases of the development of the military official languages program and ensured progress on the civilian side of the Department. (UPFC/REP 73-4)

As a result, misunderstanding and rumours persisted. Unfortunately, it must be admitted that the Department's public relations experts gave little help. On 21 January 1971, when the specialized officers from the Commands and Northern Region met in Ottawa, the DGBB had an opportunity to make a presentation to them. L.A. Bourgeois, a retired Brigadier general, now head of public relations at NDHQ, wrote: "[...] The officers will understand that they are getting the briefing for background purposes only and will take no action with respect to publicity, either internally or externally, without direction from this office."<sup>27</sup> In the very specific context of this period, when much hung in the balance, this attitude on the part of Bourgeois is understandable. But taken together with his intervention in 1966, when the time had come to release the study conducted by Ross — Bourgeois insisted it should not be — it foreshadows what we shall see later in this chapter. For all practical purposes, Bourgeois did nothing to publicize the program as a whole or any part of it.

Fears tended to grow stronger rather than subside as the months advanced inexorably toward a plan many people thought they would not see in their lifetime. To make it public in February 1971 without much additional explanation naturally did not make matters easier. For Anglophones, especially those who spoke no French, the main question hinged on their opportunities for pursuing their careers with prospects of promotion. Although we do not claim to list every fear, justified or otherwise, regarding the implementation of the program that was announced, let us examine some of them.

On 21 April 1971, Air Transport Command conveyed to NDHQ the apprehensions which were emerging among some of its officers regarding the careers of unilingual Anglophones.<sup>28</sup> The answer drafted by the office of the DGBB was reassuring in this regard: the careers of unilingual English-speakers would not be affected.<sup>29</sup> On 3 May, another member of the DGBB had to answer an accusation by an English-speaking lieutenant that bilingualism was being rammed down his throat, and that as a unilingual Anglophone he was being discriminated against. The obvious defence appeared in the actual text of the February plan and its appendices, which stated in more than one place that the changes announced would respect the needs of unilinguals in both Canada's major language groups.<sup>30</sup>

The Minister also received letters from voters who did not understand clearly what the program would mean. Thus on 19 April 1971, he answered a resident of Fergus, Ontario, who thought Francophones would receive strongly preferential treatment under the programs announced. According to the Minister, however, the time period over which the program was scheduled to be implemented, and language training, would give everyone the same

opportunities. Donald Macdonald repeated that he believed this program was fair to everyone.<sup>31</sup> It is worth noting that the Minister rejected a draft which was much less committed to the program than the letter actually sent out. Macdonald was entirely committed to the undertakings he had made a few months earlier.

We must understand, however, that the main concerns about future careers originated among the military, which was to be expected. One example of this is well documented and, we believe, representative of what was fairly generally thought about the subject. On 10 June 1971, a six-page memorandum was sent by the Technical Services Section at CFB Trenton, Ontario, to the local commander. It reported that the program announced on 12 February 1971 spread much confusion among the staff. They objected not to the underlying principles but to the way they were to be implemented, and even more, the schedule for putting the plan into effect. With more time and some consideration for those then in the Forces, they believed the essence of the proposal would be readily acceptable. Unfortunately, those making the complaint seem to have believed the cards were stacked against Anglophones. A close reading of the memo convinces us that all their grievances stemmed from the reduced career prospects open to Anglophones. The writer, who claimed to speak on behalf of all members of the section, including Francophones, mentioned the following matters:

- *Existing rights.* The program would affect the terms of enlistment contracts and influence promotions. Since pensions were based on the six best years of pay, a promotion denied or simply delayed might have short-and long-term financial consequences. Furthermore, the basic principles governing promotions — performance and merit — would be abolished. Fear was expressed that the Forces would be divided into three parts: one Francophone, one Anglophone and one bilingual.
- *Promotion prospects.* Francophones would be promoted faster and the merit principle replaced by the criterion of mother tongue. Rapid promotions would go to people without the usual experience, and this would undermine the quality of supervision and management. As a corollary, morale among Anglophones would suffer.<sup>32</sup>

The memorandum further requested, among other points we shall leave aside for the moment, that the information program which was announced be carried out as soon as possible. This would clarify how the bilingualism plan would affect promotions for Anglophones over the coming years. The writer

concluded by emphasizing that public relations had been disastrous. He learned of the program's existence in the newspaper long before it reached him through internal mail on 1 March 1971.<sup>33</sup>

On 17 June, the Trenton Base Commander sent the memo to the general in command of Air Transport, assuring him that what emerged was a fairly accurate reflection of how the plan was perceived so far in much of the Forces. Since the questions and complaints it provoked could not be answered adequately, it did little for morale. Information was needed quickly.<sup>34</sup> Lieutenant-General Hull replied on 25 June, giving the Base Commander reassurances designed to calm his fears. He emphasized that B and B was a national objective which would affect the Forces together with all the rest of Canadian society. The task to be performed was complex and several factors which were liable to become emotionally charged had to be taken into consideration. Some questions would remain unanswered for a while, but an answer would be found. The 28 percent objective would be achieved in the long term and implementation of the plan would be adjusted to the actual situation. There was no doubt, however, that from then on, bilingualism would be an increasingly important asset in a career, just as advanced training was in technical trades. For some time care would have to be taken that unilinguals would not suffer from these changes. This said, the Canadian Forces were representative of Canadian society. Hence the French-speaking military had to have the same opportunities as their Anglophone colleagues. When such equality was attained, Francophones could compete for senior positions. From this standpoint, Anglophones' careers would be affected to some extent, but Hull said that he did not expect to meet with objections from military personnel who cared about fairness.<sup>35</sup>

Hull thus gave his subordinate information which, in our opinion, was clearly set out in the plan tabled in the House of Commons in February 1971. The solid support he gave this plan shows that the senior military hierarchy, where the best informed people were concentrated, was generally in solidarity on the future of B and B. Yet this intervention by a lieutenant-general did not solve the problem of the general lack of information regarding the plan.

As he had implied on 26 June, Hull sent the documentation from Trenton to the CDS together with his reply. Some of the comments received from Trenton could help in developing future directives, he wrote, but obviously he did not consider all the criticisms which came to him to be valid.<sup>36</sup>

It is important to take from all this that the great fear felt by Anglophones since 1969 regarding their future in the Forces was heightened after February



1971. Yet very little was done by those in authority to make clear the full extent of the project. Among other things, at this stage, the way in which the 28 percent was to be achieved had not yet been determined.

On 22 July 1971, the CP, Lieutenant-General J. Dextraze, tried to shed some light on what the future held. He sent a letter to the chiefs of Commands regarding the 12 February 1971 document. His lines reflect the correspondence Sharp had received from Hull and no doubt passed on to Dextraze. Indeed, the opening paragraphs reproduce almost word for word what Hull had written, for example, about equal opportunities and the fact that the Canadian Forces reflected society. As a CP aware of his leadership role, however, Dextraze wanted to share his thoughts and his philosophy on how to achieve the main goals, including the 28 percent. At present, he wrote, there were 16 percent Francophones and the gap between that percentage and the target would only be filled over several years, after Francophone recruitment increased. These newcomers would only climb the ladder over the years; hence no one should expect to achieve 28 percent quickly at all levels. How would this affect promotions? First, he answered, the excellent system based on merit would be maintained. One of its parameters was each individual's potential. If, when a promotion was to be given, two people were equal but one of them was bilingual, the latter would have the promotion. That is one place where bilingualism might play a decisive role while the merit principle was still respected.

At this point in his letter, Dextraze moved onto shakier ground which was to provide ammunition for opponents of B and B until the end of the period under study. But did he have a choice of means? At the time of writing, there were more positions classified unilingual French or bilingual than there were people competent to fill them. On rare occasions, Dextraze observed, it was necessary to deviate from the promotion list drawn up in order of merit, in order to meet requirements. In such cases, only a fully qualified person already on the promotion list could be promoted, even if he were lower on that list than other people. "This is the only advantage that the Francophone or the bilingual personnel receive," he wrote.<sup>37</sup>

The CP went on to point out that at that time, in 1971, the percentage of Francophones on the various promotion lists was roughly equal to the overall representation of Francophones in the Forces. Therefore, it was legitimate to expect that eventually, after the goal of 72:28 had been reached, there would be 28 percent Francophones in all ranks. "Those few promotions made now to meet specific requirements will also hopefully speed the build up of a selection base and experience factor, and thus the achievement of the ethnic distribution. It is reiterated that the process will take several years, will be achieved within our promotion system, and will be completely fair to all."<sup>38</sup>

This message from Dextraze ends with a plea for understanding: everyone, at whatever level he may be in the Forces, must perceive the justice of a plan which could not yet be widely publicized because it was not completed, but each addressee could ensure that everyone is at least informed about the basic elements underlying the plan. “I do hope that it will be used to reassure personnel at all levels and to give them some insight into the approach being taken to implement Government Policy.”<sup>39</sup>

Here, then, is a document which was intended to be reassuring overall but, at the same time, went into details which disturbed the majority. Apprehensions were not about to be dispelled by the few speeches made by the DGBB at NDHQ beginning in fall 1971, nor by the October 1971 issue of the *Canadian Forces Bulletin*, even though these emphasized the fairness of the plan. And however legitimate apprehensions were, they might not have been so acute if Dextraze had tried to place the question of “deviations” in perspective. Even more important to remember is that this policy of deviations had been decided in August 1970, in a conversation between CDS Sharp and CP Dextraze.<sup>41</sup> It would thus seem that between June 1970 and July 1971, a system of deviations in promotions was encouraged without being publicized. Then suddenly, without the necessary psychological preparation, Dextraze took it upon himself to drop this bomb-shell.

It must be emphasized — and perhaps should have been emphasized in 1971 and after — that these deviations did not originate from the principle of 72:28. In the Canadian Forces and elsewhere, situations have always occurred which require special talents to be deployed. If, in particular circumstances, promotion was to be given to a person with less seniority or less merit than another, depending on the rating system in use, authorities did what was necessary. In contemporary armies, such deviations still occur and always will. Naturally, however, they are kept to a minimum, if only to maintain the credibility of the existing system. Most important, the very occasional exceptions are made quietly and thus no one can find anything to criticize.

At the same time, the annual performance appraisals of each member of the Forces, generally written by someone of higher rank, are ultimately the most important documents when the time comes to draw up a promotion list. To make the process easier to understand, we ask this question: how would each reader assess a person’s loyalty on a scale of one to eight? Would there not be at least some subjectivity in such an assessment? What about leadership? Is it not possible that the performance of a Francophone working in English would not be as good as that of an Anglophone working in his own environment and in his own language? The same person over his career will be

given several very different ratings on one specific aspect of his personality or his work. Those ratings will depend on circumstances, favourable or otherwise, and often on the appraiser. Nevertheless, the performance appraisal in the Canadian Forces remains a highly commendable document which seeks to be, and is, as objective as possible.

After a performance appraisal has been written and signed, it goes on to the next stage: the promotion committee. That is where all appraisals for a given trade, at a given rank, are assembled and ranked to make up the promotion list. As a general rule, a committee ranks all candidates on a scale of ten; the objective appraisal counts for eight and “potential” for two. Obviously, in the case of potential, the evaluation must be subjective, although it can be less so if, for example, a value is assigned to a specific element such as bilingualism. But the committee members retain the prerogative of determining what percentage of the two potential points they will allocate to bilingualism, physical condition, education or any of the items they see fit to include under this heading.

One essential point must be made. When the final promotion list is drawn up, it often happens that there are only tenths of a point between the first and the twentieth. Let us suppose that fifteen promotions to sergeant may be made in the course of a year in a given trade, and three of these sergeants must go to bring FLUs up to strength. Yet among the top fifteen on the list there are only two Francophones and no Anglophone bilingual enough to fill the third position. Under the deviation system, the next Francophone or bilingual Anglophone on the list may be chosen. He might rank twenty-second, 0.2 points below the fifteenth. After what we have seen, who would venture to assert that this promotion did not go to someone who, if he had worked for someone other than the person who appraised the quality of his performance that year, might have come third or even first on the list?

We have made a long digression which we nevertheless believe to be worthwhile, especially for readers unaware of the situation. In short, the principle of objective merit which must be maintained at all costs masks, as we have seen, a practice which has more than a tinge of subjectivity. Ultimately, deviations based on language representation were discontinued in the fall of 1987, and instead, Canadian Forces Administrative Order 11-6 was amended to state that “service requirements may dictate that promotion may be made out of sequence to the merit list.”<sup>42</sup> These service requirements, according to the message announcing the amendments, dictate that each position on strength “be filled with personnel with the appropriate skill and knowledge.”<sup>43</sup> The broadening of the deviation system in 1987 to include

more than simply language representation made it realistic and, at the same time, performed a great service to the official languages system in the Forces.

As for the deviations which occurred during the period 1972-1987, their numbers were very limited, if only because strict controls were applied. In addition to those mentioned in Dextraze's letter, only Directors General for Officers' and Other Ranks' Careers could authorize them; no one could be promoted to two successive ranks in this way; and in a given rank, no more than 10 percent of annual promotions could be made on this basis.

From these facts, let us return to a debate which had raged since 1968 in discussing action to be taken to achieve 28 percent Francophones throughout the Forces. Book III of the Report of the Royal Commission on B and B suggested promotion quotas to place more Francophones in the upper echelons [recommendation No 36, Annex B]. The Department replied that this would be difficult to do quickly for two reasons. First, the merit principle had to be followed. Second, the possibility of creating new positions to be given to Francophones could not be contemplated because the Forces were supposed to decrease in size between 1969 and 1972.<sup>44</sup> This latter part of the reply by Deputy Minister Elgin Armstrong was incorporated into the brief to Cabinet on Book III, but the merit principle was left out.<sup>45</sup>

When the staff of Canadian Forces in Europe commented, in the fall of 1970, on the draft plan of that year, it devoted a paragraph to proportional representation. The fairest way of making progress, it suggested, would be to set aside in each rank a percentage roughly equivalent to the total percentage of Francophones in the Forces. This would ensure equal opportunities for each group while maintaining the criteria of merit-based promotion, but with some restrictions.<sup>46</sup> This was in fact the formula used in the plan [see para 2a, Appendix C]. As we have just observed, this Departmental decision was replaced, in practice, by controversial administrative manipulation.

While Dextraze was discussing "deviations", authorities were still looking for a way to make bilingualism count in the promotion system.

On 3 June 1971, the DGBB (Lieutenant-Colonel Fournier) recommended the formulation of a directive on the place of bilingualism in the merit system criteria.<sup>47</sup> But the assistant to the CP, Commodore D.S. Boyle, advised waiting until the whole bicultural aspect of the program was accepted.<sup>48</sup> The biculturalism issue — as the term was interpreted at NDHQ, (in other words, the 28 percent) — was not, as we have seen, settled until the fall of 1971, and the final plan did not come out until April 1972. On 14 July 1971, Boyle made two additional requests: that a specific directive on

language training be developed and that work resume on the issue of bilingualism as a merit criterion.<sup>49</sup> This about-face by Boyle resulted from an error. He believed that the CDS advisory committee, which had met on 30 June, had agreed to one of the proposals put forward by the Director General Personnel Careers (DGPC) which would have led to the achievement of 28 percent at all ranks within fifteen years. But although this had been discussed at length, a decision was postponed.<sup>50</sup>

Let us focus on this period from 25 June to 8 July 1971, during which serious consideration was given to “Promotion implications of increasing biculturalism in the Canadian Forces”, the title of document submitted to the CDS Advisory Committee on 25 June, for discussion at its meeting on 30 June.

From the outset, the DGPC acknowledged in his paper that the subject before him was the one which caused the most fear and discussion in the Forces. Yet the February 1971 plan was clear: the lack of Francophone representation in the rank and trade structure had to be corrected [see para 2g, Annex C].\* No doubt it was to this latter paragraph that the DGPC was referring in June.\*\* The question was simple: how could existing promotion procedures be used to obtain 28 percent Francophones in all ranks and trades? The question might have been simple, but the answer was not. First we must recognize that:

- if 28 percent of positions was reserved for Francophones, the percentage of Anglophones would have to decrease. Hence the length of the correction process was a crucial factor;
- since there was not as yet 28 percent Francophones overall, it would not be possible to consider reallocating surpluses from some sectors;
- at the lowest level, the gap could be filled quickly by recruiting; further up the ladder however, deviation from promotion lists would have to be considered.
- Francophones in the Forces were not as yet perfectly identified;

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\* The 1971 plan called for this directive to be ready on 1 May 1971, one of the somewhat unrealistic deadlines set by the originators.

\*\* Note that paragraph 2a, Annex C seems to be a directive, while 2g calls for a directive to be prepared.

— the merit system, in place for several years, had gained a credibility that must not be destroyed.

Criteria for the solution to be sought must include: relevance (possibilities of implementation and adhering to existing promotion criteria); flexibility (the system must be able to keep operating even if one condition was altered — for example, if Francophone recruitment or attrition rates changed); and dissemination (it must be possible to explain the decision logically to everyone and quantify the penalties it carried so that everyone can understand how it might affect his career).<sup>51</sup>

A fourth criterion was identified: equity.

Equity of promotion opportunity for both language groups must be of prime importance. *Deficiencies in this area must be limited to the absolute minimum commensurate with achieving the overall aim.*<sup>52</sup>

Five methods were then studied. Two were dismissed out of hand. One proposed to increase the number of service personnel in the Forces to 100,000, with Francophones making up most of its new members.<sup>53</sup> The second involved offering promotions to those who had completed their careers but were willing to serve a further two years as supernumeraries. Both these solutions were impracticable in a period of pressure to cut back personnel. Moreover, the Department was subject to very strict financial ceilings.

The third method was to maintain the existing system, in which promotions were given to those with the greatest merit unless there were “compelling reasons to the contrary.”<sup>54\*</sup> A brief analysis showed, however, that this would run counter to the criterion of appropriateness. Even if an overall proportion of 28 percent Francophones were achieved, the merit principle could lead to Francophones being even more under-represented at the upper echelons. In the long term, the situation ought to correct itself; but since that was not certain, this possibility was ruled out.

The fourth option was to abide by the decision of August 1970. In other words, while awaiting a gradual increase in the proportion of Francophones at the various ranks, selective deviations would be made from promotion lists which did not provide a reasonable increase in Francophone representation.<sup>55</sup>

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\* In his text, Lieutenant-Colonel Creelman, on behalf of his Director General, placed quotation marks around “compelling reasons to the contrary”. This confirms what we suggested earlier: however rare deviations might be, they did exist in the merit-based promotion system.

This option offered flexibility, but was not necessarily fair. First, promotion decisions would follow negotiations within a trade or classification. Thus a great many people would intervene in this process and would surely not react in exactly the same way, and this could lead to serious imbalances between sectors. Secondly, there was no knowing when 28 percent would be achieved overall. Moreover, how this system would operate was rather difficult to explain precisely.

The method recommended by the experts was the fifth and last. It called for management to select, for each grade, an annual rate of expansion for the proportion of Francophones and an approximate date by which the goal would be met. In brief, this was the fourth option with precise quantities. There would be deviations, of course, but the method was appropriate, flexible (adjustable annually) and fair, since all trades would be treated in the same way. This method should allow the 28 percent goal to be reached in ten to fifteen years.<sup>56</sup>

The minutes show that a long discussion followed this presentation. The arguments we explored earlier were reformulated, and eventually the conclusion was the same one presented by the Director General Personnel Careers. Although some degree of consensus developed among military personnel in attendance, Deputy Minister Armstrong believed that abandoning the merit principle would not be well received. For his part, he preferred the third option, although he observed that the method of defining merit would have to change so as to give more prominence to the criterion of bilingualism. Armstrong anticipated that Francophones would have adequate promotion opportunities in the future and the desired representation would gradually be achieved.

Finally, the CDS asked that a proposal be drawn up for him using the general principles of the fifth option, but eliminating the use of certain terms (such as “deviation from the promotion list”) and presenting the material in a way that could be explained in clear and acceptable terms to members of the Forces and the general public.<sup>57</sup>

During the discussions on 30 June, Lieutenant-General M.E. Pollard, Comptroller General, firmly maintained a position contrary to Deputy Minister Armstrong’s to the effect that government policy favoured the acceleration of promotion to Francophones in the Public Service in general. On 5 July 1971, after researching the question, he acknowledged to Armstrong that he had been mistaken. In his speech to Parliament on 23 June 1970, the Prime Minister accepted recommendation 36 of the Report of the Commission on B and B, adding that knowledge of both languages should be weighted

appropriately among the other qualities considered for advancement. “It would seem, therefore, that our proposal to give accelerated promotion to Francophones over equally or better assessed Anglophones does not derive any authority from any statement of Government policy from the PM or other member of the Cabinet. It would appear to be solely DND policy, at best.”<sup>58</sup>

On 8 July, the CDS presented the new document from the DGPC to the Deputy Minister, suggesting that it be adopted promptly, especially as the Minister had requested in a letter of 25 June that a plan be completed.<sup>59</sup> In point of fact, the DGCP simply deleted the unpalatable expressions from his earlier text, as he had been asked to do on 30 June, but did not reformulate the entire issue.<sup>60</sup>

Since the Minister, the Deputy Minister and the CDS went on leave or travelled during July and August 1971, the affair was not discussed again at a senior level. In August, an English-speaking officer with the DGGBB proposed that confirmed bilinguals be given a point added to the total in the performance appraisal. Since nearly all Francophones were bilingual, they could only benefit<sup>61</sup> — as would this particular Anglophone, whose memorandum was in French. On 7 December 1971, a subordinate of the DGCP again submitted a recommendation to the Advisory Committee on this topic.<sup>62</sup> But no firm decision was taken as to how to ensure gradual growth in the proportion of Francophones at all organizational levels.

From his arrival in August 1971 until his departure in 1977, Letellier fought to have option 5 in the June 1971 memorandum from the DGCP adopted in some form, or else the system of two promotion lists, one for Anglophones and the other for Francophones, each applying merit without deviations. In his opinion, giving points for bilingualism when not all the military were bilingual would only aggravate the imbalances of a system which had demonstrated, according to the Ross Report in 1967, that it did not give Francophones their fair share. But the principle of two lists was opposed by some who feared the Canadian Forces would split in two. As for the method advocated in June 1971, it was alleged to be contrary to the merit principle. Curiously, the deviation method followed between August 1970 and November 1987 also seemed to violate that principle.

In 1972, it became clear that controlled deviation would serve as the basis for the advancement of some Francophones. On 28 January 1972, for example, Letellier drafted notes for answers to questions which would certainly be put to the CP, Rear Admiral D.S. Boyle, when he made his scheduled visit to Maritime Command. In brief, the merit principle still prevailed, but it must be acknowledged that in 1987, when the program introduced in 1972 came to an



end, Francophones had gained more ground than they had before. At the lower levels, recruiting filled in the shortfall. At higher levels, it was occasionally necessary to adjust “the present promotion flow ... if the imbalance are to be remedied.”<sup>64</sup> If, for example, there were more bilingual positions than bilingual people, in order to fill a maximum of such positions, bilinguals would obviously be favoured. “Nevertheless, promotions of Anglophones will not be jeopardized, for it is clear that a satisfying career pattern must be open to all members of the service.”<sup>65</sup>

Such a reply is less than satisfactory in more than one respect. Let us suppose that in a given year, an Anglophone is on the list for a promotion but ultimately it goes to a Francophone. What happens to the person who did not obtain the promotion and who, the following year, might be outside the promotion area, since new lists are drawn up every year on the basis of performance appraisals which vary and a potential which each promotion committee evaluates independently?

The answer came, from the CP, in the fall of 1972, in a letter sent to Commands, missions abroad and major sectors at NDHQ. The letter discussed only the promotion system in relation with the B and B goals to be achieved. It presented considerations we have already seen but will recapitulate: 28 percent Francophones must be reached everywhere within fifteen years, in a way which is and is seen to be fair to all. Everyone must be convinced that promotion is based on merit, not on culture, if only to prevent some promotions from being tainted.

Where feasible, an increase in Francophone representation was sometimes required at the end of each year of promotions in classifications or trades where Francophones were under-represented. But if the way in which the promotions system operated is taken into account, it remains as fair as humanly possible to all candidates. Thus:

- each promotion committee considered all the candidates which came before it;
- next, it formed two groups, one comprising those who qualified for promotion that year and the other comprising those who did not qualify;
- those eligible for promotion were then placed on the promotion list in descending order of the rating given by the committee to each person;

- the number of promotions actually planned for the year was then compared to the list. The committee thus saw what percentages of Anglophones and Francophones should be promoted, and these percentages were compared with those existing at the start of the new promotion year;
- if the comparison “did not provide a reasonable increase in Francophone representation, adjustments to the promotion list were considered and made if feasible; in other words, if Francophone candidates were already on the promotion list.”<sup>66</sup>
- in the event of a deviation, the non-Francophone candidate who had been passed over would have his position protected. He would automatically be placed at the top of the next promotion list and promoted at the first opportunity, unless serious reasons in the meantime made such promotion impossible.

Boyle added a table showing what had occurred since this method came into use, in order to demonstrate that a very small number of deviations were made, and on the whole, the integrity of the system was maintained.

Table 3

**ACTUAL OR PLANNED DEVIATIONS FROM PROMOTIONS  
1971-1972**

YEAR	PROMOTION TO THE RANKS of sergeant, warrant officer, master warrant officer and chief warrant officer		PROMOTION TO THE RANK of major	
	Total	Deviations	Total	Deviations
1971	2,477	7	338	2
1972 (Jan to Sept)	2,317	—	384	5
1972 (Oct to Dec) — projected	500	20	—	—
Grand total	5,294	27 - 0.5%	722	7 - 0.9%

All Anglophones who were passed over in 1971 had been promoted by the time Boyle's letter was written, and it is possible that some of the 1972 deviations had been corrected even before the end of the year. Boyle ended by noting that this information could be disseminated before it appeared in the *Personnel Bulletin*.<sup>67</sup>

Let us add to the above information the fact that in 1970, nine deviations from captain to major had occurred.<sup>68</sup> As we can see, Boyle made clear to one and all that deviations are rare, in order to silence the many exaggerated accounts that were current both inside and outside the Forces. To any impartial observer aware of what we explained earlier regarding the complex promotion process, there is no doubt that 40 deviations out of a total of over 6,000 promotions reported is negligible. Only a handful of the seventy-odd trades and classifications in which deviations occurred had more than one such instance.

On the other hand, there is also no doubt that another desired effect named in the CP's letter was not achieved: maintaining the credibility of the system. Hundreds of persons continued to believe they had been passed over in favour of a less qualified Francophone. Boyle stated in his letter that the process he described should keep promotions above reproach. But how to convince an Anglophone major that the promotion of his Francophone colleague in November, on a certain year, was not one of those deviations? Several Francophones, indeed, were told outright from the beginning of the implementation of the B and B policy that they had been promoted because they were Francophones. How does one react to that? As long as the system was in place, it was challenged in this way.

In December 1972, Boyle wrote to Brigadier-General J.I. Davies, Director General Military Careers (DGMC), that nothing more could be done than was currently being done as regards exceptional promotions for Francophones. In any case, the number and percentage of Francophones had increased steadily in nearly all branches of the military since 1968.<sup>69</sup>

Such, then, is the information which the DGBB had to deliver on a highly sensitive issue in 1973, when he went to tell the troops everything about B and B.\* This information tour was organized around an excellent presentation,

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\* Again, the DG Info had almost nothing to do with organizing this information tour. This is hard to understand, since NDHQ executive directive D3 (Chapter 9, note 111), dated 20 February 1973, made the DG Info the office responsible for information about B and B, in cooperation with the ADM(Per) and the DGBB.

given in various Forces bases and always followed by a question period. Unfortunately, no brochure was available until August 1982 to supplement the information given orally.

Letellier recalls how a draft brochure was rejected by Boyle and other very senior officers. They thought that it was phrased in terms which accused every Anglophone in the Forces of causing the flagrant injustices it emphasized, although ultimately none of them was directly responsible for the situation. Letellier also tells of the information tour which was announced in February 1973 and took place between 28 February and 31 July of that year.

It was decided that Colonel Hanna, Letellier's assistant, would speak to Anglophones as often as possible. Letellier, for his part, would mainly cover bases in Quebec, which still had a fairly large Anglophone population (in Saint-Hubert, for example). From his evidence, it appears that Anglophones were still worried about their careers and often expressed this quite forcefully. Some Francophones appeared disappointed since they were due to leave the Forces before 1987, and the promised end to the injustices.<sup>70</sup>

During this tour, personnel from DGBB made 59 presentations in 26 different locations, speaking to 7,103 civilian and military personnel. The bases and stations not covered in this first wave were visited later by Command co-ordinators with essentially the same briefing that had been given by the DGBB and his staff. After each meeting, a report was prepared commenting on reactions to the briefing and listing participants' questions.

The formal presentation lasted about half an hour. It gave a brief background on the question, concentrating on the period after 1969 and the Official Languages Act. Next, the civilian and military programs approved a few months earlier by Treasury Board were explained. Last came the basic aim of the program: to promote Canadian unity. The presentation was well organized. As early as December 1972, for example, a list of questions which might be asked was drawn up, and appropriate answers to each were drafted.<sup>71</sup>

The 1973 information tour confirmed that the 28 percent target and the promotion policy were two of the key elements which precipitated a certain animosity. After the first presentations on the Atlantic Coast (at Halifax and Shearwater), between 27 February and 1 March 1973, Colonel Hanna wrote that the questions he was asked ranged over all the areas he had discussed, but focussed mainly on the 28 percent and promotions. In regard to this, Boyle's letter of fall 1972 was more divisive than unifying, and some individuals found it discriminatory. In brief, the bilingualism at which the

program aimed was accepted but some aspects relating to biculturalism were less so.<sup>72</sup>

At the same time, some significant good will was expressed. After reading Hanna's report, Vice Admiral Boyle, CP, said that he wished to intervene where necessary to support the B and B policy in every detail. Dextraze, for his part, was prepared to submit Hanna's report to the Defence Management Committee. But Letellier preferred to wait until the end of the information tour before advising on this.<sup>73</sup>

Other reports on visits were very often similar to Hanna's. Lieutenant-Colonel S.M. Newell, who went to Saint-Hubert with Letellier, thought that Boyle's letter, in whatever spirit it may have been written, could not be perceived as fair. "The fact that it is tied to the B and B Programme is pure poison."<sup>74</sup> The bilingualism part was all very well, but biculturalism was a hard pill for Anglophones to swallow, especially when departures from the merit list were made. "It just doesn't sell on a reasoned and logical basis against the emotionalism it has built up."<sup>75</sup>

Meanwhile, to prepare for the rest of the tour, Hanna sent his report to various specialists for comment.<sup>76</sup> On 15 March, Lieutenant-Colonel A. White, assistant to the Director Personnel Career Administration, reviewed the deviations in 1972 and 1973 for promotion from captain to major. Since Boyle's letter presented the situation in 1972, it is worth noting that as of 15 March 1973, only one deviation was forecast up to 30 September, in the Maritime Engineering (MARE) category, in which a Francophone would be shifted from thirty-first to twenty-seventh place. After this promotion, Francophones would make up 2.89% of this military occupational group at the rank of major. The MARE classification operated in English only.

Consulting White's tables, we find that the first Francophone who could be promoted to major in the armoured group ranked seventy-fourth. In the personnel development classification, the first Francophone ranked nineteenth, and in personnel selection, he ranked sixteenth. The number of promotions to major each year was very small in both these specializations. Among dentists and security officers, no Francophone was eligible.<sup>77</sup>

In Halifax, someone wanted to know whether B and B as practised in the Department violated human rights. The answer came on 19 March: human rights would not be violated because, at the federal level, it was common practice to favour minorities. As for provincial legislation in this area, it was not binding on the federal level.<sup>78</sup>

Between 20 and 22 March, Hanna was at Training Command in Winnipeg. One of the comments made to him was that people were well informed about B and B — better than Ottawa seemed to believe. That did not prevent misunderstandings, as Hanna stressed, “as to programme details, and there are strongly held opinions about the way we should proceed to achieve our goals.”<sup>79</sup>

Although the atmosphere was more apathetic in Winnipeg than in Halifax, questions and comments followed the same lines. Rumours circulated freely about many promotions given to undeserving Francophones. The figures given by Boyle in September and enlarged upon by the speakers did not reassure listeners. Just when presenters thought they had overcome resistance, someone would rise to ask whether a person who had been passed over would keep his seniority when promotion came, probably months after the date on which he could have been promoted.<sup>80</sup>

All the other reports are much the same. Sometimes there were surprising reactions. One of the questions asked was why the Armed Forces were moving so quickly while nothing was being done on the civilian side.<sup>81</sup> In Lahr, officers of the *Royal 22<sup>e</sup> Régiment* claimed that the 28 percent would place them at a disadvantage because, in the infantry, they often made up over 28 percent in a given rank.<sup>82</sup> We see, then, that fear of losing opportunities for promotion, whether among Anglophones or Francophones, led to roughly similar reactions.

On 12 September 1973, Hanna, in his precise way, summarized all the visit reports. On the whole, he wrote, only a very small minority failed to grasp the logic of the equal opportunities principle.<sup>83</sup> The 28 percent target prompted three types of questions: would the percentage be adjusted after data from the latest census were received? was this an inflexible target? and how would it affect promotions? But in general, there was consensus as to the 28 percent and its *raison d'être*. As might be expected, the younger Anglophones in the audience, whose careers were most liable to be affected, were the most hesitant. As the tour continued, the need for deviations became better understood, even though they were still accepted with reservations. At the same time, Francophones were also wary. They wanted it to be made clear that their promotions were fully merited, not because of their membership in the French-language group.

Hanna concluded that the tour, which would be continued by Command co-ordinators, had achieved its objectives. The senior military hierarchy in the regions and thousands of military and civilian personnel of all ranks had been

contacted. He suggested that similar tours be organized later, just as systematically, to report on progress.<sup>84</sup> We should note immediately that nothing comparable to what was done in 1973 has been undertaken since, although the DGOL or some of his associates have travelled here and there over the years to discuss the implementation of the plan. Thus in June 1979, a CCOL could suggest that something should be done to make the program better known.<sup>85</sup> Instead, brochures in English and French on the civilian and military programs were produced in 1982-83 and revised in 1986-87. They were very widely circulated and proved useful, but it is doubtful whether they answered all the questions. Certainly they did not enable managers to read the reactions provoked by the implementation of B and B plans.

Hanna's last report in September 1973 was submitted to various offices for comment. On promotions, Major-General C.W. Ross, Chief Personnel Careers and Senior Appointments, responded on 30 November 1973. He considered that all directives regarding promotions should avoid the words "departure" and "deviation", which had a pejorative connotation and contributed to emotional reactions.<sup>86</sup>

Other evidence tends to confirm Hanna's assertion in September 1973: as the tour progressed and information was disseminated, animosity subsided. Other members of the NDHQ hierarchy also travelled to inform the military about the major issues of the day. For example, the CP was moved to speak about B and B in his presentations, although this was not his main task. Returning from his talks, he sent Letellier the questions that he had been asked about B and B in the Forces. Between 4 January and 4 May 1973, three of the CP's trips left traces in the files we consulted. In January, five of the twenty-five questions he had to answer related to B and B. In May, only two indirect questions out of twenty-three related to this subject.<sup>87</sup> Between these two dates, as we have seen, the DGBB information tour was launched, often reaching, directly or indirectly, the same audiences seen by the CP.

This did not mean resistance had died out altogether. On 21 November 1973, the Director General Manpower Utilization (DGMU), E.S. Baker, noted in a report on his visit to members of the Electronic Engineering and Communications classification, in Kingston, that he was told deviations were discriminatory and unfair. Baker gave the usual reply, but added that this subject would always be controversial.<sup>88</sup>

The 28 percent objective was to be replaced by 27 percent in 1973. As for concerns about the promotion system, they persisted, even outside the military context. Thus on 28 April 1976, the Honourable James Richardson, Minister

of Defence, gave two answers in the House of Commons to questions on the order paper. They are quoted in full below.

Linguistic knowledge of both English and French is not a factor in promotions to commissioned rank and within commissioned ranks up to the rank of Captain. However, in all officer classifications, (except for some specialist officer's classifications) knowledge of English is necessary to complete classification training which is a prerequisite to promotion within commissioned ranks up to the rank of Captain. For promotion to the rank of Major and above linguistic ability in a second official language is a factor. The total scoring system which determines relative merit is based on two major appraisal scores, "Performance and Potential". "Performance" accounts for 80 per cent and "Potential" for 20 per cent of the total possible merit score, and linguistic ability is one of the factors considered under "Potential". Other factors under "Potential" are qualifications, experience, personality, age and such other factors considered appropriate by the promotion board membership. Thus linguistic ability in a second official language, whether English or French should enhance an officer's position with respect to promotion to the ranks of Major or above in relation to a unilingual contemporary when all other factors are equal.

To support the Government's Bilingual program the department is endeavouring to establish by 1987 an Anglophone/Francophone balance of personnel in the forces corresponding to the national ratio of the two groups, currently 73 per cent Anglophones/27 per cent Francophones. To provide an equitable distribution of this ratio in all classifications and trades and at all rank levels some adjustments to the promotion merit lists as described in Question No. 3813 are made periodically, when possible and practicable, in the ranks of Major and above. Where such an adjustment is made the promotion of the officer who would otherwise have been promoted is protected and he or she will be promoted when the next vacancy occurs.<sup>89</sup>

The question of proportional representation at all levels and in all trades remained controversial. In Winnipeg in 1973, someone said very few Francophones enlisted in certain trades. For example, they considered serving in the medical support trade as effeminate. Why, then, should 28 percent be pursued in such a trade?<sup>90</sup>

In 1980, Lieutenant-General Jacques Paradis, Commander of Mobile Command, made somewhat similar suggestions. In his view, the measures taken to keep military personnel in the Canadian Forces and make units more effective must apply to both language groups. When seeking to achieve perfect national representation, this fact must not be forgotten.



General Paradis studied the prevailing situation and observed that the position of Francophones remained precarious, even in senior ranks in the infantry — a branch in which Francophones were well represented. There were 21 infantry colonels, and eighteen of them were Anglophones, including two in the *Royal 22<sup>e</sup> Regiment*. He was extremely pessimistic about whether the ideal percentage of Francophones would be achieved throughout the Forces, especially in the navy and the air force. He reached the same conclusion in 1980 as several others had done before, including General Pollard in 1971, namely that this objective in the 1972 plan should be abandoned because it was not working and made energies less focussed. Instead, the goal should be satisfactory proportional representation overall, with concentrations in some trades (33 percent in the infantry). For other branches, targets of about 25 percent would be adequate —armoured and artillery, for example, where one regiment in four was Francophone. The obvious result would be very few Francophones in some job categories and over-representation in others.<sup>91</sup>

Paradis was then grappling in nearly all of his combat units with difficulties relating to the numbers serving in them, especially among middle-ranking officers. His representations must thus be understood as a defence of the interests of his Command, at the risk of having the position of Francophones eroded elsewhere if his views were adopted.

The fact remains that debate on this objective, revised to 26 percent following the results of the 1981 Census, is still not closed. At NDHQ, a decision has been made to keep it, come what may. The decision was undoubtedly based on very good reasons, including the need to ensure a critical French-speaking mass in technical trades, so that French and those who spoke it would not disappear rapidly if the principle of proportional representation were relaxed a little too much.

On the question of promotions, Paradis makes interesting points which confirm what we suggested earlier. One of his battalion commanders was second on the infantry promotion list. After being transferred to a unilingual environment — Paradis does not say whether French or English — the man ranked tenth the following year. Was this because of language difficulties or limited skills? Neither Paradis nor the officer in question could tell. As a result, everyone was left wondering about the performance appraisal. Questions were inevitably also asked whenever a promotion came: did it come because of language? Was it one of the adjustments to the promotion list?<sup>92</sup> Deviations, as we see, remained a sensitive issue.

Paradis went on to remark that, despite the increase in the number and percentage of Francophones in the Forces, it is fair to say that there was still a backlash against biculturalism.<sup>93</sup> Hence it was important to stress forcefully that points awarded for bilingualism, together with the principle of proportional representation, were operational requirements. No one could argue against the fact that a Francophone must command the *Royal 22<sup>e</sup> Régiment* or that some training centres must be managed by fully bilingual personnel. Consideration should be given, when the situation occurred, to the fact that a Francophone was working in English, and any doubt that a promotion was based on factors other than professional competence should be dispelled. This would improve the atmosphere for everyone and enable Francophones to compete within known parameters. To this end, Paradis suggested that the promotion list ought no longer be drawn up after the bilingualism factor had been taken into account; bilingualism should not be one of the factors considered by promotion committees. Instead, every bilingual position should be filled by a bilingual, whether or not he was on the promotion list, on the condition he met all the other requirements of the position<sup>94</sup> (for example, the minimum number of years completed in one rank before being eligible for the next).

Controversy about the wisdom of the deviation principle thus continued. It incensed some people. Pierre Deniger, MP, of the joint committee, heard the following on 17 November 1981 in a presentation by Defence representatives:

“Promotion adjustments to permit more rapid advancement of francophones through the rank structure have been authorized.”<sup>95</sup>

He was the first to intervene after the briefing, asserting that he found that paragraph very insulting. He asked Lieutenant-General G. Thériault, then Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff and later CDS:

Are you telling me you're there because you are a Francophone?<sup>96</sup>

Thériault did not answer but left Lieutenant-General H.A. Carswell, ADM(Per), to speak. He stressed that, overall, between 2.5 and 3 percent of promotions were made on that basis. He also explained that all promotions were given to people already on the promotion list.

We promoted on a merit list in recognition of the fact, that francophones who had reached the top 5 per cent of the merit list had had to work in their second language in most cases and in many cases had had to train in their second language. If they could get within the top few positions of promotion under

those difficulties, they were obviously equally suitable and in many cases more suitable for promotion than the anglophones.<sup>97</sup>

In 1982, Lieutenant-General Charles Belzile, Commander of Mobile Command, in turn proposed a new way of making deviations which would have the advantage of making bilingualism really attractive to everyone. Although the idea was mainly to support second language courses, it is worth recalling it at this stage. The promotion list would be drawn up without taking bilingualism into account and a line would be drawn, below which no one could be chosen for promotion for any reason whatever. In each rank and classification, the number of promotions would be divided into three subgroups: English only, French only, and bilingual. Only functionally bilingual candidates would be promoted to the bilingual positions to be filled. Anglophone and Francophone functionally bilingual candidates could also be promoted to English-or French-only positions, respectively.<sup>98</sup>

This method is open to much comment and criticism. Its primary aim is to make functional bilingualism an operational asset in the Forces. Had it been adopted, it would inevitably have had positive effects on the percentage of Francophones promoted to bilingual positions.

Still closer to home, a senior officer at NDHQ, after studying the positive and negative aspects of various methods, proposed that separate promotion lists be drawn up, one for Anglophones and the other for Francophones. From each list, promotions would be made without deviation. This would do away with the pejorative image of promotions for Francophones, who even in 1986, according to this officer, were often told they had been promoted because of their language. This means in effect that Francophones are in principle considered less competent than other people to occupy their positions, even if they have been promoted according to merit.<sup>99</sup>

In brief, an organized way of achieving proportional representation at all levels had still not been identified by 1987. However infrequent deviations were, they frequently tainted the promotions of Francophones. Since final promotion lists in order of merit remained secret, everyone could believe that the next person's promotion was not merited. Some of the Francophones singled out took no offence at this view, since they were sure they had earned their stripes. Others were understandably nettled by the comments. Were the Canadian Forces in fact well served by the deviation system? The question remains to be answered.

## Recruiting

We have dwelt at great length with the way in which an attempt was made to achieve proportional representation at all organizational levels among the military. But at the base of the process lies recruiting. We do not intend to discuss this topic at too much length; a few pages will be enough to identify the problems, the way they were solved and, most important, the results obtained between 1972 and 1987, during the greater part of the implementation of the fifteen-year program.

The period surrounding Colonel Ross's report and the introduction of the first reforms designed to increase the presence of Francophones in the Forces gave the first impetus to recruiting, which was so important to the success of the enterprise as a whole. Let us bring the picture into focus. First, Francophone recruitment had gone on for decades, and was even as successful as forecast. It was once they were in the Forces that things went wrong for the Francophones, as Ross noted. Second, integration and unification consolidated under a single authority the recruiting operations which the three services had hitherto carried out separately. Third, the restructuring of classifications and trades, although constructive in more than one way, complicated the task of recruitment and selection at the start of the 1970s. In an overloaded trade, for example, recruiting had to be stopped and, if possible, interested applicants had to be channelled elsewhere. Fourth, the Forces were severely cut back from 1968 onward, and this made the entire recruiting operation difficult, since the numbers on strength had to be reduced, not increased. In 1970, the Forces numbered 89,000; by 1972 they had been reduced to 82,000. By the end of the decade, the new ceiling was to be 79,000. Naturally, those who had served since the Second World War or the beginnings of the Korean operations would retire at about this time. But as might be expected, recruiting activity could hardly flourish. Whenever accelerated recruitment of Francophones was advocated, an unavoidable stumbling block arose.

This said, by 1970, it was agreed that recruiters would have target Francophone percentages to meet, which would be much higher than the percentage of Francophones in the population of Canada. It was necessary to put together quickly a broad base of Francophones, from which the 28 percent required at all levels would be slowly built up.

Initially, the Department decided that, for the 1970-71 fiscal year, 50 percent of officer cadets in the Direct Officer Entry Plan (DOEP) would be Francophones. It was realized, however, that this objective would be hard to achieve.<sup>100</sup> Colonel L.J. Hutchins, who was responsible for recruitment and

selection, had to present weekly reports, beginning in January, to Commodore D.S. Boyle, his superior, who in turn worked for Lieutenant-General Dextraze.

Unless this recruitment took place and a base was assembled quickly, Dextraze worried that the 28 percent target might not be achieved. In June 1971, he spoke to Boyle about his fears, even regarding the infantry, which had a higher concentration of Francophones than other arms. Boyle agreed and, on 7 July, he linked selective recruitment with deviations.

The bicultural goals make it very difficult not to compromise the merit promotion system but if we show good faith by demonstrating that the base for the future is being established as rapidly as possible, and that the goals will be achieved as reasonably as it is possible, it should not be difficult to dispel doubts on the one hand and show good intentions on the other.<sup>101</sup>

Parallel to this memorandum to his superior, Boyle urged recruiters along the path he had traced. For the moment, the focus was on officers, for in percentage as well as numbers, Francophones were less well represented among officers than in other ranks. On 30 June, Boyle approached the new Director Recruiting and Selection, Colonel Pierre Chassé, who, as may be supposed, was well versed in B and B matters. After outlining the main idea, Boyle went into details. When positions earmarked for Francophones in universities and military colleges could not be filled, they should be transferred to the Officer-Cadet Training Program (OCTP), which took in those who, after completing secondary school, chose a military career and could become officers within twelve months. Naval classifications needed to be closely watched. Boyle wanted progress reports twice a month on four classifications: infantry, armoured, artillery and surface and submarine operations (MARS).<sup>102</sup>

On the basis of the reports he had submitted to him, Boyle could intervene. On 27 August 1971, he expressed satisfaction that all Francophone positions at *Collège militaire royal de St-Jean* had been filled, but noted that there were still vacancies in universities. Action had to be taken quickly, perhaps by enrolling at university good candidates rejected by the *Collège militaire* or recruiting directly at the universities. As for the DOEP, it was not working at all. Boyle criticized Chassé for not giving him, as had been agreed, the number of Francophones who reported to the various recruiting centres and a description of what had been done so that those candidates should become officer-cadets. Boyle now required two more things:

- that all recruiters in Francophone areas be made aware of the urgency of the situation (they were to get moving);

- that all candidates rejected by the Regular Officer Training Plan (ROTP — those wishing to obtain a degree from a military college or civilian university with financial assistance from the Canadian Forces) be approached for the OCTP; a weekly report on this was to be submitted to him.

Boyle also toyed with the idea of sending a message to the Forces to encourage Francophone non-commissioned officers to become commissioned. But would Anglophones not take umbrage at such an appeal?<sup>103</sup>

On 2 September, Chassé sent a message to his recruiters.<sup>104</sup> Six days later he responded to Boyle's concerns, assuring him that, even before his recent intervention, all Chassé's recruiters were well aware that their first priority was to recruit Francophones, especially officers. Each recruiter had his own goals and tried to reach them.<sup>105</sup> Boyle did not let the matter rest so easily. As soon as he received the note from Chassé, he said he was pleased with it and with the work that had been done. Admirable efforts had been made and staff had to build on the results they had achieved. But he also asked questions. Why were there no plans to recruit Francophones as air traffic controllers? In September, there were already 93 fewer Francophone officer-cadets than forecast, and the year was drawing to a close. Why was it that out of 3.8 Francophone candidates, only one became an officer-cadet, while for Anglophones the ratio was one in 3.5?

As we can see, Boyle (and through him Dextraze) followed the matter closely. He put the spurs to Chassé, who was well aware of the priorities and doing his best. Meanwhile, the DGBB, under the leadership of Letellier, studied the whole situation. On 28 September, Letellier shared his thoughts with Major-General D.C. Laubman, Dextraze's assistant. Letellier, who had just been appointed, found the Francophone recruitment situation disastrous, for it was not creating a base from which to achieve 28 percent throughout.

In brief, Letellier proposed placing the money allocated to recruiting where it counted. Since the aim was to have Francophones make up 50 percent of officer-cadets, 50 percent of the advertising budget had to be allocated to the French-language media. The main goal would be to recruit more within the Direct Officer Entry Program (DOEP). It was also necessary to raise the percentage of Francophones at Collège militaire royal de St-Jean from 60 to 80 percent. In 1971, the Collège rejected thirty qualified Francophones because of lack of space. Note that the question of

recruiting privates was not considered, since the suggested quotas were filled fairly easily.\*

These conclusions are based on a study by the DGBB staff. It found that, for the 1970-71 fiscal year, the DOEP was 25 percent above its Anglophone quota while only 24 percent of the Francophone quota could be filled. Each group had the same number of positions to fill. The results were noted, however, to be directly proportional to the money spent on advertising, which was divided 72/28. What had changed was recruiting quotas, not the amounts spent on advertising. The solution was not to use OCTP surplus to make up the Francophone deficit in the DOEP, where officers are turned out quickly but have no formal academic training other than high school graduation.<sup>107</sup>

On 14 October, Laubman sent this memorandum to Boyle, asking him to prepare a study for 30 November showing, among other things, whether it might be possible to recruit more officers from among NCOs or, alternatively, accept into the DOEP students who had completed CEGEP.<sup>108</sup> This project was taken up by the acting Director General Planning, Requirements and Production, Colonel Hutchins. On 21 October, Hutchins summarized the situation in a note to Chassé. He mentioned that on 19 October, during a discussion between the two, Chassé passed on to him the opinion of an expert, Pierre Pelletier, of Vickers & Benson Co, that more money spent on advertising did not automatically mean better quantitative results. Hutchins showed his colours by rejecting that conclusion.<sup>109</sup>

Hutchins felt strong pressure from above. Dextraze had told him plainly that there was no question of failing to meet the target of 50 percent Francophone officer cadets for the 1973-74 fiscal year. If the target could not be achieved in the ROTP, this must be offset by the OCTP, accepting competent NCOs into it first. In addition, the CP made suggestions regarding recruiters assigned to Quebec and French-speaking areas of Ontario and New Brunswick. They had to be Francophones or perfectly bilingual and would have to occupy their position full-time throughout their three year posting. He would not allow part of their posting to be spent taking military development courses which might take them away from their work for weeks. They would travel only for recruiting.<sup>110</sup>

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\* A May 1970 report on training points to the fact that 49 percent of recruits at various stages of basic training were Francophones. (*Projet — Francotrain — Sit Rep*, 21 May 1970 in F L, file 4705-1 *Training — Language — Vol II.*)

This was roughly the situation when, on 29 November, Deputy Minister Cloutier made an announcement regarding Francophone recruitment quotas: 50 percent of recruits would have to be Francophones until they filled 28 percent of military positions.

On the same date, Lieutenant-General Turcot wrote to the CDS regarding the lack of Francophone officers in his Command. Although he was writing only about Mobile Command, some of the points he makes are more generally interesting. Moreover, the document itself shows that the entire question of recruiting caused concern.

Turcot had commissioned a study covering only the ranks of lieutenant and captain. It found a shortfall of 114 officers at those levels. Total officer recruitment quotas had fallen in recent years; in the military colleges, the percentage of Francophones was too low; it was impossible to enlist many Francophones in the university ROTP (which complemented the military ROTP involving the military colleges); the DOEP always ran at a deficit; and lastly, resources allocated to recruiting in Montreal and Québec were inadequate.

Turcot wholly supported the recommendations of the study he had commissioned, which were as follows:

- introduction of a special recruiting program to be continued until such time as the DOEP and OCTP had sufficient numbers of Francophones to correct the situation at Mobile Command;
- 80 percent Francophones at *Collège militaire royal de St-Jean*;
- students who had completed one year of CEGEP in the vocational sector would be admitted into the ROTP(U);
- closer contact with CEGEPs until the percentage of officer-cadets from those institutions reflected their place in Quebec education.

Turcot himself added a few recommendations, including two which would place greater emphasis on (and thus more money in the area of) advertising.<sup>111</sup>

As we can see, Turcot tended toward the same views expressed by Letellier in September. Again, we must bear in mind that the study was not comprehensive, since Mobile Command had only 2,048 officers, of whom 413 were Francophones. But aspects of it are of interest to everyone. For example,



it pointed out that recruiting has been slow in recent years because the Forces had been shrinking. During this period, more Francophones (and Anglophones) left than joined up. In some trades, such as pilot, surpluses were so high in 1968 that no recruiting was done. Under the circumstances, it would have been difficult to make corrections without being very inconsistent. Starting in 1968, it might have been possible to keep some of the Francophones who qualified for retirement even though they were above the age limit while allowing more Anglophones to leave. In November 1971, since the 83,000 objective was nearly achieved, this corrective method could no longer be applied. Moreover, would its decidedly beneficial short-term effect not have worked against B and B in the medium term? Since flexibility of mind is, as a general rule, inversely proportional to age, would older Francophone officers used to working in English have been useful for a long time in French Language Units or positions where they would have been called upon to work in French?

Although this Mobile Command study was useful, it did not have direct consequences. Together with several of the observations mentioned earlier, it supported the work of those fighting at NDHQ — such as Cloutier, Dextraze, Boyle and Letellier — to bring home the urgency of the situation.

On 7 December, Dextraze discussed the 50 percent recruitment problem with some of his aides. As a result, Hutchins had the implications of such a requirement studied. On 30 December, he sent his findings to the CP in nearly eight single-spaced pages followed by five pages of tables showing percentages of Francophones by trade and rank. In the Directorate Personnel Requirements and Control, however, which had drafted the basic document, some old habits persisted. Thus in the consideration of the factors influencing the number of recruits to be accepted in a trade in a given year, training for those recruits was included. This is an important point which will resurface later, as we shall see. Occasionally, the report added, new requirements emerged and recruits had to be enlisted and trained quickly. Training time might then become an important factor. “Because of the language training”,<sup>112</sup> Francophones took six months longer than Anglophones to become qualified. In short, the expert shut himself up in his little box and examined one case, leaving aside the broad picture of the B and B programs specifically designed to end unequal treatment of Anglophones and Francophones.

The DPRC explained that the 50 percent had to be distributed according to requirements. At the start of the year, the number of recruits needed in a given trade was estimated — fairly accurately, as a rule. In future, after this initial operation, the required percentage of Francophone recruits would be established in each case. If a trade had under 28 percent Francophones, as

many as possible would be recruited, taking into account training capacities, length of the training program and availability of jobs in English or French after the training phase. In some jobs, according to this study, 100 percent Francophones would have to be recruited since there were none at all.

Few difficulties were anticipated in recruiting 50 percent among officers, but extra effort was needed in classifications where there were hardly any, and a lighter touch in the very few places where they occupied over 28 percent of positions. If some objectives were harder to achieve than anticipated, special measures should be considered. Among those mentioned were:

- offering special incentives in the form of financial bonuses or promotions;
- accepting Francophone candidates who did not meet the basic requirements;
- limiting the number of Anglophone recruits to the number of Francophone ones;
- not recruiting Anglophones until the last quarter of the year, to fill only those positions still vacant at that time.

Recruiting other ranks should not have caused problems except in trades which required a perfect mastery of English, such as air traffic controller, air defence technician or communications researcher. Again, as we see, the expert was not attuned to the underlying goals.

Recruiting 50 percent among other ranks should have led, according to the report, to 28 percent Francophones among privates and corporals by 1977. Recruit school for Francophones would have to be expanded, however, for that would mean taking in about 4,600 Francophones a year. Language and technical schools also needed to expand, since in a very short time there would be thousands of Francophones at the base of the pyramid, while the top would not be adequately filled until about 1987.

In conclusion, the report warned that recruiting 50 percent Francophones would drive Anglophones in some trades and classifications out of military life.<sup>113</sup> Annotated in this place in the document is the comment “No Sir” by an anonymous hand — someone who no doubt remembered that it was always said that B and B would not be introduced at the expense of Anglophones already in the Forces.<sup>114</sup>

The main recommendation was taken up by Hutchins in his memorandum accompanying the study which he sent to Dextraze. Cloutier's intention should be amended to read as follows:

The annual percentages of Francophone and Anglophone quotas will be as determined by the Chief of Personnel, from year to year based on the recruiting requirement to Force levels. These quotas will take into account the objective stated above.<sup>115</sup>

In other words, they were trying to be vague, not to be pinned down to a definite percentage which could produce surpluses in some places and shortfalls in others, or else force authorities to introduce discriminatory measures to attract more Francophones.

The least that can be said is that the Directorate Personnel Requirements was unsure of the means at its disposal to control the situation. This uncertainty did not register with Dextraze, who seemed to have confidence in his team once he told it clearly what path to follow. From all this work, he picked up only one point: the lack of space to train all the Francophone recruits.

On 5 January, he called Cloutier about this and suggested he revise his November statement. Francophones would occupy at least 50 percent of officer recruit positions. In other ranks, the percentage would be 35 in 1972-73 and 1973-74. Quotas for 1974-75 would be reviewed in January 1973. It was simple: Canadian Forces Recruit School in Saint-Jean was equipped to take in 2,800 people a year. In 1973-74, recruiting would increase to compensate for losses during the slow period from 1968 to 1972. With the proposed new quotas, 2,500 Francophones would be recruited in 1972-73 and 3,202 in 1973-74, which was 400 more than the school could accommodate.<sup>116</sup> These points were set down on paper and Cloutier agreed to them the same day. The Comptroller General was then notified of this change so as to include it in his mathematical forecasts.<sup>117</sup>

The plan, adopted the following April, contained these figures. The situation still had to be monitored closely, however. This task devolved upon the DGGB, as the CP wished. Hence in May 1972, the Director B & B Planning and Research, Lieutenant-Colonel Tousignant, asked the Director General Planning, Requirements and Production to obtain for him from the Director Recruiting and Selection (DRS) a quarterly report containing Francophone quotas for each trade and classification compared to the numbers actually recruited. These figures would also be used by DGGB staff working

on other B and B activities.<sup>118</sup> These reports began to come down on 30 June 1972, enabling several people to monitor the situation closely.

On 11 September, Hutchins was able to write that the ROTP had taken in 197 Francophones, compared to 85 in the previous year to date. He hoped that the remaining 118 candidates could be found by 31 March 1973. We note that for the first time there were candidates in CEGEPs — 53 of them.<sup>119</sup>

At this stage, the suggestion made by the DGBB, in 1971, that 50 percent of funds allocated for officer recruitment be spent on Francophone media had not been accepted. Tousignant, who advocated this, predicted in September 1972 that the Forces would probably not succeed in recruiting the 118 officer-cadets mentioned by Hutchins. In his view, without special measures there would be no special results.<sup>120</sup> This pessimistic opinion seems to have been shared by Letellier, who did not hesitate to allocate to Francophone recruitment \$100,000 of the special funds obtained from Treasury Board.<sup>121</sup>

Thus by May 1972, very specific mechanisms were in use to control the Francophone recruiting situation. Later in this chapter, tables will show the successes or failures. Overall, however, the system worked, in that interventions could be made quickly at the precise points where they were required.

However, the type of forced recruitment which would be necessary for several years needed some flexibility. On 20 January 1972, when asked to comment on the program which the DGBB was preparing to present to the Deputy Minister, Colonel Hutchins pointed out that 60 percent of Roman Catholic chaplains\* were Francophones. If 50 percent Francophones were recruited in this classification, what would the situation be in five or ten years?<sup>122</sup> The following November, Rear Admiral Boyle drafted a memorandum for the CDS which he wisely sent to Letellier for comment. In essence, Boyle expressed concern about officer classifications rising above 28 percent. This was already the case among doctors, nurses and Roman Catholic chaplains. In the infantry, logistics and law, a similar situation would soon develop.

Boyle calculated that by April 1974, 35.7 percent of infantry lieutenants would be Francophones. The surplus would have to be transferred to other regiments which had a deficit. He suggested reducing the number of recruits

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\* See Chapter 17, which deals in part with the special case of chaplains.

in this job category and ensuring that 28 percent was not exceeded in logistics and the law.<sup>123</sup>

On 17 November, Letellier commented on this draft, singling out three main points: the overabundance of Francophone lieutenants in the infantry; the adjusting of recruitment rates when 28 percent was achieved in a classification; and the recruiting of 50 percent Francophones. In brief, over-representation of Francophones in the infantry should not be considered a problem, because some of them would be called to serve in the Royal Canadian Regiment and Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry. Francophones in all classifications would have to work in English, even after 1987 when the number of positions in French Language Units had tripled. He agreed that a classification which approached or had reached 28 percent should be adjusted. Before cutting back from 50 percent recruitment, however, the situation had to be considered seriously so as not to affect the entire B and B program. Even with 50 percent of recruits, the Francophone officer corps would not reach 28 percent until 1977-78 at the earliest. If recruitment fell to 40 percent, this goal would have to be put back to the 1984-85 fiscal year. In any case, 28 percent overall was only a beginning; next the percentage had to be reached in all ranks. If 28 percent was reached later than planned, by 1990 Francophone representation would still be a problem.<sup>124</sup>

To understand what this debate was about, let us look at one of the statistics attached to Letellier's note. In 1972, the infantry was 42 Francophone officers short of the 28 percent target. When the ideal ratio was achieved (72:28), 54 Anglophones and 21 Francophones would be recruited each year. Until then, by recruiting 50/50, there would be 38 Anglophones (-16) and 37 Francophones (+16). The deficit would be made up in less than three years, and then recruitment could proceed normally. If, however, 40 percent Francophones were recruited, the annual surplus would only be nine officers and nearly five years would be needed to fill the 42 positions. By recruiting 35 percent, the goal would be reached in nine years.<sup>125</sup>

These calculations are important because they are part of the plan's mathematical model. Altering them in any way whatever would affect all of the rest of the program. For this reason, Letellier viewed the 1972 program as a line of defence which had to be held at all costs, and he added to his many roles that of goalkeeper ready to stop shots from all quarters. At the same time, we must acknowledge that some of the technical concerns raised are valid, given that an expert in one field often tends to approach every question from a narrow angle. Perhaps it is understandable that specialists in infantry officer-cadet training or recruiting should tend to press the warning light when they see what 50 percent Francophone recruits could actually

mean. Boyle, who was in charge of all personnel matters, was ready to take this concern into account, but not before consulting his B and B expert, who also reported to him. In the end Boyle accepted the DGBB's arguments.


Another concern surfaces frequently. During the information tour by DGBB members, a question often asked was whether, to achieve the required quotas of Francophones, admission standards for candidates in a particular classification would be lowered. Sometimes the questions related to a specific trade (as in Halifax or Saint-Hubert). Sometimes it was more general: by recruiting 50 percent of our officers from 28 percent of the population, are we not being so inflexible that we may lose highly competent Anglophones?<sup>126</sup> The answer was simple in both cases. Basic criteria could not be relaxed for Francophones alone, for this would place them at a disadvantage later in their careers when they had to compete with Anglophones. Indeed the whole program rested on equal opportunity.

In practice, the usual resistance to change operated in many ways. For example, large numbers of Francophones were recruited into the Officer-Cadet Training Program rather than the Regular Officer Training Plan, simply because some operational categories (air navigator was mentioned in Saint-Hubert, in March 1973) were not at first very popular among Francophones. Cadets recruited under the OCTP met all the program's requirements. For the two or three years immediately following 1972, however, instructors received a flood of Francophones from the OCTP, while among Anglophones, a very high proportion of recruits came from the ROTP. In addition, it was agreed that from 1973-74 on, the particular category of air navigator would receive fewer and fewer university graduates.<sup>127</sup> Thus Francophone recruiting in this instance followed a pattern which was to become general a few months later. Nevertheless, there was a rumour, which fortunately was soon quelled, that requirements were lower for Francophones.

Now that we have dealt with this aspect of proportional representation, the time has come to discuss recruiting methods and their results.

The means used for recruiting were substantially the same for Anglophones and Francophones: modern media (television) and more conventional channels (radio, press, visits by recruiters to secondary schools and universities, tours by display vans and Forces participation in local events). In 1972-73, and even more in 1973-74 and the following years, a general message was conveyed to Francophones. The same content is still used today, but often specially targeted material is added. Sometimes one job category is featured prominently in advertising, a sure sign that there is a shortfall to be filled.<sup>128</sup>

C.R. Nixon, a former officer in the Royal Canadian Navy, followed Sylvain Cloutier from 1975 to 1982 as Deputy Minister of National Defence.  
(UPFC/REP 81-17)



Now let us look at a series of tables which are revealing in several respects.

Table 4

**PROGRESS IN FRANCOPHONE PARTICIPATION  
AMONG CF OFFICERS (1966-87)**

Legend: ME = month end

GT = grand total (TF + Anglophones)

— = not available

%F = % Francophones

TF = total Francophones

YEAR ME		1966 (—)	1970 (08)	1974 (09)	1978 (09)	1982 (09)	1987 (17)
GENERAL	GT	1	1	1	1	1	1
	TF	1	0	1	0	0	0
	%F	100	0	100	0	0	0
LGEN	GT	—	7	7	8	8	8
	TF	—	1	0	2	3	1
	%F	—	14.29	0	25	37.5	12.5
MGEN	GT	—	24	26	24	26	29
	TF	—	2	3	3	3	1
	%F	—	8.33	11.54	12.50	11.54	3.45
BGEN	GT	—	77	81	79	80	81
	TF	—	5	14	15	13	18
	%F	—	6.49	17.28	18.99	16.25	22.22
COL	GT	—	293	312	318	332	357
	TF	—	21	30	35	47	47
	%F	—	7.17	9.62	11.01	14.16	13.17
LCOL	GT	—	896	914	921	968	1070
	TF	—	60	93	113	143	137
	%F	6.3	6.7	10.18	12.27	14.77	12.8
MAJ	GT	—	2,921	2866	2,901	3,083	3,345
	TF	—	209	328	421	463	568
	%F	7.6	7.16	11.44	14.51	15.02	16.98
CAPT	GT	—	—	6,239	6,080	6,121	6,743
	TF	—	—	750	943	1,166	1,539
	%F	8.4	—	12.02	15.51	19.05	22.82
LT	GT	—	—	2,299	2,481	2,468	2,269
	TF	12.7	—	553	585	624	614
	%F	—	—	24.05	23.58	25.28	27.06
OFFICER — CADETS	GT	—	—	2,041	2,229	2,589	2,427
	TF	—	—	667	790	928	725
	%F	18.6	—	32.68	35.44	35.84	29.87
TOTAL OFFICERS	GT	—	14,378	14,786	15,042	15,667	17,639
	TF	9.4	1,532	2,439	2,907	3,390	3,937
	%F	—	10.66	16.50	19.33	21.64	22.32



Table 5

**PROGRESS IN FRANCOPHONE PARTICIPATION  
AMONG CF OTHER RANKS (1966-87)**

Legend: ME = month end

GT = grand total (TF + Anglophones)

— = not available

%F = % Francophones

TF = total Francophones

YEAR ME		1966 ( )	1970 (08)	1974 (09)	1978 (09)	1982 (09)	1987 (12)
CHIEF	GT	—	837	779	802	807	900
WARRANT	TF	—	62	92	126	151	156
OFFICER	%F	6.9	7.41	11.81	15.71	18.71	17.33
MASTER	GT	—	2,320	2,155	2,087	2,190	2,364
WARRANT	TF	—	182	273	335	409	454
OFFICER	%F	7.8	7.84	12.67	16.05	18.68	19.2
WARRANT	GT	—	4,442	4,111	4,214	4,435	4,792
OFFICER	TF	—	420	601	795	914	1,077
	%F	10.1	9.46	14.62	18.87	20.61	22.47
SERGEANT	GT	—	9,517	9,524	9,777	9,967	10,215
	TF	—	1,330	1,660	1,955	2,227	2,556
	%F	13.7	13.97	17.43	20.00	22.34	25.02
MASTER	GT	—	—	10,312	10,820	11,113	11,984
CORPORAL	TF	—	—	1,978	2,241	2,800	3,483
	%F	—	—	19.18	20.71	25.20	29.06
CORPORAL	GT	—	—	22,134	15,194	14,433	21,868
	TF	—	—	4,543	4,052	4,487	6,701
	%F	15.3	—	20.52	26.67	31.09	30.64
PRIVATE	GT	—	—	14,503	21,082	22,546	15,505
	TF	—	—	5,333	6,769	7,468	4,521
	%F	24.6	—	36.77	32.11	33.12	30.13
TOTAL	GT	—	69,946	63,518	63,976	65,491	67,949
OTHER	TF	—	13,272	14,480	16,273	18,456	19,246
RANKS	%F	17.0	18.97	22.80	25.44	28.18	28.32

Table 6

**OVERALL PROGRESS IN FRANCOPHONE PARTICIPATION  
IN THE CF (1966-87)**

Legend: ME = month end

GT = grand total (TF + Anglophones)

%F = % Francophones

— = not available

TF = total Francophones

YEAR		1966	1970	1974		1982	1987
ME		( )	(08)	(09)		(09)	(12)
CF	GT	—	84,324	78,304	79,018	81,158	85,588
	TF	—	14,804	16,919	19,180	21,846	23,183
	%F	15.8	17.56	21.61	24.27	26.92	27.09


These three tables show marked progress. From 1982 on, Francophones were over-represented among permanent Canadian Forces military personnel for the first time since the mid-nineteenth century. This emerges as less of an accomplishment when we closely study tables 4 and 5. Among officers, Francophones were under par in all ranks except lieutenant in 1987. They were also over-represented at the base, among officer-cadets. The same trend can be seen among other ranks, where Francophones were over-represented among privates, corporals and master corporals and under-represented everywhere else.

Table 7

**FRANCOPHONE REPRESENTATION\***  
**31 DECEMBER 1987**

Legend: ----- ideal situation  
 \_\_\_\_\_ situation in December 1987

PERCENTAGE



\* The rank of general is omitted. Normally the CF have only one general. The Francophone percentage thus fluctuates dramatically between 0 and 100, which is not significant here.

These tables speak for themselves, but they do not tell the whole story. Table 7, which presents the situation after the plan was fully implemented, leads us to ask ourselves some questions. Were Anglophones justified in challenging the principle of “deviations” so forcefully, given the actual results obtained in the fifteen years of the plan’s implementation? Was it because of their protests and warnings that this measure, so strongly opposed when it was made public, produced such paltry results in practice?

Table 5 shows that among other ranks, the percentage of Francophones rose steadily at all levels except chief warrant officer during the period 1982-87. Among officers, the situation was rather different. Francophone lieutenant-generals and major-generals were scarcer in 1987 than in 1978. Francophone lieutenant-colonels and colonels also declined in percentage from 1982. A small ray of sunshine emerged for majors, who showed steady growth in both percentage and absolute numbers. But would these majors continue their careers? For these statistics also tell us that not as many Francophones as might have been hoped stayed in the Forces. The problem of rapid return to civilian life among the Francophone military, noted by Ross in 1966, persisted although in less acute form. We shall have occasion to see that the solutions recommended in 1971-72 were not implemented as quickly and fully as first planned. Is this the reason?

However that may be, there were indications that the objective of 26 percent in all ranks would not be reached by the year 2000, as the following projections show.

Table 8a

**PROJECTED PERCENTAGES TO BE REACHED EACH YEAR  
TO ACHIEVE 26% BY 2000 AD AT THE RANKS  
OF CAPTAIN, MAJOR AND LIEUTENANT-COLONEL**

Projection 1




Table 8b  
Projection 2





Table 8c  
Projection 3



By the end of the 1970s, DGOL had given up all hope of achieving proportional representation throughout the Forces,<sup>129</sup> although the total percentage of Francophones had increased substantially since 1966. Lieutenant-General Paradis even wrote in 1980 that he sincerely doubted the possibility of ever reaching this goal.<sup>130</sup> We are less pessimistic. Obviously, however, Letellier's close monitoring of the annual advancement of Francophones in each rank when the plan was first implemented and his interventions in regard to this<sup>131</sup> were gradually diminished by his immediate successors, or theirs were less convincing than his. Instead, they let themselves be lulled by the illusion that when total representation was achieved in one job category, everything would take care of itself after that. The deviation system was no longer needed, said the ADM(Per) in November 1981.<sup>132</sup>

So much for one part of the proportional representation problem. The other is more insidious, for it is the fording that in several military occupations (MOCs), the situation was dramatic. The figures we quote are based on statistics for 31 January 1987.

Let us begin with non-commissioned personnel. According to our study of the 101 MOCs existing at that date, Francophones were over-represented in 58.41 percent of cases (59 trades). They occupied between

20 and 26 percent of positions in 25.74 percent of trades. And in 15.85 percent, they were below 20 percent. The situation was most dramatic in the following cases:

Table 9

**NON-COMMISSIONED MOCs WTTT UNDER  
20% FRANCOPHONES (JANUARY 1987)**

NAME OF MOCs *	PERCENTAGE
Search and Rescue Technician	14.40%
Air Traffic Control Assistant	12.88
Naval Electronics Technician (Systems)	14.13
Marine Engineering Artificer	9.41
Clearance Diver Technician	8.70
Fire Control Technician (Land)	13.70
Mechanical Systems Technician	12.35

On the whole, however, although our statistical analysis leads us to qualify the positive overall verdict based on Table 5, it confirms that the situation among other ranks was fairly healthy, especially if we add to the 59 trades with surpluses the seven which had over 23 percent Francophones at this time. Even if it was agreed that there would be a surplus of Francophones in some trades, including the infantry, where they have one of the three regiments, is there justification for being still so far from the ideal situation at the end of the implementation of the 1972 plan?

Among officers, the picture is less rosy, as Table 4 shows. As of 31 January 1987, only 22.86 percent of senior management were Francophones. As for the others: \*\* 35.29 percent of MOCs existing in 1987 (a total of 34) had over 26 percent Francophones. Thus, in 64.71 percent of officer MOCs (22 out of 34), Francophones were under-represented. The under-representation was not too serious in 10 of the 34 MOCs, where

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\* Note that the names of MOCs have fluctuated considerably in recent years because of the many new arms and technologies introduced recently. Between 1983 and 1986, fifteen new trades were introduced and fourteen discontinued. In November 1983, there were 100 non-commissioned MOCs; in January 1987, there were 101.

\*\* These statistics do not include Protestant chaplains, a group which had recently acquired one Francophone among a total of 97 members. We think that this reflects fairly closely the language grouping of Protestant military personnel.

Francophones made up between 20 and 26 percent of strength. Yet even in classifications where they were over-represented, we sometimes find serious anomalies.

Aerospace engineering was 31.22 percent Francophone. But at the rank of major, Francophones made up only 14.95 percent, and they reached a low of 5.88 percent among colonels (one Francophone out of 17). Electronic engineering and communications follow roughly the same curve.

The number of anomalies increased in categories with between 20 and 26 percent Francophones. At the time of our count, air traffic control and air weapons control had no Francophones above the rank of major. Data from 30 November 1983 show that the notable absence of Francophones at these levels existed then in both these categories, even though overall they had over 26 percent Francophones.

Now let us look for a moment at officer MOCs with less than 20 percent Francophones.

Table 10

**OFFICER MOCs WITH UNDER  
20% FRANCOFONES (JANUARY 1987)**

MILITARY OCCUPATIONS	% FRANCOFONES
Armour	15.57%
Artillery	19.57
Air Navigator	19.34
Pilot	17.83
Maritime Engineering	19.03
Dental	17.56
Dental Associate	11.76
Pastoral Associate (RC)	0
Flight Engineer	8.33
Maritime Surface and Sub-surface	13.97
Personnel Selection	16.04
Intelligence	9.71

These data call for some general comments. Again, we compared these 1987 data with those of 30 November 1983. At that time all these categories



were below the 20 percent line. In three instances, the situation had deteriorated: armour was at 17.15 in 1983, dental was at 16.67 and intelligence at 10.47. The poor results in the last-named classification could easily be compared with those in the intelligence branches of the RCMP, and even more closely with those at the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, which made sensational headlines several times for its treatment of Francophones. Another strange feature is the personnel selection percentage of 22.12 in 1983 compared to the undistinguished 16.04 in January 1987.

Finally, in a bold venture, a new officer classification was created in 1986: pastoral associate (RC). In January 1987, the only members of this entire classification were three unilingual Anglophone officers, though twenty years had passed since the first serious efforts to open all military activities to Francophones.

Among the classifications with a large deficit, two had been of concern to the experts for a long time: maritime engineering and maritime surface and sub-surface. As we know, when HMCS *Ottawa* was converted into a French Language Unit in 1968, shortages here were pointed out. Although a fairly good first crew was put together, obviously the same sailors could not be left at sea all the time. When the first officers were replaced in 1971, the inevitable took place. In October 1972, Letellier asked the Director Recruiting and Selection what special effort he was making to meet the needs of this FLU. He received a reply on 13 October. The difficulty in obtaining the number of personnel required in these trades is widespread, among Anglophones as well as Francophones. Moreover, for a proportional effort, the Prairies have historically provided the most sailors, and the Prairies have few Francophones.<sup>133</sup> In April-May 1973, Colonel Hanna was on the west coast on the information tour discussed earlier. Since much of naval officer training was given on that coast, people on the spot were well aware of some of the problems relating to this activity. Thus the visitors from Ottawa were told that large numbers of Francophones left the two classifications in question. Several departed of their own accord during the training period. Part of the problem was ascribed to the forced recruitment requiring 50 percent Francophones.

In 1974, attempts were made to correct this situation by means of more training in French, a subject we shall explore in Chapter 13. We should say, however, that there is no real solution to this day. On 17 July 1978, for example, Commander K. Davis of the Directorate Recruiting and Selection wrote to the DGOL that the recruiting problem still existed throughout these two job categories. On the English-speaking side, it was partly solved by recruiting in Great Britain. On the Francophone side, no one was recruited

from outside the country.<sup>135</sup> Some months earlier, a “Maritime Others Ranks Production Study” had been undertaken, for here too there were problems.<sup>136</sup>

In April 1979, the DGOL had to admit to the Defence Management Committee that there were four major problems in executing the plan. Among them he cited the difficulty of achieving the desired percentage of Francophones in maritime and air classifications.<sup>137</sup> Little progress was made, however. In 1981, the Deputy Minister testified to the joint committee:

“We do have problems with the navy and we are in the process of preparing recommendations for the minister.”<sup>138</sup>

The only major decision taken following these recommendations was to transfer Naval Reserve HQ from Halifax to Québec. How this could persuade Francophones serving in Halifax and Esquimalt to stay in the regular Forces is a mystery to the authors of this book. Quite probably, however, the Naval Reserve would gain ground in Quebec and some of those recruited would decide to enter the regular Forces.<sup>139</sup> The real question is: would they stay there?

In March 1984, the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, Lieutenant-General G. Thériault, commissioned a study entitled Summary Evaluation of Francophone Participation in MARS and MARE Classifications.<sup>140</sup> The report was completed on 2 August. The study group, headed by Colonel D.J. Slimman, assistant to the DGOL, cast its net much wider than the mandate given by Thériault. Hence we shall have occasion to refer to this report elsewhere in this book.

For the moment, let us confine ourselves to a few points. Slimman and his team found that the revised 1980 plan, aimed at achieving proportional representation as soon as possible, was more realistic than the 1972 plan, which allowed fifteen years to achieve the goal in all ranks. The time required for a member of the Forces to reach the highest ranks made the 1987 deadline impossible. In some military occupations, the objective was especially difficult, and particularly in the navy, with its traditions, its geographic locations and major bases and its use of English in operations.<sup>141</sup>

In 1979, for classifications where Francophones were under-represented, the 50 percent Francophone recruiting objective was lowered to 35 percent. In the two naval classifications under consideration, it had never been possible to fill the earlier quota of 50 percent. From 1975 to 1982, 17 percent of recruits in MARS (Maritime Surface and Sub-surface) and 22 percent in MARE (Maritime Engineering) were Francophones. But obtaining 35 percent of

cadets from 27 percent of the population put pressure on recruiters to accept more borderline Francophone candidates than Anglophones. This said, an in-depth study showed that Francophones of recruiting age were fairly similar to their English-speaking fellow citizens, and none of their expectations was an obstacle to a military career.<sup>142</sup> Canada-wide surveys at this period show clearly that of the three branches, the navy was the least popular among both Francophones and Anglophones.

The following are three hypotheses which could explain why Francophones are harder to recruit:

- the navy has few Francophones whom they could take as models. Unlike the army, with the *Royal 22<sup>e</sup> Régiment* and its panoply of generals, the navy has no operational unit in Quebec. As a result, young Quebecers receive no information except from advertising or recruiters, who are rarely from the navy;
- in Quebec, the navy is perceived as the most Anglophone component of the Canadian Forces. Indeed, its traditions make it look British to many people. This deters young Francophones, who “make a distinction between learning English, as an essential military skill, and being denied the use of French throughout classification training”,<sup>143</sup>
- the navy receives unfavourable publicity, often from retired admirals who amuse themselves by pointing to its worn equipment or lack of strength. This may be interpreted by many to mean that by joining the navy they commit themselves to a second-rate service or will have to serve long periods at sea because of labour shortages.

In 1983, since recruitment was progressing better, recruiters might have done well to concentrate more on under-represented classifications such as MARS and MARE. In that case, however, specialists were needed, officers with experience at sea. Unfortunately, recruiting billets for naval officers are not all filled by seamen, since the first priority is to meet operational requirements (for example, seven recruiting billets out of the 26 allocated to the navy are filled by other classifications, and four of those seven are in Quebec). Yet the recruiters who are best at filling the ranks of a given classification are officers who belong to it. Not uncommonly, cadets at training schools have the impression that the recruiter did not tell them the truth. Almost invariably, that recruiter acted in good faith but was not a naval officer. This lack of recruiting officers is not about to be solved, since the

MARE and MARS classifications are acknowledged to be those which have the most specific milestones to go through at the ranks of Lt(N) and LCdr. In general, during the process of qualifying for the next rank, there is little enthusiasm for being assigned to recruiting, far from the sea and with no opportunity to take crucially important theoretical and practical tests.

ROTP officer-cadets are selected by a board including representatives of NDHQ and the military colleges. In the case of naval cadets from the OCTP and DEOP, an interview board of naval officers was set up in Halifax in 1976. This board does not keep its files very long, but it is estimated that one third of MARS applicants were rejected in 1983. (Few of those applying for MARE are rejected.) This raises the question of whether this naval selection board is effective or otherwise. One thing is certain: the percentage of MARS cadets who leave during training after being selected by the board has not declined since 1976 in the OCTP and DEOP.<sup>145</sup>

Once training is completed, however, roughly the same percentage of members of the two language groups remain in the navy. But “this should not be taken to mean that the francophone survivors of the training process live happily ever after.”<sup>146</sup>

In order to advance in MARS, an officer must pass through mandatory stages and at the same time hold positions at sea and high-profile staff positions as quickly as possible. A good variety of jobs at the captain level is ideal for a candidate’s development and helps him prepare for maritime command examinations. Several Francophone officers perceive their careers have not been managed in this way, however. They believe they have often filled positions (in recruiting or military colleges) away from the mainstream of promotions, which has set back their careers. Moreover, they are very much under-represented in the offices of Chief Maritime Doctrine and Operations (CMDO) and DGPCO, both located at NDHQ. Slimman’s team found that this under-representation leads Francophones to think they have been unable to influence the decision-making process in the navy, especially as regards career management and implementation of B and B plans.

The study group conducted a review of positions occupied by Francophone naval officers. In several cases, it was obvious that the ability to speak French was a determining factor in posting to positions at the junior officer level and, less frequently, at higher ranks. It was not possible, however, to determine any significantly different career patterns for the two language groups. Francophones who finally became officers reached the rank of LCdr an average of two years earlier than the MOC average, thanks

to the effects of promotion adjustments.<sup>147</sup> However, they took more time than the average Anglophone to reach the rank of commander, “where promotion adjustments have been less frequent”.<sup>148</sup>

As regards deviations, we note that, although the rationale was understood, those naval officers interviewed were almost universally opposed to the practice, viewing it as an artificial mechanism detrimental to morale among both Francophone and Anglophones. In the navy, most deviations were made at the ranks of Lt(N) and LCdr, yet they were perceived as colouring the promotions of all Francophones. This creates an intrinsic danger. Someone who appears to have been promoted artificially is placed in a position of responsibility where he or she is not recognized or supported by either subordinates or peers. This may impair performance and consequently hamper future progress.<sup>149</sup>

Later, the study questions the wisdom of transferring Naval Reserve HQ to Québec, a decision taken partly to improve Francophone participation and reduce Francophone attrition in the navy by giving Francophones an opportunity to serve for a few years surrounded by their language and culture. Reserve HQ was not, however, considered to be a posting which advances careers. Reservists were mainly trained from May to September. Moreover, since Reserve HQ had to deal mainly with Anglophone Naval Reserve units, it was a National Unit rather than a French Language Unit. Its staff should thus have been representative of both language groups, which meant that only about 26 percent of them were Francophones. For the moment, this action did little to establish a visible naval presence in French Canada.<sup>150</sup>

The table that follows compares Francophone representation in the two classifications we are studying as of 1975 and 1982.

Table 11  
**MARS — MARE**

	CAPT (N)	CDR	LCDR	LT (N)	TOTAL OPE- RATIONAL OFFICERS	TRAINEES OFFICER		GRAND TOTAL
						SLT	CADETS	
MARS 1975								
GT	29	71	193	230	523	252	234	983
TF	2	2	7	13	24	36	64	121
%F	6.9	2.8	3.6	5.7	4.6	14.3	27.3	12.3
1982								
GT	31	89	219	341	680	254	236	1170
TF	1	5	17	38	61	26	50	137
%F	3.2	5.6	6.5	11.9	9.2	10.9	21.9	12.1
MARE 1975								
GT	14	49	151	145	359	113	55	527
TF	0	0	6	10	16	16	16	48
%F	—	—	4	6.9	4.5	14.2	29.1	9.1
1982								
GT	17	47	135	190	389	102	122	613
TF	0	6	9	19	34	20	33	87
%F	—	12.7	6.6	0	8.7	19.6	27	14.2

We note that both classifications doubled their percentages of operational Francophone officers between 1975 and 1982. As a percentage of the total for the MARE classification, however, Francophones rose from 9.1 to 14.2 percent. Over the same period, the percentage in MARS declined from 12.3 to 12.1 percent. Comparing 1982 results with 1987 results (cited earlier in this chapter), we find that as of 31 January 1987, Francophones occupied 19.03 percent of MARE positions. Moreover, this included two captains (the equivalent of colonel in the army), while there had been none in 1982. Despite serious shortcomings, MARE showed significant progress. MARS, on the other hand, had 13.97 percent Francophones on 31 January 1987, including two captains, as in 1975. But because the total number of captain positions had increased to 37, Francophone representation had declined to 5.41 percent in this rank.

Slimman and his team concluded there were two reasons why Francophone representation was not as great in 1982 as had been targeted: the navy had not succeeded in recruiting the required number or in enabling most of those recruited to qualify in the classification. In short, implementation of the 1972 plan was poorly controlled. This is an often overlooked aspect of management: planning is excellent, the project is set in motion correctly, but control is gradually abandoned, and in the case before us, control should have been a crucial activity for DGOL right from 1972. In concluding this chapter, we may observe that the implementation of the 1972 plan fell short in a number of ways as regards proportional representation. Point one which we have not yet mentioned is that the infantry stopped being a refuge for Francophones in the Canadian Forces. Let us look at the figures.

Table 12  
**FRANCOPHONE INFANTRY AS A PERCENTAGE  
 OF ALL FRANCOPHONES, BY RANK  
 DECEMBER 1986**

RANK	TOTAL	R22°R	PERCENTAGE
Lieutenant-General	1	1	100.0
Major-General	3	2	66.6
Brigadier-General	19	3	15.7
Colonel	50	9	18.0
Lieutenant-Colonel	141	30	21.2
Major	564	60	10.6
Captain	1527	130	8.5
Lieutenant	619	62	10.0
Second Lieutenant	319	1	0.3
Chief Warrant Officer	191	14	7.3
Master Warrant Officer	460	42	9.1
Warrant Officer	1086	137	12.6
Sergeant	2592	267	10.3
Master Corporal	3477	310	8.9
Corporal	6989	762	10.9
Private — 1	1135	130	11.4
Private — 2	3307	525	15.8
Private — 3	338	7	2.0
TOTAL	23,617	2,492	10.5

Naturally, these percentages vary a little from day to day. We believe, however, that the situation we find here is very close to that prevailing at the end of 1987. Infantrymen still monopolize nearly all the top of the Francophone pyramid, but overall, they no longer fill any more space than

that to which they are entitled. This is what General Allard had tried to achieve as early as 1966.

Senior officials at DND do not hesitate to attest that between the ranks of major and brigadier-general, a Francophone officer often spends less time at each level than his Anglophone colleagues. They imply that bilingualism probably plays a role in this situation, which ultimately depends on decisions by promotion committees.<sup>151</sup> We know nothing about the secret deliberations of promotion committees and will thus accept this judgment by the ADM(Per) of the day. As for “deviations”, which definitely do favour Francophones, *Personnel Newsletter* No 5/88 reports that between 1972 and 1986, 90,186 promotions were made in the non-commissioned personnel category. Of these, 1,348 promotions were given to Francophones in accordance with deviation policy. This corresponds to 1.49 percent of the total over a fifteen-year period. In other words, they played a tiny role in creating the present situation, which can be summarized fairly easily: overall, Francophones are under-represented among officers, in operational categories in general and particularly among operational specialties in the navy, namely MARS and MARE. The Commissioner of Official Languages, D’ Iberville Fortier, stressed this strongly in May 1987, citing statistics before a Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons and in the presence of civilian and military officials from National Defence.<sup>152</sup>

These deficiencies have been known for a long time. In 1979, the DGOL told the Defence Management Committee that one of the major problems in his area was the very high attrition rate among Francophones.<sup>153</sup> The figures we have seen bear this out. Over 26 percent of recruits are Francophones at present, but in several military occupations, these recruits do not complete their training or serve to the end of their first contract. Why do young Francophones leave? The next five chapters should go some way toward answering this question.



The Honourable J. Gilles Lamontagne, PC, a bomber pilot in the Second World War, served as Minister of National Defence from 1980 to 1983. He was later appointed Lieutenant Governor of Quebec (1984-89). (UPFC/REP 80-19)





# 12

## French Language Units (FLUs)

### **National Defence FLUs at the beginning of the 1970s**

In this chapter, we shall build on the few facts about FLUs presented in the preceding chapters.

What do we find in the document mentioned in Chapter 9, adopted by the Privy Council Committee on Culture and Information in late January 1970, regarding the first five recommendations in volume III of the report on B and B? At the outset, we note that the recommendations in question are general organizational and management principles for the Public Service (PS) which would make French a language of work in the PS, change its Anglo-Saxon tone and increase the percentage of Francophones. All this hinges more or less on French Language Units (called Francophone in this document), their method of operation and their language makeup.

After studying the B and B Commission report and considering possible solutions, such as moving sectors of the Public Service into French-speaking areas, the Privy Council Committee recommended the following path to the government:

- the government should issue a statement agreeing to the creation of FLUs and acknowledging the need to ensure active and effective Francophone representation at the upper echelons of the Public Service;
- a preliminary study should identify the departments in which the concept of FLUs would be tried;
- FLUs should be created in a wide range of departments;

- one year after the establishment of FLUs, those departments should report to the government their findings as to the advantages and disadvantages of FLUs;
- the government could then decide whether it wished to extend FLUB to all departments and draw up a specific implementation timetable.<sup>1</sup>

On 2 February, Vice Admiral Hennessy noted on the Department's copy of the document that he and the Deputy Minister approved its contents.<sup>2</sup> How could they not? The DND already had FLUs and, on 29 January, Armstrong had written to R.G. Robertson of the Privy Council the letter cited above, (Chapter 9) in which his Department endorsed the sections of the B and B report dealing with this question (recommendations 32 to 37 are directly or indirectly related). His one reservation, which we shall consider later, was language of work.<sup>3</sup>

On 30 April, Cabinet approved the January memorandum. The Secretary of State Department accordingly drafted in haste a government statement which was revised by Cabinet before being released to the public. It agreed in principle to the objectives proposed by the Laurendeau-Dunton Commission for the entire Public Service: French would become a language of work, the general atmosphere would reflect Canada's linguistic and cultural reality, and French-speaking Canadians would be adequately represented as regards both numbers and responsibilities.

The document also stated that before accepting FLUs as an organizational and management concept, the government would establish a representative number of such units on an experimental basis. A preliminary study, conducted jointly by the Secretary of State and some other departments, would determine in which departments these experimental FLUs would be located. The study would report on the number of FLUs already in existence and whether they were consistent with the commissioners' proposals about how such units should operate. Only then would experimental FLUB be set up in a representative group of departments. Twelve to eighteen months later, those departments would inform the government through the Secretary of State of their findings about the advantages and disadvantages of having FLUB. In light of this, the government would decide whether to extend FLUs to all departments, and if so, set firm deadlines for expanding the program. A long-term study would be conducted regarding the potential implications of FLUs throughout the Public Service in terms of recruitment, unilingual Anglophone public servants, the number of senior officials who would have to become bilingual and the possibility of large regional Francophone units within which English Language Units could be created. Cabinet would also consider the

distinction between the recommendations in Volume III and their implementation and discuss the strategy to be adopted for communications; they would furthermore take into account all the implications resulting from approving FLUs.<sup>4</sup>

On the following 18 June, the recommendations made by the Tellier group on 16 April were approved by Cabinet. As we saw in Chapter 9, recommendations 25 and 41 by the Laurendeau-Dunton Commission were set aside, although this does not concern us at present. What is important is that Cabinet's intervention in the FLU sector from 1970 onward was to provide a somewhat better framework for those already in existence in the Forces.

The Prime Minister, in a statement to the House on 23 June 1970, accepted the suggestion of setting up experimental FLUs throughout the government.<sup>5</sup> On 31 July, he followed this up with a letter to all government departments and agencies, expressing his Cabinet's determination to achieve greater Canadian unity. Pierre E. Trudeau stated that support from deputy ministers and directors of government agencies was needed to make the most of the experimental FLU program. He went on to ask that by the following 30 September, they each submit to him a report stating whether they had any full-fledged FLUs or units approaching that concept in their jurisdictions. He wanted Defence in particular to report whether it was in a position to set up at least two experimental FLUB.

The government had the following goals:

- to bring French gradually into the prominence it deserved as a language of work in the Public Service (PS);
- to make the PS represent Canada's cultural and linguistic reality; and
- to have French Canadians adequately represented in the PS, in terms both of their numbers and their level of responsibilities.

Trudeau added that experimental FLUB were very important because they would make it possible to study the concept itself and determine whether FLUB could exist in the long term.<sup>6</sup>

On 14 September, Treasury Board issued its circular 1970-95, which was based on what we have just seen. In collaboration with the Secretary of State Department, which to date had been responsible for bilingualism programs, Treasury Board was made responsible for studying the operation of experimental FLUs and reporting to Cabinet by June 1972. To this end, it would conduct a preliminary study to determine, on the basis of the answers

to Trudeau's letter, in what departments and agencies experimental FLUs could be set up. It would also investigate existing FLUB to see how closely they conformed to the general principle put forward by the B and B Commission.

The main features of FLUB would be:

- their language use: they would communicate with the public in English or French, but French only would be used inside each FLU;
- their makeup: Francophones and bilingual Anglophones.

In order for the experiment to be valid, FLUs would be created at all levels of the federal administration, and thus both at departmental headquarters and in the regions.

Evaluation criteria had not yet been determined, but they would reflect the goals set by the Prime Minister on 23 June and repeated in his letter of 31 July. In other words, the aim was to promote the use of French, facilitate recruiting of unilingual Francophones and their participation on an equal footing with their unilingual Anglophone colleagues, create an environment in which bilingual Anglophones could use French and promote greater individual bilingualism in the upper ranks.<sup>7</sup>

While Treasury Board was setting up its evaluation system, the departments prepared to respond to the letter of 31 July. The Canadian Forces, for example, wanted to have an experimental FLU in Air Defence Command. After toying with the idea of having this role filled by Canadian Forces Station Mont Apica, the final choice went to Canadian Forces Base Bagotville, where *433<sup>e</sup> Escadron aérien* was stationed. Meanwhile, officials in the Command had reason to worry about the meaning of the term FLU and the implications of the concept.<sup>8</sup>

Among civilians in the Department, little progress was made. On 21 September, Louis Noël de Tilly, then bilingualism policy advisor for the Department, wrote to the Chairman of the Advisory Committee on B and B, reminding him that outside Ottawa, civilians were under military control. Wait to see what the military do, he suggested. However, the government wanted FLUs to operate at the decision-making level as well. In this framework, Noël de Tilly suggested focussing on the Deputy Minister's administrative branch, which included, as they were called in 1987, the Direction General Dependants Education Programs (DGDEP) and National Defence Records Management Services (NDRMS). Noël de Tilly elaborated

on his thoughts, pointing out that several Francophones, including Colonel René Morin, Director General of DGDEP, worked in these two bodies which served the public or communicated with provincial governments, including the Quebec Government. As for the unilingual Anglophones working in these two units (fifteen out of forty-three), they met all the criteria including age, for entry into language courses.<sup>9</sup> This proposal was not followed up.

On 30 October, DND replied to Trudeau's letter of 31 July. For purposes of this document, the Department was divided into four parts: the Deputy Minister's Office, the Canadian Forces, the Defence Research Board (DRB) and Defence Construction Ltd. The first and fourth would not have FLUs immediately, but would confine themselves to good intentions in the long term. For example, Armstrong discussed the case of his office, which was responsible for managing and controlling financial operations for the entire Department. A very large proportion of his employees were senior management. He mentioned that two quasi-FLUs reported to him: DGDEP and Records Management. In the latter case, Armstrong preferred to discuss the Division as a whole with its 171 employees, rather than a smaller unit of 35 employees considered by Noël de Tilly. Nevertheless, 103 of those employees were Francophones. The English-speaking boss was partially bilingual. Armstrong added that his Department was suffering from severe financial constraints and possibly substantial staff cutbacks. If a unit had to work in French, its internal workload would increase enormously, for external contact and routine work "of necessity" involved English. He was not equipped at present, he wrote, to displace and replace unqualified staff. However, the organization "will move towards these goals [presumably those identified by Trudeau] as a longer run aim and as organizational and personnel changes make this possible".<sup>10</sup> Defence Construction (1951) Ltd also stated that it would organize FLUs one day. In 1987, however, there were no FLUs in that agency. As for the two quasi-FLUB mentioned by Armstrong, their status had still not changed. We simply note in passing that all the arguments used by Armstrong could have been marshalled by any department asked to produce FLUB in 1970. No other deputy minister had the good fortune to have the Canadian Forces, which, as Armstrong pointed out, already had several FLUs numbering 4,609 military and 450 civilian staff. He added that several units were approximate FLUs. All of these were located in Quebec except for the office of the Bilingualism Policy Assistant to the Chief of Personnel (Colonel Pierre Chassé and his team). Among these were the Valcartier and Saint-Jean bases. The former provided administrative support to most land FLUs of the day, while the latter did the same for the *École des recrues des Forces canadiennes*, the *École des langues des Forces canadiennes* (which mainly taught English to Francophones) and the *École*

*technique des Forces canadiennes* (which provided an introduction in French to some technical trades). In closing, he suggested that four experimental units be set up for the exercise: the Directorate of Recruiting in Ottawa; the Chief of Staff Administrative Branch, Mobile Command at Saint-Hubert; the Bagotville Base Commander's office and administrative services; and 5 Air Movement Unit (5 AMU) in Lahr, in the Federal Republic of Germany. At the DRB, the 28 experimental units were to be located at Valcartier. Later, some FLUs could be set up at NDHQ in Ottawa.<sup>11</sup>

Why did the Forces choose the four experimental units? The answer is to be found in part of the CDS's oral presentation to the Minister in 1970 on the bilingualism program. The Directorate of Recruiting had the advantage of being at NDHQ and having a very urgent national mandate to recruit as many Francophones and bilinguals as possible, and quickly. The publicity it produced had to be aimed at the country's two major language groups and in both official languages. Staff in the directorate needed some command of French, which they did not have in late 1970. The Mobile Command division was designated because Francophones made up one third of the Command's strength. Officials also wanted to experiment with one of the air movement units which control the flow of travellers through DND airports, preferably the one in Lahr, which handled the largest number of civilian or military members of the Department and their dependants. In any case, these units had to comply with the Official Languages Act, in particular the section dealing with service to the public in the language of their choice.<sup>12</sup> Also in Air Command, CFB Bagotville would have an FLU in its administrative sector to facilitate administration of Francophone military personnel on the base in general, their dependants and, in particular, 433<sup>e</sup> Escadron.

These new FLUs would improve the conditions under which Francophones had to serve and extend the use of French as a language of work in the Forces. Furthermore, as parts of large Commands or NDHQ, they would make for better understanding between the two language groups and make the use of both languages a reality. It was agreed that these four FLUs would operate experimentally for twelve to eighteen months and would be progressively taken over by French-speaking personnel.<sup>13</sup>

The question of obtaining competent personnel for these FLUs was crucial in Ottawa for the Directorate of Recruiting. On 17 December 1970, for example, Jules Léger, Under Secretary of State, replied to the letter of 30 October by selecting 36 experimental FLUs from the list he had received. As it stands, his selection includes all existing FLUs in the Forces and omits the Directorate of Recruiting and 5<sup>e</sup> *Unité du mouvement aérien*.<sup>14</sup> Léger's letter



was forwarded to the Chief of Personnel, Lieutenant-General J. Dextraze, who commented on it on 2 February 1971. In his view, the Directorate of Recruiting and 5<sup>e</sup> *UMA* should be experimental because we would then see, among other things, how the FLU concept would apply at NDHQ. Moreover, that would make two more FLUs outside Quebec.<sup>15</sup> On 15 February, ADM(Per) T.G. Morry replied to Dextraze that, following oral discussions with Léger's office, the Directorate of Recruiting was accepted, but not the 5<sup>e</sup> *UMA*.<sup>16</sup> Dextraze, commenting on this document before sending it to the DGBB, objected to all FLUB in the Forces being considered experimental.<sup>17</sup> On 1 March, Colonel Chassé drafted a letter to the ADM(Per) to be signed by the Chief of Personnel, repeating this observation.<sup>18</sup> On 8 March, Morry wrote to Armstrong, adding the Directorate of Recruiting to the units proposed by Léger on 17 December 1970 and emphasizing that the Canadian Forces considered only three out of all their FLUs to be experimental. Even those at the Valcartier Research Centre were perceived as permanent FLUs. He stressed, however, that the Directorate of Recruiting would have difficulty operating as an FLU for two reasons. First, it had to communicate with every recruiting centre in the country; most of those were outside Quebec and thus had to be addressed in English. Second, of the 22 people on strength, eighteen were unilingual English. The Department undertook, however, to ensure that within six months 50 percent of its staff were Francophone and the rest were adequately bilingual.<sup>19</sup>

It was at about this time in 1971 that Chassé was transferred from the DGBB to the Directorate of Recruiting. More Francophones followed him. All the experimental units, however, had shortages of varying severity to be made up. Officials soon realized, for example, that raising the percentage of Francophones to 50 percent in six months was impossible. On 31 May 1971, the Assistant to the CP (military) decided that the 50 percent target would be reached in a year.<sup>20</sup>

On 17 August 1971, the President of the Treasury Board, E.C. Drury, announced that the study would begin in about three months for all experimental FLUB. He mentioned that most FLUs in the Forces would not be considered experimental. However, the use of French as a language of work would be increased, among other things, in contacts with non-French units.

The August 1971 communiqué added that the government was interested in finding out whether FLUs encouraged the use of French as a language of work equal to English; facilitated recruitment of unilingual Francophones, whose potential had generally gone untapped in the past; opened up the

possibility of greater equalization of career opportunities for Anglophones and Francophones; and helped bilingual Anglophones to work effectively in French. It would also be seen how they served the cause of bilingualism in the Public Service and how they complemented government policies designed to offer service to the public in both languages.<sup>21</sup>

Clearly, this news had been prepared well in advance. As regards those civilians involved, Armstrong was able to write to the Chairman of the Public Service Commission on 5 May 1971 that of the 444 civilians affected, only eight could be considered unilingual English.<sup>22</sup> As for the Valcartier Research Centre (see Chapter 18), its employees did not come under the Commission.

In February 1971, Noël de Tilly had suggested that civilians in experimental FLUs be notified of what was going to happen and also surveyed in order to put together a picture of these people's language status.<sup>23</sup> In March, the assistant to the Chief of Personnel (Civilian), J.H. Barron, sent a memo to Mobile Command HQ, whose civilian sector was responsible for the civilian personnel affected by the experimental FLUB at St-Hubert and Bagotville. Barron announced what was coming and asked questions; the answers were eventually used to draft the 5 May letter signed by Armstrong.<sup>24</sup> The military side of Mobile Command was alerted by this message, even though it was not addressed directly to the military. On 6 April, a message for Barron and the DGBB asked whether the letter of 12 March was intended only for civilians, whether the military would be affected later and whether this meant that the head of administrative services at Mobile Command would, in future, have to be a Francophone or a bilingual Anglophone.<sup>25</sup> All three questions were answered in the affirmative on 16 March.<sup>26</sup> What emerges from this appeal, however, is that Canadian Forces HQ, which already administered many FLUB, did not seem greatly concerned about giving information too far in advance to the military experimental FLUB it was preparing to set up.

We noted earlier that fairly serious problems were caused by lack of information. In this case, the problem was not settled immediately. In May, a brochure prepared by the specialized directorate of Treasury Board entitled *Facts About French-Language Units* was sent to departments to be distributed to all FLUs (experimental or otherwise) when their existence had been officially announced.<sup>27</sup>

The Director General Information Services, L.A. Bourgeois, studied this brochure and told the Director, Bilingualism Programs Branch at Treasury Board, B.R. Keith, that in its present form it was not suitable for the military.

On 26 May, Keith sent Bourgeois a copy of the text so that he could adapt its terminology to the military context. At this stage, Drury was expected to take a position regarding FLUs in early June.<sup>28</sup> In any event, the “military” version was not ready until mid-July 1971. Major-General Dextraze told ADM(Per) T.G. Morry that it would be presented in a future *Canadian Forces Newsletter*, an existing communications tool normally distributed throughout the Forces.

On 29 July 1971, Cabinet made its decision regarding the FLU experiment, and on 11 August, Treasury Board notified departments that it would be made public on 17 August. The letter added that preparations should be made to contact those employees concerned, using the brochure for civilians or its adapted version for the military. Cabinet stressed the need to inform public servants about the program as fully and promptly as possible. It was important that their first source of information should be official.<sup>29</sup> As if to drive this point home, the day before Drury’s announcement, the FLU Working Group at Treasury Board sent a message to departmental bilingualism advisors instructing them to be ready to pass on the message at ten the next morning, and asking that they observe the time and date of the attached press release.<sup>30</sup>

A lengthy twenty-page message in both languages (DGBB 66) was duly released on 17 August to all Forces units. It contained Drury’s press release and extracts from the letter of 11 August and circular 1970-95. It guaranteed that the brochure on FLUs would follow for civilians and a special edition of the *Forces Newsletter* would be distributed with extra copies. On 24 August, another message (DPAS 2246) announced that the brochure *Facts About FLUs* had already been sent out and officials should distribute it promptly to all civilians in FLUs.<sup>31</sup>

As it happened, the few civilians in the Department’s FLUs were better informed than their many military colleagues, because not until the following October, was the special *Forces Newsletter* published. Moreover, it appeared as two very different documents, one in English, the other in French. Under the circumstances, what guarantee was there, for example, that Francophones in the military serving on the West Coast had ready access to the French version, even though they were entitled to it?

On 13 October, Louis Noël de Tilly protested to Morry about this procedure. He wrote that there should have been a single bilingual brochure.<sup>32</sup> On 29 October, Armand Letellier, who must have been asked to explain, stated that a bilingual document with French and English texts side by side was not produced because the Department had not yet received the necessary

equipment to publish this type of document (it was to arrive the following January).<sup>33</sup> This technical reply was unsatisfactory, because a bilingual brochure could have been produced in another form. Morry stuck to his guns. On 22 November, he expressed his dissatisfaction to Bourgeois regarding both the delay in issuing the *Newsletter* and the form in which it was produced. The question of the delay, undoubtedly the more important in the circumstances, was completely ignored by Bourgeois in his reply of 21 December, which was full of fine words about the second point. He claimed that all those concerned were aware that two unilingual versions would be produced.<sup>34</sup>

On 5 January 1972, Noël de Tilly wrote to his superior that he had drafted the letter from Dextraze to Morry dated 15 July 1971 with the help of Lieutenant-Colonel J.M. Fournier (acting DGBB at the time). Both men knew the *Newsletter* was usually published in two unilingual versions. They wanted to change that by stating that the special *Newsletter* would come out in a “bilingual format”.<sup>35</sup> Since the term was not explained further by the authors, they had only themselves to blame for the less than satisfactory interpretation of the term by Bourgeois. The files we have consulted contain no traces of any further action on this issue.

### **FLUs in the 1972 military B and B plan**

Now let us outline the role played by FLUs in the drafting of the integrated B and B plan for the Department. At the time when the FLU experiment was launched, DND was in the final months of preparing its B and B program. For example, the CDS Advisory Committee had decided on 4 November 1970 that the Comptroller General should plan what type of units should be converted into FLUs over the years as Francophone resources increased. It was clear already that the next FLUs would not be announced officially until the necessary human resources were available.<sup>36</sup> The following December, a tentative list of bases and units to be converted into FLUs was ready. It was presented to the Minister at the important meeting of 21 December when the plan to implement bilingualism was adopted. At this stage, nothing final had yet been decided on FLUs; they continued to be discussed within the very broad framework of biculturalism.

The section of the plan dealing with FLUs was written between March 1971 and April 1972. The first discernible stage comprises the messages sent by the Comptroller General between 22 and 26 March 1971 to all Commands, asking them to approve the list of future FLUs. Acceptances came back quickly, and some were enthusiastic — Mobile Command wanted to expand the list.<sup>37</sup> On 29 March, since the proposal had been accepted by the Commands, it was

submitted to the DGBB to translate the names of the units into French.<sup>38</sup> Three days later, Fournier forwarded his translations to the Director General Organization and Manpower. He added the comment that no FLUs were planned for Air Transport, and this would almost automatically exclude Francophones from that activity sector. Accordingly, he strongly recommended including an air transport squadron in the list.<sup>39</sup> On 16 April, Fournier was assured that his comment would be taken into consideration.<sup>40</sup> This was in fact done by 22 April, when the CDS submitted a list to the Minister, Donald Macdonald, showing that the Department would eventually have 35 FLUs, including those already in existence. The plan was approved the same day.<sup>41</sup>

The matter was not that simple, however. On 25 June, the Minister wrote to the CDS effectively withdrawing the approval he had given in April. A firm decision, he explained, could not be made until the bicultural aspect of the program was accepted by the Defence Council. Final approval should ensure that all factors in the selection of new FLUs had been thoroughly analysed, factors such as geographic distribution; language capability of support services; fair distribution throughout the Forces; representation in each functional Command; present distribution of Anglophones and Francophones; projected workload which FLUB could create for subordinate units regarding the use of English and French; implications of FLUB in Headquarters and their effects on communications; additional demand for translation; recreation and culture; advantages and disadvantages of announcing publicly and immediately the names of units which would not become FLUs until later; and the time needed for FLUs to acquire an adequate percentage of Francophones.<sup>42</sup>

There were several good reasons for apparently putting on the brakes in this way. The bicultural aspect of the program had not in fact been accepted to date, and consequently there was a good deal of confusion. Let us recall, for example, the controversy which surfaced in the summer of 1971 regarding the 72:28 ratio (see Chapter 9). One of the questions raised by Macdonald is interesting if we look at it from his viewpoint as a politician. Was it really necessary, for example, to announce immediately, or even when the final plan was accepted, as was sure to happen soon, which of the three submarines would become an FLU, given that DND did not expect to have the necessary resources for years and did not know whether the navy would still have that unit when the time came?

When Mobile Command agreed to the list of FLUs suggested to it by HQ in Ottawa in March 1971, it asked whether it might notify the units in question of their future status. The Director Organization refused, with no explanation.<sup>43</sup> After the Minister asked the question in June, Comptroller

General Pollard felt obliged to give his opinion. When he outlined his understanding of how the 72:28 ratio would work on 10 August, he argued that a decision on future FLUs should be made immediately so that the necessary arrangements for recruiting, training, posting and so forth could be made. Moreover, secrecy could probably not be maintained over a long period. Thus he felt it preferable to make a public announcement at a preliminary stage, stating that the plan would be implemented gradually as resources became available. Furthermore, such an announcement could have a positive effect on recruiting Francophones and keeping them in the Forces. Pollard concluded by stating that the Chief of Personnel should give an estimate of the approximate time when a unit might become an FLU.<sup>44</sup> The November 1971 agreement on 72:28 also includes a paragraph on when it should be announced that a unit would one day become an FLU. In brief, the appropriate authority within the Department would be informed of the decision, but the names of FLUB would not be made public until they became viable, which in most cases would be much later.<sup>45</sup> The solution which was chosen was a combination of the two approaches. Some of the FLUB to be created by 1979 were clearly named; several have since closed down, including radar stations. Others were identified only by role; for example, between 1976 and 1979, a supply and maintenance vessel and by 1990, a maritime patrol air squadron were to become FLUs (see Appendix K).

We need not dwell here on the many alterations made to the designation plan during discussions of the 72:28 ratio. We are already familiar with the basic principles of the debate. The final list, incorporating the views of Letellier and Cloutier, was different from the tentative list submitted to Macdonald in December 1970 while in its preliminary stage.

As regards the list of FLUs to be included in the fifteen-year plan, the planners can hardly be reproached for changing their views along the way. We have already seen the contradictory guidelines they attempted to follow until spring 1971. But that is not all. Even those in the DGBB did not know in the summer of 1971 what FLUs existed in the Forces.

The message of 17 August 1971, we recall, mentioned FLUs which had been in existence since 1968 and the three experimental units. On 23 August, Mobile Command HQ pointed out that *430<sup>e</sup> Escadron tactique d'hélicoptères [430<sup>e</sup> ETAH]* and *5<sup>e</sup> Unité de contrôle aérien tactique (5<sup>e</sup> U de CAT)* should be designated as FLUs, since both were operational at Valcartier<sup>46</sup> On 3 September 1971, the DGBB replied that *5<sup>e</sup> U de CAT* was an FLU and *430<sup>e</sup>* would become one later.<sup>47</sup> We do not know how this conclusion was reached, since the former of these two units never received special attention according to the file, while in August 1969, it was announced that the second was being

established as an FLU. It is interesting to note, however, that the preliminary list dated 1 December 1970,<sup>48</sup> like that of 10 August 1971,<sup>49</sup> included 430<sup>e</sup> *ETAH* in the list of future FLUs. The confusion may stem from the fact that although 430<sup>e</sup> *ETAH* was designated as an FLU, it did not actually begin operation until 1 January 1971, after receiving its aircraft. Between 1969 and 1971, Minister Cadieux's message may certainly have been misplaced.

The reply of 3 September 1971 drafted by Major A. Arsenault prompts us to make a comment. Faced with the countless difficulties that prevented any FLU not existing in 1971 from being officially designated between 1971 and 1982, we envy the ease, in September of 1971, with which 5<sup>e</sup> *U de CAT* became an FLU. Added to this is the fact that on 31 August, Training Command suggested the inclusion of CFB Saint-Jean and the recruit and technical schools, in the list of FLUs.<sup>50</sup> On 18 September, the DGBB agreed to the technical school but said further study was needed before a decision could be made on the base and the recruit schools.<sup>51</sup> Again, the technical school seems to have been designated with ease compared to what was to follow from 1974 on.

On 6 April 1972, when the time came to spell out the names of existing and future FLUs, Colonel E.W. Ryan, Director Manpower Program Control (DMPC), sent a list to Lieutenant-Colonel C. Tousignant. The 5<sup>e</sup> *U de CAT* and *ETFC* were included, but not 430<sup>e</sup> *ETAH*: a pencilled correction to the document makes the last-named unit an FLU.<sup>52</sup> Someone had finally remembered August 1969.

Five days later, in reply to a question in the House of Commons, the "accurate" list of FLUs was released. It included 430<sup>e</sup> *ETAH*.<sup>53</sup> This is the list which the Minister and Treasury Board approved. Finally, on 1 August 1972, a message to all units "corrected" the list of 17 August 1971. It listed eighteen FLUs plus the three experimental ones<sup>54</sup> (see Appendix L). The list of eighteen remained unchanged until 7 September 1982, when the Department, in a terse news release, announced the designation of 53 new FLUB, nearly all in Quebec.<sup>55</sup> In 1985, 430<sup>e</sup> *Escadron aérien* at Bagotville became an FLU. These units are listed in Appendix M. Comparing appendices K and M, we find that a backlog had built up in creating new air force and navy FLUs.

Let us complete this picture quickly. According to the 1972 plan, 50 percent of Francophones in the Forces were to serve in FLUs by 1990. How far had this objective been attained in 1987? There were some 7,250 Francophones in FLUs at the time, out of an approximate total of 24,500.

Thus 30.8 percent\* of Francophones were serving in FLUs, which was well below the target.

### **The question of linguistically qualified military personnel**

Like proportional representation, FLUs are a key to creating equal opportunities for Francophones. For this reason, we will spend some time in reviewing some of the questions directly or indirectly related to them. First we shall look at the use of competent resources, which in this context means bilingual Anglophones and Francophones.

In mid-February 1971, the three experimental FLUs to be set up in the Department were clearly identified. The Director General Posting and Careers, aware of what was about to happen, made a study of what had to be undertaken. Starting from the fact that Treasury Board wanted 50 percent of personnel in these FLUs to be Francophones within six months and the remainder to be bilingual, the analysis showed that this would mean no less than 100 percent turnover in the Directorate Recruiting and 66 percent of officers in the identified units of Mobile Command. The extent of the changes required in such a short time was considered unacceptable. At this stage (March 1971), only the units at CFB Bagotville did not cause problems. Accordingly, an extension until summer 1972 was requested for making the changes which would comply with Treasury Board's directives. As we have seen, Commodore Falls agreed to this on 31 May.<sup>56</sup> But when the DGPC made these alarmist forecasts, he also found anomalies which he wanted to have examined. He referred to CDS directive P6/69 (Volume I, pp 232-233), which prescribed the order of priorities to be followed in posting Francophones, with FLUs heading the list. This directive was amended on 31 July 1970 (we shall see why later): as of that date, training centres came first and FLUs fell to second place.

On 27 February 1970, CDS directive P3/70 set priorities for the deployment of bilingual staff in the Forces, with Canadian Forces HQ in first place. Yet according to the DGPC, the majority of bilinguals in the Forces were still Francophones in March 1971. These directives would thus have to be reviewed very quickly, for career managers, caught between these requirements, often could not tell which way to turn. The numbers of bilingual officers in military colleges, training centres, experimental FLUs and on a possible new destroyer<sup>57</sup> to be converted into an FLU were all supposed to

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\* These totals — and thus the percentage — vary from day to day as members join and leave, but they reflect very closely the situation at the end of 1987.



increase: the demand was much greater than the supply. Under the circumstances, Colonel M.J. Doohar, acting DGPC, suggested using competent personnel in those locations rather than in experimental FLUs.<sup>58</sup>

Two sets of problems had to be addressed here: co-ordination of B and B policy in the Forces and the priority for posting Francophone or bilingual staff. Colonel Doohar went directly, as he was entitled, to the military assistant to the CP, Commodore R.H. Falls, without discussing the situation with the DGBB. On 14 May, the Comptroller General sent the CP his thoughts on posting priorities, which were similar to Doohar's. Moreover, he stressed that he had been designated to implement various parts of the program, including the make-up of the units that would become FLUs. This meant that any future proposal or plan had to go through the CG's Branch before being announced, whether it applied to civilian or military personnel.<sup>59</sup> What led to this attempt to bring matters into line was simply the number of intervening parties in the Commands. The DGBB was talking to Mobile Command about an experimental FLU at the same time that the CG was sending directives about identifying bilingual positions. Questions then came back to Ottawa connecting the two subjects, which greatly disturbed one of the two writers.<sup>60</sup> In this case, we have seen Pollard try to take the initiative. But Tousignant wrote a rather rude note on Pollard's memo to the DGBB, reminding Lieutenant-Colonel J. Fournier that the DGBB was responsible for ensuring the success of the B and B program and it was the DGBB and none other that should co-ordinate all action in this area.<sup>61</sup> On 21 May, Fournier sent Falls a draft memo reminding everyone working on B and B that this area was to be co-ordinated by the DGBB.<sup>62</sup> The message was duly sent out.

At the same time, Fournier gave Falls a document written by Tousignant on 17 May, before he had received Pollard's memo, which was intended as a reply to both Pollard and the Director Military Manpower Distribution (DMMD), who had each put forward priorities to be followed in deploying Francophone or bilingual personnel. Tousignant, we have seen, was at the CDS's office in 1969 when Allard's directive on this subject had been issued. Tousignant's document insisted this directive contained elements that must be maintained. Everyone agreed, in 1971 as in 1969, that most bilinguals were Francophones. At the same time, FLUs had to be staffed mainly by Francophones. Since they did not have access to French-language schools for their children all across Canada, they could only serve in a limited number of locations. There were very few Francophones in the air force and the navy at the rank of major and above. Moreover, part of the Francophone pool had to support existing French training centres.

Tousignant then discussed directive P3/70, which ensured compliance with the institutional bilingualism required by the Official Languages Act. He covered communications and service to the public in both languages at NDHQ, in the National Capital Region, in the HQ of each Command, and in military bases located in bilingual districts in Canada or outside Canada. There were also priorities for access to translation services, and even priorities to be given to Canadian Forces HQ offices as regards the practice of institutional bilingualism. According to Tousignant, all this could be only a long-range outlook, for bilingual personnel had first to be used for training and then, in the line of command, at points which must communicate with FLUs. When a large enough quantity of bilingual Anglophones had swollen the contingent of bilinguals, directive P3/70 could come into effect.

Tousignant went farther. The DMMD implied in his text that there was a pool of bilinguals all at the same level. The DGBB disagreed. Those who were perfectly bilingual could be deployed anywhere. Those who were less bilingual ought to be assigned to positions where their first language would be very useful. Moreover, the DMMD wanted bilinguals to serve in positions abroad (attachés, NATO and exchanges). Of the 710 positions identified in these job categories, few required real bilingualism and very few should be set aside for Francophones.

On the basis of these observations, Tousignant proposed the replacing of directive CDS P6/69 with another to be issued by the Chief of Personnel. First, he assumed that FLUs would be filled with Francophones, and would thus have a bilingual capability. After this obvious statement, he listed three priorities. The first covered the following:

- recruiting centres in Quebec, the National Capital Region and bilingual districts;
- training centres — those under FRANCOTRAIN (see Chapter 13) followed by others where Francophones were assigned;
- military colleges;
- staff colleges and schools;
- certain units supporting FLUs (medical, dental, clerical or air movement units and recreation sectors);
- operational support for FLUs (base workshops and supply and repair centres).

The second priority would include all the duties of the various headquarters. The third would cover military attaché positions, those allocated to Canadian military personnel at NATO and participation in exchanges with other countries.<sup>63</sup>

This list of priorities was only a draft to be discussed with the Director General Postings and Careers, according to Tousignant. For his part, Falls accepted the logic of the argument while observing that the priority to be given to experimental FLUs must be decided by CP Dextraze. Furthermore, he expressed a preference for a directive from the CDS, rather than the CP, so as to distribute it more widely.<sup>64</sup>

In order to prepare the ground for the directive in question, the DGBB commissioned from the DMMD an exhaustive study of the constraints as regards personnel. On 6 August, Captain (N) C.E. Leighton send his findings to Tousignant.<sup>65</sup> His excellent statistical work was marked by a certain pessimism as to the possibilities of resolving the problem of the demand for bilinguals, and hence mainly for Francophones, far exceeding the supply. Moreover, the priorities he suggested were aimed more at complying with the letter of the Official Languages Act than at attempting to give Francophones the same opportunities as Anglophones. Thus, for example, he totally ignored FLUs and kept to the same ground as the DMMD and Pollard.

Tousignant combined the statistics provided by Leighton with the idea he had suggested in May and which had been so promptly seized on by Letellier, in August, with regard to the 72:28 ratio: first and foremost, Francophones had to be allowed to work in French, and this would be done in FLUs.

In September, Tousignant circulated at NDHQ a draft directive which resembled his May document in every detail except its opening remarks. It recalled that the 1969 directive was designed first of all to make FLUs work and needed to be revised in accordance with the B and B implementation program which had already begun and with the Official Languages Act. Since bilinguals were also Francophones, intermediate priorities must be set which take into account the fact that FLUB would contain 80 percent Francophones, bilingual or otherwise. Tousignant then repeated his earlier list of 17 May, adding in the covering note to the draft circular an interesting comment: it was unacceptable that unilingual Anglophones should still be transferred to FLUs in 1971, especially as this led to investigations by the Commissioner of Official Languages, such as the one then going on at CFB Bagotville.<sup>66</sup>

While the transfers made necessary by the experimental FLUB had already begun, the question of deploying bilingual Francophones had still not been resolved. In December, a questionnaire prepared by the Treasury Board

to analyse the experiment in progress was sent to all FLUs in the Department.<sup>67</sup> When compiled, the answers were revealing: with two exceptions, all FLUs, experimental or otherwise, had unilingual Anglophones.<sup>68</sup> These data circulated through the offices concerned from February 1972 onward. One finding emerged very quickly: individual records were not accurate, and this frequently led to anomalies, such as a military employee with a French-sounding name being transferred to an FLU, since his career manager had not taken the trouble to check whether the person in question was a Francophone, or at least bilingual.<sup>69</sup> If Corporal Latouche had never spoken French, that was his bad luck — and that of the unit to which he was transferred. In short, in the first half of 1972, the inadequacy (noted by Ross in 1967) of the information on individuals in the Department's possession had not been completely corrected.

At this point, the question of the deployment of Francophones came back to the fore, but at a much lower level than first anticipated. On 4 March, a directive from the Director General Personnel Control, Brigadier-General Duncan A. McAlpine, updated Allard's release of 13 January 1969. Although the style was different, the message was essentially the same. McAlpine wrote that until such time as Anglophones could carry their weight in bilingualism, Francophones should not be siphoned off from FLUs, even to fill bilingual positions. As a first priority, then, Francophones would go to FLUs until they occupied 90 percent of positions there. Anglophones in FLUs would have to achieve the level of bilingualism specified by the Comptroller General. Quebec recruiting centres would employ only Francophones. Next came training centres, where bilingual Anglophones could serve; Francophones would only be posted there under the personal control of the DGPC. Bilingual positions at the DGBB, those of Command co-ordinators of B and B and special positions (such as military attachés) would only be filled after the DGPC had considered them. As for other bilingual positions, they would be filled first by bilingual Anglophones, or if this was not possible, by bilingual Francophones, again after direct intervention by the DGPC. The directive, noting what was available at the time, also listed some interim measures that could be adopted. Transfers of bilingual staff to non-bilingual positions would thus be reduced to the minimum, and some positions classified as fully bilingual could be filled by functionally bilingual incumbents.<sup>70</sup> Although the problem was given very serious consideration, it was not yet solved.

On 3 June, McAlpine chaired a meeting of experts to discuss the existing and foreseeable problems relating to HMCS *Ottawa*, the only naval FLU. They had to make plans for a ten percent change in its strength by the following December. Statistics for the strength of this vessel were inaccurate, and results differed depending on the sources. But the unit questionnaires from

Treasury Board revealed an alarming situation: there were 54 unilingual Anglophones on board, or 23 percent of strength.<sup>71</sup> How could HMCS *Ottawa* operate in French under such circumstances?

Unilingual personnel were posted to HMCS *Ottawa* in two ways: they could be men of Francophone origin who no longer spoke French or Anglophones who declared themselves bilingual, but had not been tested and had a highly suspect command of French. The selection process for the vessel thus had to be reviewed. McAlpine asked the Director Military Manpower Distribution (DMMD) and the career managers involved, who were at the meeting, to improve the percentages of Francophones and bilingual Anglophones on HMCS *Ottawa* before December 1972. By August 1973, there would have to be progress.<sup>72</sup> The discussions held that day brought into focus for the navy the extent of the overall problem caused by the deficit of Francophones, and thus of bilinguals.

Having taken part in some of the discussions surrounding this question, one of the authors of this present volume found that the dilemma in the navy was complex. Whatever approach was taken, unless Francophones were left at sea for longer periods than their Anglophone comrades (which would be demoralizing for the Francophones and undoubtedly drive many to resign) the fact had to be faced that for a number of years, there would not be enough Francophone or bilingual Anglophone resources to make HMCS *Ottawa* a real FLU.

What was the situation elsewhere? In the summer of 1972, the fifteen-year plan was tabled and the future FLUs were known, at least by role. Thus the career management implications of the implementation of the program could be studied. On 30 November, Lieutenant-Colonel R.J. Bachand, one of the career managers, predicted the situation that would develop if the planned FLUs were to function. His long report covered each classification and trade where problems could be anticipated in meeting the goals of the program, which in sum required more of two rare commodities: Francophones — bilingual or otherwise — and bilingual Anglophones. The scarcity of Francophones could lead to consigning them to the merry-go-round of FLUs, Bachand observed several times. There was nothing wrong with that in itself, except that if the number and variety of FLUB did not increase as planned — and he personally doubted that the plan could be followed in this area — there would not be a wide variety of positions for Francophones in the FLU net and hence there would be diminished work experience and opportunities. This would have repercussions when promotion lists were drawn up. In other words, the system in place would perpetuate injustices, though in a different form. No one wanted this situation, wrote Bachand: neither Francophones, nor

bilingual Anglophones slated for FLUs, nor unilingual Anglophones being sent on language training so they could be posted to FLUs — not to mention the apprehensions some Anglophones felt about the Quebec education system, especially the CEGEPs.

On the strength of these observations, Bachand proposed that bilingual Francophones be assigned according to the following priorities: recruiting, training and FLUs. Furthermore, he pointed out that some FLUB (HMCS *Ottawa* and 5<sup>e</sup> *Régiment d'artillerie légère du Canada*) had difficulty achieving 90 percent Francophones. He thought it would be impossible to convert three air squadrons into FLUs by 1975-76, as the plan provided. He suggested the conversion of one of the three into an FLU; they could then wait until the necessary personnel became available before converting the other two units. Similarly, he thought that the Department should forget about turning another destroyer into an FLU by 1975-76 and a supply ship by 1978-79. Problems could also be anticipated in maintaining 90 percent Francophones at CFB Bagotville or CFS Val d'Or. The other planned FLUs should not, he thought, encounter any major obstacles; in fact, the Montreal supply depot could be converted immediately, rather than in 1977-78.<sup>73</sup>

The parties concerned, including the DGBB, met to discuss this report, and on 4 December, the Director General Posting and Careers, Brigadier-General J.I. Davies, wrote to the CP. He reported that those present discussed Bachand's conclusions and generally agreed except on CFB Montreal, the communications group and the Quebec special investigations unit, which were to become FLUB in 1972/73 and 1973/74 according to the plan. There was no lack of qualified personnel, but some people questioned whether these units could become FLUs because of their roles. Moreover, given the problems of the existing FLUs, perhaps it would be best to ensure that they were running smoothly before starting up new ones. Here the DGBB disagreed, suggesting, for example, that the Commissioner of Official Languages would object if the DND did not follow its action plan. Davies emphasized the shortage of Francophones and bilingual Anglophones, which would continue for some time unless steps were taken. Among those mentioned was a bilingualism bonus — which still did not exist in the military as late as 1987 — extending the careers of Francophones or assuring them they would not be confined to FLUs.<sup>74</sup>

The next day, Boyle took note of the work performed by Bachand's group and congratulated them. Instead of denying FLU status to a unit because 90 percent Francophones could not be posted to it, he thought an intermediate situation could be considered: if over 10 percent bilingual Anglophones were assigned, the unit should still be able to work in French.

He agreed, however, that the closed circuit of FLUs described by Bachand should be avoided. He concluded by stating that the situation should be monitored closely regarding Francophones and bilingual Anglophones so that the timetable for introducing new FLUs could be adjusted if necessary. If the creation of another FLU had to be delayed, however, the decision should be justified and a new deadline set.<sup>75</sup>

The task of revising this documentation fell to Colonel Hanna. His basic conclusions were simple: the success of the program depended on all members of the Forces supporting it, whether or not they accepted its premises completely. While advancing cautiously, results must be achieved, and that meant FLUB. Hanna found it natural that some Anglophones should have fears about the Quebec education system, and he maintained that the DGBB could do nothing about this. Confinement within FLUB was a danger to be considered only if the 1972 plan did not work as intended. Hanna preferred to see training rather than recruiting benefits first from highly bilingual Francophones. As for the number of bilingual Anglophones, Bachand could not be certain of the results because, at the time, the Director Personnel Information Systems, from whom he obtained his information, admitted that his data were not perfect. Moreover, Bachand appeared not to have understood that an FLU had three years from the time it was designated to achieve full effectiveness (thus a destroyer designated during the 1975-76 fiscal year would not become a fully operational FLU until 1978-79). Finally, alternatives could be conceived, rather as Boyle did when he spoke of an interim situation. The transition period could be extended, or an FLU could be set up at a lower level (a sector of CFB Bagotville, for example, until the 90:10 was achieved so that the entire base could become an FLU).<sup>76</sup> In short, Hanna thought that Bachand and Davies had raised problems that were not unknown and should not prevent the system from working.

Part of this issue reached a conclusion on 9 March at a meeting in the office of Vice-Admiral Boyle, where it was decided that Francophones and highly bilingual Anglophones would be posted to training units first and FLUs second. At the same time, an analysis of resources by classification and trade should be undertaken to evaluate the real impact of this decision on FLU management. The Director Personnel Requirements and Control would then analyse the entire situation, including recruiting, promotion rates and FLU formation to determine its impact on the long-term goals of FLUs.<sup>77</sup>

The question of Francophone resource management was thus resolved at a higher level and in a different way from that contemplated by McAlpine some months earlier. This time, priority was placed on training, through which Francophone recruits passed before going into FLUs. Since there were only a

few hundred Francophone instructor positions compared to the thousands in FLUs, no major problem was foreseen with this reversal of priorities.

Part of what Davies wrote in December 1972 and what many people thought at that time, deserves further attention. Davies observed that FLUs were liable to divide the Canadian Forces. To avoid such a division, he thought bilingualism should be introduced quickly and resolutely. He went as far as to write that perhaps every recruit should be bilingual.<sup>78</sup> The 1973 information program addressed this matter subtly. The text of the presentation stated that FLUs might seem to be divisive factors working against the goal of national unity. In fact, however, they gave a Francophone who spoke little or no English an opportunity which his Anglophone colleague had always had, to work and pursue a career in his own language. Data now familiar to us were presented: a high percentage of Francophone recruits (roughly 30 percent), but a low percentage remaining in the Forces (18 percent in 1973). The conclusion was that Francophones were discouraged by working and competing in a language other than their own. Training in French and FLUs were there to remedy this situation.<sup>79</sup> Let us recall the fears of “segregation” among politicians and the military in 1967-68, when the first big wave of FLUB broke. These fears were still alive in 1973, but seemed less acute. The main subject of discussion then became the “prisoner of FLUs” syndrome.

The information program would thus emphasize the fact that a member of an FLU would not remain a prisoner in it.<sup>80</sup> It would do this by stressing that under the plan, there would be enough positions in FLUB or outside them (in national units, for example) to allow a Francophone to pursue a normal career. This said, one difficulty still remained. How could a Francophone be promised as rounded a career as his Anglophone colleague enjoyed in his own language? If he was to preserve his culture and be nurtured by it, he could only live in Quebec, in Ottawa to some extent, or in West Germany, if he was a member of the *Royal 22<sup>e</sup> Régiment*. But a normal Canadian military career required service in many other locations. During the information sessions, several Francophones brought up this matter. As realists, they accepted the situation, but they did not hesitate to confront the speakers with their contradictions.<sup>81</sup>

Despite all assurances, the prisoner of FLUB syndrome often cropped up. In September 1973, Hanna mentioned it as a noteworthy feature, occurring mainly among experienced Francophone military personnel. Associated with the syndrome were various assumptions and fears which were neither reasonable nor clearly thought out. Thus some Francophones said that they did not want to place their children in the Quebec education system after they had begun their schooling, in French or English, in Ontario programs. Others



did not want them educated in French in Quebec when they were in an FLU, knowing that they would have to go back to another part of Canada where education in French was not available. This was a case of passion over reason, since the conditions which gave rise to these complaints existed before 1968, when thousands of Francophones in the Forces had had an opportunity to serve in Quebec once or twice during their careers, but in units that were not FLUs at the time. This was the view of military people who no doubt sacrificed everything to their careers. They had difficulty accepting changes which required them to go back to using their mother tongue, which the system had done everything to erase over the years.

This said, other fears were justified, including those of anglicized Francophones, about the problems of working in French, a language some of them had forgotten. Such apprehension is normal, and perhaps Allard and Dextraze had this in mind when they emphasized, in the late 1960s, that English would remain the language of operations under international agreements. This brings us to the central theme of the operation of FLUs: the use of French.

### **French in the Canadian Forces**

As we have seen, the use of French was not a military priority in the late 1960s, even though bringing Francophones together in FLUs became one. This means that in 1969, some personnel still thought and acted as if the use of French should essentially be limited to communications within FLUs in the regular forces and communications between FLUs and their HQ in the Reserves.

Some facts speak for themselves. On 21 May 1965, the Liberal MP for Chicoutimi complained to the Associate Minister of Defence in a personal letter that at CFB Bagotville, located in a nearly 100 percent Francophone area, too much was done in English only.<sup>82</sup> On 7 February 1966, Social Credit MP Gilles Grégoire (who would later join the provincial Parti Québécois) cited the case of a military dentist at Jonquière who, having delivered a report in French to the commander of 15 Dental Company, had his report returned by Colonel R.B. Jackson with a request that it be resubmitted in English.<sup>83</sup>

Other examples of similar problems were given in Chapter 7 (Vol I, p 206). But there was more. An attempt was made about this time to distinguish between language of work and language of operations, although neither was clearly defined. This seemed to be an attempt to stave off the inevitable, in other words the probable conclusions of the B and B Commission. Up to that time, since English was used everywhere, there had been no need to distinguish between language of work and language of operations in the

Forces. Now that French was to be introduced, its use apparently had to be restricted. Thus Major-General Anderson in his letter of 29 April 1966 (Volume I, chapter 7, p 206) implied that the language of work in several Reserve units in Quebec was French. On 3 June, in a telephone conversation with Commodore F. Caldwell of the CDS's office, he said there was a difference between language of work, which could be French, and language of operations, which was to remain English.<sup>84</sup>

The reader will also recall that when Cadieux and Allard discussed plans relating to B and B between 1967 and 1969, they always maintained that English would remain the operational language under international agreements (Volume I, Chapter 8, pp 234-235). We asked both men what were these agreements banning the use of French. Each of them told us there were none, but for practical reasons, Canada should use English in NATO and NORAD.<sup>85</sup>

In response to an inquiry by DND, the Department of Justice gave the Department to understand, in December 1969, that government agencies could regulate the internal use of either language of communication (Volume I, p 235). But on what basis could English, for example, be made the language of operations? International agreements? What were those agreements? This was the question which Roger Lavergne asked the Judge Advocate General (JAG) to clarify.<sup>86</sup> On 2 September, the JAG wrote to the Secretary of State for External Affairs asking whether Canada was bound by such agreements. Were there international agreements on air traffic control or regulations requiring English to be used?<sup>87</sup> A long reply was sent to the JAG on 30 September. First, Canada was party to too many understandings and agreements for them all to be examined. Second, the implementation of the Official Languages Act did not contradict any international agreement. But as it was being gradually put into practice, if a problem occurred it would then be necessary to see what had to be done. "We understand from you that no such agreement has come to your attention."<sup>88</sup>


On 7 October, the JAG passed this reply on to Lavergne. He added that he had found three agreements providing for English to be used as the language of training for pilots from friendly countries. These agreements were made with the Netherlands and West Germany in 1956 and France in 1969. Only the last-named was still in effect.<sup>89</sup> So much for the chimera of international agreements.

On 29 August, the Director Implementation Bilingual Plans stated in his message 25 that the Forces would comply with existing international agreements regarding English.<sup>90</sup> Most of those receiving the message took this to mean that English was required in NATO and NORAD; in fact all that was required was to give courses in English to some pilots of French nationality.

With the tabling of the B and B Commission Report, another factor came into play. The Commissioners acted very logically, as if the language of work in the Forces was the one used throughout. With respect to the new FLUs which they suggested establishing in Mobile Command, they drew up the following communications matrix:

**LANGUAGE OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE VARIOUS ECHELONS AND SECTORS IN MOBILE COMMAND (THEORETICAL MODEL)<sup>91</sup>**

Mobile Command Headquarters



The Department's reply was that communications within FLUs were already in French; the use of French by FLUB in external communications was accepted in principle but would have to be studied; and the language of operations would continue to be English, the Department added.<sup>92</sup> At about this time, however, CDS Sharp began to lean toward partial use of French in operations. On 6 February, in a draft covering letter to accompany the bilingualism policy for the Canadian Forces mentioned in Chapter 9 above, Sharp attempted to define language of work:

[...] The words "working language" apply to normal day-to-day correspondence and communications. By operational language, it is meant that English must remain the language used where integrated forces operate together; it does not mean, however, that French cannot be the operational language for French-speaking formations or units when operating by themselves. This must be so in order to operate more efficiently and without any possible confusion arising from the use of both languages during an operation.<sup>93</sup>

This observation, which was not published, demonstrates that Allard's successor understood the time for loopholes was running out. For the moment, directive P3/70 of 27 February 1970 (see Chapter 9) stated, in paragraph 10, that the Canadian Forces will use English and French as languages of work, but English will continue to be the operational language.<sup>94</sup> At the same time, Cabinet decided to introduce French without translation progressively into its operations, and study the effects of this decision after three months. Minister Macdonald immediately reassured NDHQ that nothing would change for the present respecting documents to be submitted to Cabinet (which were in English). However, he remarked, the Department might in future receive documentation in French or English only, from Cabinet.<sup>95</sup>

While Cabinet was moving toward practical acceptance of French, the Department remained reluctant in the fall of 1970. We see in paragraph 10x of Annex C, which circulated in draft form among the Commands in September and October, that only the expression "language of work" is used. For their part, the commanders of Northern Region and Air Defence Command still claimed that under international agreements and according to the principle of standardization, English would remain the operational language of the Forces.<sup>96</sup> Chassé replied to this, in a restricted document, that everyone knew English was not the language of work at NATO.<sup>97</sup> However, many people were unaware of this fact, or ignored it. Elsewhere, Chassé went on to state that the Forces' interpretation of language of operations should be reviewed in light of what the Prime Minister had said about the use of both official languages.<sup>98</sup>

Unfortunately, this was not done, and the impression which emerges from message DIBP 25 (August 1969) was never corrected by a statement of the true bearing of the agreements binding Canada to use English only.

Fortunately, other voices were heard. Lieutenant-General Gilles Turcot, commenting on the draft of what was to become paragraph 10x of Annex C, wrote that this measure designed to make each HQ communicate with its FLUs in French was perhaps the most important in the plan. He entirely supported it, and did not want it altered or watered down.<sup>99</sup> Foreseeing difficulties in implementation, Turcot wanted French to be used on a fairly small scale at first; the plan would provide for its use to be extended gradually by teaching French to Anglophones and by translation.<sup>100</sup>


On this point, the draft and the final version of the plan remained unchanged. This allowed some people to continue to see only the “political” advantages of introducing French in the Canadian Forces, while English remained the operational language of NATO and NORAD.<sup>101</sup>

The plan was hardly released before the 9 March 1971 Treasury Board circular made bilingualism management objectives public. Among the eleven goals designed to enable bilingualism to be implemented in government agencies, three were closely linked to the use of French as a language of work: equal status of both official languages; an assurance that federal institutions could represent the linguistic and cultural values of both groups; and French as a language of work.

Despite the accumulated evidence that the government meant operations to be included in the term “language of work”, the military kept its guarded approach. On 1 September 1970, for example, Sharp wrote to the Chief of Personnel that in FLUs, the language of operations would be English, while non-operational communications would be usually, but not exclusively, in French.<sup>102</sup>

Then on 14 September, Treasury Board directive 1970-95 presented a communications matrix to be followed as closely as possible by FLUs. This diagram is very similar to that produced by the B and B Commission.

**LANGUAGES USED IN COMMUNICATIONS TO OR FROM  
EXPERIMENTAL FRENCH LANGUAGE UNITS ACCORDING TO  
TB DIRECTIVE 1970-95<sup>103</sup>**



As we see, there was no distinction between language of work and languages for operations.

The certainty that English only as language of operations was not the same as the language of work discussed by the government, was finally terminated by indirect action. CDS Sharp in February 1971, on the strength of the decision taken the previous December by the Defence Council, asked the Comptroller General to divide the Canadian Forces into two types of units: FLUs and ELUs. On 26 April, Pollard wrote to Dextraze that this was impossible: because some units supported others, they could not fit into either of these two categories, which would use only one of the national languages. CFB Saint-Jean, for example, provided services to the Language School, and had to do so in the language of its public. Creating a third category was suggested, a category of national units, to which Francophone and Anglophone quotas would be attached.<sup>104</sup>

At first Fournier opposed this idea. In his view, the Prime Minister's June 1970 statement was clear: FLUs would work in French, but be able to serve the public in both languages.<sup>105</sup> On 17 May 1971, however, Fournier sent the assistant to the Chief of Personnel a memorandum objecting to having experimental FLUs at the various headquarters because they would impede lateral communications with ELUs. According to the acting DGBB, each HQ should practise institutional bilingualism so that it could receive communications from FLUs and reply to them in French.<sup>106</sup> In other words, bilingual units were considered necessary. In June, members of the DGBB and the Directorate Organization discussed the questions and propounded a solution. The program adopted in 1972 would have three types of units: in addition to FLUs and ELUs there would be national units (NUs) which would, as a general rule, comprise the various headquarters and "unique" or highly specialized units, with small staffs which did not lend themselves to expansion. On the other hand, bases such as Montreal or Saint-Jean located in Francophone areas which did nearly all their work in French would be included among FLUs in future.

This consideration of communications led Fournier back to several documents. On 31 May, he observed that Trudeau on 23 June 1970 and Treasury Board on the following 14 September had said outright that French would be the language of work in FLUs. Yet since 1968, all messages and directives issued by NDHQ regarding B and B had maintained that the operational language of the Forces would be English. The February 1971 plan discussed language of work and contained nothing about operational language. According to Fournier, after consulting with the Secretary of State Department, the language of work referred to in government documents included operational language, technical language and language of routine communications. In short, the Canadian Forces were not in step with the government's intentions. Fournier wanted a study of the use of French as a language of operations for French-speaking units, bases and formations.<sup>107</sup> Moreover, he took steps to prepare a Canadian Forces Administrative Order (CFAO) on the subject, which he wanted to be flexible enough to enable French to play a role at the operational level.<sup>108</sup>

Before the study was completed, a draft CFAO was written and began to circulate at NDHQ. This was in October 1971. It had a long way to go before being published four years later. In anticipation of a question that might be asked about this during the 1973 information tour, an answer was prepared to the effect that French information tour, an answer was prepared to the effect that French would be encouraged as an operational language within each FLU and between an FLU and an ELU when they worked together, on condition that bilingual staff were available and the commander of the operation

thought the communications problems liable to arise from the use of French could be resolved. The reply ended with an admission that what had just been said was not approved policy.<sup>109</sup> In August 1974, the CDS of the day, Dextraze, accepted the tenor of this CFAO. In view of the abortive attempt in 1969 to make English the language of command (Volume I, p 235), we can understand that his acceptance was somewhat reluctant, as Letellier implies.<sup>110</sup>

The draft order as written [CFAO 2-15, of 1975] affirmed that English and French were the operational languages of the Armed Forces, though it stipulated that English would remain the major language of operations, and French would be relegated to the FLUs and to other exceptional situations. However, I felt that this was a possible and acceptable compromise in these circumstances.<sup>111</sup>

Letellier's opinion was definitely not shared by the Commissioner of Official Languages who, in 1977, stated that CFAO 2-15 was directly contrary to the Official Languages Act because it restricted the use of French to certain circumstances. Keith Spicer went on to cite the many sections of the CFAO which violate the law, including the following paragraphs:

To ensure the effectiveness of communications, military operations will normally be conducted in English by successive levels of command above unit level.

For the purposes of this section, "operations" refers to any military action or mission, whether strategic, tactical, service, training or administrative, and to the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defence and manoeuvres needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign. An operation is, therefore, the process of carrying out a military activity within the military environment that requires a unity of direction and action of all elements and resources employed towards the achievement of the given aim. This process employs the organization procedures and methods of communicating and of exercising command and control developed by, and unique to the military.<sup>112</sup>

The Commissioner added that the military had concluded that everything in the Forces was operational. The rationale of security and effectiveness cited to his investigators in order to justify this situation were unacceptable. Military effectiveness would be judged by unilingual Anglophones who would define it to suit themselves. We see in these latest comments that Spicer attached much greater importance to this CFAO than it actually had between 1975 and 1977. It was not interpreted in hindsight, but was written instead from an inflexible viewpoint in such a way as to make large areas of the law



completely inoperative. Understanding and deduction had preceded the CFAO, not vice versa.

Spicer pointed out that paragraphs 12 and 13 of CFAO 2-15 allowed local or regional directives regarding the use of French in air communications. To summarize them, he wrote, French could be used if no Anglophone was listening. English was so firmly established and the place of French so restricted that in October 1976, everything relating to a visit by 433<sup>e</sup> Escadron to a twin unit in France was done in English (orders, authorization and flight plan, for example). What, then, was an FLU in DND, Spicer asked, after citing this case and also the very sad case of the HMCS *Skeena*, which replaced HMCS *Ottawa* as an FLU?

The Commissioner wrote at a time when controversy surrounding the use of French in the air was raging among civilians. If the military had demonstrated some openness of mind as regards the language of aviation over the years, he stated, the current problems affecting civil aviation would not be what they are.<sup>113</sup>

In brief, the Department's senior officials, including the CDS in 1975 and his language advisor, did nothing more than place the Department outside the law. Letellier, as we have seen, was discouraged after the 1977 report, but Spicer and his investigators must have been equally so.

Since then, CFAO 2-15 has been amended several times. In 1987, it included a set of definitions which, among other things, gave a modern flavour to those in the glossary at the beginning of Volume I, which were taken from the 1980 (Military) Official Languages Plan (MOLP). It then reviewed the essential content of the Official Languages Act and its area of application, which extended, for example, to cadet corps and agencies providing services on behalf of the Department. Later it outlined the three main objectives of the 1980 revised plan. The second is of particular interest to us: "to provide to the maximum extent possible the opportunity for CF personnel to have a career and to work in the official language of their choice".<sup>114</sup>

The 1980 MOLP adds' a communications matrix not contained in the CFAO. We have decided to reproduce it with slight amendments to reflect Reserve units, since it represents the ideal, theoretical pattern which should be followed by all oral and written communications in the Forces.

**DND COMMUNICATIONS MATRIX  
ADDRESSEE**

ORIGINATOR		ELU/ERU		FLU/FRU		NA/BRU	
		UNIT	SUPERIOR FORM/GP HQ	UNIT	SUPERIOR FORM/GP HQ	UNIT	SUPERIOR FORM/GP HQ
ELU/ERU	UNIT	E	E	E F	E	E F	E
	SUPERIOR FORM/GP HQ	E	E	F or B	E/F or B	E F	E/F or B
FLU/FRU	UNIT	F E	F	F	F	F E	F
	SUPERIOR FORM/GP HQ	E or B	F/E or B	E F	F	F E	F/E or B
NA/BRU		E	E or F	F	E F	E F	E F
		E or B	E or B	F or B	F or B	E/F or B	E/F or B

Legend:

E — English  
 F — French  
 E/F — English or French  
 F/E — French or English  
 B — bilingual

(Reserve)

ERU — English regional unit  
 BRU — bilingual regional unit  
 FRU — French regional unit  
 SUPERIOR FORM/GP HQ — superior formation/group/headquarters

General G.C.E. Thériault, CMM, CD, became Chief of the Defence Staff in 1983, and left that position in 1986. He was the first French-Canadian airman to hold the position. (UPFC/REP 80-84)



Brigadier-General D.J. Gagnon, CD. On 1 May 1973, he became the first French-Canadian airman to attain the rank of Brigadier-General in the Canadian Armed Forces. (UPFC/REP 74-119)

The 1980 MOLP added notes to this diagram which modified its real scope. Thus while a unit's language of work had primacy,

consideration should sometimes be given to the efficiency of "horizontal" or "lateral" communications between units, eg, an ELU communicating with an FLU may wish to reduce response time by sending a French or bilingual copy; this practice would result in a reduction of the translation load. In every case, units should make maximum use of their indigenous bilingual personnel.

Two types of situations would lead to a short-term deviation from the communications matrix:

Circumstances may arise when immediacy or emergency will have to temporarily override the communications matrix. The commander on the spot will exercise judgement in these cases. An example of this type of exception would be the need for immediate action to prevent loss of life or to avoid a serious accident. As more functionally bilingual Service personnel are trained, the frequency of this type of deviation from the matrix will diminish.

... until the CF can recruit or train sufficient numbers of fluently bilingual Anglophones and Francophones to permit bilingual nets which neither degrade operational efficiency nor produce dangerous situations in both peace and war, military operations will have to be treated as a partial exception to the communications matrix.<sup>115</sup>

Added to this qualification on language of communications was the operational language factor. While CFAO 2-15 accepted that French was an operational language, great care was taken to restrict its place in legally acceptable terms. Paragraphs 27 and 28 state:

*Operational Language.* English and French are both operational languages of the CF.

- a. Participation of Foreign and Canadian Units. The senior operational commander is to ensure that the question of language is resolved in the planning phase if not already established by international agreement.
- b. Participation of Units of Different Languages of Work. The language of operation will be the language of the majority. In exceptional circumstances the senior operational commander can dictate otherwise.

- c. When non-homogeneous operational groups are formed, the language of work of each unit or formation remains its normal language of work at unit level or formation level.
- d. Units in Support. A unit or section called to support another must be able to support that unit in its language of work.
- e. Liaison. A unit or section must be able to effect liaison with other units in their language of work.

Air Communications. Either official language may be used for:

- a. inter-communication between aircraft during a particular mission, but only if all aircraft captains and crews are capable of communicating in that language; and
- b. inter-communication between aircraft and surface stations but only if all concerned are capable of communicating in that language.<sup>116</sup>

In short, the Canadian Forces maintained a distinction between language of work and operational language, but were compelled to allow that the latter could be French.

What place does French actually occupy in the Canadian Forces? We shall attempt to answer that question now.

It was agreed right from 1968 that French would be used within FLUs. But what would be the quality of that French in most of the units at that time, which consisted mainly of Francophone military personnel who had worked almost entirely in English for years and had often used English even at home? The question of the standard of French was not new in the Forces. Major Ernest Légaré had mentioned it in the late 1920s.<sup>117</sup> In 1967, Ross recognized that there was a problem and suggested offering French refresher courses to “Anglicized” Francophones who were being asked to revert to speaking French (Volume I, p 368, recommendation 18).

On this basis, Letellier had one of his French-speaking officers at the B and B Secretariat study the question in February 1969 with a view to preparing a circular to be signed by the CDS. He wrote that Francophones had to grasp the importance of improving their French and overcome their inferiority complex regarding French<sup>118</sup> and their skill in it. Letellier wanted Captain Pierre Dupuis to work up a few ideas quickly so that a campaign along these lines could begin as soon as the FLUs were approved and the new glossary published. At the beginning of March, a draft plan was ready. It was

never followed up, however, even though another attempt was made in June.<sup>119</sup> The basic document containing the guiding principles of a bilingualism plan submitted on 16 April 1968, included French courses as one of the activities that would need preserving. In June, CDS Allard sent a letter to Deputy Minister Armstrong stating that, while the government had views about teaching a second language, it had still identified nothing on the upgrading of native-speakers' French, which was one thing the Forces needed. Before pursuing the matter, however, he wished to learn the views of the Cabinet special secretariat, which apparently was also concerned about this problem.<sup>120</sup>

Armstrong forwarded the CDS's message to J.S. Hodgson on 20 June, stressing even more strongly than Allard the role played to date by English in Francophones' careers. He then made several proposals in the form of questions. For example, should upgrading courses be tailored to demand? Or should officers simply be sent to university? In short, the DND would like to do something but only after receiving advice from Hodgson's group as to the best approach.<sup>121</sup>

On 26 June, J.S. Hodgson, Director of special secretariat on bilingualism, sent an acknowledgment recognizing the extent of the problem, a problem well known in the civilian sector as well. He hoped to be able to respond more fully before long.<sup>122</sup> However, Departmental files did not record further discussions of this topic. Letellier left the Forces in July 1968. Moreover, at this time the Forces were moving quickly to set up FLUs, while nothing comparable was yet to be seen in the Public Service. And the B and B Commission had not yet tabled its Report. All these may have been reasons why the subject was less urgent outside the Forces than inside.

However that may be, the problem remained. Letellier mentioned efforts by Colonel Marcel Richard to promote the use of French at CFB Valcartier<sup>123</sup> — in particular, by heavily emphasizing the correctness of French. The CDS in Ottawa wrote a long internal memorandum in March 1969 stressing correct French. He found it unacceptable that documents containing French which circulated at NDHQ were full of all types of errors. They were liable to undo the Forces' good reputation on the B and B front. Nothing went unnoticed by the public's keen eye, Allard maintained, and it would be unfortunate if his organization, which was at the forefront of B and B, was the target of criticism it could easily have avoided.<sup>124</sup>

All these initiatives never led to a serious plan. In 1972 and 1973, people with a very good command of French as well as English were hired in Ottawa for duties which included acting as a "stimulus... to help assimilated

francophones to recognize their linguistic shortcomings, and help them to work in French.<sup>125</sup> Mobile Command HQ was given the same service. The aim was to make French a language of work in Ottawa and Saint-Hubert. According to Letellier, it was a total failure in Ottawa but a partial success at Saint-Hubert.<sup>126</sup>

From this we must conclude that upgrading Francophones' French had to be done on the job, however imperfect a process this was bound to be. It was not because Letellier did not understand the problem. Indeed, he chose to spend his first year of retirement from military life, 1968-69, living and studying in France at his own expense in order to steep himself in his own language again. Note that, in February 1988, a proposal was made to the Executive Committee on Official Languages that a French administrative writing course be offered at NDHQ. The reasons cited were the same as in 1968.<sup>127</sup>

Today, while the quality of French remains a problem, the root of the evil is somewhat different. Most commonly, a young Francophone officer of the 1980s has been educated in French (to high school graduation or university) and then taken his first military courses in French. If he is in the land army, he will even have spent his first years of service in French. The struggle now is no longer to induce anglicized Francophones to speak French again but, very often, to compensate for shortcomings, mainly in written French. To this end, several initiatives are now in progress in FLUs. This is done at random, however, as Commands see fit, and some are more aware of the problem than others.

Now let us turn to another aspect of the question of the real place of French as a language of work.

We cannot conceal that there was some degree of scepticism in the military when the FLU communications matrix produced by the government was released in the summer of 1970. Following an information session offered by the FLU Services, established by Treasury Board to help departments engaging in the exercise, Colonel Hanna concluded a report with the observation that the entire FLU system rested on the assumption that Francophones wanted to work in French. There were many signs, or so a number of people believed, that this was not then the case among the old guard, and in 1973, discussions during visits to bases showed that feelings were sometimes strong on this subject among acculturated Francophones.<sup>128</sup> A second negative factor at the time of the experiment was a certain disbelief, even in the offices of the DGBB, that it would be possible to use nothing but French in experimental FLUs, especially those in Ottawa and Saint-Hubert.<sup>129</sup>

Added to these conditions was a third important factor, revealed to its full extent in the answers given by commanders of FLUB to the control questionnaires drawn up by the FLU Services. Between 31 July 1971 and 22 November 1972, three of these questionnaires were used by the FLU Services at Treasury Board to determine how the experiment was progressing. The first of them was designed to cover the period 31 July to 20 November 1971 and was sent to FLUs in the Department in December 1971.<sup>130</sup> By the time the results came back to Ottawa and were compiled, it was February 1972. Those results showed that, except for *Musique du R22<sup>e</sup>R* and the Combat Arms School Detachment, each FLU contained a number of unilingual Anglophones. This was the finding which raised again, let us recall, the issue of priorities for posting Francophones which we studied earlier. For our present concerns, let us ask the question: in these circumstances, how could French be used as the only language of work in a given FLU?

Table 13  
**CHANGE IN THE NUMBER OF UNILINGUAL ANGLOPHONES  
 IN FLUs (31 JULY 1971 to 1 APRIL 1973)<sup>131</sup>**

UNIT	1 <sup>st</sup> FLU Service questionnaire (31 July to 22 November 1972)	3 <sup>rd</sup> and last FLU Service questionnaire (24 May to 22 November 1972)	Computer report 1 April 1973
Ottawa	54 (23%)		30 (16.1%)
12 <sup>e</sup> RBC	53 (10.9%)	45 (9.5%)	39 (8.8%)
5 <sup>e</sup> EG du C	53 (12%)	65 (27.9%)	53 (22.7%)
1 CDO	33 (20%)	No reply received	21 (10.4%)
5 <sup>e</sup> Bn S du C	47 (13.9%)	31 (2.6%)	32 (4.7%)
5 <sup>e</sup> RALC	34 (10%)	37 (12.4%)	31 (20.6%)
QG et 5 <sup>e</sup> G de C	26 (13%)	12 (5.9%)	15 (7.5%)
433 <sup>e</sup> ETAC	19 (8.6%)	15 (7.2%)	15 (7.3%)
5 <sup>e</sup> UMGC	10 (13%)	2 (2.6%)	5 (7.2%)
1 R22 <sup>e</sup> R	10 (1.7%)	7 (1.2%)	14 (2.4%)
Office of the Commander and Administrative Services CFB Bagotville	10 (6%)	8 (4.6%)	—
Chief of Staff and Administrative Services Mobile Command HQ	10 (23%)	7 (16.2%)	—
2 R22 <sup>e</sup> R	4 (0.5%)	5 (0.7%)	6 (0.9%)
DRS	4 (25%)	2 (14.2%)	—
3 R22 <sup>e</sup> R	2(0.3%)	4(0.6%)	10 (1.5%)
Det EAC (Valcartier)	0	0	0
M/R22 <sup>e</sup> R	0	0	3 (6%)
CFB Valcartier	0	5 (3.5%)	3 (3.5%)



Table 14

**NUMBER OF ANGLOPHONES WHO HAD FAILED OR NOT  
TAKEN A FRENCH TEST WHILE SERVING IN AN FLU AS OF  
OCTOBER 1987**

	NUMBER OF ANGLOPHONES			NUMBER ON STRENGTH IN THE UNIT (E + F)
	TOTAL	FAILED	UNTESTED	
* CFB Valcartier	12	0	1	245
CFB Montreal	72	1	11	521
* EAC Valcartier	1	—	1	55
* 1 <sup>er</sup> Cdo	3	1	1	161
* 5 <sup>e</sup> RALC	48	5	10	590
* 5 <sup>e</sup> RG du C	38	2	20	290
* 2 <sup>e</sup> R22 <sup>e</sup> R	12	—	5	597
* 3 <sup>e</sup> R22 <sup>e</sup> R	11	—	5	596
15 <sup>e</sup> Unité dentaire (Bagotville)	4	1	1	7
Dét 15 <sup>e</sup> Unité dentaire (St-Jean)	6	—	4	12
* 5 <sup>e</sup> Ambulance de campagne	26	—	2	178
* 5 <sup>e</sup> Bataillon de Service	44	—	13	765
* 12 <sup>e</sup> RBC	33	—	4	466
* QG et Escadron de Transmission, 5 <sup>e</sup> GB	13	—	1	276
CFB Bagotville	116	4	18	743
425 <sup>e</sup> EAT	41	5	12	197
Fighter Group Headquarters, Air Control System, Montreal	1	—	1	2
* 433 <sup>e</sup> EAT	20	1	7	198
CFS Chibougamau	4	—	1	102
CFS Mont Apica	10	1	—	127
CFS Senneterre	10	1	2	104
CFS Moisie	11	2	3	128
* Skeena (replaced the <i>Ottawa</i> )	50	7	20	227
<i>Algonquin</i>	86	17	36	243
715 <sup>e</sup> Esc des transmissions (St- Hubert)	2	2	—	59

- NB: 1. Units marked\* existed between 1971 and 1973, when the surveys shown in Table 13 were conducted.
2. Some names have changed between Table 13 and Table 14. Det EAC (Valcartier) became EAC Valcartier, 5<sup>e</sup> EG du C= 5<sup>e</sup> RG de C, 5<sup>e</sup> UMGC= 5<sup>e</sup> Ambulance de Campagne, 433<sup>e</sup> ETAC= 433<sup>e</sup> EAT.

We see from Table 13 that as of 1 April 1973, or about five months after

We see from Table 13 that as of 1 April 1973, or about five months after the end of the experiment conducted by Treasury Board, the percentage of unilingual Anglophones still persisted in most FLUs, despite attempts to remedy the situation. Fourteen years later (Table 14), however, a distinct improvement could be seen. As of 21 October 1987, among the 9,005 positions in FLUs, 776 Anglophones were distributed through all units. Fifty-one of these, all non-commissioned officers, had failed a French test, and we can expect that most of these were unilingual Anglophones. As for the 187 who were not tested, we can only make suppositions. Some would certainly fail the test. To judge, however, from the fact that many bilingual Francophones refused to waste their time on testing, it is plausible that many of the untested Anglophones, especially those serving in the Valcartier units, were competent in their second language. The only doubtful cases were in the two naval units, especially the more recent, the *Algonquin*.

In a message of November 1971, the DGBB asked units a series of questions to discover how far the implementation of bilingualism had progressed. It wanted to know, for example, how much French was used as a language of work in FLUs.<sup>132</sup> The answer to this question finally came, thanks to the first FLU Services questionnaire. Its disquieting results — which several persons had prosaically expected — were elaborated upon some time later. Familiarization visits to several FLUs by teams comprising members of the Treasury Board FLU Services and the DGBB began in February 1972. The first message conveyed clearly by the hosts was that they had never received precise directives from NDHQ regarding the use of French. What they did receive had been prepared by Treasury Board, with a request that it be used on an experimental basis. Thus they had nothing official, as Brigadier-General Marcel Richard, for example, said to his visitors on 21 February 1972. This was repeated on subsequent days in Valcartier, at Maritime Command, in Halifax and aboard the *Ottawa*<sup>133</sup> On the strength of these reports, Headquarters felt obliged to refer back to the communications matrix.

A long letter, drafted in the DGBB offices, went up the chain of command to be signed by Major-General D.C. Laubman, assistant to the Chief of Personnel, on 19 May 1972. It began by recalling the various government documents transmitted to all FLUs which explained what FLUs were, and that there was still no Administrative Order for communications. Laubman attached instead a communications matrix and some additional directives encouraging the use of French by FLUB. He acknowledged that some Commands, because of a lack of qualified personnel in their headquarters or support units, would have difficulty adhering to these principles. Laubman's suggestion was that each one ought to emphasize what was immediately

achievable. Greater use of French as a language of work must be encouraged in FLUs, even if this caused a few problems. The improvement of FLUB lay through continual support and encouragement. If personnel were unable to follow the directives, Laubman added, they ought to say why and make suggestions. The chiefs of Commands who received this document were asked to verify bilingual resource requirements in sectors directly connected with FLUs. An analysis of the documents supplied would enable NDHQ to set better posting priorities. Lastly, initial addressees were asked to forward the letter to FLUs with appropriate comments.

The communications matrix was patterned after the one provided by Treasury Board, but adapted to the military. In brief, all communications were to be in French within the unit; in the language of the public when the FLU communicated with the public; and in French when the FLU wrote to other units in the Department or to the Public Service. FLUB would receive communications in French or English, depending on who sent them. As for oral communications with DND or Public Service units, they would be in French “whenever possible”.<sup>134</sup>

After May 1972, no one could plead the lack of a directive. This one was followed by Treasury Board approval of the B and B plan the following September, the 1973 information tour, the presence of Command and base coordinators, CFAO 2-15, the 1980 MOLP and more. But did this settle the question? We think not.

In October 1973, a report on training Francophones in naval trades focussed on the extent to which French was used on the *Skeena*, the vessel which replaced the *Ottawa* as an FLU in the fall of 1973. Apparently the language used on board was “franglais”, except on the bridge and in the operations room, where English was used outright and recognized as the operational language. Investigators were told that English was the operational language of NATO [sic]; communications with other naval and air force units, which were all ELUs, were in English; technical publications were not available in French; and many naval terms and code words were not translatable or, if they were translated, much time and part of the meaning would be lost. Furthermore, there were unilingual Anglophones on board. Accordingly, French was used where there was no risk of misunderstanding. After reviewing these reasons, the writer of the report noted that all those questioned told him that French could be used more.<sup>135</sup> Was it really necessary to use English everywhere if, in the course of operations, thirty people at most had to communicate with other units? The document submitted by Commander Pierre Simard in 1970, cited above, foreshadowed the situation

we have just described. The naval FLU was considered bilingual by its first commander. This perception was passed on to his successor, Commander Neil Boivin, who spoke French less fluently than Simard but still did not increase the use of English on board, keeping more or less to the status quo.<sup>136</sup>

A memorandum of 30 March 1972 from the Deputy Minister, Sylvain Cloutier, to the Minister, Edgar Benson, regarding the 90:10 ratio in FLUs noted that the primary objective of these units was to create conditions of service which would enable Francophones to work in their own language and socio-cultural environment. This would achieve some degree of equality in the conditions of service of Francophones as compared to their Anglophone fellow-countrymen. While encouraging bilingualism by posting Anglophones to such units was a necessary and desirable objective, it was not the primary consideration for FLUs. What made the 90:10 ratio in FLUs reasonable was the attempt made to introduce so many values different from those of the existing system.

In September 1971, Cloutier recalled, General Allard wrote to the Minister, Donald Macdonald, about his fear that too many Anglophones would enter FLUs. He thought this would bring the Forces back to where they had been every time an effort was made to establish FLUs before 1967-68. Allard also noted the tendency to consider FLUs to be bilingual units, a mistake which needed to be corrected, in his view. They should not become language, schools for young Anglophone officers.

On these grounds, Cloutier argued in March 1972 that the 90:10 ratio included in the plan since fall 1971 should be maintained. If French later became a real language of work, the proportion of Anglophones in FLUs could gradually rise above the 10 percent limit.<sup>137</sup> This argument was accepted as it stood.

What happened to these opinions expressed in 1971-72? First, representations were made so that the 90 percent Francophones figure was decreased in FLUs in Quebec, which meant that the percentage and number of Anglophones increased. The Commissioner of Official Languages, Max Yalden, advocated this in July 1979. His reasons were simple. Many Francophone officers complained about being confined to Quebec, which naturally had the greatest need for French-speaking military personnel. To counteract this, more bilingual Anglophones had to be produced, either by giving them language training or by sending them to Valcartier, where French was so strong that unilingual Anglophones learned the other language just as Francophones had had to do in the past. In any case, more graduates of language courses had to be allowed to serve in French, and the FLUs at

Valcartier were well suited to that, according to Yalden.<sup>138</sup> This was consistent with the revised plan, which had been submitted to Treasury Board in draft form, in April 1979. The 1980 Official Languages Plan (Military) did in fact contain this change: FLUs in Quebec could have an 80:20 ratio, while FLUs outside Quebec remained at 90:10.

Where had this change led by 1987? We may suppose that many untested Anglophones in FLUB in Quebec (Table 14) were still in the process of acquiring their second language. In any event, it is highly unlikely that they posed a threat to the language system of FLUs. This said, FLUs in Quebec did not comply very closely with the 80:20 ratio. A June 1987 count shows that a large majority of FLUB in Quebec had 90 percent or more Francophones, six had between 85 and 90 percent and four had between 80 and 85 percent. Under the 80 percent mark were the Bagotville detachment of the 15 Dental Unit (three of its military strength of eight), *425<sup>e</sup> Escadron d'appui tactique* (74 percent, but it had only been an FLU since 1985), the detachment of 711 Communications Squadron at CFS Mont Apica (two of its total military strength of three) and the CFB Saint-Jean detachment of 715 Communications Squadron (three of four members). Thus the objective was very far from being met, especially when we consider that the larger units (*5<sup>e</sup> Bn S du C*, *2 R22<sup>e</sup>R*, *3 R22<sup>e</sup>R*, *5<sup>e</sup> RALC*, *12<sup>e</sup> RBC*, CFB Valcartier, *5<sup>e</sup> GBC* HQ and transmissions squadron and so forth) all had over 90 percent Francophones. What took root after 1968 on the Francophone side seems as hard to destroy as what had existed before that time.

Table 15

**PERCENTAGE OF ANGLOPHONE OFFICERS  
IN FLUs AT 5<sup>e</sup> GBC**

UNIT	PERCENTAGE OF ANGLOPHONE OFFICERS
5 <sup>e</sup> RALC	35.5%
12 <sup>e</sup> RBC	21.1%
5 <sup>e</sup> RGC	16.6%
QGET	10.3%
2R22 <sup>e</sup> R	4.8%
3R22 <sup>e</sup> R	5.1%
5 <sup>e</sup> Bn S du C	4.3%
5 <sup>e</sup> Amb de C	0.0%
5 <sup>e</sup> PPM	0.0%

Table 16

**PERCENTAGE OF ANGLOPHONE OTHER RANKS  
IN FLUs AT 5<sup>e</sup> GBC<sup>139</sup>**

UNIT	PERCENTAGE OF ANGLOPHONE OTHER RANKS
5 <sup>e</sup> RALC	13.0%
12 <sup>e</sup> RBC	5.0%
5 <sup>e</sup> RGC	9.6%
QGET	3.2%
2R22 <sup>e</sup> R	2.1%
3R22 <sup>e</sup> R	1.2%
5 <sup>e</sup> Bn S du C	2.7%
5 <sup>e</sup> Amb de C	8.6%
5 <sup>e</sup> PPM	6.0%

Although this situation was healthy for Francophones on the whole, there were still some disturbing facts. According to a very thorough study carried out at Valcartier in 1984-85, some FLUs which had well under the allowed 20 percent Anglophones had undue numbers of Anglophone officers.

We find that in January 1985, 35.5 percent of officers in 5<sup>e</sup> RALC and 21.1 percent of those in 12<sup>e</sup> RBC were Anglophones. The overall percentages of Anglophones in these units at the time were 14 and 6.4 respectively. Two FLUs in 5<sup>e</sup> GBC had a greater percentage of Anglophones among other ranks than the percentage of Anglophone officers (5<sup>e</sup> Amb de C and 5<sup>e</sup> PPM). In all other units of 5<sup>e</sup> GBC, Francophones were under-represented in the officer corps, and this had reached endemic proportions in 12<sup>e</sup> RBC and 5<sup>e</sup> RALC.

Thus FLUs looked very different in 1985 from the way they had first been intended to be. Broadly speaking, a very high percentage of Francophones were under the command of Anglophones. General Allard had warned against this in 1971. A former Armoured member, Allard had transferred to the infantry during the war under circumstances he recounts in his *Memoirs*.<sup>140</sup> After leaving the Forces, he still kept a close eye on the operation of the FLUs he had established and which he had intended to be rather like the *Royal 22<sup>e</sup> Régiment*. Hence his letter of 1971 and some of his comments published in 1985, which tie in precisely with the study at Valcartier. Allard pointed out that 12<sup>e</sup> RBC has not had a Francophone commander for over ten years.<sup>141</sup> The unit seemed to have become a place where an Anglophone Armoured officer went for a certificate of competence in French before moving on to higher positions. Where could one expect Francophone in the Armoured Corps to take their experience as commanding officers? And had the situation described in 1985 progressed by 1987?

Table 17\*

UNIT	PERCENTAGE OF ANGLOPHONE OFFICERS
5 <sup>e</sup> RALC	22.2%
12 <sup>e</sup> RBC	26.19%
5 <sup>e</sup> RGC	0.0%
QGET	12.5%
2R22 <sup>e</sup> R	9.9%
3R22 <sup>e</sup> R	0.0%
5 <sup>e</sup> Bn S du C	10.0%
5 <sup>e</sup> Amb de C	0.0%
5 <sup>e</sup> PPM	50.0%

\* According to a computer report requested by the authors in summer 1987.

It appears, therefore, that the 1985 finding had already had a strong positive impact on 5<sup>e</sup> RALC, 5<sup>e</sup> RGC and 3<sup>e</sup> R22<sup>e</sup>R. Elsewhere, percentages were up, but not to allowable 20 percent. The exception is 5<sup>e</sup> PPM, which is a special case because it had only two officers — hence the abrupt change in percentage. A serious concern persists, however, as to the support in the Armoured Corps for keeping 12<sup>e</sup> RBC an FLU.

On the basis of these findings, the first of which date back to 1971, as we have seen, we can qualify the judgement of historian Jean-Yves Gravel on 12<sup>e</sup> RBC. In his 1981 history of the unit, Gravel wrote that the first commander of this FLU, Lieutenant-Colonel R. Larose, had chosen to build a French 12<sup>e</sup> RBC which would “gradually acquire technical skill. Events were to prove him right.”<sup>142</sup> Undoubtedly, 12<sup>e</sup> RBC introduced the use of French in its transmissions faster than 5<sup>e</sup> RALC. However, to claim on these grounds that 12<sup>e</sup> RBC was a real FLU in 1971, when 10.9 percent of its strength consisted of unilingual Anglophones, or in 1973, when 8.8 percent of its strength could not speak French, is to fabricate a legend which anyone familiar with military operations cannot support. For over ten years, this FLU had an under-representation of Francophone commanding officers, and in 1987 it had one Anglophone officer for every 32.8 Francophone in order ranks. At 5<sup>e</sup> RALC, this ratio was one in 40.5.

The 1985 study of FLUs in 5<sup>e</sup> GBC found that in Flus where the percentage of Anglophone officers was over ten, the percentage of oral communications in English within the unit was also over ten.

Table 18<sup>143</sup>

FLUs WITH OVER 10% ANGLOPHONE OFFICERS	PERCENTAGE OF ANGLOPHONE OFFICERS	PERCENTAGE OF ORAL COMMUNICATIONS IN ENGLISH
HQ and 5 <sup>e</sup> GBC	10.3%	17.2%
5 <sup>e</sup> RALC	35.5%	12.3%
12 <sup>e</sup> RBC	21.1%	21.5%
5 <sup>e</sup> RGC	16.6%	32.9%

Again, 12<sup>e</sup> RBC ranked lower than 5<sup>e</sup> RALC.



The study also showed that at Valcartier, where French was most firmly established in military operational units, the communications matrix was not closely followed, especially in all types of written communications from Mobile Command HQ in Saint-Hubert and NDHQ in Ottawa. Very clearly, in this Francophone bastion, French did not occupy its rightful place and much of the blame belonged to NDHQ, even though it devised and agreed to a set of B and B plans and programs. During the study period in the fall of 1984, for example, 79.3 percent of texts (other than messages) received from Ottawa by FLUs in 5<sup>e</sup> GBC were in English only. The proportion was 92.2 percent for messages.<sup>144</sup>

FLUs, on the other hand, followed the matrix fairly closely, to judge by the table that follows. It gives data gathered over a six-week period in September and October 1984 for part of the correspondence sent to HQs in Saint-Hubert and Ottawa.

Table 19

**OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE  
(NOT INCLUDING MESSAGES)<sup>145</sup>**

UNITS	FMC HQ PLUS NDHQ			FMC HQ			NDHQ		
	BIL	F	E	BIL	F	E	BIL	F	E
HQ and 5 <sup>e</sup> GBC		100%			100%			100%	
5 <sup>e</sup> RALC		97.8%	2.2%	(N/A)	(N/A)	(N/A)		50%	50%
12 <sup>e</sup> RBC		91.1%	8.9%			100%			100%
5 <sup>e</sup> RGC		100%			100%			100%	
2R22 <sup>e</sup> R	1.1%	96%	4 %		100%		16.6%	83.4%	16.6
3R22 <sup>e</sup> R		98.9%						83.4%	%
5 <sup>e</sup> Bu S du C		98.2%	1.8%		100%			100%	
5 <sup>e</sup> Amb de C		86.6%	13.4		100%				
5 <sup>e</sup> PPM		100%	%		(N/A)	(N/A)		100%	100%

Again we see that 12<sup>e</sup> RBC does not rank very high in this regard, coming barely ahead of the lowest-ranking unit, 5<sup>e</sup> Amb de C.

Table 20

**MILITARY MESSAGES SENT TO NDHQ AND MOBILE  
COMMAND HQ (FMC HQ) BY 5<sup>e</sup> GBC UNITS<sup>146</sup>**

FMC HQ			UNITS	NDHQ		
BIL	F	E		BIL	F	E
	90%	10%	5 <sup>e</sup> RALC		75%	25%
	75 %	25%	12 <sup>e</sup> RBC		68.1%	39.9 %
	50 %	50%	5 <sup>e</sup> RGC		80%	20%
	75 %	25 %	QGET/5 <sup>e</sup> GBC		14.3%	85.7%
	66.6%	33.4 %	2R22 <sup>e</sup> R		3%	97%
	75 %	25 %	3R22 <sup>e</sup> R		22.7%	77.3%
	75 %	25 %	5 <sup>e</sup> Bn S du C		9.6%	90.4%
	66.6%	33.4 %	5 <sup>e</sup> Amb de C			100%
	100%		5 <sup>e</sup> PPM		100%	
	76.5 %	23.4%	Number of messages		30.8 %	69.2 %
	59	18			62	139

In terms of messages sent, FLUs at 5<sup>e</sup> GBC deviated considerably from the communications matrix in the hope of expediting matters, the author of the report was informed.<sup>147</sup> FLUs at 5<sup>e</sup> GBC sent 76.6 percent of their messages to Mobile Command HQ in French, but a scant 30.8 percent to NDHQ.

All this confirms the conclusions of a Treasury Board audit report written by Micheline Babinski in September 1982, which, despite its title *Language of Work — Department of National Defence*, describes only the situation in Valcartier. The following are two of its conclusions:

At Valcartier, the language rights of the military personnel are generally met in terms of personal and central services, supervision, meetings and verbal and written communications when these activities originate within this FLU.

NDHQ, FMC HQ and Personnel Careers do not comply with the DND Communications Matrix and communicate verbally and in writing with Valcartier in English most of the time.<sup>148</sup>

FMC HQ became quite aggressive when the time came to comment on Babinski's draft. While calling it fair and objective, it criticized its tone for

implying that the land army was doing nothing in the area of B and B.<sup>149</sup> The author of this comment, Lieutenant-Colonel J.M.G. Ouimet, appeared reluctant to agree with what Babinski had written. Although much had been done, as Ouimet rightly pointed out, the fact is that a great deal remained to be done, as Babinski rightly reported. In 1983, Ouimet claimed that most of the correspondence sent out by his HQ to FLUs was in French or bilingual format.<sup>150</sup> However, the 1985 survey concluded that 64.1 percent of messages from Saint-Hubert and 47.4 percent of other written correspondence from the same HQ was in English only.<sup>151</sup>

One of the authors of this volume served at CFB Saint-Jean between 1975 and 1978 and can attest to a parallel between Saint-Jean, a Training Command base with its HQ in Trenton, and the Valcartier FLUs. Inside the base, which had not yet been declared an FLU, nearly everything was done in French, but as soon as communications were established with Trenton and Ottawa, the place of French shrank to something reminiscent of the findings at Valcartier. Elsewhere the situation was worse. At a May 1983 meeting of base co-ordinators of official languages, the representative of CFB Montreal, which became an FLU in 1982, said that there was still a need to operate largely in English on the base.<sup>152</sup>

Therefore, it is not surprising that in November 1981, the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on Official Languages asked DND representatives to appear and answer questions based on the reports of the Commissioner of Official Languages for 1978 to 1980 inclusive. The session was held in accordance with the criteria of the day. On the one side were representatives of the Department, led by the Deputy Minister, “Buzz” Nixon, who defended the DND’s record to the last breath against all comers. On the other side were Senator Guay and a group of MPs (notably Denis Dawson and Pierre Deniger), who failed conspicuously to be impressed, citing very specific cases (use of French in Saint-Hubert, in *202<sup>e</sup> Atelier de Longue-Pointe*, in Montreal and in RMC) to undercut the fine façade of the Department’s officials.<sup>153</sup>

At one point, Deniger asked “whether or not a unilingual francophone can serve his country in the armed forces in the same way that unilingual anglophones can...”<sup>154</sup> Nixon immediately began framing his answer around the case of a unilingual French master warrant officer in Valcartier, but Deniger interrupted him, “I must tell you that I am not impressed by this type of answer, Mr Nixon.”<sup>155</sup> Then Nixon resolved to impress the MP with the following: “Nowadays [in 1981] it is no easier for a unilingual anglophone to

move up in the Canadian Armed Forces than it is for a unilingual francophone.”<sup>156</sup>

This is a rather daring assertion, to say the least, and Lieutenant-General Thériault intervened to qualify its tenor, saying, “The positions which these unilingual francophones may occupy are necessarily limited by... the French language units. [It was especially difficult to advance in French only] ... in the air force and the navy”.<sup>157</sup>

There are no studies similar to the Valcartier audit for other FLUs, and hence none for the air force and the navy. Many indicators, including the above statement by Thériault and others to follow, have been encountered so far; they tend to show that the status of French was lower in those two elements than in the land force.

General Allard had noted in 1971 that FLUs ought not to turn into language schools. As of 1980, it was agreed that FLUs at Valcartier could serve as training grounds for small numbers of Anglophones wishing to embark on this adventure. Brigadier-General P. Addy, a former commander of 12<sup>e</sup> RBC who headed the brigade in 1987, made a strong plea for this in May 1983, while he was a colonel.<sup>158</sup> The 1985 study concluded that Anglophones transferred to FLUs in 5<sup>e</sup> GBC should be functionally bilingual before joining their units. According to an investigator, English spread rapidly as a language of work in any FLU which had unilingual Anglophones. There were even examples of young unilingual Anglophones who, after serving for months at Valcartier, were as unilingual as ever. In 5<sup>e</sup> Bn S du C, an experiment with four young Anglophone soldiers who had a limited knowledge of French proved disastrous. Tested once before they came to Valcartier and again after six months on the base, their command of French proved to have decreased.<sup>159</sup>

In 1978 it was clear in the navy that there had been positive results with recruiting Francophones but also that problems were resulting from that success. Since the only existing FLU could not absorb them all, Francophones were being scattered among the various units, where they sometimes made up a substantial percentage (over 10 percent) but were still very much in the minority. In October 1978, the Commander of Maritime Command suggested setting up another FLU which would siphon off Francophones and bilingual Anglophones. In his letter to Ottawa, Vice-Admiral A.L. Collier acknowledged all the benefits conferred by the first FLU. He explained that the next one could be a more modern vessel than the *Skeena*, the helicopter-carrying destroyer *Algonquin*. At first, its strength would be 50 to 55 percent

Francophone, and as much as possible of the rest of the crew would be bilingual Anglophones — which leads us to infer that there would be unilinguals among the latter. Little by little the percentage of Francophones would rise, on the *Algouquin*, according to Collier. In order for it to operate in French to its maximum capacity, the percentage of Francophones on the *Skeena* would eventually have to be allowed to drop (but not below 70 percent) and the number of Francophones on some other vessels where they held over 10 percent of positions would also have to decrease. Studies by the navy concluded that this new FLU was a good idea.<sup>160</sup> Lieutenant-General James C. Smith, ADM(Per), agreed to the proposal the following 6 December.<sup>161</sup> Added to this initiative by the navy was the transfer of the Naval Reserve to Québec in 1983, mentioned in Chapter 11. The Director of Naval Reserve in Quebec in 1983, Captain (N) D.E. Pollard, went as far as to say that the navy was even moving toward having a naval base in Quebec, which he called an “obvious necessity”.<sup>162</sup>

As regards FLUs outside Quebec, the 1980 revised plan maintained the original principle of 90:10, calling it the only way to enable Francophones to work in French while reducing the possibility of their cultural or linguistic assimilation.<sup>163</sup> At this time no serious consideration was given to the question of using an FLU as a language school, which the *Algouquin* would probably be according to Collier’s 1978 proposal. Indeed, this role had already been played by the *Skeena*.

In September 1975, Treasury Board issued a directive regarding the implementation of the second part of the resolution on languages passed by Parliament in June 1973.\* Thus a new concept came into being: units working in French (UWF), designed to enable officials in the National Capital Region to use mostly French. This means that in many but not all cases, French would be employed at a higher organizational level than FLUs. By increasing the number of duties in which French would be mainly used, the Department hoped to improve professional advancement opportunities for French. These UWFs would be a congenial environment for unilingual Francophones and would also enable bilingual Anglophones to use more French.

UWFs would comply with the Official Languages Act in their communications with the public. Within the units, work would be done in

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\* The first part of this resolution — the annotation and linguistic designation of positions — shall be covered in Chap. 14, for the military, and Chap. 15, for the civilians.

French unless service to a member of the unit was required in English. With regional offices outside Quebec, UWFs would communicate in English or both languages; with those in Quebec or with other UWFs, all communications would be in French. All experimental FLUs in the National Capital Region would be converted into UWFs.<sup>164</sup>

The directive announced a schedule for designating and setting up UWFs together with details of their place in organizational charts, which many people found unrealistic. Chapter 18 describes one case of resistance to this initiative. The rest of the story is told by Armand Letellier. After setting the project in motion despite enormous difficulties, Letellier realized that the government was backing off in the face of the wave of discontent which this concept had aroused among Anglophone officials, whose unions had rejected the very concept of UWF.<sup>165</sup> The UWF venture was stillborn. The turmoil surrounding the idea had attracted the attention of hundreds of people all over the government, distracting them from more essential objectives for months on end.

This episode may lead us to suspect that French as a language of work hardly extended even to Ottawa. With few exceptions, units at NDHQ operated in English. Hence the observations we have reported regarding unilingual English communications received from NDHQ by FLUB. Moreover, General Thériault told the Joint Committee in November 1981 that the Department's senior management work was mainly performed in English.<sup>166</sup> Two days earlier, the representative of the Commissioner of Official Languages attending the hearings criticized the Department for using French so seldom outside FLUs. He went on to ask what initiatives had been taken at the senior management level to promote French. Does an Anglophone Deputy Minister speak to his Francophone personnel in French?<sup>167</sup>

It is interesting to note that the *Official Languages Annual Plan 1983-84* included the following:

In August 1981, the Department took action to provide participants of NDHQ senior management committee meetings, conferences and seminars with agenda, minutes and other documentation in bilingual format. At the same time action was taken to advise participants of their right to speak in the official language of their choice at meetings and seminars. From that date, agenda and minutes of meetings with the Minister of National Defence, the Deputy Minister and the Chief of Defence Staff, Defence Council, Defence Management Committee meetings, CDS Operations Briefings, Armed Forces Council and Senior Management meetings have been published in both official languages.<sup>168</sup>

Several aspects of this paragraph were in fact acted upon immediately. Does this mean that French has since then become prominent as a language of work at NDHQ? The Commissioner, in his January 1987 special report, focused specifically on this question, accusing the Department, on the grounds of three well-founded cases we shall discuss in due course, of doing nothing to support French as a language of work.<sup>169</sup>

The DGOL, Guy Sullivan, who had helped the Department overcome a similar difficulty in the late 1970s, seemed ready to reuse a tactic which had succeeded earlier. In a presentation to the Ministers, Perrin Beatty and Paul Dick, on 17 February 1987, he set the reported deficiencies against a host of positive accomplishments and problems with no easy solution.<sup>170</sup>

In May, the Department faced the ordeal of appearing twice before committees of the House of Commons and the Senate. On 19 May, before the Standing Committee on National Defence, Lieutenant-General J. de Chastelain, Chief of Personnel, put forward measures indicating that new leadership would be exercised by the Department's senior management and would follow the line traced by Deputy Commissioner Gilles Lalande's questions six years earlier.<sup>171</sup>

In point of fact, the Director General of the Department's Executive Secretariat had produced an open letter in February 1987 stating that the use of French would be promoted by a number of measures, including the use of the language of the employee's choice in correspondence or in management committee presentations and discussions. At this stage, a more detailed directive was being drafted.<sup>172</sup> It led to several initiatives, among them holding the daily meeting of the Department's senior management in French once a week, on Thursdays, beginning 2 July 1987. These measures demonstrate fairly clearly that until 1987, apart from translations, French had barely been used as a language of work among the Department's senior officials, even though the best of intentions had been voiced in 1981.

Outside Ottawa, it was reported in May 1987, this aspect of the Department's official languages programs was progressing well. General P. Manson, CDS, declared that French was used in the air in Bagotville without causing safety problems.<sup>174</sup> A few days later, discussions between political and military representatives regarding FLUs and French took place in relative calm, each person showing readiness to accept the other's views politely.<sup>175</sup> Then MP Anne Blouin exploded because the Canadian Forces Medical Centre in Ottawa was unable to serve its Francophone patients in French. De Chastelain replied that the Forces were short of both Anglophone and Francophone doctors. While refuting the argument that patients could not

obtain care in French in Ottawa, he accepted that patient records had to be completed in English, even by Francophone doctors, so that all accredited caregivers could understand them. MP Charles Hamelin, who co-chaired the session, exclaimed, "Incredible!"<sup>176</sup>

On this occasion, although some shortcomings in relation to FLUs were pointed out, such as the lack of a Francophone air transport squadron,<sup>177</sup> MPs and senators were fairly willing to accept the version they were given. Thus the naval base in Quebec translated, in practical terms, into Naval Reserve HQ and very strong encouragement for the creation of Naval Reserve squadrons, which did in fact develop over the years in Quebec.<sup>178</sup> The idea of a real base at the mouth of the St. Lawrence with a few units attached to it was not mentioned in public.

After these appearances, Associate Minister Dick wrote a reply to the January report of the Commissioner of Official Languages recording the efforts made to improve the place of French at NDHQ.<sup>179</sup> But this did not close the matter. On this particular point as well as others in his January report, the Commissioner was still not satisfied. Consultations continued over the summer, and in August part of the 393<sup>rd</sup> meeting of the Defence Management Committee was spent on official languages. The Director General Information, Brigadier-General J.R.C. Bertrand, pointed out that the mainspring of the program remained FLUs, in particular 5<sup>e</sup> Brigade, which was highly successful in its undertakings, did not create two separate armed forces and kept young Francophones in the Forces.<sup>180</sup> Nearly twenty years after its founding, a high-ranking officer thus asserted what most Francophones in the military had thought for a long time, and what Allard had attempted to maintain against the opposition of Pearson; namely, that Francophones' rights and culture could be respected without tearing the Forces apart. On top of Bertrand's testimony came the good wishes of the Commander of Air Command, who wanted to establish another FLU outside Quebec and ensure that it worked.<sup>181</sup> As for Deputy Minister D.B. Dewar, he spoke at length and strongly in favour of building up the French cultural and linguistic presence in the Forces in general and at NDHQ in particular, which he believed ought to play a prominent leadership role in this area.<sup>182</sup>

On 26 November, the Assessment of the Last 15 Years on Bilingualism nevertheless concluded that the 1972 objectives for FLUs and French as a language of work had not been met.<sup>183</sup> The Minister, Perrin Beatty, took up his pen in turn on the following 7 December to write a letter to D' Iberville Fortier making a much more specific commitment for his Department than Dick had made the previous June. He admitted that DND was "substantially



slower than the rest of the government machinery as regards language of work .”<sup>184</sup> Moreover, he acknowledged this was “the key element on which all the other points in the special report hinged.”<sup>185</sup> He recalled NDHQ initiatives in the area of language of work and said he hoped other elements in the Canadian Forces would not be slow to follow suit.<sup>186</sup> It is too early to analyse the actual effects of these new attempts. But how different the positive attitude in 1987 seems to us from the response to the 1977 COL special report!

At the risk of seeming to blow our own horn, we must mention the importance which French and Francophones have acquired in Ottawa, at the National Defence Directorate of History, since 1974. Until then, according to the Director, Dr W.A.B. Douglas, the Directorate of History had consisted mainly of Anglophones, many of them unilingual. With the advent of FLUs in 1968 and the expectations that their numbers would grow until 1987, historical reports and archives of all sorts in French would place more demands on the Directorate’s historians and archivists. Moreover, Douglas believed that a Francophone view was needed in official histories. To achieve these objectives, Douglas and Letellier agreed in principle in December 1973 and January 1974 to establish a Francophone section in the Directorate of History, which would work in French. Despite the staff cutbacks then in progress at NDHQ, the Directorate of History succeeded in maintaining roughly the same strength because this new section had been approved by the authorities.<sup>187</sup> More important, however, Francophone Canadian historians began to pursue careers in their own language in a discipline where hitherto Francophones had made only sporadic individual efforts. Since 1974, thousands of pages of Canadian socio-military history have been produced by this Section, whose members have acquired prominence in the Canadian and international military history network. This experience clearly demonstrates that if the will is not lacking, units working in French can be established in Ottawa, as the government had wished in 1974-75.

### **The Forces’ FLUs in 1987**

On the one hand, it seems certain that French has made significant progress in the Canadian Forces. On the other however, it still has a long way to go before being recognized as equal to English. We shall have ample opportunity to weigh the truth of this observation. Let us now end our survey of FLUs with some brief comments.

One aspect of the problem, competent personnel, was raised in the Bachand report and its aftermath. The issue was not laid to rest. Authorities refused to approve a list of 22 new FLUs submitted to them in August 1974.

The reasons for delaying the project were many, and Armand Letellier provides a good description of the frustrations while he was in office, that is until the end of 1977. To summarize these events, questions arose out of the communications matrix. Could the Saint-Jean base, for example, which provided services to the Canadian Forces Language School, operating partly in English, be an FLU? These reservations were quickly set aside, but discussing them delayed the implementation process, for every explanation had to be written out at length, and supported, before being considered at a subsequent meeting of the appropriate committee. The weeks of delay mounted up quickly as more obstacles surfaced. To take another example, security and intelligence services resisted the conversion of their units in Quebec into FLUs.<sup>188</sup> When we compare this reminiscence by Letellier to Table 11 in Chapter 11 and some parts of the Commissioner's 1977 study,<sup>189</sup> they all tell the same tale: this sector is allergic to Francophones. A corresponding attitude is found in communications, where English could not be replaced, according to several experts.<sup>190\*</sup>

In addition to breaking through these roadblocks, the reasons for choosing each air force unit had to be explained, even though the 1972 plan had been approved and studies of the resources available for the new FLUs had been conducted expertly and had led to affirmative conclusions.<sup>191</sup> An interesting political debate was added to all this: one of the FLUs was to be at 405 Maritime Patrol Squadron, based in Greenwood, Nova Scotia. This would have opened up a new specialty to Francophones in their language. However, the Premier of Nova Scotia objected publicly and in writing to Francophones moving into the Annapolis Valley.<sup>192</sup> While CDS Dextraze, on his way through Moncton stated that 405 Squadron had to become an FLU regardless of local opposition, the Secretary of State for External Affairs said in the spring of 1976 that no firm decision had been made on this issue.<sup>193</sup> It was a politically sensitive one. But did the creation of the other 21 FLUs have to be postponed because of the population of the Greenwood area? No progress was made on this case until September 1982. At that time, the CDS hinted that 427 Transport and Rescue Squadron (Trenton) and 405 Squadron might possibly become FLUs in the near future, but this had still not happened by 1987.<sup>194</sup>

No doubt the situation in 1975-76 was complicated by another factor. At this time, the Minister of Defence was the Honourable James Richardson,

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\* How, then, do we account for the use of bilingual Francophone signallers in ONUC, the United Nations force in the Congo, in 1960?

never a staunch supporter of the French fact in Canada. The file of new FLUs remained on his desk for approval from 4 November 1975 until he left the portfolio on 13 October 1976. One day, Richardson's executive assistant told Letellier that the minister "was in no particular hurry to see new FLUs established" and that Letellier should curb his impatience.<sup>195</sup> Some extracts from the House of Commons Debates prove that even his political adversaries gave little credence to Richardson's statements in support of B and B when he was Minister of Defence.<sup>196</sup> As for his political orientation after leaving the Liberal Party of Canada, he summarized it publicly many times: a bilingual Quebec in an English Canada.

The section of the 1972 program dealing with FLUs thus quickly melted away. By 1974, many delays had caused widespread frustration.<sup>197</sup> The episode of units working in French was another setback. In 1982, the list of FLUs was extended, it is true, but as we have seen, it was still far short of the 1972 objectives. The Official Languages Plan (Military) submitted by Defence to Treasury Board in March 1983 was approved the following August on three conditions, one of them being that FLUs, ELUs and NUs be redistributed so as to increase the number of FLUs.<sup>198</sup> In 1987, no work on such a redistribution had been done and nothing was heard about speeding up the designation of FLUs behind schedule on the 1972 plan, even though, in the meantime, the total number of military personnel in Canada had increased by several thousand: this suggests — and the statistics in the preceding chapter bear this out — that the number of Francophones also leaped ahead in the 1980s.

In 1982, Brigadier-General Derek McLaws, in a report we shall discuss later, stated that FLU personnel goals should be critically examined. "For example: why should FLUs provide for employment of only 50% of the CFs' francophones at any one time — why not more; why should the proportion of anglophones in FLUs be 20% in Quebec and 10% elsewhere; what should be the target dates for achieving and maintaining such manning goals?"<sup>199</sup>

In our opinion, if such a review of objectives and their results was conducted and released to the public, it would enable the whole military population to regain contact and even, especially among those who have joined the Forces since 1973, to come to grips with FLUs, which are an essential aspect of the B and B plan.



# **Part Three**

## **Training of Service Personnel**

Our two languages and our diversity of cultures in Canada are the expression of our spiritual values even as our vast country is the reflection of our physical strength and variety. They go together, for the physical features of Canada have had a determining effect on how we have lived and thought and felt in this country. The country has formed us even as we have learned to live in it and to search out its riches.

Our challenges, and the problems they entail, are at the same time our opportunities. Canada is a country spanning a continent and stretching to the Arctic because people of vision and determination responded to the opportunities they saw beyond the four small colonies that formed the origin of their endeavours. Canada is a highly developed country because people of enterprise have sought out its potential and harnessed its resources. Canada is a bountiful country because people of the land and sea have toiled long and hard to harvest its plenty.

Above all, however, Canada is a free country because its people have learned to accept and to cherish their differences. Our linguistic duality and cultural diversity are both the condition and the safeguard of our continuing freedom and our unity as a country.

Our two official languages are something more. They are an opportunity. They are two of the richest of our assets and resources. Let us move together in the conviction, not that our two official languages are a problem or a burden, but that they are a means and an opportunity to live broader, fuller lives as individuals and as a country. Let us not permit our country to be divided by what can so enrich us.

Gordon Robertson, *A National Understanding*, (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1977), p 78.

In Canada, the Land Forces had admitted that members of its French language minority learned much more quickly and performed better if they received their basic training in their own language. In 1969 this practice began to extend to the other arms, and the number of trades that could be learned in French increased. Indeed, Training Command had very early worked out ambitious plans which the B & B Directorate General assimilated in 1971-1972. But short-term considerations soon got in the way of planned development. When the matter was studied in 1985, the fact emerged that, apart from its handsome facade, *FRANCOTRAIN* was still far from achieving its initial objectives.

On the other hand, training and development of officers in the early 1970s was simply a matter of following up programs already in existence — at the Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean, for example. But it required firm directives from General Jacques Dextraze to get those in charge to make further progress. Objectives for the use of French and percentages of Francophones were set, both for officer-cadets and for experienced officers taking professional development courses. The success achieved in 1987 in this sector, while far from what was aimed for in 1972, nonetheless compares well with that achieved by *FRANCOTRAIN*.





# 13

## Francotrain

### Formulation of a plan for training in French

The Ross Report (1967) contained recommendations aimed at making basic military training available in the French language (see recommendations 22 to 31 in Appendix PP of Volume I, pp 368-9). The sectorial experiment the army had conducted in this field was expanded on 1 May 1968, when the *École des recrues des Forces canadiennes* (ERFC) [Canadian Forces Recruit School] was set up for all Francophone recruits.<sup>1</sup> From then on there were thus two streams of recruits: Anglophones coming out of Cornwallis and Francophones from the ERFC at Saint-Jean.<sup>2</sup>

These schools for recruits, like all training functions, came under Training Command, which was then based in Winnipeg. In the summer of 1967, almost all training that had been done at the three HQs before 1964 had been transferred to Winnipeg. Training Command was responsible for the next step, the possibility of setting up technical courses in French. Allard was very set on the creation of a technical school for Francophones, which was the subject — along with French Language Units and French education for children of service personnel,— of projects presented to and accepted by the Department and Cabinet during the winter of 1967-1968.<sup>3</sup> Because of this, the *École technique des Forces canadiennes* (ETFC) was protected by Prime Minister Pearson and his successors, according to the 21 March 1968 letter from Pearson to Defence Minister Cadieux (Chapter 8, Volume I, pp 220-1).

The specialists had had to work quickly to arrive at this first favourable conclusion. In December 1966, they had begun to consider how to get bilingual staff to Training Command HQ: they thought that it would be necessary over the long term to have such staff at all training centres in order to provide assistance in French to trainees.<sup>4</sup> After the Ross Report came out, it was no longer just a matter of helping Francophones in their own language during training, but of providing all their instruction in French until they

reached the TQ<sup>\*</sup>-3 level of specialization. Thus in December 1967, a new document set out three possibilities: a technical school, to be located in Quebec; a combat arms school at Valcartier, which would include young infantry, artillery and armoured vehicle soldiers; and a naval school at Cornwallis for training sailors.<sup>5</sup> In January 1968, there was talk of offering summer courses in French for radio technicians in the future technical school; the questions of adding other trades and training Francophone officer-cadets in their own language were also studied.<sup>6</sup>

These good intentions were severely hampered by the small number of available bilingual instructors.<sup>7</sup> Moreover, the vast reorganization begun in 1964 had not yet been completed. After training personnel were moved from NDHQ to HQ in Winnipeg, it was decided in the first months of 1968 to reconstruct a directorate general in Ottawa which would work out directives concerning training of recruits, language courses, military colleges and higher education. It was understood, however, that Training Command would be responsible for the administration of these directives.<sup>8</sup> We do not intend to write the history of this sector of National Defence. We shall simply say that it has undergone changes since 1968 and for several years has been called the Directorate General Recruiting, Education and Training (DGRET). The rest of the chapter will deal with areas affecting DGRET closely or from a distance.

In February 1968, General Allard sent all Commands the summary document on B & B prepared by Major-General Pollard of Air Command, to be used as a basis for the comments that each of them were to prepare.<sup>9</sup> Accordingly, Major-General R.C. Stovel, of Training Command, wrote on 12 February to sum up what had been accomplished in his Command since 1967 — the developments we have just described. At that time, Stovel promised to provide a more detailed study soon; his further observations arrived on 12 March. Stovel made no reference in it to Pollard's work. In his opinion, Training Command's reflections on B & B had begun when the Ross Report was received in the spring of 1967. Most of what he wrote in March can be found in another form in his 12 February letter, which mentioned for example, the obvious need to have the necessary number of bilingual instructors to keep up with growth in the number of courses offered in French. Stovel sent a study on bilingual positions that would be needed at Training Command based on the premise that Francophones were to make up 25% of

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\* Since 1968 levels in training of other ranks have been designated in different ways. In this chapter, we shall use the 1987 abbreviation TQ, or "trade qualifications".

the Forces. For the moment, he admitted, he could not accomplish much. Officer-cadets at universities who intended to go into the army or air force could be offered training in French during the summer. Francophone officer-cadets from the military colleges would do this phase in English. In 1969, it was planned to offer a Phase I in French to all Francophone officer-cadets; as the number of qualified instructors increased, French would be extended to Phases II and III. English courses would remain in the training program for Francophone officers.

We note that Stovel accepted Ross's recommendations, which dealt at some length with teaching English to Francophones, as Letellier did not fail to emphasize in his book.<sup>10</sup> Stovel seemed to want to stick strictly to what had been defined; he was not interested in broadening the discussion. Therefore, since Ross had not mentioned military training for medical or dental officers or officers promoted from the ranks, Stovel assumed that the current situation was satisfactory.

For other ranks, Stovel repeated what he had written in February, stating that for the moment, apart from the infantry, all training was given in English. He also said that even if some technical courses might be given in French at Saint-Jean, it was unthinkable to offer them all at this school because the duplication of equipment and space would be too costly. In other words, many technical courses would one day be given in French at schools other than Saint-Jean, and most often outside Quebec.

Stovel supported the creation of a Francophone training centre for combat arms up to the third level of specialization. His ultimate aim was to provide instruction in French in the 97 trades existing at the time,<sup>\*</sup> even if some problems occurred in those with very low numbers. Stovel naturally brought up the question of work instruments that were needed in French but at the time were available in English only.

When he approached the matter of language courses (the subject of chapter 15), Stovel clearly let it be understood that this was mainly a matter of teaching English to Francophones. Here again he kept on the convenient blinkers, refusing to contemplate that responsibility for bilingualism might in future better be shared by Anglophones and Francophones.

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\* Before unification, there were, a total in the three arms of 322 trades taught to other ranks (sailors, soldiers and air personnel), not counting the 28 specialties for musicians. The disappearance of 225 trades during restructuring after 1965 is indicative of the magnitude of the change that took place.

However, he conceded that the fifty positions reserved for Anglophones to learn French (50 in March, 60 after June 1968) would have to be filled.<sup>11</sup> In short, Training Command was ready to move ahead as far as the means that they had available, or would have, allowed.

On 29 April 1968, a draft implementation plan of Winnipeg's proposals for training in French was circulated in Ottawa. Colonel S.V. Radley-Walters, Director of Training at NDHQ — the only training unit that had not yet been moved to Winnipeg — prepared this document. He wanted to have the comments of those receiving it by 7 May, because all would then have to be studied by the CP and the Defence Council.

Radley-Walters added several elements to those that Stovel had already mentioned, and based his plan on these factors:

- only other ranks were covered;
- 25 percent of recruits would be unilingual Francophones;
- women were not part of the present projection;
- ideally, instruction in French for a specialty would begin when all work instruments were available in French;
- attention would first be concentrated on trades related to combat arms or operations;
- it would not be possible to offer all courses in French;
- naval courses in French would only be given at the Fleet School at Halifax and Comwallis;
- the practical part of these courses would be done on a French language vessel.

A start was made with the radio technician course at Saint-Jean, because it was the simplest to organize. The lessons learned from this experience were to be used elsewhere. The cost of implementing French instruction there would be affordable and the necessary Francophone presence was in place. Since 1 April, they could count on having twenty Francophone recruits per year learning this trade. To set up the course, thirteen new teaching positions had to be filled with qualified military personnel from Commands other than Training Command. Furthermore, the funds required

for translation, relocations to Saint-Jean and so forth had to be found from the 1968-1969 budget, which had been approved before this question arose.

The Radley-Walters document also introduced the idea of implementation phases. Even if all trades should in principle become available in French, constraints such as costs and lack of qualified personnel required planning and choices that would lead to a gradual expansion of training in French. Phase I would provide training in French up to TQ-3 in sixteen trades. Four would be taught at Saint-Jean, three at Valcartier and nine at Halifax. In a second phase, fifteen technical trades were to be taught at Saint-Jean. To meet the requirements of these two phases, 256 civilian and military personnel would be needed for the new courses at Saint-Jean and 43 for Halifax and Cornwallis; none would be needed at Valcartier since personnel already teaching courses in French would be used. Phase I of the plan was to be completed in two or three years and Phase II over an indeterminate number of years, depending on circumstances.

The document ended with the following recommendations:

- Training Command should initiate the pilot project at Saint-Jean with thirteen instructors and a budget of \$680,000.
- The Command should start to offer the courses already mentioned at Valcartier.
- The Command should undertake to offer eight trades in French at Halifax and Cornwallis.<sup>12</sup>

On 24 May, a document setting out goals and number of persons and funds required was ready to be submitted to the Program Review Board. The program was now divided into three phases.

Table 21

**PROPOSED PHASES FOR TRAINING IN FRENCH, MAY 1968**

PHASES	GOALS & LOCATION	YEAR
I	Radio technician, Saint-Jean	1968-1969
II	Three new trades, Saint-Jean Eight sea trades, Fleet School, Halifax Courses for infantry, armour and artillery, Valcartier	1969-1970 to 1971-1972
III	Trades at Saint-Jean increase in number to support French Language Units	1972-1973 to 1976-1978

It was recommended that Phase I be approved immediately so that it could begin in February 1969, and that the other two phases be accepted in principle.

All the explanations we have seen are found in this May 1968 assessment. It is a long document containing technical annexes which give detailed costing. There is also a study of requirements and estimates. For example, 95 candidates would be accepted into the airframe technician course each year, but only 86 would pass the course, this projection being based on the 10 percent attrition rate usually found among Anglophones. As for naval personnel, since it was said that international agreements stipulated that communications between units operating in different languages take place in English, English would remain obligatory in all naval trades. Thus Francophone signallers, radio operators and radar technicians would continue to receive their training in English; the other trades could be taken in French.<sup>13</sup>

But the deadlines expanded. In April 1968 Allard had said that the pilot course in French would start at Saint-Jean in September 1968;<sup>14</sup> in fact this did not happen until the summer of 1969. Allard's desire to encourage development of technical courses at Valcartier rather than at Saint-Jean did not help matters. Funds for 1968-1969 were limited, and the required number of Francophone recruits intending to train as radio technicians had to be found before the course could start. Furthermore, it was necessary to hire instructors and provide them with classrooms and work instruments in French.

Many events took place before Phase I started officially. Among others, Lieutenant (N) R.C. Auriat conducted a “feasibility” study on the eight naval courses to be offered in Halifax; the results were ready in December 1968. Auriat pointed out several problem areas. For example, operational ships could not take more than a certain number of trainee technicians on board for practical training. On a destroyer, 18 of the 217 positions were reserved for this purpose; there were 20 positions available on a helicopter carrier. If they took more, an operational ship should be converted into a training ship. Technical courses for Francophones were going to train more sailors than could be given practical training in the only French Language Unit in the navy. Hence the surplus Francophones would have to be placed in courses given on land, even if some of the training periods had to take place later in the seaman’s preparation.

Among the other critical factors raised by Auriat were training personnel and work instruments in French. Nevertheless, the projections provided by Maritime Command in December 1967 on the eight courses planned were still valid and the problems envisaged were not insurmountable.<sup>15</sup>

The discussion thus continued with no conclusion in sight at the end of 1968. On 11 December, however, a very important meeting of all those closely concerned with the changes that would be occasioned by training in French took place in Ottawa. Among those present were, of course, General Allard, who chaired the meeting, Major-General W.K. Carr, who had replaced Stovel at Training Command, and Colonel W.W.K. McConnell, Director General Quartering.

Allard opened the meeting by presenting the *École technique* as one way to remove existing obstacles in the path of Francophones. Then decision making began. The *École technique* would be at Valcartier, declared Allard. He then confirmed that he would have to deal first with making 26 trades available in French. The *ETFC* would be responsible for training troops up to TQ-3; for levels 4 and 5 they would go to other schools where Francophone cells already existed. Over the long term, training in French in combat arms would extend to levels 5 and 6. Finally, there would be no costly duplication of instructional facilities. As far as possible, basic documents would be translated first. Because there were limits to the resources available to work on this, technical documents and all others used at levels above TQ-3 would not be translated. Instead, the Department would ensure that there were bilingual instructors who could use English texts.

At the time of this meeting, officials thought the process could be started on 8 January 1969 at Valcartier and Shilo (for artillery), while the pilot course would start at Saint-Jean the following April. Naval courses would come a little later. In Allard's view, this plan was acceptable since it did not allocate too much money to Saint-Jean. His priority was to obtain funds to convert Valcartier. The experts at this meeting then said that work could not start at Valcartier until two years after the requirements relating to the new and old functions of the base were formally recognized, which had still not happened by that day — 11 December 1968. Allard then turned to Carr and asked him to outline briefly his project for training Francophones. He added that Saint-Jean should only receive a minimum of money for necessary construction in the interim period. Allard would even have preferred that the position of the Saint-Jean base in the Department's priorities drop from category A to B or C.

On that same 11 December, an interim policy for training Francophone recruits was adopted. Clearly it was only valid until such time as Valcartier was ready. Thus, apart from the pilot course at Saint-Jean and those for combat arms, the other courses to be offered in French would be at existing centres. But as sectors became ready at Valcartier, transfers would be made. Standards were to be the same for Francophones as for Anglophones; priority was to be given to sending the former to French Language Units. Perhaps a few surplus personnel among the R22<sup>c</sup>R might be transferred to Francophone cells at Training Command; Carr would have to consult his counterpart at Mobile Command. As long as there was a lack of qualified instructors, Francophones would receive instruction in English. The program could not be implemented overnight. In the navy, the practical phases would be offered on four operational ships, one per squadron. Apparently, although this is not stated in the minutes of the December 1968 meeting, Allard and the other participants assumed that most Francophones would have to do their practical training on ELU ships, since only one FLU vessel existed. During this meeting, the necessity of preparing an overall plan for training Francophones was recognized, and Allard asked Carr to set up a special team using resources from his HQ. As the project proceeded, HQ of the new (Valcartier) Francophone school would leave the group to implement the plan on the spot. What existed at CFB Saint-Jean could be used. But requirements had to be defined quickly in order to facilitate the presentations to the Program Review Board.

After the meeting, Allard added to the minutes that a directive would follow authorizing the implementation of the decisions.<sup>16</sup> At this stage the principle of training Francophones in French was recognized. The objections



raised were mostly practical and could be summed up in this question: how could a system of military training be set up which, while using a different language, would be consistent with what already existed concerning what was taught, as well as teaching methods, technique and operations? The apparent acceptance of instruction in French was the fruit of much work, resulting in a basic change in the attitude of Anglophones. To take Vice-Admiral R.L. Hennessy as an example, even in 1965 he still considered English to be the only language of work and thus necessarily of training.

Carr returned to Winnipeg after the 11 December 1968 meeting with the task of clearly defining his project. For his part, Allard, in his Directive D6/69 of 14 February 1969, gave in more detail some of the ideas he had developed the previous December. The directive set out a method for implementation of Francophone training at Training Command in a concept to be called FRANCOTRAIN. Within FRANCOTRAIN would be a HQ called *LADIF* (*La division de l'instruction francophone*). *LADIF*'s role was to advise and assist the commander of Training command with all aspects of the training of Francophones and command and control of the staff provided for *LADIF*.<sup>17</sup> Detached from Winnipeg HQ and established in Quebec City as of 13 July 1969, *LADIF* was to be administered by CFB Valcartier.<sup>18</sup> The FRANCOTRAIN project's goal was to achieve "equality of opportunities for francophone and anglophone tradesmen of the Canadian Armed Forces."<sup>19</sup>

Directive D6/69 also stated that Francophones in the three arms would be trained in French up to TQ-3, at the *École technique* at Saint-Jean — where, in addition to the radio technician course, one for radar technicians was planned for when the courses began — or at Valcartier, Borden, Shilo or Chilliwack for the land forces or at Halifax for the navy. According to this directive, the Forces' *École de recrues* and the *École des langues* would remain at Saint-Jean. In December there had been thoughts of locating the former at La Citadelle (Quebec) and the latter at Valcartier. It was projected that from 1970, additional trades taught in French would be added to the few already designated.

Training in French was initially to be aimed at supporting French Language Units. The trade school, which would one day be at Valcartier, would come under Training Command. Finally, the directive asked the head of this Command to review the situation constantly and to keep plans in line with priorities, economic realities, effectiveness and practical training. The directive also contained a description of the role of the Staff officer who would be seconded from Winnipeg to head *LADIF*.<sup>20</sup>

On the following 21 April, two documents were prepared at Winnipeg explicitly describing FRANCOTRAIN. As it was obviously impossible to ensure training in their own language overnight for Francophone officer-cadets and recruits, Training Command set up three separate phases for launching the program, based on availability of teaching material and the required Francophone (or bilingual) instructors. Changes could not in fact be made before a good number of Anglophones in the military became bilingual by taking language courses. The FRANCOTRAIN project was thus closely linked to the results obtained from the French language courses (the subject of Chapter 15).

Here are the three phases proposed at that time by the Training Command authorities.

### PHASE I

- Installation of *LADIF* in Quebec City, July 1969.
- French training at the *École technique*, up to TQ-3 (that is, the recruits course and introduction to their trade) for radar and radio technicians.
- Training in French up to TQ-3 in the combat arms trades, broken down as follows:
  - a. Armoured personnel, artillery and infantry at CFB Valcartier (*Détachement de l'École des Armes de Combat*)\*
  - b. Field engineers at CFB Chilliwack (Canadian Forces School of Military Engineering).
- French training for naval recruits would be offered progressively up to TQ-3 at the Fleet School in Halifax.
- Language courses and training courses for all Francophone recruits would continue in French at CFB Saint-Jean (Quebec).

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\* This name was later changed to *Détachement du centre d'entraînement au combat* and then to *l'École des armes de combats de Valcartier*.

## PHASE II

Further levels of training would be given in French in the trades in Phase I, and training in French would be introduced in 23 new trades, starting in 1970, in existing schools: eight naval trades, four land combat arms trades and eleven technical trades (mainly air force).

## PHASE III

Phase III included all French courses given at CFB Valcartier except those given at the Fleet School (Halifax), the field engineer trades (Chilliwack) and firefighter (Borden). This phase was directly linked to setting up the new school planned for Valcartier and obtaining necessary resources, including facilities and teaching and administrative personnel.<sup>21</sup>

But the writers of the program, fearing that Phase III might be too costly, recommended in a "Plan B" that the courses in this phase continue to be given in the existing trade schools, rather than being concentrated at Valcartier. They foresaw the formation of "Francophone cells" in English schools. The training specialists estimated the cost of Phase II to be somewhere in the range of 60 to 90 million dollars, without counting the additional staff of 500 that their Command would have to draw from other sectors of the Forces.<sup>22</sup>

Allard rejected this revised phase III and the system of French cells, which he found distasteful. The CDS also rejected Hennessy's suggestion of concentrating at Valcartier all aviation technical trades for Anglophones and Francophones then offered at Clinton. However, the CDS had to come to grips with changing his February directive. The 14 August 1969 amendment still favoured concentration of French courses at Valcartier. But, given the high costs that would result, the Valcartier solution would not go into operation for ten years. In the meantime, the guiding principles would be followed with regard to FRANCOTRAIN; infrastructure expenses would be kept to a minimum; what the Forces already had at Valcartier and in the Quebec area would be used to the full.<sup>23</sup>

On 15 April 1969, the *École technique* was at last created.<sup>24</sup> By June, Phases I and II of FRANCOTRAIN were approved. Ottawa even insisted that Phase II be given priority standing.<sup>25</sup> In the months to come, B & B in the Forces was to be reinforced by the promulgation of the Official Languages Act and publication of the third volume of the B & B Commission report with recommendations 35 and 38 (Appendix B). Obviously these two recommendations would be accepted at once by the Department of Defence,<sup>26</sup>

where staff personnel had been working on the matter since the spring of 1967 and were on the point of introducing promising solutions.

An undoubted will to take action with regard to training Francophones in French thus appeared towards the end of the 1960s, even though the perfect solution was still far off. Several kinds of problems still existed, some of which we have already mentioned (lack of bilingual instructors and work instruments in French). Others can be guessed at. For example, before starting a course in French, a minimum number of students were needed and in several of the technical trades in the air force and navy, there were still too few in 1969. In order to respect the spirit of FRANCOTRAIN, some students could be forced to wait for weeks, even months, after going through the *École des recrues*, before a large enough group could be assembled. A two-part solution was suggested in October 1969, and later implemented. First, it called for assembling a platoon at the recruit school of Francophones intending to study a trade in which there was only a small number of them. In other words, candidates for military life would be kept as civilians until the appropriate number had been reached. They would undergo basic training together before moving on as a group to later schools. Second, young Francophones who in previous years did not have access to a technical course, or failed it because of lack of English, were to be reclassified.<sup>27</sup>

In general, Phase I of FRANCOTRAIN was carried out on schedule and Phase II started in the fall of 1969. All the *LADIF* positions were filled and the usual problems of a new organization were being solved. Some delays were caused by lack of students or qualified instructors.<sup>28</sup> At the end of 1969, the lack of instructors was worst in the naval courses, to the point that two trades supposed to be given in French could not be offered. But it was anticipated that this would be made up in April 1970. The requirements of the naval FLU had complicated the situation. But the *Ottawa* had had a successful first year and made a good start on the second, so that in December 1969 the highest B & B priority for the navy could finally be FRANCOTRAIN.<sup>29</sup>

### **Some hitches**

The first radio technician course at the *École technique* finished on 25 November. In the same month, French courses started at the signals school in Kingston. Between December 1969 and May 1970, ten courses were supposed to start at the aviation trades school in Borden.<sup>30</sup> One of the critical situations pointed out by Ross in 1967 — that Francophones were tremendously under-represented in technical trades — was on its way to being resolved. From 1970, one might believe that a Francophone could be

trained in French up to TQ-3, in several trades before being placed in a French Language Unit. It was still only a partial solution. At this 1970 starting point 25 trades out of 97 were available or about to be. As courses with large numbers had been selected, however, 50% of Francophones would soon have access to instruction in French up to TQ-3.

Phase III, which provided for a mass transfer of Francophone training to Valcartier (except for a few trades), was called into question again — even, as we have seen, before Allard's departure from the position of CDS, in mid-September 1969. We may suppose that those who had succeeded in selling the concept of caution to this champion of B & B in the Forces would not lay down their arms after his departure in September 1969. The bargaining would be hard between those who were in favour of creating Francophone "cells" in Anglophone schools and environments and others who would defend the Valcartier solution, which required duplication of materiel, premises and administrative services.

Since Phase III was much studied by *LADIF*, at Quebec, and in Winnipeg and Ottawa, 1970 was a pivotal year for training in French. On 18 March, the Chief of Personnel, to whom the Directorate General of Training reported, sent the CDS a memo which went through the usual steps before it reached the Defence Council, almost unchanged, on the following 15 June. Its contents were accepted there with a slight modification.<sup>31</sup> What was this text?

The authors first reviewed the history of FRANCOTRAIN. They emphasized that what had been planned by Allard in August 1969 — to use the infrastructures in the Quebec City region to the maximum — was impractical because the centres were too far away from each other, they had not been set up for training and it would be too costly to renovate them (although these costs were not specified). In sum, by taking this route, they would be going counter to another part of the 14 August 1969 amendment, which was to keep costs to a minimum. Another difficulty lay in the fact that the Forces had foreseen for 210 positions (200 military and 10 civilian) for the centralized school at Valcartier. These would only be filled in Phase III, but this could not be achieved by following Allard's August 1969 criteria, as had just been noted. The acknowledged need for Phase III and the fact that the Department did not have the necessary funds or resources to implement it was a paradox and a dilemma, leading inevitably to an interim practical solution: rather than start to concentrate French training in the Quebec City region, the number of French courses in the existing schools should be expanded; in other words, DND ought to continue in the same vein as Phase II. The positions reserved for the Valcartier school for the 1970-1973 period would then be allotted to FRANCOTRAIN.

The memorandum not only put forward this alternative, but made it attractive, accompanied as it was by a list of factors which ended with the promise of introducing, almost immediately, training in French in six trades in addition to those previously planned. This would mean that 70 percent of Francophone recruits would receive training in French up to TQ-3, in 1970-71. Moreover, at least one technical trade was to be added to the technical school at Saint-Jean, and the Valcartier combat arms school was to be developed so that as of 1973 all Francophones taking these trades could attend. Finally, the possibility of offering nine additional courses in French by the middle of 1971 was considered (81 percent of Francophones would thus be covered up to TQ-3). In 1971 the 22 trades that were still offered only in English would come under review. This great increase in the use of French would be based on ongoing and accelerated translation of work tools.

Brigadier General J.A.G.R. Dupuis, CMM, OStJ, CD, MD, was the first French Canadian to become Commander of the Canadian Armed Forces Medical Services, on 1 November 1979. Promoted Major-General in 1982, he retired in 1985. (CFPU/REP 86-023)



Colonel Anne-Marie Bélanger, OMM, OStJ, CD, was promoted to this rank on 1 January 1978. She was the first French Canadian woman to take on the new position of Director of Canadian Forces Women Personnel, created in 1979.

The writers of this project were aiming at a gradual expansion of FRANCOTRAIN until April 1973, when the situation would be reviewed with an eye to the structure of the Forces at that time. They thought that by then the time would probably have come for moving in favour of the Valcartier complex. In the pivotal 1970-1973 period, there would be several advantages in following the course described:

- FRANCOTRAIN's purpose would be maintained;
- no renovations or major construction;
- maximum use of existing schools and of existing personnel;
- no major duplication of instructional tools;
- a significant contribution to implementation of the bilingualism policy in the Forces.

In short, FRANCOTRAIN was an important B & B instrument in the Forces. It was essential that it not get bogged down, which could happen if Phase III as actually defined were carried on.

Hence the need to accept the recommendations outlined earlier. In addition to these, it was suggested that teaching of French be included in the FRANCOTRAIN mandate and that the latter be given a new priority to obtain necessary bilingual personnel.<sup>32</sup> The suggestion that teaching French be part of FRANCOTRAIN was found in the Chief of Personnel's March memorandum. As to the idea that it was necessary to increasing the number of bilingual Anglophones through French courses, whether or not these courses were run by FRANCOTRAIN, this relied on simple reasoning. Francophone or fully bilingual Anglophone instructors were required, and they were all concentrated in the French Language Units. Hence the proposal to increase the number of Anglophones learning French who could later serve in FLUs, thus freeing up highly qualified personnel for training.<sup>33</sup> This point of view was accepted by the Minister on 15 June 1970. We shall leave the subject of teaching languages for now, since this sector will be dealt with in a later chapter.

Also on 15 June, the Minister agreed to the other parts of the presentation made to him on FRANCOTRAIN, with one important difference. He had been told that the proposal was a reworked Phase III. The Minister made sure it was understood that the changes were part of an expansion of Phase II,



which left the concept of Phase III — and its Valcartier school — unchanged.<sup>34</sup>

Thus after 15 June 1970, more changes were made to Directive D6/69 (amended in August 1969) and Directive D5/70, which provided for 210 positions for the proposed school in Phase III. These would now be allotted to FRANCOTRAIN to make up the Francophone cells.<sup>35</sup> On 23 June, the CDS agreed to the extension of Phase II's implementation. On 13 August he amended D6/69 in terms of the new data, specifying that the concept of Phase III remained unchanged, although it was on hold for the time being. The new D6/69 included the teaching of French in FRANCOTRAIN's mission, as well as the teaching of trades in French to Francophone recruits.<sup>36</sup>

Infrastructure costs were not totally eliminated in this way, but they came to under a million dollars over three years, most of it spent on additions to Saint-Jean, where performance orientated electronics training courses (POET) were to be taught starting in September 1970.

There were several other ways in which 1970 was notable. A preliminary bilingualism policy had been accepted and outlooks were adjusting. If, as had been said in 1968, Francophones had to take naval communications courses in English, they could from now on, when necessary, have interpreters, at their elbow.

In another area, it was felt that the powers of Training Command, less than four years old, were already starting to be seriously weakened. Thus the Fleet School at Halifax was transferred to Maritime Command; other schools became part of Mobile Command. It was specified, however, that Training Command would remain responsible for FRANCOTRAIN and determine the priorities for setting up new courses in French.<sup>37</sup>

Finally, the directive governing use of bilingual Francophones and Anglophones would be changed in accordance with FRANCOTRAIN's role. As we have seen, expansion of courses in French was partly hindered from the start by the lack of qualified French-speaking instructors. The new bilingualism policy of December 1969 — which implied that there would one day be 28 percent Francophones in the Forces and that they should be treated as well as Anglophones — and the expansion of Phase II, decided upon earlier, caused additional pressures in this area. Reference was made to this problem in all the documents we have mentioned dealing with expansion of Phase II. Brigadier General R.S. Graham of Training Command said in each of his reports on FRANCOTRAIN that it was vital to have the necessary instructors.<sup>38</sup>

Anglophones' language skills were not ignored. On 25 May 1970 Chief of Personnel Hennessy issued Directive 10/70, stating that bilingual Anglophones already in the training centres where FRANCOTRAIN was to be extended, had to achieve level 4 (out of a maximum of 6) on French comprehension and speaking tests before they could serve there. Bilingual Anglophones who came from elsewhere on assignment to FRANCOTRAIN would have to meet the same requirements.<sup>39</sup>

In Ottawa, Lieutenant General Can was very clear at the June meeting of commanders: there were not enough bilingual instructors. To improve the situation it would be necessary to change another Allard directive dated 13 January 1969. In June 1970 the Commander of Mobile Command also expressed to the CP a view similar to Can's: training needs were becoming so pressing that consideration had to be given to using some Francophones outside French Language Units, although posting them to FLU's was supposed to have priority.<sup>40</sup> General Sharp, the CDS, asked the CP to deal with this matter on 26 June 1970.<sup>41</sup> On 20 July, a rough draft of a directive was prepared. Eleven days later, the CDS officially changed the priorities for use of Francophones for the period from 1 August 1970 to 1 January 1972, during which time Training Command (except its HQ) would be accorded first priority rather than FLUs. There was a need for bilingual instructors during the period in which courses given in French by the Command were increasing, and at the time it was mainly Francophones who were bilingual, the CDS explained.<sup>42</sup> But as Dextraze wrote in July 1971, progress in training in French was a heavy burden on the use of the few bilingual personnel the Forces had available.<sup>43</sup>

### **Cancellation of course location changes planned for Phase III**

There was much optimism, and this seems to us significant, during the few months following this decision. The future of FRANCOTRAIN seemed assured, since the decision had been made to provide it with the necessary bilingual personnel to teach courses in French or to interpret them when necessary for Francophones who had to take courses where English was still used.<sup>44</sup> In the circumstances, it should not be surprising that the fifteen-year plan, adopted in the spring of 1972 but prepared in the fall of 1971, gave little space to FRANCOTRAIN. It merely said that adjustments would be made for 1973-1974 and 1974-1975 to what existed at that time and planning of Phase III would be completed.<sup>45</sup>

In fact, in November 1971, almost a year before Treasury Board accepted the fifteen-year plan, Sharp had ordered a revision of Phase III that in June 1970 had only been planned for 1973.<sup>46</sup> The draft revision circulated at

NDHQ in early 1972 and was sent to Winnipeg with the imprimatur of the DGBB.<sup>47</sup> At the end of February the final document came back to Ottawa for approval. Its main conclusions were simple. First, the goal of Phase III was to find the most effective and fair way of training Francophones in the Forces. Second, in order to make training in French available at all levels, the existing schools could be used. That is to say, the Francophone cell model in existence since 1969 could be used and a bilingual training complex could be set up in Quebec. There, courses would be offered to both language groups<sup>48</sup> while some Francophone cells would very probably be set up.

These conclusions were submitted in April 1972 to the CDS, who wanted the whole matter to be looked at more closely. On 6 July, Sharp signed a directive to this effect which had two guiding principles: the number of courses offered in French should increase, and some of them were to be transferred to Quebec. The study was to consider which would move to Quebec and which additional courses, other than those related to trades (for example, those on leadership, management, various specialties, and so on), should be offered in French; to examine the political and economic effects that relocation would have on the bases and local communities involved; and to include an estimate of relocations timetables.<sup>49</sup>

We shall pause here, because what was to ensue in the matter of relocation of courses had, in our opinion, already been foreshadowed by what went on before. In 1969 the aims of moving courses offered in French to Quebec were:

- 1) to give Quebec a larger proportion of courses (about 3 percent were in Quebec in 1970, and this was after the technical school had been opened and included the combat arms school at Valcartier and the recruit school);
- 2) to give Francophones an opportunity to be trained in a familiar cultural environment.
- 3) to retain a larger percentage of Francophones in the Forces by allowing them to spend this important training phase of their career in the Province of Quebec.<sup>50</sup>

After the April 1972 report and the directive of the following July, there was no more talk of repatriating courses in French to Quebec, but some courses were to be offered in English and in French. This meant that reasons

(2) and (3) above lost a lot of their value since, in addition to naval personnel, it was very probable that a large part of Francophones in the air and land forces would continue to take courses outside Quebec. This left only the first argument to be developed, which was not a great deal when we remember that between 1964 and 1966, when the Forces were being integrated and unified, decisions were made which led to all technical courses being located outside Quebec. Had it not been for Allard, the ETFC would probably not have existed. Why, when integration and unification of the Forces, which had been justified by savings in dollars and human resources, was scarcely complete, should decisions made less than ten years earlier be reversed? It is scarcely surprising that no one in 1964-1966 had taken the French fact into account, as Allard said in his memoirs.<sup>51</sup> But in 1972-1973, when decisions did have to be made in terms of the role and place of Francophones in the Canadian Forces, would there be the courage to reverse decisions made in 1964-1966 and embark on a new route? Given the economic parameters of the study ordered by Sharp in July 1972, one might doubt it.

The study was to be made over several months, including visits by the investigators during the summer of 1972 to the schools which might be transferred to Quebec. In the fall, deliberation began at the DGBB and elsewhere to decide whether FRANCOTRAIN should give training in higher TQs (4, 5 and 6, for example) than those on which it had concentrated up to then. Since 1967, the Forces had been gradually made more accessible to Francophones but, as wrote Clement Tousignant, those who were going to stay in the Forces should have access to more advanced courses in French. In trades where English was really of prime importance, it would be necessary to offer English courses to Francophones while giving them more specific trade-related training in French.<sup>52</sup> Letellier, to whom Tousignant wrote, agreed. For the time being, however, the Forces were only 17 percent Francophone and had an acute shortage of instructors. While over the long term, 100 percent instruction in French was the aim, in the short term it would be necessary to make compromises.<sup>53</sup> We note that the DGBB staff intervened in the process launched by Sharp in July 1972 by appealing to *LADIF* in Quebec, with whom they had close links. But it was *LADIF* that was responsible for integrating all interventions before presenting an opinion to senior authorities.

On 2 April 1973, the Defence Management Committee (DMC) was finally able to discuss Phase III, based on an ADM(Per) document dated 26 March 1973. The oral presentations were made by Rear-Admiral D.S. Boyle (CP) and Colonel Lagacé. Boyle covered the historical aspect of the matter, which could be summed up thus: Phase II would continue to expand, and

some courses would be transferred to Quebec “in order to redress a long standing inequity in the training system in regard to siting of schools ....”<sup>54</sup> These two measures were designed to increase the retention rate of Francophones in the Forces.

Lagacé, from the DG *LADIF*, spoke after Boyle, and stressed the progress that had been made. He said that they would soon need to prepare to offer more advanced courses in French — TQ-4 and 5. FRANCOTRAIN had already trained 1,901 students, and, as he spoke, 1,973 were going through the system. A study of the progress of men and women, trade by trade, allowed him to foresee, for example, that TQ-6A could be offered in French in 1978 for radio operators.

Having shown what FRANCOTRAIN had accomplished and what was expected in the future, Lagacé approached the question of moving certain schools to Quebec. He first said that Training Command was no longer in favour of this solution, which it had previously supported. Relocating seven courses from Ontario to Quebec, and the *École technique* to Kingston would cost about 25.8 million dollars and, despite negative reaction from Winnipeg to this proposal, this is what Lagacé advised, on the condition that the funds for the moves came from B & B funds and not from Training Command’s budget.<sup>55</sup>

The DMC accepted the proposals, but with reservations concerning the relocations. In brief, the decisions were as follows:

- the proposed transfers were approved in principle, although these proposals should be “subject to further scrutiny and approval as they are processed later in more detail through PCB ...”,<sup>56</sup>
- a supplementary study of the detailed schedule for the moves was to be prepared for the PCB;
- none of the schools in Quebec, except the *École technique*, could be considered for relocation;
- the eventual costs should come from additional funds supplied by Treasury Board for B & B, if the financial aid formula was not approved;
- Treasury Board was to be advised that the physical changes planned for Saint-Jean might change in the coming months;

- the Defence Management Committee would receive an annual progress report on FRANCOTRAIN, starting in the spring of 1974;<sup>57</sup>
- expansion to TQ-4 and 5 was accepted for at least one of the courses, which each of the five large existing schools would have to select and begin to offer in the summer of 1974.

In short, the Department's highest authority, which then included a Francophone deputy minister, Sylvain Cloutier, and a Francophone CDS, General Dextraze, had just placed the final decision in the hands of an expenditure control committee which was liable to ignore totally the basic interests underlying the relocations. Everything would depend on the attitude of the CP, a Lieutenant-General, who alone could draw the Program Control Board away from its extremely mundane concerns. To understand more clearly what was to happen, let us look at a side issue.

Two aspects of FRANCOTRAIN were at stake: a change in the location of certain schools and the expansion of the number of courses offered. But before approaching these two subjects, there is another that we should look at briefly. Starting in the spring of 1972, there was increasing pressure to reduce the role of Training Command. The plan was to move its HQ from Winnipeg to Trenton and downgrade the Command to the level of a System. Thus, instead of being headed by a Major-General, it would go down a step to Brigadier-General. Since these two parts of the initial plan were not too surprising, they were accepted by the DGBB and carried out on 30 June 1975, under Canadian Forces Organizational Order 5-02 of September 1975. But the program also provided for *LADIF* to be dismantled and its functions reassigned to NDHQ when the latter was restructured in the fall. Letellier objected, saying that *LADIF* was still necessary to the smooth operation of FRANCOTRAIN. He suggested rather that *LADIF* become a separate division of NDHQ, in the CP branch, until its mission was complete. To strike *LADIF* from the organizational charts at this time would be interpreted as negative and a backward step for B & B goals.<sup>58</sup>

After numerous consultations, the decision was finally made: *LADIF* would be transferred to NDHQ, where it could in any case better play its role as advisor and more easily interact with the DGBB. Some of its tasks — basic training of recruits and language training — would be given back to the new Training System.<sup>59</sup> *LADIF* would be under the immediate control of NDHQ starting on 5 March 1973 and would keep its staff, including the position of Brigadier-General. It would remain, it was said, a division directly responsible

to the CP. And, apart from a permanent representative in Ottawa, *LADIF* would stay in Québec City.<sup>60</sup>

*LADIF*'s mandate thus became:

- to advise the CP, the DGRET\* (in Ottawa) and the commands on everything to do with training of Francophones in the Forces;
- to develop appropriate educational concepts and techniques;
- to plan for expansion of FRANCOTRAIN;
- to maintain close links with the DGGB, the DGPC (personnel careers) and the DGPRC (personnel requirements and control).<sup>61</sup>

At the time of restructuring, it was decided to change the name *LADIF*, an anomaly at NDHQ, to DG FRANCOTRAIN. Humour made one of its occasional appearances in Ottawa: the Division was often called the Spanish Railroad, as the Spanish dictator Franco was still alive at the time. Consequently after two requests — one having gone astray — CDS Dextraze approved a change on 14 February 1974. DG FRANCOTRAIN would become DG *LADIF*.<sup>62</sup> Then, in September 1976, DG *LADIF* was dismantled. There remained in Ottawa only two positions for majors in the Directorate Individual Training (DGRET), part of the Directorate General Recruiting, Education and Training, to work on FRANCOTRAIN.<sup>63</sup> In 1979, the number of majors was reduced to one and the post was not filled between 1981 and 1985. Does this mean that *LADIF*'s job was complete in 1976? Unlike Brigadier-General D. Gagnon, the last Director General of *LADIF*, we doubt it very much. On 24 November 1975, Gagnon came in a roundabout way to accept the dismantling of his division, which had been proposed in 1972. However, he said, the replacement body in Ottawa should be at the directorate level. As we have just seen, his recommendation was ignored.

When we study the question of training in French in the Forces, we come to understand that 1973 was a pivotal year which had many repercussions. Let us go back to our discussion of the relocation of schools to Quebec, in April 1973. At that time the Defence Management Committee asked that this relocation, which it had agreed to in principle, should be studied in more depth and a plan drawn up for presentation to Treasury Board. The study was

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\* DGRET at that time.

carried out during the summer.<sup>65</sup> In October 1973, Lieutenant General W.A. Milroy, the new ADM(Per), who had been promoted to this rank after heading Training Command, reviewed the training situation in French for the chiefs of branches at NDHQ and the Commanders. Speaking of Phase III, he said that only six of the 64 trades taught in the Forces were offered in Quebec. The Defence Management Committee decided to relocate some schools to Quebec; they considered this a necessary step to meet B & B goals. But these changes, Milroy wrote, were not “cost effective”.<sup>66</sup> This blow was followed by a series of others in January 1974. Milroy began the new year with a devastating memorandum against the undesirable relocation of schools to Valcartier, Saint-Jean and Montreal. Firstly, he said, the Department did not have much latitude with regard to funds, which had already been limited for several years, and could not afford costly changes. But there were other reasons:

- The number of instructors and senior staff had been reduced in the schools, which had made for greater integration of the different courses, not an increase in courses as was planned in Phase III.
- Phase III was scheduled for 1976-1977, but there were now plans to make costly investments in 1974-1975. Before this, however, Training System’s commitments would have to be reviewed because it could not undertake all that had been planned for 1974-1975. Priorities would be decided after this review.
- Cost estimates for the changes were incomplete. Had someone thought, for example, of the sums required for construction on the bases of new housing and schools for the children of military instructors; of inflation, which could be 12 percent to 20 percent if steel was used in the construction of the military schools?
- Finally, the Training Commander had also sent negative comments, very similar to those that Milroy himself had made on 22 February 1973 when he was Commander, Training Command, at Winnipeg.

Milroy suggested that a new detailed study be made, this time by the Program Control Board Construction Sub-Committee, on the total requirements for training, including projects already approved or about to be approved. A DGRET representative would make a presentation to this sub-committee.<sup>67</sup>



Major Filiatrault, the permanent representative from DG *LADIF* in Ottawa, completely disagreed with Milroy's arguments. He wrote a memorandum stating his objections, which he put on file. During the summer of 1973, Filiatrault had worked on planning the relocations, as the Defence Management Committee had asked him to do in April. His unpublished comments deserve to be quoted. Why was Phase III impracticable and undesirable, he asked. What standard of comparison was being used? For example, the personnel reductions mentioned had been taken into consideration in June and July 1973, but that had only led to cancellation of one of the moves discussed — the non-trade driver training. Milroy had spoken of considerable expenses for 1974-1975, without stating them exactly. Filiatrault set out the financial implications as they had been presented in the report he had helped to prepare:

1973-1974 — \$ 1,384,000  
1974-1975 — \$ 2,266,000  
1975-1976 — \$ 19,505,000  
1976-1977 — \$ 21,438,000  
1977-1978 — \$ 25,450,000  
1978-1979 — \$ 8,777,000

As can be seen, expenses were lowest between 1973 and 1975 and highest from 1975-1976.

Filiatrault continued his point-by-point argument by emphasizing that Phase III of FRANCOTRAIN was a directive from the Defence Management Committee while the other activities of the Training System were not. The future study was to combine all sorts of disparate projects, not all with the same intrinsic value. Concerning the costs of schools and housing mentioned by Milroy, Filiatrault submitted that they had never been thought necessary at Saint-Jean, either in the summer of 1973 or in January 1974. At Valcartier and Montreal, the necessary infrastructures were already in place, on the bases themselves or in the area. According to Filiatrault, Training Command's comments "should be taken for what they are worth, coming from a command that has always been against Project FRANCOTRAIN. These comments of 22 Feb 73 ... were considered ... [and presented] to DMC. DMC nevertheless approved the Project in principle over the objection of TCHQ."<sup>68</sup> The review by the construction sub-committee ordered by Milroy was no doubt based on a sound financial basis but, stressed the Major, compared to Phase III of FRANCOTRAIN's deep meanings the study will be out of context.<sup>69</sup>

Ten days after receipt of Milroy's order, the sub-committee started work in some confusion. Several of its members questioned the validity of the figures given by the representative of the Chief of the program for amounts not provided in the financing program for the next five years — about \$30 million — that would have to be found if some schools were relocated.<sup>70</sup> Milroy, who did not attend these meetings, was kept well informed about them by one of the participants, E.S. Baker, Director General Manpower Utilization (DGMU).

On 31 January, the sub-committee rejected the proposed changes to the program presented to them for Saint-Jean and Saint-Hubert and asked the ADM(Per) to do the work again and bring it back to the sub-committee. Some questions needed to be answered. Was not the trade of air traffic controller, which they wanted to move to Saint-Hubert, to be part of some integrated inter-departmental courses being studied as a possibility by the government? Was the terrain at Saint-Jean suitable for land ordnance engineering (LORE) and non-trade drivers? Finally, relocation of the Chilliwack Warrant Officers School to Longue Pointe (Montreal) should be reevaluated because of the costs involved.

During sub-committee discussions, it was mentioned several times that, while FRANCOTRAIN was government policy, relocation of the schools was Departmental policy, implying that this could be changed. The sub-committee's recommendation can be summed up thus: different bodies of NDHQ and Training System should jointly review Phase III of Project FRANCOTRAIN before working out as quickly as possible a combined, consolidated and financially effective approach. The letter covering this revision should present alternatives to the sub-committee and, after this first phase, to the Defence Management Committee.<sup>71</sup>

Milroy now had a mandate to replay the game he had lost the previous April. He had said at the time that his Command favoured additional increases in the number of courses in French (Phase II further extended), but rejected the principle of relocation of schools to Quebec because of the costs involved. On 23 January 1974, Brigadier General K.C. Lett of Training Command wrote to the DGRET in exactly the same words, repeating that for years they had been rationalizing the schools. The proposed relocation would run counter to this in a period of financial and human resource cutbacks.<sup>72</sup>

Milroy's concept won the day. For a time, the question of relocation remained under study. Brigadier General D. Gagnon, whom we have seen as first Francophone General from the air force and the last Director General of

DG *LADIF* before it was dismantled in 1976, presented Milroy with some alternatives in this field. Then they prepared to go through the channels again to obtain approval. But nothing came of this. The relocation concept was put off indefinitely. In 1987, it was still on hold.

If we are to believe Gagnon, and the facts tend to confirm what he said, giving up on this idea resulted in damage to the whole FRANCOTRAIN program. Indeed, the stubborn opposition to relocation by certain high-ranking persons has often been interpreted as a rejection of the very concept of FRANCOTRAIN.<sup>73</sup>

Let us look again at the underlying ideas of FRANCOTRAIN which were outlined by Allard in his 1985 memoirs, in the Ross Report and in the report of the Bilingualism and Biculturalism Commission. In essence, it was an attempt to correct the chronic under-representation of Francophones in the Forces by treating them more fairly. This translated into a desire to offer training in French. But almost all the military schools were located outside Quebec. In 1973, there were only two in Quebec, the *ERFC* and the *ETFC*, and it was clear right from the following year that relocations to Quebec of courses in French were doomed. Young Francophones would continue to learn technical trades in an Anglophone environment, in schools where they were in the minority and in cultural surroundings that were completely strange to most of them. This also perpetuated several trends that efforts had been made to eliminate since 1966. Scattered throughout English Canada, there were still small, isolated groups of Francophones without much power to exert pressure. Francophone instructors and their families would be posted to areas where it was difficult for them to live in French. Many of them would still be offered the old choice between accepting such changes for the good of their career or refusing them with possible negative results to their career and promotions. Studying this matter, we realize that the initial solution worked out by experienced Francophones was taken and watered down by specialists in a system who knew almost nothing about the problem with which they were supposed to be dealing. Their perspective was limited to the short term, to dollars and immediate efficiency. As a result, they prepared to follow the same principles that had been amply proven ineffective in integrating Francophones into the Armed Forces, both at the time of the two great wars of this century and in peace-time. What is more, the promises that were made in 1974 were not kept.

## FRANCOTRAIN bogs down

Another turning point occurred in 1973. Since there were no relocations, what happened to the number of courses in French? As we have seen, in 1972, 44 trades were offered in French up to TQ-3, that is to basic training level, allowing a young technician to start work in a unit. It was also planned to offer more advanced TQs in several sectors, starting in 1974. In fact, a December 1973 report indicated that in 1974-1975 six trades\* would be offered up to TQ-4, 5 or 6A, and the second and third phases of infantry officer classification (023) would be available in French.<sup>74</sup> Despite the scrapping of the great relocation project, following a decision taken in the first weeks of 1974, the performance orientated electronics training course was moved to the *ETFC* and would be available in French up to TQ-4.

But there were many obstacles in the path of development. If we look closely, starting in 1972 they all combined to make the fragile structure planned by Allard in 1966 (although not started until 1969) to crumble from within. Let us look briefly at some of these obstacles, not necessarily in order of importance to the matter at hand.

Part of the Bachand study, of which we spoke of earlier, dated 30 November 1972, dealt with the fact that English was the internationally recognized language of work in several trades and classifications: pilot, air navigator, air traffic controller, signaller (sea), radio (sea) and air defence technician, for example. According to Bachand, in these cases courses should be given in English to Francophones who had previously been taught the language. As we can see, in the view of this military officer, French was in several areas more of a handicap than an asset.<sup>75</sup>

This was expressed in another way at the time of the briefing tour in 1973. Going from Halifax to Shearwater, Colonel J.E. Hanna wondered why Francophone boatswains should be trained in French when they would be serving in English, the language of operations. Orders from the bridge would be in English. The proposal was then made to provide Francophones with English terminology as much as possible. Hanna also learned from this visit to naval forces that FRANCOTRAIN's whole value was frequently questioned. Several people wondered if it was very practical for young Francophones, after their training in French, to arrive in a work environment

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\* Weapons technician (sea),(061) TQ-4; radar technician (231); vehicle technician (411); traffic technician (933); flight engineer (091) TQ-5; and infantryman (031) TQ-6A.

where English, which they would not know well, was used.<sup>76</sup> In his fall 1973 report, which gave a summary of all the visits made since May, Hanna refers to these remarks.<sup>77</sup> Questioning the relevance of FRANCOTRAIN in a particular trade seemed a way of saying that the situation was much better before.

On 9 March, Hanna sent 2 copies of the notes he had made in Nova Scotia to the Director General Recruiting, Education and Training, saying that two corrective measures had been suggested: that fewer Francophones be recruited, or that Francophones' lack of English be remedied.<sup>78</sup>

On the same day, at the weekly meeting convened by the CP, the fact that Francophones serving in English Language Units did not always have an acceptable level of English was raised. Those present thought that more emphasis should be put on operational English during studies at the Language School. The problem, it was recognized, was that there were at the time more Francophones than could be placed in French Language Units. The DGRET was instructed to review the whole question.<sup>79</sup> This question and Hanna's memorandum were sent to Lagacé for action. On 21 March, the response was already sketched out in large part. Lagacé wrote that FRANCOTRAIN already strongly encouraged the learning of English terms. The problems being discussed were normal, given the present influx of Francophones. A solution had already been found: English courses of varying lengths for unilingual Francophones who had reached TQ-3.<sup>80</sup> Thus Lagacé, the very one who should have been defending the idea of equality of Francophones to be achieved through FRANCOTRAIN, clearly implied that the system really only existed to attract Francophones to the Armed Forces, where they would then be anglicized.

From the start of FRANCOTRAIN, it had been understood that compromises would have to be made before the ideal solution was achieved. That had been stated in, among other documents, Canadian Forces Administrative Order 9-53, still in existence in 1987. We have included significant extracts from this in Appendix N, and we shall speak of it again later.

What was to be done with the trades or classifications where English was required? In January 1972, Training Command had received agreement in principle that the training of Francophone pilots should continue in English. It would be necessary to their careers for them to have a good grounding in English. The Forces would undertake to provide them with this.<sup>81</sup> In February, Maritime Command, with the support of Training Command, had suggested

that some trades be placed under the heading “tutorial assistance”, because of the large amount of English they required.<sup>82</sup>

For student pilots, an English course was adopted with the emphasis on technical terms in order to bring all Francophones who were weak in English to an intermediate level of knowledge of the language. This was to prepare them for Phase II of the classification: selection for Phase III, conducted in English only, had become very stringent for Phase II candidates.\* According to Training Command, this new approach had been very helpful. Five of the six Francophone candidates had done as well in Phase II as their Anglophone colleagues. The second language tutorial program was also applied to two trades in 1972 and had met with great success, said the experts in a January 1973 report.<sup>83</sup> There was total agreement from Rear-Admiral D.S. Boyle of NDHQ, who added that Training Command had taken control of B & B questions right from 1969, and that it was thanks to this that FRANCOTRAIN was running so well.<sup>84</sup> The continuing addition of courses given in French no doubt justified this enthusiasm — as long as one closed one’s eyes to the relocation question, which, as we know, was already in difficulty, and to that of tutorial aid in English, which would ultimately prove to be a breach of the principle of equality of opportunity that would be used to the fullest without regard to consequences.

For the time being, however, tutorial assistance in English was a temporary measure, the understanding being that one day all training would be given in French. This said, the inevitable bottleneck created by compensatory recruiting of Francophones brought the reactions we have seen, which were not limited to the sectors we have mentioned. Brigadier-General J.I. Davies, Director General Personnel, noted in early 1973 that there were too many unilingual Francophones coming out of Training Command. They could only be used in French Language Units, reducing the flexibility of the Canadian Forces. His solution was to cut back recruiting or give more English courses to these unilingual recruits.<sup>85</sup> In short, regressive, ineffective solutions from years gone by were unimaginatively suggested. By concentrating too much on the present, the experts forgot the past as well as the future.

Erosion of the principle of equal treatment could be done in other, much more subtle ways. In May 1973, after discussion of Phase III by the Defence Management Committee, Rear-Admiral Boyle wrote to the Commands to take stock of FRANCOTRAIN. He reminded them of the goal — all courses in

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\* Phase I, available in French, was the same for all officer-cadets, whatever their classification.

French for Francophones — and the present constraints. He stressed that as the number of courses in French increased, the teaching of English to Francophone recruits would decline in importance. But for the moment, the following principles prevailed:

- Courses in French would put a good deal of emphasis on English terminology.
- Since English was necessary for Francophones, they would continue to take second language courses, except for individuals who were part of the combat arms or pilot projects.
- Since many graduates of FRANCOTRAIN could not be absorbed into French Language Units, the English Language Units where they were posted would be responsible for helping these newcomers in every possible way.

In addition to these guidelines, the following point was made: “Unless, in the opinion of school authorities, a student’s knowledge of a second language [sic] is inadequate, students may decide whether to attend a course of instruction in French or in English when both are available.”<sup>86</sup>

This last principle is extremely interesting. It arises from two others that many feel are much more important. The first is that of freedom of persons employed by, or dealing with, the federal government to choose which official language they will use. This has existed in a very explicit way since the enactment of the Official Languages Act, was reaffirmed in 1982 by the Charter of Rights, and in 1988 by the new Official Languages Act. The second principle is that of non-segregation, as Cadieux put it when he was Minister. Since the Department refused to create or even mention the idea of Canadian Forces divided along language lines — except in terms of the 26 percent Francophones statistic, for example — officials did not seek to establish what we shall call a Francophone stream, where a recruit who stated that he or she was a Francophone when enlisting in the Forces, thus becoming part of the desired 26 percent, would follow a totally Francophone path, at least in training courses.

As to personal freedoms, any military person would say that they are already quite limited. Anyone who has read an order concerning haircuts, whether or not men can wear a beard, or the kind of jewellery and amount of makeup permitted for women, must surely be convinced of this. Moreover, the

regulation which classes a person as a Francophone or an Anglophone\* limits freedom of choice in several cases.

Allowing the freedom to take a course available in both languages in English or French meant that a good many bilingual Francophones were steered towards English, in particular Francophones from outside Quebec and from some parts of Montreal. As a direct result, the possible number of students in French was reduced. This in turn placed pressure on the offering of courses in trades with a small number of specialists.

At the time of the study of Phase III, some naval and air classifications and trades had been put to one side because of the very specific form of learning in flight and because English was predominant in all these occupations. The navy had asked, in March 1973, that their classifications and trades be studied.<sup>87</sup> On 24 May, a directive forming a research group on this matter was issued by the ADM(Per). In it we read that, even if English must remain the operational language of the Forces, it was necessary to revise the training given exclusively in English in several sectors for Francophones. We must remember that CFAO 1-15, making French an operational language in the Forces, had not yet been promulgated. Consequently, the committee was asked to review the training associated with the naval and air operations branches to determine “the best method of conducting this training for Francophones”.<sup>88</sup> On 30 May, Colonel Hanna wrote to the DG *LADIF* to protest this wording. He (and Letellier) believed that the mission should have been defined as reviewing the training associated with the naval and air operations branches “in order to provide training in French to Francophone candidates”.<sup>89</sup> Nothing was done about this, and on 29 June 1973 it was specified that the study group be divided into two sub-committees, one dealing with the navy, the other with the air force. On 15 August the names of the investigators were provided. Brigadier-General D.J. Gagnon (DG *LADIF*) would preside over the whole study, and Letellier loaned him Lieutenant-Colonel Derek McLaws, a pilot in the former Canadian naval air services. Letellier was not happy about the mission or those who were behind it. At that time, the ADM(Per) was a civilian, T.S. Morry, and it was his assistant, Rear-Admiral D.S.Boyle, who signed the May directive. No doubt this is the reason for the precise instructions given by Letellier to his representative on the committee. The latter, after having spent a year in Quebec with his family to become familiar with the French language and

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\* See the glossary at the beginning of Volume I.



culture, had just come to Letellier's office where he would soon replace Hanna.

Letellier indicated to McLaws that he should give the highest priority to his role as a member of the study group — Gagnon and McLaws were not part of the sub-committees. They headed them, in a way. The DGBB added that he would consider it a mistake for the study to conclude that it was necessary to continue as before to train Francophones in English. He also pointed out the study group's inadequate mandate. If Allard's January 1969 directive had been followed up with structured plans and programs, we would not be doing "feasibility" studies in 1973. As Letellier's representative, McLaws should put forward a point of view beyond what was immediately achievable. It was necessary, he said, to find solutions for Francophones so that sectors would not be closed to them. Among other things they might consider the possibility of naval bases in Quebec. He concluded by saying, "Finally while you should support the practical and common sense approach and even in some cases the short term compromise, you must remain adamant and insist on the application of the principles ... leading to the instruction of francophones in the French language."<sup>90</sup>

The draft report on the navy was circulated on 24 October. The authors said that they had discovered serious difficulties with regard to the MARS and MARE classifications. While they had weighed all the factors, they believed that the commanders of the schools affected by their recommendations, if they were accepted, should look a bit further into the question.

Some characteristics of the report should be mentioned. It relied heavily on the directive stating that English was the language of operations — a fact that Hanna had contested unsuccessfully on 30 May. It was noted that large numbers of Francophones left the two classifications under study, a gap that was dealt with by giving them more English courses before they started Phase III of their training. As this initiative only started in the spring of 1973, it was still too early to analyze the impact, the writers had the temerity to say, completely forgetting what 63 years of an English language regime in the navy had done to Francophone representation.

How did the sub-committee approach the study? They examined the details of training in each phase, analyzed what "could" be accomplished in French at each step and what "should" exist, and dealt with the human and material resources necessary to implement the suggested changes.

The authors, who cited the goals of FRANCOTRAIN on the one hand, on the other stressed the fact that English was obligatory in the two

classifications. By examining what could be taught in French, they perpetuated the idea that the final product should be a bilingual Francophone. The French language could be used for training “provided safety of personnel was not jeopardized and that the student would subsequently be able to operate in English”.<sup>91</sup> As many technical terms only existed in English, they claimed, the student would learn them and use them in this language, the language of operations. Throughout the report, when they suggested that some aspect of training should be conducted in English, they meant that only English would be used. When part of a phase was taught in French, however, the technical vocabulary would often be in English. In any case, practical training phases would be in English only.” The question therefore becomes one of determining the optimum language to be used as the Francophone progresses along his training.”<sup>92</sup>

We are only on page 5 of the report (out of 14), and the authors have not yet started to give us the facts. We shall examine a few of these as listed. Part of Canadian naval officers’ training in MARE was done in England, which was why English was necessary. According to the French naval officer on exchange duty at the time, in Maritime Command, Francophones would need to take an adjustment course if they were to take this part of their training in France, a possible alternative. We note that this adaptation was considered in a negative light by the sub-committee; apparently it was not at all as negative for a Francophone Canadian to adapt to English in order to take courses in this language in Canada, or even in England.

The investigators had to study the Coast Guard as well, where they noted that officers were trained in French but a certain level of bilingualism was still demanded of them. They also observed that the language of work in the French language units of the Coast Guard and the language of communication along the Seaway was often French. The investigators did not go further than making this observation. Since English was the language of operations in the Forces, the latter had no doubt nothing to learn from the Canadian Coast Guard’s experience.

In the report the authors did take it upon themselves to recall the existing difficulties with regard to the number of qualified bilingual instructors for FRANCOTRAIN. Each time the number of courses in French was increased, a further burden was placed on this scarce resource. As soon as there was some latitude in this area, FRANCOTRAIN would progress. But the FRANCOTRAIN of the navy’s imagination was almost completely different from the one launched in 1969. For example, it was warned that when English was necessary, the Francophone student should have the right to a tutor, but not as a crutch. “The amount of tutorial assistance should be decreased

progressively to the point where the final examinations' are conducted in English."<sup>93</sup>

This analysis of the situation which (while based on the reality of the time) had nothing to do with the goals sought by B & B plans, concluded thus:

- MARS II — approximately 1/3 in French with technical and naval terminology in English;
- MARS III — approximately 1/2 in French, with technical and naval terminology in English;
- MARS IV — (COMMON) — 1/4 in French; 1/4 in French with technical and naval terms in English; logistic lectures in French if a Francophone is available;
- MARS IV — no French to be used.

No French would be used in the MARE classification courses, but some parts of the written examinations might be available in French. No one thought to explain how a technical exam in French was conceivable when all the training was in English.

That, according to the study group, is what FRANCOTRAIN should be for both of these two naval classifications MARS and MARE. As to naval trades, for which English was very necessary [Radioman (sea), Signaller (sea), Radar plotter], the same introductory remarks were made as for officers. In the naval French Language Unit, they observed, French was seldom used as the operational language. That said, they recognized that some very similar trades were already taught in French elsewhere in the Forces, especially in the air force. Such training was thus feasible if the necessary number of qualified instructors were available.

In the case of radio operators and signallers, it was recommended, the language schools should be relocated, when financially and humanly possible, so as to allow young Francophones to continue to improve in English while taking courses. For the moment, the FRANCOTRAIN courses would be given at Esquimalt. The theoretical part would be given in French "as far as possible," but the practical phase would take place at sea, in the language of operations — English. In order to have access to these three trades, Francophones would have to achieve an intermediate level of English.

Respecting these parameters, the FRANCOTRAIN courses for radio operators and signallers could start in September 1974.<sup>94</sup>

As unbelievable as all that might now seem, these recommendations were actually circulated at NDHQ in October and November 1973. This was only a few weeks after the end of the briefing tour the DGBB had conducted on B & B programs in the CAF, during which they had approached FRANCOTRAIN from the open-minded perspective of 1968-1969, and when experience had already clearly demonstrated that Francophones who received their military training in French were successful in the same proportions as Anglophones trained in English.<sup>95</sup> Obviously, Letellier objected strongly to the survey, the result, he recalled, of the mandate issued in May 1973. He repeated in writing what Colonel D. McLaws had verbally supported in the working group. According to Letellier, the underlying principle of training Francophones in French had been brushed aside; it was understood that the present situation could not be changed overnight, but they should still agree over the long term to achieve this goal through short-term objectives.<sup>96</sup>

Shortly after Letellier made these comments on the naval sub-committee's report, the report on the air force was received. It dealt with the classifications of pilot, air navigator and air traffic controller and the trade of assistant air traffic controller. While the investigators may have made a serious study of the possibility of using French in flying — for example, visiting the flying school at the Chicoutimi CEGEP — they decided to cling safely to the assertion that English was the language of operations. They concluded more or less as follows: in the four occupations studied, the francophone graduate should be functionally bilingual at the end of training, which should not preclude courses to be given in French. In a more professional way than had been done with the navy, with a more in-depth analysis of the factors involved, they looked at all elements of training.

The conclusion was that it was not practical to train groups of forty Francophone pilots. The first students to enrol might have to wait for weeks before a group of this size was formed and the course could begin, something their Anglophone colleagues, recruited at the same time, would not have to do. But, even with mixed groups and English courses, there were ways to see that Francophones had as good a chance as Anglophones to become pilots — for example, by ensuring that the students had an intermediate level of

English before taking the special course in English technical vocabulary;\* by providing them with study material and written exams in French (which is more than the navy provided), as well as bilingual tutors and instructors who would be available throughout their theoretical and practical courses. If a pilot trainee did not have enough English to be allowed to fly solo safely at the end of basic training, he would be given supplementary English courses. Something quite similar was proposed for Francophone future navigators: intermediate knowledge of English before starting on the course, theory in French, practical training in English, availability of tutors. For assistant air traffic controllers, training in English with tutors was suggested.

In sum, the Air Force report rejected the principle of total training in French for Francophone candidates for these jobs, which directly contradicted the goals of the 1972 plan.

The above proposed changes, in favour of Francophones would bring up translation problems. On the other hand, change in the number of instructors would be required since it would suffice to designate the existing positions as bilingual and fill them appropriately.<sup>97</sup>

Letellier commented on the Air Force report on 2 January 1974. While he found it more positive than the preceding one, he saw that it had major flaws resulting from the working group's mandate. He emphasized that the apparent obstacles caused by translation of publications related to the courses, or by the required basic English courses, had already been studied by specialized agencies. Solutions were beginning to emerge. He reproached the two sub-committees for ignoring the Official Languages Act, the Department's B & B plans and their implications; because of this they had looked for economically achievable solutions. This was a negative approach. The two reports were unacceptable and did not address the real problem. Letellier therefore recommended that the study group review and revise the reports, and said that he was prepared to help.<sup>98</sup>

Letellier was not the only one who was unhappy with the work that had just been done. Major General J.J. Paradis of Mobile Command wrote on 5 March 1974, concerning the sub-committee's report on the air force, that it was inadequate in that it upheld in another form what had existed up to then.

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\* Apparently the writers were agreed that having Francophones spend time learning English while Anglophone colleagues were already taking flying courses was less discriminatory than having them spend the time waiting for a group of 40 Francophone student pilots to be formed.

The tutorial aid as presented in the report was already a failure because, as the air report emphasized, a Francophone candidate who was isolated in an Anglophone environment often would not dare to ask the questions he or she should, out of fear of ridicule. While recognizing that a pilot should know English to communicate, Paradis did not agree with the reasoning of the air force sub-committee that this was the basic reason for English courses. Finally, Paradis said that the costs for B & B in the Forces were not the province of the sub-committee but of the government.<sup>99</sup>

Two other comments are worth examining. The first is that of Brigadier-General G.C.E. Thériault, a pilot, future CDS and, at the time he wrote on 18 March 1974, Commander of the 1 Canadian Air Group in Europe. His comments, similar to Letellier's naturally dealt mainly with the air sub-committee's report. But, unlike Paradis, he also commented on the naval report.\* In sum, even if English was the main language of communication in the Forces, said Thériault, the sub-committees had confused FRANCOTRAIN and teaching of languages, too often in their reports putting forward the idea that English was the language of operations. If the recommendations of the air report were accepted, the consequences would have to be accepted as well. For example, a Francophone who had to learn in English to be a pilot and learn English at the same time could not be said to have the same chance of success as his or her Anglophone colleagues. The approach had already led to high failure rates among unilingual Francophones. The basic selection process for pilots, with its difficult theoretical and practical tests, should be available in French. The system that would prevail if the report were accepted risked already familiar results: a lack of Francophone recruits and a low retention rate among those who made it through the entry stage.<sup>100</sup>

We will also include the comments of another Francophone pilot, Lieutenant-Colonel Jacques Forest, head of the Translation and Terminology Branch under Letellier. He wrote that he was completely staggered by what he had just read. He was critical of the negative comments concerning translation, in the naval report. He pointed out that the Commands had only to give him their priorities and he would then do what was necessary. If they could not get their priorities straight in Halifax, that was not his concern. He then attacked the idea of the proposed tutors, giving a little example of the likely results in aviation, an area with which he was very familiar: "*Baisse tes flaps et ton undercarriage avant d'atterrir* or perhaps "*avant de lander. Si*

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\* Armand Letellier has told us that he never received a copy of Thériault's letter and was thus not able to make use of support which would have been most helpful.

*t'allumes pas ton afterburner, to vas crasher. Fais partir ton engine quand le ground crew to donnera le thumbs up, etc.*" Forest was enough of a realist to admit that controllers had to know English, and that several technical documents could not be translated since they were very long and subject to constant changes. That said, however, the two studies made no attempt to treat Francophones and Anglophones equally. They accepted the idea of assimilating the Francophone as quickly as possible by seeing that he or she did not fail because of lack of English. If true goals and the steps to be taken to achieve them were immediately set, matters could develop as they should. What rightly irritated him most was that the real question had not been dealt with.<sup>101</sup>

Obviously not all the comments were in this vein. Rear-Admiral Boyle, promoted to Vice-Admiral in March 1974, was now head of Maritime Command. It was he who, as Chief of Personnel, had endorsed the mandate of the study group a year earlier, and his view was that the two sub-committees had done a very good job. He feared, however, that they might be going too fast in implementing the suggested measures for the navy while qualified instructors were still lacking at Halifax. Having read Letellier's comments, he waved them aside, calling them "untimely". English was the language of communication in the Forces and would remain so for a long time yet. Francophones were not treated unfairly since they became bilingual while learning their trade, and without loss of pay or seniority.<sup>102</sup> Those who remember how Boyle's defended Letellier when he was the latter's superior at NDHQ will no doubt be shocked by the cynicism of his comments.

Air Defence and Air Transport Commands also approved the report.<sup>103</sup> Training Command saw in it intermediate solutions which should be implemented and studied again later.<sup>104</sup> In Ottawa, Chief of Maritime Operations Rear-Admiral R.H Leir and Chief of Air Operations Major-General W.K. Carr each accepted the report on his respective domain.<sup>105</sup>

What did Brigadier General D.G. Gagnon do about all this? In his opening comments to the report, he indicated the negative reactions, that the sub-committees' recommendations had raised while adroitly recalling what the mandate\* of the study group had been. He then repeated what Training Command had written to him: that the proposed solutions were not final, but

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\* It is possible that the mandate had been prepared by Gagnon himself before Boyle agreed to and signed it in 1973; that is frequently the case with such studies.

a step in the right direction. He thus chose, despite flaws which he recognized, to support what the sub-committees had produced.<sup>106</sup>

On 16 July 1974, Lieutenant General Milroy, ADM(Per), followed up the report by signing Instruction 8/74 entitled “FRANCOTRAIN III — Sea and Air Operations Training”, containing the conclusions reached by the two sub-committees. However, special emphasis was placed on some aspects of tutorial aid: all material necessary for study and for written exams must be in French, work on translation was to start immediately for the program which was scheduled for September 1975. In 1976 (the positions for bilingual instructors had in the meantime to be identified and filled) they would review the whole matter both to determine whether other measures were necessary to ensure the success of Phase III and to make plans for expansion, based on experience acquired and resources available.<sup>107</sup>

All this was a bitter experience for Letellier. He wrote, “In this matter, I had to bide my time until 1976. However, I resolved to assess this project, and to reopen the debate on the matter if necessary.”<sup>108</sup> Unfortunately, his book about his experience as head of DGGB contains nothing about the 1976 review. In fact, what concerned him in that year was the disappearance of *LADIF*, which he believed would have negative repercussions on the FRANCOTRAIN project: “I felt that we were not yet at the point [1976] where we could rely on the regular system to ensure proper functioning of French-language trades instruction programs. I was afraid that managers in this field would be unenthusiastic about an increase in their workload, and would be less willing to administer the French-language programs effectively.”<sup>109</sup>

In 1976 ADM(Per) Instruction 8/74 was not really reviewed. But we can observe that the air force worked hard to resolve the problems inherent in its implementation. The 1974 directive asked the air and naval arms to provide reports in March of every year. In the files we have read reports from the air force, but have found none from the navy. Major-General K.E. Lewis, acting Commander of Air Command, wrote in May 1976 that implementation of Instruction 8/74 was delayed by the lack of bilingual instructors, especially for pilots. Lewis demonstrated his willingness to deal with this problem and his annoyance at the continuing loss to the Canadian air force of so many good Francophone candidates.<sup>110</sup> His serious and sincere intervention brought up again the matter of tutorial aid in this category of employment. The following July, Letellier and the authorities at NDHQ agreed that for two years the percentage of Francophones in the air French Language Units would be reduced so as to release Francophones to provide tutorial aid at Portage la



Prairie and Moose Jaw.<sup>111</sup> Work was still in progress on translation of training manuals but there too, with Forest as Director of Translation and Terminology, matters were moving ahead.<sup>112</sup>

One of the difficulties in providing training in French was the lack of bilingual instructors. Compensatory recruiting of Francophones since the early 1970s, for the purpose of quickly correcting an imbalance of more than a hundred years standing, was bound to cause this kind of problem. As FRANCOTRAIN grew, so did the need for Francophone or bilingual instructors or tutors. This led to the debate we have seen on the subject of priorities for assignment of Francophones: French Language Units first, or training centres?

In C.P. Dextraze's 22 July 1971 letter, mentioned earlier, he spoke of this dilemma. In order to obtain 28 percent Francophones, he wrote, there would have to be a demonstrated readiness to treat Anglophones and Francophones equally. Training in French would be a major test of willingness to do so, and the Forces must deal with the problem in everyone's interests. These comments from Dextraze had been made when the priority for the use of qualified bilingual personnel placed Training Command at the top of the list, as CDS Sharp had ordered in July 1970. The Command's report on FRANCOTRAIN on 31 December 1972 spoke of unilingual English tutors (how could they help unilingual Francophones?) before declaring candidly that the temporary arrangement ordered by Sharp was not a success since the positions reserved for bilingual Francophones were not yet adequately filled. The report also asked that Training Command remain at the top of the priority list when the time came to transfer bilingual Francophones who were qualified to train.<sup>113</sup>

Letellier believed that the answer to the problem lay elsewhere. Francophones were needed to serve in the French Language Units and to fill bilingual positions; there were not enough of them to do both. In order to fill the void and solve Training Command's problems, more bilingual Anglophones must be produced. Unfortunately, their numbers were increasing very slowly, Letellier remarked, since it required six months to train them. It would be necessary to:

- issue a directive saying that a second language was a requirement for anyone wanting to pursue a career in the Forces;

- promote qualified bilingual Anglophones ahead of unilingual Anglophones.<sup>\*114</sup>

That said, the discussion returned to the priority of assignment of bilingual Francophones. Letellier and his peers, who emphasized equality of opportunity, then suggested that Anglophones should become bilingual in greater numbers. Training Command and its affiliates were only thinking of the problems of the moment, with the considerable influx of Francophones, the strong pressures to train them in French, and a lack of competent bilingual or Francophone instructors.<sup>115</sup>

Despite all the good will, often evident on both sides, the perfect solution was delayed, in part because the French language courses did not seem to live up to their promise. This is why there were complaints in 1973, at the time of the briefing tour, about the lack of qualified senior personnel for FRANCOTRAIN. Remarks of this kind were still being made in 1974 during the study of naval and air operations. Obviously it was in these two areas, where there were practically no Francophones before 1970-1971, that the situation was most critical. As usual, the land force came out better than the air force and navy.

In 1975-1976, when a whole series of supplementary courses was offered under the FRANCOTRAIN program (that is, completely in French or with tutorial assistance), reports still came to NDHQ indicating that success would depend largely on the availability of qualified bilingual training personnel. These were, in many cases, loaned to the school in question for the necessary weeks to prepare and to give the course.<sup>116</sup> In 1984 and 1985 a study showed that in 21 trades the number of bilingual instructors was still insufficient.<sup>117</sup>

Combined with the staggering blows to *LADIF* and FRANCOTRAIN between 1972 and 1976, this glaring lack of linguistically qualified instructors was no help to a system that was crumbling before the eyes of helpless spectators. Up to 1976, Letellier had too much to do to concentrate his attention on FRANCOTRAIN. In any case, *LADIF* was specifically in charge of the project. When, however, the Language Commissioner's 1977 Report appeared, with its harsh comments about the training of Francophone military personnel, *LADIF* had been dismantled. The Commissioner said that he was surprised by the "dissolution" of *LADIF*. The Department had decided that *LADIF's* objectives had been achieved and the time had come for the

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\* Other solutions were also planned; these will be dealt with in Chapter 15.

organization's "healthy" integration into existing structures. The Commissioner's team and several of the persons interviewed had reached a "quite different"<sup>118</sup> conclusion.

The COL's recommendations for training were to:

- a) ensure an on-going re-alignment of the CF Training System so that both official language groups were involved equitably in the design, implementation and control of training programs; in this way training would be as well suited to the needs of Francophones as it was to the needs of Anglophones;
- b) make certain that all training and development became equally accessible in the two official languages and that the quality of the programs, the courses and the instruction were equivalent in the two languages;
- c) draw up an inventory by August 31, 1987, of the internal and external resources still needed to ensure equitable professional training and development in both official languages with a view to allocating the resources required;
- d) arrange more training and development courses for Francophones, to be conducted in places where the atmosphere was favourable to the normal use of the French language in the same way as English courses were conducted in places that favoured the use of English;
- e) ensure that there was a fair balance between the number of training schools located and courses given in a French milieu and the schools located or courses given in an English milieu so that the two languages had equal or equivalent advantages and enjoyed throughout the Canadian Forces similar natural support from both language communities.<sup>119</sup>

It would be ill-considered not to mention some of the positive or negative observations of the Commissioner's team. Thus, the failure rate for Francophones in courses for professional qualifications offered in French was comparable to that of Anglophones — which is what everyone who had studied this question had thought for some decades.

Elsewhere the report emphasized that FRANCOTRAIN had never defined its long term objectives (for example: offering exactly the same range of courses to Francophones as to Anglophones) because of the power structure

within the Department. An analysis of the program would “reveal ... the contradictions within the Department concerning bilingualism; much can be learned about the forces at work and the reserved and often negative attitude of many of the Department staff simply by reading the various reports on the program.”<sup>120</sup>

As for arguments justifying this situation, they were indefensible. The first was that of the costs involved in properly training personnel in French. The Commissioner wondered why then “costs connected with activities carried out in English were taken for granted.”<sup>121</sup> The second argument said that there were at times too few Francophones to conduct a course. In 1975-1976 “dozens of courses were given in English to classes of under ten, sometimes as few as four or five.... In addition, on several occasions courses were given in English to classes in which half or more of the students were Francophones.”<sup>122</sup>

The third argument was the lack of qualified Francophone instructors. At CFB Borden, the school where instructors were trained, only one of seven courses was available in French. What is more, Francophone instructors often had to work in both languages, unlike their Anglophone colleagues. Finally, since everything had been planned and devised in English, instructors taught from translations which they sometimes had to do themselves, although they very seldom had had training as a translator. No courses were planned in French and translated into English.<sup>123</sup>

What the Commissioner seemed to be saying then, was that there was little motivation for a Francophone to become an instructor in these circumstances. He also attacked the simplistic ideas (which we have already noted) of the navy and air force. He noted that in these two arms, when it was thought necessary, there was no delay in asking for help from Great Britain or the United States. The possibility of doing the same in France or Belgium was dismissed, supposedly for security reasons. However, when it came to training sailors and pilots in French, as with naval operations, there was a great deal to be learned from these countries.<sup>124</sup> The Security Branch in Ottawa had been very discouraging with regard to some experienced Belgian naval officers who wanted to transfer to Canada. This attitude probably caused these officers, who were generally in lower ranks, to withdraw their proposal.<sup>125</sup>

As to Canadian military aviation, it showed no leadership in the field of training. Its air traffic controllers were trained in English only, even though military experts said that there was no insurmountable problem in making

them all bilingual. “They said that they would start tomorrow if they received orders to do so.”<sup>126</sup>

Finally, the Commissioner was unhappy that such a large part of training took place outside Quebec. The more so because some of those interviewed gave his investigators to understand that this was done deliberately so that a Francophone could become familiar with English while taking an electronics course in Kingston, for example.<sup>127</sup> This resulted in the Commissioner’s recommendation, which recalled the aborted relocation plan of three years earlier.

One of the notable aspects of the Commissioner of Official Languages’ report lies elsewhere. Reports produced by the DGBB, for example, mentioned the number of courses offered in French up to TQ-3 level. In 1974, in its annual report to Treasury Board, there is a table which sets out a spectacular improvement in the number of courses offered in French.<sup>128</sup>

Table 22

**NUMBER OF COURSES OFFERED IN FRENCH, 1969-1973**

YEAR	COURSES*	PERCENTAGE
1969-1970	4	6.1%
1970-1971	25	38.4%
1971-1972	44	67.6%
1972-1973	46	70.7%

The Commissioner, on the other hand, based his percentages on the total number of courses registered by Training Command in 1975-1976; that is, the list of those offered by all Commands, not taking into account the number of times the same course may have been given. He concluded:

It is still impossible today to acquire full professional training in French in areas as straightforward from a language viewpoint as music, health services, security and intelligence, information, management and administration, physical education and so on, or in essential fields related to aviation,

\* Number of courses up to TQ-3.

communications, the various logistics specializations, military engineering and so forth.<sup>129</sup>

This observation was based on the contents of a report from Training Command, from which the Commissioner's team prepared the following table. It was thus extremely difficult to contradict. The only positive aspect in all of this, Keith Spicer explained, was that the DND started from practically zero in 1969, and eight years later 10.5 percent of courses were offered in French. Depending on how Department officials looked at the question, they could always congratulate themselves on what had been accomplished and be satisfied, or they could look at the present and the future training of Francophones in a way that would encourage further efforts, given the vast amount still to be accomplished. The COL looked at things with the latter attitude.

Table 23

**TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT  
1975-1976\***

Courses given participants within	Number of course titles given in			Number of participants in courses given in:			
	English	French	Other	English	French	Other	Total
CF Training System	369	52	14	29,939	5,717	59	29,715
Mobile Command	99	20	—	3,699	1,032	—	4,731
Air Command	50	—	—	1,749		—	1 749
Maritime Command	163	7	—	4,589	205	—	4,794
Other	81	1	—	1,002	8	—	1,010
Total	762	80 (10.5%)	14	40,978**	6,962 (14.8%**)	59	46,99**

Source: "TSHQ Data Centre — Fiscal Year 75/76"

\* Does not include the Military Colleges, Staff Colleges, on-the-job training, exchanges, etc.

\*\* We have corrected errors in addition contained in the COL's Report.<sup>130</sup>

The reader may recall that the draft of Commissioner Spicer's report flabbergasted civilian and military authorities in the Department, in the summer of 1977. On 29 July 1977, Deputy Minister C.R. Nixon told Spicer that he believed in the same principles, but preferred to respect them in ways different from the COL.<sup>131</sup>

A curious thing happened at about this time concerning ADM(Per) Instruction 8/74 which, the reader will recall, was supposed to be revised in 1976. It was finally rewritten in September 1977, no doubt after a request from the Deputy Minister and the CDS to review all NDHQ directives with a view to examining how matters stood, and identifying what remained to be done to fulfil their mandate. On 22 September, Major General J.A. St-Aubin, Chief of Personnel Development, sent the revised version of the ADM(Per) instruction to Lieutenant General J.D. Smith, who signed it. Nothing changed for aviation courses, except that two trades were added to the list of courses available with tutorial aid: Air Weapons Controller and Air Defence Technician. On the naval side, however, a large concession had been made: officer classifications MARS and MARE would from then on be taught in French in all phases. The three other trades would be given in French up the TQ-3; at TQ-4 instruction would be in English with tutorial aid available. Finally, the directive added a new course to the tutorial aid list, a basic course in aeronautical and preventive medicine.<sup>132</sup>

Before circulating this new version, Smith sent it to Letellier for comment. Years later, in 1985, at the time of a study done on FRANCOTRAIN, it was realized that this document had stayed in the DGOL's drawer (with a note saying that it should be studied as soon as possible). What is more, the original directive was by then no longer on the list of instructions that were then in effect.<sup>133</sup> As we can see, the lack of general direction the Commissioner had emphasized also affected more limited matters at the very moment he was preparing his final report.

In September 1977 a Treasury Board Circular stipulated that "professional training or development should be available, in both official languages where feasible, by 31 December 1978, and possibilities for professional development for francophones should be comparable to those for anglophones."<sup>134</sup> At the Department of National Defence there prevailed a calm certainty that much had been done for B & B. Neither the Commissioner of Official Languages nor the Treasury Board succeeded in convincing the Defence Staff that there were enormous shortcomings in the system. On 20 March 1978 Deputy Minister Nixon wrote to the new Commissioner, Maxwell Yalden, informing him that the Department was studying the recommendations of his predecessor and intended to reply, indicating which of them:

- a. had already been implemented or were in the process of being so;
- b. were peripheral to the Department or did not fall under its control;  
or
- c. required major expenditures beyond the present capacity of the DND.<sup>135</sup>

On the following 25 October, the final response was sent. The Department rejected the two last recommendations concerning FRANCOTRAIN, which would have had the merit of reviving plans for relocation of schools to Quebec for Francophones. The pretext given was that they would result in duplication. The third (c) was still under study. The first, it was claimed, was completely implemented.\* Recommendation (b) was partially implemented, but complete implementation was not desirable.<sup>136</sup> Overall, the response confirmed what could have been seen in the summer of 1977 — the Department did not take the Commissioner of Official Languages' work very seriously.

There was then a new round of studies and comments at higher levels and in different circumstances from those of the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s. It would certainly be false to claim that the situation for Francophones did not continue to improve between 1977 and 1980.

In 1979, the training provided in both official languages in the land forces for men going into combat arms was studied. The conclusion was to keep the activity at Valcartier in French up to TQ-3, but to concentrate most of the remaining training at Gagetown on condition that Francophones could do so in French. This program was effectively implemented, even though it went counter to one of the recommendations of the Commissioner of Official Languages. He had suggested in 1977 that more courses in French be offered in Quebec. Curiously, many of the opponents of the Gagetown decision used as one of their arguments that too much account had been taken of the Commissioner's 1977 recommendations which were not Department directives. Priorities in this kind of study, it was argued, should be military ones. *Esprit de corps* had to be considered.<sup>137</sup> Observing these reactions from certain limited sectors of the land force, the most Francophone and francophile of the three arms, we can understand the extent to which the polite but obvious rebuff that senior authorities had made to the Commissioner

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\* Such a claim astonishes us to this day.



in 1977-1978 had eroded B & B in the Forces. This did not, however, prevent positive voices from continuing to make themselves heard.

Thus, in June, when several persons were wondering about the abnormally high number of Francophones leaving the land forces, Colonel Terry Liston, on staff at Mobile Command HQ (he had served in the R22<sup>c</sup>R and ended his career as a Major General), made an interesting suggestion. The problem had been studied too long, he said. It was time for action, and Liston took examples from trades practised in the three arms to demonstrate that what the B & B Commission had said in 1969 was still valid.

For soldiers (except in the artillery, and the difference was very small) the attrition rates for Francophones and Anglophones were comparable, Liston wrote. Coincidentally, Francophone recruits were trained at Saint-Jean, in Quebec, in their own milieu. Comparison of this to the disastrous attrition rate among Francophone officer-cadets trained in French in Chilliwack, British Columbia, cleared away doubts about the value of training Francophones in their own milieu. If more proof was needed, the rank of Corporal provided it. The attrition rate for Francophones was increasing everywhere except in the infantry where they were capable of training the men in French, in their milieu, even in Lahr, Germany. For sergeants, Liston observed a reversal: attrition rates for Francophones and Anglophones were equal, except in the combat arms. Liston thought that Francophones outside of combat arms who reached the level of sergeant had already given up and spoke English. Those who could not cope in English had left the Forces. In the army, it was precisely at the rank of sergeant that other ranks started to come seriously in contact with English, because they were often transferred for the first time out of their own environment. From warrant officer up, there were so few Francophones left that any comparison became useless.

Liston added that the number of studies made little difference. The “facts of life” were not going to change. Francophones were “people”. They worked better in their own language than in another, and they wanted to send their children to French schools as did most of their Francophone fellow citizens. In short, Liston called for the implementation of the recommendations the Language Commissioner made in 1977. The military had to stop running around in circles.<sup>138</sup>

The problem of the lack of Francophones in the land forces was still not solved in March 1980 when Lieutenant-General J. Paradis, in search of solutions for Mobile Command, made a judgment on the navy. His comments are worth mentioning, though the reader must keep in mind the partisan attitude of the author. First of all, the Forces had shown that they were unable

to implement FRANCOTRAIN throughout the system. Therefore, given the urgency of the situation, short-term realistic objectives had to be achieved. The Francophones who stayed in the navy were anglicized through marriage and work. Those who left this service often had done so because they and their families felt cut off from their own environment. The navy, with centres at Halifax and Esquimalt, never attracted the planned percentage of Francophones. The only way to achieve this would be to create naval military installations in Quebec. From TQ-4 up, trades were taught in English only; Francophone officers could only work in English, and there was nothing on the horizon to give them hope for a more promising future.<sup>139</sup> In fact, Paradis thought that recruiting for land forces as many Francophones as possible would get better results toward attaining the national representation groups objective than trying to reach 27 percent of Francophones in each of the three elements.

### **FRANCOTRAIN in the 1980s**

Almost three months later, the section of the revised military plan devoted to FRANCOTRAIN (Chapter 6 of the program) said that the Canadian Forces should make training and courses in English and French available “to the greatest extent possible.”<sup>140</sup> “However, the essential requirement to have a knowledge of English in almost all classifications and trades raises a question as to the practicality of providing certain training completely in French.”<sup>141</sup>

The Official Languages Plan (Military) of 1980 then listed the broad objectives of FRANCOTRAIN (equal opportunities for Francophones, improvement of representation of Francophones while lowering failure rates). FRANCOTRAIN was designed to provide courses in French in a progressive manner, both those leading to qualification in a trade or classification, and those meant to train specialists in each job category, even though the courses might not be a prerequisite for career advancement.

Depending on the classification or trade, the number of courses to be taken varied. For this reason, in the two following tables, which show FRANCOTRAIN’s position in 1980, we will find at the different levels of qualification fewer job categories than actually existed. Tables 24 and 25, from the MOLP, describe respectively the situation for the 29 officers’ classifications and 97 trades that existed in 1980.


Table 24<sup>142</sup>**OFFICER CLASSIFICATION COURSES**

Classification Course	No. of classification	Available in French	%	Available with TA	%	Total
PHASE I (Basic) Common to all classifications	29	29	100	—	—	100
PHASE II (Intro. to classification)	24	11	45.8	11	45.8	916
PHASE III (Special to classification)	15	3	20.0	7	46.7	66.7
PHASE IV (Special to classification)	12	2	16.6	5	41.7	58.3
	Total	45	56.25	23	28.7	84.9

Table 25<sup>143</sup>**OTHER RANKS TRADES QUALIFICATIONS**

Trade Qualification Level	Number of Trades	Available in French	%	Available with TA	%	Total
1 & 2 (Recruits) (course common to all trades)	97	97	100	0	0	100
3 (Intro. to trade)	64	47	73.4	16	25.0	98.4
4 (Special to trade)	13	2	15.4	10	77.0	92.4
5 (Special to trade)	58	21	36.2	13	22.4	58.6
5A (Special to trade)	11	0	0	2	18.1	18.1
6A (Special to trade)	40	4	10	14	35.0	45.0
6B (Special to trade)	28	1	3.6	4	14.3	17.9
7 (Special to trade)	5	0	0	1	20.0	20.0
8 (Special to trade)	1	0	0	0	0	0
	Total	172	54.25	60	18.9	73.15

A former officer-cadet at the Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean, Captain (N) Marc Garneau, OC, OMM, CD, was also the Canadian astronaut who made a flight on space ship Challenger from 5 to 13 October 1984, which set a precedent in Canadian aerospace history.  
(CFPU/REP 83-202)



Lieutenant-Colonel M.A. Lise Boulanger, LLL, was the first woman to become a judge in the office of the Judge Advocate General of the Canadian Armed Forces.  
(CFPU/REP 85-146)

Let us put aside the courses with tutors, knowing how little they can do in fact for Francophones. Thus reading the “available in French” column, we find that Francophone officers and other ranks can respectively take 56.25 percent and 54.25 percent of their courses in French. Let us add to this observation the following, also taken from the MOLP.

In addition to the courses which provide the fundamental qualifications required in each classification or trade, the CF also conducts approximately 788 classification and trade specialty qualification (COQ/ TSQ) courses in training schools or within units. These courses, which are established to meet specific job requirements within a classification or trade, vary in duration from a few days to several months. While many such courses are conducted regularly, others are offered only on an as-required basis. In many cases the small number of Francophone students makes it impractical to offer courses in French or to schedule them in French on a regular basis. Additionally, the present shortage of suitably qualified bilingual instructors places limitations on DND’s capacity to increase rapidly the number of courses in French. At present, approximately 50 COQ/TSQ courses are available in both languages.<sup>144</sup>

Setting aside for the moment the adverb “approximately” in the preceding paragraph, and our certainty that several of the 50 courses in French referred to were offered with tutorial assistance, in fact 6.34 percent of the courses referred to were available in French in 1979-1980. If all the courses are added — those on tables 24 (68) and 25 (232) — to the 788 mentioned in the above quotation, we come up with a grand total of 1,088 (in Appendix N, which is the CFAO 9-53 revised in September 1986, the figure mentioned is 1,200 courses). The percentage of courses available in French in 1980 was thus approximately 24.3 percent. As can be seen, they were still far from achieving even a semblance of equality. That being said, this percentage is still a big improvement on the 10.5 percent noted by the Commission of Official Languages three years earlier.

In the revised 1980 plan, the argument for rapid assimilation of Francophones to the English language took precedence over equality of opportunity. In fact, on the subject of FRANCOTRAIN, the plan says:

In the context of the one-force concept, it is inevitable that there will be a requirement, especially in NATO, NORAD and UN operations, for

Francophones in most MOCs\* to communicate in English as they progress in rank. Similarly it will gradually become necessary for Anglophones to operate and communicate in French as the CF evolves into a bilingual institution. While this requirement can, for the most part, be met through language training, the previously mentioned factors such as the small number of Francophone students for certain courses and non-availability of qualified instructors, must be taken into account when determining the practicality of developing courses in French. In some cases, the tutorial assistance approach may be more realistic and ultimately more beneficial, from a career point of view, to the person undergoing training. However, it is reiterated that in most cases the aim remains for tutorial assistance courses to gradually evolve into totally French courses.<sup>145</sup>

We should recall here that authorities higher than the DGOL were responsible for accepting this program. At the top were the Minister (Gilles Lamontagne, a former Air Force pilot), the CDS (Admiral Falls, a former naval air pilot), and Deputy Minister C.R.Nixon (a former officer in the Canadian navy), all of whom had supported this document. We should also recall that FRANCOTRAIN had been undeniably successful between 1968 and 1980 in bringing the failure rate for Francophones to about 20 percent (from 45 percent) in trades available in French up to TQ-3; this was comparable to the Anglophone failure rate in training courses in their own language.<sup>146</sup>

The problem of lack of bilingual training staff was still critical in 1980.<sup>147</sup> But was this ever discussed in an open way? For example, could DND not have hired qualified instructors from among retired Francophones or offered supplementary service periods to qualified persons who were on the point of retirement?<sup>148</sup>

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\* Military Occupation Category

In the early 1980s it was impossible not to notice that FRANCOTRAIN was in disarray and moved as the wind blew, without precise directives as to its goals.\* The pinch continued to be felt most in the naval trades, particularly in the two large categories of MARE and MARS, as we saw in Chapter 11. In 1983, it was resolved to look at this problem once more, in isolation. On 23 March, the VCDS, Lieutenant General Gérard Thériault, asked for an assessment of Francophone participation in these areas.<sup>151</sup> The study group, headed by Colonel D.J. Slimman, Assistant DGOL, could include in its report any relevant information on other categories of military occupations.<sup>152</sup>

The report from the Slimman study group was ready on 2 August 1983. Its extremely objective tone did nothing to hide the facts, which were as overwhelming in 1983 with regard to MOCs MARE and MARS as the Ross report had been in 1967 on the Canadian military as a whole. The 1983 study is about fifty pages. Let us look at what seems to us to be relevant at this point (Chapter 11 has already dealt with parts of the report.)

The first thing to note is that the MARS classification was, of all those open to officers, the one with the highest attrition rate. The rate for Francophones was higher than that for Anglophones. Phase I, available in French, had a similar attrition rate for Anglophones and Francophones. Following this phase, Francophones in the officer candidate and direct enrolment plans without the required proficiency in English went to the Language School. The instructors and many of the officer-cadets interviewed believed that Esquimalt, with its naval environment and Anglophone milieu,

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\* Perhaps this is why Department authorities tended to quickly evade any question concerning training in French when they appeared before a joint committee of the Senate and Parliament in November 1981. They were asked if there was any relationship between the large number of Francophones leaving the Forces and the lack of French training. The quick response: "All basic training, as we indicated, is now conducted in both official languages."<sup>149</sup> Lieutenant-General Carswell then moved quickly in another direction, making good use of the leeway his questioner had given him by asking two questions at once. The second question, dealing with work instruments for training, was dealt with in depth. Two days later, Lieutenant-General Thériault was asked to answer a question from MP Deniger about the range of possibilities for Francophones. He said that Francophones could not be posted only to FLUs and that at some point they might want to take up posts where English was necessary. Therefore the CAF were anxious to "provide Francophone members of the Armed Forces with the opportunity to take classes in English in order that their unilingualism does not prevent them from achieving their career aspirations."<sup>150</sup> In sum, here as elsewhere, efficiency, as perceived by higher authorities, took precedence over equality, which should have been the basis of anything concerning official languages. If in general, as Thériault implied and as we know for a fact, a good part of all training was done in English, there is no doubt in our mind that this anomaly should have been corrected.

would be preferable to Saint-Jean.\* Moreover, according to the Slimman team, it was not evident that the level of English required when leaving the Language School was sufficient to allow Francophones to succeed in the subsequent phases of their naval officer training. If they intended to continue to train Francophones using English, it would perhaps be better to ensure that they first understood the language well.

The succeeding and most critical phases (II, III, and IV) were conducted by Training Group Pacific (TGP). It was observed that MARE candidates, who had to have an engineering diploma and came most often from universities and military colleges, did quite well. In fact, if they were in the Regular Officers Training Program (ROTP), they did a summer course and had easier access to a long, less abrupt period of learning English, especially if they were in a military college. Here, Anglophones and Francophones were almost equally successful, about 80 percent and 75 percent respectively.

In the MARS classification, Anglophones and Francophones from the ROTP left in greater numbers (respectively 51 percent and 54 percent). But things were even worse for the Officer Candidate Training Plan (OCTP) and the Direct Entry Officers (DEO) where the percentage of failures increased rapidly: 65 percent for Anglophones and 82 percent for Francophones. These abnormally high rates meant that training an operations officer in the navy was more costly even than training an air pilot.

According to Training Group Pacific personnel, the language problems were not always apparent. Even if Francophones were told that they could ask questions, they often hesitated to interrupt the instructor. The Group also lacked bilingual instructors to further FRANCOTRAIN or to provide tutors for Francophones. Because of the level of English required, it could take up to six months longer to produce a DEO/OCTP Francophone officer than an Anglophone in one of these programs.

Before 1976, Francophones were all placed on one of the Group's three training ships for their training at sea. In 1976, because English was the language of naval operations, this was changed and Francophones were dispersed on the three ships. In this way, it was claimed, they would learn their profession and acquire the prevailing outlook more quickly. TGP said that, if all Francophones were placed on the same ship, their chances of

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\* Might not this suggestion result from the attitude that kept Francophones in the navy in the same position of subordination and forced acculturation that Ross said existed throughout the Forces in 1967?



exposure to English were reduced. This happened, let us emphasize, scarcely two years after the study by the naval sub-committee that had led to the ADM(Per) Instruction 8/74. Even more disturbing is that, when a study was done in 1976 on the “production” of naval officers (Maritime Officers Production Study), a paragraph was devoted to Francophones. It indicated that potential officers from this Canadian language group should at the same time cut links with their environment and learn to live in a very Anglo-Saxon naval tradition. It added that this type of person, prepared to abandon everything, was rare among the 27 percent of the population that was Francophone. Consequently the navy had to expect continued problems in this area.<sup>153</sup> This clearly leads us to believe that in 1976 nothing had been planned to change this system and make it more Canadian, and thus more acceptable to Francophones.

It is therefore not surprising that Slimman and his two assistants, one of whom was Captain (N) M.H. Tremblay, wrote in 1983:

For all practical purposes [despite Instruction 8/74] there is no tutorial assistance [in TGP] and the ability of francophones to survive [in the training courses] depends on the speed at which they can learn to function effectively in English.<sup>154</sup>

The lack of qualified instructors mentioned by TGP was also analyzed by Slimman. He noted that the navy had 78 MARE and 139 MARS bilingual officers between the ranks of Lieutenant and Captain (N). In 1983, 15 of the former and 37 of the latter held bilingual posts. The career managers claimed that they did not have the necessary information to determine the relative priority for manning bilingual positions with properly qualified personnel.<sup>155</sup>

The investigators were able to ascertain that there was a real lack of work instruments in French.\* The study group also corroborated what Major General Liston had written in 1979 and 1980: the older Francophones in the navy had a good knowledge of English and were often married to Anglophones. Without saying so outright, the three investigators thus touched on the question of acculturation.

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\* These two points — effective use of bilingual personnel and translation of technical documents — will be looked at briefly in Chapter 16.

Again reference was made to the Coast Guard. The paucity of Francophones in the recruiting centres\* did not seem to be because of their dislike of marine activities. Thus, in the previous year 36 percent of recruits at the Coast Guard College in Sydney, Nova Scotia were Francophones and the organization had therefore reached its goal of recruiting between 30 percent and 40 percent Francophones. Two main factors explained this success: Francophones were instructed primarily in French, and also received English language courses since it was recognized that this is an essential professional skill. A good part of the Coast Guard's activities took place in French Canada (30 percent of its officers served in the Saint Lawrence region).<sup>156</sup> As for the military naval arm, the Slimman team noted at the time of their interviews that young Francophones arriving at Esquimalt (after Phase I, given in French at Chilliwack) were not prepared for the reality that all instruction from now on was to be in English. They made a clear distinction between the fact that English was a professional requirement, which they accepted quite well, and the fact that they were not allowed to use their own language during training, which they accepted with less equanimity. The many failures and withdrawals at Esquimalt could not help but be bad publicity for the navy.<sup>157</sup>

The picture was scarcely a bright one in the navy. In the Regular Officers Training Program, an increasing number of naval officers were applying to be transferred to another arm. In 1985, the four graduates from the Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean who were to go into the navy asked to go elsewhere; their requests were all denied. At the Military College as well as at Chilliwack, positions for instructors or teachers reserved for naval officers were often filled by military staff from other specialties because of a lack of candidates from the navy. Another observation was that Francophones mostly withdrew or failed during Phase II. In Phases III and IV, the attrition rate was more or less equal between the two language groups. But, on final examinations, the Francophones often achieved lower marks than their Anglophone colleagues.<sup>158</sup>

From all this evidence it was concluded that, if training took place in a more bilingual atmosphere, the attrition rate for Francophones would drop and their interest in a naval career would be stimulated.<sup>159</sup> It was recalled that in 1968 a naval French Language Unit was, according to its Command, a bilingual unit. Slimman and his two assistants noted that the dissolution of *LADIF* had been premature and that reports from Maritime Command on

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\* The navy attracted the fewest recruits of all three services throughout Canada.

FRANCOTRAIN reached Ottawa and were circulated there without anyone making any serious comment on them.<sup>160</sup>

In their conclusion, the team spoke mostly of MARS because for MARE the principal problem was recruiting. In the first case, the attrition rate was so high that there was reason not only to introduce more use of French for Francophones but to review the whole selection process and the different steps for qualification (this has since been done).<sup>161</sup> This part of the Slimman report summed up all previous observations without making precise recommendations. In a conversation with Colonel Slimman in the fall of 1983, one of the authors learned that for internal management reasons the report remained as it was. The Commander of Maritime Command, Rear Admiral J.C. Wood, accepted the data in the report but, using the data collected, wanted to direct the reforms to be made himself. Some things have changed since then and, as we saw in Chapter 11, the number of Francophones has increased. It remains to be seen whether the actions of Wood and his successors will have had any appreciable results.

In general, we can say that, in the years 1983 to 1987, there was new interest in FRANCOTRAIN. The Department's 1983 report, for example, continues to mention the difficulties encountered: lack of bilingual instructors; insufficient numbers of Francophones in the higher levels of certain trades; important changes made in some courses, which meant that the French versions are constantly out of date; little money allocated to translation. At least they no longer hesitated to write that, even if the program was constantly revised, "further progress will continue to be slow".<sup>162</sup> The tables were more complete and consequently less complacently laudatory than those from the 1970s, at least up until the Commissioner's 1977 report. In 1983 the courses in English and French were distributed as follows:

Table 26<sup>163</sup>**MIXED TRAINING**

	OFFICERS		OTHER RANKS		MIXED OFFICERS AND OTHER RANKS	
	Total French Cours	Total French Cours	French Cours	French Cours	Total French cours	Total French Cours
Basic training	20	8(40%)	125	57(45.6%)	—	—
Classification training	122	12(9.8%)	556	144(25.9%)	—	—
Advanced training	399	7(1.8%)	1997	214(10.7%),	263	33(12.5%)

Brought back to reality, sad though it may have been, those responsible for the program could at least again begin the planning exercises that were so fruitful between 1969 and 1973. But it was a long trail. In 1985, a comparative progress table was drawn up for a study at Valcartier which we mentioned earlier. Here is what it demonstrated.

Table 27<sup>164</sup>

COMPARATIVE TABLE OF ALL CLASSIFICATION TRAINING AND TRADE  
QUALIFICATION COURSES GIVEN IN FRENCH OR AVAILABLE  
WITH TUTORS IN 1978, 1982 AND 1984

OFFICERS	IN FRENCH			WITH TUTORS			TOTAL		
	1978	1982	1984	1978	1982	1984	1978	1982	1984
Classification Training									
Phase II	45.8%	43.4%	30.4%	45.8%	47.8%	52.2%	91.6%	91.2%	82.6%
Phase III	20%	91%	25%	46.7%	90.9%	66.6%	67.7%	100%	91.6%
Phase IV	16.6%	10%	36.3%	41.7%	90%	54.5%	58.3%	100%	90.9%
Total	31.4%	27.3%	30.4%	54.1%	68.2%	56.5%	76.5%	95.5%	86.9%

OTHER RANKS	IN FRENCH			WITH TUTORS			TOTAL		
	1978	1982	1984	1978	1982	1984	1978	1982	1984
QM									
QM 3	73.4%	66.2%	68.8%	25%	21.5%	29.7%	98.4%	87.7%	98.5%
QM 4	15.4%	20%	23.1%	77%	13.3%	7.7%	92.4%	33.3%	30.8%
QM 5	36.2%	28.1%	33.3%	22.4%	24.6%	31.6%	58.6%	52.7%	64.9%
QM 5A	0%	0%	0%	18.1%	0%	0%	18.1%	0%	0%
QM 6A	10%	3.5%	13.1%	35%	32.7%	31.6%	45%	38.2%	44.2%
QM 6B	3.6%	34%	3.3%	14.3%	27.6%	40%	17.9%	31%	43.3%
QM 7*	0%	0%	25%	20%	83.3%	75%	20%	83.3%	100%
QM 8	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
TOTAL	34%	27.7%	31.9%	27.2%	25.6%	30.3%	61.3%	53.3%	62.2%

\* 4 courses only

We can observe several significant decreases between 1978 and 1984 in the column for courses available in French, as well as several increases in the number of courses with tutors. The author of the report noted that in courses with tutors the Francophones of the land force were as reticent as the naval officer-cadets to interrupt with a question. He came to the same conclusion as many other analysts: this kind of instruction was of little help to Francophones; they were asked to make constant efforts at understanding that their Anglophone colleagues did not have to make. The greatest frustrations came from the fact that CFAO 9-53 was not respected. The French versions of summaries and other teaching materials were often not available, except in the infantry; the examinations were often written and corrected in English.<sup>165</sup> In short, the substance of CFAO 9-53 had completely eluded them, which was predictable right from 1973-1974, when the innovators of the 1960s had almost all left the Forces.

What the Commissioner of Official Languages had observed in 1977 was still true in 1984. Francophone instructors were overworked and Francophone students, thrown into an English milieu, suffered. The reader will find in Appendix O what an investigator discovered concerning training of other ranks in the land force in 1984, and will see that at that date, approaching 1987 but fifteen years after FRANCOTRAIN began, even the land force was far from having accomplished miracles. In confirmation of this we shall add that on 24 July 1985 a complaint that had come to the COL about the language of instruction for Francophones at the Canadian Forces School of Military Engineering (CFSME) was sent to Deputy Minister D.13 Dewar. On 16 October, the DGOL sent a reply. Commissioner D'Iberville Fortier judged it to be incomplete and asked for additional information (12 December 1985). On 14 May 1986 he received a reply saying that "the problem can only be solved in the medium and long term ... the study of the situation is continuing ...."<sup>166</sup> Finally on 13 June, it was announced that several judicious changes would improve the language abilities of the officers at this school and that "representatives ... of NDHQ are currently studying this matter and in the next few months will be proposing measures to improve the situation in the medium and long terms."<sup>167</sup>

Shortly after the report *15 Years After* on Valcartier\* came out and had begun to be circulated, an extensive study of the FRANCOTRAIN program, in two sections, was set up by the ADM(Per).<sup>168</sup> This time the purpose was

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\* The commander of the 5 Canadian Brigade Group, who had requested this study, was Brigadier-General T. Liston of whom we have written when he was a colonel in 1979, in Mobile Command.

to evaluate the extent, management and future direction of the program. Contrary to the more limited study by Slimman two years earlier, Major I. Stenberg, chairman of a study group of three, which included Lieutenant Commander J. Russell and Captain F. Carrier, had a mandate to make recommendations. All of our observations up to now concerning FRANCOTRAIN were found in the Stenberg report, in one form or another. We will thus merely present below in three columns the conclusions and recommendations, along with a few supplementary remarks that we have taken from the body of the report when we felt it was necessary.

Table 28

**CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND REMARKS TAKEN FROM THE 1985 STUDY ON THE FRANCOTRAIN PROGRAM, LED BY MAJOR STENBERG<sup>169</sup>**

**CONCLUSIONS**

- |  |  |   |
|--|--|---|
| 1. DIT* is the NDHQ coordinator for the FRANCOTRAIN program.   | It is recommended that:  |   |
| 2. The position at DIT responsible for FRANCOTRAIN has not been filled by a full time Regular Force Officer.   | a. the FRANCOTRAIN position at DIT be filled by a full time Regular Force officer;   |   |
| 3. The NDHQ Instruction ADM(Per) 8/74 dated 16 July 1974, which gave direction for the introduction of the FRANCOTRAIN Program into certain trades and classifications, was deleted. | b. an NDHQ instruction concerning the specific FRANCOTRAIN Program goals of each trade and classification be developed and issued by ADM(Per); | The team said that the FRANCOTRAIN Program had lost its sense of direction.                               |
| 4. There is sufficient direction in training policy documents at NDHQ, Commands  | c. training policy documents, particularly CFAOs 9-15 and 9-47, be reviewed at all levels of Command   | CFAO 9-15 set out the method to be followed to establish and staff military courses; 9-47 was a guideline |

and Schools to conduct the FRANCO TRAIN Program; however, as this program is not specifically identified in the policy documents, it is possible to c o n c l u d e erroneously that the policies do not a p p l y t o FRANCO TRAIN.

with the intent of specifically identifying the FRANCO TRAIN Program;

for conduct in individual training.

5. The aims of the FRANCO TRAIN Program are affected by the timing of language training. Such training prior to TQ-3 of officer phase training prevents the francophones from obtaining a basic qualification in the same length of time as their anglophone peers.

d. a study should be conducted to investigate the impact on the FRANCO TRAIN Program of francophones taking English language training prior to their TQ-3 or officer phase training;

The investigators remarked that the infantry had courses in French without giving English courses to the recruits. They cleverly recommended a study on the need for English courses for recruits before they enter into a trade.(pp. 5,6)

6. The tutorial assistance policy, as written, is not totally adhered to by most schools.

e. if schools are to use TA, they must comply with all aspects of CFAO 9-53;

They noted that instructors or reference documents were not bilingual and, even worse, that a course provided for by CFAO 9-53 could be conducted in English merely at the initiation of a School, Command or DIT, in Ottawa, where the position of c o r d i n a t o r f o r FRANCO TRAIN was not filled (pp. 8, 9). It seemed to be too easy to change or cancel a French course (p. 9).

7. There is a perception that tutorial assistance s o l v e s h e francophone's

f. if recommendation (52.) e. is not considered suitable, the DIT be tasked to review CFAO 9-53 with input from



problems on an English serial.

8. Tutorial assistance, as it is now applied in the training system, places the francophone student at a disadvantage with his / her anglophone peers.

9. There is a shortage of French speaking instructors in 21 trades.

10. Some career managers give a higher priority to staffing other bilingual positions from the available pool of talent than to instructional positions.

11. Not all the identified bilingual, instructor positions at schools are filled by capable, qualified personnel.

12. Administrative support of the FRANCOTRAIN Program is, for the most part, not up to the same standard as the English training system.

Commands and Schools; "... the Infantry School has determined that TA is an ineffective way of conducting FRANCOTRAIN. They teach English serials or French serials in their purest sense. TA has become a non-issue with them. It is the study team's view that this is the model that should be followed." (p. 11)

g. career managers review the posting priority to designated bilingual instructor positions in

h. all bilingual instructor positions be filled by capable, qualified instructors;

j. designated bilingual positions in administrative and material support areas be filled with competent bilingual personnel;

As had the COL, they noted given that bilingual instructors (usually Francophones) had to do more work than the others. Schools;

Sometimes a specialist was sent to be an instructor because he was bilingual, even if he was not qualified as an instructor. The authors said that if one counted only the *capable Francophone instructors*, there would be more than the 21 trades mentioned in conclusion 9.

13. We have reached a point in many trades where training in French is no longer able to advance. The system is not prepared to give, nor is the student prepared to take, the training in French.
14. Because of the method of preparing new or redesigning old courses, a French serial cannot be started before an English pilot course is run.
- k. Commanders, with the advice of Branch Advisers, must establish procedures to increase training in French;
- m. new or redesigned courses be developed simultaneously in English and French.

The Stenberg Report made another observation which recalls similar remarks made by the Commissioner in 1977.

For many of those courses beyond the basic level, the student must decide whether to take the instruction in English with Tutorial Assistance (although TA is not adhered to as per CFAO 9-53) or wait, possibly a long time, for sufficient students to be available to run a French serial. At the present time DIT\*, Commands and the Schools, in conjunction with the career manager, may decide how to course load the francophone students. For example, the possibility exists in a trade for 20 francophone students to be loaded one or two at a time to a number of English serials with TA, rather than to conduct a totally French serial. This practice in effect circumvents the aim of FRANCOTRAIN.<sup>170</sup>

Now let us look at two complementary aspects of the report we have just analyzed. First of all, the reactions to it are relevant. Major General J.A. Fox, Chief Professional Development, supported the report in its entirety. But he warned that each trade and classification would have to be studied in order to see which could practically be taught in French and to have a better knowledge of the resource implications in each case. He said that recommendation “m” was idealistic. On the other hand, he concluded that CFAO 9-53 would have to be rewritten introducing tutorial aid categories (appendix N is the rewritten version that Fox spoke of in December 1985).<sup>171</sup> On behalf the Commander of Communications Command, Lieutenant Colonel

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\* DIT — Director of Individual Training

R. Grenier endorsed the complete report. His only reservation was that it would be unreasonable to teach the more advanced technical courses in French unless there were more chances for Francophones to work in their language, which leads us to the French Language Units. Finally, he suggested that the acronym FRANCOTRAIN be changed to something more French.<sup>172</sup> Maritime Command also agreed with the report's conclusions and recommendations, again mentioning the lack of qualified Francophone instructors as well as the great changes being made in the MARS and MARE classifications. In sum, they would do everything possible to do more to implement this important program. Rapid progress in the near future, however, would continue to be governed by how matters developed, given constraints caused by lack of personnel.<sup>173</sup> Training System agreed with Maritime Command.<sup>174</sup>

Mobile Command rejected recommendation "m". Colonel W.K. Megill added that in his opinion tutorial aid did not work: "It is difficult both for instructors and students."<sup>175</sup> Air Command persisted in the belief that tutorial aid was necessary in the case of its Groups (each conducted parts of training; for example, adaptation courses necessary for each pilot when changing from one type of airplane to another or returning to flying after a Staff phase). However, each Group admitted honestly that CFAO 9-53 was not respected; students often received their courses in English with no material in French. This situation would be remedied. The most negative of the reactions received by Air Command came from Maritime Air Group, where even tutorial aid was more or less done away with. Everywhere else, there was the sense that this assistance had balanced the failure rate between Anglophones and Francophones. It was noted, contrary to what some Commands had written, that in the air force the main problem was the lack of material in French, not lack of Francophone or bilingual instructors, even if sometimes in Maritime Group there was little room to manoeuvre, because bilingual positions had to be filled both in operations and training.<sup>176</sup>

The second area that we wish to emphasize is taken from a memorandum of 18 October 1985 that Major Stenberg, the officer evaluating official languages in the DGOL at the time of the report, wrote to his superior. Stenberg noted the sectors where greater vigilance on the part of DGOL would have allowed for reorientation of FRANCOTRAIN's direction. Obviously ADM(Per) Instruction 8/74, forgotten in the DGOL files and later by everyone, topped the list. Moreover, DGOL had done nothing when, on 31 December 1978, it had observed that the Treasury Board directive instructing that training available to Francophones should be comparable to that for Anglophones, was no longer respected. DGOL had also not made efforts to correct the anomaly that more than 80 courses existed only in

English, with no tutorial aid, thus contravening CFAO 9-53. Yet, according to CFAO 2-15, DGOL was the primary advisor to the ADM(Per) on anything to do with official languages in the Forces. Nor had DGOL reminded the persons responsible on site that they were supposed to report to NDHQ any difficulty encountered in meeting the requirements of CFAO 9-53.

The 1980 Military Plan called for (activity 6.1.3) a review of the FRANCOTRAIN program starting on 30 April 1980, and for annual projections of future activities and their implementation dates. These annual reports, continued Stenberg, were general in nature and were not uniformly prepared, so that it was difficult to tell whether or not there had been progress. Moreover, they contained nothing with regard to plans for the future. The same plan added, in a note, that the purpose of activity 6.1.3 was to ensure the earliest possible selection and introduction, in the French language, of the maximum number of new courses, beginning with conversion of tutorial assistance courses. The annual review would include details of availability of course manuals, work instruments and other resources in French (films, publications). Here again, nothing was done. It was understood that the Director of Individual Training was the main authority responsible for this sector, but DGOL was named as being equally responsible. "It appears that our division (sic) could be partially responsible for this situation because of its lack of monitoring and reporting."<sup>177</sup>

Stenberg concluded by advising, in quite a direct manner despite his rank, that DGOL become somewhat more involved if it did not want to be embarrassed by situations that could develop because of inadequate control. In his opinion, silence from DGOL was often interpreted as a sign of approval even when this was not always the case."<sup>178</sup>

To all appearances, the disastrous state of FRANCOTRAIN's health had scarcely changed in 1986. In fact, on 12 January 1987, the Commissioner of Official Languages sent to the Clerk of the Privy Council a *Summary of facts concerning contraventions to this Act by the Department of National Defence*, dealing in particular with the language of work because no "adequate and appropriate action has been taken by the Department ... [concerning] the above-mentioned recommendations."<sup>179</sup> In 1977, a predecessor of Commissioner Fortier had written that one of the great obstacles to the equality of status of French in the Forces was to be found in military training that was too often unavailable in French. Ten years later, Fortier believed that the Department had "failed to take appropriate measures"<sup>180</sup> to put into action the 1977 recommendation which called for a balance between French and English training. There were far fewer French than English courses. "In many

cases in which courses are not available in French, the Department provides what it refers to as ‘tutorial assistance’ in French to the Francophone students of an English language course. Tutorial assistance nonetheless represents second-class treatment and is unacceptable as anything more than a temporary expedient.”<sup>181</sup> In support of this, the Commissioner deployed two complaints that he had received about training, one of which had to do with the Engineering School. This has been already mentioned.

The following 16 February, the DGOL told Minister Perrin Beatty and his associate Paul Dick that corrective measures had already been taken “[TRANS] and the project [FRANCOTRAIN] has been revitalized”.<sup>182</sup> That referred to the revision of CFAO 9-53 following the Stenberg report. “[TRANS] Although it is criticized by the Commissioner, tutorial aid seems to us to be a logical and revolutionary method of proceeding gradually to instruction given completely in French, taking into account the financial constraints and the lack of bilingual personnel we have to contend with.”<sup>183</sup> Finally, said the DGOL, a system to monitor development of FRANCOTRAIN had been put in place. At this point let us remark that the constraints DGOL Sullivan had just spoken of had been pointed out by Allard in ... 1969, and the monitoring he mentioned was supposed to have been implemented since 1980, according to the revised plan for which he had been one of the main persons responsible.

Sullivan also stated that the case of the Engineering School at Chilliwack was being used by the Commissioner to demonstrate the Department’s bad will. This did not in fact exist because... “[TRANS] we are actively seeking solutions.”<sup>184</sup> He was equally eager to emphasize the problem of the lack, already pointed out innumerable times, of bilingual staff and appropriate French terminology. Finally, he recalled that some courses were only given once or twice a year and others were offered to only a few students. Ought they to dedicate resources that would scarcely be used in practice, he asked.<sup>185</sup>

That is still a good question. But let us ask it in another way. Could these courses that were given seldom or only to a small number, not be given in French on a regular basis — with, of course, tutorial assistance for Anglophones? Nowhere does CFAO 9-53 say that tutorial assistance must be offered only in French to Francophones.

In May 1987, during a meeting of the standing joint committee, Lieutenant General de Chastelain, CP, spoke of FRANCOTRAIN in these terms in his introduction:

[Francotrain] is a four-phase program progressing from an initial phase involving tutorial assistance in French, to a final phase involving a full curriculum in French. Submitted to a thorough evaluation in 1985, the project has been revitalized, and responsibility for it has been placed in the chain of command, with progress being monitored through an information system.<sup>186</sup>

As can be seen, there was no question here of spending time on the ups and downs of FRANCOTRAIN's history. The exchanges which followed the remarks by Departmental authorities did not deal with the program, although it came up twice in the replies, FRANCOTRAIN was used as one of the examples of what the Department had accomplished since 1972.<sup>187</sup> One might reflect that it was fortunate no MP or Senator looked behind the facade of FRANCOTRAIN.

The revitalization of FRANCOTRAIN mentioned in May and written in CFAO 9-53, resurfaced in June 1987, when the Department wrote to the Commissioner of Official Languages to tell him that "[TRANS] the FRANCOTRAIN project was being improved..."<sup>188</sup> And, on 15 September 1987, a message from the Chief of Personnel Development effectively relaunched FRANCOTRAIN in a practical way. It read:

The ultimate goal of the FRANCOTRAIN programme is to make all individual training courses (MOC, sub-MOC and Specialty) available in both official languages. From a practical perspective this goal may prove unattainable in specific instances. In these cases tutorial assistance,\* at the maximum achievable level as defined in Ref b, shall be offered.

Henceforth Ref. C, which is promulgated annually and amended as necessary, shall include the language of instruction in accordance with the FRANCOTRAIN program for each in-service course as a basic element of the tasking.

Ideally individual serials of courses shall be scheduled as English or French. Where the ability to schedule French Language serials is lacking and tutorial assistance is necessitated, tutorial assistance to the planned level in accordance with the FRANCOTRAIN program shall apply to each and every serial of training for a specific course. The practice of designating one or two serials as TA and the

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\* See Appendix N.

remainder as English only will neither be instituted or accepted as to do so erroneously denotes a lack of availability of tutorial assistance.

Further, when tasked to provide instruction in both official languages, but exigencies of the CF requires a serial(s) to be loaded with members from both linguistic groups then, as a minimum the training establishment shall conduct the training at the TA 3 level.<sup>189</sup>

This message, distributed to all Commands, which sent them to their units, affirmed a will to take action. Consultation of the relevant files clearly shows us, for example, that since the summer of 1986, Maritime Command had seriously taken its part in FRANCOTRAIN in hand with the firm intention of eliminating shortcomings in this area. It should be noted, all the same, that one year later the Commander of MARCOM was still facing the old problems. The Command lacked bilingual personnel and work instruments in French, he said to the Defence Management Committee on 31 August 1987. And, he added, these problems were being studied.<sup>190</sup> At this same meeting, General Paul Manson, CDS, insisted that there be more improvements to FRANCOTRAIN in general, remarking that in the case of general mobilization, for example, operational effectiveness of the mobilization plan would have to take into account training of unilingual Francophones.<sup>191</sup>

The review of all courses which Fox mentioned in 1987, has progressed a great deal since then.<sup>192</sup> As for instructors, wrote the Minister to Commissioner of Official Languages D'Iberville Fortier in December 1987, very high priority had been given to these positions, and in the next posting period [summer 1988], there ought to be noticeable improvements in this area.<sup>193</sup> Pessimists will remark that there was already good will all the way back in 1969. Who can ensure that in three or four years all will not be lost in the maze of military bureaucracy?

In the summer of 1987, P.G. DesBecquets replaced Guy Sullivan as DGOL. He immediately ordered a report on the general situation of B & B in the Department. This document, issued in November 1987 but with data taken from the previous April, stated that "only 8.7 percent of all courses are given in French."<sup>194</sup> So much time had been wasted between 1969 and 1987.





# 14

## Higher Education

Higher education in the Canadian Armed Forces is offered at three levels: in military colleges, for officer cadets; in staff schools and colleges, for captains and some senior officers; and at National Defence College, for colonels and generals. We shall study each of these levels separately.

### **Military colleges**

Histories of the founding of *Collège militaire royal (CMR) de Saint-Jean* and of Royal Military College (RMC), Kingston (a third college, Royal Roads Military College (RRMC) is in Victoria, British Columbia) have been published and are available to the public.<sup>1</sup> CMR and RMC were the colleges most affected by B and B; Volume I traced the course of this aspect of their history as far as the 1960s, and we shall now carry it further.

The Royal Commission on B and B asked Professor Louis Painchaud of *Université de Sherbrooke* to study how B and B was practised at University of Ottawa and Laurentian University, both in Ontario, and at *CMR*. His work resulted in a book.<sup>2</sup> Interested readers will find that the author, who taught French at *CMR*, analysed what B and B was at that military college shortly before the publication of the B and B Commission report. Painchaud maintained that none of the three universities in question was really a bilingual institution.

The bilingualism practised there is mainly “one-sided”, confined to French Canadians. It is mainly French Canadian teachers and students who are bilingual or have the strongest wish to become so. As a result, some of them come to despise this “one-way” bilingualism.<sup>3</sup>

Long before this book was written, Painchaud submitted to Colonel Armand Ross, then Commandant of *CMR*, a draft of report 17, which he had written for the B and B Commission. Ross wrote extensive notes on it and returned it to the author with his comments on 15 April 1966. Painchaud subsequently amended only points of detail in his version. On the following 14 September, Assistant Deputy Minister James A. Sharpe sent Michael Oliver, the Commission’s Research Director, a copy of Ross’s remarks,

including his strong disagreement with the conclusion that none of the three universities was bilingual.<sup>4</sup>

Now let us turn to recommendation 40 in the report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry on B and B (Appendix 18). We note three facts. First, the commissioners did not include Royal Roads in their considerations because it was supposed to close down; in fact, it still exists today. Second, they wanted *CMR* to become a French-language institution granting degrees up to the Bachelor of Arts while RMC remained English-only. Third, both colleges were supposed to place heavy emphasis on second-language training.

Rightly or wrongly, the commissioners had thus concluded that a bilingual *CMR* was ineffective, even though military personnel in both language groups liked to emphasize its bilingual status.

However, the proposed conversion of *CMR* into a French-language college did not sit well with the military or even with the Department's senior civilian authorities. General Allard, for example, wrote in his memoirs that the college he had conceived in 1950 would not only be at the secondary school level but also be a place where Francophones could prepare for RMC by learning English.<sup>5</sup> However, between 1952 and 1969, in the midst of some public controversy,<sup>6</sup> a tradition of shared bilingualism was created at *CMR*. While at first bilingualism was mainly confined to Francophones, the situation changed considerably over the 1960s, partly because of persistent and well-supported complaints that *CMR* was a place where anglicization took place,<sup>7</sup> and also partly because within the college, a similar observation led military authorities to encourage all officer cadets to be functionally bilingual.<sup>8</sup> Last and perhaps most important, there was a growing openness to sharing the burden of bilingualism between Anglophones and Francophones,<sup>9</sup> and not only at *CMR*, as the following case demonstrates.

In the fall of 1968, authorities at RMC, noting the obvious lack of interest among Francophone officer cadets, assembled a group to study both the problems faced by its French-speaking students and those facing Anglophones wishing to improve their French.

On 28 November, three Francophone officer cadets in their fourth year presented their language group's point of view to account for their lack of involvement in college life. Arriving from *CMR*, most of them were confronted for the first time with the reality of minority status. At the same time, they were well aware of government directives on B and B and found that RMC was doing nothing to implement them. Rejecting anglicization, they

turned inward, formed a clique and did not take full advantage of the opportunities available to them to develop their leadership skills.

Meanwhile, bilingual Anglophones wanted to improve their French, either because they wished to better their marks in that subject, or because they believed that promotions in the future would depend on bilingualism, or wished to enlarge their circle of friends or wanted to join in improving the Canadian dialogue. RMC was not very conducive to this, however. It was located in a very English city: a majority of officer cadets spoke English only and the use of French in college routine was not encouraged.<sup>10</sup>

After taking note of these facts a committee, consisting of Anglophone and Francophone officer cadets and two bilingual officers, was instructed to make recommendations. The bilingualism committee recommended, on 6 December, that RMC have a long-term plan to ensure that by the end of their time at the college, officer cadets had a minimum knowledge of Canada's other official language and the corresponding culture, so that the situation described on 28 November could be corrected. More open dialogue between the two language groups would be difficult to establish at RMC because of the problems noted earlier in the city of Kingston, and also the lack of bilingual staff and the Department's financial constraints.

However, the committee urged that as of January 1969, verbal announcements relating to non-academic routine (announcements at meals, in dormitories, during parades and so forth) be in French. After a month of preparation, a system of alternating English-French would be introduced. In addition, an attempt would be made to offer bilingual social activities (such as films).<sup>11</sup>

Following this, authorities at RMC wrote to Ottawa to ask that unilingual officers scheduled to be transferred to RMC in 1969 be replaced by bilingual staff.<sup>12</sup> One of the authors, a fourth-year officer cadet in 1968-69, recalls very clearly the committee's study, and even more, making announcements in French addressed to everyone without translation, in the second semester of the academic year.

The attitude demonstrated in this case by the military side of RMC, although its immediate effects were very limited, shows that B and B was gaining ground outside the confines of Francophone circles. The initiative by Commodore Hayes and his bilingualism committee, combined with those described in Volume I which Dean George F. Stanley had taken some years earlier on the academic side, paved the way for the much more structured steps taken to promote French and Francophones at RMC from 1975 onward.

After this look ahead, let us return to recommendation 40 in Volume In of the B and B Commission report, which relates more specifically to the future of *CMR* as proposed by the commissioners.

The reaction of Colonel Pierre Chasse was fairly representative of what many Francophones and Anglophones in the military thought of *CMR* in general. As regards the granting of academic degrees, Chasse merely pointed out that *CMR* would have to obtain a charter. He fully agreed with the suggested increase in emphasis on bilingualism at RMC and *CMR*. However, he urged against converting *CMR* into a French language unit, stressing the value and uniqueness of the bilingualism prevailing there. Instead of making RMC and *CMR* two unilingual units, he supported the part of the recommendation calling for increased bilingualism.<sup>13</sup>

This comment was not, however, taken up by Elgin Armstrong, the Deputy Minister. He forwarded to the Privy Council agreement in principle to having RMC as an anglophone college and *CMR* as a francophone one. Where the difficulty arose, according to Armstrong, was in the matter of degrees, an expensive proposal to implement. Options were being studied, he said.<sup>14</sup> The brief to Cabinet dated 16 April proposed the acceptance of the recommendation regarding the two military colleges. It submitted that for the moment, however, the duplication of all courses would not be desirable, and *CMR* was not empowered to grant degrees.<sup>\*15</sup> In June, the Prime Minister accepted this recommendation in the same way as all the other ones pertaining to the Forces, included in the B & B Royal Commission's Report. The debate should thus have been closed. But such would not be the case.

Between August and October 1967, General Allard set up an Officer Development Board.<sup>16</sup> At first, it was not planned that the Board would seek to reflect the Francophone fact in Canada. But Roger Lavergne, DGDEP, wrote a note, received by Colonel Letellier at the office of the CDS, pointing out that the Board's mandate should take into account the principle of equal opportunities for Francophones and Anglophones. At worst, if it was decided to exclude this principle, it must be part of the future outlook for the officer corps in the year 2000.<sup>17</sup>

The Board did in fact touch briefly on this question in the chapter on Qualitative Requirements, in which section 5 dealt with bilingual and language

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\* The four-year degree at *CMR* was approved in 1969. Initially, degrees were granted in three scientific subjects.

requirements. Although written before Volume III of the B and B Commission was released, it did reflect the first two volumes and no doubt documents and opinions from Allard and his *entourage*. The authors had no doubt that the two official languages had equal status in all units and Commands. In their view, it was essential that as many academic and military training courses as possible be available in French, and that ultimately, degrees in several disciplines be granted in French by military colleges; that a high percentage of civilian and military officials be bilingual; and that officer cadets take at least one course in their second language. Lastly, these conclusions were to be reassessed when Volume III of the Commission's report was released.<sup>18</sup> We must admit that the Board's report, which covers hundreds of pages in three volumes, did not centre on the B and B question. Of the sixteen key people on the Board as it was until March 1969, two were Francophones: Brigadier-General B.J. Guimont (deputy chairman) and Dr J. Brazeau (consultant psychologist).<sup>19</sup> When the Board became the National Defence Education Centre Planning Group on 1 March 1969, Major-General W.A. Milroy replaced Major-General R. Rowley, who had presided over the study to date. The team was then changed so that there was only one Francophone in the group of nineteen people of officer rank: the administrator, a captain.<sup>20</sup>

Clearly, no importance was yet attached to the factor of Francophone representation in making decisions which concerned (or ought to concern) them just as much as their colleagues in the other language group. The report did propose that from the outset, the majority of Planning Group HQ consist of bilingual officers, as was required by the very nature of the work to be done. However, in view of the shortage of resources — according to the annexes to volume I of the report, about four percent of officers were bilingual — this objective was set for the end of the 1970s.<sup>21</sup>

On 24 October 1969, the Defence Council rejected the concept of a single education centre for officers to be located in Ottawa, where officer cadets and officers on more advanced military training would have been side by side. Thus the status quo was preserved, and the idea of the education centre abandoned. A new name was adopted, the Canadian Defence Education Establishments (CDEE) This agency came into being on 1 January 1970. Its purpose was:

to control all existing officer educational institutions and to direct their evolution towards a cohesive system designed to meet the professional needs of our unified officer corps at the turn of the century.<sup>22</sup>

How much importance was given to the CDEE? First, it was an agency within the CP's office, headed by a major-general. But it was also an HQ and

its major-general had the authority of the head of a Command. The February 1970 bilingualism program for the Forces contained an element relating to the CDEE: plans were to be formulated to develop a high level of bilingualism among teachers, staff and officer cadets in the military colleges.<sup>23</sup>

On 23 January 1971, nearly one year later, General Milroy submitted a document to this effect to the advisory committee to the CDS.<sup>24</sup> After painting the bright picture of bilingualism as it already existed at *CMR*, the document concluded that the standard of bilingualism at RMC and RRMC had to be raised. The previous year, however, academic standards at those colleges had been revised. Fresh changes to them would be poorly received. Moreover, since heavy demands were already placed on officer cadets during the summer months,

The imposition of additional compulsory language instruction at RMC and RRMC would impede cadet progress in established degree programmes.<sup>25</sup>

It would also be difficult to change the situation unless teachers and military instructors became bilingual.

The *Implementation plan to increase B and B in the Forces*, adopted in December 1970, called for action to be taken at RMC and RRMC in September 1971 to achieve a bilingualism program similar to that of *CMR* (see para q, Appendix C). On the basis of this commitment, the CDS returned to the attack.<sup>26</sup> Major-General Milroy acted swiftly this time, and a specific directive, completed on 30 April 1971, identified three more immediate objectives:

- to increase opportunities for Francophones to take courses in French;
- to help Anglophones improve their French skills;
- to create a bilingual atmosphere at RMC and RRMC.

These goals were to be achieved without impairing the quality and viability of the degree granted by RMC and without affecting military training courses taken by officer cadets in the summer months.<sup>27</sup>

Milroy set medium-and long-term goals in the plan he submitted for approval to Lieutenant-General Jacques Dextraze, CP.

Among the thirteen medium-term goals, we note the following:

- to increase the percentage of Francophones among staff at RMC (to 15 percent) and RRMC (to 10 percent), while slightly reducing the percentage of Francophones at *CMR* (to 75 percent);
- to increase recruiting efforts in Quebec and other parts of French Canada;
- to undertake a modest expansion at RRMC with a view to the possibility of granting degrees, as was already done by *CMR* and RMC;
- to encourage transfers of officer cadets from both colleges outside Quebec to the college in Quebec, so they could take degrees there in science and administration (the two disciplines in which degrees could be taken at *CMR* in 1971).

The other medium-term goals related to encouraging students to participate in college life so that they acquired as thorough a knowledge as possible of their second language. Although this was not clearly stated, we infer that these remaining nine articles of faith were aimed at Anglophones (for example, sending volunteers — military or civilian staff — on language training; scheduling more visits to Quebec for officer cadets at RMC and RRMC; and offering language courses from the Canadian Forces Language School (CFLS) to those who had not achieved the required level of bilingualism at the end of their time in college).

In the longer term, the percentage of Francophone staff would rise further at RMC (to 25 percent) and RRMC (to 15 percent), while decreasing at *CMR* (to 60 percent). Military personnel transferred to the colleges would be required to be bilingual. Engineering courses would be available in French at RMC as Francophone representation increased. When the percentage of Francophones became more favourable, RMC would alternate between a “French week” and an “English week”.<sup>28</sup>

To help us understand the situation in 1971, let us look at a table of language representation among military staff in the military colleges in that year.<sup>29</sup>

Table 29

**MILITARY PERSONNEL IN MILITARY COLLEGES  
as of 31 January 1971**

	FRANCO	%	ANGLO	%	TOTAL	BILINGUAL %	
RMC	7	6.9	95	93.1	102	44	43
RRMC	1	19	52	98.1	53	16	30
CMR	45	78.9	12	21.1	57	55	965
TOTAL	53	25%	159	75%	212	115	542

As we can see, the ideas put forward by Milroy were not based on strict analysis. What did the medium and short terms mean in terms of years? When would administration and daily life at RMC be conducted in French and English alternately, as was done at *CMR*? What is most interesting, however, is the direction suggested by Milroy's recommended approach: a gradual move toward two bilingual colleges, instead of one English-speaking and one French-speaking, as the Commission on B and B had recommended and was endorsed by the Prime Minister on behalf of Cabinet in June 1970. Political masters were simply ignored in this matter.

Some of the data presented by Milroy gave rise to concern. For example, according to a study of success rates by language group and college over five years, it was found that Francophones had a higher failure rate. A scant 25.5 percent of Francophones who entered college after a stringent preliminary selection completed their program. Among Anglophones, the rate was 43.5 percent for those who began at *CMR*, 51.1 percent for those at RRMC and as high as 55.9 percent for those who began and ended their studies at RMC.<sup>30</sup> In the early 1970s, Francophones made up about 21 percent of the whole of the graduating class. Milroy wrote that this percentage absolutely had to be raised to 28 percent, which was also the general objective set for the B & B programme.<sup>31</sup>

Elsewhere, it was noted that as of 30 September 1970, 15 of the 39 Francophones in their final year of military college were at *CMR*.<sup>32</sup> This meant that 38.4 percent of Francophones had opted for one of the two degrees which *CMR* had recently received permission to offer in French.\* Unless the

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\* *CMR* awarded its first degrees in 1971.



Forces wanted to turn all their French Canadians into administrators and scientists,\* they would quickly have to offer a wider range of options in French. Hence the importance of Milroy's long-term goal of offering French engineering courses and science courses beyond degrees already covered in French at Saint-Jean.

Lieutenant-Colonel Clément Tousignant at the DGBB's office commented on the projections of the CDEE. He suggested, first, that Anglophone recruits take an eight-week immersion course in French before entering RMC and RRMC. This, added to the usual courses in the second language taken over the four academic years, would give graduates a functional knowledge of their second language when they left military college. Tousignant found a second weakness in the CDEE proposal that implies that Francophones would enter RMC directly where engineering courses would be available in French as Francophone representation increased. Tousignant thought that courses should be available in French before more Francophones went directly to RMC. He took pains to point out the poor success rate of Francophone officer cadets, noted by the CDEE himself. Moreover, at this stage, this recommendation as it stood, would run counter to efforts to have degrees granted in French. What would the CDEE say if someone said that Anglophones at CMR had to take their courses in French? Tousignant asked.<sup>33</sup>

The reply which the Chief of Personnel, Dextraze, decided to give to Milroy on 7 June was phrased differently. He acknowledged, as Milroy had done, the value of the bilingualism program at CMR, but took issue with one of the conclusions in the 30 April document: namely, that such a program would not work at RMC. Milroy had written that the program at CMR had succeeded because of a combination of three factors: its enrolment was 60 percent Francophones and 40 percent Anglophones; a very high proportion of staff at the Saint-Jean college was bilingual; and the college was located in a Francophone cultural milieu. Dextraze wrote that he saw no reason why the conditions for the success of CMR could not be duplicated at RMC and RRMC. Indeed, it was essential that civilian and military staff at all three colleges become bilingual, for otherwise B and B projections would never be achieved. Dextraze closed by stating that he appreciated the work of the CDEE on this matter, but the plan had to be revised to incorporate second-language training at RMC and RRMC.<sup>34</sup>

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\* In fourth year at *CMR*, at the beginning of 1970-71, there were only three Anglophones in a class of eighteen.

When Dextraze sent his reply, a study of French teaching at RMC and RRMC was already in progress. Two consultants had been selected: Dr Gérard Blackburn, former Director General of the Public Service Languages Bureau and Professor in the Faculty of Administration at University of Ottawa, and Mr R.C. Duplantie, Director of the Public Service Languages Bureau. We shall discuss their recommendations in the next chapter. For the moment, we note that on 1 September, at a meeting with Major M.C. Stewart of the CDEE, they were asked whether it was possible to introduce French at the two Anglophone colleges in the same way as English was used at *CMR* (as Dextraze wished). According to Stewart, Blackburn argued that this process was very complex and almost impossible to plan and implement in an English-speaking environment. This virtual impossibility, Blackburn went on to say, was what accounted for the nature of the B and B Commission's recommendation that RMC remain English-speaking.<sup>35</sup> To this very specific reply, let us add that the sense of direction which emerged from the Blackburn-Duplantie report, as we shall see, ran counter to the wishes expressed by Dextraze in June 1971.

Others questioned Dextraze's wishes from another angle. Second-language courses offered far from any support environment rarely showed convincing results. Kingston was not a Francophone environment, and it would not be possible to have 40 percent Francophones there while maintaining the proportion of 60 percent at *CMR*. As we know, in the years following 1971, substantially more Francophones than the target percentage were to be recruited, and this could have brought a small French wave to RMC. But once the objective was achieved, the effects of this surplus would disappear forever. What place would French hold then?<sup>36</sup>

On 30 September, Dextraze asked the new head of the CDEE for a report on the B and B program in military colleges. Rear-Admiral R. W. Murdoch replied that he was unable to tackle the question directly until many others relating to these colleges had been resolved. For example, because of the number of Francophones who had chosen to remain at *CMR* for third year, fewer beds than in the past were available for recruits. Consequently, the number of Francophones had declined to only 16 percent of all recruits entering military colleges in September 1971, compared to 22 percent a year earlier. Murdoch rightly found this decline disturbing<sup>38</sup> at a time when everything was geared toward proportional representation.

Dextraze was not satisfied with this answer. First, he ensured that a direct link was established between the DGBB and the CDEE, and by 22 October, a preliminary meeting of the two offices was held.<sup>39</sup> Second, he had Colonel

Hutchins, Director General Planning, Requirements and Production, write a memorandum on the development of the military colleges, including a section on B and B. A first draft of this was returned to Hutchins on 23 November by Major-General Laubman, Dextraze's assistant, asking him to revise the B and B section.<sup>40</sup> Finally, on 2 December, Dextraze sent Murdoch an unequivocal and urgent appeal. In his opinion, B and B was not being implemented in the military colleges at the rate dictated by the urgency of the circumstances. Neither the goals stated by Milroy the previous April nor the Francophone recruitment rates recently proposed by the Deputy Minister could be achieved under present conditions. In 1971-72, Francophones made up only 19.5 percent of military college enrolment; the figure should have been 25 percent. In 1972-73, the range of 25 to 28 percent had to be achieved, and in 1973-74, 50 percent. With such percentages, assuming *CMR* remained a bilingual institution and thus continued to accept Anglophones, consideration had to be given immediately to expanding it physically while giving thought to introducing bilingualism at RMC.

Dextraze sketched some paths to be explored, but first and foremost he stressed acting quickly. His staff would be ready to support Murdoch in his advance toward the goal set for him, namely, to develop a short- and long-term plan for 1 January 1972 outlining the steps to be taken to improve B and B in the military colleges.<sup>41</sup>

Meetings and correspondence followed between 7 and 23 December. They enabled Murdoch to formulate a plan which he knew in advance would be supported, apart from a few details, by Letellier, Hutchins and, most of all, Dextraze.<sup>42</sup> On 31 December, Murdoch submitted his proposal to the Chief of Personnel. It was approved after some slight amendments and incorporated into the B and B plan sent to Treasury Board in April 1972. This plan took several factors into account, including the percentage of officers the Forces wanted to train in military colleges.

In brief, *CMR* would increase its capacity to turn out Francophone officers while maintaining its current ratio of Anglophones to Francophones (40 to 60) over the long term. Between the 1972-73 and 1975-76 academic years, however, the ratio would be readjusted to 30:70. In addition, the CDEE planned to create at RMC a "mirror image" of the concept of bilingualism prevailing at *CMR*.<sup>43</sup> Thus while RMC built up a critical mass of Francophones by direct entry of Francophone recruits who could study in French, *CMR* could have 70 percent Francophones so that the colleges overall would maintain a percentage of Francophones ranging between 28 and 35 percent. What emerges from this whole process is that the B and B

Commission's recommendation 40 had been rejected. Letellier explained in his memoirs that Dextraze and in particular Cloutier told him in no uncertain terms that *CMR* would remain bilingual and *RMC* would become so.<sup>44</sup>

Even before obtaining Treasury Board approval, which was not forthcoming until September 1972, Murdoch was able to take the first administrative steps toward adding the 200 new beds needed at *CMR*, hiring additional professors at *RMC* to provide French instruction for Francophones and reviewing the files of bilingual military staff who might fill the academic vacancies at *RMC* which could not be filled by civilians in 1972.<sup>45</sup> By 21 December, he commissioned a study of the introduction of courses in French for Francophones at *RMC*.<sup>46</sup> Monsignor Jacques Garneau of Université Laval, who conducted the study, concluded that some courses could be offered in French in 1972-73 to Francophone engineering students transferring to *RMC* from *CMR*. He discouraged authorities, however, from immediately accepting 40 Francophone recruits and guaranteeing them courses in French throughout their program of study from the fall of 1972 onward.<sup>47</sup> The outgoing Commandant of *RMC* and his replacement agreed with Garneau.<sup>48</sup>

The tribulations surrounding Treasury Board's acceptance of the part of the 1972 plan relating to the military colleges have been ably recounted by Letellier.<sup>49</sup> Here we shall merely summarize them. The 31 December 1971 plan included a section dealing with *RRMC*. How could unilingual officer cadets from Victoria be integrated into a bilingual *RMC* in third year? Attached to the plan submitted to Treasury Board was a memorandum to Cabinet asking for reaffirmation that *RRMC* would not be closed. This was not given. Instead, Defence was ordered not to include *RRMC* in its plans until Cabinet had ruled on the college's survival.<sup>50</sup> Also worthy of note is Treasury Board's initial opposition to the fact that objectives for the military colleges did not comply with recommendation 40 in Volume III of the B and B Commission report. In response, the DND began to put together a dossier to convince Cabinet to rescind its endorsement of the recommendation in question. Before this had gone far, however, the Chairman of Treasury Board, Bud Drury, who had served as Deputy Minister of Defence in the 1950s, withdrew the objection raised by his officials to the failure of DND in this affair.<sup>51</sup>

Since the entire program of B and B in the Forces had not been approved until September 1972, all that could be done in 1973 was to start up projects: hire architects; make plans for the additional professors, including two who were coming to teach French as a second language full-time; offer intensive French courses over the summer to staff at *RMC* and forty volunteer officer

cadets; designate two bilingual squadrons out of eight, in which Francophones would at first be concentrated; and draw up a five-year plan to implement B and B at RMC.

In 1973, during a briefing tour on B and B in the Forces, the part of the presentation dealing with the military colleges stated that when all forecasts had become reality, officer cadets would be able to take a degree in either official language in any of the disciplines taught. What listeners heard was that all graduates would have to be bilingual.<sup>52</sup>

At the beginning of 1973-74, nine courses were offered in French to officer cadets in third and fourth years, with an enrolment of 99 Anglophones and 55 Francophones. But the real new beginning came in the fall of 1976, when new buildings were available with more classrooms and professors' offices.<sup>53</sup> In 1974, when the great new venture was about to be launched, many experts remained sceptical, including civilian and military officials at RMC. Even those who thought the plan could succeed took pains to emphasize the difficulties, including the problem of hiring and keeping highly qualified Francophone professors in the Kingston area, which had no cultural or academic support. Other questions were left hanging: Francophone officer cadets at *CMR* could look for an escape route by taking degree courses at Saint-Jean; furthermore, the problem of unilingual officer cadets from *RRMC* adjusting to RMC was not resolved.<sup>54</sup>

In 1974, although B and B objectives for the military colleges were identified, there was some uncertainty surrounding them until such time as a precise role was determined for *RRMC*, which it was by now planned to be kept open. These objectives were:

- to grant degrees in both official languages;
- to extend the characteristics of *CMR* outside that college;
- to increase Francophone representation so as to meet the requirements of the Forces;
- to provide cultural services in support of B and B.<sup>55</sup>

*CMR* came close to achieving the planned percentages of Francophones and Anglophones at the beginning of 1974, with a ratio of 77:33. In the fall, construction began on the new rooms which would open for residents the following year.<sup>56</sup>

The *Report to the Defence Management Committee on bilingualism and biculturalism in DND* released by National Defence on 6 December 1974 states that officer cadets in the two language groups were distributed as follows among the three colleges.<sup>57</sup>

Table 30

**DISTRIBUTION OF CADETS IN THE  
MILITARY COLLEGES, 1974**

	ANGLOPHONE	FRANCOPHONE	% FRANCOPHONE
RMC	538	55	9.3
RRMC	222	3	1.3
CMR	155	299	65.9
TOTAL	915	357	28

Thus in two years the percentage of Francophone officer cadets had increased substantially, even above proportional representation of Francophones. This positive aspect of the question still remained very isolated among many negative factors. For example, *CMR* yearbooks and annual reports had been published in bilingual format since their first appearance in 1953, while yearbooks and annual reports for RMC and RRMC were still published in English only in 1974. Yet one of the goals of RMC was in future to develop its capacity to communicate in both official languages and to understand the principles of biculturalism.<sup>58</sup> It was not until the fall of 1975 that the yearbook of RMC, a national institution founded in 1876, became bilingual.<sup>59</sup>

As for the population of Kingston, it was ill informed about what was happening. An article on B and B at RMC did appear in the local daily, the *Kingston Whig Standard*, in September 1973. In March 1975, a Canadian Press release stated that RMC had been “ordered” to take in 40 percent Francophones as of 1977, and by September 1975, it was “required” to offer all academic programs in both languages.<sup>60</sup> These few lines prompted a fairly negative editorial in the *Whig Standard* on 8 March 1975, attacking the new RMC on several fronts. After the required reorganization, the newspaper claimed, the student-teacher ratio would be three to one at RMC while it was fifteen to one at Queen’s University, also located in Kingston. The duplication of courses would create two unilingual sectors rather than a single bilingual one. Since the deadlines were very short, RMC was being subjected to a revolution rather than undergoing evolution. The editorialist made his

strongest attack, in this case with justification, on the lack of information which had been provided to the population of the small city where RMC had become an institution.<sup>61</sup> MP Flora MacDonald, who represented the Kingston area in the federal Parliament, had to telephone Major-General Duncan McAlpine on 11 March to find out more about the future of RMC for an open-line radio show. MacDonald quickly grasped what the Department wanted to do, but as she pointed out, the Opposition was not there to defend the Government. If she were asked a question about this topic, she would answer that she wanted some of the money earmarked for B and B to be used instead to maintain the Air Transport Command Band, located in her riding, which was supposed to be disbanded.<sup>62</sup>

There was a wide gulf between what the Canadian press reported and the facts of the case. For example, the RMC was to become bilingual over six years, not immediately, as was believed. The following were the main stages along this path. In the summer of 1974, a position of B and B co-ordinator would be filled. During the 1974-75 academic year, three bilingual professors would be hired by the faculties of science and engineering;\* a B and B Committee of officer-cadets would be set up; an experienced Francophone professor would be appointed special assistant to the registrar, and his duties would include recruiting and hiring Francophone professors.<sup>63</sup>

In 1975-76, CEGEP students from Quebec, who were to be the first Francophone recruits to enter RMC in expectation of a complete program in French, visited the college twice. During their basic training at Borden in the summer of 1976, representatives of RMC met with them to prepare them thoroughly for their new life.<sup>64</sup> During the 1977-78 academic year, the Commandant of RMC's Committee on the implementation of B and B resumed monthly gatherings, after nearly a year without a meeting. French and English were used at alternate meetings, and administration of the Cadet Wing was done alternatively every week in English and French. The Commandant wrote:

The attitude of the Cadet Wing is generally more receptive of the French fact than in the past. With more francophones being admitted every year, this trend should continue.<sup>65</sup>

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\* In subsequent years, reports from the Commandant of RMC would note the arrivals and departures of those teaching courses in French.

The number of bilingual positions in the academic establishment (professors and support staff) rose to 100 in 1978-79. At that time, Francophone officer cadets made up 25 percent of the student body.<sup>66</sup>

The Commandant's report for the 1979-80 academic year was published in bilingual format for the first time. Following are a few significant extracts:

This year saw the graduation of the first large group of Francophones who entered RMC in September of 1976, directly from the CEGEP system. Forty started and of these, 30 graduated; three more were recoured and are expected to graduate this coming year. RMC continued to offer as many courses as possible in the French language to engineering students including elective and prescribed Art courses. Defining a course as one subject for one term, 159 courses were offered in French during 79/80. The search for suitably qualified bilingual professors continued. We had two resignations and hired eight new professors for the coming academic year. It is expected that 95% of the course[s] required in the French language will be offered in 80/81.

RMC continued to work in achieving its goal of 65% Anglophone and 35% Francophone by 1982. At the end of the 79/80 academic year the ratio was 28% Francophone and 72% Anglophone.

All squadrons now operate as bilingual and use the language of the week alternating French/English for all squadron operations, meetings, parades, etc.<sup>67</sup>

The section on the Bilingualism and Biculturalism Program in the RMC Commandant's report for 1980-81 reads as follows:

RMC continues to function as a bilingual institution with a growing number of bilingual staff both military and civilian. Approximately 26% of the staff is now bilingual and all departments, sections and most subsections are able to provide bilingual services to students and staff. All orders and most directives are now published in both official languages.

The Cadet Wing alternates in French and in English weekly and Officer Cadets responsible for preparing directives to the Wing must originate them in the language of the week that the event will take place.

Two resignations were received from members of the bilingual teaching staff and two are going on sabbatical leave this coming year. Seven of the eight vacant positions have now been filled with one offer still to be accepted. During the Academic Year 80/81, approximately 95% of the courses



required in the French language were offered. The specialties lacking are in Process Control, Metallurgy and Structures.

RMC was directed by the Deputy Minister and the Chief of the Defence Staff to have a Francophone/Anglophone population of 35%/65% by 1982 [...] It is unlikely that this goal will be achieved. For the 80/81 academic year the ratio was approximately 26% Francophone and 74% Anglophone and for 81/82 we will likely have even fewer Francophones as a result of fewer transfers from CMR and fewer Francophone Senior Matriculant applicants.<sup>68</sup>

By this stage, we may say that a dramatic change had occurred.\* One of the authors, who was an officer cadet at RMC between 1967 and 1969 and returned there to teach between 1978 and 1980, can attest that the language climate had changed remarkably. Francophones could now be comfortable in their own language, a situation which has more or less stabilized since then.

Despite the immense progress, it must still be stressed that the picture was far from perfect. For example, a student could not obtain a BA taking most of his courses in French if he were interested in history, political science, economics or commerce. A degree combining two of the four above-mentioned specialties together with a few courses in geography could not be taken in French. Thus, while the problem of Francophones earning a degree in French was nearly solved as regards engineering and sciences, it persisted in the arts, even though Professor George Stanley had taken fine initiatives in the 1960s, as we saw in Volume I (pp 191-192). Paradoxically, the history department had more Francophone professors between 1965 and 1971, but in 1987, it had none.\*\*

In 1980 the *Official Languages Plan (Military)* or *MOLP* was released. Chapter 6, part 2, is devoted to the military colleges. It gives a summary of the situation which today may be considered optimistic, but we must remember that it was written when RMC seemed on the point of making a reality out of the ideal model created for it in 1972.

The military colleges system was treated as a whole in the Plan: one university with three campuses which, overall, was a bilingual establishment

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\* RMC had barely come to terms with the Francophone fact when it had to adjust to the arrival of women officer cadets. The young men accepted the situation well, but some older members of the alumni club, reacted rather badly.

\*\* Moreover, in 1987 it was no longer possible to take a BA in French; this program was discontinued in 1976 because of a lack of candidates.

representative of the official language groups. Each of the three components was then discussed. *CMR* remained the example to be followed. Achievements at RMC since 1974 were summarized. By spring 1979, Francophones were expected to occupy 35 percent of officer cadet positions at RMC, and in any case, that was the percentage which activity 6.4.2 in the report assigned for RMC in 1982.<sup>69</sup> According to the Commandant's report cited above, the figure would be 28 percent in 1979-80 and 26 percent in 1981-82. Percentages for subsequent years were:

1982-83 — 23.4 %	1983-84 — 23.9 %
1984-85 — 27.2 %	1985-86 — 26.4 %
1986-87 — 21.8 % <sup>70</sup>	

The objective in 6.4.2 was thus never met,<sup>\*</sup> and since *CMR* came fairly close to its quotas (65F:35E), we may conclude that the shortfall at RMC had an effect on the total Francophone representation sought by the system.

The MOLP goes on to discuss the degrees offered in the three colleges.

RRMC offers only one degree program<sup>\*\*</sup> and RMC and *CMR* offer degree programs comparable to it. Consequently, by establishing RMC and *CMR* as bilingual institutions, equality of access to all university level education within the CMC system is assured. In addition, by maintaining a student ratio of 65%A/35%F and 35%A/65%F at RMC and *CMR* respectively, it will continue to be possible to provide a milieu in which bilingualism can be fostered to the advantage of both language groups. In this regard, it is important to note that the majority of RRMC officer cadets complete the last two years of their degree programs at RMC or *CMR* and are thus able to benefit from the bilingual program.<sup>71</sup>

The first sentence is hard to understand. It seems to imply that *CMR* gave degrees in as many fields as RMC. In point of fact, it offered degrees in only five areas: administration, computer science, science with a specialization (in physics or physics and mathematics) or without, Canadian studies with a minor in administration, and lastly, military and strategic studies. All these

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\* In 1981, Francophone officer cadets who had completed their preparatory year were transferred from *CMR* to RMC. This was not enough to achieve the desired percentage at RMC and was poorly received by many of those whom the decision affected.

\*\* By 1983-84, RRMC was offering four degrees, none of them available in French: physics and oceanography; physics and computer science; general science; strategic and military studies.

degrees were available in both official languages. Moreover, up to 1988, all graduate programs were concentrated at RMC and available in English only.\*

The 1983-84 annual Official Languages Plan, dated 31 March 1983, gave a more accurate picture of the situation. It stated that at RMC, almost all engineering courses were offered in both official languages, and a few fourth-year elective courses were given in English only, while one was in French only. "In the Science and Arts Faculties the number of courses offered in both languages changes from year to year depending on student demand and the number of qualified professors."<sup>72</sup> The oceanography course at RRMC was available only in English. Officer cadets at that college who selected one of the degrees offered there had little opportunity of being exposed to the long-standing bilingualism of *CMR* or the more recent bilingualism of RMC.

Despite the notable B and B shortcomings in the military colleges system, it would be unfair not to acknowledge the huge success of *CMR* since 1952 in training hundreds of Francophone officers in all three forces and hundreds of bilingual Anglophone officers. Neither can we ignore the more recent efforts by RMC to imitate *CMR*, nor the obviously very positive initial results achieved by that venerable institution. Deputy Minister C.R. Nixon spoke with justifiable pride about both these colleges in November 1981.<sup>73</sup> Lieutenant-General G.C.E. Thériault, former Commandant of *CMR*, added that the college's experiments in bilingualism were at the cutting edge of what was being attempted across Canada and in the main government institutions.<sup>74</sup> In 1987, it was the turn of Lieutenant-General John de Chastelain, a former RMC officer cadet and former Commandant of the college, to point to its unquestionable progress along the path of bilingualism in comparison to the exclusively English atmosphere which had prevailed when he was a student there in the 1950s.<sup>75</sup> However, we must place in the overall picture the contribution of military colleges to the officer corps. Rarely did they supply more than 20 percent of the young officers entering the Forces in any year. In the chapter that follows, we shall see that the officer corps as a whole was far from bilingual.

Finally, let us recall that the special report of the COL in 1977 referred to recommendation 40 by the Royal Commission on B and B. After studying all the relevant reports, the COL proceeded to observe:

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\* On 17 June 1988, the Quebec National Assembly unanimously approved Bill 204, authorizing *CMR* to offer master's and doctoral programs (Castonguay, *CMR*, pp 170-188 and 230).

“To comply with the Act, the Department should be in a position to offer equivalent training in French and English”.<sup>76</sup>

This would not prevent the three colleges from energetically pursuing a program of second-language teaching; in other words, English at *CMR* and French at *RMC* and *RRMC*.<sup>77</sup>

### **The Staff Schools and College**

Staff courses in Canada for Canadian officers in the regular Forces did not begin until 1947 for the Army (Canadian Army Staff College) and 1948 for the Air Force (RCAF Staff College). The Navy never offered such courses, preferring to send its candidates to pursue their further education at the Royal Naval Staff College in the United Kingdom. In 1959, the Air Force set up three levels of Staff courses:

- a. Staff School;
- b. Staff College; and
- c. Extension School.

The integration and unification of the Forces resulted in three integrated institutions, open to officers in the three forces:

- a. the Canadian Forces Staff School (CFSS), which later became the Canadian Forces College (CFC), located in Toronto;
- b. the Canadian Forces Staff and Command College (CFSCC), also located in Toronto; and
- c. the Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff College (CLFCSC), situated in Kingston.<sup>78</sup>

The Ross Report and the Report of the Royal Commission on B and B did not contain any specific recommendation regarding equal access to these elite training centres. Ross proposed, however, that Francophone officers be given as required an advanced English course before those periods of professional training which are virtually necessary in order to win promotion to higher ranks (see recommendation 17, Appendix PP, volume I, p 368). If readers will refer to the text preceding recommendation 39 in the B and B report (Appendix B), they will find that the commissioners admitted that, after a certain point in a career, a knowledge of English became an unavoidable

ingredient for success. Hence, no doubt, the omission of Staff schools and colleges from this document.

It is in the beginnings of the comprehensive plan drawn up by General Allard before he left in 1969 that we first find references to the number of “bilingual” officers to be selected for these training establishments, where, moreover, staff would increasingly have to work in French (Volume I, p 239). The *Implementation plan to increase B and B in the Forces* tabled in the House in February 1971 stated that study programs would begin to use French in September 1971 (Appendix C, para r). Major-General Milroy had begun to think the matter through in January, and his February directive CDEE 3/71 outlined the means to be adopted so as to proceed along the desired path. In brief, these were:

- a. to provide libraries with French reference materials and study rooms where refresher courses in French could be offered;\*
- b. to give students the option of writing short papers or essays in French, and later, all their written work;
- c. to organize bilingual student syndicates on a voluntary basis;
- d. to make all instructional and course material available in French [as well as English];
- e. to have the necessary translation and interpretation services so that all could take part in conferences or joint discussions in their own language (meetings of all students, bilingual or otherwise).<sup>79</sup>

Here is how Brigadier-General D.S. MacLennan, Commandant of CLFCSC Kingston, proposed to apply this directive. Depending on the number of students, one or two bilingual syndicates would be formed for the first two sessions of classes, when the instructor had a prominent role to play. Staff procedures would be tried out in French in these groups, while remaining compatible with Canadian practice; teaching would be in English, however. Throughout the remainder of the course, students would have the option of submitting some of their assignments in the official language of their choice and would occasionally meet in one or more bilingual syndicates.

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\* This was for Francophone officers who had lost some of their ability to use their language.

During some practical exercises, internal work could be done in French, while external communications would be in English.

According to MacLennan, the “problem” of bilingualism had to be viewed in light of the fact that English remained the operational language of the Armed Forces. Given this, options for the use of French had to be very few, and the right to join a bilingual syndicate had to be controlled: all Francophones would join, but college authorities would determine which bilingual Anglophones would be members.

Finally, the Brigadier-General asked for more bilingual personnel; namely, an officer (translator/writer), an editor and a clerk. He stressed the importance of starting early and being visibly enthusiastic.<sup>80</sup>

Between Milroy’s projections and reality, there naturally intervened the chronic shortage of qualified bilingual personnel able to serve as instructors or to administer courses. Furthermore, there were not enough translators and no lexicon of military terms compatible with those used in France and Belgium.<sup>81</sup> This situation was not confined to the CLFCSC, moreover. In order to counter the absence of French, the College tried unsuccessfully to obtain the services of a French Army captain, then in Canada under the Canadian-French officer exchange program.<sup>82</sup>

Colonel Pierre Chassé, acting DGBB, tried to calm the fears of the assistant Commandant of the College, Colonel C.L. Kirby, by telling him that the Secretary of State Translation Section could begin to help him in 1972, and as of 1973, its support would be on an ongoing basis. He added that at the same time, NDHQ was preparing an English-French/French-English lexicon, CFP\* 121(5)(B), and an abbreviations manual, CFP (121)6.<sup>83</sup>

During the exchanges that continued between Kingston and Ottawa, MacLennan was moved to say what he thought. Although candidates would have permission to write their papers in French, he saw drawbacks in immediately forming “bilingual” syndicates consisting only of Francophones, since:

- this would interfere with the process of integration and co-ordination of their professional training;

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\* CFP: Canadian Forces Publication.

- the absence of Francophones in other syndicates would considerably reduce the Canadian contribution to them, at a time when the number of candidates from other countries was increasing year by year, and would affect the quality and quantity of the representation of the various branches and services in both Anglophone and Francophone syndicates.<sup>84</sup>

The new Commandant of the CDEE, Rear-Admiral Murdoch, said that he shared MacLennan's view and agreed to delay the creation of such syndicates until 1972-73.<sup>85</sup> When Brigadier-General F.W. Wooton replaced MacLennan in 1971, he let it be understood that "bilingual" syndicates could be formed in the third and fourth sessions, or from mid-December on.<sup>86</sup>

For its part, the Canadian Forces College (CFC) combined two institutions located in Toronto: the Canadian Forces Staff School, where captains stayed for ten weeks, and the Canadian Forces Staff College, where majors stayed for 45 weeks. In 1971, the Commandant of CFC was Commodore W.P. Hayes,<sup>\*</sup> who proposed to solve the problem in three phases at Staff School:

- Phase 1: (July-October 1971), three Francophone majors recently assigned to the School as directors of syndicates would familiarize themselves with it;
- Phase 2: (October-December 1971), one of the directors would be responsible for the bilingualism project, while the other two headed the first "bilingual" syndicates; and
- Phase 3: the "bilingual" syndicates program as proposed by Milroy's directive would be applied progressively.<sup>87</sup>

The following table, which summarized a report by the Commandant of CDEE, gave a better understanding of the state of bilingualism at the three institutions in 1971-72.<sup>88</sup>

\* As Commandant of RMC in the late 1960s, Hayes opened the door to bilingualism in his own way, as we have seen.

Table 31

**STATUS OF BILINGUALISM AT STAFF SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES  
1971-1972**

		CFSS (Toronto)	CFSC (Toronto)	CLFCSC (Kingston)
1.	Bilingual staff	3 majors	2 lcols	2 lcols 1 capt
2.	Courses	Candidates could write in French; 1 or 2 bilingual syndicates from Oct 71	Candidates could write in French; 2 bilingual syndicates from Dec 71	Candidates could write in French; 1 or 2 bilingual syndicates from Dec 71
3.	Library	162 French books 4 French journals 1 French newspaper	French books recently ordered	963 French books 19 French journals 3 French newspapers
4.	Distinct classrooms to study French	yes	yes	yes
5.	Requirements	Translator, clerk, reviser, typists, French textbooks	Translator or translation service	Liaison with the Director, Translation and Terminology (Co-ordination) (DTTC), NDHQ



When Letellier became DGBB, he brought to the job his experience as Deputy Director of the Army Staff College. He had held the position from 1962 to 1966, when there was no program for Francophones. When Murdoch sent him his report, Letellier made favourable comments. While recognizing that the proposed program was modest, he went on to say that it was an important first step in the right direction. He noted differences between the colleges, however, as regards written work.

- At CFSS, students had the option of writing some personal work and their final paper in French.
- At CFSC, candidates were only given the choice of writing in French or English for essays or presentations on a “selected” topic.
- At CLFCSC, students could write their presentations in English or French.

The DGBB concluded by hoping that Francophone staff were as well qualified in their first language as the Anglophone staff was.<sup>89</sup>

The B and B program adopted in 1972 included one activity for post-commissioning institutions. It was stated very tersely: the introduction of the use of French in studies. The paragraph expanding on these few words confined itself to presenting without comment the February 1971 forecasts regarding B and B in Staff institutions and acknowledged the type of problems encountered in implementing them.<sup>90</sup>

Despite the shortage of qualified bilingual staff and the translation difficulties which could not be overcome rapidly, the Commandant of CLFCSC Kingston concluded his 1971-72 annual report by stating that the program had to continue, but following observations had to be taken into account:

- bilingual syndicates should be made up of people with different degrees of language ability;
- all discussions in those syndicates should be conducted in French;
- written work relating to operations (papers or other presentations) should be presented in English;
- efforts to produce a French military lexicon had to continue; and

— priority had to be given to translating staff procedures.<sup>91</sup>

For his part, Commodore Hayes reported in August 1972 that CFSC had one bilingual colonel, two lieutenant-colonels, one warrant officer and two non-commissioned officers. But none of the administrative staff or clerks were bilingual, and no one was responsible for planning, translation, terminology and revision. Consequently, although two bilingual syndicates had been set up, no exercises had been conducted in French. During the second session, however, 90 percent of discussions in one of the syndicates and 70 percent in the other were in French. Because of the shortage of bilingual staff, no written work was submitted in French. At a social meeting with spouses, members of the two syndicates showed a remarkable *esprit de corps*, which continued to the end of the course. All that was needed to improve the program was an increase in teaching and administrative staff.

CFSS was unable to follow the timetable because it had no translators and few bilingual instructors and clerks. One syndicate did operate partly in French, however. It was expected that two syndicates would be able to work in French in the next course, at least for three of the four sessions planned. In January 1973, members of these syndicates would do 75 percent of their work in the language of their choice, but they would unavoidably have to use English in their other activities because these required more than two syndicates to work together.<sup>92</sup> The DGBB said he was very pleased with the progress thus far, despite the scarcity of staff and materiel. The Commandant of CDEE hastened to convey this to the commandants of the colleges.<sup>93</sup>

The following year, the Commandant of CLFCSC submitted a report roughly similar to the previous year's, except that this time he reported to the Director Education (D Edu),\* since the CDEE had been abolished in fall 1972.

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\* At the time of writing, these institutions report to the Director Professional Education and Development, under the Director General Recruiting, Education and Training.

Table 32

**LANGUAGE IDENTIFICATION OF STAFF POSITIONS  
AT CLFCSC IN 1974**

	Identifi- cation	Positions identified	Positions filled
Commandant or assistant	F	1	0
Principal administrative officier or administrative officer	F	1	0
Chief warrant officier or sergeant clerk	I	1	1
Sergeant or corporal clerk	I	1	1
Librarian and clerk	—	2	
Officers' mess supervisor	—	1	1
Lieutenant-colonel instructors (syndicate directors)	F	3	2
Editor, reviser and 2 clerks	I	3	1
TOTAL	—	13	6

Legend: F functionally bilingual  
I fully bilingual (integral)

Thirteen bilingual positions had been deemed necessary to make the system work. Only six were filled adequately.

The next chapter will explore the reasons underlying the imbalance between the supply and demand of bilingual people. The existence of this imbalance explains why colleges could not implement B and B as quickly as the CP and they themselves would have wished.

The September 1973 Wooton report referred to bilingual syndicates including both Francophones and Anglophone volunteers with enough understanding of French to take an active part in discussions. CDEE 3/71 was supposed to offer some flexibility in the French language skills of Anglophones belonging to bilingual syndicates. The aim, Wooton wrote, was not to teach French, but to enable Francophones to improve their French military idiom by using the language every day. To some extent, Anglophones

with a good understanding of French could use their own language in a bilingual syndicate while a Francophone used his mother tongue. Wooton concluded, no doubt rightly, that much had been done with a small academic staff at CLFCSC in the first two years, but the question of academic staff and translation had to be solved if the situation were to be improved.<sup>94</sup>

One of the authors recalls very clearly his course at the Staff School in Toronto in the fall of 1973. There were two officially bilingual syndicates at the time. In practice, one consisted of Francophones and operated in French. The other comprised Francophones who preferred to use English and some bilingual Anglophones, and it commonly used English. The two majors who headed these syndicates were Francophones. When the two syndicates met, they communicated in both languages, depending on each speaker's preference. As for joint sessions where all students assembled, they were conducted in English only (and filled at least a third of the time spent each day at the School), although some bilingual lecturers asked for questions in French.

The report submitted to Treasury Board in May 1974 reflected the situation in Kingston and Toronto fairly accurately. It stated, however, that one objective was to create totally Francophone groups, while constantly ensuring that their members represented various classifications in the Forces. But up to that time, as we have seen, "bilingual" modules had been discussed. Some people might take this to mean "Francophone", as they had grown used to seeing the two terms used in the same breath over the years. In 1973, however, Wooton had said that his bilingual groups would include Anglophones and Francophones. The experience we related above was consistent with this.

As for the remainder of the 1974 report, it stated:

*CLFCSC B & B Achievements.* Throughout the 1972-73 period the College manpower establishment was completely revised, designating 13 positions as bilingual, and setting up a Language Production Cell. Library acquisitions of French publications now comprise more than 1000 volumes as well as numerous magazines, newspapers and periodicals. Two bilingual syndicates now operate effectively — students are provided the opportunity to submit written work and conduct exercises in either language. Many early problems of translation and abbreviation are being satisfactorily resolved.

*CLFCSC Future Goals.* The greatest problem with the introduction of the B & B Program has been the acquisition of suitably proficient military directing staff. If this manning situation is resolved, the above goals are expected to be 100% achieved for academic year 1974-75.

*CFC Achievements.* CFSC has been engaged in an extensive reorganization of its course material which has detracted somewhat from more significant progress towards the B & B objective. Its course offerings in the French language are limited to 66% of the tutorial periods for two syndicates only. Students in these syndicates may submit all assignments in French. Marking and subsequent discussion are conducted in the language of choice of the student. Library facilities are available fully in both languages and library holdings now show significant levels in the French language commensurate with francophone course representation. In CFSS, 67% of course exercises are now offered in French; however, because of limited qualified staff, only 23% of discussion can be carried out in French. Of the overall course content of 315 hours, 63% is available in the French language.

*CFC Future B & B Outlook.* CFC's qualified bilingual staff has been barely sufficient to maintain current projects and more ambitious plans for the future have had to be realistically tailored to maximize B & B returns. A new Command and Staff course syllabus at CFSC is being introduced in 1974. It is intended that this course be offered entirely in both official languages. This will entail a significant expansion of CFSC resources in terms of bilingually qualified personnel, a French language library and provision of simultaneous translation equipment and qualified translators/interpreters for the auditorium. Target date for achieving this objective is 1978.<sup>95</sup>

Little progress occurred between 1974<sup>96</sup> and 1977, and the Commissioner of Official Languages found the picture far from rosy when he was given an opportunity to study these professional development institutions. He commented:

In recent years, some half-hearted efforts have been made to alter the traditional unilingual Anglophone image. What this amounts to is the establishment, at certain levels and within certain programs only, of "bilingual or Francophone syndicates", the translation of part of the teaching material used in the class (but not reference works), the granting of "permission" to present projects in one's own language and, finally, an increase in the number of French publications in the various "libraries for bilingual students". These feeble efforts are quite inadequate to solve the problems or meet the objectives of the Act. In fact, the objective stated in the Department's bilingualism program is to introduce French into the courses taken in these institutions. This objective is clearly inadequate: the goal should simply be to provide the same services — and the same quality, of course — in both languages. If major constraints are at the root of the

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\* Small working groups.

inequalities, the consequences should be shared by the two language groups instead of being left for one of them alone, the Francophones in the present case. Once again, it should be pointed out that, with the exception of the Management Development School in St-Jean, all of the development courses which are essential to a promotion are given in English-speaking areas, such as Kingston and Toronto.

Although it is in a French-speaking area, the school in St-Jean gives its courses in English only, with the exception of a training course for recruiters. This school is isolated from the surrounding community and falls far short of according French its rightful place either in the services it offers or in its internal administration. The Department's official explanation is that few courses are offered or given in French because the lack of sufficiently qualified students limits the Management Development School's scope for providing managerial training in French.\* This sort of approach explains the lack of haste to set matters right. If the Department is not able to set up a proper structure that is really capable of providing instruction in both languages in these schools, the only logical solution would be to create equivalent and distinct schools for each language group, Francophone and Anglophone.

In concluding this brief analysis, mention must be made of two special general training programs available to members of the Canadian Forces and their dependants: the "University of Manitoba Special Program" and "Project Loyalist".

The agreement with the University of Manitoba enables servicemen and their dependants to obtain a university degree from that institution by taking correspondence courses or courses offered by other recognized educational institutions.\*\* Project Loyalist, which grew out of an agreement with Loyalist College in Belleville, Ontario, is for servicemen close to retirement who wish to acquire "new, marketable skills". While both programs theoretically make it possible to obtain credits for courses taken in other educational institutions, this does not necessarily mean that they offer adequate guarantees regarding the equality of status of the two official languages and, consequently, of the two language groups. The Department should reach similar agreements with French-speaking educational

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\* One of the authors took a middle management course there in 1976. He appears to have been "sufficiently qualified" to pass it — in English.

\*\* The University recognized courses taken elsewhere and gave students the appropriate credits for them.

institutions<sup>\*</sup> or take other action to provide services of equal quality to the two language groups.<sup>97</sup>

To date, the general situation as outlined by the Commissioner has changed little. Section 3 of the revised plan prepared in 1978-79 (and made public in 1980) painted a picture similar to what we have seen so far, although the staff crisis seemed to have subsided. In addition to the courses discussed earlier, there was a new one which was very important because it affected all junior officers, unlike those in the colleges mentioned earlier for which students were selected.

The Officer Professional Development Program, implemented in 1975 as directed by Defence Management Committee (DMC), is a self-study program for CF junior officers. It comprises examination studies in six professional study fields: General Service Knowledge; Personnel Administration; Military Law; Financial Administration; National and International Studies, and War and the Military Profession. The aim of the program is to broaden and deepen the junior officer's knowledge and understanding of the military profession beyond the specific technical expertise of classification training and to contribute to the foundation of knowledge upon which further professional development will be built. With the exceptions of selected CFAOs and of current events references, all study materials are provided to registered officers. By DMC direction, study materials were provided in both official languages from the outset. Of the 23 publications in current distribution by the program, 17 are in bilingual side-by-side format. The remaining six publications are provided in either English or French versions as requested by the registering officer. All examinations are printed in bilingual format as are all program directives and general correspondence.<sup>98</sup>

The MOLP confined itself, for institutions of higher education, to maintaining the goal identified in 1972 and seeking to achieve it through the same means, which included organizing "bilingual or French speaking student syndicates/study groups on an optional basis."<sup>99</sup> We thus find that the 1974 report to Treasury Board was wrong to state that the groups would consist solely of Francophones. As for any follow-up to the Commissioner's report, as so often happened elsewhere, nothing at all was done. The 1983-84 Annual Plan continued in the same vein, while again emphasizing the lack of

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\* In 1988, National Defence reached such an agreement with the Université du Québec. Brigadier-General Liston had taken up this question energetically, sincerely and enthusiastically in 1984-85.

bilingual staff or of interpretation for all students listening to lecturers who used only English.<sup>100</sup>

The “Assessment of the last 15 years” noted tersely that as of 1 April 1987, the goals for Staff colleges discussed in 1972 had not been achieved, although the situation of Francophones and their language had shown a “marked improvement”.<sup>101</sup> Curiously, this report, dated 26 November 1987 and written for the new DGOL, Gilles DesBecquets, seemed less optimistic than that submitted by Sullivan to the Ministers of Defence in February 1987. This report, written in French, stated:

Professional training in both languages for our officers also includes at other levels:

- a. 3 bilingual syndicates out of 12 at Staff School in Toronto;
- b. at least 1 bilingual syndicate out of 6 at Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff College in Kingston; and
- c. 2 bilingual syndicates out of 16 at Staff College in Toronto.

In these three institutions, administrative services and correspondence are bilingual and instruction assistance is also available.<sup>102</sup>

These facts, the DGOL added, formed the positive part of his discussion of professional training. He was right, as was Major J. Demers, who some months later wrote what was overall a rather negative assessment of the past 15 years of progress in the area. Thus there are two different ways of looking at the same situation. We find, however, that in 1987, after the many setbacks for B and B, the positive aspects must take a much more modest place than the one they have occupied over the past decade.

### **National Defence College (NDC)**

Others have written the history of this College, founded in 1946.<sup>103</sup> We shall confine ourselves here to noting that its students are Canadian and foreign colonels or senior officials who come together for some ten months to discuss security and defence questions from a broad perspective, national or international. When in 1971 the Minister, Donald Macdonald, asked that consideration be given to offering a course entirely in French, a study of the question was prepared by the College’s staff (which included Paul Malone from External Affairs and Capt (N) Bernard Thillaye, both Francophones). It was then forwarded to CDS Sharp, who had it rewritten before sending it to



Deputy Minister Cloutier on 8 February 1972. The suggestion was that the NDC become a bilingual institution rather than offering courses entirely in French at various intervals as Macdonald had proposed. This would be more practical according to Sharp, who was keen to advance progressively toward bilingual status. In the first phase, students would be allowed to submit assignments in French and bilingual modules would be formed.

There was also a need for bilingual teaching and administrative staff, more French titles in the library, a translation module, a lecture hall with interpretation facilities and Francophone lecturers. No difficulties were expected in obtaining bilingual British and American students. In early 1972, the College stated it was ready to take the first steps with only a slight increase in administrative and support staff.<sup>104</sup>

Sharp's conclusion was exactly what Rear Admiral S. Mathwin Davis, then commanding the College, had wanted:

We feel the National Defence College should not reflect the bilingual character of Canada as a spectrum of understanding and misunderstanding with extremes, at either end, of obstinate unilingualism. Rather, we feel we should set an example with a determined endeavor to move into a situation where all can accommodate themselves and, in one way or another, achieve a continuing bilingual and bicultural communication and understanding.<sup>105</sup>

The Macdonald option was thus set aside to make room for that of Davis and Sharp, which we must admit tied in fairly well with what other professional development institutions planned in the area of B and B. In March 1972, Davis intervened directly in the case by informing the Commandant of CDEE that he would like to introduce courses in French as a second language at the College. He left Murdoch and Letellier to draft a B and B policy to be applied at NDC.<sup>106</sup> One month later, after discussions with three Francophone students then in residence, Davis again approached Murdoch, this time at greater length, proposing what he called an "ideal model" of how B and B should operate at the National Defence College in Kingston.

According to Davis and his Francophone advisers, the language dimension of this would be achieved if an Anglophone could speak English and be understood by a Francophone, while the latter could speak French and be understood in turn. A cultural component had to be created by ensuring that a minimum 30 percent of a class were Francophones who had studied and lived in a French or French-Canadian culture (12 students out of 40, or 5 or 6 out of 18 military and 7 out of 22 civilian). These Francophones would all

have a good command of English and all Anglophones would have achieved at least the functional level in French, which would enable them to follow a lecture in French. According to the three Francophones advisors, B and B at the College would depend heavily on staff, who would have to be sympathetic toward the project and its attributes. Two group directors would be bilingual Francophones, while the other two directors and Staff officers would be bilingual Anglophones. One of the duties of the Francophone directors would be to find Francophone lecturers in Canada or elsewhere, which presupposed that they would be well informed about publications in French relating to the many topics covered at the College. Further suggestions followed: all published notices and memorandums would be bilingual; Anglophones would be allowed to practise their French for a few weeks before exposure to Francophone lecturers; general instructions regarding courses would be available in bilingual format, but not all documents relating to courses would necessarily be in both languages. The three Francophones advisors did not favour simultaneous translation because they believed it could become a reason to put B and B on a dead-end road. Moreover, bilingualism as they envisaged it at the College made interpretation unnecessary. At worst, a unilingual French lecturer might not understand questions from the floor, and then a Francophone would translate them for him.

Davis, after reporting what the ideal model might be like, wondered how the individuals and agencies concerned would react when they were informed that such and such a person could not come to the College because he was unilingual English. He thus advocated an intermediate model, the one he had proposed to Sharp in February. However, he accepted most of the other arguments of the three men he had consulted, recalling that the choice of adequate numbers of bilingual directors and Francophone students depended on Ottawa, and thus much of the solution was out of his own hands. He advocated installing interpretation facilities in the auditorium to help students.\* As this would take several months and guest lecturers had to be arranged four to five months in advance, the B and B program could not begin before September 1973.<sup>107</sup> In short, Davis faced the same problems as commandants in the Staff colleges. Unlike them, he used paper with a bilingual letterhead.

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\* In his letter of September 1983, Davis said that he fought to obtain interpretation for a practical reason: the air conditioning system used in summer was noisy. Interpretation would require a silent hall. By fighting for interpretation, he hoped to obtain a new air conditioning system. This "oblique" strategy, as he calls it, worked wonderfully.

The Commandant of the CDEE, Rear-Admiral R.W. Murdoch, took up the case as he had done for the Staff colleges and submitted a proposal which was examined by Colonel Hanna at the office of the DGBB. Hanna adopted the premise that the proposed program's justification depended on the degree of participation of Francophones as students. He would find it hard to justify major expenditures (on interpretation) if the few Francophone students were perfectly bilingual.<sup>108</sup>

Nevertheless, at Cloutier's request, the Commandant of the CDEE prepared a program to introduce studies in French at National Defence College, which he submitted to the Chief of Personnel on 2 June 1972 with the recommendation that it be approved and forwarded to the CDS.<sup>109</sup> This program was, apart from a few details, identical to that of the Staff colleges. The CP endorsed it and submitted it to the CDS.<sup>110</sup> The VCDS intervened to recommend that it be implemented and incorporated into the plan to be submitted by the Department to Treasury Board. But to avoid introducing new costs into the program already under study, construction of the interpretation module would be delayed and the program itself would begin in 1973-74.<sup>111</sup> The DGBB agreed with the recommendation of the VCDS, but recalled that plans must be made to form Francophone syndicates with the possible participation of virtually unilingual Francophone students.<sup>112</sup> In late July, the CP presented the revised program to the CDS,<sup>113</sup> who approved it on 31 August 1972.<sup>114</sup>

The interpretation module was to be installed in October 1973 and the first Francophone syndicate was to be set up in 1973-74. A report even stated in February 1974 that the College would have achieved 100 percent of the goals of its bilingualism program by the following year, no small attainment for an institution of that type.<sup>115</sup>

This said, it would be inexcusable for us not to mention two facts. The first is that the equipment required for interpretation was installed on false pretences. One was that in future, NDC would have unilingual Francophones of the rank of colonel or the civilian equivalent as students (which was not very likely), and unilingual Francophone lecturers (which had rarely happened since 1974-75). To our knowledge, Colonel Daniel Reichel, former director of the Swiss federal military history department and library, who was invited by Major-General Richard Evraire, Commandant of National Defence College from 1984 to 1987, was the first Francophone lecturer. He donated about a hundred volumes, many of them in French, to the College library (also serving CLFCSC), which mainly had books in English from the United Kingdom, the USA and Canada. In fact, 98.5 percent of its holdings were in

English in 1985, which shows the small role played by French thought and culture at the academic level.<sup>116</sup>

The other point is that the College was under the same constraints as the Staff colleges as regards the availability of directors of bilingual study groups and of translations. Thus the reports in the earlier part of this chapter regarding Staff schools and colleges relevant to these two constraints also apply to NDC, though to a lesser extent because interpretation was available there for much of the time. Does this mean that a Francophone senior civilian official from the federal or Quebec government studying in NDC, was entitled to greater respect than a Francophone in the military at the rank of captain or lieutenant-colonel training in a Staff school or college, where lectures were given only in English, without interpretation? Or rather that the practical aspect — since all Francophones in the military were bilingual, why would it be necessary to speak to them in their own language? — prevailed among military middle managers, while the theoretical model of the Official Languages Act came to the fore for senior civilian and military officials?

Let us conclude by taking note of part of the report written by a participant in course XLII (1988-89) regarding B and B at National Defence College during his stay. Correspondence between the Commandant and Francophones before the course was in English; by order of the Commandant, interpretation was cancelled and replaced by “passive” bilingualism (unfortunately, not all candidates were bilingual); five of the lecturers were Francophones; but none of them uttered a word of French; there was no French-language syndicate; only one of the syndicate directors was a Francophone appointed part way during the year; and the quality of translation in both directions was appalling.<sup>117</sup>

There is both good and bad in these facts, but it seems clear that, even after 1987, there still remained a long way to go to achieve the goals which the College had set for itself in the early 1970s.

# **Part Four**

## **Institutional Bilingualism**

His Grace spoke about the question of language. He depicted the whole of America as destined in future to use English; and in behalf of Catholic interests, he asked us to make that language the usual tongue in which the Gospel would be proclaimed and preached to the people.

Let us leave... to Catholics of every nation that come to this welcoming land of Canada the right to pray to God in the language which is at once that of their race and that of their country, the blessed language of their fathers and mothers. Priests of Christ, do not deprive anyone of what each holds dearest after the God he worships.

Have no fear, Most Reverend Archbishop of Westminster: in this land of Canada, and especially in this French land of Quebec, our pastors, as they have always done, will lavish on the exiled sons of your noble homeland, like those of heroic Ireland, all the comforts of religion in the language of their fathers, you may be sure.

But at the same time, allow me, Your Grace, to lay claim to the same right for my compatriots, for those who speak my language, not only in this province but wherever there are French groups living under the shadow of the British flag, the glorious star-spangled banner and most of all under the sheltering wing of the Catholic Church — the Church of Christ who died for all men and who laid on no one the obligation to deny his race in order to remain faithful to Himself.

Henri Bourassa's reply to the speech by the Most Reverend Mgr Bourne, Archbishop of Westminster, at the closing session of the XXI<sup>th</sup> Eucharistic Congress in Montreal on 10 September 1910.

Henri Bourassa  
*Religion, Langue, Nationalité*  
Montreal: Le Devoir, 1910

Among all of the aims included in the 1972 DND B & B plan is institutional bilingualism — the capability of an institution to provide services to the public and its own personnel in the two official languages — this objective is the most specific one given by the government to all its departments and agencies. If there was one aspect of the 1972 program that was disappointing, this was it. The program implied that, by 1987, bilingualism would still be a weight to be borne primarily by Francophones, which was contrary to the equal treatment promised them at the same time. Nevertheless, Anglophones were expected to shoulder a greater share of institutional bilingualism when 15 years had passed. This was achieved to some extent, but far less than was expected in 1972. Was French “rammed down the throats” of Anglophones in the military, as some said? If so, the evidence shows that it was not digested.

In Chapter 16, we shall see that 1972 projections of bilingual publications and bilingualism in CANEX did not materialize. Who will be surprised after following our analysis to this stage? As for determining the precise return on the money invested, directly or through the intermediary of those working to implement and execute the plan, this is a subject that cannot yet be discussed in a fully appropriate manner. For, despite the many problems we have raised, hope remains that the seed planted in 1972, which had not grown to full maturity in 1987 as hoped, might do so by about the year 2000. We can, however, discuss part of the human and financial effort invested by DND in official languages since 1972.





# 15

## The Weight of Bilingualism: Second-Language Training

### English and French courses for service personnel up to 1967

Before integration and unification had done their work, second-language courses were given at various sites managed by each of the three services. In the Army, at the Canadian Army Training School (CATS), courses in English and French were given beginning on 1 September 1952, in addition to training courses for Francophone recruits and privates being promoted to corporal, after the school was moved from Saint-Jean to Valcartier.<sup>1</sup> Thus 20-week English courses were given to about a hundred candidates over the year. French courses lasting 20 to 24 weeks were provided for Anglophone commissioned and non-commissioned officers who had volunteered (25 candidates per course, two courses per year).

The language teachers were lieutenants or sergeants. Their teaching materials were purchased from the *Institut pédagogique de Québec*, the Canadian Legion and the US Army Language School in Monterey, California, but they also used about 40 films from the Army film library, 34 of which were in French. As soon as Francophone candidates arrived, their knowledge of English was assessed: they were rated A if they were bilingual, B when they had enough ability to take training in English, C if they had some knowledge of English and D if they had no English at all. According to this source, Anglophone candidates do not seem to have undergone a similar assessment. Language teachers used the teaching method advocated by Dr I.A. Richards of Harvard University, and candidates took 45 tests which measured their progress throughout the 20 or 24 weeks of the course.<sup>2</sup>

At first, English language courses were not very well organized. In November 1952, the Commandant of CATS, Major W.E. Sutherland of the *R22<sup>e</sup>R* — who called himself more Francophone than Anglophone — wrote that young Francophones lacked motivation. Many had joined the Army because they were fed up with school and were depressed when they learned that they would waste 20 weeks in a classroom learning English. We should

note from the outset that this remains a concern today. Another problem raised by Sutherland was the candidates' lack of education. The Army was trying to teach them to read, write and speak English when some of them did not know how to read or write French correctly, because they had had less than four years of schooling. Lastly, military instructors came and went too quickly — thirty of them had passed through the language training company in twelve months — and this caused, among other things, lack of continuity in the program.<sup>3</sup>

In April 1953, the school was given a mandate to investigate language training methods and techniques with a view to improving them.<sup>4</sup> Apparently, Valcartier was not achieving as good results in this area as the RCOA Apprentice Training Company in Longue-Pointe.<sup>5</sup> CATS reported to Eastern Area Command (Quebec City) but could communicate at any time with the Director Military Training (DMT) in Ottawa on any matter relating to training. The results of the investigation led to an improvement in course continuity when four civilian teachers were hired through the good offices of the Quebec Department of Welfare and Youth.<sup>6</sup>

From 1954 to 1958, courses proceeded routinely. Sometimes, in order to free up regular personnel, reserve officers were called up to serve as language teachers. In 1958, there was talk of relocating the school, then housed in temporary buildings designed only to last through the Second World War. One of the options considered was to move to Gagetown, near Oromocto, New Brunswick, a recently built military base.<sup>7</sup> But the civilian teachers were unwilling to do so, partly because there was no French-language school for dependants in Gagetown. Several military officials, for their part, hesitated because they would have to sell their houses if they moved.<sup>8</sup> Thus in the spring of 1959, CATS moved from Valcartier to *La Citadelle* in the heart of Québec City, where it remained until November 1968.<sup>9</sup> The following is a recapitulation of language activity at CATS over this period.<sup>10</sup>

Table 33

**SECOND-LANGUAGE COURSES AT CATS, 1959-67**

	FRENCH COURSES		NCO COURSES (Junior leader)	
YEAR			PART 1 ENGLISH COURSES	
	COURSES	PERSONS	COURSES PERSONS	
1959*	1	7	1	38
1960	1	12	1	32
1961	2	24	2	66
1962	1	8**	1	36**
1963	2	26	3	110
	1***	23		
1964	3	47	2	63
1965	5	55	3	64
1966	2	26	2	31
1967	2	28	1	17

\* Courses began in June

\*\* Estimate

\*\*\* Special course for officer cadets

In 1966, L.G. Kelly, a searcher on the Royal Commission on B and B, reported that language teaching at *La Citadelle* was “in a very healthy state” and personnel were “interested... efficient and very likeable.”<sup>11</sup>

On 12 November 1968, the *Dépôt du R22<sup>e</sup>R* was reduced to nil strength following a decision to centralize Armed Forces recruit training. Thus Francophone recruits in the sea, land and air branches were trained together in French at the *École des recrues des Forces canadiennes (ERFC)* at CFB Saint-Jean after 1 May 1968.<sup>12</sup> In addition, those wishing to take French or English courses in future went to the Canadian Forces Language School (CFLS),<sup>13</sup> also located at the CFB Saint-Jean. That, in essence, is what happened in Army second-language training.

In the Royal Canadian Navy, the picture was simpler. No French courses were organized for Anglophones. In 1951, a scant 2.2 percent of officers and 11 percent of seamen were Francophones. In February 1952, following an investigation by Commander Marcel Jetté, it was decided to set up a school

for Francophone recruits in Québec under the name of HMCS\* D'Iberville.<sup>14</sup> The first course was given to 60 recruits. Eventually three courses were given simultaneously to 180 recruits for a six-month period. After taking the course, Francophone sailors joined their Anglophone colleagues, who were just completing their eighth week of recruit training. Francophones were thus thrown into the ninth week of a unilingual English course to sink or swim.<sup>15</sup> According to the Director Naval Training, the first weeks spent at Cornwallis were a "critical" period for a Francophone recruit; that was when the discovery was made whether he or she was able or willing to adapt to living in English.<sup>16</sup>

In October 1955, the Francophone recruit school moved to HMCS Hochelaga, Ville LaSalle (near Montreal). It left LaSalle on 31 July 1961.<sup>17</sup> for Longue-Pointe in eastern Montreal, where it remained until October 1966.<sup>18</sup> Its teaching was then integrated into the Canadian Forces Language School. As L. G. Kelly observed, "Over-emphasis on military atmosphere will militate against effective language-learning."<sup>19</sup> From 1967 on, naval recruits needing English went to CFLS at Saint-Jean, where they were soon joined by Army recruits. Air Force recruits were there already.

On 2 May 1949, the Royal Canadian Air Force set up a section, the Composite Training School (KTS), in Trenton, Ontario, which taught English to Francophone recruits and officer cadets who were not fully bilingual. On 2 April 1951, this unit was attached to the School of English at Saint-Jean.<sup>20</sup> It then had 30 officer cadets, 238 airmen and 42 airwomen studying their second language. The total number of trainees rose to 469 at the end of June 1951.<sup>21</sup>


Overseas expansion after 1951 and a pressing need for Francophone personnel for its bases in France prompted the RCAF to step up recruiting in Quebec, and more importantly, to accept unilingual Francophones at last. Since English was the language of operations, these recruits necessarily had to learn English before they could be useful. On 1 January 1955, the section which taught English to Francophone officer cadets, then located at Saint-Jean, was attached to RCAF Officers School in London, Ontario, the city where the RCN had taught English courses to Francophone sailors during the Second World War. The section moved to Centralia, Ontario, with the officers school in July 1958.<sup>23</sup> According to Kelly's study on this school, there was a very disturbing discontent in Centralia in 1965, caused partly by poor-quality

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\* HMCS (Her Majesty's Canadian Ship).

housing but also by a bad attitude among the staff.<sup>24</sup> In 1964, recognizing that more bilingual officers were needed, the RCAF began offering French courses. There were various ways of gaining access to them. The reader would do well to memorize them, for the model that took shape here was repeated on a larger scale a few years later.

The first option was a 20-week residential course offered at RCAF Station at Saint-Jean, Quebec, for 20 officers at a time. Anyone could apply to take this course, but selection was based on service requirements. In the first week, the student took a battery of tests and was then placed in one of three levels: elementary (audio-visual course developed by the *École normale de Saint-Cloud* in France), intermediate (same as elementary but accelerated so as to cover other subjects of study prepared at Saint-Jean) and advanced (the Saint-Cloud method served as a base but most of the material was developed at Saint-Jean). Added to this first option was the possibility for officers to take the course offered at *La Citadelle* by the Army or alternatively the one offered by the Public Service Commission (PSC). Following this course, the officer would be transferred to a position where he could use his French. Later in his career, further such transfers might be made.




Her Excellency the Right Honourable Jeanne Sauvé, PC, CC, CMM, CD, Governor General of Canada and Commander-in-Chief of the Canadian Armed Forces, from 1984 to 1989.



Her Excellency Jeanne Sauvé, performing one of her many military duties in Ottawa.

His Eminence Maurice Cardinal Roy, CC, OBE, CD. A military chaplain during the Second World War, he then served as Ordinary of the Canadian Armed Forces from 1946 to 1981.



The second option involved extramural courses using an audio-linguistic method already in use at Canadian Forces HQ in Ottawa and in various RCAF establishments in Quebec. In 1965-66, this possibility was extended to other locations in Canada (1 Air Division in France used the Saint-Cloud course). The audio-linguistic method covered four levels, but only the first two were available within the program. After the course, a student could take the test recognized by the RCAF. His results would be placed on file and he might eventually be assigned to a location where knowledge of French was required.

Students had to spend at least four hours a week on the audio part of the course. The teacher was in attendance two hours per week until he had given 35 hours of classes. Students had to take every opportunity to come in contact with French (listening to radio or television in French, reading appropriate newspapers and magazines which had to be made available by stations, organizing French tables in messes, and so forth). Interested stations were asked to apply to their HQ, giving the number of students prepared to take the course and stating whether a qualified teacher could be hired locally. Other administrative criteria which we omit here were also included. But overall control of extramural courses was in the hands of Canadian Forces HQ in Ottawa.<sup>25</sup>

The first two courses given in residence at Saint-Jean met with their share of failure. Lack of motivation, it was rapidly demonstrated, rather than real inability to learn a second language impeded progress. It was then recommended that candidates should be volunteers and should take a language aptitude test before being designated as trainees.<sup>26</sup>

On 2 June 1964, Francophone officer cadets returned to the School of English at Saint-Jean.<sup>27</sup> In 1966, Kelly visited the school and reported to the B and B Commissioners that it was the best of the six schools he had visited, for both effectiveness and good relations.<sup>28</sup> Nevertheless, the officers responsible for training found that Francophone officer cadet navigators in professional courses had a higher failure rate than Anglophones. For the first time, the staff officer who received these observations in Ottawa was a Francophone himself, fully bilingual and a navigator to boot. Captain (AF) Louis Noël de Tilly was thus thoroughly familiar with the problem. On the basis of the work of Dr E.J. Brazeau (Volume I, p 165), de Tilly attributed the situation to two main causes:



- a. communications (ability to use the second language just learned during the period of integration into the Armed Forces and during training); and
- b. psychological, sociological and cultural adjustment.<sup>29</sup>

The acting Director General Recruiting and Training attempted to solve the problem by means of English immersion courses, tying the Department's work into that of the Public Service Commission.<sup>30</sup> But on 23 April 1967, the School of English was disbanded as a unit. Its teaching staff and students were transferred to the new Canadian Forces Language School which was officially opened in Saint-Jean on 1 May 1968, following unification of the Canadian Forces.<sup>31</sup> On 1 March 1972, the English Language Training Unit was created at CFB Borden. Its name was changed to Canadian Forces Language School (Borden) on 5 September 1975, when it began teaching both official languages.<sup>32</sup> Lastly, the Joint Services Language School (JSLS), founded in Ottawa in 1963, was renamed Canadian Forces Foreign Language School on 19 August 1968.<sup>33</sup> It became *CFLS/ELFC* Ottawa on 1 December 1979, teaching foreign languages not only to the military but also to officials from other federal departments and Crown corporations.<sup>34</sup> The last-named school will not be covered in this study, since it is peripheral to our present interests.

### **Reorganization of official languages teaching and difficulty of dividing responsibilities**

CFLS was one of the results of the policy decisions which led to the integration and unification of the Canadian Armed Forces. It affords an example in one very special field of the adjustments made by service personnel to comply with the wishes of their political masters. At CFHQ in 1966, official languages teaching was the responsibility of the Director of Training. He had a narrow perception of his task of unifying the language schools of the three services. In a memorandum dated 1 January 1966, he wrote that the language of work in all three services was English, which was used by the majority of Canadians and Canada's allies\*. Canada was a bilingual country, but a French Canadian who joined one of the three services would have to learn English first in order to understand the training he was given afterwards. He had to have a very good command of English so that he

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\* He seems to believe that citizens from Turkey, Greece, Germany, Portugal, France, Denmark, Norway, Belgium, The Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Italy speak English as first language, the same way Britons, Americans and Anglo-canadians do.

could compete on a fair footing with his English-speaking compatriots.<sup>35</sup> According to the author, English courses should come early in Francophones' careers, preferably right after recruitment and definitely before specialized training, except for those who joined after graduating from university.<sup>36</sup>

As we can see, the proposed Language School — the integration of all schools was to be studied in 1966, and this led to the creation of CFLS in 1968 — was designed for Francophones first and foremost, in accordance with the view prevailing early in 1966. This changed gradually, as we may already suspect. But how remote the concerns of the day seem from the 1926 Militia order that all lieutenants in the permanent forces had to pass an examination in French before they could take the examinations that would perhaps enable them to become captains.<sup>37</sup> This mandatory introduction to the French language for Anglophones had been abolished long ago. Such a practice never extended to the Navy or the Air Force, and indeed, despite all the good intentions expressed for over twenty years, it still did not exist in 1987 within the Canadian Forces officer corps.

We are already familiar with the Prime Minister's intervention in April 1966. Its repercussions on civilian Defence officials are analysed in Chapter 18, together with the Public Service Commission Language Bureau, established in 1964. Even the military side of Defence could not be completely unaffected by these innovations. In September 1966, Canada agreed to join the Bureau of International Language Coordination, the creation of which Great Britain had proposed on 26 July. One of the purposes of this Bureau was to disseminate information on language training to participating countries.<sup>38</sup> The Department of National Defence was duly represented in the fall of 1966 by Roger Lavergne, and the Public Service Commission by J.J. Guérin of the Language Training Branch.<sup>39</sup> The renewed interest in language teaching in Canada was thus well known outside the country.

In 1966 and 1967, the various schools that taught English and French were brought together at Saint-Jean. This also meant that teaching methods had to be standardized, which proved to be a fairly lengthy process. The Public Service Commission (PSC) initiated an experimental French course for 42 Anglophones in the first few months of 1964. This pilot project was a success and the Commission received permission to broaden its experiment. The following September, courses became solidly established. In 1966, work was carried out on tests designed to be used in the early months of 1968 to rate language knowledge on a scale of 1 (none) to 5 (perfect).<sup>40</sup> As 1967 ended, affairs were not nearly so well organized on the military side.

True, the CFLS had been founded. But who would teach courses: specialized military personnel or civilians? The answer was agreed upon in 1966: civilians would do the job. But which civilians? Would they come from the PSC, which was in the process of building up a body of qualified teachers, or would the Department hire its own teachers as it had to date? Again, the answer came quickly. In the fall of 1966, a process had already begun which was to lead the PSC to become involved in teaching languages in DND.

We shall not go into all the details of the negotiating process, which took many twists over the years. We should summarize it, however, so as to give the reader an idea of what was happening regarding the superstructure attached to the actual language courses.

At the language school in *La Citadelle*, Québec, civilian teachers who taught English to Francophones were hired and paid by the province, which was reimbursed, under an agreement, by the federal Department of Manpower and Immigration. Then, on 22 September 1966, Treasury Board agreed in its circular TB 658722 that language training for the military would be integrated with that of the PSC.<sup>41</sup> From October 1966 until February 1967, the federal Department of Manpower and the Quebec Department of Education negotiated the termination of their agreement. They finally decided that the federal-provincial agreement would expire on 31 August 1967. On 1 September, the PSC would assume responsibility for military language training.<sup>\*42</sup>

Parallel to these federal-provincial discussions, others took place at a purely federal level between the PSC and DND regarding the status of civilian teachers at the future CFLS. These negotiations extended from 24 October 1966 until 21 April 1967. National Defence was concerned to ensure that those already teaching for the Department should be subject, as of 1 September 1967, to the hiring criteria already followed by the PSC. It was finally agreed that the PSC would be responsible for the following duties:

- recruiting the teaching staff needed by the Forces;<sup>\*\*</sup>

\* In point of fact, DND had already, in October 1966, offered its civilian teachers in Quebec a temporary contract under which they would work directly for the Department until 31 August 1967, while improving their working conditions, including pay, as of 14 November 1966.

\*\* In 1967, however, hiring would be conducted jointly. National Defence wanted to be represented when the teachers who had worked for it at *La Citadelle* applied for the new positions. This practice terminated in 1971.

- training teaching staff;
- providing pedagogical supervision of teaching staff;\*
- conducting research into language training methods and improving them.

The Canadian Forces, for their part, were financially responsible for civilians tasked with language training and for the administration of the facilities allocated to language training within the Canadian Forces.<sup>43</sup>

This agreement did not really come into effect until the final months of 1971, when a language training program was set up on the bases. Moreover, it was subsequently amended several times regarding responsibility for the financial burden of language teachers, which in 1972 was transferred to the Public Service Commission.<sup>44</sup> At the time of writing, it is over ten years since the Department resumed financial responsibility for civilian second-language teachers. Thus we have more or less returned to the 1967 agreement.

While we are considering the superstructure surrounding language courses and the results they achieved, let us pause a moment to examine the division of responsibilities within DND.

Integration played a crucial role in what was to follow. As we have seen, beginning in 1967, the CFLS concentrated the various language courses hitherto given in the three services at Saint-Jean. We have also seen that Training Command had been set up in Winnipeg in 1966. Thus, in theory, general control over language training was to be exercised in Winnipeg. From 1964 to 1967, however, most of the leadership in this field came from the Directorate of Training (DT) at CFHQ. Commander P.M. Birch-Jones, DT-4, ceased serving as supervisor of language training in Ottawa in summer 1967, and his responsibilities were transferred to Training Command in Winnipeg. Birch-Jones was proud to leave behind him a CFLS that was running smoothly, where PSC teachers would improve courses and incorporate more technical vocabulary into courses for Francophones. According to him, Training Command was not ready to take on the new responsibilities for language training which devolved on it. Hence there should be an officer in Ottawa responsible for this area, as there was one in Winnipeg. After all,

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\* Reports by teachers' civilian supervisors would be sent to the commandant of the military school.

CFLS was to offer courses to some 2,000 people per year and would have a staff of 200 civilian and military personnel, more than half of them teachers. This would give rise to many dealings between DND and the PSC, which would probably take place in Ottawa. Moreover, a number of CFAOs relating to language training (one on French, one on English and a third on testing) were being drafted.<sup>45</sup>

The Division responsible for training in Ottawa ensured that one of its officers maintained contact with language training. In 1968, as people became aware that bilingualism could be an asset in a military career, internal pressure began to mount for more French courses for Anglophones. Of course, the trend was not reversed immediately and the foremost function of CFLS was still to teach English to Francophone recruits who, after taking their basic training in French at Saint-Jean, were preparing to study a trade in English. Thus a memorandum of May 1968, cited earlier, noted that after Francophones reached specialization standard TQ3 (i.e. the moment a military is ready to perform in his/her trade), they went to CFLS.<sup>46</sup> At a meeting chaired by General Allard at the end of 1968 on trade courses in French, the CDS took the opportunity to remind listeners of this. But looking ahead (perhaps too far?), Allard implied that the situation was temporary; when all technical courses were available in French, Francophones would only learn English at the point in their careers where it became necessary for them.<sup>47</sup>

In both the above-mentioned cases, mention was also made of the deficit of bilingual instructors, as we noted in the preceding chapter. There were two complementary ways of closing this gap: first, by proportional representation of Francophones at all levels; and secondly, by having available Anglophones who were bilingual enough to offer even a minimal proportion of courses in French. In 1968, however, the teaching of French to Anglophones was still patchy. Thus the names of two Anglophones in the military were submitted in June to spend a year in Quebec in a bicultural development program designed for senior Public Service managers. But no Francophone was to steep himself in English culture in Toronto.<sup>48</sup> From September 1968 to April 1969, the Principal Naval Overseer in Quebec put constant pressure on Ottawa to gain access to French courses for himself and his unilingual Anglophone personnel. He eventually won his point.<sup>49</sup>

These examples point to a new trend: pressure by Anglophones to learn French. As 1969 progressed, this movement became stronger. The Official Languages Act played an unquestionable role at the general level. But the draft B and B program for the Armed Forces submitted by Allard before he retired as CDS already contained bilingualism objectives which suggested that there would be bilingual Anglophones (see Volume I, p 239).

On 20 August 1969, the Department's Advisory Committee on B and B (chaired by Roger Lavergne) formed a subcommittee to study the number of bilinguals which the Armed Forces would need and the quality of teaching required in light of the new bilingualism policy.<sup>50</sup> The subcommittee was chaired by Major Alexandre Taschereau of the Directorate of Training. We should note that he was assigned to language training at HQ in Ottawa from August 1969 until he retired from the Forces in 1982. In addition to Taschereau, the subcommittee consisted of six members, among them Louis Noël de Tilly, whom we met earlier. The group's report was submitted to T.G. Morry, who chaired the Advisory Committee after Lavergne died on 24 February 1970. Events soon overtook this 28-page document but some parts are interesting in that they show, for example, how CFLS operated two years after its founding.

The school accommodated 725 students at a time, of whom 635 were Francophone recruits taking the basic English course before proceeding to their TQ3 course. Twice a year, a 15-week advanced English course was given to thirty Francophones, young future commissioned or non-commissioned officers. Three times a year, a 14-week French course was offered to Anglophones: career managers in Ottawa chose 180 candidates. In addition to these formal courses, special courses were offered; for example, intensive French courses for Anglophones assigned to serve on the *Ottawa* or in *12<sup>e</sup>RBC* or for personnel from Training Command.

This view of the school's work was complemented by a few recommendations, some of them poorly supported by the facts. There was a proposal, for instance, to put up a building designed specifically for language training, recognizing that the temporary buildings erected during the Second World War at Saint-Jean were obsolete. The report insisted, however, that Saint-Jean should be identified as a permanent base, which amounted to rejecting Allard's suggestion, made in December 1968, that it be placed on the list of bases that might be closed during the unification process. According to Allard, technical and language schools should be at Valcartier.<sup>51</sup> He had long harboured great designs for that base, as he wrote in his *Memoirs* (pp 198, 228-9 and 242). Saint-Jean, the subcommittee suggested, should be kept to offer some security to civilian teachers, but also because Saint-Jean was ideally situated for Francophones, who learned English in their own environment, for Anglophones, who approached French in a Francophone environment, and for teachers, who were close to Montreal with its French- and English-speaking universities. The essential part of these conditions, however, could be met by locating the CFLS in Montreal or Saint-Hubert, where the Department owned large areas of land.

At another point, the report asserted that more language teachers should be drawn from the military. We have seen that the Department opted for the opposite solution in 1967 under an agreement with the PSC.

One recommendation appears more realistic to us: the number of personnel studying French could be doubled, despite the real constraints on the number of living spaces available at Saint-Jean, when even the existing premises were inadequate in many respects. This would require making the scheduled period of 14 weeks for the continuous French course, first offered in September 1969, more flexible. In brief, students would have to achieve a certain level of knowledge on the scale of 5, depending on the bilingual position for which they were slated. Once they reached that level, they would leave the school, whether it took eight weeks or twenty. After a while, students could be enrolled in the school every month to replace those who had passed their French test at the appropriate level. By the end of the year, the school would probably have turned out 350 functionally bilingual Anglophones — that is, scoring at level 3 out of 5 on the test. This result could be achieved by keeping the existing buildings, hiring twelve persons and investing about \$20,000. We note that this proposal was an unqualified recognition of the quality of the PSC's French courses which, according to the report, compared favourably with those of private schools. The intention was for the Department to use this expertise to the greatest advantage.

The subcommittee dealt with other questions relating to its subject of study. It agreed to having civilians in the Department study at the CFLS (see Chapter 18) and wanted every effort to be concentrated on that institution, leaving aside for the moment the plan to open satellite schools (mainly to teach French) in various bases across Canada. It suggested the revision of CFAO 9-34, which dealt with testing, and wanted the military to continue taking part in the bicultural program at Quebec. Lastly, the report proposed the opening of a mini-laboratory at CFHQ which would enable Anglophone military and civilian personnel who had taken French courses to maintain their skills.

Judging that the teaching of English to Francophones was going well, the Taschereau group gave most of its attention to Anglophones who were learning French. It immediately came up against a question that was not to be answered for years: how many military bilinguals would the Forces need?<sup>52</sup>

Despite this major obstacle, which could not be surmounted for the moment, the subcommittee did good work. This is demonstrated by the fact that several of its recommendations were implemented over the years, including the preservation, unwarranted in many respects, of CFB Saint-Jean,

where a new CFLS was later located. In addition, a language laboratory was installed in the library of CFHQ by spring 1970.<sup>53</sup> However, one point not raised in the report was the subject of a brief skirmish. Colonel Pierre Chassé had reached the conclusion that there should be a directorate at CFHQ exclusively responsible for language training. In the late 1960s, French as a second language for Anglophones was added to English for Francophones as an important B & B component, and it was thought that those who would have to supervise all this activity should come under the new directorate general advocated by Chassé throughout 1970. In the event, a Directorate of Language Training became part of the Directorate General Bilingualism and Biculturalism (DGBB). During the 1970s, it was transferred successively from DGBB to the DG Recruiting, Education and Training (DGRET) and then back to the Directorate General Official Languages (DGOL) before returning to DGRET, where it was still to be found in 1987. These successive transfers between the two directorates general were evidence of uncertainty about the status language training should have. Was it purely and simply a training function, thus belonging under DGRET? Or rather, in view of the growing attention given to bilingualism and “producing” bilingual military personnel, should language training not be seen as one of the areas that should be tightly controlled by DGOL?

The increasing role of CFHQ in language training, scarcely two years after the decision was made to abandon this whole area to Training Command, provoked some reactions. In May 1970, the Command launched a large-scale study on teaching English and French for the 1970s and beyond. This led to talk about the FELT Report (*French and English Language Training Report*), whose conclusions were made public in Winnipeg in December 1970.

Let us recall the general context surrounding this study. The Official Languages Act was in force; the first bilingualism program for the Forces had been released, as had Volume III of the Laurendeau-Dunton Commission report, with its recommendation 35\* (see Appendix B) that Anglophones called to serve in the French sector take French language courses, a recommendation fully accepted by the Department. The *Implementation Plan designed to increase B and B in the Canadian Armed Forces* (Appendix C) was already being prepared. In its published form, it contained activities

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\* Let us also bear in mind recommendation 40, part B, calling for French to be promoted at the Royal Military College, which would remain unilingual English, and for English to continue to have prominence at the *Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean*, which would become unilingual French instead of bilingual according to part A of the same recommendation.



relating to language training, already a very active field, as was pointed out to Cabinet in the reply to the questionnaire on B and B sent out to departments by Cabinet in summer 1970. Lastly, Training Command was often at the forefront concerning B & B on account of FRANCOTRAIN, among other things.

All these facts have already been aired, and many of them we have examined in detail. The authors of the FELT Report were also very familiar with them, as they were aware of other pressures to promote French teaching. Thus an article in the 22 January 1970 issue of the *Totem Times*, the base newspaper at Comox, British Columbia, strongly criticized the Forces' bilingualism program. The anonymous author did not always have his facts right, but he touched a sensitive chord when he noted that bilingualism was becoming important in the Forces, that Anglophones had to be able to become bilingual, but that it was nearly impossible for them to do so for lack of appropriate French language courses.<sup>54</sup>

Throughout 1970, language training remained an issue. At a June 1970 Defence Council meeting, the Deputy Minister observed that part of recommendation 38 by the Royal Commission on B and B stated that university or other resources could be used for language training (Appendix B). The Chief of Personnel reminded him that the Department was working with the PSC.<sup>55</sup> The captain of the *Ottawa*, Commander Pierre Simard, proposed for his part that an officer be assigned to teach French on his vessel. Chassé called this proposal a luxury the Forces could not afford. Simard also wanted long periods of immersion to be organized for his Anglophones sailors in Halifax. Chassé felt it was preferable to rely on Saint-Jean, a school which had the advantage of already running smoothly.<sup>56</sup> People were looking everywhere for solutions. At Saint-Jean itself, the Personnel Selection Unit was moved and the facilities which had housed it were renovated to accommodate 230 students of French at a time, which amply fulfilled the Taschereau group's recommendation. However, the same report by Training Command (TC) in Winnipeg noted that if this number was to be increased, new buildings would have to be put up.<sup>57</sup> It is at this juncture that the FELT Report comes into the picture.

The main author of the report was Dr J.E. Mayhood, who was responsible for research at TC. Assisting him were the officer responsible for *LADIF* (French training for francophones) and the officers commanding CFB Saint-Jean and CFLS. We note the absence of qualified representatives from Ottawa. But, had officials not forgotten to include TC on the Taschereau subcommittee? While the report was written by Dr Mayhood, its conclusions

and recommendations were the result of a consensus reached by the members of the working group, which sought to make recommendations on the management and conduct of English and French language training at Training Command in order to comply with the requirements of Departmental policy on bilingualism in the Forces.

The report submitted by Mayhood to his commander was long, well documented and fiercely argued. Unfortunately, much of it went wide of the mark. Mayhood seems in fact not to have intended to concentrate on the assigned topic. Taking advantage of the spaces still left blank at this stage of planning, for example, on proportional representation, he proposed solutions which sometimes read like a B and B plan missing some of its basic principles.

Mayhood acknowledged that it was hard for him to predict exactly what proportional representation policy the Department would adopt. He felt it was certain, however, that both the country's official languages would increasingly have to be taught. He discussed the issue of 28 percent representation everywhere, anticipating that the adjustments made in several trades in order to achieve the desired percentage would result in an increase in the number of students in the basic English course. It remained to be seen how many and over what period, given that FRANCOTRAIN, as it developed, was to absorb directly a growing share of unilingual Francophones. The members of the Mayhood study group did not let a shortage of facts stop them. They made a long series of recommendations based on existing documentation (for example, CFAOs) and, even more, on a unique vision of what B and B in the Forces should be.

Mayhood advocated three streams for Francophones, based on language skills. The first, which he called bilingual, was more or less what Francophones had had to deal with for over a century: they were bilingual or became so, and that opened up every course in the Forces to them. The second was the FRANCOTRAIN stream, which offered a partially bilingual candidate a number of options in French up to certain training levels. It was understood that the range of possibilities in French would broaden over the years to a maximum which would meet the Forces' requirements for personnel qualified in English. Lastly, for those who could not learn English, there would be a limited unilingual stream. Although Mayhood was only supposed to study language training, he skilfully enlarged his area of intervention by making this part of his proposals rest on English courses to be given to Francophones, who would take knowledge tests throughout their courses. Each recruit would be assigned to a stream on the basis of these tests. Furthermore, candidates who only qualified for the unilingual stream

because they did not have the aptitude to learn a second language could be discharged from the Forces if there was no vacant position in this stream. In the case of Anglophones who failed French courses, Mayhood did not plan any return to civilian life. This was, of course, contrary to the principle of equal opportunities which the Minister had accepted some years earlier and was in the process of formalizing.

The Mayhood Report was full of considerations which were the concern of CFHQ. One table, for example, showed the periods of service in French Language Units which linguistically qualified Anglophones would have to perform, depending on whether those units had twenty or twenty five percent Anglophones, and on the percentage of bilingual Anglophones. What use was this, when it was still not known how many such units there would be and in what fields? Mayhood disregarded these basic questions.

On actual language courses, their intensity and the levels to which they should bring their students, Mayhood was more credible. Here again, however, he proposed measures which were the responsibility of CFHQ in Ottawa. Thus he suggested interdepartmental co-operation to avoid duplication and competition on the language teacher market. He recommended that all candidates be aware that once their language training was completed, they would be assigned to an appropriate work environment.

There was very little in this report that deserved to be remembered, and that little was dictated by simple common sense. For example, it recommended that candidates be tested before they began courses and at various stages during their courses, in order to withdraw those who had achieved the required levels and make openings for new students. Also noted by Mayhood was the recommendation that language courses be offered to spouses of members serving in an area where the second language was used.<sup>58</sup> It is amusing that this point was still on the agenda in 1987.

As it happened, Mayhood's recommendations arising directly out of his mandate were already being dealt with in Ottawa by the Directorate Language Training. Let us note the dates carefully. The report was completed at the end of 1970. It began to circulate at TCHQ in Winnipeg in January 1971. On 2 March, Major-General W.K. Carr sent it to the CDS with a letter stating that he had had Mayhood's document compared with the program made public the previous February and no major differences had been found. However, he wrote, before implementing its recommendations, several decisions had to be made in Ottawa. To this end, he had set aside all Mayhood's recommendations which would have to be implemented by CFHQ. Lastly, he stressed that all the senior authorities who had anything to do with

language training should meet soon to clearly define responsibilities in this area.<sup>59</sup>

Language courses did not yet have priority in Ottawa, however. It was agreed that they would play a prominent role in the final plans, which were still in preparation. The partial plan released on 12 February was sure to have a heavy impact; it would insist on sharing the weight of bilingualism equally between the two language groups thenceforth. In theory, the combination of all measures studied to date — accelerating recruiting of Francophones, training them in French and creating new opportunities to serve in French — with measures to make more Anglophones bilingual ought, in the end, to wipe out the injustices which had persisted for over a century. This last point was, indeed, clearly understood by the commands which, in fall 1970, commented on the part of the draft Implementation Plan dealing with more Anglophones becoming bilingual. Northern Region Command emphasized that Anglophones had to be encouraged to write French so that French Language Units did not inherit officers who could not perform staff duties.<sup>60</sup> Chassé agreed, saying that as soon as the program had been approved, he would work with the appropriate authorities to have French writing courses introduced in military and staff colleges.<sup>61</sup>

The Canadian Defence Education Establishments (CDEE), for its part, expressed doubts about bilingualism among officer cadets. Referring to Annex C, paragraph q, it wondered whether it was possible to begin French courses at RMC in the fall of 1971 and produce functionally bilingual officer cadets by 1976. According to the CDEE, officer cadets in the military colleges, caught between university courses, military training and daily sports, had almost no time to themselves. These colleges could not become language schools. If everyone were required to achieve the functional level before graduating, perhaps a year of study would have to be added to the program, although even this would not guarantee complete success. As for the many officer cadets who took their education in civilian universities, the most that could be done was to encourage them to become bilingual. Yet in order to offer equal opportunities to everyone, those training in university had to be at the same level as their counterparts in military college. The best approach to bilingualism for officer cadets would be to send everyone to CFLS at the end of their education, to give them equal opportunities.<sup>62</sup> Chassé did not allow himself to be disconcerted by this view, which he attributed to great lack of confidence in the ability of the country's young Anglophone elite to learn French. He thus retorted that, despite the obvious difficulties, the proposed program remained achievable. In his view, a great majority of those who studied French for a certain number of years would achieve a level of knowledge which would enable them to function in their second language.<sup>63</sup>

Air Defence Command expressed even greater scepticism than the CDEE, questioning whether the Armed Forces would ever be able to achieve the proposed levels of bilingualism. Interpreting some of the conclusions of Dr Wilder Penfield, a Canadian neurologist who had expertly written about the apprenticeship of bilingualism, the writer asserted that it was practically impossible for adults to become bilingual. Moreover, the Command calculated from the percentages quoted in the draft that between 40,000 and 60,000 bilingual Anglophones would be needed by 1980. Was this possible, they wondered. Instead, the Command suggested waiting until the primary and secondary schools had produced a large number of young bilinguals, whom the Forces would recruit in a generation. Otherwise, the Forces' operational effectiveness would decrease because military personnel sent on course to fill the demand created by bilingualism would not be replaced in their positions.<sup>64</sup>

Chassé replied that while Penfield was a world-class neurologist he had rather limited expertise about learning languages. His conclusions in this area were seriously challenged by experts, including Wallace Lambert and Jacques Brazeau. Moreover, Penfield did not say an adult could not learn another language, but merely claimed that it was harder for an adult than a child. This said, Chassé reported that in his own office there were four fully bilingual Francophones who had known no English before they turned seventeen or eighteen. Air Defence seemed to believe that Anglophones suffered from a defect which would prevent them from learning another language. For his part, Chassé had confidence in the adaptive capacities of his Anglophone colleagues with whom he had worked for years.

Chassé agreed that the problem should be solved in the long term by the school system. He also recalled, however, the government's decree that, in the meantime, measures had to be taken to make federal agencies institutionally bilingual. Chassé rejected Air Defence Command's analysis. Neither the dollar cost nor the cost in operational effectiveness would be as high as the Command feared, because it had not taken certain facts into account; for example, Francophones would make up part of the bilingual complement, and this bilingualism would often have been acquired without costing the Department a cent.<sup>65</sup> This last point had been made by other agencies, including Mobile Command, headed by General Gilles Turcot.<sup>66</sup> As for the impact of language courses on the Forces' operations, it was to resurface often in several forms, as we shall see.

These positive and negative comments by commands about language training and its effectiveness in producing bilinguals had at least the advantage of responding to a document submitted to them with the precise aim of obtaining their reactions. Dr Mayhood's FELT Report, on the other hand,

challenged the entire B and B program which had just been launched. Nevertheless, one of FELT's positive effects was to force all agencies involved in language training to discuss the boundaries they would each have to observe.

In this process, which lasted several months, the first stage was the precise allocation of authority right at CFHQ, where there was some degree of confusion. The new Directorate of Language Training, under a DGBB which was in the process of formation for most of 1971, implemented the Base Language Training Program in March. Outside Ottawa, in the places where the directive would have its strongest impact, it was hard to adjust to a new situation which, like many others relating to B and B, had had undesired effects. Thus several requests for further information were made to the Directorate of Training, the source of everything relating to language training until the end of 1970. In April 1971, Commodore D.S. Boyle in Ottawa opened the internal debate on the division of teaching duties, which, as his memorandum made obvious, he wanted to be returned to the Director of Training (DT).<sup>67</sup> Acting DGBB Colonel Jean Fournier disagreed, citing recommendation 41 in the B and B Commission Report, which had led to the establishment of a DGBB with a mandate to centralize all B and B activities. He acknowledged, however, that his organization and the one headed by Boyle, the Division of Planning, Requirements and Production, needed to agree on clear mandates,<sup>68</sup> especially because Boyle assumed that everything relating to teaching English to Francophone recruits still came under the Director of Training. Boyle's attitude, locked as it was into the old system which seldom left room for the question of B and B, could have been partly caused by his wish not to have his power as a director general diminished, which would happen if he lost all responsibility for language training. For the time being, the Directorate of Language Training (DLT), which had only been in existence for four months, was mainly concerned with offering new opportunities for language courses to experienced military personnel. On 13 April, however, Boyle threw open the door to all second-language courses, including the English courses offered annually to hundreds of Francophone recruits.

The Chief of Personnel, Lieutenant-General Dextraze, showed his hand at a later meeting with Boyle and Fournier. He favoured the new organizational chart which put the DLT under the DGBB because language training was a very important part of the planning in which the Division was engaged. Nevertheless, he stated that he was ready to discuss the question again when the Director General B and B took up his duties, after August 1971. At the time, on 21 April 1971, Boyle still expected his Directorate of Training (DT)

would keep control of English courses for Francophone recruits, but that advanced second-language courses, both English and French, would come under the DLT. He also pointed out that the DT remained responsible for language courses offered by other agencies, mainly private schools subsidized by the Department.<sup>69</sup> Thus there remained several grey areas which needed to be clarified promptly, and the DT and DLT had to agree quickly, if only to reply to the FELT Report, as Boyle had urged be done in 7 May.<sup>70</sup> In the meantime, the FELT Report was left hanging until such time as the responsible authority in Ottawa reacted to it.

Twenty-four days later, the DLT singled out one of four options: the one that would give his office primary responsibility at CFHQ for language training. He cited several factors, chief among them that the DGBB was supposed to consolidate beneath it everything relating to B and B, at least during the initial phase of implementing a set of new programs. The other arguments put forward were rather feeble. They referred to the great devotion of the DLT to language training alone and the fact that Treasury Board opposed the duplication of efforts.<sup>71</sup> It is hard to see how a DLT reporting to a directorate general other than the DGBB would fail to fulfil these two conditions.

However that may be, the following 7 July brought official approval of the above-mentioned proposal, drawn up by Fournier and Lieutenant-Commander J.P. Godbout, both of the DGBB. On 26 June, the DLT had been given primary responsibility for everything relating to language training in the Forces.<sup>72</sup> The next step was to decide what to do with the FELT Report and also to agree on a *modus operandi* between the specialized sectors in Winnipeg and Ottawa.

Officials were able to put off the unavoidable meeting about the FELT Report on the grounds that final B and B plans were not ready. Boyle wrote to General Carr<sup>73</sup> (on behalf of Dextraze) that without knowing what the bicultural aspect of the program would be, and even more, what the actual Francophone recruiting levels would be, there was little point in discussing several of the items raised by the FELT Report. But Training Command insisted, and finally the Chief of Personnel sent a message pointing out the difficulties there would be in discussing several subjects. He added that Colonel Hanna, the Assistant DGBB, could go to Winnipeg on 22 and 23 July to discuss the following items:

- a *modus operandi* between TC and CFHQ;

- FELT recommendations that could be discussed; and
- links between the DLT and CFLS.<sup>74</sup>

Before turning to this July meeting, let us go back to 3 March 1971. On that date, a message from Ottawa notified all commands of the birth of the Base Language Training Program (BLTP). These courses, under the general supervision of a teacher, gave students an opportunity to develop their second-language knowledge on their own. It was hoped to decentralize training in this way.<sup>75</sup> As we can see, the Forces were going back, by means of a different method, to what the Air Force had done for years, and this meant that the centralization which had been given such strong encouragement from 1963 had to be made more flexible. One of the reasons for this about-face was the heavy demand among Anglophones for second language help. After all, bilingualism, many believed, was going to become a selection criterion when promotions were being given out.

Among the bilingualism objectives announced by Treasury Board on 9 March were three directly relating to language courses: bilingual communications would increase in places across Canada where this was deemed necessary; language courses would be offered; and the number of bilinguals would increase.<sup>76</sup> In late March, the DLT came back with a message announcing that teachers for the new program would be hired by the Public Service Commission, and in late September 1971, courses teaching the rudiments of a second language would begin on the bases. These courses would be administered by base commanders and their education officers. The message specified that the DLT would be responsible for hiring, training and pedagogical supervision of teachers.<sup>77</sup>

Two months later, the way in which the program would operate was spelled out. With a view to promoting B and B, 28 language training centres would be established in September in bases across Canada and in Europe, in addition to the courses offered by CFLS and the Public Service Commission. Each of these locations would have a small number of teachers who would supervise each student's progress by meeting with small groups for half a day each week. The program would be extended gradually to more bases and stations, so that by the fall of 1972, most would be covered. Students would have to do at least six hours of work on their own, weekly over a period of 40 weeks. These 400 hours of work, including the half-days, were supposed to enable students to achieve level 2 or 3 out of 5 on a test. All the pedagogical aspects of the course for the Forces would be under the control of the DGBB/DLT. But the bases also would have duties, such as selecting students. The seventy teachers hired for the first 28 centres would comprise



67 teachers of French and three teachers of English (two in Valcartier and one in Europe).<sup>78</sup> Thus Appendix C, paragraph n. was implemented within a reasonable time. Indeed, everything relating directly or indirectly to language training, such as the question of how bilingualism should affect a career, which we have discussed elsewhere, was taken firmly in hand by CFHQ in Ottawa.

Other events, some of them outside CFHQ, helped to break the grip which Training Command logically thought it had over all training. Thus, on 16 June 1971, Treasury Board officially approved the reorganization from which the DGBB emerged, although this was kept confidential for several weeks. Conditions were imposed on this approval as some were on the acceptance of the implementation of the B and B program already in progress. Most of these conditions were designed to avoid duplication of government efforts. With respect to language training, the conditions were as follows for the Armed Forces:

- use of PSC Language Bureau research results;
- consultation with the Bureau regarding the preparation and structure of language courses;
- adoption of PSC testing, both to ensure that candidates were capable of taking a course and to determine the level at which they could begin; and
- use of PSC evaluation and performance techniques and levels of second-language knowledge.

It was also understood that, after one year, the Forces would review their course curriculum to verify its effectiveness and appropriateness to the work environment; that they would not attempt to achieve, through the BLTP, a level of knowledge higher than 1 on the PSC scale of 4; and that all courses designed for levels 2, 3 and 4 except the 14-week English course offered at Saint-Jean to Francophone recruits would come under PSC jurisdiction.<sup>79</sup>

As we can see, the initiative had passed from the hands of the Forces to those of the PSC, following a path traced back in 1967. The DLT was in fact anxious to maintain a link with the Language Bureau and willingly agreed to the above conditions, which seemed reasonable in this period of severe budget cuts in the Forces.<sup>80</sup>

Also in June, the DLT continued to work with commands and bases to organize its working network so that the new courses could make a good start in September.<sup>81</sup> On 7 July, with an eye to the White Paper due to be released in a few weeks, the Minister, Donald Macdonald, wrote to Secretary of State Gérard Pelletier to inform him that the Department's budget was based first and foremost on activities related to Canada's sovereignty and security. Documents attached to his letter presented the costs of language courses depending on whether they were covered entirely by the Department or by the PSC. In any case, Macdonald added, improving B and B at Defence made language training a necessity, and its costs should not and could not be covered by the Department's existing budget.<sup>82</sup> At the same time, steps were being taken in Ottawa to send BLTP teachers to Saint-Jean to become familiar with the advanced courses offered at CFLS and with military life, especially that of recruits at CFLS.<sup>83</sup> On 15 July, Treasury Board did approve the necessary funds to operate the BLTP,<sup>84</sup> and a Defence news release dated 23 July announced the BLTP, stating that its centres would complement rather than replace CFLS.<sup>85</sup>

Training Command in Winnipeg was left out of all this, or at best, occasionally consulted. The Command remained connected with language courses, to be sure, but its hold over the planning aspect was rather weak. It was there to implement directives and manage courses offered by CFLS, which in 1971, for example, had about 480 students pass through its advanced French course.<sup>86</sup>

Training Command also joined in studying solutions to the problems which would be created by accelerated recruiting of Francophones. In spring 1971, events after 1972 were forecast. In brief, the trimming back of Forces strength ordered in 1968 by the government was to be completed during 1972. From then on, recruiting, which had more or less been at a standstill for four years, would resume on a larger scale: 9,000 recruits were anticipated for the 1972-73 fiscal year and 9,400 in subsequent years. In order to achieve 28 percent Francophones as quickly as possible, there would be a very high percentage of Francophone recruits, although that was not yet definitively fixed. In addition to basic training in French, there would be English courses for these recruits, and also advanced French courses for Anglophones and advanced English for Francophones. All these activities would take place in Saint-Jean. CFLS and basic English courses would take up some 831 beds at a time in 1972-73, and 1,906 subsequently. At present no more than 1,204 could be accommodated, in premises originally designed for 992 people. Furthermore, despite the results expected from the BLTP, it was estimated that to achieve the Forces' bilingualism goals, CFLS would have to take in

about 2,400 students. It only had space for 190.\* There was a major housing problem to be solved.<sup>87</sup>

In this very mundane area, the Director of Training in Ottawa was the person who provided the necessary expertise, working with Training Command in Winnipeg. Among the solutions considered was training all recruits, both English- and French-speaking, at Valcartier, the location of the *École technique des Forces canadiennes* and the building of a language superschool in Saint-Hubert. This would mean closing the Cornwallis and Saint-Jean bases.<sup>88</sup> Two objections were raised. The CDS, as we have seen, preferred English and French technical courses in the same specialty to be concentrated in the same place. Since all courses in English were already being given outside Quebec, the idea of the *ETFC* at Valcartier did not sit well with him. More important, though, was the Minister's warning, transmitted by the VCDS, not to close any bases at that time.<sup>89</sup>

If the Valcartier/Saint-Hubert option had been chosen, a minimum of two years would have been needed to put it into practice, even after all authorities had approved it. That was why the main recommendation at the 9 June meeting in Ottawa was coupled with short-term emergency plans which entailed the renovation of buildings, especially in Saint-Jean, so they could accommodate recruits, those taking the basic English course and the additional military and civilian personnel required. As for language courses arising out of B and B policy goals, until the essential new school was built at Saint-Hubert, the Forces would have to continue to rely on existing resources, namely CFLS, PSC courses and the BLTP, due to get under way soon.<sup>90</sup> It should be noted that the plans put forward by Allard in 1969, when he wanted to concentrate *ERFC*, *EFTC* and CFLS in Valcartier, thus suffered a severe setback. Allard's vision included the closing of Saint-Jean, which was unthinkable in 1971, said Macdonald. Hence the following decisions were taken on 9 June:

- Training Command would re-examine, with a view to cutbacks, the issue of the costs of accommodating an influx of recruits which the Forces had grown unused to receiving over the past four years (on

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\* Between 1971 and 1976, according to rough projections, 3,000 Anglophones and 300 Francophones would have to be made bilingual at various levels. Between 1976 and 1980, the estimates were 4,000 and 1,000 respectively. Assuming that the BLTP and some PSC courses on which military personnel were sent would make some Anglophones bilingual and that there would be very few Francophones in advanced English courses, 2,400 spaces was seen as a reasonable estimate.

the Francophone side, never before in peace-time had the projected number of recruits been handled);

- a detailed plan for CFLS at Saint-Hubert would be drawn up;
- the number of civilian and military positions required in order to train recruits in 1972-73 would be budgeted, but from existing strength (there was no question of going to Treasury Board to ask for increases);
- a letter to the Secretary of State would be drafted for the Minister's signature, so that the Secretary of State would receive it before the White Paper was studied by Cabinet.\* This letter had to draw a clear distinction between English courses for Francophone recruits, which the Forces had offered for a long time, and those associated with the new B and B objectives.<sup>91</sup>

The solution advocated by Training Command, which had given rise to the document placed before the CDS Advisory Council on 9 June, was to reorganize the basic English course for recruits into two phases: a 16-week phase at Saint-Jean and an eight-week phase at various of the Command's bases (Halifax, Borden and Kingston). This would halve the costs of the renovations which would then have to be carried out at Saint-Jean and Cornwallis in relation to the 9 June projections, based on dividing Francophone recruits between the two places. The reason for the lower costs was that those on language training would be dispersed among bases adequately provided for the purpose and fewer additional persons would be needed to manage them. This solution was chosen and approval was given in Ottawa on 29 July 1971.<sup>92</sup>

On 22 and 23 July, when Colonel Hanna was in Winnipeg, this problem of accommodation was on the agenda for discussion. Hanna was accompanied on this trip by Lieutenant-Colonel Tousignant, Major Taschereau and Major Clements from DT. General Carr, for his part, was supported in these discussions by several aides, including Colonel Lagacé of *LADIF* and Colonel V. Ménard Commander of CFB Saint-Jean, as well as Dr J. Mayhood.

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\* This letter, mentioned earlier, was sent on 17 June to the Minister, who had it revised substantially before sending it to Pelletier on 7 July.

Thanks to the minutes written up by Hanna on 28 July and a letter from General Carr dated 30 July 1971, we have a good idea of how the conversation unfolded. The two documents agree on the facts and the atmosphere in which the talks took place. The meeting began at 9 am on 23 July. Hanna took pains to congratulate the authors of the FELT Report and also outlined the mandates of the DGBB, the Directorate Planning and Research and the Directorate Language Training.

As Carr was aware, the DLT was the office with primary responsibility at CFHQ for teaching French and English in the Forces, which included controlling course objectives and content. In co-operation with the Public Service Commission, it was charged with ensuring that facilities, funds and human resources were used as effectively as possible in order to meet the requirements of language training for the military by:

- co-ordinating not only teaching on the bases but also research and relevant projects;
- developing course methodology, and developing and supervising the application of teaching techniques;
- supervising, managing and evaluating institutional resources; and
- exercising pedagogical control over teachers, including their selection, recruitment, training and pedagogical supervision.

When Carr spoke, he began by noting that the opening of Hanna's presentation was the very first reaction to the FELT Report which he had received from CFHQ. He added, in his letter, that Hanna and his small staff should be congratulated for having begun to work on those of the report's recommendations which could be implemented. This euphemism ignored the simple fact that many of these decisions had been taken even before the document was ready and totally independently of it.

Can did not hesitate to express some of his convictions forcefully. The first was that the DLT should come under the DT rather than the DGBB, because language training could not be separated from the rest of training. In this, Can seemed to attach operational value to knowledge of both languages, although as we have seen, French did not receive even limited status as an operational language until 1974. And it was not until 1981 that Colonel Paul Addy, spreading the doctrine of French as an operational necessity in the Forces, also tried to put into practice what had been presented as theory seven years earlier. However that may be, Can noted that, according to the draft

description of the mandate of the Director of Language Training, the incumbent was to combine the duties of planner, decision-maker and manager. As a corollary, Carr thought, very little responsibility would remain with TC. Yet, since its founding, Training Command had done a great deal in language training and it was not prepared to accept the Public Service Commission as its master in this area, since the PSC was probably not at the same level as the Command. The Treasury Board directives of 16 June, which Hanna read at the meeting, were clear on the interdepartmental co-ordination which ought to exist in teaching the country's official languages. But the Forces, through CFLS, TC and the DGBB (if the DLT remained in it), should have standing with the PSC.

As for the Base Language Training Program, TC supported it in principle. But the DLT had absolutely nothing to do directly with CFLS. Carr was irritated by the fact that the familiarization visit to Saint-Jean by prospective BLTP teachers had been organized by Taschereau directly with the Language School. The chain of command had to be followed, and only TC could ask its units, including CFLS, to perform a particular duty. Hanna and Taschereau promised not to do such a thing again. Carr wanted future teaching cells to come under CFLS, and thus his Command. Taschereau thought this could happen later, but so far, everything had been done by himself, and it was better to leave things as they were. At length, of course, the solution proposed in June by TC to reduce the number of trainees in Saint-Jean was discussed briefly. Hanna promised a prompt reply on this point.<sup>93</sup>

Over the summer, Carr was transferred to Ottawa and replaced by Major General W. A. Milroy. When Major-General Laubman, on behalf of Dextraze, signed a letter dated 28 September 1971 in reply to Carr's letter of 30 July, he was therefore writing to a different man. Laubman's letter was only a summary of what Hanna had given TC to understand regarding the FELT Report: on the major points, nothing could be done until bicultural policy was finalized; the other recommendations were already being implemented. As for relations between CFHQ and TC units, in future they would follow the normal channels.

The July meeting was productive and clarified many points relating to each party's responsibilities and intentions. Laubman was highly complimentary to the authors of the FELT Report;<sup>94</sup> now that Mayhood and TC had saved face, the report could be dismissed from everyone's minds. At the same time, it could not be denied that CFHQ, through the DGBB and in particular the DLT, would have a growing role to play in language training, sweeping TC out of its path. Apart from English courses for recruits, TC

would be more or less confined to testing students and managing their comings and goings.

At this point, Armand Letellier came on the scene as Director General B and B. Between August 1971 and the end of 1972, several aspects of language training captured his attention.

The July approval of dividing up the new English course for Francophone recruits was accompanied by a request that the DT study the entire question. The situation as of summer 1971 may be summed up as follows. Francophones slated to work in a French environment (as a general rule, combat arms of the land army) did not take any English course. However, those intending to take technical courses in English were given 23 weeks of English and those planning to take a FRANCOTRAIN course in an Anglophone environment had to study English for 19 weeks. Instead, TC proposed a single type of course: 24 weeks, divided between 16 in Saint-Jean and eight in one of two Anglophone bases (Halifax and Borden). A housing shortage was generally agreed to be the main reason for this division. DLT expressed a preference for a 20-week (rather than 24-week) course designed and given by the Public Service Commission rather than TC. In late September 1971, the DT inclined toward the 24-week course more or less as it already stood (it was in truth 23 weeks). He pointed out, however, that there was no standard for this course, and the proposal that the PSC take over was worth studying.<sup>95</sup>

The report went to Letellier, who accepted its main data for the moment and said that he would discuss the question of a PSC course later with the Language Bureau and would work with the DT and TC to develop standards to be achieved by the 24-week course. He also proposed that the two planned complementary schools in Halifax and Borden be sub-units of CFLS.<sup>96</sup> The standards and sub-units materialized. Furthermore, in January 1972, CFLS tried out Language Bureau methodology and one of their courses to teach English to recruits.<sup>97</sup>

Nine days after this agreement was endorsed by TC, Letellier wrote to Commodore D.S. Boyle's assistant to propose an amendment to the divisions of responsibilities between the DLT and TC in early July. The entire phase of English language courses for recruits, for which the DT had retained responsibility, would be transferred to the DLT, except for personnel administration matters (housing, military training incorporated into language courses, support staff and so forth).<sup>98</sup> On 23 December, Colonel Hutchins replied that the DLT should become the only official at CFHQ to deal with all matters relating to these courses, even their administrative side, on the

understanding that the DT would provide any necessary collaboration, especially for administrative purposes.<sup>99</sup> It was also agreed that this responsibility would include fully informing all agencies concerned (including TC) of any change that might occur.

The DLT now controlled all language training. In May 1972, for example, *TC's English for Today project* was discarded and replaced by the Language Bureau's *Contact Canada*. Courses were to be given under the general supervision of the DGBB (DLT). As an interim solution, in other words until such time as a new and bigger CFLS was built, it was decided that the course would be given in two phases. The Halifax and Borden schools, which would be entrusted with one of the phases, would come under the pedagogical control of CFLS, but at the administrative level they would be treated as integral units of CFB Borden and the Fleet School, both of which came under TC.<sup>100</sup>

TC's resistance to what it considered an encroachment did not end in the summer of 1971. In March 1972, Major-General Milroy sent a long document to Ottawa entitled *English Language Training for Francophones*, which ostensibly addressed the question of the use of Francophones who had achieved level 3 in their training (TQ3). Milroy wrote that the solution called for a comprehensive approach by the Forces. As we might expect, the results of TC's reflections were in fact a new attempt to impose its B and B plan.<sup>101</sup> Those in Ottawa who had worked on the B and B plan, about to be submitted to Treasury Board in a month, became frantic. The Assistant Director Planning, Requirements and Production, Colonel MacGregor, made polite comments, but Lieutenant-Colonel Tousignant of DGBB was decidedly acid, hinting that Milroy and his assistants would have done better to keep quiet.<sup>102</sup>

Several questions were connected with this takeover of the language training sector as an aspect of B and B in the Forces. The most visible in the records is the renewal of the 1967 agreement between the PSC and DND. Beginning in the fall of 1971,<sup>103</sup> several discussions took place which served primarily to set forth each party's views and to spell out the policy that had prevailed since 1967. Although the subject is important, we shall confine ourselves to summarizing the agreement reached by the two parties on 13 March 1972, and submitted on 28 March to Treasury Board which approved it on 25 May.<sup>104</sup> However, the request put to Treasury Board in March would not come into effect until after the *Program to Increase Bilingualism and Biculturalism in the Canadian Armed Forces* was approved.<sup>105</sup>



Readers may be interested to learn that, in May 1972, the unilingual Anglophone staff officers at DND concerned with this file had to wait for the official translation of the PSC-DND agreement reached in March, originally written in French.<sup>106</sup> In brief, the agreement stated:

In general, the Canadian Forces, through the *École des langues des Forces canadiennes* (ELFC), will provide the materiel requirements for language instruction, will ensure that the agreed number of students attend, and will verify that the results meet the objectives of the department. The PSCLB\* will provide language training services in accordance with the needs and objectives of the DND under the bilingualism program.<sup>107</sup>

In more concrete terms, this meant that the Language Bureau would deal with research relating to courses, developing them and adapting them to DND's requirements. To this end, the Director of the Canadian Forces Program at the Bureau would consult the Commandant, CFLS, who would give him precise information about the Forces' specific needs and, if necessary, military support personnel. The Bureau would conduct research into second-language knowledge evaluation methods for use at CFLS (aptitude, placement and performance tests) and help the Forces develop the language skill tests, the results of which would be used to manage service personnel.<sup>108</sup>

In addition to providing premises and materiel, the Forces would specify the degree of skill for each trade, category, rank and classification. Studies conducted jointly with the Language Bureau would determine the degree of skill to be achieved by the end of each stage in the program and anticipate standards of success. The Forces would evaluate their employees' language skills:

- on enlistment or before registration for language courses;
- at the end of language training; and
- on other occasions.

They would also give the program director all the statistics he might need on the level of language knowledge of his personnel and determine the duration of language courses in accordance with established objectives. The results of language skill tests during or at the end of courses would be


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\* Public Service Commission Language Bureau.

forwarded to the Director of the Canadian Forces Program so that he could modify the training if necessary.<sup>109</sup> Finally, it was understood that as soon as the agreement was signed, person-years (347) and funds (\$4,887,100 for the 1972-73 fiscal year) would be transferred from DND to the Public Service Commission. Among the 347 positions were 35 military positions (34 teachers and one teaching support). Over the months that followed, they were to leave CFLS, abandoning the entire field of teaching to civilians. However, military personnel would remain responsible for part of course research and development and the preparation of tests tailored to the Forces.<sup>110</sup>

The disturbance caused by this agreement included fears among civilians who had taught at CFLS since it opened (and in many cases had taught for the Forces much longer) without having the basic qualifications required by the Language Bureau, including a university degree. Again, the Forces did not show very good judgment in the information part of their role; they waited until fears were expressed by the union before offering assurances. A letter to J.H. Barron, Assistant to the Deputy Chief of Civilian Personnel, dated 21 February 1972 stated that the proposal under study included guarantees of the rights and privileges of employees who might be affected by the proposed changes.<sup>111</sup> In June, when Hanna went to Saint-Jean to conduct a briefing, the assurance was even clearer: the 27 teachers who were not qualified according to Language Bureau standards would only be replaced in accordance with Bureau criteria as they left voluntarily (for example, at retirement or for new positions elsewhere).<sup>112</sup>

Lieutenant-General Richard Evraire, CMM, CD, a former officer cadet at Collège *militaire royal de Saint-Jean* and later its Commandant, was the first French Canadian to command National Defence College, Kingston, from 1984 to 1986.  
(UPFC/REP 78-64)



*The Royal 22<sup>e</sup> Régiment on parade at the Plains of Abraham, Quebec City, after a military review and presentation of new colours, in August 1969.  
(Archives, Régie du R22<sup>e</sup>R)*

The union was not, in fact, alone in complaining about being left in the dark: Training Command also expressed dissatisfaction that the agreement was to be signed before it was able to express certain reservations. The Chief of Personnel then intervened to state clearly that all the negotiations were carried out on his behalf on the military side by the Director General B and B; that he was fully satisfied with what had been done; that TC would be involved in the implementation phase; and that, when the time came, he expected full and complete co-operation.<sup>113</sup>

Two small points regarding the agreement should be made in closing. First, at a meeting in Winnipeg on 14 January 1972 attended by Hanna, the question of the Department's civilian personnel using CFLS to learn a second language was raised. Readers will recall that the Taschereau working group in 1969 had supported this idea. In 1972, such a solution had become simply unthinkable, since the military demand alone was more than CFLS could meet.<sup>114</sup>

Finally, when all the paperwork had been done, Treasury Board's legal advisors claimed that a government order was needed to ratify the final transfer of person-years and materiel from DND to the Public Service Commission. The affair dragged on until 1973, which tried Letellier's patience and delayed the official implementation, although in practice, events proceeded by themselves.<sup>115</sup>

Indeed, co-ordination meetings between DND and the Language Bureau began on 23 May 1972. On 5 July, notes explaining the agreement made by the DND-PSC working group became official. They provided, among other things, that in the event that person-years, materiel or funds became inadequate for the task, training would be scaled down in proportion to the shortfall of resources. The agreement, they stated, would be renewed each year, although government policy seemed to give it some permanence. In any case, if either party wished to terminate, it would have to give the other a year's notice.<sup>116</sup>

The annual discussion of the agreement in 1973 included a reorganization of the Language Bureau which, instead of keeping the Forces Program as a unit, abolished it. In its place a Directorate of Regional Operations was created in Ottawa. This worried the Commandant of CFLS, Colonel J.G. Forth who wished to know with whom he would deal. Was it to be the new regional assistant director, stationed at Saint-Jean? If so, an intermediary would have been added between himself and the real boss; in other words, the person who used to be Director of the Defence Language Training Program and had become Director of Regional Operations,

spending three days out of five in Ottawa, far from Saint-Jean, where his work was delegated to an assistant. Courses given outside Saint-Jean would come under eight regional managers if they were part of the Base Language Training Program, and three in the case of English courses for recruits (Saint-Jean, Halifax and Borden). As Hanna explained at a meeting on 27 July 1973, DND was a client of the Language Bureau, and clients complained if they were not given the services they expected. What type of interaction could there be between the Commandant of CFLS and the eight regional managers? Would it be better and faster than the direct relationship which the Commandant had had with the Director of the Forces Program, whose office was at Saint-Jean?

National Defence was opposed to the elimination of the position of Director of the Forces Program from the Language Bureau and that of BLTP Co-ordinator, when the system introduced only a few months before had not yet proved its worth.

Gerry Duclos of the PSC found Defence's oral and written presentation somewhat harsh. While he understood the military's concerns, he believed that the reorganization would give them better services (sixteen senior teachers instead of eight, for example) and that the student-teacher relationship would not be affected. Finally it was agreed that the reorganization would be tried out for the last four months of 1973. If, in the Forces' opinion, it was not more effective than the previous system, Duclos would immediately react by appointing one person to be responsible for the Forces Program alone and report directly to the Director of Regional Operations. The position of BLTP co-ordinator, which was still vacant, would be filled immediately. The regional manager at Saint-Jean would have a mandate to exercise certain responsibilities for the Borden and Halifax schools.<sup>117</sup>

This episode showed that the Forces were not the only government agency to be dilatory in informing those most affected by changes. The times and the area of language training were both conducive to "empire-building", to use the Public Service jargon. In the Forces, Training Command, as we have seen, was reluctant to be stripped of this promising field. The Public Service Commission, not only at Defence but in every department, was now making this its daily bread. It was natural for its organizational chart to be altered when it effectively took charge of the Forces Program. However, changes as major as those described above are not made easily, and it was curious that DGBB did not take up the case until spring 1973, given that the Armed Forces in general were the largest user of language training services.

Part of the explanation for this anomaly may be found in the many engrossing activities in which the DGBB was involved at the time, including

the well-known briefing tour. A further reason may be that, in the fall of 1972, the office of the DLT was transferred to the Division of Education and Training; in other words, it reverted to the Directorate of Training, which had formerly been responsible for language training. This brought the fragile arrangement between DT and DGBB into question again. In June 1973, Letellier felt compelled to write to the Chief of Personnel to redefine boundaries. DGBB, he wrote, was responsible for developing language training policy, for supervising and implementing it and for progress toward the Department's bilingualism and language training goals, while the Director Language Training had these directives implemented. Co-operation was needed in order for everything to go smoothly, and DGBB, for its part, had ensured that DLT was represented at all meetings relating to the issue, in addition to sending it copies of any correspondence. Letellier asked the Director Language Training to do the same for his assistants and himself.<sup>118</sup> Later, Letellier wrote: "Major Taschereau and I were working to develop a better relationship with the Languages Bureau of the PSC. Major Taschereau... was more personally and regularly involved in this matter."<sup>119</sup>

This change reopened old wounds. In July, Brigadier-General K.C. Lett, Commanding TC, wrote to NDHQ stating that there was confusion about the relations between his Command, DLT and DGBB.<sup>120</sup>

### **Main activities relating to second-language courses**

At the heart of these considerations, which were of significance to second-language training, lay the 1972 program, the objectives it set and the means it put forward to achieve them. Of the 45 activities in the program, 11, or nearly 25 percent, related directly to language training.

One of these — recognition that acquiring a second language was an expensive process — called for a directive to be drawn up so that graduates of the various courses would be posted to positions where their new knowledge could be used.<sup>121</sup> Later, when we assess results, we shall see that this wish expressed before 1972 remained unfulfilled in 1987, despite laudable efforts.<sup>122</sup> For while selection and subsequent deployment criteria were easy to apply in the case of a few senior officers taking the one-year course in Quebec City with their families, the situation grew complicated when officials had to deal with thousands of individuals of all ranks and trades, while taking operational requirements into account.

Another activity consisted of obtaining additional person-years from Treasury Board to compensate for some of the positions allocated to bilingualism by the Forces.<sup>123</sup> In brief, if the number of positions allocated to

the Forces to perform their primary duties was 83,000, Treasury Board could raise this ceiling by a few hundred so that more service personnel could take language courses, and so that tasks relating to B and B in the Forces could be performed without substantially affecting their operational effectiveness. With the program submitted to Treasury Board, the Forces thus obtained 536 military (plus 160 civilian) person-years. Letellier discussed this in his memoirs.<sup>124</sup>

Four more activities were related to subsidized courses for about 120 people per year and increased PSC participation in second-language training, whether as a result of the PSC's acceptance of up to 590 service personnel into its own courses or the Commission's involvement in CFLS and the BLTP, which had been made official by the 1972 agreement discussed above.<sup>125</sup>

Two other activities in section C of the program had to do with testing. They were connected with an activity in section A entitled Designation of bilingual positions in the Forces.<sup>126</sup> Earlier we touched indirectly on this whole issue. In essence, the concern in the last-named case was to determine how many positions needed a bilingual incumbent and what level of bilingualism each required. Testing was used to determine fairly precisely whether a person was bilingual and at what level. We shall not pursue these two areas very far, but we shall present a few facts of significance, even though they are not our main concern at present.

An unofficial attempt to designate positions to be occupied by bilingual officers was made in 1965, and its results were published in Major-General Anderson's report on officers (see Chapter 7, volume I, p 196). Various more concerted attempts were made subsequently, always taking into account the new developments implied by the introduction of ever greater bilingualism in Canada. Finally, the 1973 Resolution by Parliament established criteria on which the military would repeat the operation. This last attempt was ably recounted by Letellier,<sup>127</sup> while the traces left by earlier ones can be found in DND archives.<sup>128</sup>

These various operations to designate bilingual positions, which took place between 1967 and 1973, did not go smoothly. In the initial attempts, several people tried to confuse bilingual designation with 28 percent Francophone representation.<sup>129</sup> At other times, some tried to water down the criteria established by NDHQ, to such a point that in September 1967 Colonel Letellier had to go to CFB Saint-Jean to make authorities there understand that it was impossible for them not to have identified any bilingual positions; he saw it as a way of protecting the English

unilingualism which prevailed, and fairly openly so, on that base.<sup>130</sup> In the spring of 1971, when CFHQ had launched another round of designations of bilingual positions, the General Commanding Mobile Command in his turn became an advocate of flexibility. He thought in terms of two categories of bilingual positions. The first, in which bilingualism was necessary at all times, would be permanently designated on a unit's roll. Within a given sector, however, it might be found that with a given percentage of bilingual service personnel, all required services could be offered in both languages. In such cases, the required proportion of bilinguals would be achieved overall, but no particular position would be designated bilingual.<sup>131</sup> Ottawa resisted this suggestion for technical reasons. For career managers, it was much easier to have to fill a particular position which required specific skills on a base's strength than ill-defined quotas. In theory, a person designated to perform duties requiring bilingualism could be prepared months in advance by supplementing his professional knowledge with a language course, if necessary.

The fact remains that the designation of positions completed in summer 1971 was far from perfect. In September 1971, a Departmental inquiry asked how the Commanding Officer of Canadian Forces Station Chibougamau came to be an Anglophone major. There were reasons, as is usual in such circumstances: the major was ready to take up a command; he knew a little French and would soon acquire more at CFLS; and in accordance with B and B policies, Anglophones were needed in Quebec. Brigadier-General Duncan McAlpine was not impressed by these explanations and pointed out that the CO position was not designated bilingual. As it happened, a Francophone major had been appointed to command CFS Beauséjour in northern Manitoba. These postings could easily have been reversed if the Chibougamau position had been correctly designated.<sup>132</sup>

However that may be, the exercise completed in 1971 had resulted in 6,540 bilingual positions. The program set in motion in 1972 called for 8,000. This latter figure was based on several factors, including strengthened criteria designed to respond more fully to the need for bilingualism to serve the internal Francophone clientele, which was due to increase, or the simple fact that institutional bilingualism would soon expand.<sup>133</sup> That is why the task was undertaken again in 1972.

In this connection, a painful encounter between civilians and the military is worth noting. Letellier made Lieutenant-Colonel Tousignant responsible for designating military positions anew. On the civilian side, the task was assigned to Ian Dewar, who had lately taken charge of that domaine under Letellier. The exercise was expected to start the B and B program for the



Department's civilians along the right track (see Chapter 18). As we have seen, the Deputy Minister's office was about to be amalgamated with Canadian Forces HQ [to form NDHQ] in the fall of 1972 and several positions in Ottawa were not yet clearly identified as civilian or military. In fact, it had already been agreed that some could be filled, for periods not determined in advance, by civilian and military personnel alternately. Deputy Minister Cloutier asked officials to take this into account and apply common criteria to civilians and the military in Ottawa.

Using the slightly revised criteria applied in 1971, Tousignant was prepared to begin his operation on 2 October 1972.<sup>134</sup> He also decided to confine himself to essentials by dividing the operation into three phases: one concentrating on civilian positions, to which specific criteria would be applied; a phase for military positions, which would have their own set of criteria; and one which would deal with civilian/military positions at National Defence HQ as restructuring proceeded in the fall of 1972, depending on the group to which the incumbent of the day belonged.<sup>135</sup> This approach, which seemed logical at that stage of our history, reflected the concept then current at the DGGB, namely that military and civilian personnel had such different professional lives that the two groups could not possibly have common criteria.

This seems somewhat extreme to us. To be sure, military and civilian personnel were not governed by the same operational imperatives. Whether a position was in the Department's civilian or military organization, however, it could probably satisfy similar criteria for being classified as bilingual (relations with an internal or external public including Anglophones and Francophones, relations with sectors using the other language, and so forth). The logic of the distinction between civilian and military did not stand up, especially at a time when attempts were being made to bind these two groups closer together within DND. Perhaps we should look for an explanation of the blind acceptance of separate treatment for the two groups in very practical arguments, the first arising out of the experience built up by the military over seven years (if we go back to the 1965 attempt). On the civilian side, nothing serious had yet been undertaken, in DND at any rate, by the fall of 1972, as Chapter 18 will bear out.

For some reason we cannot understand, why the message calling for civilian and military personnel to agree on criteria for some positions at NDHQ was transmitted to Dewar in such a way as to indicate that common criteria were to be developed for all civilian and military positions at Defence. Not expecting this to be an easy task, Dewar approached it in two movements. First, he attacked the position classification system adopted by Tousignant and

further elaborated by the military over the past few years. Instead of the three categories into which bilingual positions were classified (contact, functional and integral, as we shall discuss later), he preferred six: unilingual English or French, and bilingual preferred, desirable, recommended and essential. We should add that each of these categories was divided into sub-categories.<sup>136</sup>

Dewar's suggestions were nipped in the bud the day after they were put forward, when Hanna called Dewar's criticism of the designation directives drawn up by Tousignant unacceptable. On the other hand, the draft alternative presented by Dewar was open to discussion, if only on the basis of the accuracy of the terms it used.<sup>137</sup> In the same breath, Hanna urged Tousignant and Dewar to find common criteria which would apply to both groups and allow a similar classification to be used.<sup>138</sup> In our opinion, Hanna had grasped the essential truth that it was possible to use a similar approach to designating positions. He implied that the basic data for this operation were to be found on the military rather than the civilian side. The collaboration for which he called did come, but from outside the Department. Tousignant and Dewar met briefly, and on 30 October, when Tousignant was acting DGBB, he went to Cloutier's office. Cloutier reminded him that he did not want common directives to be applied throughout DND but only at NDHQ, where civilian and military tasks were very close and several positions could be filled by either a civilian or a Forces member.<sup>139</sup> Tousignant and Dewar held further meetings, but had not reached a conclusion when Bud Drury of Treasury Board announced in December the introduction of what would become the June 1972 Parliamentary Resolution. This will be discussed further in Chapter 18. For the moment, we simply note that Treasury Board's intervention ended the misunderstanding within Defence and that, as of 1973, the designation of military positions was very closely modelled on that adopted by the civilian Public Service of Canada.

We should point out, however, that the fall of 1972 attempt by Tousignant met with the usual series of roadblocks before events overtook it. Thus the Associate Deputy Minister (Finance) declared he did not need any bilingual staff, and Tousignant objected to this. After the enactment of Bill C-120 and with the fact that the Forces would soon be 28 percent Francophone, there were certainly positions within the Finance Branch where French would be necessary, either in order to provide services within Headquarters or during the inevitable contacts which took place and would take place with FLUs.<sup>140</sup>

From the identification of military positions, let us turn to language knowledge testing, which became one component in the process of refining statistics initiated by the Ross Report. As we have seen, the documents

available in 1967 did not enable officials to determine precisely just who in the Canadian Forces was a Francophone or an Anglophone. This problem was gradually cleared up, and we can assert that as of 1972, the margin of error was reduced to almost nothing. But who in the military was bilingual? From 1966 to 1970, individual declarations of bilingualism were used to put together a file which was often used for reference. This unscientific tool was replaced by tests prepared and administered by the Forces, which used slightly different levels of competence from those of the Public Service. After 1972, the same levels were used in all federal agencies, but the tests were prepared by the Forces, in co-operation with the Public Service Commission, and administered entirely by the Forces from that time on. Results were entered in individuals' personnel files, so as to enable career managers to put the right person into a given position when the situation allowed. But many months passed before the decision to introduce this mechanism was finally implemented.

In the fall of 1971, however, a testing program was begun in order to identify which recruits were bilingual and at what level.<sup>141</sup> Yet this did not answer the fundamental question: which members of the Forces, who were their own estimation bilingual, really did know their second language and how well? In 1971 again, DND began testing those self-declared bilinguals. In March 1971, of the 17,148 Anglophones and 8,636 Francophones who had declared themselves bilingual, 12,569 were tested for aural comprehension. A certain score (four on a scale of six) had to be achieved on this test in order to qualify for the other tests (reading comprehension, writing and speaking).<sup>142</sup> As it happened, only 5,203 of the 12,569 self-styled bilinguals tested had a score of four or more.<sup>143</sup> In other words, on the basis of individual declarations, there could have been high hopes of filling bilingual positions adequately by 1972. The harsh reality was very different. This meant the data base was wholly inadequate. For example, it showed 1,210 bilingual Anglophone pilots. Yet testing, combined with the experience of career managers who gave their opinions regarding those not tested, cut the number down to 150 at most.<sup>144</sup> On the strength of the personal declarations of bilingualism by Anglophones, several postings had already been made. The Forces' bilingual capability was thus much less than had been believed, especially if we add to this phenomenon the one mentioned earlier: persons whose names sounded French but who had never used French or had lost the use of it.<sup>145</sup> Some self-declared bilinguals who failed the aural comprehension test hastened to blame their failure on either the accent of the recorded voice or the poor sound quality of the tape recorders.<sup>146</sup> Over the months, it transpired that very few of those people could ascribe their low scores to any other factor than their own lack of competence in the second language.

All these facts only underscored the necessity of testing in the Forces, and the 1972 program made it clear that this would be an ongoing activity. There were hopes of completing a first round of testing in the Forces by April 1973. The results obtained as of 1 January 1972 were presented as follows:<sup>147</sup>

Table 34

**RESULTS OF BILINGUALISM TESTS  
AS OF 1 JANUARY 1972**

	INTEGRAL		FUNCTIONAL		CONTACT	
	E	F	E	F	E	F
Major and above	33	104	98	7	302	123
Captain/Lieutenant	66	205	209	62	835	343
Senior NCOs	37	378	72	218	523	495
Corporal /Private	39	537	113	629	855	1630
Total	175	1224	492	916	2515	2591

The words “integral”, “functional” and “contact” are clear enough in the context. They were described and quantified in CFAO 9-21 and duly evolved through the period 1970-80. To be rated “integral”, for example, required a minimum of 14 out of 20 at the period when each of the four tests (listening, speaking, reading and writing) was marked out of 20. In addition, a minimum of four on each of the first two tests was required. The “functional” rating was given to those who scored between 10 and 14 (with three or less on listening and speaking) and “contact” for totals under ten with a minimum of two for listening.<sup>148</sup>

Let us go back to the figures in the last table. We note that of the 2,807 bilinguals (integral and functional combined) presented, 2,140, or 76.2 percent, were Francophones. This trend persisted throughout the initial years of the program’s implementation, justifying the decisions taken three years earlier by Allard, relying on his intuition and experience, on the deployment of Francophones (see volume I, p 232). For it was very clear in 1972 that the Forces had to choose whether to give priority to using their Francophone potential on the basis of the bilingualism factor or the biculturalism factor (28 percent, FLUs and so forth). Allard had inclined toward the latter option, and Letellier continued in the same vein. The choice was bound to cause

some problems for the implementation of Bill C-120, which was primarily concerned with institutional bilingualism as it affected the Canadian situation.

The initial test results were taken into account when the time came to determine how many people were to be offered language training over the years to come. Another factor in the equation to be worked out arose from the bilingualism objectives identified by the 1972 program, which reformulated and amended the February 1971 implementation plan (see para 2, Appendix C). The result was three five-year phases, which may be summarized in the following table:<sup>149</sup>

Table 35

**PERCENTAGES OF BILINGUALS TO BE ACHIEVED  
BY RANK AND PHASE**

PHASES	BGens and above	Other officers	Senior NCOs	Cpls and Ptes
Phase I - 1 April 1972 - 1 April 1977	40%	30%	20%	15%
Phase II (----- / 1 April 1982)	50%	40%	30%	20%
Phase III (----- / 1 April 1987)	60%	50%	40%	25%

Activity 29 in the program, in particular its Annex D, analysed the situation which had to develop in order for these percentages to be achieved. All the figures were based on a military strength of 83,000 with 28 percent Francophones. Today we know that the strength of the Forces fell below the 83,000 mark for several years, but returned to that mark and even exceeded it after 1985. Furthermore, the Francophone percentage today is not 28 but 26. This said, in light of what existed at the time, with fairly accurate forecasts of the number of positions that would ultimately be designated bilingual and a realistic estimate of the bilingual resources then available, planners were able to lay down the general direction to be followed.

According to the program's authors, there were three types of bilingualism requirements to be taken together. First of all, 8,000 bilingual positions would be filled by Anglophones or Francophones, who would provide the necessary institutional bilingualism to serve members of the internal and external public in the language of the client's choice. Secondly,

1,290 positions in FLUs were reserved for Anglophones who would have to be bilingual. Thirdly, 1,280 Francophones would serve in ELUs and 10,340 in National Units.<sup>150</sup> We note from this that the 26,953 Anglophones who would be in national units were not asked to be bilingual. On the one hand, this substantially reduced the pressures to teach French to Anglophones. On the other hand, the scheme called for 13,860 Francophones to be bilingual (28 percent of the 8,000 positions of the first type plus 11,620 of the third type; in other words, all Francophones in NUs and ELUs) out of a possible total of 23,240 bilinguals. In short, 59.6 percent of Francophones in the Forces would have to know English.

The number of Anglophones who would have to be bilingual was set at 14,100. This figure was calculated by adding 72 percent of 8,000, or 5,760, to the 1,290 who would serve in FLUs and multiplying the sum thus obtained by two so that bilingual Anglophones would not be confined to the 7,050 bilingual positions reserved for them. Thus only 23.5 percent of Anglophones would have to be bilingual.

All this, let us remember, was taken from the Program to Increase Bilingualism and Biculturalism in the Canadian Armed Forces. All the objectives of the program, listed on pages 1 to 3, were designed to create equality between Anglophones and Francophones in the Forces. As we can see, it provided for much more anglicization of Francophones than “francization” of Anglophones, driving a gaping hole through the principle of equality of Canada’s two official languages — unless we agree that one of them should be more equal than the other. We believe that neither those who conceived the program nor those who accepted it at all levels attached enough importance to this essential fact, which made it possible to move straight ahead, albeit more slowly than before, with the process of anglicization that had always been the lot of Francophones in the military.

To sum up, over half (50.7 percent) of the 27,299 bilinguals of various levels that the Forces were to have in 1987 would be drawn from the Francophones who would make up 28 percent of the Forces’ strength. The best that can be said of the situation projected for 1987 in relation to that in 1972 was that it promised gradual change for Francophones.

Once the goals had been set, the planners had to explain how they were to be achieved. Activities 042 and 135 of the Program and Annex E gave ample details of the needs to be met before coming to the inevitable conclusion: a new building had to be put up for CFLS which could accommodate much larger numbers of students at once than it had accepted

since 1967-68. Among the figures presented in the plan was an estimate of the existing number of bilinguals. Taking the three recognized levels of knowledge together, there were roughly 3,200 Anglophones and 11,000 Francophones. Since the percentages of bilinguals to be achieved for Phase I translated into a total number of 15,673 and these were overall percentages, (in other words, not officially broken down into 72E:28F), it could be concluded that the first phase was already in hand. The problem lay, of course, in the fact that most of these bilinguals were Francophones who had to serve first in FLUs and NUs. Few thus remained to fill the 8,000 positions which would be designated bilingual and enable the Department to comply with the Official Languages Act. Consequently, it was imperative that Anglophones take up all the part of the bilingualism mandate which fell to them. This was essentially the message that was conveyed to Anglophones in the 1973 briefing tour, when the section on French courses was presented.<sup>151</sup>

Several factors had to be taken into account in calculating the number of people who would be studying English or French at CFLS at one time. These included:

- an estimation of existing number of bilinguals in each language group;
- the estimated percentage of bilinguals among recruits in each language group (35 percent among Francophones, 5 percent among Anglophones);
- the use of the BLTP to train the necessary bilinguals at the “contact” level;
- the use of Public Service Commission courses and subsidized courses for advanced training of a certain number (mainly of those studying French);
- the estimated annual attrition rate of bilingual strength and loss in ability to use a second language among those not placed in a favourable environment for several years (for example, 3 percent of bilingual Anglophones placed in such a situation could go from functional to contact; such people would need more courses before they could go back to a functionally bilingual position);
- the growing numbers of unilingual Francophones recruited to fill up 28 percent of the military positions.<sup>152</sup>

It was estimated that between 1972 and 1987, 654 Anglophones and 1,231 Francophones would be on training simultaneously at all times. After 1987, the figures would be 831 and 957. As we have seen, the 1972 program had to be taken as a whole. That was why it projected that, after 1987, fewer Francophones than formerly would take English courses. At that time, all projected FLUs and FRANCOTRAIN would be fully operational.

The point to bear in mind is that, in 1972, the Department concluded that it needed a CFLS which could accommodate 1,600 students at a time. The premises then available had room for 1,039. Most of the buildings had been put up during the Second World War and were designed for temporary use. Moreover, two of the most modern buildings had recently suffered fires. One of these was a total loss, the other could be restored to 66 percent of its initial capacity at a cost of \$450,000. For reasons of economy, the program called for all language training to be given in the same place. Saint-Jean was suggested, or another location close to Montreal, a bilingual big city.<sup>153</sup>

Thus the program sent to Treasury Board in the spring of 1972 again took up the expansion of the CFLS, an idea which had been tossed around for several years.<sup>154</sup> In the process, it took care to include among the options that of placing the new school at CFB Saint-Jean. This choice was dictated by political considerations. At a 10 April 1972 meeting of the Defence Council, when the program was discussed, the new Minister, Edgar Benson, took up where his predecessor had left off by asking that the location of CFLS be reconsidered: he preferred Saint-Jean to Saint-Hubert.<sup>155</sup> As we have just seen, the authors of the program had left the door wide open to Saint-Jean while not quite closing it to Saint-Hubert. On 10 April, however, the die was cast and Saint-Jean moved ahead, although Cloutier and Dextraze had warned this would be the most expensive solution.

Matters relating to CFLS fill many files at NDHQ, TCHQ and CFB Saint-Jean. Let us keep to the essentials. Once the location of CFLS at Saint-Jean had been accepted in principle, agreement had to be reached as to whether *ERFC* and *ETFC*, which Allard had both wanted to locate at Valcartier, should be kept at Saint-Jean. When it was decided that they would stay, a base was needed at Saint-Jean which would support the operations of these three schools. Hence plans had to be drawn up for a support base (transport, logistics, food, military police and so forth) and each of the three new schools, since nearly all the buildings on the base had to be rebuilt.<sup>156</sup> This had the not insignificant effect of improving living conditions for Francophone recruits.



A hotel-school accommodating 1,600 students of English and French was approved in principle in 1971. As data which began to be important in the early 1970s were factored in, such as ERFC, ETFC, base services and the influx of more and more women recruits into the Forces (there were plans to accommodate over 100 at a time, among Francophones alone), the building grew ever larger.<sup>157</sup> On 14 August 1973, a press conference was held in Saint-Jean at which journalists and the local people were brought up to date in English and French. On 25 June, the government had announced that the entire base was to be rebuilt between January 1975 and July 1978. Saint-Jean, believed by some to be dead, was born again from its ashes. Indeed, the \$51 million budget was more than had been spent on any base since Gagetown was opened in New Brunswick in 1953. The base also supported the *Collège militaire royal* and, including the schools, numbered 2,900 persons in 1973. By 1978, the number was to be 5,660 civilian and military. Total annual expenditures leapt from \$17,762,000 to some \$35,000,000.<sup>158</sup>

On 30 January 1976, in the presence of the Minister of National Defence, James Richardson, a ceremony at Saint-Jean officially marked the start of the rebuilding program, although in fact construction had been proceeding for months.<sup>159</sup> The new base was not occupied until 1979.

So much for the general planning of language training, but much follow-up was needed and that provoked considerable reaction. Long before the program was approved, critics disputed the wisdom of having thousands of military personnel taking language courses simultaneously, either at CFLS or on the bases, when their numbers had been decreasing since 1968 and at the same time the duties assigned to them were multiplying. When Lieutenant-Colonel W.R. Campbell\* in September 1970 made a very rough estimate of what B and B might cost, he had the sense to ask whether the Forces would succeed in maintaining several hundred members at a time in language training for years.<sup>160</sup> The question was raised again briefly at the 21 December 1970 Defence Council meeting,<sup>161</sup> but this did not prevent the implementation plan from proceeding.

In April 1971, Commodore F.D. Elcock, Director of Organization, in turn prepared a long memorandum explaining that the Forces were already short of personnel. The ceiling allowed them comprised recruits and those on various types of training assignments, including the approximately 2,400 men

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\* Campbell projected that 10,000 bilingual members would be trained over five years, which meant that, allowing for a percentage of failures and departures for sundry reasons, 650 to 720 members would be taking language courses at any given moment.

and women who in each future year would be on language training rather than working. This meant, according to Elcock, that at any given time the Forces would be lacking 2.4 percent of the strength they required in order to operate adequately. Since the units in Europe were at 100 percent strength, the personnel shortage was home first and foremost in Canada. Thus the deficit in this part of the Forces was 6.3 percent. That, asserted Elcock dramatically, was why ships remained in port, aircraft were not as well maintained, communications were imperfect and dental and medical services were being eroded. The White Paper asked for too much, he concluded.<sup>162</sup>

A group at CFB Trenton who opposed the program put forward in February 1971 asked whether a section would be able to operate with a high percentage of its members absent on course. The work not performed by those absent would automatically devolve on their colleagues, who would log overtime without pay, as was the rule in the Forces. This would cut into evening courses for some or might interfere with the part-time jobs of members and their spouses which enabled the family to make ends meet.<sup>163</sup> In a few pages, we shall see that this fear, expressed in 1971, that too many courses overloaded the colleagues who did not take them, became a fact in spring 1973.

The figures were alarming. In his July letter, Macdonald wrote to Gérard Pelletier, Secretary of State, that between 1971 and 1980, French had to be taught to 29,000 Anglophones and English to 10,000 Francophones. It was estimated that, once CFLS was completed, the Forces would be offering language courses to 9,000 students per year using various methods.<sup>164</sup> The Minister's press release of the following 23 July announcing the Base Language Training Program referred to 1,400 students in the first year and 2,500 the following year.<sup>165</sup> In fact, in April 1972 these courses had an enrolment of 1,490.<sup>166</sup> In the summer of 1971, before the Base Language Training Plan began, Maritime Command had already announced that the Plan would affect its operations; the four hours each student would spend on these courses in a week would be taken from working time. The Command did admit, however, that savings in dollars and staff lay at the end of the road.<sup>167</sup> The fact remained, as stated during the information sessions on the program made in the bases in 1973, that what was then happening in Forces' language training was completely unique.<sup>168</sup> In September 1973, when Hanna wrote the final report on the briefing tour, he phrased the problem of the operational repercussions of such an undertaking differently. Management, he wrote, complained of a drop in effectiveness on the bases which was only partly due to the courses. But a persistent question remained unanswered: should the advancement of individuals be promoted at the expense of a unit's smooth operation?<sup>169</sup> This initial criticism of the scope of language training deserves

note because in its way it foreshadowed fairly clearly difficulties which were to follow with everything relating to the teaching side of the 1972 official languages plan, in particular the teaching of French to Anglophones.

First, what had to be done to persuade Anglophones that bilingualism was an asset? Boyle wrote in October 1972 that one important factor to consider was the lack of bilingual resources. He went on to state in his letter, which was to be given maximum distribution, that greater opportunities for career success could be contemplated for bilingual service personnel, as was to be expected in a country such as Canada. Hence the Forces should encourage unilinguals to learn a second language, especially those unilinguals with a high career potential.<sup>170</sup> Many of those selected for language training tried to avoid that “hardship”; some recommended in December that candidates should be sent without much concern for their state of mind, just as they were sent on United Nations peacekeeping missions. This pressure did not succeed, and Hanna was among those who opposed this method, preferring conviction to compulsion.<sup>171</sup>

While Boyle’s reasoning on the necessity for bilingualism in Canada seems perfectly logical to us, we should immediately add that it scarcely won over the majority of unilingual Anglophones. A lieutenant-colonel who was selected to spend a year in Quebec with his family to learn the language and culture of the region would rarely refuse such an offer, because it meant a promotion to colonel shortly after his return and almost certainly another to brigadier-general at least in years to come. But how could the right selection be made of privates or corporals who would remain in the Forces and who had a good career in front of them? We must bear in mind the percentages of bilingual Anglophones to be achieved in all ranks. Those in the lower echelons of an English-speaking regiment, in a technical Air Force service in Trenton, for example, or on a vessel where English had always been used, had great difficulty seeing how French could help their careers.

Some persons in 1973 frankly doubted the need for institutional bilingualism in the military.<sup>172</sup> Others were alarmed by everything relating to these courses. Since students would only go to CFLS eventually for comparatively few weeks, there was no question of bringing their dependants. And when Anglophones took French courses, there was the supposition that they would then be transferred to an environment where their new skills would be useful; in other words, almost certainly in Quebec. Would there be French courses for wives and children?<sup>173</sup> The 1973, DGBB tour speakers were asked this question. They could always hold out hope by saying that this difficulty had already been acknowledged and was still on the agenda. They could always remind listeners, too, that Francophone military spouses over

the years had had to learn how to manage, although such an argument did not go very far. As had been pointed out in spring 1971 in this very connection, bilingualism applied to Anglophones was liable to transfer to them the language problems encountered by Francophones.<sup>174</sup> This would mean more negative situations instead of their elimination. In other words, no clear and tidy answer was given to this question. The arguments or tentative responses put forward by the speakers from Ottawa left little hope. Added to the prospect of the hardships of family life in a French-speaking environment was the trauma to an Anglophone private or corporal of the mere idea of having to work in French one day, when functioning in his first language was not always trouble-free.

As we have seen, officials had ruled out a compelling argument which might have promoted bilingualism among Anglophones; namely that bilingualism might come to play a central role in the preparation of promotion tables. Instead, this part of the B and B program had to be made acceptable by means of the more or less philosophical arguments such as Boyle presented earlier or the one which follows.

For another way of “selling” language courses, in particular French for Anglophones, was to emphasize that bilingualism would gradually form an absolutely essential bridge between two unilingual islands. This brings us back to the fear of a parallel army conjured up by Brigadier-General J.I. Davies on 4 December 1972: this spectre could evaporate if bilingualism were emphasized. What would happen in the event of war if there were two armies that could not communicate? Davies’ fear was so great that he wondered whether bilingualism should be made mandatory at the start of a career.<sup>175</sup> While Boyle agreed that adequate communications had to be ensured between FLUs and the rest of the Forces,<sup>176</sup> he rejected the idea of requiring recruits to be bilingual. One of the answers prepared in December 1972 to questions that might arise during the 1973 briefing tour stated outright that there was no intention to teach French to Anglophone recruits,<sup>177</sup> something which did not please all Anglophones. Thus in March 1973, Letellier was told, after his presentation at Saint-Hubert, that more and more bilingualism was being required, and English courses were given to Francophones as soon as they entered military life, but Anglophones followed a unilingual track after recruitment. Why did they not have French courses from the start of their career?<sup>178</sup> This echoed what some of the commanding generals had conveyed to Ottawa nearly three years earlier, in the fall of 1970, regarding the Implementation Plan made public in February 1971. Colonel Pierre Chassé had countered that, as soon as language courses were operating at full capacity, this fear would be allayed.<sup>179</sup> In their often-quoted memorandum of 10 June 1971, members of the technical services section at

CFB Trenton advanced the same argument, alleging it was unfair that Francophones took English courses when they entered the Forces but Anglophones had no equivalent in their second language. Despite all that was said to calm questions in 1973, the situation was still not resolved — far from it, for as we have seen, the new CFLS which was to change the picture would not be operational until six years later. By 1979, however, fears among Anglophones as to the possible career implications of not knowing French had long since subsided.

This perception of a form of discrimination on second-language courses, which had not been usual until then, remained in evidence in the first years of the 1972 plan's implementation. It was accompanied by a perception that potential or graduating students were not well managed. However, back in July 1971, General Dextraze had written to heads of commands that a method of selecting candidates for language courses had to be devised.<sup>180</sup> In June 1972, the Director of Language Training was asked to give career managers the results achieved by BLTP students. The plan was to choose some of those who had passed these basic courses to take more advanced courses and then be transferred to FLUs or bilingual positions.<sup>181</sup> The following December, Hanna called for student selection to be rationalized; to do otherwise was uneconomical and the resulting situation eliminated the effectiveness of the language training program.<sup>182</sup> A few months later, the briefing tour provided an opportunity to discover how French language courses were perceived outside Ottawa. The question was frequently asked: why send Anglophones to learn French and after graduation transfer them to a place where they would never use the second language — in the West, for example? The briefers replied very honestly that it would be several years before everything fell into place.<sup>183</sup> But how could such an argument inspire confidence in the system which had been in place for some eighteen months? Were potential clients not justified in believing that language training had been poorly integrated into the B and B program, especially when specific fears about maintaining acquired skills had been voiced since 1971?<sup>184</sup>

Parallel to this questioning of practical follow-up to advanced French courses, officials learned that the language courses offered at the bases were very far from yielding the expected results. Despite some problems related to the availability of the right material at the start, the BLTP came on stream in the early months of 1972. Organizers were, indeed, proud of the way it established itself.<sup>185</sup> The first serious assessment came out in 1973, and amounted to the following:

- students were selected without testing their aptitude to learn a second language, and it was found that many of the Anglophones enrolled would never be able to learn French;
- because of a lack of information, Anglophones were surprised by the number of leisure hours they would have to devote to their studies if they wanted to progress, and large numbers dropped out;
- 160 working hours had to be spent on the BLTP, while in several sectors, service personnel worked over 40 hours per week; these 160 lost hours had to be made up by students themselves or already bilingual colleagues (most of them Francophones) or by other Anglophones not on course;
- in the navy and combat arms, it was very hard to take such a course. In Lahr and Baden, absenteeism was about 50 percent, and in April 1973, the officer in charge of the BLTP in Europe threatened to terminate the program.<sup>186</sup>

Obviously, the BLTP had to carry on in Europe. Access to language courses could not be denied to 5,000 Canadians in the military for three years of their careers. Indeed, many of those serving in London, which had a strong Canadian military presence but did not offer the BLTP, considered this discriminatory. Yet the visitors from NDHQ who went to Europe in May-June 1973 were shocked to be informed of the disenchantment there. Nothing of this had penetrated to Ottawa. This shows once again how isolated the specialized offices of a large organization can be, and again brings to the fore the question of the withdrawal of management of language training from DGBB's responsibilities.

In passing, we should note that local initiatives were taken to counteract the high absenteeism rates in some bases, such as Gagetown, where exercises, operational courses and business travel kept it at about 30 percent. The option of 160 hours/40 weeks was kept open, and one of the three BLTP teachers devoted himself to it. His two colleagues, however, developed a course which ran for two weeks and took up half of each student's working day. This proved very practical, since these two weeks could be fitted in fairly easily between exercises, which were generally planned far in advance.<sup>188</sup> Gradually this method was adopted elsewhere, with support from Chief of Personnel Boyle.<sup>189</sup> Overall, however, there was a wide gap between the number of people enrolled in the BLTP and the number of graduates, and it was not about to be filled.

The other major problem in 1973 was still the selection of students for French language training and subsequent employment of those who had taken it. Boyle attended a meeting in March 1973 which addressed this topic. It was acknowledged that commanding officers were led to make a more or less random selection. To make an ideal selection, they would have to know the Forces' real bilingualism needs, which was nearly impossible. For intermediate and advanced French courses, on the other hand, a more judicious selection could and should be made, based, for example, on a graduate receiving a higher rank in a position where he would use the language of Molière. A methodical process to select the 100 officers who would take a course due to start in June was set in motion. It would all be easier, however, if DGBB could obtain more person-years from Treasury Board, because the already serious problem of strength was hard to deal with throughout the Forces.<sup>190</sup>

At a subsequent meeting, it was decided to create a B and B cell under the Director General Personnel Careers. Five people from the Division would belong to it, under the leadership of an experienced officer, Lieutenant-Colonel F.J.L. Boyle, who, unlike his namesake, was a Francophone who still spoke perfectly the French he had learned from his mother. As soon as his team was fully in place, it would have the task of comparing actual bilingual resources, which were becoming better identified in 1973, with existing needs. This study would make it easier to select personnel in connection with the B and B program and suggest adjustments if necessary.<sup>191</sup> But such things could not be done overnight. In August 1973, it was found that the positions of the 519 person-years which were to be used to offer French courses to Anglophones at the recruit level had not been filled. Thus a one-year course for 70 members at the rank of corporal and above was organized at the last minute.<sup>192</sup> At the very end of November 1973, Major-General C.W. Ross was forced to acknowledge that major French courses were still given at CFLS to reduced enrolments. He identified three factors which worked against these courses:

- personnel shortages;
- lack of motivation because it was still not clear to Anglophones that bilingualism benefited them; and
- poor selection for advanced courses.

There was the beginning, however, of progress on this last issue, which had been taken up by the B and B cell created under the Director Military Manpower Distribution (DMMD-B and B). Lieutenant-Colonel Boyle and his

team summarized the situation in an appendix to the November 1973 Ross's memorandum. Base commanders would remain responsible for the BLTP. They would bear in mind, however, that each session was supposed to make the student advance a level in aural comprehension. For the formal French course, which ran for 14 weeks at CFLS and was designed to produce functionally bilingual graduates, DMMD-B and B would study the characteristics of each bilingual position (rank, environment, specialty and so forth) before approaching career managers, who would choose the candidates. For the continuous French course, which could be offered by the Public Service Commission to students requiring a very long learning period, or by CFLS to students who already had a good foundation and would not need so many weeks on course, DMMD-B and B would also help with selection. While the basic English course for Francophone recruits was controlled by TC, the more advanced 15-week course for Francophones would be subjected to DMMD-B and B involvement in selection.

Career managers, for their part, would have to use their own criteria when they had to send someone on course. Among these criteria were individual willingness; availability of personnel under the control of each career manager; possibility of transfer to a Francophone environment following the course; each individual's likelihood of promotion; and prospects of replacing those who, after their course, would serve in French and be ready to move on to something else.<sup>193</sup> To these we may add an interesting point: in February 1973, Letellier suggested that only career managers should be able to withdraw a student from a course. Occasionally, in 1972, a commanding officer or director had withdrawn students, and this had upset the efforts made by career managers.<sup>194</sup>

Thus in late 1973, a selection system was put in place for major courses, but it had not yet been proven to work. However much effort was invested, how well bilingualism really functioned would depend not only on the number of bilinguals on paper but also on the quality of graduates, which remained an open question in 1973. As the reader is now aware, FLUs were still complaining in 1985 about receiving Anglophones whose bilingualism was far from functional. Since the system had not yet produced enough bilingual Anglophones in 1973, fears about the quality of individuals' bilingualism lay in another direction. Recruiting, which had resumed in 1972, had taken in a very high proportion of Francophones who had gone to *ERFC*. After taking their initial training in French, they went on to basic English courses before proceeding to learn their trade. Complaints were growing, especially in Halifax. The CFLS detachment there had planned to accommodate recruits for



eight weeks, but often they stayed as long as twenty weeks or more. As a result, the school had difficulty achieving its objectives.<sup>195</sup>

A little later, complaints came from elsewhere. Since there were too many Francophone recruits, FLUs could not absorb them all. Thus many came out of FRANCOTRAIN and were thrown into ELUs without the necessary preparation. The Director Language Training began to study the possibility of creating units which would give English language courses geared to the environment in which recruits would serve.<sup>196</sup> The Department of National Defence was very different from other departments, as Philip Deane of the Language Bureau had written in October 1972; it wanted a lot of English courses, unlike his other clients who mostly tried to obtain French courses.<sup>197</sup>

While the English skills of recent Francophone recruits posed a problem in 1973, the loss of French among old Francophone members in FLUB surfaced again significantly during the 1973 briefing tour.<sup>198</sup> As we have seen, no reply firmly supported by the facts was given to the victims of the wholesale anglicization which had gone on until 1966-67.

Before turning to the results of the language training activity in the 1972 plan, we should point out that special attention was given to some sectors of it. Royal Military College was undoubtedly the sector which benefited most from this. On 10 May 1971, G. Blackburn and R.C. Duplantie were given a mandate to study how bilingualism could be improved at RMC,<sup>\*</sup> especially among Anglophones. Letellier described in his book the context in which this took place, but without going into detail.<sup>199</sup>

According to their mandate, Blackburn and Duplantie were to seek a solution which would increase bilingualism among officer cadets at RMC without interfering with the military training given during the summer or impairing the quality and validity of the venerable institution's degrees<sup>\*\*</sup> or its special characteristics.

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\* In fact, at both RMC and RRMC, but ultimately only RMC was chosen for serious official languages teaching.

\*\* How could learning one of Canada's two official languages in a Canadian university impair the quality of the degrees it granted? Rear-Admiral Murdoch, who commanded CDEE at the time and who was responsible for the mandate given to the study group, might have had an answer. We should bear in mind that the same year, *CMR* began to grant degrees to bilingual Anglophone and Francophone officer cadets.

The two men issued a preliminary report in September 1971. They offered several conclusions which recall what other education specialists were to repeat over the years, and the Air Force seemed to know already before its wisdom was lost in the mazes of integration; namely, that a person's good attitude toward a second language, in this case French, is quickly lost if it does not seem to be of any use. In short, RMC had to integrate language training into active life, which would require a major effort by the system. If authorities were not prepared to undertake it seriously, it would be better to delay language courses until they became necessary in each individual's career. If bilingualism were to be introduced at RMC, the researchers recommended that the first part of the French course consist of ten weeks of immersion in an appropriate environment. In any event, what was learned had to be used in a career.<sup>200</sup>

This recommendation was not kept as it stood. However, parallel to the institutional bilingualism at RMC which we have discussed, there were a great many language courses during the 1970s, as the Commandant's reports mentioned in Chapter 14 revealed. Today, officer cadets at the three colleges who fail the required bilingualism tests take second-language courses during the academic year. In the summer following their first year of college, all officer cadets in military colleges who are not fully (or "integrally") bilingual are offered an intensive second-language course.<sup>201</sup> In 1979-80, the annual report of the Commandant of RMC stated that 67 Anglophones and 129 Francophones had achieved the required functional level in their second language and were thus exempted from continuing their training in that area.<sup>202</sup>

Let us now summarize the negative factors we have mentioned which played a role in the performances achieved by the considerable language training activity between 1972 and 1987. First, we find in the program approved in 1972 that second-language training was still aimed much more at Francophones than Anglophones. Moreover, the number of members who were supposed to take language training was astronomical. To this objection, which was noted very early, the Chief of Personnel, Lieutenant General Jacques Dextraze could only reply in July 1971 that the Forces would have to do the best they could with the limited resources available.<sup>203</sup> Until 1979, another constraint stemmed from the fact that there was no CFLS able to accommodate 1,600 students at a time. Hence some complaints of discrimination were levelled by Anglophones in the early days; in other words, in the fairly brief period when they began to believe that the 1972 program would be implemented in full. According to Hanna, in September 1973 Anglophones were fairly willing to accept the explanations given them

that it was impossible to offer them immediately what most Francophones had as soon as they entered the Forces: second-language courses.<sup>204</sup>

Apparently, during the crucial period 1971-73, no one worked seriously on the “equality” alternative. This might, for example, have meant speeding up the implementation of FRANCOTRAIN, with the result of relieving CFLS of Francophone recruits studying English so as to make room for Anglophones to take French courses. All those who designed the plans and those who supported them were prepared to spread out the equalizing of opportunities over fifteen years. At this stage in our study, we are aware of what happened in several areas to the full implementation of the 1972 program, despite the fact that it was a condition *sine qua non* for achieving near equality between Canada’s two main language groups.

The curriculum was also being developed between 1971 and 1973. For example, it was agreed in June 1971 that French courses would give highest priority to oral communication and lowest priority to writing ability, the hardest to acquire.<sup>205</sup> At the same time, a flagrant lack of co-ordination was observed between courses and the use to which the newly acquired language could subsequently be put. Moreover, Anglophones were failing at all instructional levels, in particular in the courses taught at bases. It was mainly Anglophones who were targeted to achieve level 2 or 3 within the BLTP before going on to CFLS. Officials had to acknowledge in 1973 that the BLTP had performed poorly.

### **Disappointing results of the language training activity and attempts to correct the situation up to 1985**

Reading the May 1974 *Review of Achievements of DND Bilingualism and Biculturalism Program*, we are led to connect two sets of statistics. The first is taken from a course enrolment table, which shows that during 1973-74, the basic English course was taken by 1,300 Francophones, and advanced English by 82. Among Anglophones, 413 took the Formal French course at CFLS, 76 Public Service Commission continuous courses, 3,460 BLTP courses, 323 PSC block courses and 229 subsidized language training in private schools. Thus, in total, 1,382 Francophones and 4,480 Anglophones were enrolled in second-language courses.

The second set of numbers comes from Table 8 of the report, which stated that as of 22 February 1974, 88.7 percent of the Forces’ 64,682 Anglophones were unilingual, compared to only 24.8 percent of the 15,970 Francophones. From this we see that the 4,480 members enrolled in French

courses represented only 6.9 percent of the Anglophone establishment, which was 88.7 percent unilingual, while the 1,382 enrolled in English courses represented 8.8 percent of the Francophone establishment, which was 24.8 percent unilingual.

Thus the first year of operation of the language training activity could hardly be called revolutionary. Despite the difficult establishment of a structure designed to reverse a historic trend by making numbers of Anglophones bilingual, we find that the French course at CFLS, with space for 480 students, trained only 413. Optimists will note that this figure was 95 higher than the 1972-73 figure.

According to the 1974 Review, the state of bilingualism in the Armed Forces as at 22 February 1974 was as follows.

Table 36

**BILINGUAL STATUS OF THE CANADIAN FORCES  
FEBRUARY 1974**

	ANGLOPHONES				FRANCOPHONES						
		I*	F**	C***	TOTAL		I	F	C		
OFFIERS	12,582	298	755	2,416	3,469	2,018	1,035	642	341	2,323	
OTHER RANKS	52,100	535	885	2,403	3 823	9,986	3,433	3,903	2,650	13,647	
TOTAL	64,682	833	1,640	4,819	7,292	12 004	4,468	4,545	2,991	15,970	
					19,296						

- \* I = Integral
- \*\* F = Functional
- \*\*\* C = Contact

These figures were followed by a note:

Statistics are labelled Anglophones and Francophones for convenience; actually they represent groups with primary languages of English and French respectively. Specifically, there are 1184 Francophones whose primary language is English and 45 Anglophones whose primary language is French.<sup>206</sup>

This may be taken to mean that a large proportion of the 2,473 Anglophones claiming to be integrally or functionally bilingual were actually

Francophones who declared that English was their first language. This should not be a surprising revelation to any reader at this stage.

The years 1974 to 1977 were marked, as far as language training activity was concerned, by major events to which Letellier devoted many pages. The first event encompassed everything resulting from the 1973 Resolution, including the designation of bilingual positions in the Forces and the plan by which they were to be staffed, which Brigadier-General H.F. Wenz was instructed to draw up. As a result of this, the number of bilingual positions increased to 14,000 and, after a more thorough study of the question, the Defence Management Committee agreed on 29 March 1976 to postpone for five years, until 1992, the deadline for achieving bilingualism in the Forces, which as we know depended heavily on language training.<sup>207</sup>

The second event was, of course, the special study by the Commissioner of Official Language, which has already been quoted many times and contains observations on language training. A table with data provided by the Department in November 1976 to a Cabinet working group chaired by Gordon Robertson served as the basis for the Commissioner's comments.

First of all, the Commissioner referred to the enormous sums allocated by the Department to teaching languages to the military (\$23,816,000 for 1976-77) and the \$40 million projected annually until the 1992 deadline. He then proceeded to areas which confirmed what could be detected in the 1972 program:

Anglophones can enroll in French courses on a voluntary basis, whereas Francophones must take English courses since they are an integral part of basic military training for all except certain infantrymen. Thus there is a double standard from the outset. The Department acknowledges that this situation exists but feels that it is just part of the game....

At the time of the study the Department was issuing its first directive requiring certain English-speaking servicemen to acquire some knowledge of French. Starting in the 1978-1979 training year, English-speaking officer cadets must have some knowledge of French in order to obtain their degrees;\* it is estimated that about ten per cent of these cadets will not acquire that knowledge because they do not have a "talent for languages".<sup>210</sup>

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\* It need hardly be stressed, the COL added, that an officially recognized knowledge of English has always been required of French-speaking officer cadets wishing to obtain their degrees.

Referring to language training results from 1972-1974 (our Table 37), COL Keith Spicer observed, "It seems clear that when all the resources that have been allocated to language training over the last five years are taken into account, the results are definitely unsatisfactory."<sup>211</sup> This was especially so because:

the contact level means a very limited knowledge of the other language, so limited indeed that the individual is unable to engage in conversation; the functional level is sufficient for a person to converse. Finally, the integral level is the only one that indicates a high standard of bilingualism.

The figures speak for themselves. We would, however, like to point out that the fact that few Francophones attain the integral level through language training in no way implies that they will never reach that level — they can avail themselves of excellent English-language immersion classes outside the classroom, and the results obtained would make any language teacher envious!<sup>212</sup>

Table 37<sup>208</sup>

**LANGUAGE TRAINING RESULTS (1972-77)  
ACCORDING TO THE COMMISSIONER OF OFFICIAL LANGUAGES**

PROGRAM	ENROLMENT SINCE 1972	LEVEL REACHED BY STUDENTS			
		BELOW CONTACT	CONTACT	FUNCTIONAL	INTEGRAL
<i>English programs</i>					
Basic English	6,151	—	5,659	492	—
Advanced English	358	—	—	208	150
Subsidized Plan	109	41	58	10	—
BLTP	869	652	182	35	—
SUBTOTAL	7,487	693	5,899	745	150
<i>French programs</i>					
Formal French	1,749	490	700	437	122
Continuous training	275	—	104	160	11
Six months	89	—	67	22	—
Secretaries	92	92	—	—	—
BLTP	9,999	7,499	2,100	400	—
Subsidized Plan	261	99	138	24	—
SUBTOTAL	12,465	8,180	3,109	1,043	133
TOTAL	19,952	8,873	9,008	1,788	283

Later, the report added that a far higher proportion of Francophones than Anglophones were “integrally” bilingual.

In view of all this, in particular the fact that training on the bases, with an enrolment of 9,999 Anglophones, had only succeeded in turning out 400 at the functionally bilingual level since 1972 (see Table 37), Spicer wondered whether it would not be appropriate to spend more effort “establishing mechanisms which foster equality of status for the two languages and equal opportunities for the two language groups.” He added, “The obligation of acquiring and learning to use the other official language satisfactorily must from now on be shared by both groups.”<sup>213</sup>

As conceived, the BLTP was to be a miracle solution. By coming to those who needed courses and adapting to their schedule, it was supposed to avoid many disruptions. In theory, the introductory course also freed CFLS from that area of training, which was onerous in more than one way, not least for accommodation. Success in this first phase was expected to reduce the risks of failure at CFLS, which was much more expensive in dollar terms, if only because of the travel, accommodation and meal expenses it implied. By September 1970, concerns were aroused regarding all the costs associated with language training, already expected to be exorbitant, and phases were proposed which would weed out those without aptitude or motivation.<sup>214</sup> The BLTP was designed to play this role and also give hope to Anglophones worried about their future in the Armed Forces. On —5 March 1973, when Letellier met with Mobile Command staff as part of his briefing tour — he was to see the rest of the personnel the next day — he was asked whether there were some approaches in the B and B program which seemed by then to achieve more positive results than others. He replied unequivocally: the BLTP.<sup>215</sup> How disillusioned he was to become over the years, as he observed the results pointed out by Spicer in 1977.

This was not all. The Commissioner’s investigators also noted, for example, that the Foreign Language School administered by National Defence in Ottawa, where service personnel studied languages other than English and French together with civilian officials from every department, only offered its courses in English. The same was true at Canadian bases in West Germany, where German courses were given starting from English only. Many dependants were allowed to take these courses, but obviously unilingual Francophones could not, at least with much profit.<sup>216</sup>

The Commissioner then made his recommendations. We present them in Table 38, with the comments made by the Department in October 1978.



Table 38<sup>217</sup>

1977 COL RECOMMENDATIONS — LANGUAGE TRAINING	DND COMMENTS 25 OCTOBER 1978
<p>Develop plans and strategies to ensure that language training for military personnel of both official language groups would normally follow the same criteria, so that both groups would share common obligations or privileges and have the same employability across the CF system.</p> <p>Ensure that language training programs would continue to be job-related and that graduates were taught to a level high enough for them to perform their duties adequately in their second language.</p> <p>Review by December 31, 1978, the effectiveness of the various language training programs, in particular Base Language Training Program (BLTP), and take whatever remedial measures are necessary.</p> <p>Ensure that voluntary language training provided to military personnel of one language group is made available on a similar basis to military personnel of the other language group.</p> <p>Adopt and apply a consistent policy in admitting dependants into classes of the Base Language Training Program.</p>	<p>Rejected because it would require “unrealistic” resources.</p> <p>Partially implemented. Difficulties were experienced in providing adequate training in writing skills so that graduates could work fully in the various HQs and senior positions.</p> <p>This review was conducted and recommendations were submitted for approval.</p> <p>Implementation would depend on whether or not the above recommendations were approved.</p> <p>As above.</p>

The response to the first recommendation, a brusque *nyet*, was more evidence that, as the tenth anniversary of the Official Languages Act approached, the Armed Forces were still not prepared to turn away from the one-way bilingualism which had been one of their characteristics since the nineteenth century. As for the Department’s other reactions, they were based in essence on the recommendations made by Wenz in 1976. He had proposed that the Forces allocate 1,200 person-years and \$42 million annually to language training (mainly teaching French to Anglophones). This astronomical request was rejected by Treasury Board in June 1977. DM “Buzz” Nixon wrote to CLO Yalden in October 1978 explaining that the Department was preparing an alternative to the previous plan, which would allow bilingualism to move ahead without affecting the Forces’ primary mission.<sup>218</sup>

In April 1979, the Defence Management Committee (DMC) received a presentation from the working group overhauling the 1972 program. The group acknowledged that there was still a shortage of bilingual Anglophones, and that this remained serious in the overall management of B and B. The situation had to be corrected, while taking into account Treasury Board's rejection of the 1977 plan. The 1979 proposal was thus more modest than the 1977 one, calling for only 384 additional person-years.\* Clearly, if this new proposal were approved by DMC and Treasury Board, it would further postpone the 1992 deadline. The briefers from the Working Group remarked, however, that even in this new situation, the Department would not look too badly. An important consideration in 1979 was, naturally, to ensure that the new CFLS fulfilled its mandate. If the new person-years were granted and existing courses were maintained, five of the school's eight buildings would have to be used. Thus, when CFLS was ready, the question of the Forces' operational capacity surfaced again. Unless the necessary funds to pay for replacements for students were obtained, CFLS could not be filled to capacity.

This observation did not mean that goodwill had been lost. At that time (April 1979), consideration was being given to a 40-week continuous French course divided into two phases. The first, offered in regional centres,\*\* would last 22 weeks and was designed to bring participants up to the "contact" level. It would be followed by 18 weeks at Saint-Jean, which would raise 520 Anglophones per year to the functional level. Participants would be carefully selected and subsequently placed in bilingual positions as far as possible. This was where the additional 384 person-years were to be used if granted. Other courses would be given to Anglophones, but the Forces would have to bear the full weight of them: a refresher course (six weeks in Saint-Jean for eighty Anglophones per year who had been unable to serve in French for some time); a nine-week block course for sixty students four times a year; and a ten-week course in Saint-Jean for Anglophone officer cadets who had completed their first year at military college, during which they would already have taken five hours of French per week.

English courses remained substantially the same. Some 1,300 Francophones not slated for army combat arms would take the 24-week basic English course. The advanced English course would upgrade the skills of

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\* The question of the additional person-years will be addressed in Chapter 16.

\*\* Halifax, Gagetown, Montreal, Ottawa, Petawawa, Trenton, Winnipeg and Esquimalt.

ninety Francophones yearly. Lastly, Francophone officer cadets would have access to a ten-week English course. According to the planners, the increase in bilingual Anglophones should begin to be felt by 1980-81.<sup>219</sup>

This part of the Official Languages Plan (Military) was closely scrutinized by Treasury Board. The Board was disposed to grant the person-years requested and the corresponding salaries on condition that French courses were subject to firm criteria, such as the following:

- candidates had to have a good aptitude and considerable interest in learning French;
- graduates had to be posted immediately to bilingual positions (the Department said “as far as possible”); and
- the individual career plans of those selected had to justify the investment.<sup>220</sup>

In effect, the MOLP repeated the conditions laid down by Treasury Board. It stated: “It is intended that the graduates of this program [continuous French course] will be posted to bilingual positions.” Before the MOLP was made public, CDS Admiral R.H. Falls announced, on 19 March 1980, that Treasury Board had acceded to the Department’s request. His letter displayed a new willingness to take action.

It is my intention to make maximum use of the FY 1980-81 resource allocation as it is one of the most encouraging signs in our efforts to effectively launch the language training program.<sup>222</sup>

In fact, it was agreed that renewal of the allotment of person-years granted for one year to replace students on continuous training would depend on the performance of the new program. We can understand why Falls said that he wished to take action to achieve the objective.

Falls’ letter stated that the first period of the continuous French course would be given at sixteen bases rather than the eight initially planned.\* Each would take twelve students, except Ottawa, which would have eighty. Indeed, steps were taken in March to make the necessary alterations at the various locations and have career managers begin selecting the required officers and

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\* Greenwood, North Bay, Kingston, Borden, Cold Lake, Edmonton, Calgary and Comox were added to the eight previously mentioned.

non-commissioned members. According to Falls, the agreement enabled both the language and the military needs of the Forces to be met.<sup>223</sup>

This favourable conclusion was not reached without difficulty, however. This is evident from the various meetings which brought Command Co-ordinators of Official Languages (CCOLs) to Ottawa between 1978 and 1980, and in particular the meeting of 26 and 27 June 1979. On that occasion, CCOLs were unanimous about certain very important provisions to be included in the 1980 plan. One of them related to the Department's insistence that continuous French courses should be crucial to its strategy to train the managers needed to make the Canadian Armed Forces institutionally bilingual. But continuous French courses took students away from their work for months to learn their second language. Command Co-ordinators argued in June 1979 that members on language training had to be replaced by Reserve personnel, who would be added to the total establishment of the Forces. A certain number of positions thus had to be obtained from Treasury Board. DGOL responded rather negatively to this request, arguing that the government freeze on Public Service hiring made it impossible.<sup>224</sup> No doubt he remembered how he had been rebuffed in June 1977. One question arises: why did DND authorities adopt this position of "self-censorship" in this case (as indeed in others which had nothing to do with B and B)? Why did they conclude from the outset that there was no point in submitting a new application file to Treasury Board? Verbally or in writing, the co-ordinators held to their positions on this point, and eventually the Department made the request we have seen to Treasury Board.<sup>225</sup>

There were other areas of discomfort. Wenz had suggested the abandoning of the BLTP because of its poor results. The Commissioner of Official Languages, for his part, questioned its validity. It became clear in March 1980 that continuous French courses would replace the BLTP, and this did not sit at all well with Mobile Command. Readers will recall that FMC had problems in recruiting for its operational units, in 1980; these were particularly acute among Francophones, many of whom were joining the Forces with the secret or avowed hope of learning English. The only recruits who did not take the basic English course were those planning to enter combat arms. Moreover, in 1980 a number of officers were arriving in Valcartier with only a smattering of English. This prompted two questions. First, while the continuous French course was offered to Anglophones at great expense, opportunities for young Francophones to improve their English in the workplace were eliminated at a time in their careers when it was hard to make them available for long periods of training out of their unit or trade. The other question related to second-language training for Anglophone and Francophone dependants uprooted from their home environment. As for the

first question, NDHQ agreed with Saint-Hubert in May 1980 and gave it eight English teacher positions to distribute among Gagetown, Valcartier, Montreal and Petawawa. As far as dependants were concerned, Mobile Command had to find the necessary funds out of its own pockets. It did this in 1982, for example, when nine language teachers were paid by Mobile Command in addition to the eight paid by NDHQ.<sup>226</sup>

Not all the negative reactions to the cancellation of the BLTP were of the same order. Maritime Command (MARCOM), for its part, believed the BLTP was worthwhile because it saw difficulties in sending a student on course for 18 weeks.<sup>227</sup> In the flood of responses to the Commissioner's 1977 Report, MARCOM\* wrote to NDHQ in October 1978 describing the prescribed procedure for staffing bilingual positions as very difficult in its case. Many vessels had more bilingual personnel than bilingual positions. However, those bilinguals were not necessarily qualified to fill the positions designated bilingual. What the Command did not say was that its (bilingual) Francophones were concentrated in the lower echelons, and this of course prevented them from filling many positions adequately. One solution that was put forward was to create a new FLU which would siphon off these "bilinguals" and enable them to use their own language. More specifically the Command made a suggestion for bilingual positions on vessels, which it said would be in keeping with the Commissioner's intentions. These it summarized as follows: the two language groups would serve together; bilingualism would help people in the minority group; and bilingual positions were a way to carry out these intentions. For the moment, MARCOM could not comply with this policy. It asked for a grace period during which it would not have to fill all its bilingual positions, and those of its units which had at least ten percent bilingual Francophones would be considered able to serve the public in both languages. It further undertook to fill positions adequately as soon as it had the necessary personnel.<sup>229</sup>

This proposal was accepted by the Assistant Deputy Minister (Personnel), Lieutenant General James C. Smith, the following December.<sup>230</sup> After Treasury Board agreed to the revised language training plan and it began to be implemented, MARCOM returned to the attack. If we take the trouble to read between the lines, we find the whole philosophy of B and B questioned by Pierre Simard, who had been the first captain of the *Ottawa* after it became

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\* MARCOM had other problems with managing bilingual positions, for example at the Regional Co-ordination Centre in Halifax, which had contacts with the public. In this particular case, officials seemed ready to act but not too quickly. In July 1978, they could not promise bilingual service 24 hours a day, seven days a week, before 1 April 1979.<sup>228</sup>

an FLU (in reality a “bilingual” vessel as Simard wished), and was now the Co-ordinator of Official Languages in Halifax. He had the distinction of being the only civilian in the military commands to hold such a position. In June 1982, perceiving that preparations were being made to make service personnel bilingual in accordance with the positions they were to fill, Simard responded that, in his opinion, there were no positions in his Command where Anglophones graduating from the continuous French course would be able to use their second language routinely. Naturally, Simard took good care not to explain why; fifteen years after General Allard had made his projections in 1967, the navy had not progressed more rapidly in the use of French. He also said nothing about the fact that, in nearly all vessels, Francophones held over ten percent of positions, but at the lowest ranks. Lastly, he also avoided discussing the fact that all those Francophones were bilingual. In short, he did not say why the navy had systematically avoided doing anything essential since 1967, and even more, since 1971, to make languages and opportunities equal.

Instead, Simard chose to reiterate a request put forward in October 1981 that NDHQ approach Treasury Board to gain its support for a directive stating that the navy would be complying with Departmental intentions on postings after courses if its continuous French course graduates were assigned to vessels which had at least ten percent Francophones. This definition would cover all vessels on the East Coast, because each had between 12 and 16 percent Francophones.

Simard made the following specific suggestions:

- a. that students graduating from the continuous French course be assigned as a priority to the two FLUs until they filled ten percent of positions there;
- b. that the period in which to implement the 1978 decision be extended (see above);
- c. that postings of continuous French course graduates to vessels with over ten percent bilinguals be considered to fulfil Treasury Board’s conditions and the requirements of the Official Languages Plan for institutional bilingualism; and
- d. that the 125 bilingual positions on the West Coast be deleted from the list, since the 10.3 percent Francophones there did not normally constitute “significant demand”.<sup>231</sup>

With respect to this last suggestion, Simard added that, if the 125 positions were not eliminated, continuous French course graduates could be transferred to almost any vessel, because as a general rule, every vessel had ten percent or more Francophones. This would comply with suggestion c. above. At worst, he wrote, the significant demand on the West Coast could be eliminated by recalling some Francophones to the East Coast and thereby reducing the proportion of Francophones to less than ten percent on the West Coast.<sup>232</sup>

Simard treated the presence of Francophones on the West Coast cynically, although any objective observer would have to recognize that this presence was in fact symbolic. As for the rest of the proposals by the Co-ordinator of Official Languages at MARCOM, they represented fairly accurately the thinking of Canada's senior naval hierarchy. Francophone sailors had to be anglicized in order to serve in the navy. As a result, everything that came from Ottawa regarding "significant demand" and bilingual positions designed to serve Francophones in their own language was meaningless.

The 1982 request was rejected in May 1984, and the way it was done is interesting. Brigadier-General R.L. Bell, Director General Military Careers Officers (DGMCO), to whom Simard had written two years earlier, stated that he had consulted with DGOL Sullivan, who had asserted that the suggestion for the use of continuous French course graduates could not be presented to Treasury Board at that time. However, the DGOL agreed to extend the 6 December 1978 agreement until more bilinguals were available.<sup>233</sup>

This reply, as might be expected, gave MARCOM all the latitude it needed to pressure Bell and his naval career managers, despite Treasury Board's clear intentions. It is remarkable that the DGOL did not immediately reject vigorously Simard's initial request in the fall of 1981, but rather left the matter in limbo for nearly three years before making a reply through an intermediary chosen by Simard. Why was the navy favoured in this way when all sectors of the Forces were in the same situation, with not enough bilingual Anglophones to fill all their positions?

This distressing example of inertia did not inhibit senior authorities from making grandiose declarations about the best of intentions when they were hauled on the carpet. In November 1981, Deputy Minister Nixon declared to the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on Official Languages:

So that members of the armed forces can serve anywhere in Canada, we must have a completely bilingual institution, able to integrate unilingual

anglophones or francophones anywhere in the country. This is a very ambitious aim but we will not have a truly Canadian force if we do not succeed in attaining this objective.<sup>234</sup>

The Commissioner had nevertheless written in his report some months earlier:


The Department has no apparent will to exercise a leadership role in the matter of language reform.<sup>235</sup>

Despite repeated attempts by Nixon and his assistants to challenge this assertion, the representative of the Commissioner of Official Languages who attended this meeting reaffirmed that he was “able to defend point by point the statements in this chapter on National Defence in the annual report for 1980.”<sup>236</sup> Naturally, the question of staffing the 9,000 bilingual positions was raised again: only 44 percent of them were adequately filled. Nixon and Sullivan launched into long, closely argued explanations recounting what had happened from 1978 to 1980, when the entire 1972 program was revised. Gilles Marceau, MP, had already replied to this in advance:

You do establish programs. One is not denying that.[...] But are these structures really creating an improvement in the situation? That is the crux of the matter.<sup>237</sup>

The Department’s representatives were careful not to become embroiled in details about bilingual positions in the navy. In November 1981, Simard had still not received the negative reply called for by his October letter, and this gave him grounds for optimism. Was there uncertainty in Ottawa, or a “wait and see” policy? Certainty was, however, much in evidence when either the old or the revised program was attacked from outside. That the ship was leaking at every seam, not least in language training, was apparently obvious to everyone except those on board.





CFB Saint-Jean, south of Montreal. Originally built by the RCAF for air training it became, since unification of the Canadian Armed Forces, a training base for Francophones. The long building at the centre right of the picture houses the Canadian Forces Language School, *École des recrues des Forces canadiennes* and Base HQ. (SJC 79-1942)



Aerial view of *Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean*, founded in 1952 in the former barracks of the Royal Canadian Dragoons (lower left in the picture). Classrooms, laboratories and new dormitories have greatly changed the original site. (Courtesy of the Commandant, *CMR*)

However that may be, the saga of language courses did not end there. Indeed, it gathered more momentum with the 1980 plan and the Treasury Board demand that results be produced. A study of this entire area of the great bilingualism plan was commissioned on 1 February 1982. The following 15 March, the report was submitted by the Chairman of the study group, Brigadier-General D.J. McLaws, DGRET, formerly assistant to DGBB Letellier. What was the reason for the study?

First, nothing serious had been done since the Wenz report, which was far from comprehensive. For example, Wenz assumed that 1.7 persons per designated position had to be trained in order to ensure that the 14,000 bilingual positions were staffed at all times, and he maintained that with an energetic training program based on the continuous French course then being developed, 60 percent of bilingual positions could be filled quickly with a 73 percent Anglophone contribution. But the rationale for that 60 percent was never explained, as McLaws rightly pointed out. It was projected, in 1992, that 100 percent of bilingual positions would be filled, 73 percent of them by Anglophones. We have seen, however, that the application to Treasury Board based on these data was rejected; the request which was accepted in 1980 covered only one third of the recommendations put forward by Wenz. The program began in 1980 rather than in 1977 and with only a fraction of the strength originally planned. Furthermore, the continuous French course did not live up to expectations. Wenz had proposed the three types of courses we have seen, in order to achieve success by 1992. The ten-month continuous French course which was the nexus of his projections was to make 70 percent of officers functionally bilingual; however, the first two of these graduated only 38.7 percent of the officers enrolled and 12.4 percent of the non-commissioned members. At this rate, in order to achieve the 1992 objectives, 1,600 bilingual Anglophone officers and 12,000 non-commissioned members would have to be produced annually beginning in 1982-83. Thus the goal could not be achieved by 1992 and no one had yet proposed another target year, as the McLaws group pointed out. In fact, the group did not try to remedy this. The 1980 Official Languages Plan had taken due note of these difficulties: it did not contain any target number of bilinguals to be achieved annually, nor any year by which bilingual positions could finally be filled adequately.

First and foremost, McLaws addressed ways of increasing the number of bilingual Anglophones year by year. His study reflected the hard-won experience of over a decade of teaching French. Despite the enormous activity devoted to this, the number of functionally bilingual Anglophones remained virtually unchanged at 1,422 officers and 727 NCMs in January 1982. Among the many explanatory factors we may note the following. Candidates were not

carefully selected; many were not adequately tested before going on course; others were not well motivated; and finally, a number had little aptitude for learning. As in the early 1970s, graduates were not assigned to places where they could use their new knowledge, and hence quickly lost it.

To change this, the McLaws group put forward over forty recommendations which covered the ground very well and demonstrated, first and foremost, that over the years there had been no control at all over language training. McLaws found that requirements had not been perfectly quantified, and he asked that the Forces:

- a. conduct a critical review of the designation/staffing operation;
- b. determine, for the 73 percent Anglophones, all the necessary data by rank and trade for the benefit of career managers;
- c. stress the importance of the whole area by placing it on the VCDS's priority list;
- d. study the impact of the number of students in a class on the results obtained;
- e. emphasize speaking skills by a test based on interviews;
- f. release ahead of schedule any student who had achieved the functional level before the end of the course;
- g. bring the three CFLS buildings not currently used for language courses back under the control of the School; and
- h. conduct a comprehensive review of language training in order to set priorities for resource allocation.

We should add that McLaws proposed to eliminate the other French courses and invest everything on phases I and II of the continuous French course, the only one capable of producing tangible results.

Other recommendations, of course, deserve note. Some were obvious, repeating facts reported between 1971 and 1973. We note, for example, the question of posting graduates and the proposal to study the reintroduction of the BLTP, which had failed because of flagrant absenteeism and a high dropout rate. If everyone from the CDS down insisted on the priority and

benefits of bilingualism, according to McLaws, the problem of disaffection which underlay the failure of the BLTP could be eradicated.

The selection and motivation of candidates were discussed at length. On the first subject, the McLaws group pointed out that candidates who scored an A on the Modern Language Aptitude Test (MLAT) needed an average of 960 hours in class to become functionally bilingual; those who scored a B would require 1,140; C 1,290, and D 1,500. Since the continuous French course provided the equivalent of 1,040 hours of class time, those who scored a D should not be accepted into it. Among those with a C, individuals scoring two out of five on the aural comprehension test might possibly be selected. Linked with these suggestions was the proposal that the MLAT and the aural comprehension test be administered to as many potential Anglophone candidates as possible so that career managers could always have a reserve for the continuous French course.

Selection would not be based solely on tests. Candidates should also be selected from among those who wanted to take such a course, whose career plan would allow them to promptly use the French they learned, and whose families did not have any major objection to serving in a French-speaking environment.<sup>238</sup>

Motivation was related to the above criteria and was not very strong, as the BLTP showed. According to McLaws, chiefs at all levels had not adequately supported bilingualism. There had not been enough encouragement for Anglophones to become bilingual. Indeed, officials had created disincentives, according to some in the military, in other words the prospect of being posted to Quebec or in a bilingual position. There had also been a certain reaction to the French fact, to bilingualism in general, to so-called “French Power” and to adjustments of promotion lists in favour of Francophones. This goes some way to explain why few people had volunteered for courses, and also why career managers pressed to fill quotas selected unsuitable candidates. Exhortations by commanders and coercion by supervisors could not remedy the situation. In the view of McLaws, individuals had to be reached and persuaded that bilingualism was important for them and for the Armed Forces, which had to support government directives. McLaws even drafted a text designed to raise morale among Anglophones. In essence, it was an appeal which implied that bilingualism was a factor which improved the prospect of a good career.<sup>239</sup>

This is very interesting. McLaws was an officer selected in the 1970s to spend a year in Quebec, with his family, immersed in French. Six years later, he had become a general and served as Assistant DGBB and Commander of

CFB Saint-Jean, two positions where French was essential. He could speak from experience of the value of courses, ways of improving them and motivation. He took care to link bilingualism and careers directly, although without going so far as to say that second-language courses could become career courses, as they were called — in other words, virtual pre-requisites for any promotion, like leadership courses for NCOs or staff courses for officers. Yet many appeals had been made along these lines since 1971. Some of the official languages co-ordinators in the commands strongly recommended this solution. In 1977, the CCOL of Air Command again put forward this proposal, arguing that it was the best way of motivating Anglophones.<sup>240</sup> Mobile Command insisted in 1978 and 1979 that second-language courses be a mandatory part of the career development process for unilinguals, whether Anglophone or Francophone, but the Assistant Deputy Minister (Personnel) rejected this in August 1979.<sup>241</sup> In brief, McLaws avoided committing himself to a trail which had been blazed earlier, but so far rejected. After all, if bilingualism became a crucial career factor, the field would still be dominated by Francophones, even in 1982. In this eventuality, the readers will understand that deviations from the order of merit would no longer be discussed; in any case, as we saw earlier, this was a misguided debate. One question one could ask was this: in the event that a very high proportion of the Anglophone majority was bilingual and the Francophone minority predominantly unilingual, would bilingualism not have been a career factor?

Although the motivation path suggested by McLaws was interesting — it included, among other things, a letter of congratulation from the CDS to those who had achieved functional bilingualism through courses or on their own — it remained incomplete, since the connection between language courses and career courses was not mentioned. This said, McLaws touched on the subject when he proposed drawing attention to the fact that bilinguals would improve their employment and promotion prospects in comparison to unilinguals. But this was in broad terms what Vice-Admiral Boyle had written in 1972. What this approach had yielded was only too easy to quantify ten years later.

A technical recommendation by the McLaws group had to do with creating a dynamic model for managing bilinguals and bilingual positions. In March 1983, this task was assigned to the Directorate Manpower Analysis, which finally in 1987 produced a computerized model compiling information on bilingual positions and personnel, while estimating the shortages that might occur at various times.<sup>242</sup>

In addition, McLaws asked that methods used for individual training also be applied to second-language courses: development of a three-year program;

creation of a cell to establish criteria and ensure they were followed; and formulation of a training plan for the new teaching program and testing. In short, CFTS, which had not found favour in the early 1970s, but had returned in strength to language training, was to have its hand further strengthened in 1980, when the Department had resumed control over language teachers.

The preceding recommendation was accompanied by one which called for the Director Language Training to be placed under DGRET again (which was done as of 1 January 1983). The following supervision and control chain for language training was also to be adopted: ADM(Per) (advised by DGRET/DLT), CFTS, regional language training directors (Montreal, Winnipeg, Ottawa and Borden), local language training directors and teachers. Why? With the 1980 reorganization, all language teachers had been placed on the establishments of the bases where they were serving, although ADM(Per) Instruction 6/80 clearly stated that CFTS remained wholly responsible for the program, including pedagogical control. After long discussions between commands and the DGOL on the status of local teachers, DGOL Message 27 was issued in July 1981, placing language teachers under the direction of base commanders. But thirteen of these bases which offered Phase I of the continuous French course did not report to CFTS. In response to the message, Mobile Command and Air Command wrote to their units that the chain of command passed through their headquarters before going to CFTS. In effect, pedagogical control from Trenton was thus rendered almost impossible. DGOL Message of 27 of July 1981 had therefore to be replaced by another message from ADM(Per), which redefined the reporting chain clearly, specifying that bases would provide material and administrative support for teachers and CFTS would be fully and directly responsible for pedagogical matters.<sup>243</sup>

Training Command and NDHQ clashed over this. Mobile Command wanted language training to be controlled by the commands with CFTS having nothing more to do than provide standards to be followed and monitor results. This would mean commands would have to have the appropriate resources to conduct courses (administer teachers and candidates, for example).<sup>244</sup> This did not happen, but it shows the extent to which the commands, in particular FMC, still resisted certain guiding principles which had given birth to CFTS. This said, control remained a major problem. We saw in Chapter 10 that the Commissioner of Official Languages criticized official languages co-ordinators in the command HQs (CCOLs) and the bases (BCOLs) for spending too much of their time on language training and not enough on ensuring the equality of the two official languages. Despite his exhortations, the situation had altered little by 1987. The BCOL reported to his command, and in most cases was tasked with administering the language

courses taught on his base (Phase I of the continuous French course). Under these circumstances, some intervened more than they should, either on their own initiative or interpreting the will of their CCOL. After all, local language training directors figured under them in the organization charts. People were sometimes driven to ask who was really in charge of local language courses.<sup>245</sup>

One final aspect of the McLaws report deserves mention. In May 1982, the Director Language Training, who reported to DGOL, drafted a study directive which, if it had been signed, would have dealt with the poor English encountered among Francophones serving mainly in Quebec and the problems resulting from this weakness. In Chapter 9 we addressed the still latent fear which the DGOL conjured up around this time, namely the emergence of two armies, one French-speaking and the other English-speaking. In brief, the draft emphasized the fact that Francophone NCOs, having served mainly in Quebec since entering the Forces, had lost the English they had learned in their basic courses years before. All the evils this could breed had to be studied.<sup>246</sup>

This proposal had no immediate results, but the McLaws study moved ahead and addressed the real basic issue. Curiously, McLaws recommended strongly in part 6 of his study, but not in his 44 formal recommendations, that research into the causes and results of poor English among Francophones, which had not been conducted because of lack of personnel, should be carried through.<sup>247</sup> Let us remember that McLaws certainly had to know better than anyone that one of the intentions of the 1972 program was to lead, within the broad perspective of equal opportunities, to a situation where the Canadian Armed Forces would include many unilingual Francophones. The revised Official Languages Plan of 1980 still stated:

Up to the present, DND policy has provided for Francophone other ranks who do not meet the English language profile for their trade to undergo English language training prior to the TQ3 course. This policy was established for some or all of the following reasons: instruction in TQ3 and in subsequent trades courses was not available in French; reference material was available in English only; it was likely that the first assignment after training would be to an ELU or to a unit in an English milieu; there was a need to operate or communicate in English as a function of the job. However, as the number of trade courses available in French increases and as more FLUs are approved the need for second language training at this early stage will be reduced.<sup>248</sup>

We know that in 1982, as in 1987, the real barrier to equal opportunities was not unilingualism among Francophones but rather accumulated delays

all over in the implementation of the 1972 plan, which should have led to French unilingualism being harmoniously integrated into the Canadian military machine. It should be remembered that the delay in FRANCOTRAIN was largely attributed to the lack of qualified bilingual instructors. The reason why there were not enough bilinguals was that Anglophones had not yet taken over as much of this area as they should have. McLaws repeated this obvious fact *ad nauseam* in his study. Yet at the same time, he seemed, like Sullivan, to want the perpetuation of bilingualism among Francophones — for that is precisely the very clear meaning we should see in the proposed study — on condition that such bilingualism did not become a career necessity. He could not see the wood for the trees. The real difficulty was not unilingualism among Francophones. This said, we must admit that 1982 marked a new departure in the revised language training program set in motion in 1980.

In March 1983, the Department was able to submit to Treasury Board in its 1983-84 Annual Official Languages Plan the follow-up it had undertaken to give to the McLaws Report's 44 recommendations, which had all been accepted. Thus the number of students in the continuous French course rose from 560 to 656, where it was to stay for at least two years. The “contact” level of second-language knowledge had been eliminated (which meant that the many bilingual positions designated at that level would have to be reviewed, as McLaws also wished); and three working groups (policy, personnel and training) had been in operation since November 1982 to implement several of the other recommendations, including the study of a return to the BLTP (as we are aware, Mobile Command had continued with it).

It remained a priority for the Department to improve the performance of French courses and ensure better use of speakers of French, including in National Units which communicated in French with FLUs.<sup>249</sup> Was all this very different from the priorities set in 1971-73?

In the main, 1982 to 1987 was devoted to implementing the McLaws Report. Let us refer, for example, to the minutes of the third MARCOM/FMC BCOL working study on 4 and 5 May 1983. What do we find? Among other things, a presentation by a representative of the Directorate Language Training, Lieutenant-Colonel J.R. Thériault, explained how far implementation of the McLaws recommendations had progressed. Some had already been introduced, he reported, others were in progress, among them a curriculum which included language structures and vocabulary used in military situations and the development of teacher training.<sup>250</sup> Colonel G.S. Clements of CFTS, who was responsible for personnel matters at Trenton, made a complementary



presentation on language teaching and testing. It can be seen from his treatment, together with the development of language training since 1980, including the McLaws study, that this activity was gradually being appropriated by the military. In 1980, the Department resumed control over language teachers, and all pedagogical matters came under CFTS. In 1982, it became more and more obvious that the program followed by the Public Service Commission was not suitable and had to be changed. Accordingly, DND moved back to the situation prevailing before 1967. There was even strong pressure to have military teachers. Let us paraphrase Colonel P. Addy who, on the first day of the working study, said that DND wanted bilingual Anglophones in the military who could do more than order restaurant meals in French.\* As some pointed out sarcastically, they were apt to know all the French they needed to grow houseplants but none of the vocabulary of military operations.

Clements recalled that language training cost the Department \$40 million and occupied the equivalent of 1,200 persons a year. Interesting experiments were being tried. For example, 24 Anglophone recruits had been sent to Saint-Jean for a six-month French course and then transferred to Quebec. Being projected in their second language working environment, they were treated in the same way as Francophones had been for so long, which strictly from the standpoint of bilingual performance had been very successful. There were hopes of the same success. Readers will remember, however, the unfortunate experience of some of them, related in Chapter 11: in Valcartier, they lost some of their French.

The general orientation which developed was strictly military and its form was based on individual training, which implied the following characteristics: a military curriculum which responded to military requirements; a test mechanism which was part of the system, not an end in itself (it would serve as a link between the trainer and the user of the bilingual resource, which had not been done since 1971); improved teacher training; improved responsiveness in survey-type testing; and improved pedagogical supervision (LAT-02s were responsible to BCOLs after 1982) and services to units and bases.<sup>251</sup>

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\* The agreements signed with the PSC between 1967 and 1973 included a clause on the Forces' responsibility for ensuring that the results of courses were consistent with the Department's objectives. Was this responsibility taken as seriously as it should have been by either side? In Addy's view, it was not.

Also notable was Colonel Addy's articulate and convincing presentation, which went over much familiar ground to end with ideas which, although they went in the general direction then prevailing, would be implemented very differently if it were up to him. It was also Addy who put forward the proposal presented by Mobile Command in June 1982 on the differential promotion system discussed in Chapter 11. What did Addy say in Québec in May 1983? He acknowledged that language had to play a crucial role in military communications and that French was necessary in Canada. In his view, it was an operational necessity. To put it simply, what would be done with unilingual Francophones in the event of mobilization? Certainly it would be dangerous to send them all to Language School for at least six months. Hence the need for the regular Forces to be bilingual in peacetime so they would be ready in wartime. Bilingualism had to be recognized as an operational requirement, and unilinguals encouraged to make the necessary sacrifices to take language courses. "Gentlemen," he said in French, "I maintain that in the present context, apart from the fact that generals have been told by the Minister that they would not be promoted unless they were bilingual, there is no concrete motivation."<sup>252</sup> A man of strong convictions, Addy maintained that the bilingualism objective set by Wenz in 1976 was the one to be aimed for, "not the objective in the official languages plan, which was not really a plan at all but an assortment of good intentions".<sup>253</sup> The 1971-72 plans were not realistic, given that the type of changes proposed in 1972 would take at least thirty years.

Addy cited more myths, such as the belief that French could only be learned through formal courses, and that such courses could only be given by civilians who knew less about military life than a recruit who had taken his eleven weeks of basic training. First of all, the Forces would never have the resources to do everything through formal courses. Consequently, Anglophones interested in the experiment should be placed in FLUs, as he himself had been successfully placed when he commanded *12<sup>e</sup> Régiment blindé du Canada*. With the work in progress (second-language training standards and plans and a more military content), the Forces were on the right track. If military teachers could be added as the situation came to allow it, that would be even better.

Addy also suggested that there should be two schools under CFTS teaching second-language basics: a school of English somewhere in an English-speaking environment, and a school of French in Saint-Jean. After

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\* A phrase which Sullivan, then DGOL and present in the room, could not help but notice.

this stage, a student would be sent to a school at a base in his environment where he could have access to the vocabulary of his trade in his second language, under the control of the appropriate command. For example, an English-speaking pilot would begin at Saint-Jean under CFTS and proceed to Bagotville, where he would learn the French of Canadian military aviation. Other individuals might follow what Addy called the method of learning by osmosis, used by many Francophones over the years and successfully practised by him at *12<sup>e</sup>RBC* when he commanded there.<sup>254</sup>

The main point on which Addy and Clements differed, as we can see, was control over courses. Clements wanted his CFTS to have full responsibility,<sup>255</sup> as McLaws had proposed, while Addy favoured decentralization, without taking into account the differences which would appear very quickly between an Anglophone who put the finishing touches to his bilingualism at Valcartier and one who did the same in Halifax. Moreover, his method called for FLUs to serve as language schools, which was never their purpose and ran counter to what the study conducted at Valcartier and published as *15 Years After*<sup>\*</sup> would conclude in 1985.<sup>256</sup>

Let us return to the minutes, where we find that when those BCOLs present discussed language training, they listed the same problems as McLaws had noted. This shows that he was very close to the mark in his 1982 analysis: selection criteria were wrong, or in any case did not provide the quality of candidates the Forces were entitled to expect; the dropout rate was still high for all sorts of reasons not related to the people taking the courses; the number of people per class for the CFC phase, ten, was too large.<sup>257</sup> Some persons pointed to a new area of concern. Officers and non-commissioned members were mixed in locations where hierarchy was very important; as a result, non-commissioned members were intimidated and said too little or too much, which sometimes led to incidents.<sup>258</sup> As for the lack of motivation among Anglophones, it persisted in 1985, if we are to believe the study *15 Years After*, which stated:

To a great extent, Anglophones wish to spend most of their career in an environment corresponding to their culture. A very high percentage of them are afraid that Quebec will become a ghetto for them.<sup>259</sup>

As noted earlier, this report also complained that unilingual or nearly unilingual Anglophones were transferred to units at Valcartier, which implies that in 1984-85, the right person was still not being posted to the right place,

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\* To our knowledge, the study was not translated into English, but for its title.

or else that the proposal to make people learn French by osmosis, as Addy said was already done at *12<sup>e</sup>RBC*, was being implemented energetically. According to the count conducted on site, less than 45 percent of Anglophones at Valcartier had a knowledge of French at the functional level or better.<sup>260</sup>

### **The Military Second Language Training Plan in 1985-87**

In the final months of 1985 and early 1986, the Forces announced their new Military Second Language Training Plan (MSLTP), the long-awaited fruit of recent disappointing experiences. Because it did not produce its first results until 1988, and as its performance could not be analysed until after that, we shall present only a rough outline of it here.\*

In December 1985 and January 1986, three documents were released, each presenting the MSLTP in its own way. ADM(Per) Instruction 6/85 of 31 December was a typical military document, which described in a straightforward way the experience acquired in this area, pointed out shortcomings and referred to the studies which had led to the MSLTP, before breaking down into components the future execution of this plan and identifying those responsible for implementing each component. Almost at the same time, special issue 6/85 of the *Personnel Newsletter* was issued. Entirely devoted to the MSLTP, it condensed the instruction of 31 December and made it easier for readers to understand. Finally, on 14 January 1986, General Thériault, the CDS, described the MSLTP in a document entitled *Policy Paper: Military Second Language Training*, in less technical terms than Instruction 6/85, but at much greater length.

The basic arguments made by these three documents were alarming for some, as might be expected. The target for the Forces was 21,000 bilingual personnel, of whom 15,000 would be Anglophones. At the time there were only 2,500 bilingual Anglophones compared to 10,500 bilingual Francophones. Other findings gave cause for hope, however: now that the majority of the recommendations in the 1982 McLaws study had been implemented, the percentage of CFC candidates who had achieved the functional level had risen from forty to seventy percent among officers and from fourteen to forty percent among other ranks.

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\* In a conversation on 27 May 1988 with one of the experts at DLT, we were informed that the MSLTP was being restructured.

The reasons for the greater failure rate of the former courses were then listed. We shall repeat only a few which seem new to us: low interest in learning French, except among generals, 61.4 percent of whom were bilingual as compared to the anticipated 60 percent; courses given to members too close to retirement; the possibility of a good career for a unilingual Anglophone; the strong possibility that after passing the course graduates would be transferred to Quebec, with myriads of problems, “particularly if family members are unilingual Anglophones.”<sup>261</sup> (Just what were these problems? Children’s education? Lack of services in English? One thing is certain: the CDS, simply by mentioning possible drawbacks, lent credence to certain persistent rumours.)

In studying the difficulties encountered by Anglophones in becoming bilingual, researchers were apt to focus on the Francophone experience. English was necessary for the Francophone. Courses were given to them at the start of their careers, when everything (age, marital status and learning capabilities) worked in their favour; ongoing refresher training was possible; and the risks of conflict with other operational requirements (for example, service with United Nations forces) were minimal.

The 1982 McLaws Report led to a new series of studies being undertaken. One study conducted by the Armed Forces Personnel Applied Research Unit demonstrated that there were two types of motivation for second-language learning:

- a. *integrative motivation*, characterized by positive attitudes toward the target language, culture and people, and by a desire to become more like the members of that culture in several significant ways; and
- b. *instrumental motivation*, characterized by the pursuit of incentives other than the learning of the language itself, such as promotion, salary bonuses and the like.

“In general”, it was concluded, “success in acquiring a second language is significantly greater among individuals with integrative rather than instrumental motivation.”<sup>262</sup> Nevertheless, instrumental motivation appeared generally necessary at first if the effects of integration were to begin to make themselves felt. A delicate balance had to be struck between the two types of incentives.

Following the McLaws study in 1982, some questions remained to be debated, such as the voluntary aspect of second-language training courses

(SLT), the gap between the responsibilities of the individual and those of the Forces, SLT Program priorities and ongoing research into candidate selection and interest. All this formed the subject of a second study by McLaws (McLaws II), completed in July 1984, which gave rise to the formulation of new recommendations incorporated into the MSLTP. Among these was one recognizing the need to give separate consideration to the SLT principles which would be applicable to officers and non-commissioned members.

The report also recognized there was a distinct need, especially among Anglophones, to be assigned to a developmental position following a language course. Given that the last comprehensive examination of language requirements covering all military positions had been completed in 1976, it was decided to conduct a new investigation of all military positions, to be completed during the 1987-88 fiscal year. At the same time, other factors such as language of work and a person's capacity to maintain his or her second-language abilities were also evaluated.

The 14 January 1986 language training policy continued with diverse statements, some of which were surprising. It asserted that custom and the law dictated that the exercise of Command be in French and English in the Armed Forces. Officers had not only to accept this fact but also be able to deal with their subordinates in both official languages. Knowing service personnel and their dependants, and caring about their welfare, figured among the essential leadership functions which could not be performed effectively without the establishment and maintenance of dialogue with subordinates. Language was thus one of the main tools of leadership. It was the officer, not his subordinate, who was responsible for communicating in the language which would ensure the best possible understanding. The officer also had to understand his subordinates' cultural backgrounds and the dual nature of the country. This cultural awareness-raising was fostered, if not fully achieved, by learning and using a second language. If an officer was to be able to play his role as leader in the fullest sense, he had to be able to communicate in both official languages as early as possible in his career.

Furthermore, since career officers' leadership responsibilities increased with each promotion, they needed to improve their second language skills constantly. The fluency with which career officers expressed their thoughts on a wide range of subjects and the way in which they promoted the bicultural and bilingual nature of the Forces and the dual nature of the country took on added importance as they moved up the ranks and assumed greater responsibilities.

The Forces had already begun to build a bilingual officer corps by means of the SLT programs for officer cadets in military colleges, newly enrolled Francophone officers and general officers. The time had come to cover the full spectrum and offer the program to other officers. In essence, bilingualism would become an intrinsic part of a Canadian officer's attributes, and the purpose of second-language training would be to build up a bilingual career officer corps over time. This concept, which came into effect in April 1986, had immediate consequences, even though the creation of a bilingual career officer corps was a long-term objective. Henceforth, the plan would include an SLT program for new (direct entry) officers (DEOs) and the Officer Candidate Training Plan (OCTP). It would also include the existing SLT programs for candidates in the Subsidized University Education Plan (SUEP) and the Reserve Entry Training Plan (RETP). All new DEO/OCTP officers who were not at the functional level when they entered the Forces would take a six-month intensive second-language course immediately after training at CFB Chilliwack. If necessary, this initial training would be followed by nine-week long block courses offered during their first postings. Officers would subsequently have to maintain their skills in the second language at a satisfactory level. Although unilingual officers currently on active service were not directly affected by these changes, many of them would have the opportunity to become bilingual by enrolling in second-language courses, in particular the CFC, which would continue to be offered. Officers promoted from the ranks would have access to SLT if necessary after obtaining their commission. As for new officer cadets from the military colleges, starting with the 1986 entry they would have to demonstrate regular and individual progress in second language competence in order to graduate.<sup>263</sup>

The unchanging character of the arguments sustaining the idea of a bilingual officer corps can be seen by referring to Volume I, p 60: Militia Order No. 12 of 14 February 1899 carried the same message in different terms. Did the 1985-86 appeal to a bilingual officer corps have any chances to get better results than the 1899 one? The question has to be asked, in light of more recent good intentions. The 1969 Report of the Officer Development Board stated that all officers should be bilingual, and level of knowledge of both official languages and aptitude for learning languages should figure among officer selection criteria.<sup>264</sup> Yet in 1972, after three years full of commitments in DND as regards official languages, the Officer Career Development Program was produced, on the basis of the 1969 report. The Program did not even include B and B among the criteria on which it was based.<sup>265</sup>

Let us return to the content of the MSLTP. The concept of bilingualism for non-commissioned members was defined in terms of the requirements of

each type of work or trade. This approach subdivided trades into four groups according to the proportion of bilinguals required in each. Group I, for the time being, comprised nineteen trades requiring a minimal number of bilingual personnel. For this group, the Department would continue existing practices based on the concept of the national representational group (NRG) (in other words, 74 percent Anglophones and 26 percent Francophones). Most Francophone recruits would continue to receive SLT, but Anglophone recruits would not. However, some senior NCOs might receive SLT when the need was felt. Several naval and air force technical trades figured in this group (map reproduction technicians, naval electronic sensor and radio operators, and aviation, avionics and aviation medicine technicians).

Group II encompassed fifty two trades in which the bilingual requirement only exceeded the current percentage by a small amount and only at some rank levels. These trades would be treated like those in Group I, except that more senior personnel would be given SLT as required to meet specific shortfalls. This group included operational jobs in combat arms: radio operators, naval signallers, radar technicians, naval electronics technicians (acoustics), and hull, airframe and construction engineering technicians and electricians.

Group III comprised twelve trades which required a large proportion of bilingual personnel. For these trades, the level of 26 percent Francophones would continue to be recruited, and all would take language training. The remainder of the requirement would be met by giving French language training to about 40 percent of Anglophones. Some SLT would be given to small numbers of more senior personnel. Among these were field engineers, linemen, air defence, ammunition and communications technicians and drivers.

Group IV consisted of fourteen trades in which over 50 percent of the establishment (and 60 percent of NCOs) had to be bilingual. These were declared bilingual trades. The Francophone NRG quota was to be kept at 26 percent and intensive SLT courses would be given for six months immediately after initial training and before trades courses to all Anglophone and Francophone recruits who were not bilingual. The following is a complete list of these trades: search and rescue, photographic, laboratory, X-ray and preventive medicine technicians, medical, operating room and dental clinical assistants, dental hygienists, military police, clerks, physical education instructors, stewards and postal clerks.

Aptitude for second language learning will be a requirement for enrolment or remuster into a Group IV trade just as a mathematics and physics aptitude is required for an electronics trade.<sup>266</sup>



In short, for non-commissioned members, SLT would be considered a skill. The aim of this, it has to be remembered, was to fill positions identified as bilingual.

An essential part of the MSLTP was a complete reorganization of second-language training. For example, new French and English teaching programs were being completed. They emphasized competence in communication and were designed to meet the specific needs of the Forces. Everything — simulations, role-playing, vocabularies, and so forth — was geared to daily military life and the various tasks to be performed.

Parallel to SLT, all students of basic French or English would receive roughly three hours a day of military indoctrination, part of which might be given in the student's second language. The purpose was to ensure that students who undertook SLT did not lose the skills they had acquired in officer candidate school and recruit school.

In 1986, new tests were developed emphasizing satisfactory communication and expression in a military setting. Less importance was attached to grammar and syntax. Here the distinction between officers and non-commissioned members surfaced again: there were two separate tests scheduled to come into effect in 1986. Unless exempted, all personnel would take their respective test periodically.\*

The new French program was tried out in Ottawa and Petawawa in 1985. It was scheduled to become the Forces' official second-language program in the summer of 1986. Another innovation announced for August 1986 was that the ten months of language training in French would be given entirely at one of the following centres: Esquimalt, Winnipeg, Ottawa, Montreal, Valcartier, Bagotville or Shearwater. The five months of temporary service at Saint-Jean would be a thing of the past. The course would offer an intensive period of classroom teaching and assignments to enable every candidate to achieve the functional level or higher by the end of the course.

One fundamental principle behind MSLTP is accountability. The MSLTP was developed on the premise that if we are to achieve our goals and

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\* The 1972 program referred to testing as an ongoing activity. This was repeated here. But as a study by the DGOL in 1985-86 revealed, hundreds of Francophones still had the "contact" rating they had been given on leaving CFLS in the late 1960s or early 1970s. Their command of English was unlikely to have remained at that low level. Testing was controlled during the period 1972-86 in the same way as everything we have studied so far.

optimize the use of our current resources, all of the players will have to accept their share of responsibility. Accountability under MSLTP means that DND will have to submit a detailed and critical account of the utilization of SLT resources to Treasury Board, who will monitor our performance. Accountability within DND can be divided into three levels:

*The Individual.* The concept of Instruction Time Credit (ITC) which is already in use in the Public Service Commission, introduces a visible measure of accountability for the students. The ITC determines the training hours each individual will require to achieve a given second language objective. The introduction of ITC means that the Service accepts its share of responsibility for bilingualism in the CF by providing members with the required amount of training to allow them to reach the functional level. In return the individual's responsibility will be to reach the required second language proficiency level within the allotted time, and then to maintain the acquired skills.

*Schools/Centres.* CF language training schools and centres will have to provide the best SLT possible — qualitatively and quantitatively. They too will have an increased level of responsibility. In all language training schools and centres, an increased military staff will carry out the roles and functions associated with the militarization of second language training. Courses will be structured, intensified, and will adequately address specific military needs. Also, as a rule, there will be no early graduation from any SLT courses. Schools will thus aim to bring students to the highest possible level of communicative competence during the time allotted.

*Teaching Staff.* Because of the increased responsibility placed upon students and their ITC limitations, the teachers have been informed that they will have to ensure their students receive all allotted SLT hours. Past professionalism demonstrated by the teaching staff has convinced us they will take up the challenge and will assume these new responsibilities.<sup>267</sup>

In essence, the new concepts were an adaptation of what had worked well for Francophones and the fruit of a gradual evolution which had gone on for over a decade.

According to its designers, the new plan was tailored to promote bilingualism in the Armed Forces, and to more accurately reflect Canadian reality. Ambitious plan, it would require many persons to reassess their firmly established perceptions of bilingualism. Preliminary studies tended to show that the effects of this plan could only be positive.

The MSLTP came on stream in April 1986 and was scheduled to be fully operational in mid-1987. A communications strategy was developed to inform

all personnel in detail of the major changes about to occur. Briefing sessions for command representatives were held at NDHQ in the summer of 1985; they all received quantities of documentation to help them answer most of the questions anticipated. Recruiters and career co-ordinators were fully informed about the concepts as well as about the implementation strategies and procedures. Briefing sessions were planned within the commands, so that eventually all members would know exactly how all this would affect them.<sup>268</sup>

This information was clearly designed, among other things, to demonstrate that the military leaders had made a strong and definite shift in support of language training.<sup>269</sup> Other points to be noted were increased personal responsibility for acquiring a second language, and the will demonstrated by the Department to augment the use of both official languages. One of the fundamental principles of the MSLTP, according to CDS Thériault, was equity:

The first aspect of this principle is tied to the universality of opportunity. Because of the new officer bilingual concept, equal opportunity will be available for all officers to compete under a uniform system. The commonality of approach in the Group IV trades (the bilingual trades) brings equity between Francophones and Anglophones as second language proficiency becomes a military trade requirement for both groups. Equity is also reflected in the different approach for officers and NCMs, as training will be adapted to meet each group's distinctly different needs and capabilities. In short, contrary to previous SLT programs, we will now have the same policies applied as uniformly as possible to both linguistic groups.<sup>270</sup>

This principle of equity between Anglophones and Francophones seemed firmly rooted among officers with the MSLTP, but certainly not among NCMs, where wholesale anglicization outside the combat arms still seemed to be accepted in 1986, despite the clearly defined objectives of every plan and program released since 1969. Furthermore, those who drafted the CDS policy seemed to have forgotten completely the "equitable" effects which were supposed to be achieved one day by FRANCOTRAIN and FLUs. The only serious reference to the full Department's set of objectives came in the following paragraph:

The DND Official Languages Program involves 2222 Pys<sup>\*</sup>. Of these 2222 PYSs, 1797 are now part of the DND establishment while the remaining 425

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\* PYS= person-years

are given as a yearly supplementary/incremental allocation based on our 1980 submission to TB. DND committed an additional 148 PYs from within its own resources in August 1982, but these have never been used fully for language training due to selection and availability problems. Thus, we have a grand total of 2370 PYs available for the Official Languages Program, of which the majority, or 2088 PYs, is allocated to MSLTP. The remaining 282 positions are used for such other official languages duties and responsibilities as translation and terminology, command and base coordination, etc.<sup>271</sup>

Some basic facts emerge from a close look at all the documentation on the MSLTP. Among these is the fact that the CFTS, which had barely had anything to do with teaching French since 1967, had taken a leading role in that domaine after 1980, to such an extent that by 1987, it was the Public Service Commission that was liable to be forced out. In 1985, the conceptual and developmental phases of the MSLTP were completed and the implementation phase was well advanced. During this period, any necessary revisions could be made in response to “a change in the requirement, an unforeseen breakthrough or a revision of guidance.”<sup>272</sup>

Instruction ADM(Per) 6/85 also stated:

The composition of the command and control element of MSLTP consists of two elements, military and civilian, with differences in status, rank structure and terms of employment, although they function as an entity. The new structure will ensure that these two groups — in their two hierarchies — are brought together as a cohesive, mission-oriented entity. Military leaders, at all levels, must be looked upon as having a direct impact on the command and control of MSLTP operations and related service activities. This will require a just proportion of military leaders to civilian educational specialists at the senior and intermediate decision levels for SLT.<sup>273</sup>

The instruction took sixteen pages to explain the division of responsibilities among all parts of DND under the MSLTP. At the top of the pyramid was DGRET/DLT, who, on behalf of the ADM(Per) and ultimately the CDS himself, was responsible for implementing and promulgating MSLTP policy and guidelines. Obviously, at NDHQ, DGRET, DGOL and the Chief Personnel Careers and Senior Appointments had to work closely together. Heads of commands, the commandants of the military colleges and the Commander, Canadian Forces Training System (CFTS) were responsible for advising NDHQ on the general directives of the program and, most important, its implementation. The officer commanding an SLT school or centre reported to the officer commanding the base where the school was located, except in five cases. The officer commanding the English Language Training Division

in Halifax reported to the Commandant of the Fleet School; the officer commanding the CF Language School in Ottawa reported to the Commander, CFTS; the heads of SLT in the military colleges reported to the Principal or Commandant of their respective colleges; the officer commanding the English Language Division at CFB Petawawa reported to the Commandant, Combat Arms School in Petawawa; and the officer commanding the English Language Division at the Naval Officer Training Centre (NOTC) in Esquimalt reported to the Commanding Officer NOTC.

Second-language courses had been developed according to the principles of the individual training system. However,

Many activities under MSLTP, particularly those to be undertaken in the conceptual or development phases, will not be covered by this approach, e.g. the introduction and validation of new language knowledge tests, the re-orientation required to bring ED personnel on line with MSLTP, the introduction of the Modern Language Aptitude Test/*Test d'aptitudes aux langues vivantes* (MLAT/TALV) and ITC, the negotiating of a new collective agreement with the ED group, etc. These and other MSLTP activities have wide implications in the Forces and clearly fall outside the responsibility of any single agency. These require a high degree of co-ordination which will be provided by NDHQ/DLT.<sup>274</sup>

In brief, NDHQ would provide broad control and policy guidance, set general priorities and assign responsibilities to commands, validate all courses and issue guidelines for language knowledge tests. Commands would, among other things, prepare and maintain course training standards and submit a copy of them to CFTS HQ, publish course schedule charts and recommend changes to specifications and core curricula,<sup>\*\*</sup> both of which were produced by CFTS and published by NDHQ/DLT.<sup>275</sup>

This dilution of responsibilities seemed liable to lead to uneven quality. CFLS Saint-Jean provided courses to new officers with a view to building up a bilingual officer corps. The means of achieving this goal, however, were scattered among dozens of places across Canada, from Halifax to Esquimalt, where most other French courses would be given, including the CFC and, of course, subsidized courses. Would Halifax, Esquimalt, Edmonton and

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\* ED: a PSC job category which covers education in general. EDs prepare courses adapted to requirements, which are then given over to teachers.

\*\* A core curriculum included performance and skill objectives, performance controls and pedagogical procedure.

Winnipeg be able to produce as good a bilingual Anglophone as Saint-Jean or Valcartier? It remains to be seen.

Other aspects of the MSLTP also have to prove their worth. Courses were designed to make students functionally bilingual. This was not stated in the three documents we have just referred to, but it was made explicit elsewhere and followed on from the conclusions of Wenz in 1976 and McLaws in 1982. The functional level was defined as 2 on listening, 2 on speaking, 2 on reading and 1 on writing. Constant vigilance will be needed to ensure that a 2-2-2-1 from Halifax corresponds to the same score from Valcartier. The 15 years of disappointing experience which led up to 1987 must not be repeated on the way to year 2002.

What the MSLTP did not do, in contrast to the 1972 program, was to quantify the number of functionally bilingual people it actually intended to produce each year and plan how long it would take for all bilingual positions in the Forces to be filled appropriately; this, after all, was the purpose of the exercise. For how many more years will officials be able to say that FRANCOTRAIN is prevented from progressing by a lack of qualified instructors? Elsewhere the needs are also urgent. *15 Years After* pointed out in 1985 that 77.9 percent of career manager positions in Ottawa were filled by unilingual Anglophones. In practice, this meant that in that year about seventy Francophones from 5<sup>e</sup> *Groupe-brigade* in Valcartier had to have an interpreter when they met with their career manager.<sup>276</sup> From this it is hard to extrapolate a figure for the Forces as a whole. What is not so difficult is to understand how frustrating this situation must be, even for a very bilingual Francophone. Some who have served for more than twenty years have never been able to speak French to the six, seven or eight career managers who have followed their progress at one time or another. During the 1973 briefing tour, Francophones listened attentively, respectfully and with a faint hope born of experience when they were told that this situation would be completely changed before 1987....

The MSLTP came into effect in 1985. Complementary studies continued. June 1987 saw the release of *Development of Improved Selection Methods for French Language Training* by the Canadian Forces Personnel Applied Research Unit. This study concluded:

- a. In addition to language aptitude and initial proficiency, there are other variables, such as attitudes, motivation, and personality, which are significantly related to success on intensive French language training.

- b. Reliable measures of these attributes, suitable for administration during the selection process, have been developed.
- c. Administration of these measures during the selection process, and interpretation of their results by trained Personnel Selection Officers, has the potential to improve the accuracy of predicted outcomes on French language training.
- d. The methodology used to develop these measures (although not the measures themselves, which are CFC-specific) is appropriate for use in other language training settings and in other organizations.
- e. Self-rated proficiency and propensity measures provide economical means to conduct post-course follow-up studies of the improvement, maintenance, or loss of language skills, and of the underlying reasons.<sup>277</sup>

Major R.T. Ellis then recommended the employment of the language training survey he had developed as the basis “for providing a narrative description of non-cognitive factors related to language training performance.”<sup>278</sup> He also wanted another study of language-skill maintenance/loss to be conducted using self-rating scales mailed out to CFC graduates.<sup>279</sup>

Ellis’ excellent and professionally executed study was further evidence of the militarization of language training for the Forces. In about a decade, no doubt it will be possible to measure the development of French courses in the Public Service compared to those in the Forces and assess the quantitative and qualitative performance of each. Will this lead to a different conclusion from that put forward by Major Taschereau in 1969, before he became the first DLT? We must point out that his championing of the PSC was not supported by scientific data. Will Training Command’s assertion in 1971-72 that the Department had nothing to learn from the PSC about language training be borne out?

The message in the three documents mentioned above took more concrete form on 29 August 1986 in *MSLTP Implementation Directive 2/86 — Criteria for military second language training courses*, signed by Commodore W.J. Broughton, DGRET. It emphasized that the new courses were based on a communicative approach tailored to the needs of the military. The Instructional Time Credit (ITC) would give each member of the Forces a pre-determined amount of training to become bilingual. The individual would then have to take the necessary steps to maintain acquired skills. There would be no early graduation and every SLT class hour belonging to the ITC would

be sixty minutes long, not including coffee breaks (for example, five hours of class per day meant 300 minutes, which might be divided into six 50-minute periods).

The functional level denoted an ability to communicate with others in military situations in the second language “consistent with one’s rank and military occupation (MOC).”<sup>280</sup> On the tests, this meant a three in comprehension and speaking (out of a maximum of five) and an overall minimum of ten out of 20.

The following courses were offered:

- Basic English Course (24 weeks, maximum 530 hours);
- Block English Course (nine weeks, 250 hours);
- Continuous English Course (46 weeks, 1,200 hours);
- Basic French Course (24 weeks, maximum 530 hours);
- Block French Course (nine weeks, 250 hours);
- Continuous French Course (46 weeks, 1,200 hours);
- Refresher Immersion French Course (three weeks, seven hours a day in class);
- NDHQ General Officer/Senior Executive French Language Tutorial Course (private lessons, four times a week in the student’s office);
- General Officer/Senior Executive Immersion Course (one week, seven hours a day, for two students at a time at CFLS);
- General Officer/Colonel SLT (four hours per week maximum);
- Canadian Military Colleges SLT (five hours a week in the military colleges plus ten weeks of six hours a day for one summer);
- Civilian University Second Language Training (ten weeks in summer at that time, generally offered in the military colleges);
- Post—SUEP (Subsidized University Education Plan) SLT (same as above but at CFLS);



- subsidized SLT (instruction to follow); and
- more specialized courses, such as administrative writing in English and French at Valcartier, approved by the DLT.

Courses taken and progress in them would be described in detail in officers' performance appraisals. The purpose of applying the Individual Training System to SLT was repeated: to provide "a logical, interacting series of steps between the time a training need is identified and training is completed."<sup>281</sup>

The basic English and French courses were offered to all officer candidates who had not achieved the functional level in their second language; to all recruits in Group IV trades; to all Francophone recruits and to forty percent of Anglophone recruits in Group III trades; and to selected Anglophone or Francophone recruits and other personnel in groups I and II. The Basic English Course was given in various centres across Canada, while Basic French was offered by CFLS in Saint-Jean. The first surprise was that Anglophones, whether officers or non-commissioned members, had to achieve 2-2-2-1 in their Basic French Course. The standard was the same for Francophone NCMs except in 32 military occupations where it was higher. For all Francophone officers it was much higher: 3-3-2-2. In cases where the required standard was higher (in other words, for Francophones), a maximum of 36 weeks could be spent in the basic course if the first 24 were not enough. Anglophones who did not succeed in becoming "functional" in 24 weeks "will be offered additional SLT through Block Courses at a future date."<sup>282</sup>

These nine-week block courses were designed for Anglophones and Francophones who could achieve the functional level without continuous courses. CFLS offered five a year in each language. The Refresher Immersion French Course given in the same location was designed for members who had attained the functional level but "because of unusual service conditions"<sup>283</sup> had not been able to maintain it, and were being posted to a bilingual position.

Continuous courses were intended mainly for the type of persons we have already met, namely those who were already well into their careers and had not scored above two on the listening test or more than a total of six for the four language skills. Between 96 and 120 officer candidates would be selected from among motivated volunteers eligible for a bilingual position. The NCMs, numbering between 132 and 170, would also take the MLAT and the Language Training Survey proposed by Major Ellis in his study. They would have to have at least five years of service still to complete and members of

trades in groups IV, III and II would be chosen for these courses according to a decreasing order of priority. The course, given once a year, would take between a minimum of 228 and a maximum of 290 candidates. These continuous French Courses would be given in seven centres: Esquimalt, Winnipeg, Montreal, Valcartier, Bagotville, Shearwater and Ottawa. The continuous English course was given in Valcartier.

While the MSLTP was being introduced, the serious shortfall which had continued since 1971 in turning out bilingual Anglophones led to sharp criticism from the Commissioner of Official Languages. In his January 1987 report to the Governor in Council, he underlined the fact that:

most bilingual positions in the military are occupied by incumbents who do not meet the linguistic requirements established by the Department itself.<sup>284</sup>

Commissioner D'Iberville Fortier recalled the 1977 recommendations concerning this problem\* the Department should

stop appointing unilinguals to bilingual positions... and plan transfers of military personnel more on the basis of the language needs of positions.<sup>285</sup>

Despite the MSLTP, the Commissioner's opinion was that, as in the case of FRANCOTRAIN, "no appropriate and adequate action has been taken to correct this situation within a reasonable time."<sup>286</sup> In 1986, 63 percent of all bilingual positions were still not adequately filled.

On 16 February 1987, DGOL Sullivan gave his response to the two Ministers in charge, as he had done for FRANCOTRAIN. He stated that the MSLTP was in place and the bilingual officer corps should come into being by ... 2002.<sup>287</sup> As for bilingual positions, Sullivan argued that there was a difficulty, because the Forces' true capacity to fill them was higher than the very low capacity they reported — the same one the Commissioner had cited.

Sullivan presented a case in point. Under the Associate Deputy Minister (Materiel), 241 of the 969 bilingual positions, or 31 percent, were adequately filled. But a statistical count showed that, of the 4,553 people reporting to ADM(Mat), 806 were bilingual; if they were in bilingual positions, 83 percent of the ADM(Mat) requirement would be filled. However, the qualifications or ranks or both of these bilingual personnel made them unsuited for the

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\* As well as a 1981 recommendation his predecessor had also made on the same topic in his annual report.

available bilingual positions, and there were other reasons for this type of shortfall. For operational reasons, for example, commanding officers might move personnel from one task to another, so that there was no guarantee that a bilingual person appointed to a bilingual position would remain there. The question of cost also arose: in recent years, sudden financial constraints had been imposed on transfer budgets. Nevertheless, the gravity of the problem of managing bilingual personnel had been recognized, and a working group on the issue had been set up in 1986. Readers will recall the DMMD/B and B of 1973. This group had done what it could, but little by little, its impact and the number of people working on it had decreased. At the time of writing, a major held the title of Co-ordinator of Official Languages under the Director General Manpower Utilization. The basic question presented earlier in this chapter, namely appropriate training of personnel and posting to bilingual positions, had not been resolved. Sullivan observed that this had had visible consequences for FRANCOTRAIN, an essential part of the 1972 program. At the same time, ways had been found between 1974 and 1986 to reduce from four to one the number of officers working on the co-ordination between SLT training and the right postings for the people who had gone through this type of training.

Sullivan continued his February 1987 briefing with the good news that the target percentage of bilingual generals had been exceeded: 63 percent in 1987 instead of the 60 percent planned in 1972. Taking the program as a whole, he concluded that three reforms might do much to alleviate continuing problems: reidentification of language requirements; better assessment, resulting in a more accurate inventory of bilingual personnel; and greater priority given by the personnel system to the administration of bilingual positions.<sup>288</sup>

In May 1987, the Assistant Deputy Minister (Personnel) made a presentation to the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence on the development of bilingualism in the Forces. He stressed the main obstacles still persisting and the Forces' successes in the area, expressing the hope that the MSLTP would go far to correct the failings noted by the Commissioner of Official Languages. At that time, 66 percent of generals were now bilingual, and nearly all should be by 1995. Among colonels, bilingualism was also being promoted so ' that it seemed likely that this percentage would rise as well. As for other officers, our readers are already well aware of the difficulty. Lieutenant-General de Chastelain stated:

All schools and centres are currently programmed at, or close to, their maximum capacity. Teaching resources are being utilized to the maximum extent. The limited inventory of bilingual personnel available to training

establishments prevents any significant expansion of occupational training in French....<sup>289</sup>

The discussions which followed between Committee members, none of whom were Francophones, and witnesses went smoothly. Member of Parliament W.R. Jardine said that the output of bilingual Anglophones had been disastrous, and asked why. De Chastelain went over the reasons for that failure, factors which led to MSLTP and were supposed to be eliminated by that program over the next ten years. The MSLTP would make full use of the Modern Language Aptitude Test for Anglophones; a *Test d'aptitude aux langues vivantes* for Francophones was also being prepared. These tools, in particular the first, were expected to lead to better course results.<sup>290</sup> Another MP, Derek Blackburn, believed that the solution to the problem lay in French courses for all recruits, not only those destined for an officer career.<sup>291</sup> This would, of course, have considerable repercussions on the teaching faculty and available space, which was already stretched to capacity.

We should note two of de Chastelain's replies because they suggest a radical change in outlook in the senior Anglophone military hierarchy since the 1960s and 1970s. Blackburn asked related questions about the possible dangers in the use of two languages in military operations and about the language situation in NATO. The ADM(Per) replied that personnel in NATO armed forces did not all understand English — far from it. Instructions to the highest echelons were given in English, but each member nation then translated them for its own troops. In Canada, the same thing happened when French Language Units took part in operations within larger bodies. While he was commanding in Germany, he recalled, he had taken part in exercises under German command, with orders given in German. He had a translator with him, and English and French were then used for Canadian troops. He had never witnessed failure to understand orders because of language.<sup>292</sup>

The other intervention dealt with the weight which should be attached to bilingualism in a career. We saw, in Chapter 11, the debate about this question, which did not yield many tangible results, at least to benefit bilingual Francophones. But now, with the MSLTP for officers, de Chastelain said that bilingualism should become (implying that it had not yet become) an essential aspect of an officer's career, like physical fitness and professional competence.<sup>293</sup> Why had the many appeals for this not been heeded after it was realized in 1973 that the BLTP and the other French courses were not living up to their promises!

This House of Commons meeting had been precipitated by a television report on a document signed by the officer commanding CFLS in Saint-Jean,

which stated that when an Anglophone had not succeeded in attaining the “functional” level after his 24-week basic course, officials wrote in his records that he had “taken the course”. On the other hand, a Francophone who had not succeeded during the 36-week course “had failed”. The journalists had not, of course, distinguished between the different objectives of the two types of courses. The fact remained that the reaction of the French-language media had driven the Department to offer explanations. On 19 May, de Chastelain discussed this incident in his opening remarks, but the Committee’s members did not carry it farther.

The situation was different one week later, when General de Chastelain, Deputy Minister D.R. Dewar and three other DND witnesses appeared before the Standing Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on Official Languages. On this occasion, Co-Chairman Charles Hamelin and Senator Joseph Philippe Guay made an uncomplimentary allusion to the episode.<sup>294</sup>

In fact, this session, attended by Commissioner of Official Languages D’Iberville Fortier, went much less quietly than that of 19 May. It opened with a presentation by the Deputy Minister, who discussed such topics as staffing of bilingual military positions. He stated that the priorities to be given to these various positions were currently being reorganized, and a working group would define the criteria for these priorities. As soon as the presentation ended, MP Jean-Robert Gauthier observed acidly that there was an enormous gap between the 1972 objectives and the 1987 results. De Chastelain then spoke, agreeing with Gauthier, but also attempting to paint a broader picture which included the progress achieved. He said that over those fifteen years, approximately 80,000 men and women had been lost from the Forces.<sup>295</sup> This answer, which did nothing to explain the slender results as regards bilingualism among the Anglophones who came to replace the military personnel who had left, failed to placate the politicians. Later, Hamelin followed up an explanation about the lack of bilingual documentation (see Chapter 16) by observing that the reason why little emphasis had been given to this sector of the activities of the 1971 and 1972 programs was “because the bilingual person has French as his mother-tongue but speaks English, is it not?”<sup>296</sup> De Chastelain, an Anglophone, replied in his excellent French “That is right, Mr Chairman.”<sup>297</sup> The General later seemed to be trying to qualify his response. He had little success, perhaps because he believed what he had just said. Had he not admitted on 19 May that anglicization was continuing at that very moment in the Forces?<sup>298</sup>

Dewar had an opportunity to speak to the Joint Committee after De Chastelain, and he pointed out:

We do not consider that we are an assimilating organization and I do not think either in terms of will or in terms of purpose we would want such an impression to be left.<sup>299</sup>

His listeners were not soothed by his words. MP Desrosiers wondered why the MSLTP was decided upon in 1985, when the language program for Anglophones had been unproductive for over ten years and all those responsible knew this.<sup>300</sup> De Chastelain reminded him that the program was revised in 1977 and the early 1980s, although the major changes making bilingualism part of an individual's status as a Canadian officer, came in 1985.<sup>301</sup> Hamelin was unmoved, remarking that the same promises had been made in 1972 as in 1985. Desrosiers, also unimpressed, asked what the Forces would do in the coming year, and what their present objectives were.

De Chastelain had been less convincing than he had been on 19 May. Then, he had said that the 1972 programs, including the language training program, were not to be blamed for the results achieved.<sup>302</sup> On 27 May, he said rather that during their implementation "we have had bad experiences.... [but] we have taken steps to lessen these problems. We will be undertaking new experiment[s], we will be dealing with the situation and we shall see whether that settles the problems."<sup>303</sup> De Chastelain was also moved to support the position of the Surgeon General of the Canadian Forces, who required the files of all patients at National Defence Medical Centre in Ottawa to be kept in English only, because every Francophone doctor understood English but not all Anglophone doctors understood French.<sup>304</sup> One question which Senator Guay asked amid a series of others remained unanswered. Why was the minimum level of functional bilingualism required for Francophones in the MSLTP higher than the level for Anglophones?<sup>305</sup>

We must recall that the Commissioner's special report attacked language training from the standpoint of the number of unfulfilled bilingual positions. When Associate Minister Paul Dick replied to D'Iberville Fortier on 25 June 1987, he focussed on this point:

The language requirements of all military positions will be reviewed during this year; a larger number of bilingual Anglophones will be posted to French Language Units to improve their newly-acquired language skills; and a working group is now setting criteria and priorities designed to ensure that bilingual military positions are filled and language abilities have greater weight in the merit evaluation process and the promotion system.<sup>306</sup>

In August, at the 393<sup>rd</sup> meeting of the Defence Management Committee, this theme was taken up by the Deputy Minister and General Manson, the

CDS. Manson fully supported everything Dewar put forward. He also pointed out the peculiar type of dilemma facing the military: on the one hand, everyone could use the language of his or her choice; but on the other, officials said that an officer could not pursue a career without being bilingual.<sup>307</sup> This dilemma remained to be solved. Manson could not say how to cut the Gordian knot.

We do not claim here to have the last word on everything relating to French language programs since they came into effect in 1971. This chapter will close, however, with three tables and another long quotation from a 1987 *Personnel Newsletter*.

The first two tables summarize the period 1972-87.

Table 39<sup>308</sup>

**BILINGUAL PERSONNEL OBJECTIVES**

	OBJECTIVES SET IN 1972 FOR 1987	PERCENTAGES ACHIEVED IN 1987
Generals	60%	62.18%
Officers	50%	31.33%
NCOs	40%	19.57%
Corporals and privates	25%	6.89%

Table 40<sup>309</sup>

**BILINGUAL ANGLOPHONES AND FRANCOPHONES:  
INTEGRAL AND FUNCTIONAL LEVELS**

	1972 STRENGTH	1987 OBJECTIVES	1987 STRENGTH	NET RESULTS
ANGLOS	1,332	18,711	3,643	-15,068
FRANCOS	4,280*	6,575*	10,122*	+3,547

\* We believe that these figures, which also show numerical and percentage change in Francophone representation between 1972 and 1987, reflect accurately what de Chastelain said about anglicization to the Standing Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on Official Languages, in May 1987, and suggest that Dewar's remarks to the contrary, on this subject in front of the same body, should be viewed with some skepticism.

Table 41<sup>310</sup>

**SECOND LANGUAGE RESULTS OF ANGLOPHONE AND  
FRANCOPHONE OFFICER CADETS IN THE MILITARY  
COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES (1986) ENROLED UNDER  
THE REGULAR OFFICER TRAINING PLAN (ROTP)**

INSTITUTIONS	FUNCTIONAL OR INTEGRAL LEVEL	
	% ANGLOPHONES	% FRANCOPHONES
RMC	46.6%	97.3%
RRMC	39.1%	100
CMR	83.3%	100
Civ Univ	16.9%	73.7%

Finally, *Personnel Newsletter 8/87* replied to a question from one of its readers. Part of the exchange ran as follows:

*Question:* Unilingual French personnel get an English language course after basic training. Unilingual English personnel do not get a French language course. Those that start out as unilingually French and who become bilingual during their career have a better opportunity to get a job after their service than do those who begin as unilingually English.

According to the Charter of Rights, everyone is entitled to equal opportunity at their place of work. Are English-speaking people getting a fair shake?...

*Answer:* The statement that unilingual English personnel do not get a French language course is no longer true. For example, nine NCM occupations have been identified where over 50% of the positions in those occupations must be filled by bilingual members. This means that unilingual francophones and anglophones going into these occupations will be given 6 months of intensive second language training under the Military Second Language Training Plan after their recruit training and before their occupation training. In this case, as in all others, second language training is provided to meet service requirements, not to prepare anyone for a second career.

Are anglophones getting a fair shake? That really depends on what you mean by a fair shake. Anglophones are able to receive all their training, and then are able to work throughout their career in their First Official Language (FOL). Francophones are more frequently forced to learn a second language in order to train and work. In fact, promotion for francophones is often dependent on how well they can compete in their second language against



their anglophone co-workers who have the advantage of using their FOL. With that perspective in mind, who is getting the fair shake?

The Canadian Forces' official languages objective is to allow members, to the maximum extent possible, to have a career and to work in the official language of their choice. The reality is that we have not yet reached the stage in the CF where we can employ francophones in their own Language in spite of their constitutional and legal rights. The Military Second Language Training Plan may redress the acute shortages that presently exists [sic] in the number of bilingual anglophones in the CF. However, this will take time. The aim is not to man every bilingual position with a bilingual francophone, but rather to have anglophones and francophones share equitably in the bilingual responsibilities of the CF.<sup>311</sup>



Armoured vehicles of the *12e Régiment blindé du Canada* preparing for a field exercise (GNC 76-4201)

Canadian Forces Base Valcartier, near Quebec City, houses the *5<sup>e</sup> Groupe-Brigade du Canada*, a Francophone formation comprising several land FLUs and a major National Defence research centre. Large empty spaces nearby, not shown on the photo, are used for training purposes.  
(Archives, *Régie du R22<sup>e</sup>R*)





# 16

## Equality of official languages and the costs of implementation

### Translation, terminology and publication services up to 1987\*

Translation services have existed in the Armed Forces in one form or another for over 200 years. In the beginning, translation was done on contract by independent experts. The service gradually became more structured and the specialized sectors which we know today were set up within the Department of National Defence: translation, terminology and French publications. We shall now deal briefly with the whole subject, touching only lightly on interpretation and omitting altogether multilingual translation for military intelligence services.

Before 1934, numerous periodicals, leaflets, folders and charts dealing with military training, arms drill, vehicle maintenance, tactics and military administration had been translated. Some of them were voluminous works; for instance, *the Manual of Military Law* or *King's Regulations and Orders*.

F.J. Cugnet was the first to translate the military regulations to *Ordonnance qui règle les milices de la province de Québec et qui les rend d'une plus grande utilité pour la conservation et la sécurité d'icelle* (Orders for the Militias of the Province of Quebec designed to increase their usefulness in providing protection and security), dated 29 March 1777. Then in 1804 came *Règles et règlements pour la formation, l'exercice et les*

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\* This section has benefited greatly from the patient research of Captain J R Boissonnault, who spent over two years in the Directorate of History replacing Serge Bernier, who had been assigned to another task. The authors wish to thank Captain Boissonnault for devoting himself so assiduously to this project.

*mouvements de la Milice du Bas-Canada* translated from Rules and regulations for training, drill and deployment of the Militia of Lower Canada. Between 1857 and 1866, Louis-Timothée Suzor published, in addition to his *Traité d'art et d'histoire militaires*, a series of translations and adaptations of current military manuals. Benjamin Sulte published several more translations in 1870: Militia regulations, field service regulations and infantry drill manuals. The authors of a number of translations at this period were regular officers who had been temporarily assigned to this task and included General A.O. Fagès, Captain C.F.O. Fiset and Colonel D.B. Papineau.<sup>1</sup> Major Rodolphe Girard, author of the well-known novel *Marie Calumet*, was another translator. There were also several civilian translators in the Department including Henri Grignon, the nephew of Claude-Henri Grignon, the novelist.

As far as we know, until the 1940s there was no reasonably comprehensive official bilingual military lexicon which one could rely on when translating military technical terms in the Canadian context. Translators often referred to equivalent terms in the French army. These were not always appropriate, however, to the British or North American context in which the Forces were developing. We would particularly like to draw attention to a request in 1923 by Assistant Deputy Minister G.J. Desbarats concerning French equivalents for officer ranks in the Canadian Air Force. The answer of Lucien Pacaud, of the High Commission in London, was very simple. The French did not have distinctive titles for their air force; they used English ranks or those of their own army<sup>2</sup>. We should point out that in France the air force was part of the army, just as it was in the United States, but in Canada and Britain the two services were separate.

Prior to the 1930s, there was a technical translation office in the Militia to look after day-to-day translation (orders, rules and regulations, and so on) and translate extracts from publications dealing with training and administration. This system was not unique to National Defence, for in 1933 there were over 90 translators working in the various federal departments, their recruitment being left to the organization concerned.

The Hon C.H. Cahan, the Secretary of State, introduced a Bill in Parliament at the beginning of 1934 to create a Translation Bureau that would bring all translators under central control and dramatically reduce government operating costs. Liberal MPs, such as E.R.E. Chevrier (Ottawa) and P.J.A. Cardin (Richelieu), strongly opposed the proposal. They maintained that this Bill would do nothing to improve the lot of French Canadians or make the French language more secure. Their efforts were in vain, and the Act was passed on 28 May 1934.<sup>3</sup>

Since then, all federal departments' translation services have come under the Translation Bureau, which in turn comes under the Secretary of State.<sup>4</sup> The Bureau's mandate is to provide translation from English into French and vice versa, and from foreign languages into English. The Militia did not transfer its translators to the Translation Bureau until 1 January 1938.<sup>5</sup> In the inter-war years, free-lance translators were frequently used to translate lengthy works. At National Defence, translators were picked for their military experience and knowledge of military technical vocabulary.

Here is an actual case to show how contracts were awarded: the translation of the *Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War 1914-1918*, by Colonel A. Fortescue Duguid, Director of Historical General Staff Section, which was published in January 1938. The title of the French version was *Histoire officielle de l'armée canadienne dans la Grande guerre 1914-1918*. The Chief of the General Staff had asked Colonel Duguid on 15 February 1933 to suggest a translator for the work, which at that time had not yet been completed in English. The Colonel recommended Major Ernest Légaré, Commander of the Canadian Officers' Training Corps (COTC) at Université Laval. Years passed, however, and no decision was taken about the translation. In the meantime, Duguid went on writing his history.

On 13 March 1936, General L.R. Laflèche, the Deputy Minister, suggested the name of Major Olivar Asselin to the Chief of the General Staff as a translator for Duguid's work. Asselin, a journalist, had started three French newspapers in Montreal between 1904 and 1935: *Le Nationaliste*, *l'Ordre*, and *La Renaissance*.<sup>6</sup> He had begun his military career in the American army before serving in the Canadian Expeditionary Force during the Great War. Asselin and Laflèche signed the contract for translating chapters 7 to 16 on 1 June 1936. However, the Major's health deteriorated rapidly and he died on 18 April 1937 before he could complete the work.<sup>7</sup> He had, however, translated all but one of the chapters.

On 20 September 1937, Duguid once more suggested Légaré's name (he was now a lieutenant-colonel) to the Chief of the General Staff as Asselin's successor. The suggestion was again rejected.<sup>8</sup> On 2 February 1939, Alice Asselin, the Major's widow, asked the Militia to transfer to her the contract which her husband had begun. Her request was refused.<sup>9</sup> The Department turned instead to Colonel J.H. Chaballe, another journalist and former soldier, and in May 1939 signed a new contract with him. Chaballe finished translating chapters 16 to 20 and correcting the proofs of Asselin's work on 11 March 1940. However, because of the outbreak of the Second World War, energies had to be directed to more important tasks. Chaballe rejoined the

Forces on 1 August 1940 as head of the Army's Technical Translation Bureau. The French version of Duguid's work would not be finally published until 1947; the first six chapters, preface and table of contents had been translated by the Military Translation Bureau in the 1930s, before Asselin's work.<sup>10</sup>

Modernization and the diversity of weapons in the 1939-1945 war gave rise to numerous publications of all kinds for the Army. Because of its practical importance, this literature had to be translated for unilingual French-speaking personnel. Colonel J.K. Lawson, Director Military Training (Army), said in June 1941 that, if the Department wanted French Canadians to play a greater role in the Armed Forces, translation should not be limited to training brochures; King's Regulations and Orders (Canada) [KR (Canada)], Financial Regulations and Instructions (FR&I) and so on should be translated too. At the time, the Secretary of State's Translation Bureau was already having difficulty in coping with its workload. Lawson therefore proposed that another organization be set up under Colonel Chaballe to look after translation for the Army. This proposal was accepted by the Minister of National Defence on 11 June 1941.<sup>11</sup> That is how the Bilingual Publications Bureau under the Director Military Training came into being. By the end of its first year of operation, it had translated 118 military manuals and brochures.<sup>12</sup>

The Bureau wanted to extend its activities to include the Air Force and the Navy. With that in mind, the acting Deputy Minister, (Naval and Air Services) K.S. MacLachlan, asked the Deputy Chief of Naval Staff (DCNS) if he would agree to second Captain (N) J.O. Cossette (paymaster) to Colonel Chaballe's office to represent the Royal Canadian Navy and help translate training manuals for the Navy.<sup>13</sup> In reply to this request, the Director of Personnel (Navy) wrote to the Chief of Naval Staff (CNS) to say that he disagreed with the proposal. He added that Admiralty manuals, especially those which were classified, could not and should not be translated into other languages. He concluded by saying that it was impossible to work or fight effectively on a ship in two languages.<sup>14</sup> MacLachlan nevertheless repeated his question. Finally, the DCNS agreed and allowed Captain Cossette to take up the position on 26 August 1941.<sup>15</sup>

Cossette, however, was not very comfortable with the idea of translating naval work instruments into French. In fact, he wrote a memorandum to the DCNS on 29 October 1941, just a few weeks after taking up his position as translator, in which he said:

I have gone into the matter of translation of Text Books into the French Language for use of the Naval Forces very thoroughly, and as one who thirty-

one year ago entered the Service with absolutely no knowledge of the English language feel that I can comment with some authority on the proposal.

In order that there should be no misunderstanding on the subject, I wish to state right at the beginning that from past experience my considered opinion is that the project as far as the Naval Service is concerned, is an absolute waste of money, and that instead of helping any prospective recruits to better understand the complicated machinery of a modern Service, I feel that it would be a handicap to further advancement.

... Owing to the complexity of the Service and the exchanges between the Royal Navy and the Royal Canadian Navy, it is imperative that ratings in the Naval Service should acquire with the least possible delay a thorough reading, speaking and writing knowledge of the English language.

It is not possible in the Naval Service to have Ship's Companies composed of French speaking Canadians and officered by their compatriot, although this might be possible in the Army.

I feel that in supplying French Text Books to French speaking ratings we would only retard that which is essential, the mastering of the English language, and as all beginners who learn another language think first in the mother tongue and make a mental translation prior to giving the answer, it would follow that a rating who has studied the French Text would rely on this knowledge to a far greater extent than he would had he first mastered the language and then studied any of the Text Books in that language.

... I can't find any argument in favour of the scheme as far as the Naval Service is concerned, but quite a few against.<sup>16</sup>

The Minister asked his Deputy Minister, W.G. Mills, to obtain further information on the matter. He in turn asked the DCNS on 4 November 1941 to do a survey to find out if translating certain manuals would be to the Navy's advantage. This task was given to none other than Captain Cossette, and the result was sent to the Minister on 19 December 1941. Here is a brief summary of the comments made by the commanding officers who were contacted by Cossette. The Commanding Officer of the Royal Canadian Naval Depot in Halifax recommended that every effort should be made to teach English to French-Canadian recruits and added that distributing French handbooks would discourage them from learning English. The Commanding Officer of HMCS *Montreal* considered that French-speaking recruits found the English terms easier to grasp; if necessary, they could be given an explanation of the terms in French. At HMCS *Montcalm* in Quebec they also thought that, rather than translating the handbooks, they should explain in

French what the naval terms meant because they would be new to the student in either language. The Commanding Officer of the Naval Depot at Esquimalt believed that, if French recruits were taught in French, it would harm morale and create discord between Francophones and Anglophones. A dictionary of naval terms would, however, be very useful.<sup>17</sup> We should point out that all the senior officers consulted were Anglophones. The practical outcome was that the question of translation into French for naval operations in Canada would be closed for many years.

During the Second World War, the Air Force also had a small translation section within its Publications Bureau under Group Captain K.B. Conn. This sub-unit was unable to keep up with the work and in December 1942 Wing Commander James A. Sharpe, Secretary for Air, asked Colonel Henri DesRosiers, the Deputy Minister of National Defence (Army), to let the Bureau of French Publications (Army) take over the translation of Royal Canadian Air Force technical manuals into French.<sup>18</sup> In turn, the Director Military Training recommended in January 1943 that the Chief of the General Staff (CGS) authorize the transfer of translation for the Navy and Air Force currently being done by the Army's Bureau to an inter-service committee which would be set up for the purpose.<sup>19</sup>

The CGS, Lieutenant-General K. Stuart, forwarded the recommendation to the Minister the same day. The Minister, however, preferred to increase the Bureau's staff to enable it to translate manuals for the Air Force.<sup>20</sup> The Bureau's strength increased to 13 officers, 20 other ranks and 15 civilians.

A better idea of the work accomplished by the Secretary of State's Translation Bureau can be gained from statistics dated 31 March 1943, and compiled by J.P. Chevassu, head of the Defence Translation Section, giving the number of pages translated for the Army and Navy, just as the Air Force came into the picture.

Number of Pages Translated<sup>21</sup>

	1941-1042	1942-1943
Army	12,614	20,573
Navy	2,004	1,596
Total	14,618	22,169



In 1942 the Army Bilingual Publications Bureau possessed a sizeable collection of military technical terms. The US War Department, which was planning to land troops in North Africa, asked the Bureau to produce an English-French/French-English dictionary. The new Canadian/American dictionary, which was published in 1943, contained a large number of commonly-used terms, many of them only distantly connected with military life. Soldiers who did not have a general dictionary found it very useful.

The Army Bilingual Publications Bureau had included in its plans an English-French dictionary containing only military expressions. In 1942, the former became the Army Language Bureau and set about producing the Canadian bilingual military dictionary. Several different ideas were present at the birth of this work, which was directed by J.H. Chaballe and, after its publication in 1945, continued to be used until the end of the 1960s.

It was needed for a further reason — one that had also led to the translating of training manuals. These publications, essential to the Canadian Army, had the further purpose of tightening the bonds between English and French-speaking allies. Thus, following the armistice of 1940, General de Gaulle's French Forces and the Belgians troops, in both Great Britain and Canada, undergoing their training in British or Canadian centres and using the weapons, the equipment and (in the case of the Belgians) the methods of the British army, had to be taught in the language with which they were acquainted. Our bilingual publications were most useful in that respect, facilitating the work of the instructor and accelerating the progress of the class. There also was there need of this military dictionary.<sup>22</sup>

In January 1945, the Bureau added sections to translate from Russian, German, Spanish and Portuguese. At this point, it changed its name to Bureau of Military Translators but remained under the Director Military Training, with its staff of 48, including 15 officers.<sup>23</sup> The Bureau would also co-operate very closely with the US War Department in the production of a Russian/English military dictionary.

The Bureau was not abolished at the end of the war but went through a very difficult period. On the one hand, there was an upsurge of translation needs from other departments, mainly regarding demobilization and resettlement, and from the Army Historical Section, which was reconstructing the main events of the war. On the other hand, the Department of National Defence wanted to cut its staff. In addition, translators' salaries in the Department — and elsewhere in the government — were generally falling behind those in private enterprise. The lack of financial incentives was partly the reason for the shortage of staff and adversely affected the quality and

quantity of translation. Excessive delays in all fields of translation became common in the years that followed.<sup>24</sup>

On 7 June 1950, Paul Mathieu, an Assistant Deputy Minister, wrote to the Secretary of the Defence Council intimating that signs, letterheads and so on must be made bilingual. In addition, all correspondence which the Defence Department received in French had to be answered in that language; the same applied to correspondence with governments or municipalities with a Francophone majority (Quebec and northern New Brunswick).<sup>25</sup> Translation would be provided by the Secretary of State's Translation Bureau.

In October 1950, Brigadier-General Bernatchez, Vice-chief of the General Staff, suggested to Brigadier-General Allard, Commander of Eastern Quebec Area, that translation into French should be confined to brochures and that corresponding English technical terms should be given in brackets. Such translation would be done by the Secretary of State's Translation Bureau, while Université Laval would revise the grammar. Although Allard and Université Laval had come to an agreement, the arrangement was never consummated.<sup>26</sup>

A study was undertaken to determine how many training manuals were available in French. The report, which was presented on 15 December 1950, had found approximately 1,000 training manuals, of which 700 were of British origin and 300 were Canadian or Canadian/British. Out of the total, 190<sup>27</sup> were available in French. However, 33 of these were out of date, 25 were obsolete and 72 were *Memoranda on Training in the Canadian Army*. That left only 60 publications which were considered to be up to date. The Department proposed that it should stop translating old manuals and concentrate instead on new ones coming off the press. However, the Translation Bureau immediately gave warning that, in its present situation, it could not translate more than 75 pages of text every six months.<sup>28</sup>

Despite the fact that translation offices in all the departments had a considerable backlog of work, the Defence Department proceeded in 1951 to dismantle its own office and transfer its translators to the Secretary of State's Translation Bureau, which had just seven people to serve the three Services.

Major C. Falardeau, the secretary of the Personnel Committee, told the Defence Council on 25 April 1951 that the Army had a translation of King's Regulations (Canada). It was, however, six months behind in publishing amendments to the regulations and the French version represented 40% of the total cost of production.<sup>29</sup> A note to the Air Force Chief of Staff added: "We [in the Air Force] have never had King's Regulations (KR) in French.

Publishing them does not present any difficulty but the distribution of amendments is going to create great delays. If possible, we should avoid publishing KR in French".<sup>30</sup> This and the translating of daily orders were debated at the Defence Council's meeting on 31 May 1951. It was decided that:

- a. King's Regulations (Canada) would be published in French and English;
- b. Army daily orders would continue to be published in both languages; and
- c. the Navy and Air Force would publish daily orders in French and English as far as possible.<sup>31</sup>

The Secretary of State's Translation Bureau was overwhelmed with correspondence and military training manuals to be translated into French and texts in 17 foreign languages to be translated into English. In addition, it had to cater to the needs of the Historical Section and the Judge Advocate General's office. In 1953, the number of translators assigned to the Department of National Defence was increased to 21, and they were divided into six sectors according to their work: the Historical Section, Army Technical Section (training, manuals, military log books), Current Affairs, Judge Advocate General, and Director of Military Intelligence. According to a report by Miville Belleau, the Chief of the National Defence Translation Section of the Translation Bureau (Secretary of State), translation was subject to considerable delay. However, when he consulted the Defence clients involved, he found that they were not very worried about it. Besides, they were in the habit of using free-lance translators for urgent matters.<sup>32</sup>

Did outside translators really provide fast service? Here, for example, are some statistics relating to the Freelance translation of *The Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War*.

Table 42

**PUBLICATION DATES OF HISTORICAL TEXTS IN  
ENGLISH AND FRENCH**

Title	Date of Publication	
	English	French
<i>Six Years of War</i>	December 1955	April 1959 <sup>33</sup>
<i>The Canadians in Italy</i>	September 1956	June 1960
<i>The Victory Campaign</i>	January 1960	June 1960

One reason for these delays had to do with obtaining final approval for the original text. In the case of the first two volumes, the Defence Department did not authorize translation until after the English edition was published; in the case of the third volume, it gave authorization only a few months before it came out. The proofs of these translations, moreover, had to be corrected by the Historical Section. We should emphasize that, during those years, the Historical Section did not have a bilingual person on staff, apart from Major C.C.J. Bond, an Anglophone cartographer. He is said to have had 1,000 changes made in one French manuscript,<sup>34</sup> the authors were unable to verify this because the proofs were destroyed on 25 June 1965.

We already know that the messages senior management wanted to convey were not always received as they should have been. Such was the case with the instruction which Associate Minister Paul Mathieu sent on 19 December 1961 to Air Marshall F.R. Miller, Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. He asked Miller to approach the three Chiefs of Staff and tell them that henceforth all signs on military buildings in Quebec and in places where there was a large proportion of Francophones should be bilingual.<sup>35</sup> In a confidential memo on 27 December to the heads of the Navy, Army and Air Force and the Defence Research Council, Miller suggested that, rather than issuing a direct order on this matter, they should send a letter recommending that signs should be made bilingual and the matter should be given the minimum of publicity.<sup>36</sup>

The Chiefs of Staff certainly used a minimum of publicity because, three years later, the Associate Minister had to repeat Miller's memo almost to the word to the Chief of Defence Staff. Interestingly, Miller was now the CDS as a result of integration (see Volume I, p 193). Once again, the demand produced mixed results from a practical standpoint as the exercise had to be repeated in 1972, this time in earnest.

The year 1962 marked the start of the expansion of translation services in the Armed Forces which followed the tabling of the report of the Royal Commission on Government Organization (Glassco Report). On 6 April 1962, the Deputy Minister, E.B. Armstrong, told Jean Miquelon, Under-Secretary of State, that HQ Eastern Quebec Area needed its own translation service.<sup>37</sup> This was because the Government of Quebec, quite rightly, insisted on using French, and the Army had to communicate in French with contacts at all levels of government in Quebec and certain parts of New Brunswick and Ontario. Armstrong therefore proposed to hire four translators to fill this need.<sup>38</sup> On 5 July, Miquelon replied that the hiring of four translators was justified but the Organizational Review Committee wanted to look at the Department's needs in Quebec as a whole before considering the decentralization of the Translation Bureau.<sup>39</sup> The same request, but with more details, was made to the Hon. G.E. Halpenny, the Secretary of State, on 5 October by Pierre Sévigny, Associate Minister of Defence.<sup>40</sup> However, Treasury Board on 20 December only approved two positions, one for the Army and one for the Air Force.<sup>41</sup>

It must be said that for a number of years some effort had been made to distribute press releases simultaneously in French and English, although this practice was still the exception. There were practically no complaints about unilingual English press releases, except from certain members of the French press, because the majority of those who used them were either unilingual Anglophones or bilingual Francophones.<sup>42</sup>

In the interpretation field, the Department did its full share. The Directorate of Communications Services acquired equipment in 1963 which was used by all departments for interpretation at conferences. Users had, however, to find their own interpreters. According to a report covering the period from May 1963 to August 1965, the equipment had been used 18 times, among other things for federal-provincial conferences and meetings between the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce and provincial representatives.<sup>43</sup>

On 1 May 1964, Major-General Bematchez, the Vice Chief of General Staff, authorized the formation of the Canadian Army Training Manuals Publication Section (see volume I, page 192), which would be headed by Major J.O.P.E. Clavel and located in Quebec City. It would come under the Director Military Training but would receive support from the Secretary of State Translation Bureau.<sup>44</sup>

The translating efforts of manuals had been put on those dealing with training when the Secretary of State Translation Bureau was the only player.

This tendency did not change when Clavel came onto the scene; indeed, the Bureau pushed ahead faster and further in this direction. February 1965 estimates called for the translation of between 50 and 60 training manuals a year if the number of translators rose to nine, which was the authorized strength. However, Clavel had only five translators in 1965, all military personnel;<sup>46</sup> and in 1967, he had only three.<sup>47</sup> Despite this, by combining all efforts — including outside contracts — 71 manuals were in the process of being translated in 1965. Because unification was imminent, Training Command asked that several manuals which were about to be translated should be put aside until a decision was taken on their fate.<sup>48</sup> If we just consider training, and only in the Army, the horizon would seem to be getting brighter. However, when we look at table 43 as a whole, this effort appears as it really was: a mere drop in an ocean of documents, 99.77% of which were in English only. One of the problems in the service which Clavel headed was essentially related to careers: what officer would want to devote several years to translation, knowing that it would hardly count when it came to a promotion?

As the following table shows, there was an immense amount of work to be done.

Table 43

**NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF MILITARY MANUALS  
BY LANGUAGE OF PUBLICATION  
AND TYPE OF MANUAL (1964)<sup>45</sup>**

TYPE OF MANUAL	ENGLISH ONLY		ENGLISH AND FRENCH		TOTAL	
	NUMBER	%	NUMBER	%	NUMBER	%
Maintenance and Operations	21,206	86.57	—	—	21,206	86.57
Technical and Professional	2,065	8.43	5	0.02	2,070	8.45
Training	983	4.01	31	0.13	1,014	4.14
Administration	287	0.76	20	0.08	207	0.84
Total	24,441	99.77	56	0.23	24,497	100

Besides manuals, there were all kinds of administrative orders that the Department had for years been trying to produce in both languages. The Ross Report found major problems in this area. For example, at one base where

Canadian Forces Administrative Orders (CFAOs) were used in both languages, amendment No. 58 was available in English in December 1966, but there was nothing after No. 28 in French. In February 1967, Ross added, twice as many amendments were issued as the Secretary of State's Translation Bureau could translate.<sup>49</sup>

Ross's findings were not followed by very strong recommendations. The report did mention drafting in French (instead of translating) texts relating to the training of Francophones, including tests and examinations, or preparing an English-French/French-English military lexicon, which all three arms could use, to replace the dictionary Chaballe had produced in the 1940s, which only catered to the Army's needs. Finally, the report recommended that visual training aids (graphs, diagrams, photos and films, for example) should be made available in both languages.<sup>50</sup>

Ross' moderation in these matters can no doubt be explained by the fact that since Prime Minister Pearson's declaration in April 1966, translation had come to the fore everywhere in the public administration. Defence had foreseen as early as October 1965 that many administrative publications would in future have to be published in both languages. In March 1966, the Department started to draw up lists of these publications.<sup>51</sup> Not surprisingly, the changes raised further problems: special equipment was required to print the two texts side by side; delays occurred between the production of documents in English and their publication because the French translation had to be approved before it went to the printer; and the resulting documents were heavier and more bulky, an important consideration if they had to be transported during operations.<sup>52</sup>

Furthermore, the question of priorities had become acute because demand was growing by leaps and bounds. In 1967 the CFB Valcartier requested that certain messages of general interest emanating from Headquarters in Ottawa be sent to them in both languages. Ottawa replied that this was impossible because the Translation Bureau was concentrating on CFAOs and Queen's Regulations and Orders; in any case, many of the subjects referred to in these messages were dealt with in such documents. In May 1968, Colonel J.O.A. Letellier himself admitted that the situation had not changed because there were not enough translators.<sup>53</sup>

In the meantime, at a meeting on 25 October 1967, Cabinet agreed on ways of improving and speeding up translation. It said that translation should be of good quality; each department would recruit Francophone writers and editors to produce original work in French and ensure that the quality of translation done by contractors was satisfactory. The Secretary of State would

determine with each department what kind of relationship it should have with the Translation Bureau.<sup>54</sup> By November, the Chief of the Translation Bureau's Technical and Scientific Division was assigned to studying the situation in the DND.<sup>55</sup> The initial point of contact at Defence was Roger Lavergne in the Deputy Minister's Office, but Letellier was to have complete control over its terminology section and the Publications Service, and be responsible for assigning translation priorities (see the mandate of Letellier's group in Volume I, pp.211-212).

Sometimes Lavergne was driven to assert his authority in no uncertain terms with regard to Departmental translation directives, especially on what should not be translated or the priorities to be observed.<sup>56</sup> Nevertheless, military translation from English to French was done almost independently of him. From August 1964 on, the Publications Section at CFHQ co-ordinated the publication of translated texts, making arrangements directly with the Translation Bureau. The advent of the Bilingualism Secretariat in the summer of 1967 did not affect the situation directly, especially because both organizations worked for Commodore Caldwell, executive assistant to the Chief of the Defence Staff. However, in February 1968 it became obvious that too many people at NDHQ were going directly to the Translation Bureau on their own initiative with documents which, when seen in the larger context, did not warrant immediate attention. This interfered with real priorities. On 13 February, a directive from Caldwell laid down that in future it would be the branch head's responsibility to authorize or refuse translation. Documents for translation would then be sent to the Publications Section, which would submit them to the Bilingualism Secretariat for a priority rating.<sup>57</sup>

In 1968, some of the bilingual publications, including CFAOs, were printed by the Government Printing Bureau, others by the Departmental section. Consideration was given to doing all printing at Defence because the Bureau was very expensive (about \$10 a page). However, Defence would have to purchase the equipment needed to produce documents in side-by-side format, which would require a capital investment which the Department decided it could not make in 1968.<sup>58</sup>

The years from 1969 to 1972 were marked, as far as the Department's B & B planners were concerned, by a rapid increase in the demand for translation and its consequences. Even before Bill C-120 was enacted, as the Government strengthened its support for bilingualism, notably through the October 1967 Cabinet decisions, Departmental authorities were moved to review the state of the forms which the Department used. It was apparent from a review of the directives which was completed in November 1967 that forms used by the general public and individuals working in the Department



ought to be bilingual, with the English and French appearing as far as possible on the same side of the paper and in the same sized type. Should it be necessary to resort to unilingual English or unilingual French documents, the Deputy Minister's approval would have to be obtained.<sup>59</sup> This, however, only affected a small proportion of the forms and left out all those used in everyday work, for example, in dealings with other departments. In July 1969, on the eve of the enactment of Bill C-120, Defence experts estimated that at least 13,200 of the 15,000 forms found in various parts of the Department were in English only; however, 2,000 of those used by the public or relating to civilian and military employees were available in French.<sup>60</sup> In this area alone, there was thus an enormous amount of work still to be done.

As the reader will recall, administrative orders were routinely translated but the French version was much delayed. To remedy this, it was suggested that these orders should be published in a side-by-side format, which was certainly the best way of ensuring that both texts would appear simultaneously and be equally available everywhere. Parliament had experimented with this method first before adopting it at the end of 1967 for Bills which members received for discussion.<sup>61</sup> A year later they were still talking at the DND about buying suitable printing machines and congratulating themselves on having reduced the delay in publishing French texts. At the end of December 1968, the French version of CFAOs was only four months behind the English version, compared with six months at the time of the Ross Report; according to the forecast, the gap would be reduced to one month by February 1969. The minimum delay that could be expected was two to three weeks, given the equipment with which it was not possible to typeset texts in French.<sup>62</sup> In February 1970, the situation was the same.<sup>63</sup> The Implementation Plan dated 12 February 1971 still "hoped" that the two versions of the various orders, directives and forms would be drafted and distributed together (see Appendix C, paragraph y). The Department had thought that it would be possible to put things right by the end of July 1971 because the staff required to translate CFAOs and the Queen's Orders and Regulations applicable to the Canadian Forces (QR&O) was available, but it would be fall before this wish was fulfilled.

In fact, the accumulated delays were to tax to the limit the Secretary of State's translators and the Government Printer's specialized equipment for many months.<sup>64</sup> In November 1971, the Department was able to announce that CFAOs, QR&Os, CFSOs, Daily Orders issued by the administrative unit at CFHQ in Ottawa, most general messages sent to the Department's civilian and military personnel, notices at CFHQ, signs, posters and forms were produced simultaneously in both languages.<sup>65</sup> The time had come to think of the future and to draw up a new list of priorities<sup>66</sup> which would eventually appear in the

1972 Plan. We shall come back to this later. In the meantime, CFHQ had to obtain the equipment needed to print the two languages side by side, if only to relieve the Government Printing Bureau, in Hull, of the burden. It finally did so in 1972.<sup>67</sup> In addition, priority had to be given to reprinting in side-by-side format documents that had been released in both languages but in separate format. These were the Queen's Orders and Regulations applicable to the Canadian Forces (QO&R), the National Defence Act, new CFAOs and amendments to all CFAOs. Then it would be the turn of reprinting CFAOs in numerical order, followed by Canadian Forces Supplementary Orders (CFSOs). In the case of training manuals, their size and intended use (for example, would they have to be carried on operations?) would determine how the two languages would be presented, whether side by side, both within the same cover, or separately.<sup>68</sup>

In 1971, the Department was able to chalk up one more success: the English-French/French-English military lexicon. Letellier tells us how the lexicon was brought to fruition,<sup>69</sup> but the question is worth further attention.

It was Brigadier-General Marcel Richard more than anyone else who aroused French-Canadian soldiers' enthusiasm for correct French. In August 1964, when he was a lieutenant-colonel and the Commanding Officer of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion of the *R22<sup>e</sup>R*, he submitted a brief to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism entitled *La nécessité d'une terminologie française, grammaticale et de bon aloi, qui soit officielle dans les Forces armées* (The need for grammatical, authentic and officially recognized French terminology in the Armed Forces). In speaking of the quality the terminology should have, he said:

There is only one quality that the Canadian Armed Forces could possibly aim for, and that is what is currently known as "international French". The entry on the world stage of a host of new French-speaking countries, the military missions which represent us in some of these countries, our membership in NATO, and Canada's vocation as an international mediator, oblige us to take this course.

As French armies have created and, so to speak, exported throughout the world the military terminology of international French, we must not hesitate to go to the fountain-head. This does not of course mean slavishly adopting all the terms currently used in the French armies, including certain barbarisms and neologisms in very poor taste, which have rightly been condemned by critics and grammarians. Without going to this extreme or being puristic, it is nevertheless time to shed our Québécois inferiority complex (which the military suffer from as much as civilians) and to recognize the fact that

the French are better than we are with regard to the language which we share with them but which was theirs before being ours.

Above all, military French includes terms which do not belong to modern technology but are rooted in tradition. These are the authentic and colourful words which we could use profitably to replace the habitual dreary anglicisms — for example, *prise d'armes*, *rassemblement* or *défilé* could replace *parade*, and *garde-à-vous* should replace *attention*.<sup>70</sup>

Brigadier-General Richard's contribution to correct French usage was undeniable when it came to creating a military lexicon. General Allard got work started in 1967 on an English-French/French-English lexicon which would be more in keeping with the times than Chaballe's dictionary and more suitable for operations, military training and administration.<sup>71</sup>

Major Jean-Marc Fournier,\* who headed the terminology section in the Bilingualism Secretariat, inherited the task of producing the lexicon at the beginning of 1968. The procedure may be summed up as follows: a record was created in Fournier's office for each term chosen; a bulletin containing information from several records was then published and circulated to Major Clavel, Colonel Richard, the Department's translation office and others for comments; after their comments had been taken into account, an approval bulletin was prepared and sent to the Secretary of State Terminology Centre and the departments concerned, which they were asked to comment on and return; at this point, the revised record was prepared. A batch of revised records was then sent to the Terminology Centre for approval and incorporation into the glossary. Only the final lexicon would be considered official.<sup>72</sup>

Even though 110 terminology bulletins were sent to the Bilingualism Secretariat, the Canadian Forces Manuals Publication Service and the Translation Bureau, the greatest reliance was placed on the comments of Marcel Richard, at that time Colonel and Base Commander at Valcartier, about the appropriateness of the translation of terminology.<sup>73</sup>

The first edition of the lexicon was prepared jointly by the Bilingualism Secretariat and the Secretary of State Translation Bureau and resembled the NATO lexicon published in 1968. It contained some 14,000 expressions and became available in 1969 under the title of *Administrative and Staff*

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\* He later became a lieutenant-colonel and frequently served as acting DGBB in the interval between Chassé's departure and Hanna's arrival in 1971.

*Procedures Manual, Volume 5 — Military Lexicon English-French/French-English* — CFP 121(5). A second edition of 7,000 copies was published two years later and contained approximately 60,000 military terms; it could be amended easily, being in a loose-leaf binder.

This military lexicon, as well as being used by the Canadian Forces, was distributed to a number of federal and provincial departments and to the United States, France, England, and even Cameroon.<sup>74</sup> The number of terms in the lexicon has since increased as the result of revisions.

We now come to the heart of this section of the book, namely the vast field of translation in general in the Canadian Forces. As might have been expected, the Forces readily accepted the B & B Commission's recommendations 26 and 27 in 1970 (Appendix B). The staff made no comments, but in practice ignored paragraph b of recommendation 26, which called for an end to the practice of drafting directives, CFAOs, etc. exclusively in English and translating them into French afterwards.<sup>75</sup> The Commission clearly hoped that original drafting would be done in French from time to time. When the Cabinet Committee on B & B asked Colonel P. Chassé and Elgin Armstrong in the summer of 1970 what they had accomplished in the translation and terminology area, however, they were able to point to the achievements mentioned earlier, including the lexicon.<sup>76</sup>

From a different perspective, we can definitely say, without going into details, that the demand for translation of all kinds increased from the moment French language units (FLUs) were created in 1968. Official French names for units, offices, and ranks were a priority from 1967-1968 onwards.<sup>77</sup> After Bill C-120 was enacted, the pressure became even greater.<sup>78</sup> Demand was shooting up, but since 1967 the Secretary of State had failed to keep up with it. All government departments were suffering as a result of this situation.

The implementation of FRANCOTRAIN sorely tried Major Clavel's Publications Section. In December 1968, Colonel Lagacé, the military attaché in Paris at the time, sent Clavel 89 French military technical manuals on naval and air force matters to help him in his task.<sup>79</sup> Despite this, in September 1969 the Department was still only able to translate 20 training manuals a year.<sup>80</sup> In 1970, the prospects were far from rosy. Chassé's team did a breakdown in November which revealed that only five of the 65,800 publications in the Canadian Forces (classified and unclassified but not related to training) were available in French. In six years, 135 training manuals and 2,400 forms had been translated. On the other hand, almost none of the 105,000 Engineering Orders (from two to ten pages each) had been translated. The Department was hoping to put into French during the next two years

18,000 pages of summaries, notes, examinations and exercises to support FRANCOTRAIN, but quantities of Local Orders and Standing Orders at the bases were still in English only.<sup>81</sup>

These findings supported the view that this backlog could be solved by assigning a great many more translators to Defence, not just in Ottawa but in the Commands and at bases as well. Armstrong wrote to Gordon Robertson of the Privy Council Office in January 1970 that the implementation of recommendation 26 of the Laurendeau-Dunton Commission depended on the obtaining of adequate resources.<sup>82</sup> A memorandum to Cabinet in the following April maintained that Command HQs and French language units would require more translators.<sup>83</sup> The drafts of the plan which was to be tabled in Parliament in February 1971 discussed increasing the number of translators and decentralizing translation services across the country. Paragraph as of Appendix C gave the final version of the plan, which made the important distinction between the time when the principle was accepted and when the positions created would actually be occupied (1 January 1973). Defence approached the Secretary of State in 1971 for translator positions and requested that some of the translators should start work in September.<sup>84</sup> This deadline was put back a little.

On 5 July 1971, after consultations between the specialists at National Defence and Secretary of State, an official request for more staff was sent by the DND to the Under-Secretary of State, Jules Léger. The basic premises agreed upon were as follows:

- the Secretary of State would respond to the increased demand for translation in the Forces;
- there would be regional translation offices, but at training schools, sub-sections would be set up on site and headed by translators familiar with military terminology;
- the CFHQ terminology section would be accepted as the authority on military terms and a terminological research sub-section would be seconded to it;
- translators would have to have security clearance to “confidential”, and sub-section heads to “secret”.

- retired military personnel who met the Translation Bureau's standards would have priority for the positions in Defence, and an officer would sit on the Selection Board for these translators;
- the Training Manuals Publication Service would be taken over by the Secretary of State in the 1971-1972 financial year;
- translators would come under the Secretary of State (for pay, promotion, etc.) but sub-sections would be given work by local military commanders.<sup>85</sup>

Among the documents attached to the short letter T.G. Morry wrote on 5 July was one entitled *Data and Rationale for Increased Translation Services*. It emphasized the translation needs created by the accelerated recruitment of Francophones that was just getting under way and by FRANCOTRAIN, where more and more Francophones would be heading because, in time, there would be more courses available in French. Because course content changed frequently, there was a steady demand for translation at such bases as Borden, Kingston, Saint-Jean, Valcartier, Chilliwack, Esquimalt and Halifax. The more direct links there were between students, instructors and translators, the better the work would be co-ordinated. These bases and CFHQ — were to be provided with a sub-section in 1971-1972; it was estimated that 15 translators, five revisers and two terminologists would be needed in the first phase. In 1972-1973, 39 translators, 13 revisers and two terminologists scattered among the various bases and HQs in Canada should be brought in to complete the infrastructure.<sup>86</sup>

It was virtually this plan that the Secretary of State sent to Treasury Board on 3 August for approval. On 16 September, Léger wrote to Sylvain Cloutier that "Treasury Board's agreement in principle ... has been conveyed to the Superintendent of the Translation Bureau."<sup>87</sup> While waiting for Cabinet's formal approval, the appropriate personnel services were alerted. As soon as confirmation was received from Cabinet, the recruiting campaign would begin.<sup>88</sup> It actually began on 26 October, 1971, which meant that the translators' arrival at the training bases was delayed until the winter of 1972.<sup>89</sup>

This did not mean that the Forces did nothing about finding ways to increase translation facilities between 1969 and 1972. The situation in 1970 was obviously not favourable for creating a military translation corps; such service was therefore provided by civilians.<sup>90</sup> To complement the work done by the Translation Bureau and the Manuals Publication Service, qualified persons<sup>91</sup> were hired under contract, but from the spring of 1971, public

servants (mostly former servicemen) were also given contracts to translate a few manuals during the evening or in their spare time.<sup>92</sup> LADIF suggested in September 1971, rather late in the day, that the Department's 1971-1972 Winter Works Program should try to attract translators to help reduce the mountain of work, which even the new translators would have difficulty in clearing up.<sup>93</sup>

One of the problems in the 1969-1972 period was translators' salaries. The Minister, Donald Macdonald, admitted this at the Defence Council meeting on 21 November 1970.<sup>94</sup> Let us take the case of institutions providing higher education within the Forces, which we discussed earlier. Plans to give French a greater role in this area depended largely on translating and constantly updating all the written material relating to courses. The translators, who were university graduates, would work on-site and had to understand and translate correctly everything being taught to experienced officers. Depending on whether they were at level 1, 2 or 3, they would make between \$5,960 and \$11,900, \$11,166 and \$14,694, or \$14,001 and \$17,501. The average pay of the officers these translators were dealing with was about \$15,540 for majors, \$18,600 for lieutenant-colonels and \$22,560 for colonels.<sup>95</sup> In the course of time, the disparity between the two professions would gradually disappear.

Other difficulties arose from misunderstandings or the quality of French translations which was often far from acceptable.<sup>96</sup> For example, a list of French abbreviations for French language units was submitted for approval to Lieutenant-Commander J.P. Godbout, who was working for the Director of Translation and Terminology Services (DTTS). He replied to the Director General Organization and Manpower on 10 May 1971 that the general rule was that no abbreviations would be used in French. This decision, which was not conducive to writing concise messages as normal practice required, was partly based, according to Godbout, on the fact that there were already too many abbreviations in English, which was of course quite true. Besides, a French abbreviation might be similar to an English abbreviation that had long been used in a totally different context, which could lead to confusion. Godbout's conclusion was therefore that only English abbreviations should be used in a French text, except on the rare occasions where the French abbreviation of a French term was already well established.<sup>97</sup> Commodore F.D. Elcock, to whom this message was addressed, was surprised by the answer but had the good sense to take the matter up again with Lieutenant-Colonel S.M. Newell, Godbout's superior. On 4 June, Newell corrected his subordinate's interpretation by approving the list of abbreviations of unit titles which had been submitted to his office in April, explaining that Godbout's memo referred to abbreviated military terms. Thus, while "aslt" was used in

English, the word “*assaut*” would be used in full in French. Hence Elcock made it clear in his message DO 90 of 23 September 1971 that the official names of French language units were French and abbreviations of these names could also be used.<sup>99</sup>

In September 1971, the Department was still working on the basis of two kinds of units: English language units and French language units. It knew that further developments were going to take place and there would be national units as well. On 17 August 1977, message DO 90 was replaced by a document declaring that all units, whether they were FLUs, ELUs, NUs, bases, headquarters or formations, would have names and abbreviated titles in English and French in order to comply with the guidelines which stated that they were both Canada’s official languages. Proper names, of course, would not be translated.<sup>100</sup> Since then, all the relevant official documents have been revised in keeping with the decision to accept French abbreviations of unit names.

There were also some grey areas in the translation field with regard to the responsibilities of organizations whose duties overlapped. The Bilingualism Secretariat had set up a translation and terminology section at its inception; this became a directorate in 1971 and is known today as the Directorate of Translation and Terminology Co-ordination (DTTC). Nothing of this kind existed on the Deputy Minister’s side of the Department in the crucial years 1967-1972, even though Roger Lavergne was the Department’s official representative at the Secretary of State. After his death, he was followed by Bob Snidal and later, briefly, by Louis Noël de Tilly. This meant, for example, that the request for more translators in 1971 went through Noël de Tilly’s office to obtain an *imprimatur*, despite the fact that all the experts on the matter were on the military side. Noël de Tilly did a study of the civilian side’s translation needs, which he appended to the end of the military request (see Chapter 18). In 1971, when priorities had to be drawn up for the program which was going to be submitted to Treasury Board, Letellier reminded Newell that this was the Department’s Bilingualism Adviser’s (Noël de Tilly’s) responsibility, but they should nevertheless prepare directives on translation and terminology and make recommendations about who would be responsible for implementing them.<sup>101</sup>

Moreover, rationalization had been at work in two complementary sectors. At the end of 1964, the CDS Secretariat had been given responsibility for publishing, printing, distributing and maintaining stocks of the regulations, orders, manuals and brochures used by the Canadian Forces. In actual practice, however, the publishing tasks were divided up. The Secretariat was responsible for publishing certain regulations, brochures and orders of a



general nature. Training Command published training manuals, the Director of Engineering published technical orders, and so on.<sup>102</sup> Some of the Secretary of State's responsibilities were transferred in 1967 to Letellier's Bilingualism Secretariat, which brought together, among others, the CFHQ Publications Section and the Translation and Terminology Section, which included the subsection of the Canadian Forces Manuals Publication Service.<sup>103</sup> In November 1969, CDS Sharp ordered a study on the centralization and control of graphic arts, CFHQ publications and related services. This study was to take into account the technical problems raised by the use of two languages.<sup>104</sup> Chassé was called upon to give his advice, which he did in December, simply repeating what we already know about the Department's obligations following the enactment of Bill C-120.<sup>105</sup>

On 3 September 1970, after seeing the study's recommendations, Sharp was convinced of the need to centralize management of all the services which had been examined,<sup>106</sup> and in July 1971 the Directorate of Documentation and Drawing Services (DDDS) made its appearance under the aegis of the ADM (Mat). We shall have occasion to talk about this directorate a little later. For the present, we shall simply note that the amalgamation did nothing to solve the problem of delays in translation. The technical publications service reckoned that it took a minimum of five months to produce a text, two or three months to complete the editing, typesetting, design and proof-reading stages, and a further two to four months at the Government Printing Bureau — and that was for an English version.<sup>107</sup> When this version had to be translated, another two to three months had to be added before the publication could finally appear in bilingual form.

One of the organizations which could be called upon to translate a technical work of the kind we have been talking about was Clavel's group. However, as we know, he did not have enough personnel to take on alone the whole of the translation program required by the Forces. According to a report on the translation of Canadian Forces Publications dated 23 June 1972, the Manuals Publication Service had to translate and revise some 750 manuals over a period of five years in order to meet the requirements of the Department's B & B program. In view of these facts, Captain André Gagné recommended that the Service should now be transferred to the Secretary of State Translation Bureau, a move which had been contemplated for some time.<sup>108</sup>

Clavel's Service was disbanded and incorporated into the Translation Bureau at the end of 1972, but the excellent work it had done was not forgotten, as proved by this extract from a letter which Letellier wrote to Clavel on 23 January 1973:

The quantity, and even more the quality, of your translations such as we find in the 200 major publications and the 300 less extensive ones that you have produced during the past eight years have often been pointed out to me and attest to the degree of excellence you have attained. The high points in your work have been CFP 152 — *Seaman's Handbook*, CFP 201 — *Manual of Drill and Ceremonial*, and CFP 121 (3) — *Staff and Writing Procedures for the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces*. Other publications too numerous to mention also come to mind. The linguistic complexity of the subjects you handled did not pass unnoticed.

From its inception, the Publications Service has served the needs of the Canadian Army well, particularly the needs of the R22<sup>e</sup>R depot and battalions and the *Collège militaire royal*. The Canadian Forces as a whole subsequently benefitted from your services. You have recently had the privilege of giving very tangible support to DND's bilingualism objectives, and the Department in turn has been lucky to have had an organization like yours at its disposal.

I was very pleased to learn of the assistance you have given to the FRANCOTRAIN project, particularly in helping to set up uniform translation teams in the Training Command and Mobile Command schools. It was not difficult to convince the Translation Bureau to post members of its staff to these places because, after visiting the sites, it realized that we were both competent and firmly established. The unwavering support that you have given to the Director of Translation and Terminology Services has also been greatly appreciated.<sup>109</sup>

The organizational aspect of translation and terminology — which included publishing translated texts, whether in side-by-side or other format — was already well advanced, indeed almost complete, when Letellier took over as DGBB in August 1971. Several months had already been spent working out what would happen when the many new translators arrived in 1972. By fall, a consensus was reached.<sup>110</sup> The *Program to increase B & B* submitted to Treasury Board was thus more or less a summary of what we already know. It dealt with access to translation outside Ottawa, which would become the norm in 1974-1975; after 1972, therefore, CFHQ would not be alone in having a translation service that was striving to satisfy broad needs quickly. The program also made provision for all new documents to be distributed in both official languages simultaneously. Anything published in the last five years, apart from technical publications, was to be available in French in 1977-1978.<sup>111</sup>

Activity 109 in the 1972 program referred to computerizing French military terminology so that it could be used by translators and the military in general.<sup>112</sup> Incidentally, this aspect of the 1972 program was accepted by

Treasury Board on condition that all computerization programs be carried out in cooperation with the Secretary of State, and any systems that were developed at least be compatible with each other.<sup>113</sup>

Captain A.R. Gouin had written to Colonel Fournier, in July 1969, asking whether his section had considered machine translation. Fournier admitted that it had not and referred him to *Université de Montréal* and University of Ottawa, where projects were under way, and to the Translation Bureau, where the progress of these experiments was being closely watched.<sup>114</sup> Two years later, Newell resurrected the idea and got it accepted as a factor to be considered, at least insofar as terminology was concerned.<sup>115</sup> As soon as Letellier had settled in, he went further and began talking about machine translation. Moreover, Captain Gouin was in California finishing his master's thesis on the subject and would be interested in joining DGBB afterwards.<sup>116</sup> In his book, Letellier outlined what was done about these two matters.<sup>117</sup> Computerized terminology has made great strides since then, and today, anywhere in Canada, a computer can have access to a military lexicon of tens of thousands of words and expressions. Machine translation has not developed as quickly. Even now, it is far from perfect. However, there too results are coming, and in 1988 the Secretary of State was prepared to sponsor a number of programs,<sup>118</sup> which was not the case ten years earlier.

Also under the heading of translation and terminology, activities 091, 096 and 097 essentially sought to provide editor-revisers for military personnel who wished to write in their second official language, or even in their first language in cases where their French had been weakened by working in English for many years. This subject is dealt with in Chapter 12. The expedient, although expensive at first, was expected gradually to become more profitable, as choosing to work in one's second language (mainly French) or to translate some of one's own texts into French would reduce translation costs.<sup>119</sup> The idea was a good one, but it failed to produce the results for which NDHQ had hoped. The new emphasis on bilingualism at NDHQ in recent years caused it to reappear in 1987, and this time there seems to be the will to make it succeed.<sup>120</sup> Other activities in the 1972 program were designed to ensure that a clause was included in all contracts for Defence equipment which would commit the supplier to providing all the technical and operational written instructions in both Canada's languages. This was asserted to be the only way to ensure that unilingual Francophones would quickly get access to new equipment in their language.<sup>121</sup>

The last two endeavours sought to ensure that, at some unspecified time during the second five-year phase in implementing the program (1977-1978 to 1981-1982), all new technical manuals would be published simultaneously in both languages and old ones would be made available in a bilingual format; furthermore, contracts would continue to be awarded for translation outside the federal administration but in support of federal activities.<sup>122</sup> These facts were presented during the 1973 briefing tour and, to judge from the notes, do not seem to have provoked any significant reaction.

As Colonel Letellier has already described some of the main facts relating to translation and terminology before 1977, we propose simply to chronicle what happened during the 1970s, using other, less public documents.

The Publications Service alone, between 1964 and 1972 when it ceased to exist, had translated a total of 3,550,000 words.<sup>123</sup> The statistics in the *Review of achievements in the B & B Program in DND* (May 1974) showed that there had been an enormous increase in translation. The number of words translated by or for the Department was 973,000 in the 1971-1972 financial year, 3,246,000 in 1972-1973, and 18,090,000 in 1973-1974. By then, 100 translators were assigned to the Department and another 150 free-lance translators had contracts with the Secretary of State.<sup>124</sup> In 1978, the number of words reached 24.6 million. If we compare Defence with other departments, only the House of Commons had more words translated by the Secretary of State.<sup>125</sup> In March 1978, DND had 839 publications available in bilingual format. A further 121 were being translated and 263 were in the French editing section or being typeset. It could be said that, from 1976 onwards, simultaneous publication of administrative texts was assured.

In May 1974, two years after translation made its fresh start, things were going well for translation for training purposes (4,780,000 words in 1973-1974) and better still in non-technical work (CFAOs, QR & O, CFSOs and administrative reference manuals). The latter, it must be said, were already well advanced in 1972. We should note, however, that difficulties were still being encountered five years after the proclamation of the *Official Languages Act*: some offices tried to avoid translation because they said they could not wait, or there was no need for French in their case.<sup>127</sup> Even so, the Department expected that, in the area of translation, it would beat the April 1978 deadline. Six editor-revisers were already on the job and up to 150 free-lance translators were working for Defence.

However, some dark spots still remained. Little progress had been made in computerizing terminology because of extreme caution on the part of the

Translation Bureau. Furthermore, the planned number of experts in terminology had never been reached because they were hard to find. The Department had still not managed to include a standard clause on technical documentation in all contracts for the purchase of new equipment. The Department said that technical translation would be ready to start two years earlier than planned, progress having been faster than expected in the non-technical area. But there was much to be done. Projections indicated that 287,625,000 words would have to be translated in the next 12 to 15 years; machine translation could be used judiciously for this purpose and it was essential to encourage its development.<sup>128</sup>

The May 1974 *Review of achievements* was intended for Treasury Board and seems to have described the situation quite well. In the following December, a *Report on the status of B & B in DND* was submitted to the Defence Management Committee. The section on translation opened with a very optimistic sentence about accomplishments. Some details followed: almost all the documents required to conduct 48 courses in French were available; 75 CFAOs and 720 publications had been translated, although not all of them were yet available in the appropriate bilingual format; the Translation Bureau would have a computerized terminology system in September 1975; five of the eleven editor-reviser positions had been filled; and the bilingualism clause in contracts had been introduced.

The following table provided a good summary of DGBB's accomplishments and expectations.

Table 44<sup>129</sup>**TRANSLATION, 1971-1974**

	1971-1972	1972-1973	1973-1974	FORECAST FOR THE NEXT 13 YEARS
GENERAL PUBLICATIONS COMPLETED	35	99	290	380
IN PROGRESS (WORDS)	751,340	1,089,000	8,059,000	8,500,000
INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIAL (WORDS)	221,340	1,057,000	4,780,000	51,625,000
ADMINISTRATIVE DOCUMENTS (WORDS)		1,100,000	5,251,000	91,000,000
TECHNICAL PUBLICATIONS (WORDS)			INCLUDED IN INSTRUCT- IONAL MATERIAL	287,625,000
TOTALS (WORDS)		3,246,000	18,080,000	438,750,000

The figures in this fine table needed to be qualified, the report said. A great deal of translation had been done on the training bases, but the support services (typing and page-setting) could not keep up with it. At Borden, where the situation was worst, there was a backlog of 5,000 pages, and it could grow to 55,000 pages. In other words, although the translation had been done, the students were not yet reaping the benefit, which confirms what Chapter 12 hinted at, and makes us wonder how intelligent managers could fall into this kind of trap in the mid-1970s.

Out of the 720 translations of publications mentioned above, 287 were in circulation and 300 were in the process of being published; officials promised that the delay was gradually being reduced. However, the requirement that general messages should be published simultaneously in both languages was not being respected as much as it ought to have been.

... there appears in many instances to be a lack of understanding ... and a lack of forcefulness on the part of the supervisors. The directives ... have been explained and unless personnel at all levels make a big effort to ensure

that publications and directives are translated while they are being prepared, further progress ... will be hampered.<sup>130</sup>

As for the bilingualism clause in contracts for new materiel, the part of the report dealing with “qualifications” appeared to contradict the part dealing with accomplishments. Indeed, there was no mention of any contract where the bilingualism clause had been applied. In fact, the report went out of its way to stress the problems that would be encountered with foreign industry, the resistance of Departmental managers who were not convinced of the need for this clause, the validation that French texts required and “the extreme caution which will have to be exercised ... especially in sensitive areas where safety is important”.<sup>131</sup>

According to the authors of the report, 5,000,000 words of a technical nature had already been translated for schools, but no Canadian Forces Technical Instructions (CFIT) or administrative manuals had been translated. If a start were not made soon, the delays in this activity would be formidable. Now, the Department had French language units, and would have more; it provided courses in French; and its publicity highlighted up the opportunities to work in French in the Forces. Yet all these things could really only be achieved if the translation side of the program was fulfilled.<sup>132</sup>

The tone of this part of the report was pessimistic, as we can see. The general conclusion is puzzling when we compare it with what had been said in the previous May.

It is essential that work instruments in both official languages be made available to our personnel as soon as possible. Otherwise we will soon reach the stage where a large number of Francophones trained in French, will know little English, and will not have the tools to work in their primary language. Consequently, every effort should be made to seek the necessary funds and authority to begin work while the planning and the co-ordination of government policy is in progress. Additionally, until the need to issue directives and instructions in both official languages is generally accepted at NDHQ, senior management must exert pressure to ensure that the equality of languages is respected in this often neglected area.<sup>133</sup>

The alarm was therefore well and truly sounded in December 1974 as far as progress in translation and terminology was concerned. What were the results? Let us refer again to the Commissioner’s 1977 report. In the section dealing with this subject, the Commissioner began by declaring that translation at Defence was not seen as the indispensable instrument of communication between the two official languages that it should be. Since the French language was not used in the creative stages of any project, translation

at National Defence was just the inevitable passage from English to French. Translation therefore became an obstacle to the expansion of French in the Forces.<sup>134</sup>

At the time of the Commissioner's special study, the Department was congratulating itself on the following achievements: in January 1976, 50% (440) of its general and administrative publications (including those used for training) were bilingual, 25% (246) were at the printer's, having been translated, and 8% (71) were being translated. On the same date, 52% of its official forms existed in both languages. The Department had also compiled twelve specialized lexicons and was preparing a further 90 for 1978.<sup>135</sup>

Plenty nevertheless remained to be done, and in an area in which work had been going on for years (16 years in the case of forms, 52% of which had been translated). In 1977, no one in Ottawa had any idea of the translation needs or backlogs at the functional headquarters. French texts were often distributed long after the English ones. Moreover, French terminology was not always correct.<sup>136</sup>

In theory, some progress had been made since December 1974 with the standard clause in contracts. The Department had added two more very explicit directives to the two which already existed\* but had not been seriously implemented, namely Instruction 2/74 from DGDAS\*\* at NDHQ, issued on 18 June 1975, and CFAO 57-12, issued on 31 October 1975. DGDAS 2/74 stipulated that any proposal to omit the clause must be coordinated by the Director of Documentation and Drawing Services (DDDS) and have the approval of DTTC. However, the Commissioner was told that "the Department ... cannot determine in how many cases the clause requiring manuals to be supplied in both languages was fully complied with, partially complied with or not complied with at all. What is the point in issuing directives of this kind if their implementation cannot be monitored or even measured?"<sup>137</sup> By not requiring bilingual manuals from its suppliers, the Commissioner noted, the Department created almost insoluble problems for itself. In certain cases, for example, the companies refused to recognize the translation of their manuals if they had not done it themselves. "An analysis of the general aspects of the problem shows that the Department's efforts to enforce systematic and complete compliance with this clause have been feeble, to say the least",<sup>138</sup> said the Commissioner who went on to cite the

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\* CF Specification D-01-100-100/SF-000, dated 4 September 1973 and CFAO 2-14, dated 24 October 1974.

\*\* Director General Departmental Administrative Services



purchase of the German Leopard tanks, which were supplied without documents in French, crucial though they were.

According to the Commissioner, almost nothing had been accomplished on the technical side. Treasury Board circular 1975-113 required work instruments to be translated by 31 December 1976.<sup>139</sup> On 19 December 1975, the Deputy Minister of Defence replied that the Department would not be able to meet this deadline, mainly because of delays on the technical side.<sup>140</sup> In fact, as late as 1977, the Department had not even tallied the number of pages to be translated. The number of words involved in translating Canadian Forces Technical Instructions, maintenance instructions, specifications and standards, technical drawings and documents relating to supply, logistics or scientific matters was very approximate. Some manuals of a technical nature had indeed been translated, but the Commissioner in certain cases was critical of their quality, which was in fact poor almost everywhere.<sup>141</sup>

The Commissioner's recommendations were logical. He wanted all forms to be bilingual by 1978. He also wanted the Department to do much more to make publications in general available simultaneously in English and French.<sup>142</sup> Recommendations 29a and b read as follows:

start translating technical material without delay and expand the translation as fast as the availability of competent translators permits, taking advantage of whatever technological aids to translation may be available;

henceforth make it an essential condition in any negotiation or contract or agreement for the purchase of goods or services that the supplier provide bilingual documentation such as manuals, operating instructions and so on, and inform all interested parties, including the Department of Supply and Services, of this condition.<sup>143</sup>

The Department replied to this part of the Commissioner's report, in October 1978 that it had fully implemented the recommendation on forms and was also in the process of making non-technical publications available simultaneously in both languages. Recommendation 29a was being examined by the Secretary of State with a view to developing computerized translation and terminology. As regards 29b, the Department was content to repeat its policy, explaining that sometimes suppliers were unable to comply with it.<sup>144</sup> This was tantamount to admitting what the Commissioner had said: that Defence was timid when it came to applying the bilingualism clause to technical training manuals accompanying new equipment.

One more fact: in 1977, DTTC had already received many complaints from technical schools and engineers who maintained, and provided evidence, that the French versions of technical training manuals were full of errors, and even contradictions, which constituted a potential threat to safety.<sup>145</sup>

Faced with this situation, DDDS suggested setting up a TACT (Technical Accuracy Check of Translation), which would check the accuracy of the translation against the original text. This system, although fine in theory, also had many drawbacks, one of them being that it practically doubled the pay for the same work. That was why the Department turned instead to machine translation and the UMMT project (Université de Montréal Machine Translation). Here is a little background information on UMMT:

In 1971 the CETADOL project became the UMMT project (Université de Montréal Machine Translation) which, under the leadership of Alain Colmerauer, introduced the first complete machine translation system.

In 1972, the National Research Council stopped subsidizing [any machine translation projects] except UMMT, which a year later it finally handed over to the Secretary of State Translation Bureau. Linguists under Richard Kittredge improved the experimental UMMT 71 system and introduced a more powerful version in 1973. In the meantime, the computer scientists began creating new software. The year 1974 saw a complete generative morphology of French being programmed and the first experiments with REZO, an adaptation by Gilles Stewart of William Woods' communication networks. In 1975, the UMMT project was awarded, in addition to research, its first development contract, the METEO system. In 1976, the project completely changed its focus to applications when it obtained a contract to develop a much more ambitious system. The next two years were therefore devoted to producing a machine translation system for technical manuals which was used in the first instance to translate the technical documentation for the Aurora.<sup>146</sup>

Indeed, with the help of the UMMT system, translation of the publications relating to the Aurora, a long-range patrol aircraft, began in January 1979. The whole task was completed in 1980.

In another sphere, DTTC continued from 1977 to 1980 to publish specialized glossaries: *The Boatswain's Manual* (March 1977), *Glossary of Maritime Navigation* (March 1977), *Cook's Glossary* (September 1977) and *The Infantryman's Glossary* (July 1979). DTTC helped to create the *Aeronautical Communications Lexicon*, which was published by Transport Canada in 1981, and an *Air Operations Lexicon*, published jointly by Transport Canada, the Secretary of State and Air Canada in 1980.

But the bulk of technical documents continued to be out of reach for the unilingual Francophone. Defence Management Committee was quite clear on this point when it met on 12 April 1979: technical documents were not available in French because only 2% of approximately 50,000 documents had been translated. Why was this? Government directives had not provided specific means in order to push ahead in this area. Besides this general observation, there were other factors:

- the immensity of the task (perhaps 5,000,000 pages of technical information);
- the cost (up to \$75 a page);
- the limited number of qualified translators;
- the limited financial resources;
- the slower than anticipated development of computerized translation.<sup>147</sup>

Not all current technical material had to be translated because much of it was already out of date, or would soon be. It was therefore important to tackle the publications which were essential. The Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel) suggested three steps, and was supported in this by the DGOL: a committee should be set up to select priorities (31 July 1979); the first list of documents to be translated should be prepared (31 July 1980); a Departmental program change proposal should be initiated (31 December 1980). It was nevertheless concluded that the millions of dollars which would be spent on this in the coming years would probably only enable the Department to satisfy the minimum requirements of the Act.<sup>148</sup>

The different data given in the latter two paragraphs were contained in the plan published in 1980. Some refinements were added. Thus the ADM (Mat), for example, would try to make bilingual work instruments available to Departmental personnel “wherever they may be required”.<sup>149</sup> But who was to decide what this little phrase meant? Nobody knew. He would also set up a task force to determine which technical work instruments had to be translated and in what order.<sup>150</sup> As regards the standard clause requiring suppliers to provide their technical reference documents in both official languages, the Department would continue to “ask” the Department of Supply and Services to include the clause in contracts and would “urge” suppliers to comply with it. In cases where that was not possible, extreme measures would be taken; that is to say, “ [the DND would] acquire the right to translate and republish

the documents in the other official language as soon as possible after they were received".<sup>151</sup> Here again, the Commissioner's 1977 recommendation remained a dead letter.

If we look through the pages of the 1980 Plan, we find some real gems in the section on work instruments. For example, the plan stated that all bilingual work instruments (not just the technical ones) will be available "wherever they may be required".<sup>152</sup> In another place, it is thought that all administrative documents will be available in a bilingual version "by 31 December 1983"<sup>153</sup>— in other words, five years later than had been forecast in 1972 and seven years later than DGBB's report writers foresaw in December 1974. Furthermore, if we look at the goals which each of the Commands had set for itself regarding the availability of bilingual work instruments, we see that only Mobile Command took the matter seriously. It was the only one to set itself a deadline: 1985.<sup>154</sup>

The 1971-1972 projections in this field, as in all others that we have seen so far, were shrouded in an increasingly dense fog. Yet the extent of the challenge that technical translation presented had been known at a very early stage.

Letellier touches on the subject in his book<sup>155</sup> when he deals with the period during which DGBB watched its grandiose projects developing day by day. It was said in 1973 that, since the translation of administrative texts was ahead of schedule, it was time to start thinking about the translating of technical instruments, which was scheduled for the second five-year period in the plan (1977-1978 to 1981-1982). The fact that technical translation was put aside during the 1972-1977 period was an indication of the problems anticipated, one of them being the amount of time the work would require.<sup>156</sup> In the fall of 1973, the Director of Documentation and Drawing Services had made a rough estimate of what the technical translation operation would cost and how long it would take to complete.<sup>157</sup> But in order to fill in the details, a study was commissioned on 30 November 1973 to look at practical matters associated with translation, such as the format in which English and French texts should be presented, the manner in which the work would be co-ordinated and the availability of qualified translators.<sup>158</sup> The task force was headed by Lieutenant-Colonel R.J. Langlois, who presented his report in April 1974 after having studied a number of specific cases, particularly in Europe. The French-British teams working on the Concorde aircraft and the European Economic Community's specialized services had shown that technical translation was both possible and practical.<sup>159</sup> On 5 June of that year, L.G. Crutchlow, the ADM (Mat), submitted the report to Defence Management Committee,<sup>160</sup>

and supported the Langlois recommendations concerning the hundreds of millions of words which would have to be translated at a cost in the region of \$305 million (constant 1974 dollars).

The Committee dealt with the report at its meeting on 8 July 1974 and found the recommendations generally acceptable. They included the standard bilingualism clause, made into a directive in 1975 by the Director General of Departmental Administrative Services. The Department, however, allowed one exception in the application of this decision: this was in cases where new equipment had to be operational by a certain date but the supplier could not provide the necessary translations in time. In such cases, the Department would take the “extreme measures” indicated in the 1980 military plan which we have already quoted. Defence Management Committee also proposed that everything connected with the latest equipment should be translated first because it would probably be the last to become obsolete. For safety reasons, all technical translations would be checked by the supplier of the equipment in question or by expert translators and, in addition, the translations would be validated by the users. It was agreed that ADM (Mat) would create an office to be the focal point for all activities relating to technical translation. Moreover, the Department would discuss its way of tackling the problem with Treasury Board so it might be confirmed and become the basis for more general government policy. The Department would also try to obtain from Treasury Board the funds needed to operate the venture. If successful, and after ADM (Mat) had conducted a more thorough study, the Committee finally agreed that 50% of the technical documents existing in 1974 and considered to be useful for the medium term could be bilingual in 15 years’ time, in other words about 1989.<sup>161</sup>

What happened between 1974 and 1979? First and foremost, the discussions with Treasury Board came to nothing, so that the new projections Defence made in 1974 were never officially sanctioned at a higher level. One could thus say in 1979 that Defence had received no definite directive from the government with respect to the decisions it took in July 1974. Nor had the bilingualism clause in contracts received further support; new equipment, rather than contributing to solving the problem of technical French, in the end simply swelled the translation backlog. Finally, no matter whether the technical translation was done by the Secretary of State or was contracted out, there were not sufficient experts within the system to check and verify the translations and produce them in a bilingual format. Thus some 20,000 pages which had been translated since 1974 were never published because of lack

of funds or qualified staff.\* Finally, even though the principle of having a Project Administrator Bilingual Technical Documentation (PABTD) had been accepted, the Department had not filled the positions that had been authorized, and still had not made a more detailed assessment of the cost of technical translation than Langlois had (it was not in his terms of reference).<sup>162</sup> These observations were made in December 1979 by Captain M.H. Tremblay and K.F. Wehrle from the office of the Director General Evaluation Services, who had been asked by the Deputy Minister on 13 November 1979 to do a quick survey of bilingual work instruments, make recommendations on the problems they found, and suggest a way to survey the actual use made of bilingual work instruments.

Accepting the 1980 plan's conclusion that all administrative work instruments would be available in both languages in December 1983, the two men concentrated on the delay in technical translation, which they believed was caused by insufficient human and financial resources. But that was not all. One of the Department's main objectives was to become sufficiently bilingual to provide equal career opportunities, in their own language, to members of both language groups. At the time, unilingual English technical publications made it impossible to apply this principle. But neither the principle, the pragmatic approach of the (Military) Official Languages Plan to the translation of technical documents into French nor the decisions taken by the Defence Management Committee in 1974 were very precise. Managers therefore interpreted translation obligations in their own way and set priorities which took into consideration their overall shortage of resources. As there was no link between the general policy declaration and its implementation, there was a great risk of efforts being misdirected. French manuals were perceived simply as a government *fiat* that had to be obeyed, since nobody had clearly explained why they were required. The result was that decisions were taken in isolation and based on shifting criteria.

This flagrant lack of co-ordination was certainly reflected in the many initiatives aimed at making technical work instruments available. The Director General Administrative Services was responsible for all NDHQ's administrative work instruments; DTTC for all matters concerning translation and terminology in the Department; the Director Individual Training for translating films and other requirements for FRANCOTRAIN; the Director

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\* The Langlois report foresaw a large shortfall of qualified translators, revisers and validators which would be difficult to fill in the short term. Langlois thought, however, that with sufficient effort and perseverance, the Department could begin to close the gap significantly within three years.

Documentation and Drawing Services for providing and managing publications, engineering drawings and graphic arts services for NDHQ and the Forces in general; PABTD for budgeting, authorizing and monitoring the conversion of unilingual English technical documents to a bilingual format; the committee formed in 1979 for deciding priorities; and the Chief of Supply and the authors of program change proposals for ensuring that the bilingualism clause would be set out clearly in all contracts for equipment.

This was all so diffuse that it was difficult to determine who should be held responsible for a particular decision or lack of initiative. DTTC, for example, had nothing to do with the standard bilingualism clause. DGOL, representing ADM (Per), was certainly responsible for official languages, including work instruments, but ADM (Mat) and his managers were the ones who authorized and controlled the use of resources and the expenditure of funds to provide them. The management mechanisms for co-ordinating and integrating the activities of the two groups were ineffective, or even non-existent. For example, there was not a single progress indicator in the 1980 military plan for anything to do with work instruments. In a word, the DGOL's supervision was inadequate; in fact, he did not conduct any formal evaluations or establish direct monitoring of the relationship between activities and the resources they used.<sup>163</sup> This last direct criticism is interesting because, as we have seen, a DGOL employee was to make the same remark about FRANCOTRAIN in 1985.

What did Tremblay and Wehrle suggest should be done to change this situation? First, the Official Languages Co-ordinating Committee which advised ADM (Per) should also have a direct link with the Deputy Minister and the CDS; DGOL's role, duties and organization within the Committee should be reassessed in order to improve their mutual effectiveness; above all, the monitoring function of the Official Languages Program should be put into operation or its potential improved. Second, the needs for bilingual work instruments should be identified, starting with FRANCOTRAIN and the French language units. It is interesting to note that the two authors believed that the resurgence of FRANCOTRAIN could serve the cause of technical translation because managers in ADM (Mat) would be presented with an evident need to be met.<sup>164</sup> Going beyond their mandate again, they suggested that the number of people assigned to FRANCOTRAIN should be increased in order to improve progress, a suggestion which, as we now know, would remain a dead letter. For the present, then, the objective, according to the authors of the report, should be to translate the documents that would enable a Francophone operator, or person in charge of base maintenance, to work in French.

One of the embarrassing aspects of the Tremblay-Wehrle report was that it appeared several times to take issue with the policy on translating technical instruments itself. According to the authors, the Department should study the actual use made of bilingual documents and establish how desirable it was to have them: which documents should be bilingual, the two authors asked, and what would they be used for? In their view, the requirement for all documents accompanying new equipment to be bilingual was idealistic. The difficulty of applying it and its exorbitant cost made it impractical at a time when translation was already monopolizing scarce resources. They went on to recommend that this policy should be revised and reworked so as to give managers practical and realistic goals rather than unattainable ideals. In addition, they thought a survey should be done to measure the extent to which existing bilingual work instruments were being used.<sup>165</sup>

With a document such as this casting doubt on the quality of the DGOL's work and at the same time questioning the soundness of the original policy, it was no wonder that work bogged down. Here again, the authors had made no attempt to integrate their work with the broad vision of the 1969-1972 planners who sought to create real equality between Francophones and Anglophones. Knowing what the Navy had done for Francophones up to December 1979, and given the preponderance of English in technical matters, one may well question the good faith of those who ordered this overview. It was at best a hodge-podge of unsupported opinions, especially if compared with the report Colonel Langlois wrote after touring North America and Europe, where he found that technical translation really and truly existed in ordinary life.

Be that as it may, the Co-ordinating Committee was timid in following up the Tremblay-Wehrle report. For example, during the meeting on 6 March, Commodore E. W. Crickard, Director General Personnel Careers Other Ranks, who had just returned from a visit to Valcartier and Bagotville, made a verbal report on the various problems concerning official languages that he had encountered, including the unduly long time it took to get manuals translated. The Committee agreed on the work instruments which should be given priority for translation for FRANCOTRAIN.<sup>166</sup>

At a weekly meeting in the first week of January 1981, Guy Sullivan, the DGOL, stressed that:

...there are many projects which could be undertaken by the Director of Translation and Terminology but unfortunately resources are very limited. One project which is considered important is the publication of CNP 121(5) (Military Lexicon). Its importance lies in its ability to assemble the



terminology developed so far, encourage composition in French and reduce the demand for translation. He suggested that the division should think about developing a system which could produce an annual revision of CFP 121(5).

The DGOL discussed the lack of co-ordination of the work being done in the translation area and suggested that a co-ordination system should be developed to monitor the translation of important documents, especially documents dealing with technical matters. He added that the problem should be considered in the context of an overall plan and that the possibility of establishing such a system, perhaps an automated one, should be examined in 1981.<sup>167</sup>

These equivocations were not good enough, and senior officials of the Department were forced to admit to the Joint Committee on Official Languages in November 1981 that they had not made very much progress in this field.<sup>168</sup> They went on to dwell upon the problems inherent in translating documentation for the F-15 (an aircraft that Canada did not possess) and the Aurora; in the latter case, 67 publications of 400 pages each had to be translated. Needless to say, none of the witnesses to the Committee mentioned the bilingualism clause which should have been included in the contract for the Aurora, and none of the MPs or Senators present confronted the officials with the fact that they had failed to act on their own directive.

However, there was some progress on other translation fronts. Mobile Command obtained a translation module in 1982 when the translation services at Saint-Jean and Saint-Hubert were amalgamated. Henceforth, there would be a staff of 25\* at Saint-Hubert, and for a start they had about three million words to translate.<sup>169</sup> In 1987, this would be the only Command to have such a module devoted exclusively to the Command and its units but working in collaboration with DTTC so as to avoid overlapping. This success came after many years of trying to bring the translators to the users. For example, as far back as 1967, Valcartier had been asking Mobile Command to establish a translator position either at Valcartier or at Saint-Hubert. Because the Secretary of State ultimately turned down the request, FMC HQ, with the support of military authorities in Ottawa, allowed Valcartier in January 1968 to create unofficially a translator position which would officially be an AS-03 position (civilian administrative staff). Essentially, the argument that took place between November 1967 and January 1968 boiled down to this: the

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\* They were a director, two terminologists, three revisers, thirteen translators and six support staff.

Secretary of State provided a regional translation service in Quebec City for all federal departments there that wished to use it. However, it was located in the Montreal area and the military in Valcartier found that it was not quick enough. With French language units about to multiply and an initial mass influx of not very bilingual Anglophones imminent, Valcartier wanted its own translation section. The Secretary of State refusing to budge, the military got around the problem by creating an AS-03 position which would ostensibly provide bilingual editing services but in fact would be required to do a lot of translation in the secretariat at CFB Valcartier.<sup>170</sup>

Two years later, Mobile Command would again exert pressure on the Secretary of State to send two translators from its regional office to FMC HQ at St-Hubert, which at that time had under its control 13 FLUs as well as the experimental one. The regional office agreeing,<sup>171</sup> the first transfers to St-Hubert took place during the months that followed. As the years went by, this would lead to achieving the ultimate goal in 1982. Again, as we have seen in the past, Mobile Command showed leadership. It is surprising that it was the Command where the need for a French presence was the least pressing that succeeded in obtaining the most help with translation. Had Maritime Command and Air Command, or even ADM (Mat), really solved all their problems in this area?

In May 1983, P. Bouchard, who was the director of the military translation portfolio at the Secretary of State, said that out of the 27 million words (100,000 pages) translated in 1982-1983, four million had been supplied to Mobile Command. He estimated that the Canadian Forces would need 100 million words in the next ten years, which included an enormous volume for Mobile Command.<sup>172</sup> According to Lieutenant-Colonel J.M.G. Ouimet, the Saint-Hubert office translated an average of 210,000 words a month in 1983 and several of the Command's bases were linked to it by computer. Valcartier was slated to be booked up in the next few months.<sup>173</sup> As the base could not do all its own translation, most of the work was being sent to the Secretary of State's Quebec City office. The time taken was often too long, however, and it was urgent for Valcartier to be able to Communicate directly with Mobile Command by computer, in order to get certain texts translated quickly which were not necessarily considered by the Québec office as priorities among the requests it received from far and wide.<sup>174</sup>

One of the points which Bouchard emphasized was that there were still instances of documents being translated twice by the Secretary of State, or when a French version already existed. This problem appeared insurmountable; errors of this sort were still being found in 1985<sup>175</sup> and continue to this day. Duplication does not always occur in the way we have

just described. For example, at the meeting in May 1983 and in the presence of DGOL Guy Sullivan, Lieutenant-Colonel Ouimet remarked that NDHQ, which was a National Unit, was sending written material in English to the Commands, which were also National Units, in accordance with the communications matrix. But when these messages had to be passed down to the units, each Command was obliged to translate the same text. Could not the translation be done just once by the originator?<sup>176</sup> The necessary corrective action was not taken until September 1985, when the ADM (Per), Lieutenant-General P.D. Manson, sent a memorandum to remind staff of NDHQ's duty with regard to the documents it published: every order, directive or publication, etc, had to be sent out in both official languages simultaneously if it was intended for large-scale distribution or for French language and English language units alike.<sup>177</sup>

Another point relating to translation appeared in the minutes of a meeting of Base and Command Official Languages Co-ordinators in May 1983: in several places there was still a long way to go simply to provide base routine orders in French; it was even common to read in these orders that the translation would follow.<sup>178</sup>

However, to come back to technical translation, in 1982 the Secretary of State thought that it could teach the French their own language. Phillippe LeQuellec, the Assistant Under-secretary of State (Translation), who was of French origin, declared a little while before his untimely death:

The role that the translator has played in the past has become very important for our technical and scientific development. Canada's traditional support for translation has enabled it to move ahead of France as regards the quality of French in technical and scientific fields. The French lack not only the vocabulary but also the concepts and the capacity to communicate scientific information.<sup>179</sup>

As far as Defence was concerned, one would search in vain for a plausible confirmation of that statement. In 1987, the French submarine *Améthyste* was ready to slip below the waves for months at a time; the Ariane rocket was the only one in the Western World which was producing results; France had state-of-the-art Mirage aircraft and all sorts of advanced communications and other equipment for ground or air forces. "The French lack ... the vocabulary ... the concepts and the capacity to communicate scientific information"? One thing that was quite certain in 1982 was that the Secretary of State had missed the boat as far as technical translation for Defence was concerned. In its 1983-1984 Annual Plan, tabled on 31 March 1983, Defence stated that it had "begun to develop a selective plan for

translating technical publications”<sup>180</sup> Are we reading (in French this time) one of the decisions taken by the Defence Management Committee ... in 1974? Not at all! This beautiful sentence comes after another claiming that this selective plan is one (of two) important initiatives for solving some of the Department’s problems. It is only fair, to remember that Treasury Board was partly responsible for technical translation and that throughout 1983 there were meetings between Defence and Treasury Board to improve communications and to define and solve particular problems.<sup>181</sup> Be that as it may, this type of translation was still a priority for planning purposes, but not a priority when it came to taking action.<sup>182</sup>

The projections of the number of words to be translated in 1983-1984 and 1984-1985 were followed by a note to the effect that technical work instruments were not included. However, after a program had been established, the Department believed that five million words (i.e. the technical documents most widely circulated among Francophone technicians) would be sent in under twelve months for translation and technical verification.<sup>183</sup>

The “pragmatic” approach to technical translation that managers took in the 1970s was far removed from the ideal promoted in 1974, and it produced little in the way of results, as we have seen. In 1979, Tremblay and Wehrle suggested that the problem should be tackled selectively, and in 1981 ADM (Mat) began to explore this option more thoroughly. On 30 August 1982, the Defence Management Committee adopted the principle that the only technical instruments that would be translated were those associated with existing programs and equipment, and that met established criteria; for example, they could be used for training, maintenance, operations and safety purposes.<sup>184</sup> On 19 September 1983, at its 357<sup>th</sup> meeting, the DMC went over the matter once again, this time with the intention of sorting out the details. At this stage, there was a Project Administrator Bilingual Technical Documentation, Lieutenant-Colonel J.L.L.M. Lalonde, supported by his staff. Lalonde’s presentation and the questions which followed brought out the fact that jurisdictional disputes were still a real problem.

The DM requested clarification as to why Operations Manuals were not included in this project as he believed that they should have a fairly high priority. ADM (Per) indicated that these were better handled under Francotrain. ADM (Per) offered to provide the DM with a separate overview on where the CF stood on instruments of work outside those under the ADM (Mat) purview.<sup>185</sup>

The minutes also reveal that the meeting was a rerun, in a different form, of the August 1982 presentation, and in fact this was confirmed by ADM (mat).<sup>186</sup> Progress moreover depended on a program change proposal involving \$100 million over 10 years, which had not yet been presented to the responsible officials in the Department but was “still being developed”.<sup>187</sup> Certain sums, however, had already been budgeted for the translation of technical documents for the Canadian Patrol Frigate Program.<sup>188</sup>

Even at this stage, there were some people in senior management who questioned the need for the operation in progress.

The ADM (Pol) requested clarification as to the soundness of this program. More precisely, he wanted to know whether implementing the program was really essential and whether it was indeed a strict requirement of the Official Languages Act (OLA). All the members of the Committee were in complete agreement that both these factors applied and that all Francophone employees should be able to consult manuals translated into their language. Some trades had a very high failure rate and it was pointed out that this might be partly due to the scarcity of bilingual technical documents (BTD). After noting that machine translation could bring about certain improvements, ADM (Mat) pointed out that, thanks to machine translation, General Motors had been able to provide maintenance manuals for the 1 1/4-ton truck at the same time as it officially handed over the vehicle. However, it was pointed out that no way had yet been found to alleviate the safety problem, especially in regard to validation, where mistakes could have very serious consequences. This problem could be expected to become more acute when the maintenance manuals for the CF-18 were published.<sup>189</sup>

At the September 1983 meeting, a number of decisions were taken which once again avoided the main issue. Thus, consultations would be begun with the Treasury Board Secretariat and the Commissioner of Official Languages — the Department needed the Commissioner’s endorsement in order to put pressure on the Board; Defence would continue to exchange information on machine translation with the Secretary of State; criteria for selecting the documents to be translated would be improved, and a program change proposal would be developed within the next two months. Finally, the Defence Management Committee called for a progress report on technical translation before the end of 1983.<sup>190</sup>

As we have seen, when the Department made haste, it did not necessarily move any faster. It was hardly surprising, then, when we examine the August 1985 special report on FRANCOTRAIN, to find a litany of familiar excuses. For example, there were complaints of overlapping responsibilities, lack of coordination in translation and priorities being decided in at least three

different sections of NDHQ, not to mention the Commands and schools, which also had their own set of values. The quantity of instructional material for technical courses that had not been translated was so enormous that “NDHQ, the Commands and schools must work together to establish an order of priorities on this matter”.<sup>191</sup> The quality of existing technical translations was frequently challenged, which delayed the start of courses in French and led to schools refusing to have documents translated. At Mobile Command, however, the translation module was deeply involved in what went on. The translators visited their clients and were proud to show how seriously they took their work. As a result of this close cooperation, Mobile Command schools got better translations than the other schools. The bilingualism clause was not always honoured in supply contracts but when it was, translation services saw their workload on the manuals side stabilizing and were consequently able to devote more time to courses.<sup>192</sup>

The relevant recommendations of the specific report read as follows:

[It is recommended that]

DTTC re-examine the priority system for translation of work instruments for Francotrain;

all Commands ... adopt an FMC-style translation cell to be used in support of their Schools; and

material that is necessary for the student be translated immediately, followed by the translation of CTSS, CTPs and Lesson Plans.<sup>193\*</sup>

Is it not amazing to read this in 1985, after all the efforts made since 1971 to provide translation for FRANCOTRAIN? The truth of the matter is that FRANCOTRAIN had broken down; translation was not needed for new courses because there were no competent instructors to teach them, so the priorities for translators had been transferred to other sectors, especially administrative translation, which was supposed to have been more or less completed in 1976.

It is hardly surprising that, when the Commissioner of Official Languages accused the Department in January 1987 of standing still, the third sector he cited was technical translation. At that point, almost 90% of administrative publications were available in both languages compared with only 5% of

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\* CTS=Course Training Standards; CTPs=Course Training Program.

technical documents — 13 years after the decisions taken by the Defence Management Committee in 1974, which should have made it possible to abolish this anomaly by 1987 or 1989. What is more, the Department used those unilingual documents as an excuse for designating unilingual English positions.<sup>194</sup>

The DGOL, of course, preferred to dwell on what had been accomplished. Thus he informed the Ministers in February 1987 that he had put a stop to the NDHQ practice of issuing orders and directives in English only with the phrase “French to follow” at the bottom. Now, these documents were in fact being published in both languages simultaneously. As to technical publications, DGOL recalled that it had been decided in 1984 to allocate \$71 million to the clearing up of the 300,000-page backlog within ten years; 60,000 pages would be done by April 1988. The policy of selective translation would be pursued in accordance with carefully chosen criteria. In cooperation with the Secretary of State, the Department would continue its efforts to reduce backlogs both by making use of contracts and by discussing the “envelopes” allocated to Defence.\* A Departmental directive was being prepared which would, among other things, clarify responsibilities and priorities by dividing the Defence envelope into sub-envelopes for the Department’s various components. Finally, there would be greater emphasis on the whole question of the standard bilingualism clause in contracts. At the worst, managers would have to see that any translations which the supplier was unable to produce were done in time for the delivery of the new equipment.<sup>195</sup>

Having said this, we should not shut our eyes to the real constraints with which the Forces were faced in this area. In 1987, the backlog was estimated to be four million pages and the cost of producing a page in bilingual format was between \$350 and \$600, depending on the complexity of the work. The project was going to cost between \$1.4 and \$2.4 billion. Moreover, suppliers were often very reluctant to produce bilingual manuals. Some were afraid that poor translations might cause problems that would involve them in expensive lawsuits; they therefore quoted astronomical translation costs or simply refused to provide bilingual publications. Yet this was not a ban to their getting the contract. The Canadair Challenger aircraft was a case in point: the

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\* From 1985 on, the Secretary of State held discussions with each department to determine the number of words that would be translated. The ceiling arrived at could not be exceeded: in 1985-1986, Defence was allowed a maximum of 27,000,000 words. The Department had to use its own funds for anything beyond that. In 1986-1987, Defence was given funds to translate 22,000,000 words.

unilingual manuals accompanying the aircraft cost \$3.2 million. Treasury Board in November 1986 authorized the expenditure of \$6.7 million to replace them with bilingual manuals in a side-by-side format. The frigate contracts were awarded without a bilingualism clause, because the two competing companies simply refused to provide an estimate on this aspect of the job. DND had to put \$15 million aside to cover it. It was the same story with the CF-18. On the other hand, the land element did better with the Iltis jeep, the 1 1/4-ton truck and the Leopard tank. In the early part of 1987, 338 out of 349 contracts that required estimates included the bilingualism clause to cover accompanying documentation but, as the DGOL pointed out, the bilingualism clause was often dropped between the initial stage and the time the contract was actually signed. There were also other constraints, among which we must include the persistence of serious defects in computerized translation, and the fact that verification of translations continued to be a bottleneck because Defence was short of qualified personnel. Finally, the Defence translation envelope had been reduced from 27 million to 22 million words. It had indeed been increased by 3 million words for 1987-1988, but with the proviso that the original estimates for 1988-1989 would stand. Since technical translation in 1987-1988 would be about 18 million words, very little would be left for other areas.<sup>196</sup>

That was essentially the message that Lieutenant-General John de Chastelain, Adm (Per), gave to the Standing Parliamentary Committee on Defence on 19 May 1987. He added that he was in favour of creating translation cells in other Commands similar to the one in Mobile Command (an internal recommendation on these lines had been made in 1985, but thus far no concrete action had been taken). He admitted that the combined effect of backlogs in translation and the delay in producing bilingual Anglophones was holding up FRANCOTRAIN. During the period for questions from members of the Parliamentary Committee, de Chastelain had to explain that only the highly technical pages cost over \$300 to produce in bilingual format and that this figure included all stages (translation, revision, verification, composition and publication). He admitted that most translations cost much less: for example, the Treasury Board Secretariat had issued a directive requiring that documents of under 500 words should be translated by those who prepared them.<sup>197</sup> A few days later, D.B. Dewar, the Deputy Minister, repeated very briefly, this time to the Joint Committee on Official Languages, the situation report which Sullivan had presented in February. The few questions that were asked were quite easily avoided, no doubt because the historical aspect of the question had been ignored, unlike the recollections of the Committee members regarding other facets of B & B in the Canadian Armed Forces.<sup>198</sup> In answer to a question on possible co-operation between Canada, France and Belgium on translation, Major-General Richard Evraire,



who was at that time Canadian co-chairman of the Franco-Canadian Military Co-operation Committee, assured members of Parliament that discussions on terminology did take place. In addition, there had been joint exercises in the three services which “had enabled Canadians to understand better how things were done in the French Army, Navy and Air Force. A few of the words (used by one or the other) were different.”<sup>199</sup>

The Department’s officials seemed to be much more receptive in 1987 than they had been in 1978 when they faced the devastating special report by Keith Spicer, Commissioner of Official Languages at the time. In fact, the Associate Minister, Paul Dick, wrote as follows to Commissioner D’Iberville Fortier in June 1987:

The Department will settle the complaint about bilingual work instruments in the following way: it will include a clause in all invitations to tender requiring the supplier to provide bilingual documentation, it will implement the new Treasury Board directives on bilingualism in the electronic data-processing field, and over the next ten years will have a limited number of technical documents translated in accordance with strict priorities and criteria, using Canadian firms in collaboration with the Secretary of State and the Treasury Board Secretariat.<sup>200</sup>

Although these measures are by no means new, one can only hope that this time they will produce the intended results.

By 1987 it was quite obvious that the training of Francophones in French was suffering because of the tremendous delay in translation.<sup>201</sup> The editor of *Assessment of the Last 15 Years on Bilingualism* noted briefly in the 1980 (Military) Official Languages Plan, beside goal 38 (make bilingual work instruments available to personnel, wherever they may be required), all the shortcomings that we have mentioned and ended with a laconic “not achieved”.<sup>202</sup> The same comment appears after goal 39 (the standard clause in contracts).<sup>203</sup> The body of the text is peppered with comments on defects in translation which it would be tedious to repeat. They do, however, have the merit of putting translation in its context; that is to say, within the framework of the 1972 program which sought to equalize opportunities between Anglophones and Francophones.<sup>204</sup>

Unfortunately, this fundamental aspect of the problem was often absent from discussions in the period from 1974 to 1987.

Indeed, to judge from a DTTC document dated 22 April 1988 (written in English only by a Francophone, Lieutenant-Colonel S. Viel, twenty years after

Allard began his efforts), some persons even then still suffered from tunnel vision. The document contained, moreover, a paragraph entitled “Quality of Translation” which took issue with the language used by translators as being beyond the educational level of the user.<sup>205</sup> Another senior officer (writing in French this time) made the following remarks on the subject:

In my opinion, it is too simplistic and quite unacceptable to lay the blame for poor communication on the shoulders of translators. The comment that the language translators use is so abstruse as to be incomprehensible is simply nonsense. In my opinion, there is only one way to write a language: the right way. The constant complaint we have heard for so long, “this is Parisian French and my Francophones don’t understand it,” comes from people who are not sufficiently bilingual and use this as an excuse for their own inadequacy or ... from Francophones who have not worked in their mother-tongue for many years. Finally, what I deplore most often is that paragraph 13 smacks of prejudice and implies that the majority of French-Canadian service personnel are morons! As the comment was written in English, the paragraph will be read with great interest and will confirm certain people’s own prejudices, especially as the author is himself a Francophone. It is quite obvious that our recommendation in this case should be, first, to reject paragraph 13 and, second, to make sure that DUC and the Language Bureau do not meddle in any way with the exceptional quality of language we are accustomed to receive from translators.<sup>206</sup>

We may take Lieutenant-Colonel Y. Falardeau’s exasperation with a grain of salt, but it came from the heart and deserved to be said out loud. Obviously, Viel’s view should not be rejected entirely; his description of the translation situation repeats what we already know. For instance, the Department asked the Secretary of State for 36 million words for 1987-1988; it was given 24 million and told that this maximum would almost certainly not be increased in the near future. Current translation was estimated at 20 million words a year, leaving only four million for catching up with arrears, which was not sufficient. That was why the Department was already subsidizing translation from its own funds (the \$71 million voted in 1984) and might have to do more.<sup>207</sup> Not a word was said, however, about the beneficial effect that would have resulted if the standard bilingualism clause in contracts for new equipment had been applied from 1973-1974 onwards. Millions of “technical” words had been added to the translation load during those 13 years which quite simply should not have been there.

### **Institutional Bilingualism**

The reader is already well aware that institutional bilingualism — the capacity of the Canadian Forces to be able to address Canadians in either of the

country's two official languages — was a long way from achievement, if only because military bilingual positions (or civilian positions, as we shall see in Chapter 18) were not staffed adequately. Even if the conclusion to this section is more or less obvious to anyone who has read the book carefully to now, we thought it would be advisable to deal briefly here with two major topics: the making of CFAO 36-39 and the story of CANEX.

Among the numerous initiatives taken by the Forces at the end of the 1960s to encourage bilingualism, some appear now to be irreversible, at least in the short term. One of these was the *Personnel Bulletin*, which today appears in a single, bilingual format but had begun publication in English and French under separate covers in August 1966. One of the drawbacks of that original decision was the possibility that the French version might not be available wherever Francophones were serving (for example, to a Francophone sailor on the west coast).

In the case of *Sentinelle*, the Canadian Forces news magazine, the Department had to opt for separate copies in each language. It had been agreed when publication in French first began that the contents would consist partly of translations and partly of original French articles, which could be translated into English for *Sentinel*. The distribution problem soon came to haunt the project's sponsors. In April 1970, it was in fact suggested that the magazine (and other material in French which, at that time, was frequently published under a different cover from the English original) should only be distributed in places where Francophones were numerous. Col. P. Chassé then pointed out that there were Francophones everywhere, in larger or smaller numbers, all of them with a right to be served in French, and that Anglophones who had become bilingual wanted to keep up their French, which French reading matter could help them to do.<sup>209</sup> The distribution of *Sentinelle* is very thorough and complete but, almost unavoidably, it is still unavailable in some English-speaking parts of the country.

The administration of the Forces has been profoundly affected in many ways by the various official languages programs that we have already touched upon. They have left their mark on a whole series of such manuals as Canadian Forces Addresses, Volume I, Messages and Mailing, and the CFAO series (see Appendix P). Let us take a closer look at the one publication that has probably had the greatest and most direct influence on Canadians outside the Department of Defence, namely CFAO 36-39, Signs and Markings in the Canadian Forces.

Let us go back to 1961-1962, when, as the reader will recall, successive Associate Ministers of Defence called on military establishments in Quebec and the National Capital Region to put up bilingual signs. Their belated efforts had limited success. A fresh attempt was made in Allard's time, but it was far from comprehensive, especially in its initial form. Because of unification, signs and markings on mobile equipment had to be changed. The study conducted in 1967 nevertheless came to the conclusion that, since the international language of aviation was English, aircraft only needed to be labelled "Canadian Armed Forces", and Allard agreed. In August 1967, the Chief of Technical Services (CTS) at CFHQ noted this decision, to which he had made a substantial contribution, as was quite proper. However, the Minister, Paul Hellyer (a former airman), was not satisfied; he wanted aircraft to be identified in both languages.<sup>210</sup> Accordingly, message CST-29 dated 15 February 1968 was sent to the units concerned explaining the new system of markings on aircraft, with English on the port side and French on the starboard side. For aircraft engaged in search and rescue, "Rescue" and "*Sauvetage*" would be used.<sup>211</sup> This again resulted from a decision taken by the CDS at a meeting held on 20 December 1967.<sup>212</sup>

Suddenly, in September 1968, Air Transport Command raised objections to the term "*sauvetage*" on its specialized aircraft. These grammarians declared that the term was incorrect and could be interpreted as meaning "salvage". Moreover, again according to these «experts», even the French only used the word "rescue".<sup>213</sup> At CFHQ there was complete support for the word "rescue", which was functional (whatever that may mean), recognized and used by all similar organizations around the world.<sup>214</sup> On 3 October, Lieutenant-General Sharp, the VCDS, suggested to Allard that "rescue" be the only word. Sharp was apparently not as convinced as his colleagues, however, because he wrote that "it seems" that this term is used by "all NATO countries, including France".<sup>215</sup>

On two occasions, on 24 September and 10 October, Chassé intervened, unsuccessfully, to try putting an end to this foolishness. His argument was simple. He had taken the trouble to check with the French air attaché, who had told him that in his country the words "*sauvetage*" and "*secours*" were used to express the idea conveyed by "rescue" in English. Chassé maintained that, notwithstanding the experts in the Command, the word "*sauvetage*" did not always mean "salvage". As far as he was concerned, he wanted to hold to the message sent out on 15 February 1968, especially because the word "*sauvetage*" appeared in the English-French naval dictionary under "rescue".<sup>216</sup> One might legitimately ask if: a person who is being saved from a dangerous situation, whether on land or sea, is really upset by reading (if he or she

is in a fit state to read) “*Sauvetage/Rescue*” on an approaching aircraft? If Air Transport Command had simply obeyed the directive issued on 15 February 1968, would it have harmed its operations in any way? It was going to have to change the markings on its aircraft in any case.

In preparation for Bill C-120, the Defence Council decided in July 1969 that the Department would provide visual bilingualism on all its vehicles, ships and aircraft and at all its establishments. It had therefore to take stock of the situation and issue new instructions which would comply with the language equality requirement forcefully expressed in the new law.<sup>217</sup> DIPB message no. 25 dated 29 August 1969 explained that all Forces vehicles had to be identified in both languages in compliance with the Official Languages Act. Chassé received a great deal of feedback at the beginning of September. For example, the *R22<sup>e</sup>R* unit, which was then on United Nations duty in Cyprus, informed him that its vehicles were identified in accordance with UN directives.<sup>218</sup> One could not argue with that. Gagetown implied that the order would be obeyed, but reluctantly. Its vehicles would be identified in both languages by April 1970. Nameplates on buildings and office doors, however, would not be brought up to standard until 1970-1971.<sup>219</sup> Ottawa HQ was amending publication 121-1, which described signage to be used on doors and buildings.<sup>220</sup> Elsewhere, the questions raised were of a practical nature. For example, London, Ontario responded that vehicles for its recruiting staff already had bilingual markings, but did cars used by Military Police also have to be identified in both languages? Chassé replied that they did.<sup>221</sup>

Two matters came up very frequently: one was cost, since the Department's budget was frozen, the other was the standardization of identification. On the first question of costs, what happened at the Petawawa base is of interest. Petawawa sent a terse message on 9 September that the changes to signboards and markings required by Bill C-120 were estimated at \$35,000. The base would begin making the changes when the necessary human and financial resources had been received (it did not specify from whom).<sup>222</sup> Fortunately, Petawawa came under Mobile Command, which was the only functional HQ to provide funds for this purpose in 1969-1970. The other commands did not follow suit until 1970-1971.<sup>223</sup>

Many of the questions or comments which Chassé received were concerned with standardization. No one wanted to put manpower or money into visual bilingualism only to have NDHQ reject their efforts afterwards. The Chief of Personnel therefore asked the Chief of Technical Services,

Lieutenant-General L.C.C. Lilley, to review current policies and make changes where necessary.<sup>224</sup>

On 5 November, the directive had still not arrived.<sup>225</sup> Two days later, a message to all concerned announced that, when they had been taken, complete decisions on the form, design details and production of signs and markings would be circulated. However, bilingual signboards at the entrance to bases could be produced in the meantime using the 3 September revision of CFTI 10-3-1. The others would have to wait.<sup>226</sup> Questions continued to pour in while they were waiting. The Director of Security, who was responsible for Military Police, wanted his men's vehicles to be identified in both languages only in regions where Francophones were numerous; Chassé refused.<sup>227</sup>

The directives gradually arrived, but they had little effect, or they had been poorly thought out. For example, in 1970 aircraft were identified in both languages:<sup>228</sup> all the English was on the left, the side on which one boards and leaves the aircraft, and all the French was on the right, the side hardly ever seen. It was not decided until December 1970 how land combat arms vehicles would be identified.<sup>229</sup>

These piecemeal responses did not eliminate all the gaps. The Official Languages Commissioner's first report, covering 1970-1971, dealt with a complaint about the unilingual licence plates on the Department's vehicles.<sup>230</sup> At about the same time, Colonel Fournier, commenting on recommendations 3 and 4 in Book 5 of the B & B Commission's report, stated that very good progress had been made in placing a bilingual text on signboards and signs, and that this task would be completed by 1 January 1973.<sup>231</sup> The fact remains that, despite directives made three years previously, some signboards at the entrance to bases were still in English only, in November 1971. General Dextraze pointed this out to the Commander of Mobile Command when discussing the base at Wainwright, Alberta, where the 1<sup>er</sup> *Commando* of the Airborne Regiment, an FLU, was stationed; to make matters worse, one of the Official Languages Commissioner's teams had just paid a call there.<sup>232</sup>

Not everyone was satisfied with what had already been done, especially the quality of French and where it had been placed in relation to the English, as in the case of the aircraft. On the whole, co-ordination was lacking. This had been noticed as early as the end of 1970 by the Chief of Technical Services, who had asked an officer in the office of the Directorate of Technical Resources Management to prepare a directive on co-ordination which could be easily understood and was consistent with the implementation of B & B in the Canadian Forces.<sup>233</sup> In fact, this would become a new CFAO.


In June 1971, a draft was circulated for comments, due in by 19 July<sup>234</sup> CFAO 36-39 was finally promulgated in February 1972,<sup>235</sup> a 1986 copy can be found in Appendix Q. One aspect of the 1972 version led to the resumption of work on aircraft because it said that: “it is not permissible to place markings in only one language on opposite sides of a piece of equipment” (see paragraph 5 of Appendix Q). In fact, the Official Languages Commissioner cited a complaint which he received on this subject, in his 1972-1973 report.<sup>236</sup> The navy managed to slip through the Commissioner’s net for twelve years with its historic abbreviation HMCS (Her Majesty’s Canadian Ship), which was not changed to *NCSM* (*Navire canadien de Sa Majesté*) until 1984.<sup>237</sup>

Paragraph 14 of the 1972 CFAO stated that the whole visual bilingualism program should be completed by December 1973. In January 1972, Letellier saw two long years’ work ahead of him in order to comply with the order that he had himself prepared. Nevertheless, he put forward a priorities plan for military establishments in the National Capital Region.<sup>238</sup> During their 1973 briefing tour, the DGBB staff found that visual bilingualism had produced very good results in a number of places but there were many defects overall. After visiting CFS Moisie, Hanna wrote to the Commander of Air Defence Command, praising the excellent work done by Lieutenant-Colonel André Cimon, who was in command there.<sup>239</sup> Outside Quebec, however, there was generally a great deal to be done, or redone, because spelling was often bizarre, as Letellier found when visiting London, Lahr and Baden.<sup>240</sup>

Six months before the end of the program, Letellier became worried by what he and members of his staff had seen. Informal discussions led him to believe that it was a lack of funds that had slowed down implementation of the CFAO. He suggested that the necessary funds should be taken from the supplementary budget provided by Treasury Board to Defence for B & B, in September 1972, and channelled to needy bases through the Commands (we shall come back to B & B finances at DND later in this chapter). Letellier also asked the Director of Construction Engineering (Control) (DCEC) to make a quick appraisal of the situation.<sup>241</sup>



HMCS *Ottawa* was the first ship in the Canadian Armed Forces to be designated as a naval French language unit. It was replaced by the *Skeena*, a ship of the same type as the *Ottawa*. Since then, the *Algonquin*, a more modern ship, has also become a naval French language unit.



CF-18 aircraft from 433 Squadron flying in formation. The Squadron is stationed at Bagotville, Québec.



The action moved immediately to ADM (Mat) via the VCDS, who was surprised that the December 1973 deadline could not be met. While he agreed that in some places lack of funds was a valid excuse, he also pointed out that the generals commanding had sufficient flexibility in their budgets to fill the gaps. Finally, the VCDS asked whether it would be possible to meet the deadline if additional funds were provided.<sup>242</sup>

ADM (Mat) L.G. Crutchlow, a retired general, replied to the VCDS on 30 July that it would require a total of \$409,000 divided between the various Commands to complete the visual bilingualism program. In spite of this sum, Mobile Command was afraid that work would have to continue beyond the December 1973 completion date. Crutchlow could not understand what had happened. He recalled that \$3.6 million had been allocated to the Commands under the heading of construction (which included signboards and markings) and that generals commanding had authority to approve projects up to \$25,000, a ceiling which would generally cover the cost of putting visual bilingualism in place at a base or station. He concluded that the heads of the Commands had given a very low priority to signboards and markings and they should perhaps be reminded of the deadline they had been given.<sup>243</sup>

Finally, the question was dealt with by the Department's Program Control Office, on 29 September 1973. Funds would be released, but the December 1973 deadline would not be met.<sup>244</sup> Indeed, a year later, the following would appear in a report:

One of the more graphic indications that the equal status of the two languages is recognized and respected is the presence of bilingual signs. Bilingual signs are also a prerequisite to the provision of services of equal quality in both languages. CFAO 36-39 set a deadline of December 1973 as the date by which all signs and markings found in the Department were to be in bilingual form. However, major constraints such as increased cost of materials and manpower have delayed full achievement of this objective. It is estimated that nearly 95% of all signs and markings are now bilingual. The few that are still unilingual are in the process of being produced.<sup>245</sup>

A few months previously, the Department had openly expressed the hope that its signs would be bilingual by April 1975.<sup>246</sup> But what did the Commissioner of Official Languages find in 1977? He found that this deadline had not been met; that the translations which had been done were frequently incorrect; that there was no proper co-ordination; and that the two languages were not always given equal prominence. Moreover, search and rescue helicopters, "and more particularly the ones used for publicity and information purposes, still [carried] the sole identification RESCUE. The addition of

SAUVETAGE [would] do much to increase the Canadian public's awareness of the role of this aircraft ... How [could] any federal organization justify in 1977 the use of unilingual signs and markings?"<sup>247</sup> The Commissioner's recommendations on this subject were:

ensure that by 31 October 1978, all informational and directional signs at NDHQ, Bases and DND establishments, and those elsewhere for which the Department is responsible, are bilingual and free from grammatical and spelling errors;

ensure that by 31 March 1978, all DND vehicle, ship and aircraft markings are bilingual, both in Canada and abroad, and that all DND-owned auxiliary equipment such as steps for aircraft, gangways, and fueling equipment bear departmental identification in both official languages.<sup>248</sup>

In October 1978, the Department reported that these two recommendations had been partially implemented.<sup>249</sup> In May 1983, five years later, more instances of unilingualism in this area were found in various parts of Canada.<sup>250</sup> In 1987, after consulting a number of official documents, we were obliged to conclude that the letter of CFAO 36-39 of 1972 was still only incompletely implemented, even if a great deal of progress had been made, as indicated in the November 1987 Assessment which said, under this heading: "All permanent notices and signs are posted in a bilingual format".<sup>251</sup>

In this case, as in all the others that we have mentioned, it could have been said that a general directive, even when backed by a detailed administrative order and a special allocation of funds, is not enough to change old habits. Let us now look at another individual case.

## CANEX

The mandate of CANEX, as we know it today, is to procure goods and services for its authorized patrons, at an appropriate place and time and at reasonable cost, and to administer funds to support recreational, morale and welfare programs for its patrons and their families.<sup>252</sup> Before going any further, let us look at how it began.

A Regimental Funds Board, originally known as the Board of Adjustment and Custody of Regimental Funds, was set up in England on 15 October 1916. The Board was to prevent waste caused by overbuying — which had led to the unnecessary accumulation of goods in the regiments — and to recover the profits made by military canteens. The Board was dissolved on 19 September 1919 after its members returned to Canada.<sup>253</sup> A similar board

existed in Canada but for a shorter time — from 19 January to 4 December 1919, when the Auditor General (Canada) took over its responsibilities until all accumulated funds had been redistributed.<sup>254</sup>

Between 1920 and 1940, messes and canteens were administered by those who used them, without any control from HQs in Ottawa other than financial auditing. This helped to create among the members a feeling of loyalty to the mess or canteen which they belonged to and owned. However, when the Second World War came, it became imperative to have effective control over all these assets. It was therefore decided in February 1940 to reinstate a Regimental Funds Board to advise the Adjutant-General on matters concerning messes and canteens and to inspect and audit regimental funds in Canada. The Board had no jurisdiction over the funds of units overseas.<sup>255</sup>

In April 1940, an agreement was reached between four national voluntary organizations — the Knights of Columbus, the Salvation Army, the Canadian Legion and the YMCA — and the Crown, which was represented by the Department. The agreement stipulated that these organizations would procure as sporting activities, reading materials, entertainment, canteens and other services for the welfare of the troops. A number of canteens were therefore set up in camps; 5% of gross sales of each canteen was transferred to the regimental funds of the unit using it and the money was employed for the benefit of the troops.<sup>256</sup> This procedure became the cornerstone on which subsequent services of a similar kind were built.

When the Army's strength was increased after 1950, the DND launched a program to develop permanent residential quarters at regular Forces bases. In order to make them more attractive for military personnel and their families, they had to be provided with clubs, recreation centres, theatres, grocery stores and service stations, for example. At the same time, the overseas contingents in Korea and Germany experienced the same needs. At first, the Canadian Forces did not have time to set up such services, since training requirements, the Korean War, and the problems associated with establishing a Canadian military community in a foreign country demanded a great deal of attention. Our units in Germany were therefore served by the British NAAFI (Navy, Army and Air Force Institutes).

Gradually the hectic pace moderated, and there was time to think about providing Canadian services for our soldiers abroad. The Department studied the British NAAFI and the American PX and found that their administration was centralized. It was then agreed that the same formula should be adopted for the Canadian Army. In 1954 the Maple Leaf Service was born. It did not cover the Navy or Air Force because their structure and methods of operation

were different and they preferred to continue running their services in a less centralized way.<sup>257</sup>

Thus non-public funds activities were managed differently in the three elements. The Army had its own incorporated company, the Maple Leaf Service; the managing director was a civilian but the rest of the board of directors consisted of senior army officers with a chairman appointed by the CGS. The Navy's functional unit was the fleet or ship. The Commander had ultimate responsibility but usually delegated operations to the supply officer. The Air Force to some extent copied the Navy, its functional unit being the base or station.<sup>258</sup>

In 1966, a team chaired by Rear-Admiral C.J. Dillon was formed to study a common system for managing non-public funds in the three elements of the Canadian Forces. The results of the study were presented to the CDS in July 1967 and its recommendations were discussed at a meeting of the Defence Council in September 1967, which endorsed the new concept, known as CANEX (Canadian Armed Forces Exchange System).<sup>259</sup> It was agreed that CANEX would not be a Crown Corporation or have the status of a civilian company (which Maple Leaf had, for example) but would instead be an integral part of the Department of National Defence. A new division was therefore established in the Chief of Personnel Branch. Its first director general was Brigadier-General C.H. Mussells, who had the task of assembling the staff needed to work out the final details for implementing CANEX.

According to the original plan, the role of DG CANEX would be confined to issuing technical directives to retail stores, grocery stores, snack bars, car clubs and service stations regarding the resale of goods. Purchasing would be done by the CANEX central office, which would then offer the merchandise to individual units of sale by means of a Merchandise Offer Bulletin. Managing the resale side would be a military responsibility. A certain number of military personnel would therefore be needed at head office to manage operations, and on each base an officer would be appointed BXO (Base CANEX Officer). On ships and at stations, duties relating to CANEX would be included in the job description of one of the military personnel. In addition, civilians would be used at the points of sale and in the Ottawa offices.<sup>260</sup> CANEX is directed by senior officers. On the bases, the Base Commander has authority over operations although, technically, his specialist officer reports to DG CANEX at NDHQ.

From the moment CANEX came on the scene on 1 October 1968, the subject of bilingualism was raised through the medium of non-public funds directive 15/68. Appendix B of this directive stated that all signs identifying a

CANEX had to be bilingual, whether inside or outside the building. Notices giving hours of business and displays also had to be in both languages in the following places:

- a. the National Capital Region;
- b. the Province of Quebec;
- c. where there was sufficient demand; and
- d. in bilingual districts and in establishments outside Canada.

However, the titles CANEX and EX would be used without any alteration on French signs.<sup>261</sup> The reason for this was that these terms were considered to be logos; that is to say, expressions which could be used in both languages. Even so, there were initially nine spelling errors in the bilingual sign at Lahr and it took about a year to correct them.

Colonel Chassé wanted the bilingualism policy to include the hiring of bilingual personnel and translating work instruments into French in places where, according to Directive 15/68, there were considerable numbers of Francophones.<sup>262</sup> As a result, CANEX did in fact put bilingual people in several stores at Bagotville, Valcartier and Lahr, Germany.

The French army in Germany happened to use the word *Economat* to designate shops which fulfilled the same role as CANEX. Canadian military personnel stationed at Lahr and Baden, who had ready access to nearby French bases, began to use the term *Economat* for CANEX. The translators assigned to CANEX also used *Economat* to translate “exchange” (base retail store). Little by little *Economat* took root to the point where, when the annual report on the Personnel Support Program was presented in 1971, the French version was entitled *Les Economats des Forces canadiennes* (CANEX).

In 1970, the on-site manpower evaluation team did a study of public funds that went to support to non-public funded activities. Of the 1,093 public positions which existed on 1 April 1960, 568 would be eliminated by 1 April 1973.<sup>263</sup> Such cuts were being made throughout the Forces and were slowing down the hiring of Francophones as well.

In 1970, after a meeting of the Quebec Regional Council, Major J.E. Norenus, who represented CANEX HQ, asked that a start be made on translating the CANEX system’s financial statements and operational forms. In

addition, the Major received a directive from his HQ on 3 December telling him to speed up the publication of the non-public funds directives which had been sent for translation on 20 October, 1969.<sup>264</sup> However, in view of the large number of amendments which had been made to them in the meantime, it was decided not to proceed with translation.

The Program to increase B & B in the Forces, sent to Treasury Board in 1972, had essentially been prepared the previous year. The Director General Personnel Services, to whom the Director of CANEX reported, had made his contribution as early as August 1971.<sup>265</sup> This became activity 128 in the program, which admitted that bilingual services had been difficult to provide because of the lack of qualified human resources. The situation, however, would be reviewed in 1972.<sup>266</sup> The Director of CANEX did issue a directive in April 1972 requiring that “Canadian Forces CANEX establishments communicate with and offer their services to authorized clients in both official languages in the National Capital Region, designated bilingual districts and regions where there is a significant demand”.<sup>267</sup> In general terms:

The objectives of the Canex policy on bilingualism are to ensure that the English and French languages and cultures possess and enjoy equality of status and equal rights as to their use in Canex.<sup>268</sup>

Section 1513 of Canadian Forces Publication 191(1) dealt with communications within the Canadian Forces and specifies:

Communications between base exchanges, NDHQ/D Canex, and other elements of the CF shall be based to the extent practical on the following principles:

- a. base exchanges and NDHQ/D Canex shall use their working language for internal written and oral communication;
- b. external communications shall normally be originated in the working language of the originating unit; and
- c. replies to correspondence shall normally be made *in the working language of the unit originating the reply*.<sup>\*</sup>

\* Authors' italics. The “unit originating the reply” was corrected by D CANEX’s administrative instruction No 6 dated 1 April 1977 (SGDDN 1655-2), which says “in the language of the originator”. In 1984, CFP 191(1) had still not been corrected in accordance with D CANEX Administrative Instruction no. 6.

### Section 1514 dealt with communications with the public:

Base exchanges and NDHQ/D Canex shall observe the following principles when communicating with the public:

- a. the language of the addressee shall determine the choice of English or French when originating correspondence with the public; and
- c. replies shall be made in the language of the original correspondence.

### Section 1515 described how the principles were to be applied:

The principles enunciated above shall apply to all types of communication initiated by Canex, including the following:

- a. Canex manuals, guides, and bulletins shall be issued in bilingual format;
- b. local orders, directives, instructions, forms, notices, informative leaflets, merchandising displays, signs, or advertising, and other printed notices shall be printed in the working language of the unit, or in bilingual format if they are intended for use in the National Capital Region, in bilingual districts, or in other locations in which there is a significant number of Service personnel of both language groups; and
- c. all Canex services provided to authorized patrons shall be available in both official languages in the National Capital Region, in bilingual districts, and in other locations where there are such a significant number of authorized patrons of both language groups as to warrant provision of the service in both languages.<sup>269</sup>

Not everyone was pleased with the CANEX bilingualism policy. The manager of the marketing division in Ottawa, A.T. Bowlby, made no bones about his reservations in a memorandum dated 10 January 1973, where he disregards the client's right to be served in his or her language against the right of CANEX employees to work in theirs. As the business language of North America was English, Bowlby contended, thousands of dollars would be saved by no longer translating directives, instructions, forms, and so on and concentrating bilingualism efforts exclusively on points of sale. He pointed out that a very small number of copies were made of some of the documents produced in Ottawa because they were only intended for CANEX officers. Why translate them, when all of those officers were able to work in English?<sup>270</sup>

The Director of CANEX, Colonel E.M. Boucher, did not agree with Bowlby. On 29 January, he replied that the predominance of English in North America should not prevent CANEX from complying with the Department's B & B directives, whether they dealt with employees or customers. He reiterated that, apart from a few exceptions (for example, the exorbitant cost of conference interpretation or lack of space for French on coupons), everything would be bilingual. Thus, Commissioner of Official Languages would have no cause for complaint.<sup>271</sup>

At this stage, we should stress a point about the training of CANEX employees. In 1972, only CANEX military officers received special training, in a six-week course given by the US Navy.<sup>272</sup> Those who took it had to have a very good knowledge of English. However, in a continuing effort to Canadianize its organization, CANEX announced in June 1973, in its second report on training, that the first home-study course had been developed, translated and was available to CANEX personnel. Three more such courses would go through this process and be completed by February 1974, to replace training taken outside the country.<sup>273</sup> Those responsible for this task were known as the Promotion Committee, which was composed of Major (ret.) A.R. Harvey (chairman), Major J.O.M. Leblanc, Captain L.E. Stewart and Warrant Officer P.J. Larouche.

The Committee's achievements during its 21 months of existence are worthy of special mention. It conducted, sponsored or co-ordinated 11,550 hours of training for managers, supervisors and employees. It also planned and conducted two-week pilot courses for CANEX officers and managers and helped the Canadian Forces School of Administration and Logistics at Borden to prepare course standards. In addition to doing a little translation, the Committee showed its particular concern for bilingualism by checking French texts, promoting sales, revising translations and compiling a CANEX glossary.<sup>274</sup>

Let us pause for a moment to draw attention to some advances. During a Canadian Cheese Festival in 1974, John Poirier, manager of the CANEX supermarket at CFB Cold Lake, produced a bilingual advertisement which caught the Kraft Company's attention. Kraft's regional marketing manager wrote to Poirier stating that he had seen completely bilingual posters for the first time at Cold Lake, and offered him his warmest congratulations.<sup>275</sup> And when visiting Lahr in May 1973, Letellier noted that there were many bilingual notices and several French-speaking clerks in the CANEX.<sup>276</sup>

In connection with a review of the CANEX B & B program, Major Weber of D CANEX wrote on 25 December 1975:



Attention has also been directed in the area of supplier advertising and packaging to ensure that the provisions of the B & B program are being implemented.

CANEX catalogues, publications, etc., are now produced in bilingual format which appears to satisfy customer and B & B requirements.

Emphasis has been placed on ensuring that adequate supplies of French reading material is available for purchase through Base Exchanges and other outlets. However, experience has shown generally that customer response is minimal outside of predominantly French units. This has resulted in a loss of Non-Public Funds on some bases.

Two areas of concern — the first being the extended delay in the translation service as rendered by the Bureau. Some items are out-of-date by the time the translated material is received for printing and distribution. This in turn has resulted in additional NPF funds being expended for translation services, other than Public, for bilingual retail or commercial material. As for the second, some concern has been expressed with the increased cost to Non-Public Funds for dual advertising and translation expenses incurred by base exchanges.<sup>277</sup>

All written matter that CANEX provides to military personnel or the general public is now in bilingual format. Publications, directives, displays and general announcements have been bilingual since 1972. In 1977, this was extended to advertising bulletins and special offers mailed to customers.<sup>278</sup>

In the CANEX offices in Ottawa, however, everything was done in English, which created problems within the organization. The manager of the CANEX department store at CFB Valcartier sent the following memorandum to D CANEX in September 1976:

To whom it may concern:

This is to inform you that CFB Valcartier is a French-language base. The readers of our local newspaper are French-speaking too. We have no qualified personnel to translate articles for publication in our newspaper.

Would you therefore please send us copy in French in future?<sup>279</sup>

In March 1977, Captain A.A. Jacobson was appointed bilingualism coordinator<sup>280</sup> for the organization by the new D CANEX, Colonel D. McLaws, Letellier's former assistant. In July, Captain J.R.D. Bélanger was appointed French editor.<sup>281</sup> In August, Brigadier-General J.E. Tucker, McLaws' superior, wrote to Letellier regarding translation of official correspondence:

... our departmental translation facilities do not appear capable of responding adequately to the demands ... In addition, the Exchange System, in order to project a responsible corporate image, must issue much of its “business” correspondence in bilingual format.

... Correspondence either “official” or “business”, which must be issued in both official languages, must therefore be translated ...

... [so] one NPF-paid employee [Miss Fraser] — a member of the CANEX personnel staff, completes all translation. She is assisted by the one Francophone military officer on staff [Bélanger], who proof-reads/revises work.

... The bilingual personnel resources of D CANEX are minimal ... and it is generally difficult to obtain service from the Translation Bureau within the time-frame that an agency such as CANEX must work.<sup>282</sup>

In short, Tucker said, CANEX was prepared to make real sacrifices in order to comply with the Department’s policy directives on B & B.

Let us now look in very practical terms at another point mentioned earlier. In February 1977, J.L. Lévesque, principal of the *Ecole Général Georges-Vanier* in Lahr, Germany, informed the DGBB that there were no French magazines in the newsstand at Uplands military airport in Ottawa and there were just three French books, *Le Soulier de Satin* and *L’Annonce faite à Marie* by Paul Claudel and Plato’s *Symposium*. He asked if something could be done about this.<sup>283</sup> A copy of the letter was sent to Colonel G.J. Gauthier, the Base Commander in Ottawa. On 18 March, the latter wrote to DGBB as follows:

Mr Lévesque’s observation is acknowledged and I wish to assure you that action is in hand to provide some books and magazines in French at our AMU newsstand.

However, I should point out that these periodicals will be in very limited quantities and varieties and will not likely satisfy Mr Lévesque should he make a return visit to our facility. For one thing, our newsstand is a fairly recent venture (NFP) designed both to serve our authorized patrons and to generate much needed profits for our recreational and community activities.<sup>284</sup>

In September, Lieutenant-Colonel N.D. Moore wrote to his superior, Colonel McLaws:

It is my view that we are missing a great opportunity to make some good money by retailing books. Book sales in the last year have increased more than any other sector.<sup>285</sup>

The next year, the BXO at Chilliwack sent the following message to CANEX HQ:

There is an increasing demand in this Exchange for magazines and pocket books in the French language. These are not available through our regular supplier in Vancouver [...] In spite of the fact that our Francophone density may be larger than normal for this province, it appears unlikely that there would be sufficient volume to make importation from Montreal viable. Regardless, our morale situation clearly dictates that we must provide pocket books and/or magazines in the French language.<sup>286</sup>

In the same vein, Colonel McLaws wrote on 5 February 1978:

The Minister of National Defence wants priority attention given to the matter of endeavouring to obtain a Canadian distributor or supplier of Canadian paperback books in both English and French for CFXE [CANEX in Europe].<sup>287</sup>

On 1 June 1978, CANEX HQ sent a Merchandise Offer Bulletin to all CANEX facilities informing them that a contract had been signed with *La Librairie Dussault Ltée of Montreal* through which a complete range of French books could be obtained.<sup>288</sup>

As we have seen, much effort was made to comply with the B & B requirements. However, the Official Languages Commissioner's report in December 1977 drew attention to a number of shortcomings in CANEX services. The themes developed in the study<sup>289</sup> are summed up very well in the executive summary:

The CANEX organization has made visible progress towards bilingual services, especially in the area of signs, advertisements and other printed material. However, at the level of person-to-person service, much remains to be done. CANEX must commit itself to providing service in both languages at all outlets where both language groups are present, and take the necessary steps with respect to hiring personnel. It must also ensure compliance by concessionaires with its policy on official languages. And finally, the Department must take action to ensure representation at headquarters of both language groups within CANEX commensurate with the responsibilities of this organization vis-a-vis both language communities.<sup>290</sup>

When the Commissioner talked about concessionaires, he was referring to the beauty salons, service stations or snack bars which can represent up to 25% of the services provided by CANEX facilities. Since 1973, the directive on leases and permits had been modified and contained a clause obliging concessionaires to comply with the Department's B & B policy on signs and services.<sup>291</sup>

As for bilingual services, the Commissioner noted that there were no linguistic requirements attached to the 5,000 sales clerk positions. Unilingual Anglophones were sometimes employed in Quebec but the reverse never occurred elsewhere in Canada or in Germany; most of the employees in Ottawa, both civilian and military, were unilingual Anglophones, and French translations were often of poor quality. Furthermore, CANEX claimed to provide bilingual services outside Quebec in places where there was a sufficient number of Francophones, but this number depended on the Base Commander's interpretation. On 13 September 1976, the proportion of Francophones at Borden was 31%.

Yet the Borden CANEX offers practically no service in French. The unacceptable rationale we were given may be summarized as follows: most servicemen are bilingual, and if not, they are at Borden to learn English; therefore, CANEX is justified in giving service only in English.

In determining "significant numbers", it must be kept in mind that DND is responsible for the presence of servicemen of one language group in the other language milieu; postings are not usually a matter of free choice. Unilinguals may experience real hardship in the absence of service in their language. If DND does not provide it, it will not be available. (It is rare for "civilian" stores in places like Esquimalt and Halifax to provide bilingual service.) DND should accept its responsibility to provide services equally to both language groups, in all locations.

Another weak spot in CANEX's bilingualism policy is the statement that its execution is "dependent on the availability of bilingual personnel and translation services". Our interviews revealed clearly that CANEX is making little effort to hire bilingual personnel ... and therefore lacks the capacity needed to offer bilingual services. A more positive policy, demanding affirmative action to hire and actively use bilingual personnel, is in order.<sup>292</sup>

The Commissioner did not stop there. He made 11 recommendations concerning CANEX which can really be summed up in the first one:

"revise the CANEX policy on bilingualism in order to ensure conformity with the Official Languages Act".<sup>293</sup>

The reaction of DND in October 1978 was to emphasize that all the recommendations were either in the course of being implemented or were going to be included in the revised plan. The first one, which we have just quoted, had already been addressed in the 1 April 1977 directive, mentioned earlier. Active bilingual services would be provided according to the availability of bilingual people on site, as CANEX facilities drew very largely on military dependants to fill the sales clerk positions at their hundreds of points of sale.<sup>294</sup>

In July 1979, after Commissioner Maxwell Yalden and some of his assistants had undergone the familiarization period we have already mentioned, he was far from being satisfied with CANEX facilities and everything in the Forces covered by the general term of non-public funds, such as local radio stations and recreational facilities. This is what he said:

In some areas, we were told that not much could be done to correct the linguistic problem because the activity in question was supported by non-public funds and therefore not subject to the *Official Languages Act*, or to departmental policy. Yet, without for the moment delving into the legal aspects of the matter, if one considers the very significant advantages given to non-public and sometimes profit-making enterprises (such as rent factors, the availability of a more or less captive clientele ...) it would not seem unreasonable to suggest that the people in charge of these activities be urged to adhere at least to the language policies of the Department ... I get the impression that sometimes the fact that some activities are supported by non-public funds is used as an excuse for not promoting linguistic equality and wonder if this is an acceptable notion in 1979 [that is to say, more than two years after the study was conducted which led to the report in December 1977].<sup>295</sup>

Readers who wish to know what the 1980 military plan had to say about CANEX should refer to Appendix E, which we have already used in Chapter 9 to illustrate the lack of clear commitment.

We shall now analyse the military positions in CANEX, using data taken from the establishment as of 28 February 1984. We have not included civilian personnel because they were employed by non-public funds and were not included in the Forces database. Furthermore, this class of employee was hired on the spot by the local Commander or his representative and fluctuated enormously from one year to another. Finally, the majority of the civilians had never taken a language knowledge examination.

Our statistical study\* covered CANEX facilities on 57 bases and stations. Tables 45 and 46 show that out of a total of 123 positions, 39.1% were bilingual and 7.3% would become bilingual by 1991. These positions can be divided into 32.6% at the “functional” level and 6.5% at the “contact” level (Table 46).

Table 47 shows that 45.6% of bilingual positions were filled by Francophone personnel (one position at a predominantly English-speaking base was vacant). Overall, 38.6% of bilingual positions were occupied according to the requirements (Table 48).

Table 45

**NUMBER OF MILITARY POSITIONS IN CANEX  
31 DECEMBER 1983**

NUMBER OF HQ, BASES & STATIONS ACCORDING TO PREDOMINANT LANGUAGE		NUMBER OF POSITIONS						
		UNILINGUAL		BILINGUAL		TO BECOME BILINGUAL		TOTAL
	NUMBER	NUMBER	%	NUMBER	%	NUMBER	%	NUMBER
<b>NATIONAL UNITS</b>								
CANEX HQ	1	1	12.5	4	50.0	3		8
Bases	5	2	18.2	7	63.6	2	37.5	11
Stations	2	1	33.3	2	66.7	-	18.2	3
Total		4	18.2	13	59.1		22.7	22
<b>FLUs</b>								
Bases	4	-	-	9	100.	-	-	9
Stations	5	2	20.0	8	80.0	-	-	10
Total		2	10.5	17	89.5	-		19
<b>ELUs</b>								
Bases	26	38	70.4	13	24.1	3	5.5	54
Stations	14	22	78.5	5	17.9	1	3.6	28
Total		60	73.1	18	22.0	4	4.9	
Grand Total		66	53.6	48	39.1	9	7.3	123

\* Compiled by Captain Boissonnault.

Table 46

**CLASSIFICATION OF POSITIONS BY  
LANGUAGE REQUIREMENTS**

	NUMBER	% OF 123
Bilingual positions at functional level	40	32.6
Bilingual positions at contact level	8	6.5
Unilingual French positions	2	1.6
Unilingual English positions	64	52.0
Future bilingual positions	9	7.3
Total	123	100.0

Table 47

**OCCUPIED BILINGUAL POSITIONS AND LANGUAGE REQUIREMENTS**

POSITIONS OCCUPIED BY	LANGUAGE REQUIREMENTS							
	TO BECOME BILINGUAL		FUNCTIONAL		CONTACT		TOTAL	
	NO.	%	NO.	%	NO.	%	NO.	%
Francophones	2	3.5	20	35.1	4	7.0	26	45.6
Anglophones	7	12.3	19	33.3	4	7.0	30	52.6
Vacant	—	—	1	1.8	—	—	1	1.8
Total	9	15.8	40	70.2	8	14.0	57	100.0

Table 48

**POSITIONS OCCUPIED BY LINGUISTICALLY  
QUALIFIED INCUMBENTS**

POSITIONS OCCUPIED BY	MEET REQUIREMENTS		DO NOT MEET REQUIREMENTS		TO BECOME BILINGUAL	
	NO.	%	NO.	%	NO.	%
Francophones	17	30.3	7	12.5	2	3.5
Anglophones	5	8.8	18	32.1	7	12.5
Total*	22	39.1	25	44.6	9	16

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\* Tables 48, 49 and 50 include in the total one position which was classified as bilingual at the functional level but was not occupied at the time of our survey. This explains why the percentages of "occupied positions" are less than 100%.



Table 49

**DUTIES OF BILINGUAL POSITIONS  
OCCUPIED BY THE TWO LANGUAGE GROUPS**

HQ, BASES, STATIONS ACCORDING TO PREDOMINANT LANGUAGE	MANAGERS				ASSISTANT MANAGERS				TOTAL
	FRANCO		ANGLO		FRANCO		ANGLO		
	NO	%	NO	%	NO	%	NO	%	
NATIONAL UNITS	1	5.6	7	38.9	2	11.1	8	44.4	18
FLUs	9	52.9	—	—	8	47.1	—	—	17
ELUs	2	9.1	4	18.2	4	18.2	11	50.0	22
TOTAL			11	19.3	14	24.6	19	33.3	57

Table 50

**LANGUAGE REGIME OF POSITIONS  
OCCUPIED BY FRANCOPHONES AND ANGLOPHONES**

HQ, BASES, STATIONS ACCORDING TO PREDOMINANT LANGUAGE	FRANCOPHONES								ANGLOPHONES						T O T A L
	BILINGUAL ESSENTIAL						TO BECOME BILINGUAL	BILINGUAL ESSENTIAL,				TO BECOME BILINGUAL			
	BILINGUAL		ENGLISH		FRENCH			BILINGUAL		ENGLISH					
	NO	%	NO	%	NO	%		NO	%	NO	%		NO	%	
NATIONAL UNITS	2	9.1	—	—	—	—	1	4.5	11	50.0	4	18.2	4	—	22
FLUB	17	89.5	—	—	2	10.5	0	—	0	—	—	—	—	18.2	19
ELUs	5	6.1	9	11.0	—	—	1	1.2	12	14.6	3	62.2	3	5.7	82
TOTAL	24	19.5	9	7.3	2	1.6	2	1.6	23	18.7		44.7	7	5.7	123

Table 49 shows where the positions occupied by Anglophones and Francophones were in CANEX, and includes positions which were supposed to become bilingual (all were at the assistant manager level). Table 50 shows the language regime of the units where military personnel were employed. It is interesting to note that there were no Anglophones in French language units but there were nine Francophones working in a predominantly English milieu. If we add up the percentages, we find that 30% of CANEX military staff were Francophones. However, what really stands out is that within the French language units, 89.5% of Francophone positions were designated bilingual while in the English language units, 62.2% of Anglophone positions were designated unilingual English. This shows that at the beginning of 1984 there was still a great gulf to be crossed before the Department could claim all its employees really understood what equality meant.

Following the Commissioner's special report in 1987, all of these CANEX positions were being reviewed at the time this was written. On the whole, however, despite the real efforts of 1972 which during Colonel McLaws's short stay in D CANEX were renewed and given greater emphasis, CANEX still had a long way to go to achieve perfection.

This is what the *Assessment of the last 15 years on bilingualism* reported when comparing the objectives in the 1980 plan with what was actually accomplished:

1980	1987
To provide, by 1983, a full range of services in both official languages to patrons and employees of CANEX where there is significant demand.	Across the country, the service is not equally provided. At certain places, the system works well, at others, there is a lack of qualified personnel and in other areas, the needs are ignored, which runs contrary to good business sense.
To establish, by 31 Dec 80, linguistic requirements for all CANEX positions, whether full time or part time, public or non-public.	The linguistic requirements for the positions have more or less been established; however, it happens very often, either by ignorance or by lack of good will, that the positions have not been filled by qualified personnel. A reidentification of the positions is required. Not reached.

1980	1987
signs and advertisements of equal linguistic quality and prominence in both official languages by 31 Dec 79.	The national publicity is carried out in both official languages. However, it happens fairly often that local publicity is unilingual either by error or because of difficulty in obtaining the publicity by an outside source. A follow-up is i d <sup>296</sup>

### **The Cost of Establishing B & B in the Canadian Forces**

When programs to encourage a greater Francophone presence in the Forces were adopted in 1968, the public immediately wanted to know how much it was going to cost. Value for money also came into the picture, but we shall not be dealing directly with that aspect of the problem in this short section. It would require exhaustive studies by experts, accurately accounting for everything connected with improving the lot of Francophones, to provide the complete picture. What should appear in the expenditure column for the activities concerned, and when exactly should an activity be brought into the picture? For example, should everything connected with the *R22<sup>e</sup>R*, a French Language Unit par excellence, appear in the expenditures column right from 1914? And if the answer to this question is in the negative, exactly when should the cost of maintaining this unit start to appear in the books? If this regiment were excluded from the accounts, why should the other FLUs be included? If FLUs cost the same to operate as English Language Units or National Units, should all the costs relating to their existence, including FRANCOTRAIN and translation, be highlighted? And how does one calculate the real cost of language training? Should the pay of men and women in the Forces who are taking language training, instead of performing their usual tasks, be included or not? If their pay is counted, should it not also be included when calculating the cost of staff courses or any course which requires absence from work, such as defensive driving? What of the minutes or hours taken by various people to translate and produce in bilingual format short documents which are not worth sending to the translation section? None of this takes into account the cost of the numerous mistakes like those we have noted at the beginning of the 1970s for instance, when bilingual markings were being put on aircraft. In short, the crucial question is: should we and can we determine how much our bilingual and bicultural Forces cost?

Such issues provide the reader with some idea of the magnitude of the task. They also show that figures, no matter how cold they may be on paper, are in fact reflections of major policies which can be the source of bitter

debate. The difficult points we have just raised are by no means the only ones, as we shall see. We have, however, already said that we shall limit ourselves to an overview of the most readily identifiable expenditures in the various specific B & B programs from 1968 on, excluding, for example, the cost of the task force led by Colonel Ross and of the Bilingualism Secretariat and the expanding organizations which succeeded them.

When the time came to put the numerous new FLUs into operation in 1967-1968, it was soon realized that the cost would not be high. The base at Valcartier had to be renovated in any case, and it was not a matter of increasing the establishment or the number of units, but simply of bringing Francophones and bilingual Anglophones together in specific units which would have existed in any event as a result of the general reorganization. The only cost that could be identified dated from 1964 — the Canadian Forces Publications Service.

Although estimates of the costs associated with FRANCOTRAIN<sup>297</sup> appeared in the files from 1968 onwards, it was not until 1970 that the first detailed report on these costs was made under the heading of B & B. Lieutenant-Colonel W.R. Campbell, in Colonel P. Chassé's office, based his calculations on two criteria:

- a. Did the activity contribute to B & B?
- b. If it had not been for the Official Languages' Act, would this expenditure have been made?

Thus Campbell arrived at the following table, which attempted to account for expenditures in the fiscal years 1968/1969 and 1969/1970.

Table 51

**EXPENDITURES ASSOCIATED WITH B & B  
FISCAL YEARS 1968/1969 AND 1969/1970<sup>298</sup>**

ITEM	COST M=millions	COMMENTS
CMR	\$9.3 M	Since 1968, CMR had provided more degree courses (\$3.9M). Renovation and purpose (\$1.5M).
CB Valcartier		B & B's share of the cost of changes which had to be made in any case.
CLS		Supplementary costs caused by the large increase in language training courses since 1968.
	\$2.8 M	Expenditures caused by unusually large moving expenses and \$800,000 for temporary accommodation).
Individual Training	\$1.8 M	<i>ETFC at St-Jean, setting up IADIF, Ecole des armes de combat at Valcartier, transfers</i>
Publication, translation,	\$400,000	Essentially CF Publication Service, including employment of freelances
Special projects	\$390,000	Bilingual markings on aircraft (\$200,000), on other vehicles (\$80,000) and bilingual
Education of military dependants (see	\$300,000	
Bilingualism bonus	\$160,000	
Total 1968/1969 and 1969/1970	\$28.45 M	

It should be noted that these costs were entirely borne by National Defence at a time when its budgets were severely restricted. In such circumstances, it was only to be expected that this would give rise to some concern. For example, the estimates provided in 1968 for FRANCOTRAIN alone envisaged expenditures totalling \$31.908 million up to April 1977.<sup>299</sup>

There was perhaps not too much cause for alarm; in fact, these long-term forecasts showed \$3.535 million for the fiscal years 1968/1969 and 1969/1970; that is to say, almost double the actual expenditures shown in Table 51 (\$1.8M). This sum, however, added to all the other inventoried expenditures, began to frighten officials in the summer of 1970 as they approached the final draft of the February 1971 plan to increase B & B in the CAF (Appendix C), which contained 28 activities to be completed over ten years.

Campbell was again given the task of examining the program's financial impact. He took into account only the eight activities which would require financial and human resources. His total of \$10.385 million, according to a memorandum dated 17 September 1970, related to the start-up of certain activities (including construction of the new CFLS). He added that they would cost another \$5.900 million a year after they began operating.<sup>300</sup> Unfortunately, despite all the consultations Campbell held in order to arrive at his results, they were flawed from the start. For example, he estimated that the Defence translation effort would cost \$1.5 million over five years and the establishment of translation modules at the various headquarters would cost \$555,000 (without mentioning subsequent annual operating costs). As we have already seen, all of this was covered from 1971 on by the Secretary of State, which had previously been doing a lot of work for Defence. Campbell also thought that language teachers would be paid by the Public Service Commission. In fact, the funds would come out of the Defence budget, even though they were administered by the Commission.

The general anxiety which pervaded Campbell's document soon proved to be justified. The Commander of Air Defence Command believed that the total cost of the program in human and financial resources should be regarded as a separate commitment over and above those which Defence already had.<sup>301</sup> In plain English, no matter how essential B and B was, it should not take precedence over quality in operations. This interpretation which was far from being new and denoted reduced support for B and B or, worse still, a total lack of understanding of the need to weld together the country's two major language groups. Despite this, the Minister, Donald Macdonald, accepted the notion in December that he would eventually have to go to Cabinet for increased human and financial resources for B & B.<sup>302</sup>

The quarterly reports on B and B prepared for the Minister often contained a paragraph on costs. But can we really trust them? For example, the report dated 28 January 1971 said that over the last three years (1968/1969 to 1970/1971) B & B had cost \$7.5M (Campbell's figure was \$28.45M for 1968/1969 and 1969/1970 alone), of which \$2.5M was for the fiscal year

1970/1971 which was not yet ended.<sup>303</sup> These variations were not confined to an isolated document. In a memorandum dated 9 February 1971, Chassé wrote that the program which the Defence Council had accepted in the previous October would result in additional costs under the heading of operations and maintenance. He put those costs at \$2,912,000 for 1972/1973, \$3,500,000 for 1973/1974 and \$3,525,500 for each fiscal year from 1974/1975 to 1977/1978. On examination, one finds that these forecasts included, for example, \$330,000 a year under the heading of DGBB military staff, and \$63,000 and \$113,000 respectively for civilian staff in DGBB and the Canadian Forces Publication Service.<sup>304</sup> No allowance was made for inflation in the years from 1972 to 1978, which made these forecasts uncertain, to say the least.

Ten months later, in another document prepared by the DGBB, the forecast for 1972/1973 had risen to \$7,232,000. Over and above this were possible additional expenditures of \$6,000,000 which, if they occurred, would bring the total budget to \$13,322,000.<sup>305</sup> That, then, was how the expenses for 1971/1972 and 1972/1973 were presented in November 1971. A major overhaul of the statistics had evidently taken place between February and November. In April, the Chief of Personnel called for new estimates because he found the February data inadequate. Colonel Jean-Marc Fournier put together statistics which were divided into three sectors: the current cost of the B and B program plus the future cost of language teaching and those related to training in French. What Fournier called the existing program included, broadly speaking, the elements of the memorandum of 9 February. The figures had, however, been changed: in 1971/1972, the program would cost \$3.6M and from 1972/1973, it would cost \$4.1M.

Table 52<sup>306</sup>

**EXPENDITURES AND FORECASTS  
FOR THE CANADIAN FORCES  
BILINGUALISM AND BICULTURALISM PROGRAM**

SUBJECTS	COST FOR FISCAL YEAR 1971/1972	COST FOR FISCAL YEAR 1972/1973
Base Language Training Program		
a) Materials	456,000	1,460,000
b) Staff	544,000	
c) Recruitment and transfers	50,000	50,000
Subsidized language training	5,000	50,000
Language training provided by the Public Service Commission — temporary duty expenses (approximate)	75,000	75,000
Canadian Forces Language School		
a) Officers and NCMs	1,100,000	1,300,000
b) Personnel	2,900,000	3,030,000
a) Personnel	370,000	370,000
b) Temporary duty — officers and NCMs	270,000	270,000
c) Civilian organization	92,000	230,000
Bilingual publications		
a) CFHQ	242,000	267,000
b) Dictionaries	43,000	
c) Signs	130,000	
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>6,377,000</b>	

Between 1971/1972 and 1975/1976, the cost of language training would rise from \$3.3M for 1971/1972 to \$46M a year from 1975/1976 on after the new language school had been built and 2,400 students were on course each year in order to meet the 1980 deadline (1970 Plan).

In April 1971, the plan was for CFLS to be at Saint-Hubert, and training for Anglophone and Francophone recruits as well as FRANCOTRAIN to be at Valcartier. Therefore, the forecast showed the bases at Saint-Jean and Cornwallis as closing in 1975/1976. Given these premises, it was assumed that the costs for the training portion would be distributed as follows: \$4.81M in



1971/1972, \$21M in 1972/1973, \$20.55M in 1973/1974 and \$2.2M in 1974/1975. After that, operating costs would decline because of the closure of the two bases.<sup>307</sup> We know today how many unfulfilled wishes these forecasts contained. They nevertheless had a certain realism about them which the February forecast tended to lack. Perhaps Chassé's fear of alarming certain people in the Department partly explains why he had come up with such small figures two months earlier. The fact remains that the Minister, Donald Macdonald, did not seem worried about the cost of the program. According to him, the cost was relatively small. B and B would in his view lead to greater equality and eliminate some of the frictions that stood in the way of durable national unity.<sup>308</sup>

Between April and June 1971, accurate costs became available for certain activities. For example, it was estimated on 22 April that the launching of the Base Language Training Program (materials, teachers and students) would cost \$394,027. In fact, \$456,000 was finally approved for this item.<sup>309</sup> Two months later, in June 1971, Fournier received the estimate for DGBB's operations in 1972/1973.<sup>310</sup> At this point in time, officials were still working with the options for CFLS (Saint-Hubert or Saint-Jean) and for basic recruit training (Valcartier, Cornwallis or Saint-Jean), which of course only made it possible to give approximate figures.<sup>311</sup>

On 16 June, 1971, when Treasury Board gave official approval for the creation of the DGBB (although it had been operating for some time), the Board laid down as its tenth and final condition that the program be financed out of the funds Treasury Board had authorized for the Department.<sup>312</sup> Macdonald had a different view because of his perception that the cost of language training would be astronomical. He estimated that from 1974, when the new language school would be completed, \$51.8M would go to cover the salaries of students, teachers and support staff; construction alone would have swallowed up \$46M. The BLTP (Base Language Training Program) would cost \$1.8M a year (equipment and salaries), and language courses provided outside CFLS (i.e. directly by the Public Service Commission) would cost \$4.5M.

The annual total needed to sustain the language training activity when operating at full capacity was \$58.3M. This did not include subsidized language courses, repairs and replacement of materials, etc.<sup>313</sup> The White Paper released in August 1971 stressed that special programs that were not in the budget, such as language training, and were linked to a government policy, would be considered by Treasury Board in competition with other requests for supplementary funds.<sup>314</sup> This sentence, appearing in a document which Cabinet studied and accepted on 22 July, gave rise to great hopes;

however, by October 1971, neither the Secretary of State nor Treasury Board had replied to the request Macdonald had made in July, which many found disturbing.<sup>315</sup> Moreover, the projections made in July already seemed too ambitious to Colonel J. Hanna,<sup>316</sup> who was certainly correct, given that the language training operation today costs around \$40M a year, as we saw in the previous chapter, rather than the \$58M forecast in 1971.

Treasury Board wrote to all departments on 4 August 1971 asking them how they planned to achieve the B and B objectives which it had circulated the previous March. This led the new Deputy Minister, S. Cloutier, to ask Louis Noël de Tilly on 1 October to prepare a reply outlining the Department's needs for B and B in 1972/1973 as \$3.4M.<sup>317</sup> Lieutenant-Colonel Clément Tousignant pointed out that this sum was far less than Macdonald had asked for in July, and he raised problems as well. Were they to suppose, for example, that the White Paper took precedence over the tenth condition stipulated by Treasury Board the previous 18 June? Would they have sufficient funds to support the enormous effort required for language training?<sup>318</sup>

Six days later, the Deputy Minister finally got the CDS to send him the projected expenditures we mentioned earlier for 1971/1972 (which was by then half over) and, more importantly, for 1972/1973. These projections included funding for six person-years in 1971/1972, which were to be used for drawing up the civilian program; the number would rise to 18 in 1972/1973 (see Chapter 18). The military program would try to get an additional \$6M from the Defence budget for 1972/1973 in order to develop two of its main activities: language training and FRANCOTRAIN. At this juncture, the CDS also undertook to produce a complete B and B program for the next five years.<sup>319</sup> As late as November, however, Treasury Board was still thinking in terms of the data provided on 1 October.<sup>320</sup> It is only fair to say, in defence of Treasury Board's experts, that the Forces were not yet ready to provide an accurate blueprint.

Being an optimist, the Director of Financial Services for the Canadian Forces seemed confident that the military would receive additional funds from Treasury Board. He therefore sought to eliminate from the X Budget\* the portion allocated to what he called "expenditures for bilingual training". Colonel Letellier was against this cut because it would have an impact on

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\* X Budget: expenditures which will completely disappear or decrease over a long or short period.

bilingualism objectives (all language courses would be affected and their scope would have to be curtailed); visual bilingualism would also be affected (bilingual signs, markings on aircraft, etc); and it would not be possible to comply with the Official Languages Act.<sup>321</sup> It must be admitted, however, that the Department had already got Treasury Board to promise, more or less firmly, \$6M in supplementary funds for B and B programs. The Deputy Minister wanted a factual rationale for this figure by 2 February 1972. Letellier made the following comment in his quarterly report dated 15 December 1971: They would have to move fast to secure the \$6M, but proceed slowly in planning the budget so that the figures that appeared in it would be as accurate as possible.<sup>322</sup>

Tousignant, who was the author of the report just mentioned, was given the budget to look after. He too favoured acting quickly to meet the 2 February deadline, if only because of the new language school, whose cost had continued to rise since it was first discussed. The situation had to be stabilized.<sup>323</sup>

Tousignant's memorandum of 23 December 1971 traced the course to be followed in order to meet the 2 February deadline, and provided a critical path. Tousignant began by stating that it was impossible to include everything in the budget to be presented to Treasury Board; there were a number of routine activities, such as bilingual signage, for which nobody at the local level had bothered to calculate the amount strictly attributable to B and B. As presenting the costs to the Defence Council, he suggested that only expenditures directly connected with changes stemming from B and B should be considered. Thus for the language courses portion, the funds requested should be the sum of the costs of the present CFLS at Saint-Jean, the new CFLS at Saint-Hubert and the change in student numbers. In the rest of his memorandum, Tousignant wondered what should be presented first to the Defence Council and then to Treasury Board. In its directive of March 1971, Treasury Board required departments to submit all the costs for the program. However, Defence's position was unique in that its plan covered 15 years, and it would be unrealistic to put the figures in right away. Tousignant therefore recommended that the DGBB should present the entire program (15 years); estimate costs only for the first five-year phase (1972/1973 to 1976/1977); provide details of the cost to National Defence for 1972/1973; and put a price-tag on the activities which would be covered by the supplementary funds requested from Treasury Board for that particular year.<sup>324</sup> These recommendations, which incidentally Tousignant had already started to implement (as documents written on the previous 13 and 17 December showed),<sup>325</sup> were accepted by his superiors. On 17 December, Tousignant explained to representatives of the offices concerned what he

expected them to do to help him prepare the five-year financial forecasts and especially the forecast for 1972/1973.

Activities 117 to 199 in the *Program to Increase Bilingualism and Biculturalism in the Forces* dealt with budgets for 1972/1973 in phase I (1972/1973 to 1976/1977) and with supplementary financial and human resources for 1972/1973.<sup>326</sup> However, no figures were given. As the document explained, Defence was waiting for Treasury Board to approve the principles it had put forward before submitting the associated costs.<sup>327</sup> The DGBB went boldly ahead preparing estimates, the files show.<sup>328</sup> Then, in mid-January, D.M. Cloutier came to an agreement with Treasury Board on the principle that \$6M in supplementary funds could be used by Defence for B and B activities. Some supplementary person-years might even be added to the current authorized Forces structure.<sup>329</sup>

Letellier has provided a good summary of the main stages which had to be gone through before Treasury Board agreed on 29 September to grant 737 supplementary person-years and funds totalling \$12M for 1972/1973 (which was almost half over) and 1973/1974.<sup>330</sup> The Letellier Papers<sup>331</sup> describe the sequence of events and the changes that were made in the form of the Department's request as the months went by. Most of the fuss was about technical matters. For example, the Department did not ask for the supplementary \$6M when it was preparing the estimates for 1973/1974 because it supposed that the \$6M which had been obtained in this way for 1972/1973 as part of the B budget\* for that year would automatically become part of the current Defence budget, that is to say, what was then called the A budget for the following year.\*\* In fact, \$6M was again provided in 1973/1974.<sup>332</sup> But the department would have liked to obtain over \$9M in supplementary funds in 1972/1973. Treasury Board, by imposing a ceiling of \$6M, forced the planners to postpone certain activities to 1973/1974 or to cut back on others during 1972/1973.<sup>333</sup> Despite this, as official approval did not come until the end of September 1972, the activities which were dependent on supplementary funds understandably suffered a setback; they were to have taken place between the entire period from 1 April 1972 and 31 March 1973.

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\* The B budget includes the cost of new services or those relating to the expansion of existing services (capital, operations, management, etc. on the services in question).

\*\* The A budget is the new cost, for the future fiscal year, of services which existed in the preceding year. The Defence budget can be summarized as A budget + B budget - X budget.

The fact is that the Department was not ready until the end of July to present its request for supplementary resources to Treasury Board.<sup>334</sup> For purposes of this part of the chapter, let us recall the basic facts which were agreed with Treasury Board experts, and Treasury Board's reply on the subject several months later.

The Table brings together information on the military B and B program that we already know and other information which we shall elaborate in the following paragraphs. It is important, for example, to distinguish between the civilian person-years allocated to the military program (items 4 and 5 in the Table) and those allocated to the civilian program (items 7 and 8). In the second case, the 54 PYs\* in the forecast would be used for the civilian program, in Ottawa or elsewhere, or to replace Defence civilians on language training (Chapter 18). The 194 civilian PYs for the military program would be used for it exclusively, some being transferred to the Public Service Commission's Language Bureau, others joining the DGGB or sectors heavily involved in B and B (publishing documents in bilingual format, testing, the colleges and senior training schools, etc).<sup>336</sup>

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\* PYs = Person-years

TABLE 53<sup>335</sup>

**REQUESTS FOR SUPPLEMENTARY RESOURCES  
AND TREASURY BOARD RESPONSES<sup>335</sup>**

DEFENCE REQUESTS 27 JULY 1972	TREASURY BOARD RESPONSES 29 SEPTEMBER 1972
1. Construction of CFLS at Saint-Jean, including funds for plans, for 1972/1973 [Military Program — MP]	1. Approved in principle — final approval to depend on presentation of specific plans, still to come.
2. Approval in principle of expansions at RMC, RRMC and <i>CMR</i> due to B and B programs [MP]	2. Yes, except for RRMC. More specific plan awaited for final approval for RMC and <i>CMR</i> .
support expansion of B and B in CAF. [MP]	3. Agreed, including costs incurred in 1972/1973 in launching new CFLS project.
4. 489 more PYs for 1972/1973 (363 military and 126 civilian) [MP]	4. Approved.
5. \$13,095,000 and 241 PYs [173 military and 68 civilian] to be added to Defence A budget in 1973/1974. [MP]	for \$6M in 1972/1973 and \$6M in 1973/1974. For further funds, Defence must ask TB afterwards, like any other department. In 1973/1974, 68 civilian PYs accepted; the decision on supplementary PYs for the same year is held over.
6. Include additional PYs and funds requested for 1972/1973 and 1973/1974 in future budgets for 1974/1975 to 1976/1977. [MP]	6. Agreed, subject to review of PY requirements and funds requested.
program — CPI 1972/1973.	7. Agreed. To be taken from the \$6M for 1972/1973.
8. \$602,805 and 27 PYs. [CPI]	1973/1974.
9. Same requested for CP as MP in item 6 (above)	9. Approved.

The supplementary person-years which were granted created a technical problem. The Defence Management Committee, at its meeting on 19 September, had decided that recruiting should maintain military strength at 81,174 men and women. This decision was adhered to by the officials concerned and was below the ceiling of 81,350 allowed by Treasury Board.

In the fall of 1972, 177 military positions came under B and B, which meant that the Forces had to fulfil all their other missions with 80,997 members. The goal of 81,174 was based on economic data. On 2 October 1972, Rear Admiral Boyle, the Chief of Personnel, after considering all aspects of the matter, asked the CDS to reverse the decision he had made in September and give the go-ahead for recruiting 190 Francophones immediately, which would bring the Forces up from 81,174 to 81,3643.<sup>337</sup>

Letellier, who had instigated Boyle's memorandum, changed his mind on 20 October. In a letter to ADM (Per), he endorsed the memorandum of 2 October, but wanted the Department to go further: let the Forces recruit, he said, up to the authorized ceiling (81,350) plus the additional 363 PYs granted in 1972/1973, which would raise the target to 81,713. What Letellier was clearly after was the rapid injection of the 363 PYs for 1972/1973 so that B and B could enjoy the full benefit of them in 1973/1974.<sup>338</sup> Six days later, his case was tacitly accepted. The machinery was set in motion to adjust the rank structure accordingly and to begin making plans to send military personnel on language training, the destination of most of the 363 positions.<sup>339</sup> Before the end of the year, Treasury Board authorized the additional military PYs that the Forces had requested for 1973/1974, so that the 536 new positions were, or would be, assigned to B and B effective 1 April 1974, taking the supplementary PYs for 1972/1973 and 1973/1974 together. Treasury Board also increased its allocation for 1973/1974 to \$12M, \$1,095,000 less than Defence had asked for (see item 5 in Table 53).<sup>340</sup>

It is one thing to ask for supplementary resources. It is quite another, when the resources have been obtained, to use them in the way that was originally intended. When Treasury Board's authorization of resources for 1972/1973 arrived on 29 September 1972, it was obvious that the forecast made in 1971 no longer applied. Letellier unburdened himself to the Chief of Personnel on 2 October. On 18 October, Letellier's subordinate, Lt.Col Tousignant began to review the situation and suggested that part of the money might now be used for purposes not envisaged in 1971, such as renovating the buildings at Saint-Jean that were used for language training, or providing interpretation at National Defence College or special assistance for the Francophone recruiting program.<sup>341</sup>

At a meeting to prepare supplementary requests for 1974/1975 — this was in December 1972 — Tousignant asked all those present to think very carefully about each of their requests. He reminded them that the Forces had initially proposed 518 supplementary military PYs for 1972/1973, but that Treasury Board had reduced the figure to 363 after examining the supporting documents; he warned them not to count their chickens before they were

hatched. He went on to insist that they ensure the PYs they received were used for the intended purposes.<sup>342</sup> That suggestion was not easy to follow, as Major J. Hanson, who worked for Tousignant, pointed out in a memorandum in February 1973. The first problem was that Treasury Board had only authorized \$12M in supplementary funds for 1972/1973, instead of the \$13M requested. Moreover, the program, which had been thought out in 1970/1971, had developed under its own momentum since then, to say nothing of the changes that had occurred in the Department itself, and the adjustments made necessary by government B and B directives and various other factors. All of this had led to changes in programs and priorities. Under these circumstances, a number of PYs intended for a given financial sector in 1970/1971 had either been moved to another in 1972/1973, or would be in 1973/1974 if the table that Hanson was presenting were accepted. Accepted it was, and the calculations on how the \$12M would be used were redone; the difference between what now seemed to be needed for 1973/1974 and what had originally been proposed would be used for the new CFLS.<sup>343</sup> We will soon reproduce Hanson's table in order to show the magnitude of the discrepancies between the intended and the actual use of the supplementary PYs.

The reader will notice that, although the total of the military and civilian supplementary PYs did not change, there were numerous changes in the forecasts. Each of these was reflected, among other things, in explanations that had to be provided to Treasury Board, and each was liable to increase the number of questions from Treasury Board experts when other requests were made.

These supplementary PYs played an important role during the briefing tour, by partly allaying the fears which were often expressed, as we have seen, regarding the impact of language training on operations.<sup>345</sup> But this argument could not dispel all the anxieties for two main reasons. The first was a very practical one — how did one replace an infantry colonel who was on language training? Most of the military replacements were at the recruit level, and were 43 recruits equivalent to one colonel or general (the 437 on line 5 of column f of Table 54 divided by the 8 two lines below)? Definitely not! The reader will recall that in order to reach the goal of 28% Francophones, recruiting had been permitted in excess of this percentage. Now the great majority of Francophones had to take English courses which lasted, on average, 120 days.<sup>346</sup> So that the excess recruits would have an impact on the Forces as soon as possible, Defence had arrived at the figure of 437 military PYs, each PY representing three recruits taking 120 days of language courses apiece, and obtained them from a rather reluctant Treasury Board. What we now know about the productivity of French courses for Anglophones makes us wonder whether these PYs in 1972/1973 and 1973/1974 would not have



better served the cause of B and B if they had been used to recruit an excess of Anglophones who would have been sent to learn French.

In 1973, accuracy was still a matter of luck, despite much improved methods, including the position in DGBB to look after budgeting and the utilization of PYs, held by Major Hanson. Let us pause here to look at the results of an investigation which Colonel Hanna had to conduct for the Minister in May 1973. While preparing for Hanna the answer to the ministerial inquiry, Hanson kept in close touch with the Department's experts on budgeting. He stated in his reply that he had produced only the best possible figures in the circumstances.

What were the weaknesses in Hanson's estimates for 1971/1972 and 1972/1973? For the military program, he had to extract all the elements for 1971/1972 which were clearly attributable to B and B (for example, the positions in DGBB, and PYs associated with language training or FRANCOTRAIN). Even so, there was room for error. How were activities or parts of activities solely attributable to B and B to be determined? (Take FRANCOTRAIN, for example: would Francophone recruits not have had to be trained in any case?) Moreover, some of the activities included were in a state of flux when their costs were being calculated. The fact that during this period National Defence and the Public Service Commission reached an agreement on language training affected the calculations relating to the September 1972 program. That agreement provided for the transfer of 299 PYs from Defence to the Language Bureau. The program that had been approved by Treasury Board (1972) had a total of 266 civilian PYs; where did the 33 supplementary positions transferred to the Language Bureau come from, Hanson asked. No doubt, he presumed, they were positions which had not been included when the calculations were done for the B and B program. Another factor which contributed to the obscurity of Hanson's figures was the recent restructuring of the Forces and particularly the on-going major reorganization of NDHQ. The author of the memorandum did not explain how this could have upset his reconstitution of the costs, but the cost figures he presented did not take into account the inflation of salaries and the numerous promotions that the Language Bureau gave to its teachers, a matter over which Defence had no control, even though it paid the bill. It is interesting to note that in 1972/1973 and 1973/1974 a total of 51 PYs drawn from the supplementary funds were added to the 299 already relinquished to the Language Bureau; once again, it is impossible to put an exact figure on the cost because we do not know what level these positions were.

Table 54<sup>344</sup>

**UTILIZATION OF SUPPLEMENTARY PERSON-YEARS (PYs)  
IN FISCAL YEARS (FY) 1972/1973 AND 1973/1974**

ACTIVITIES	SUPPLEMENTARY PYs PY 1972/1973		SUPPLEMENTARY PYs FY 1973/1974		
	AUTHORIZED	UTILIZED	AUTHORIZED 1973/1974	TOTAL AUTHORIZED 1973/1974)	PROPOSED
DGBB (with DLT)	3m <sup>*</sup> . 3c <sup>**</sup>		—	3m. 3c	3m. 7c
Testing	6c	14c	2c	8c	14c
PSC	10c	—	—	10c	32m. 7c
CFLS Staff	82c	2m. 9c	23c	105c	2m. 9c
Compensation for Recruits <sup>***</sup>	350m	228m	69m	519m	37m. 39m
Other Compensation	—	—	—	—	
Senior ranks (compensation) <sup>****</sup>	8m	3m	—	8m	8m
Linguistic specialists	8c	—	8c	16c	8c
Translation	2m	—	—	2m	2m
Publication	27c	27c		27c	30c
Graphic Art	—	—	—	—	13c
QR&O project	—	—	—	—	3m. 3c
Higher institutions	—	—	2m. 26c		2m. 26c
	—	14c	2m. 9c	2m. 9c	3m. 14c
DCBP <sup>*****</sup>	17c	17c	—		19c
Language Bureau (PSC)	—	39c	—	—	61c
DCP <sup>*****</sup>	—	7c	—	—	7c
DG Military Careers	—	—			5m
TOTAL	363m. 153c	236m. 134c	173m. 68c	536m. 221c	536m. 221c

\* m = military

\*\* c = civilian

\*\*\* additional Francophone recruits to compensate for those over the 28% target who required 120 days English training

\*\*\*\* additional positions to allow replacement of personnel on language training

\*\*\*\*\* Director of Civilian B &amp; B Program

\*\*\*\*\* Director of Civilian Personnel

Hanson also expressed some reservations about the PYs for language courses. There were discrepancies between the forecasts in the program and what actually happened. They were caused by normal fluctuations in the additional recruitment of Francophones or the availability of candidates for language training. Of the 350 supplementary PYs intended to compensate for the extra Francophones recruited in 1972/1973, 228 were actually used for this purpose and a further 12 were used in administering programs related to B and B. As for the rest, they were simply not used. The forecast for 1973/1974 was that 516 of the 536 PYs would be used for language training (437 recruits, 71 for Public Service Commission courses and eight on courses for senior ranks) and the other 20 would be used for a variety of purposes, including five in the special cell created in the Director General of Personnel's office in order to audit postings of bilingual or Francophone military personnel more thoroughly. The sum of \$4,234,000 was earmarked for CFLS in 1973/1974. In May 1973, this figure was deemed ambitious; as soon as the size of the expected surplus became clearer, it would be transferred to underfunded B and B programs.<sup>347</sup>

There was an obvious advantage in having someone responsible for the budget in the DGBB, despite the problems we have mentioned. When called upon in the previous January to provide a reply on the cost of B and B for the Minister to give in Parliament, Hanson (while pointing out that his document could not be absolutely accurate) nevertheless provided data for 1971/1972 and 1972/1973 which was very similar to what he presented in May.<sup>348</sup>

This fine-tuning process in the DGBB hardly affected Treasury Board, which was well aware of the differences between forecasts used to justify requests and actual facts. Defence wanted the following additional resources for 1974/1975: 698 military PYs, 177 civilian PYs (including 111 for the Language Bureau) and \$12,458,000 for operating and managing B and B programs. Treasury Board, during preliminary discussions, trimmed down the request to 234 military and 174 civilian PYs and ... \$5,195,900, with the possibility that this sum would be increased by a little over a million dollars for 1975/1976 and 1976/1977 [it was \$6,638,100 in the second year].<sup>349</sup>

When Hanson was writing these words, Treasury Board had not even accepted the requests for supplementary resources for the 1973/1974 civilian program and would not do so until the following 6 July, two weeks after Hanson's letter.<sup>350</sup>

Two pitfalls lay in the path of those who worked on B and B at National Defence in the early years of the program. Both were largely attributable to the reductions in human and financial resources that the Department

experienced after 1968. Letellier was fully aware that the supplementary PYs he had obtained for his B and B programs would make many of his colleagues envious, and that some of them were capable of expanding the definition of B and B to include their own sectors so that they could grab a share of the prize. Letellier explained how he tried to control these PYs from his own office, by-passing the normal authorities, who were naturally furious. A compromise was reached by which DGBB had to approve the use of the PYs, but the Chief of Program (C Prog) exercised overall control and was kept informed of any additions to, or reductions of, the supplementary Pys.<sup>351</sup> The dispute over the control of the PYs was settled in May 1973. The solution did not deal with the long term. If the supplementary PYs became permanent and continued to be assigned to B and B but were completely outside DGBB's (or DGOL's) control, what guarantee was there that these resources would be used for the purposes for which they had originally been intended?

As far as money was concerned, purse-strings remained tight, as might be expected. During the 1972/1973 fiscal year, all offices at NDHQ were twice asked to reduce budgeted travel funds which had not yet been spent, by 10% on the first occasion and by 20% on the second.<sup>352</sup> At the same time, B and B was receiving money for some very questionable items. We have already mentioned what the Commandant of the National Defence College managed to obtain by putting a simultaneous translation activity into his B and B program. In July 1973, Borden obtained \$25,000 in special B and B funds to install air conditioning in the building then used as a language school.<sup>353</sup> In view of the fact that the heat affects all students at Borden (army officer cadets in summer training, student pilots, and so on) and that the allocation of buildings can be changed at the whim of the Base Commander, the question may well be asked whether it would be possible, under the guise of B and B, to obtain more than other sectors of the Forces which were asking for the same things but did not have access to supplementary funds.

As we have seen in the preceding chapters, DND did not carry out the plans which provided the justification for the amounts it obtained: this is why in the early years of the program it found itself with surplus funds which it had to reallocate or risk losing. DGBB had its own ideas. What should be done with them? But when the Chief of Programs protested, as we have seen, he was not just concerned with the PYs, but also with the supplementary dollars obtained from Treasury Board.

Briefly, this is what happened. At first, the main concern was the new Canadian Forces Language School (CFLS), a project placed firmly on the rails in March 1972.<sup>354</sup> However, the program submitted to Treasury Board

provided for CFLS but said nothing about renovating the whole of the base at Saint-Jean, although this would have to be done if it were decided to keep CFLS there. The issue here was not supplementary funds for B and B but money to be obtained from the capital expenditures part of the Defence budget. It was in this context that the senior officials controlling Defence expenditures became alarmed, even before Treasury Board approved the program in September 1972. Many of the staff of the VCDS, Lieutenant-General A.G. Hull, were unaware that supplementary funds had been requested for B and B. This lack of information was soon corrected at a meeting of the Construction Sub-committee of the Program Review Board (PRB) on 14 September 1972, when Colonel Tousignant made a very detailed presentation on what had been discussed with Treasury Board and the expectations of the Defence Department.<sup>355</sup> This was followed by a meeting with the entire Program Review Board on 29 September, the day when Treasury Board officially approved the program.<sup>356</sup> Treasury Board had agreed in August that \$440,000 of the 1973/1974 supplementary funds should be used for preliminary studies on the Saint-Jean project.<sup>357</sup> If Hull had been somewhat taken aback in August on learning how far things had gone, he had completely recovered from his surprise by September. On the 15<sup>th</sup>, for example, he accepted the basic criteria to be applied in the Saint-Jean renovation project, which was to be examined with the help of the \$440,000. On 19 September he attended the Defence Management Committee meeting where control of the Department's human and financial resources was discussed, including the resources intended for B and B.<sup>358</sup>

In October, a conversation between Deputy Minister Cloutier and Kroeger, the Secretary to the Treasury Board, which Kroeger followed up with a letter, showed Treasury Board's determination to satisfy Defence with respect to language training. Kroeger had accepted the concept of a new CFLS and was waiting for Defence to send the details so they could be approved in the supplementary funds for 1973/1974 and the necessary amounts could then be included in the basic budget.<sup>359</sup> In short, the building to house the Canadian Forces Language School was certain to see the light of day and, as we know, it was indeed built and enlarged to accommodate the CFB Saint-Jean administration, CFLS and some sections of École technique des Forces canadiennes.

CFLS was not the only expensive activity relating to B and B. When the authorities responsible for the Forces institutions for higher education presented their bilingualism plans, they provided the following costs:

Table 55<sup>360</sup>

**ESTIMATED B AND B PROGRAM COSTS  
AT SENIOR COLLEGES  
(IN 1972/1973 DOLLARS)**

	1972/73		1974/75	1975/76	1976/77
1. Staff (military)	23,516	37,038	38,891	40,836	42,877
(translators)	105,879	111,173	116,732	122,569	127,697
3. Additional (O&M)* costs incurred by increasing personnel	2,553	3,159	3,317	3,482	3,657
4. Capital expenditures					
a. Interpretation equipment	50,000	4,200	4,410	4,631	
b. Electronic equipment (TV, films, radio, etc.)	150,000	12,600	13,230	13,892	14,586
5. Cultural aids					
6. Library	15,000	15,750	16,538	23,152	24,310
7. Teaching materials	5,000	5,250	5,513	5,789	6,078
8. Minor construction projects	500	525	551	579	608
		—	—	—	
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>355,000</b>	<b>189,800</b>	<b>199,000</b>	<b>215,000</b>	<b>225,900</b>

\* O&M = operations and maintenance

This did not include the military colleges, as it was understood that RMC and CMR would have to expand because of the B & B objectives which they had been given.

Thus there were many indicators to watch when trying to identify expenditures for B and B, and they did not all become apparent at the same time. For example, matters relating to the military colleges in the 1972 program were put on hold for several weeks because Treasury Board believed

that the estimates submitted did not take the B and B Commission's recommendations into account. As a result, the change of program proposal for RMC was still in limbo in June 1973.<sup>361</sup> On the other hand, because of delays affecting construction of the new building to house CFLS, the funds allocated to the project in the 1972/1973 fiscal year were used to carry out certain renovations to the buildings which CFLS was then occupying or to make various signs at CFB Ottawa bilingual.<sup>362</sup>

Language training represented the greater part of forecast expenditures. Hence, whenever there was a delay there were repercussions. Because the agreement between the Department and the Public Service Commission came into effect on 22 September rather than 1 September 1971, as had at first been expected, Defence had to look after all aspects of the launching of base language training for three weeks (for example, salaries, travel and moving). While doing so, Defence revised its calculations and realized that the Language Bureau only required a total of \$3,002,564 rather than the \$3,319,290 budgeted for 1972/1973; in addition, the fact that Treasury Board had cut nine positions from the number forecast for language training also had to be taken into account. Discussions between Defence and the Public Service Commission regarding fiscal years 1973/1974 and 1974/1975 began in September 1972.<sup>363</sup>

There were therefore numerous upheavals, and officials always needed to have an alternative available. That was exactly what they did (as in the case of air conditioning at Borden), but they did not always follow normal accounting procedures, as can be seen from the Program Review Board meeting on 19 July 1973. On that occasion, Lieutenant-General Hull, having noted that corrective measures were going to be taken, gave his approval for part of the supplementary funds to be used for bilingual identification on aircraft or signs, with a reminder that all expenditures which differed from those in the original forecast had to be submitted to him.<sup>364</sup> This warning came after the Letellier-Hull dispute over the control of supplementary funds, which began in March 1973 and ended in the following May. The PY aspect having been settled by a compromise, Hull intended with good reason to keep a close eye on the way funds were being spent, particularly as it would be specious to try to distinguish results achieved solely through the use of the supplementary funds from those which should be attributed to the main Defence budget, into which the supplementary funds might one day be incorporated.

To return to the meeting on 19 July, not all the proposals for the reallocation of supplementary funds for B and B were approved. Everyone was in complete agreement about redoing the bilingual aircraft markings, a

\$300,000 operation<sup>365</sup> which, despite being buried in a directive from CDS, did not wipe out the blunder of the previous bilingual marking. There was also a move to redirect funds to bilingual publications and the commands, but VCDS Hull was not happy about it. His preference was for making a complete presentation to the Program Control Committee on the status of supplementary funds for B and B for 1973/1974.<sup>366</sup> Letellier would have preferred not to have that meeting, inundated as he was with work resulting from the briefing tour, then drawing to an end, and presentations on the designation of civilian and military bilingual positions.<sup>367</sup> The meeting nevertheless took place on 20 September and Hanna conducted it in his usual competent way.<sup>368</sup>

On this occasion, Hanna repeated themes already familiar to the reader. The forecasts had not been followed because Defence had been unable to hire all the civilians authorized, and the construction programs for CFLS and RMC were behind schedule. Consequently, as of 1 September, out of the \$12M in supplementary funds, there was still \$2,234,000 left in the capital expenditures account and \$1,183,000 in the program Operations and Maintenance (O & M) account. Hanna suggested adding the two together, which would involve a transfer between accounts that the Committee could not endorse without Treasury Board's agreement. In future, it would no longer be necessary to monitor anything but the O & M account. His seven original suggestions were reduced to four, which would not cost more than \$834,000. This would still leave about \$500,000 for O & M during the remainder of the fiscal year. The expenditures approved on 20 September were as follows:

1. visual bilingualism: \$409,000 [the sum established as the result of a study carried out in the commands by the Director of Construction Engineering Requirements (DCER) which assumed completion of this operation by 31 December — although the funds were certainly spent, the 31 December 1973 deadline was not met];
2. machine translation: \$150,000 for a feasibility study;

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\* The three suggestions which were discarded were very costly and vague: \$566,000 for expenses relating to military personnel; \$567,000 which would have gone to the Defence Services Program to be used for courses or translation; \$116,000 to the same program for "miscellaneous" purposes.



3. subsidies for libraries: \$250,000 would be distributed among the commands so that they could stock base libraries, especially with French books and periodicals; and
4. central air conditioning at Borden: \$25,000.<sup>369</sup>

The second of these four items confirmed a decision that had been taken during the summer concerning machine translation, a project that would be put on hold over a period of several months.<sup>370</sup> The first and third decisions would take effect in October; for example, half of the subsidies for cultural assistance (libraries) were announced to the commands on 17 October.<sup>371</sup> DGBB would have to justify what it intended to do with these subsidies to the Director Procurement and Supply Common User (DPSCU) in Ottawa. DGBB would explain that they could be used to purchase books, periodicals, films, and so on in French or English to provide cultural support to military personnel serving outside their own milieu. Units would themselves obtain the cultural aids they considered most necessary. This was certainly contrary to the centralized procurement policy, for which DPSCU was responsible; however, the latter sportingly accepted the situation.<sup>372</sup> This was just another example of the little parallel administration which, for a while, seemed to spring up because of B and B. Between November 1973 and February 1974, however, the normal methods of financial administration in Defence regained the upper hand. DGBB took the advice of the various specialist officers (logistics/finance) who had been attached to his office since 1973. The documents in “Costing and Funding B & B Programme”, Volume II of the Letellier Papers, show clearly that Hull’s warnings in spring 1973, followed by official presentations in July and September, set out the parameters for the administration of supplementary funds for B and B. The situation can be summarized in this way. Although DGBB/DGLO was the expert in the B and B field and could initiate requests for resources and see them through the system, this and subsequent operations required to utilize or re-allocate the funds received were carried out in very close co-operation with the directors of the Departmental budgets concerned. On a day-to-day basis, both DGBB and the Director of Budget A drew on the supplementary resources budget. Initial control of the budgets by the directors concerned was all the more important because supplementary funds provided over the years to set up B and B programs were absorbed into the overall Defence budget, still earmarked for B and B, and were subject to normal controls. For example, DBRP wrote on 3 December 1973 that the Department would request supplementary resources for the fiscal year 1974/1975 totalling \$2,736,000 and 174 PYs in addition to the \$12M and 757 PYs obtained in 1972/1973 and 1973/1974, the latter being scheduled to be incorporated afterwards into the Department’s overall budget.<sup>373</sup>

The same day, L.E. Davies, Director of Budget A, described to the Assistant Deputy Minister (Finance) the shortcomings in the control of funds allocated to B and B. In the 1971/1972 program, allowance had been made for inflation over a five-year period for some activities but not for others, such as FRANCOTRAIN. Moreover, some management tools had not been used. For example, if B and B was to be controlled in the same way as other programs, officials would have to re-calculate the costs of the activities, prepare the necessary Program Change Proposals (PCPs) with DGBB, and allocate a planning code which would capture all direct expenditures connected with B and B. On 12 December, Lieutenant-General Milroy, the ADM (Per), said he agreed with these suggestions, and on the 17<sup>th</sup> a meeting was held on this subject and a system was set up which would include a DGBB representative and one from D Budget A.<sup>374</sup> At that time, the estimate for B and B operations and maintenance in 1974/1975 was approximately \$29M, of which \$14M had been (or would be) obtained from Treasury Board as supplementary funds. The other \$15M came from Defence's main budget (FRANCOTRAIN and a large part of the language training that Defence had undertaken before 1971/1972). Three large capital projects had to be set in motion: the CFLS building, construction associated with FRANCOTRAIN and the military college expansions would siphon off millions of dollars and hundreds of PYs if Treasury Board withdrew the support it had provided in the shape of supplementary resources. That was why the Department's senior officials were so anxious to become involved.

After Milroy became ADM (Per), one could sense the growing alarm in his circle concerning the financial implications of all this. A sub-committee of the Program Control Committee which met on 17 January 1974 to re-calculate the cost of the projects, as had been agreed in December, put the cost of FRANCOTRAIN at \$252M and 400 PYs. E.S. Baker, who represented Milroy, faithfully reported to the Lieutenant-General the dangers he saw on the horizon, especially those relating to FRANCOTRAIN, which would in principle be taken over by the Department without supplementary funds. In short, Baker wrote, estimates for other parts of the overall Forces program would have to be adjusted to meet the needs of FRANCOTRAIN in the coming years. All the decisions taken on the subject of B and B at this January 1974 meeting revolved round FRANCOTRAIN and its consequences.<sup>375</sup> Was this because of Milroy? Although he was not present at the meeting, he had certainly let his ideas be known on the subject. It is certain, as the documents we have already mentioned bear out, was that he had asked a number of questions in order to obtain a better idea of the true financial dimensions of B and B in the Canadian Forces<sup>376</sup> just when Treasury Board was also beginning to call for explanations.<sup>377</sup>

In May 1974, National Defence provided Treasury Board with an account of B and B activities. The human and financial resources aspects are summarized in the following table.

Table 56<sup>378</sup>

**RESOURCES\* USED BY DND FOR B AND B FROM 1972/1973  
INCLUDING ESTIMATES FOR 1974/1975**

	FY 1972/1973		FY 1973/1974		FY 1974/1975	
	PERSON YEARS	COST	PERSON YEARS	COST	PERSON YEARS	COST
Program base activities	1,256 mil	14.9M	1,256 mil 288 civ	15.7M	647 civ	35.8M
Supplementary resources	363 mil 126 civ	6.0M	536 mil 221 civ 35 civ	275.4K	249 civ	2.9 M
	1,619 mil 414 civ	20.9M	544 civ	27.9M	1,847 mil 896 civ	38.7M

\* Includes expenditures for the civilian program treated in chapter 18.

Before the end of 1974, six program change proposals had been approved by the Program Control Committee: PCP P2946 for the general B and B program (\$4.9M); PCP P2494 for language training (\$24.6M); PCP P2933 for non-technical bilingual publications (\$19M); PCP P2936 for technical publications (\$225,000 for a pilot project); PCP C3925 for the military colleges (\$400,000); PCP C3870, which had been accepted by Treasury Board in 1973, for the development of CFB Saint-Jean (it was originally \$51,028,000 but rose to \$87,861,000, mainly because of inflation). Consequently, as a result of increasingly accurate costing, the estimates for 1974/1975 in Table 56 were brought down in the autumn to \$36.8M, instead of \$38.7M.<sup>379</sup>

The point to be remembered about costs during the first years that the program was implemented is that military language training took the lion's share. A DGBB document on language training in 1976 presented this aspect of the matter as follows:

1977-1978	1978-1979	1979-1980	1980-1981	1981-1982
\$24,053M	\$50,738M	\$65,354M	\$65,323M	\$65,323M

Expenditures similar to those in the last three years above would continue until 1991.<sup>380</sup>

We now know that this part of the program cost around \$40M a year in 1987, far less than the cost projections made in 1976. Moreover, when the new MOLP was prepared three years later, in 1979, the total cost of the program, of which language training was just a part, was calculated in a more realistic fashion.

Table 57<sup>381</sup>

**TOTAL COST OF MOLP  
in millions of dollars**

	1978/1979	1979/1980	1980/1981
Program cost	24,479	30,112	37,136
Construction at Saint-Jean	16,600	8,600	1,600
Total cost	41,079	38,712	38,736

In August 1979, after reviewing the draft military plan which had been submitted to it in April, Treasury Board was prepared to support its goals, provided certain conditions were met. One of the conditions was that the supplementary resources National Defence was asking for would have to be allocated and controlled by, or on behalf of, DGOL; this was to ensure that they would not be used for other projects without Treasury Board approval.<sup>382</sup> The reason for this was that the plan contained a request for supplementary human resources, because the new premises for the CFLS would soon be ready and second-language training would receive a new impetus. Here, as in the years from 1972/1973 to 1974/1975, the Department was seeking to offset the reduction in operational activities caused by language training with a larger number of military personnel even if this increment of recruits, or young inexperienced soldiers, was not really able to replace the trained soldiers that, so it seemed, would take the bulk of language training. It was also at this time that the Armed Forces obtained supplementary positions for Base Language Training Coordinators, which we mentioned in Chapter 10. In March 1980, Admiral R.H. Falls, the CDS, was very happy to announce officially to the Forces that the MOLP had been approved by Treasury Board.<sup>383</sup> In the published plan, one table was entirely devoted to the costs for fiscal years 1978/1979 to 1980/1981. We reproduce that below (Table 58).

**Table 58**

**B AND B COSTS FOR THE YEARS 1978/1979 to 1980/1981  
in millions of dollars<sup>384</sup>**

OFFICIAL LANGUAGES ACTIVITIES	1978/1979 PREVIOUS YEAR			1979/1980 NEW YEAR			1980/1981 NEW YEAR		
	PYs		Cost	PYs		Cost	PYs		Cost
	Mil	Civ		Mil	Civ		Mil	Civ	
I. LANGUAGE TRAINING									
Direct costs			18			9			18
Replacement costs									
-officers	39		1,187	40		1,290	170		5,498
-other ranks	632		7,439	643		7,632	733		
Temporary duty									
-trainees replaced		279	148			174			739
Language training		43							
-teachers			8,428			9,239	356		9,239
Teaching assistants			786	57		1,143	57		1,143
Indirect costs									
(Trainees not replaced)			(8,618)	(258)		(8,618)	(185)		(3,267)
Temporary duty for trainees not replace			174				174		65
II. OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS									
III. CAPITAL AND RENTAL COSTS									
Construction at Saint-Jean			16,600			6,630			4,160
Teaching materials									
Renovation/rentals/etc.									
IV. OTHER DIRECT COSTS									
Printing and production			281			239			197
Moving expenses									
V. ADMINISTRATION									
DGOL-Policy and evaluation (PEC-OL)	7	7		7	6		13	8	
-work instruments (DTTC)	5	8		5	8		5	8	1342
-language training (DLT)	5	6	1,043	5	7	1,055	5	7	72
NDHQ DMMD OL cell							2		297
Command co-ordinators	5	5	290	4	6	297	4	6	192
Linguistic advisors		9	192		9	192		9	307
HQ Canadian Forces Training (CFTS)	5	10	307	5	10	307	5	10	
Language tests French/English (CFTS)	1	35	1,020	1	35	1,020	1	35	1,020
Base language co-ordinators							29		877
Language schools									
-CFLS Saint-Jean	27	8	896	27	8	896	27	8	896
-CFLS Borden	14	2	374	14	2	374	14	2	374
-CFLS (ELS Div.) Halifax	4	1	119	4	1	119	4	1	119
Administration — temporary duty (DGOL only)			62			40			64
TOTAL		1,157	39,364M		1,260	30,830M		1,519	37,261M

The reader will again notice differences between the projections in Table 57 and Table 58 for the years 1978/1979 and 1979/1980. In the latter case, the expected completion of construction at Saint-Jean, plus the fact that the language courses scheduled to take place there would not yet have reached cruising speed, were major factors in the drop in the cost of B and B activities. In 1980/1981, with courses operating flat out, the figures rose again.

The actual costs for the year 1981/1982 were \$29.478M. For 1982/1983 they were \$34.609M, and the estimates for the years 1983/1984 and 1984/1985 were \$37.691M and \$39.965M, according to a document submitted to Treasury Board in March 1983. In each of these years, language training accounted for over two-thirds of the bill (\$20.559M in 1981/1982; \$25.366M in 1982/1983; \$29.192M in 1983/1984; and \$30.879M in 1984/1985),<sup>385</sup> with a tendency for this percentage to increase as time went on. However, these costs did not include “the pay for students who were not replaced in their positions” while they were on course.<sup>386</sup> This amounted to a deduction of \$24M for 1982/1983 alone. If we add this \$24M, we have a figure of over \$40M for language training alone in 1983/1984. This was approximately the amount that Colonel G.S. Clements of CFTS presented at the working study for Base B and B Coordinators in May 1983.<sup>387</sup> This was only part of what the most recent Military Second Language Training Plan.(MSLTP), then being implemented, would cost. In December 1985, 1,940 person-years were allocated to this plan,<sup>388</sup> which in the following year (1986/1987) cost a total of \$65,535,675,\* according to a computer statement dated 10 September 1987.<sup>389</sup> Thus it was the new MSLTP which produced the language training peaks which had been forecast in 1976 for the beginning of the 1980s. The other costs for B and B activities remained more or less the same, especially because practically all translation came under the Secretary of State in the period under study.

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\* The Joint Committee on Official Languages did not address the question of costs in its deliberations.

# **Part Five**

## **Other Aspects of Official Languages in the Department**

We shall analyse language policy at considerable length... a bilingualism policy full of ambiguities, contradictions and anomalies. Language policy brings us to the universal problem of integration, for no political society, regardless of its system, can survive without integrating to some extent the diverse elements which make it up. Today, as economic and even political interdependence has grown and people have become more mobile for a variety of reasons, the problem of integration has taken on new dimensions. It arises both at the level of society as a whole and at that of underlying societies, particularly in multinational federal states. It is complicated by being confused with assimilation, and this is aggravated by the confusion between individual and collective rights, which in any case are closely linked. On the one hand, this confusion explains the fierce resistance of those groups concerned, and on the other hand, by creating a false sense of security, it has led in the past to the annihilation of peoples who believed they were accepted by the majority. Assimilation is neither desirable nor practicable. We believe that in Canada, as we shall demonstrate, this continuing confusion is very largely responsible for a real wall of failure to understand often pointless and unjustified conflicts.

Kaye Holloway  
*Le Canada:*  
*Pourquoi l'impasse?*  
Vol I. Montréal-Paris:  
LGDS and Nouvelle Optique,  
1983, p xxii.



At the fringes of the great 1972 plan, events occurred which offered grounds for hope and reassurance. The military chaplaincy, for example, achieved a very high percentage of bilinguals among its personnel, for those responsible had long recognized that a person's soul could more readily be touched in his or her own language.

This positive example was accompanied from the 1950s by the opening of French-language schools, in Canada and abroad, where the children of Francophones in the military could be educated in their own language. Their success was less than that of the chaplaincy but still remarkable, especially in view of the problems encountered in the mid-1960s when an attempt was made to extend French-language schools in parts of Canada outside Quebec. Religion and education are certainly worthy of separate attention in our two volumes.

The civilian official languages program was poorly co-ordinated at the outset and slower to begin than the military program, but it was able to make use of Public Service Commission infrastructure to gain ground quickly and, in some of its achievements, take the lead over its military counterpart. On the whole, as we shall see in the final chapter, and despite some shortcomings (for example, no provision was made for proportional representation), the civilian effort made a substantial contribution to institutional bilingualism. The considerable gains it made remain inadequate, however.



Colonel René Morin, CD, served the cause of the French language and Francophones within National Defence from 1965 to 1982. He was especially active in the creation of French-language schools outside Quebec for the children of DND members serving there.

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# 17

## Two Exceptional Cases on the Military Side

### The military chaplaincy

The military chaplaincy was not always as well organized as it is today. Before the First World War, chaplains were considered regimental officers. Thus two Francophone Roman Catholic chaplains accompanied the 9<sup>th</sup> Battalion (*Voltigeurs de Québec*) and the 65<sup>th</sup> Battalion (*Carabiniers du Mont-Royal*) during the Northwest campaign in 1885, while several Anglophone Protestant chaplains did the same for English-speaking units. During the South African War, six military chaplains, one of them an Irish Roman Catholic, were with the Canadian contingents.<sup>1</sup> No French-speaking unit took part in that imperial war and French Canadians made up only three percent of Canadian strength. It is therefore not surprising that no Francophone chaplain was sent.

In 1897, the Canadian Militia General Staff gave permission for units to have honorary chaplains on condition that they cost the Crown nothing<sup>2</sup> and served in the Non-Permanent Active Militia.

At the start of the First World War, the Honourable Sam Hughes, the Minister of Militia, controlled the appointments of chaplains to units, although he did not incorporate them into a corps of their own. It was not until after he resigned in October 1916 that chaplains were brought together in the Canadian Chaplain Service Corps.<sup>3</sup> All chaplains, whether Roman Catholic or Protestant, were then administered by a Protestant principal chaplain with two assistants, one Protestant, the other Roman Catholic, based in London, England.<sup>4</sup> All were volunteers and enrolled in the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF), not the Militia.

At the end of the war there were 293 chaplains, of whom 53 were Roman Catholics.<sup>5</sup> In all, 426 chaplains served overseas, including 335 Protestants. Although we did not find any information on this, it is reasonable to assume that some of the Protestants were bilingual. On the Roman Catholic side, we

know that 102 chaplains were enrolled and 91 of them served overseas. According to Colonel J.M. Almond, then Director of the Chaplaincy, they were hand picked and had to know at least two modern languages.<sup>6</sup> In his very detailed study, Reverend Father J.R. O’Gorman gave the following numbers for RC chaplains who served overseas:

	Anglophones	Francophones	Total
1914	3	3	6
1915	9	5	14
1916	23	9	32
1917	14	1	15
1918	<u>15</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>24</u>
Total	64	27	91

In addition, eleven chaplains (including five Francophones) provided pastoral services to the military in Canada.<sup>7</sup>

Thus one third of RC chaplains were Francophones. All could speak at least two modern languages, although we do not know how well. We cannot tell whether their second language was in fact French or English. In the Navy, as in the British air services where a number of Canadians served, Chaplaincy services seem to have been targeted only at Anglophones.

In 1919, the Expeditionary Force Chaplaincy was disbanded.<sup>8</sup> Then, on 1 June 1921, the Canadian Chaplain Service was again authorized as one of the components of the Non-Permanent Active Militia. The number of chaplains was limited to 200.<sup>9</sup> There were at the time 172 major units, comprising 35 cavalry regiments, 27 artillery batteries and 110 infantry battalions.<sup>10</sup> But only two batteries and fourteen battalions were Francophone. We may assume that these were served by Francophone chaplains, either from the Militia or from neighbouring parishes.

In 1939, shortly after war was declared, the Militia Staff mobilized the Chaplain Service as a separate corps. The experience of the First World War was thus put to use. This time, there were two separate branches within the same corps, one Protestant, the other Roman Catholic, each with its own Ordinary and Chaplain General at Army Headquarters in Ottawa.<sup>11</sup>

Some 475 chaplains of various denominations and six rabbis served during the Second World War.<sup>12</sup> All were Anglophones, although some were bilingual. On the Catholic side, the Royal Canadian Navy had four Francophone chaplains out of the 30 serving that branch full-time, or 13 percent.<sup>13</sup> We know that 99,688 officers and men served in the navy and

6,834 women in the Women's Royal Naval Service. Unfortunately, we have no source, official or otherwise, of information on the proportion of Francophones. In any case, there were no groupings of Francophones in units except perhaps in recruit training schools and depots in Quebec. Thus even if the proportion of Francophone chaplains were higher than that of Francophone sailors — as it surely was — this would not necessarily indicate that Francophones were served in their own language, except perhaps in individual cases.

The Canadian Army had 730,625 men and women serving in the Second World War. According to Colonel C.P. Stacey, Francophones made up 19.1 percent of this strength.<sup>14</sup> The Military Chaplain Service, for its part, provided 155 RC chaplains, 93 Anglophones and 62 Francophones.<sup>15</sup> Several of the latter, who made up 40 percent of the total strength of Catholic chaplains, worked in their own language within Francophone units. Several others, holding key positions or assigned to camps with large numbers of Francophones (such as Borden, Petawawa and Valcartier), must have served their flocks largely in English. Thus one of the authors of this study does not recall having once taken part in a religious service in French in the seven air force bases and six military camps where he served between 1943 and 1946, even though some camps were served by Francophone chaplains. This was not an exceptional case, but a situation considered normal in locations outside Quebec and away from Francophone or “bilingual” units.

Before the Royal Canadian Air Force Chaplain Service became independent in 1940, it was administered by the Army.<sup>16</sup> During the war, it had 209 Protestant chaplains serving full-time and 82 serving part-time.<sup>17</sup> No doubt some were bilingual, but we may assume that they did nearly all their pastoral work in English. On the Catholic side, there were 106 full-time chaplains, including 41 Francophones.<sup>18</sup> Francophones thus made up 39 percent of Roman Catholic chaplains or 13 percent of all those working in the RCAF — higher than the percentage of Francophones in the air force. That should not, however, lead us to conclude that French-speaking airmen were served in their own language at the community level outside the main RCAF centres in Quebec and 425<sup>th</sup> (*Alouette*) Squadron,<sup>19</sup> since English had been adopted as the language of work in the air.

The Chaplain Service underwent some changes after the war, including a decrease in the number of full-time chaplains. Thus the regular strength of chaplains in the navy in 1947 fell to eleven Protestant and six Roman Catholic clergy.<sup>20</sup> Only one of these was a Francophone. In 1950, the regular strength consisted of fifteen chaplains, of whom ten were Protestant and five were

Catholic. Again, only one of the latter was a Francophone,<sup>21</sup> a representation of 7.5 percent of the total.

Similarly, consulting the list of army officers in 1947, we find nineteen chaplains, twelve Protestant and seven Catholic. Four of the latter were Francophones, for a representation of 21 percent.<sup>22</sup> In 1950, the number was more than twice as great, for there were 22 Protestant chaplains (all Anglophones) and eighteen Catholics, among whom fifteen were Francophones.<sup>23</sup> We can see immediately that there had been a fundamental shift in terms of language. It had taken place gradually, for in April 1948 there were eight Francophones among the ten Catholic chaplains,<sup>24</sup> while from October 1948 to April 1949, the proportion rose to ten out of fourteen.<sup>25</sup>

In the air force, the 1947 figures were nineteen regular full-time chaplains and four part-time. Of these, nine were Protestant, one was Jewish and thirteen were Catholics; among the latter five were Francophones.<sup>26</sup> This meant that 22 percent of Catholic chaplains were Francophones, which was far greater than the percentage of Francophones in the RCAF.<sup>27</sup> In 1950, there were eighteen Anglophone Protestant chaplains and eleven Catholic chaplains, five of the Catholics were Francophones, bringing their representation down to 17 percent.<sup>28</sup>

Clearly, during this short period preceding the Korean War, within the Catholic sections of the three Chaplain Services an attempt was made to reflect the French fact. This is demonstrated by the numbers and recruiting of chaplains.

	Navy		Army		AirForce		Total		Percentage
	E	F	E	F	E	F	E	F	F
1947	5	1	3	4	8	5	16	10	38.5
1950	4	1	2	8	6	5	12	14	53.5

We could even conclude that there was a movement to “bilingualize” the Chaplain Service.

His Grace Maurice Roy, a former Chaplain of the *R22<sup>e</sup>R* who became Bishop of Trois-Rivières, was appointed Ordinary of the Armed Forces on 8 June 1946, replacing Bishop Nelligan, who had retired because of ill health.<sup>29</sup> Monsignor C.E. Beaudry had been Chaplain General of the Army,<sup>30</sup> which had the largest number of military chaplains, since 1 August 1945. Every chaplain accepted in the army had to be approved by Roy and Beaudry. In this way, these two chaplains had a pronounced influence

on the implementation of a policy of almost complete bilingualism, in view of the fact that all Francophone chaplains and a large number of Anglophone Catholic chaplains were bilingual and could serve the people in their care in either language. We must not forget, of course, that these priests were being selected at a time when French-Canadian priests were more numerous and available.

When the Korean War broke out, the Canadian Government authorized a substantial increase in navy, army and air force strength. This increase was reflected in the Chaplain Services. For ease of comparison between the different services, we have used summary tables 59, 60 and 61, based on data from officer lists.<sup>31</sup> We can conclude from these that between 1950 and 1980, Francophone chaplains comprised an average of 61 percent of Catholic chaplains and 28.7 percent of all chaplains, both Catholic and Protestant. This was higher than the percentage of Francophones serving in the Armed Forces and comparable to the national average of Francophones in the overall population.

Table 59

**PRE-UNIFICATION (BEFORE 1967)**

YEAR	NAVY		ARMY		AIR FORCE	
	Prot	RC E F	Prot	RC E F	Prot	RC E F
1952	13	5 1	41	8 21	35	7 16
1955	32	19 4	59	10 35	53	14 29
1958	34	20 5	62	8 36	60	17 29
1961	18	5 3	64	6 39	58	18 27
1964	29	8 4	59	3 43	59	20 27
1967	27	8 8	60	3 42	54	18 26

Table 60

**PERCENTAGE**

YEAR	NAVY		ARMY		AIR FORCE		AVERAGE OF 3 BRANCHES	
	F/RC	F/P&RC	F/RC	F/P&RC	F/RC	F/P&RC	F/RC	F/P&RC
		**	*	**	*	**	*	**
1952	16.6	5.3	72	30	70	27.6	53	25.8
1955	17	7.3	78	33.6	67	30.2	54	26.7
1958	20	8.5	82	34	63	27.4	55	25.8
1961	37.5	11.5	87	35.8	60	26.2	61.5	29
1964	33	9.5	93.5	41	57	25.5	61	29.4
1967	50	18.6	93.3	41	59	26.5	67.4	30.9

\* Percentage of Francophone chaplains in the RC section.

\*\* Percentage of Francophone chaplains in the entire Chaplain Service, including Protestants and RC.

Table 61

**POST-UNIFICATION (1968 TO 1979)**

YEAR	PROT	RC		PERCENTAGE	
		E	F	F/RC	F/P&RC
1970	106	27	63	70	32.8
1973	93	28	54	65.8	30.9
1976	88	28	47	62.7	28.8
1979	91	30	44	59.5	26.7

There is clear evidence that chaplains were able to promote bilingualism and biculturalism on their own within their organizations, without waiting for the chiefs of personnel of the three branches to instruct them to do so.



Thus they demonstrated, both by daily example and by long-term service, that for all practical purposes they recognized the equality of English and French which was not officially proclaimed until 1969. They concluded there was a military, and even more, a spiritual need to be able to serve their people in their own language. It is unfortunate that their open minds in this regard did not inspire others.

### **Military dependants' schools \***

Under the 1867 British North America Act (Canadian Constitution), the provinces are responsible for providing primary and secondary school services. The necessary funds to cover the cost of those services are generally raised by local school taxes supplemented by money from the provincial government. In this way, each municipality provides, through the public school system, the schooling to children residing on taxed property.

Crown lands are not taxable, however. As a result, until the Second World War, unless they received non-resident school fees, provincial and municipal authorities throughout Canada rejected demands by Forces members living on bases — Crown lands — that they assume responsibility for the schooling of their children. Non-commissioned officers and men in particular could hardly afford to cover the full cost of schooling out of their slender pay in those days. Until 1939, many of their children consequently had to leave school early. In brief, every member living on a base — not all of them did so — was solely responsible for his children's education. Exceptions to this rule were rare, and in the 1930s those few exceptions were even questioned by officials of the Auditor General of Canada.

Between 1939 and 1945, the families of volunteer soldiers generally did not occupy government housing. Since they paid municipal taxes, directly or indirectly, their children could attend schools in the locality where they lived. Nevertheless, school boards in British Columbia and Ontario made representations to the Department requesting financial assistance for educating some military dependants. These requests were caused by the influx of women and children renting premises near camps so as to be close to the family

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\* This part is based almost entirely on a study written by Colonel René Morin for the Directorate of History. The few endnotes refer to other documents or studies. Information on Morin's study appears in the introduction to Volume I.

member serving in uniform. National Defence invariably replied along the following lines:

- there was no obligation for women and children to be brought to localities near military camps;
- families paid rent, part of which went to school taxes, and this entitled children to attend local schools free of charge; and
- the Department had no legal responsibility for educating the children of service personnel.

Thus, as we can see, the battle that had to be fought at this time was for access to normal education for children whose parents had chosen to live at a base or were forced to do so by the military profession of one of the spouses, nearly always the husband. It is interesting to note that few complaints were made about the lack of educational resources by those serving in the military. Had there been more, the Department might perhaps have been much quicker to acknowledge its responsibility for educating the children of service personnel. This silence was partly attributable to the fact that submitting grievances to a higher authority was difficult because of the military service code. Those who joined the Forces accepted the splendours and miseries of their condition. It is unfortunate to find that children often paid the cost of the acceptance of such a situation.

At the same time, the fact that the Department's civilian and military authorities did not perceive the seriousness of the situation tells us much about the low priority attached by the whole country to its defence, at least until 1939. Whether we like it or not, the schooling of children of Armed Forces members has been, and always will be, a major factor in the level of troop morale, and one which certainly plays a role in keeping people in the Forces. The mobility of the military doubtless makes it all the more important to have satisfactory education programs available everywhere.

Not until after the Second World War had ended was an attempt made to rectify this obvious deficiency. In November 1946, the Personnel Members Committee in Ottawa asked the Army to prepare a submission covering all three services. The Privy Council would be requested to authorize the Department to open schools in establishments, camps and bases where there was no suitable school within a reasonable distance, and to reimburse non-resident fees for children living on bases located near municipal schools where they were registered.

Following long months of discussion and preparation, the submission was finally ready. On 13 March 1947, Order in Council 1271 was approved by the Privy Council. Thus, for the first time, the federal government accepted responsibility for educating the children of military personnel. Let us stress that the involvement of this level of government in an area of provincial jurisdiction (education) did not set a precedent, for at the end of the war, the federal government had made education of young volunteer soldiers returning from the front one of the pillars of its program of reintegration into civilian life. The success of the government's 1947 decision was obvious by the following year, when the DND annual report stated that 1,174 pupils were enrolled in schools set up at camps and bases. It quickly became clear, as many expected, that the provision of housing for military families and schools for military children was very cost-effective, making military life much more attractive for young people and raising troop morale.

It is not our concern here to pursue this part of the story further. Let us merely note that this first decision regarding education of military dependants was subsequently amended many times. To gain an idea of how it had evolved by 1986, let us refer to the annual report of the Directorate General Dependants Education Programs (DGDEP) dated 11 March 1987. It stated that school services for children residing on Crown lands were provided under formulas listed in order of importance and based on PC 1977-4/3280 of 17 November 1977:

- subsidies paid under the *Municipal Subsidies Act*;
- the payment of non-resident school fees to school boards;
- a cost-sharing agreement when a school board, for example, had to invest funds in order to accommodate the children of service personnel; and
- the building and operating of schools for Departmental dependants.<sup>32</sup>

The basic guidelines by which the Department managed the school question were, naturally, complemented by agreements with the various provinces. The language aspect of the question shows us the wide range of contacts the Department had to maintain in order to have available the quality of education services it believed necessary in order for the children of its civilian and military employees to develop normally.

Before turning to the question of language, however, let us pause briefly at another facet of DND's schooling problems. One of the Canadian peculiarities is the place of religion in the education provided directly by the Department. After 1947, Roman Catholics in particular were anxious to obtain "separate"\* (that is, Catholic) schools at bases where the Department had schools. Quebec was the only province with a denominational school system divided into two branches: Catholic and Protestant. Successive ministers and the senior military and civilian hierarchy at DND had always dismissed offhand successive requests that such "separate" schools be established. Religious teaching, however, was always allowed in schools. Very often, this task was performed by local chaplains under the senior authority of the Chaplain General. It was therefore understood that the children of Catholic or Protestant service personnel had an undeniable right to religious instruction at school, and such instruction was part of all the Department's curricula.

It is against this backdrop that we shall now present the question of the teaching of the children of Francophone service personnel in French. We shall examine this in three sections: schools for the children of Canadian Forces personnel in Europe; schools in Canada; and the freedom to choose the language of instruction.

In 1950, Canada agreed to station Canadian Forces in Europe in accordance with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Land troops, consisting of an army brigade and support units, were located in Hanover, in northern Germany, in 1951, and the Air Force posted squadrons in France in 1952. At first, married members of the Forces went overseas for only one year, without their families, while single members did a two-year tour. Soon it became apparent that numbers of married members were bringing their wives and children at their own expense. The situation at the end of 1952 at the first air force base in Grostenquin, France, affords an excellent example. Four months after the base opened, there were 53 school-age children living in a large trailer park near the base. There was no school there; the closest French town with a school was 16 km away. The Department was not concerned in the slightest, since officially there were no Canadian families overseas. However, the commanding officer worried about the morale of the members who owned those trailers, and took steps to offer classes for their children. Since the majority of them came from Ontario, it was not too difficult to solve the problem of curriculum and textbooks. The Ontario Ministry of Education agreed to provide instruction and books for the 53

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\* In other words, denominational, as stipulated in the *British North America Act, 1867*.

children, in grades 1 to 10; the first unofficial school thus opened its doors at Grostenquin in February 1953.

At the beginning of that year, Ottawa had received hundreds of requests to change the policy of posting married members to Europe, since several families moved there in any case, and some of those who did not had serious problems during the year of separation. In June 1953, the Department announced that it would change its policy as of 1 July 1954 and would take steps to provide permanent housing and schools. Official authorization from the federal government to open schools for military dependants in France and Germany was given in PC 17/501 (TB 467197), dated 8 April 1954. This Order in Council was amended some time later to include Belgium in PC 1954-893 (TB 472262), dated 17 June 1954. The budget for the 1952-53 fiscal year contained a total amount of \$314,000 for schools, but only \$170,000 was spent during that fiscal year. Meanwhile, in France, 95 percent of the general construction program at Grostenquin had been completed. In addition, construction work on Air Division HQ in Metz and the Marville air station was in progress. High priority was then given to building new schools and converting unused barracks into schools. The complicated process of recruiting teachers for the following year was begun immediately. The first group of teachers hired for overseas schools arrived in August 1954.

During the 1953/54 fiscal year, the Canadian Army built 1,402 housing units for the brigade in Germany\* and the Air Force built 1,804 units for the air division in France and Germany. Schools for military dependants opened their doors in September 1954 in England, France, Germany and Belgium. From the first year of operation, they offered a program from Grade 1 to Grade 13, even though it was often given in makeshift facilities. From the outset, DND schools overseas followed Ontario standards and teaching methods. The number of pupils rose from 1,700 in September 1954 to 3,690 in June 1956. In 1968/69, enrolment peaked at 8,676. By 1986, it had fallen back to 3,606, under the influence of declining birth rates and cutbacks to our military strength in Europe.

On the whole, the accommodations and schools were very well received by members, their wives and their children. However, the wishes of Francophone families were not respected initially, for their children had to take classes in English for a number of years. A “bilingual program” was

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\* The brigade had been relocated from Hanover to the Soest area, near Dortmund, in September 1953.

offered to children of members of the *R22<sup>e</sup>R* in Werl, Germany, from 1954, but not until September 1970, after the brigade had moved again — this time to Lahr, still in Germany, but close to the French border — was a truly French school opened. It offered the Quebec curriculum for all subjects from junior kindergarten to Secondary I. In Baden-Soellingen, which was primarily an Air Force base, the same program was offered for classes from junior kindergarten to Grade 6, while high school pupils were bussed to the Lahr school.

In December 1953, HQ 1 Air Division communicated with the Chief of the Air Staff: “With regard to the necessity”, it was stated, “for teaching school curriculum in both the English and French language, COs reported that the majority opinion of the French speaking personnel was that they desired to have their children taught in English as it would help them become more bilingual, so there is no need to provide a French curriculum.” We have no idea where the Commanding Officers acquired this information. The files do not contain any form of survey, unit reports or the like. Apart from the “bilingual” school at Werl, West Germany, Francophone Army and Air Force families had access to a full program of French as a second language, which was however much more useful to Anglophone children than Francophone ones.

This said, the curricula for Anglophone pupils from junior kindergarten to Grade 6 today combine all Canada’s provincial curricula and make use of the unique opportunities afforded by European culture. Curricula for Anglophone students from Grade 7 to Grade 13 are based on Ontario curricula. Those for Francophone students are based on Quebec’s French curricula from kindergarten to Secondary V (grade eleven).

What about the language aspect of the school issue? Here, as elsewhere, the picture was not very bright until the 1960s. From the 1950s onward, a Francophone family whose head wanted to pursue a career in the military was called upon to serve all over Canada and overseas. For most children, schooling in French was confined to Quebec, Ottawa and to some extent, Werl. To summarize the situation, we can do no better than refer to extracts from the 1962 Glassco Commission Report to highlight the sombre conditions with which Francophone members of the three services and their families had to cope up to that time:

Schools subsidized by the Federal Government do not offer equal facilities to English-speaking and to French-speaking children (DND in each province followed the educational system of that province.)

In Quebec, children of military camps may attend English or French schools. But in Ontario in military camps, the teaching is exclusively in English, even where there are large groups of French-speaking children. French-speaking servicemen who wish their children to be taught in French must bear the costs of education from their own pocket.

DND has not so far authorized the setting up at any camps in Ontario of a single class with French the teaching language, in spite of the fact that in some such camps there are important groups of French-speaking children of school age.

*Military Camps Overseas* Minimum figure of 25 pupils required for setting up a class in which French is the teaching language appears excessive for two reasons:

- a. there need be only 10 children of school age to secure permission to establish a school at a military camp in Canada;
- b. in 1961 the average number of pupils per teacher in DND schools in Europe was only 19.1, and as low as 9.4 in secondary schools.

When the number of pupils does not justify the organization of separate classes, a grant for tuition fees (and another for travel expenses) is not available for French-speaking children of school age to enable them to pursue their studies in a French-speaking country or in Canada.

When Volume III of the B and B Commission Report came out in 1969, the situation did not appear to have changed greatly:

Many problems are encountered by Francophone servicemen and their dependants stationed in provinces where English is the only language of instruction. Since the curricula and the language of instruction of DND schools are determined in accordance with the policies of the various provinces, the department cannot organize French-language classes or schools in most Canadian provinces. To alleviate this problem, the department of National Defence in February 1968 established a formula providing that “where education facilities providing instruction in one or other of the official languages of Canada, consistent with the language normally used in the home and with that received during previous periods of instruction, are not available... an education allowance may be granted to defray the cost of the required education.”<sup>33</sup> The department pays up to \$1,300 a year per child under this formula. This means that, when schooling in their own language is not offered near the base, parents have to send their children away from home — which most parents do not regard as desirable. Furthermore, the present formula does not permit parents to shift the language of their children’s instruction; for those parents who want their

children to become bilingual, the present arrangements are thus unsatisfactory.

In the overseas schools, a composite curriculum is used from kindergarten to Grade VI, in an attempt to minimize the difficulties faced by children on transfer to and from Canada. In Grades VII to XIII, the Ontario curriculum is followed. Either French or bilingual classes are established wherever the number of Francophone students justifies French as the language of instruction.<sup>34</sup> For example, the children of members of the Royal 22<sup>nd</sup> Regiment posted in West Germany can follow the curriculum of the French Roman Catholic schools of Quebec to Grade IX. Although provision exists for it in CFAO's, no French class above Grade IX has yet been organized in Europe. French as a second language is taught as a conversational course from kindergarten to Grade VIII and as an option in the regular course from Grades IX to XIII, in accordance with the Ontario curriculum.

Under a foreign service allowance clause, an education and travelling allowance is available if a member posted outside Canada cannot obtain schooling for his dependent children at a standard comparable to that available in Ontario schools. However, this clause does not specify any language of instruction, so Francophone children in Grades X through XIII must study in the English-language secondary schools required in Germany by the DND.

Two-thirds of married military personnel had school-age children. Slightly less than three-quarters of the Anglophones sent their children to English-language elementary and secondary schools. The remainder were being taught in both French and English. Roughly half the Francophones sent their children to English-language schools.

Given the choice, both Anglophones and Francophones would mainly prefer their children to be taught in the two languages, particularly at the elementary level. At the secondary level the proportion who would prefer their children to be taught only in French, or in French as well as in English, was slightly lower. It is significant that all personnel, whatever their linguistic group, would like to see more French being used in their children's elementary and secondary schooling.

When the Honourable Paul Hellyer became Minister of National Defence in 1963, he had decided to correct this situation. Unfortunately, however, the first initiative to open bilingual classes in one of Canada's largest military camps was doomed to fail. In August 1965, the Minister expressed his strong desire to the Deputy Minister to hold French classes in his Department's schools. CFB Petawawa was designated a "pilot unit". To follow up the Minister's wish and at the request of the Assistant Deputy Minister, the Camp Petawawa Elementary School Board undertook a survey in September and



October 1965 to determine the extent of the requirement to introduce instruction in the French language. This survey indicated that 100 Francophone families and 241 Anglophone families expressed a desire to have their children attend the planned French classes. At an estimate of two children per family, this would mean 682 pupils in French classes. The DGDEP, headed by Roger Lavergne, was pleased with this unexpected response. There were immediate suspicions, however, that Anglophone families had not understood that most of the instruction would be given in French. On the basis of what would later prove to be false data, Lavergne took steps to introduce French classes from kindergarten to Grade 8 at Petawawa in September 1966.

On 13 October 1965, accompanied by Canadian Forces HQ Staff officers, Lavergne met with the principal administrators of CFB Petawawa schools and several senior officers, among them Brigadier-General J.A. Dextraze, Commander of 2 Canadian Brigade. The following 30 December, he wrote a letter to the Ontario Minister of Education requesting permission to set up bilingual classes. A few days later he received an affirmative reply from Ontario's Deputy Minister of Education. In March 1966, to avoid any misunderstanding, the school board was asked to ensure that all parents clearly understood the situation. Parents were also given an appropriate notice of registration. But the results did not indicate that it would be possible to conduct bilingual classes at Petawawa because the numbers did not warrant it:

Kindergarten	— 12 students	Grade 5	— 2 students
Grade 1	— 7	Grade 6	— 6
Grade 2	— 11	Grade 7	— 4
Grade 3	— 6	Grade 8	— 1
Grade 4	— 2	Total	— 51

The file containing the questionnaires completed by Francophone parents in October 1965 had given very different results:

Kindergarten	— 25
Grade 1	— 30
Grade 2	— 40
Grade 3	— 24
Grade 4	— 27
Total	146

The change of heart among the parents in question is difficult to explain. We may wonder whether the French-speaking Brigade Commander placed all his prestige and leadership behind the experiment which was to be conducted.

In view of the very low registration for bilingual classes in September 1966, the Deputy Minister asked the Minister for direction, on 28 March 1966. His reply dated 7 April 1966 is worth quoting. The Minister remained committed, and the Department should “proceed with at least four grades namely Kindergarten, Grade 1, Grade 2 and Grade 3”. At a meeting of the Petawawa School Board on 25 April 1966, C.E. Craig, the Supervising Principal, who had on many occasions voiced strong opposition to French and bilingual classes, made a threatening speech against bilingual classes. He tabled a submission on behalf of 106 teachers stating that all the teachers in the local elementary schools had gone on record as unwilling to sign their contracts for the next school year because of the introduction of bilingual classes and the special treatment afforded them by Ottawa. By special treatment was meant, an allowance of \$750 for bilingual teachers instructing a small number of students as compared to English-speaking ones whose classes were over crowded. Craig also stated that he had informed the relevant provincial teachers associations concerned and the Canadian Teachers Federation about the situation, and they had pledged their full support.

Meanwhile, on receipt of the Minister’s directive, the Assistant Deputy Minister requested the “personal support” of the Chief of Personnel “in order that the Minister’s directive may be implemented”. Lavergne again met with military and school authorities at Petawawa on 28 April 1966. At the meeting, it became clear that the senior school officials were against the introduction of French and bilingual classes. They voiced their opposition to every proposal by Lavergne to assist with the introduction of bilingual classes. They even succeeded in convincing the Base Commander that finding accommodation for the classes would be difficult. They built, indeed, a case for more space for special English classes, for example, for gifted pupils. In concluding his report to the Deputy Minister on his return from Petawawa, Lavergne wrote:

In spite of the statement by all concerned at the meeting that they wanted bilingual classes, I am still not satisfied that we will succeed unless positive action is taken by local authorities. It will also be interesting to know the reasons why the parents who have eligible children are not desirous of participating in this program. I feel that there are too many elements at work to assume that from now on this project will run smoothly.

The experiment nevertheless proceeded. When the 1966 school year began, however, there was great disappointment when the attendance figures were revealed:

Kindergarten	—	6 pupils
Grade 1	—	6 pupils
Grades 2 and 3	—	18 pupils

The total was discouraging to all who had worked so hard to get this worthwhile project under way.

What had gone wrong with this initiative? The following are possible explanations:

- bitter opposition by the teaching staff and in particular the Supervising Principal and all the elementary school principals;
- obvious lack of interest among the senior military authorities, who refused to get involved; and
- lack of involvement by the Francophone parents for one or more of the following reasons:
  - (1) for years, they had had no choice but to educate their children in English except in the Province of Quebec. Many of them believed that two years in French at Petawawa with no guarantee of French classes on their next postings (for example, in Saskatchewan or British Columbia) would disrupt their children's progress;
  - (2) the future of bilingual classes did not look very bright, with a total enrolment of 30; "Why send children to classes for just a few months?"; and
  - (3) Francophone parents were indifferent or perhaps afraid of their military superiors or of a backlash from the English-speaking majority.

In a letter of 23 March 1967, the Commander CFB Petawawa recommended the cancelling of bilingual classes and suggested that pupils attend bilingual Pembroke separate schools. Lavergne discussed the matter with Gaëtan Fillion of the Ontario Ministry of Education. Following this discussion, Lavergne wrote a memorandum to the Deputy Minister stating that he had serious doubts that the best interests of French-Canadian pupils would

be served by maintaining bilingual classes at Petawawa. He further stated that the atmosphere created by teachers, principals and the school inspector — all Anglophones — was not conducive to an acceptable situation; there were many intrigues at work and co-operation from teachers and principals was not forthcoming. In closing his memorandum, Lavergne wrote:

I hate to accept a defeat in view of the Minister's special interest in this project but I do so only in the belief that the interests of the French-speaking element will best be served by eliminating this contentious problem.

In the circumstances, Hellyer “agreed reluctantly to discontinue the bilingual classes at CFB Petawawa.”

Success in this area did not come until 1969. But before we discuss that, we would do well to pause at an important issue connected with the question: education allowances. The best way to examine this is to refer to General Allard's *Memoirs*. He wrote that, in a speech at Valcartier in October 1965, Premier Jean Lesage proposed four broad areas where the two levels of government, federal and provincial, could work together more closely. Education was one of those mentioned. Allard recalled that he turned to Ottawa, sending four memoranda to NDHQ, each dealing with one of the topics of Lesage's speech.<sup>35</sup> The memorandum on education, dated 3 February 1966, proposed a special form of collaboration which deserves mention.

The lengthy experience of military life and nomadic existence which Allard had gained by 1965 made him very aware of the problem of schooling for Francophone children. The case of Petawawa, presented above, makes it clear enough to us: French schools were only available in Quebec. Married Forces personnel who wanted a real career and had Francophone children, however, had to accept transfers as a natural consequence of their careers. What could be done with school-age children when their parents were transferred outside Quebec?\* Should they be left behind with relatives? Should one leave the spouse behind? Would it not be better to send them to an English school, even in Quebec?

Allard put forward a solution which must be regarded as in keeping with the paternalistic spirit then prevailing in the Forces, while bearing in mind that the aim was always to improve troop morale. Although not perfect, Allard's idea had the advantage of being comprehensive. He suggested the

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\* The problem related mainly to Army and Air Force members, since there were few Navy positions in Quebec.

establishment of a boarding school which would be operated by the Province of Quebec in accordance with its standards, but would be paid for by the DND. Families would thus be divided, but the children of Francophone personnel posted outside Quebec would live and study together. During annual vacations or summer holidays, the Department would pay for children to travel to their parents' homes.<sup>36</sup>

How was this memorandum followed up? Allard wrote that by May 1966, nothing had come of it.<sup>37</sup> This statement should be qualified. On 1 March 1966, the Chief of Defence advised the Minister and Deputy Minister of the tenor of Allard's notes and asked them whether they wanted to become involved immediately in these issues, which were highly political. On 4 March, the Associate Minister, Léo Cadieux, replied on behalf of Hellyer that he preferred not to act for the present. On 7 March, the CP was instructed to explore each of Lieutenant-General Allard's suggestions further. Four days later, the study of education was completed, and its authors rejected the concept of a boarding school. Several reasons were cited, including costs and the fact that it would only solve the problem for Francophones, while some Anglophones posted to Quebec were experiencing similar difficulties. This said, the writers acknowledged the nature of the problem and put forward another solution: allowances should be paid to parents who had to serve far away from adequate schools for their children — parents serving outside Canada already had this option. Thus parents alone would choose a school for children they could not take with them on their posting. This is the answer which was forwarded to Cadieux on 4 April 1966.<sup>38</sup>

As we can see, this approach to French-language schooling favoured individualism as opposed to the corporate strategy advocated by Allard. In addition, it covered every difficulty that could be encountered by parents, not just language problems. For example, disabled children who needed schooling tailored to their requirements, which was not available where his parents lived, could be accommodated.

In his memoirs, Allard noted how his boarding school proposal was followed up: in brief, it had not yet materialized.<sup>39</sup> As for the allowance, it was to be a great success.

An Order in Council dated 3 April 1947 authorized the Department to "establish and maintain schools for the education of children in establishments, camps and stations" where suitable educational facilities were not available within a reasonable distance. It also authorized the payment of education allowances to non-residents. This Order in Council and those that followed it

in subsequent years provided the clarification needed to adhere to provincial regulations or improve educational benefits gradually.

According to Colonel René Morin, however, Roger Lavergne and members of his staff realized in April 1966 that the regulations in effect were too restrictive, and financial assistance was dependent upon the availability of married quarters and other regional conditions. Furthermore, no provisions had been made for the payment of room and board when personnel were posted to isolated regions or where adequate instruction in English or French was not available within a reasonable distance of a Defence establishment. The March study of Allard's memorandum probably provided the necessary spark. Those who drafted the response to Allard and transmitted it to Cadieux on 4 April even wrote that steps were already being taken toward more comprehensive compensation.<sup>40</sup>

By this date the federal government had already agreed in principle to provide adequate education in French and English in the case of personnel posted outside Canada, by the promulgation of the Foreign Service Directives. In a letter dated 11 June 1965, Treasury Board stated specifically that the French and English languages were to be considered as factors in determining the availability of adequate educational facilities.

On 24 March 1966, the Deputy Minister submitted a recommendation on education allowances, originating with Lavergne, to the Defence Council for approval. He was asked to revise it, and the Defence Council approved it on 9 August 1966. Appropriate regulations then had to be drafted for approval by Treasury Board. To quote Allard, who sat on the Council as CDS: "this is a major and most significant step forward, but it is still not enough, since Francophones will continue to leave the Forces because of forced separation from their children."<sup>41</sup>

Lavergne accordingly wrote an official memorandum, which was approved and forwarded to Treasury Board by the Deputy Minister on 6 October 1966. This document stated that members of the Forces had the option of having their children educated in either official language. It was the subject of many meetings of Treasury Board and Defence representatives during the period October 1966 to February 1968.<sup>42</sup> It was also studied by the Advisory Committee on Bilingualism for the Federal Service at a meeting attended by Deputy Minister Elgin Armstrong. Treasury Board expressed concern about permitting "a free choice" of language of instruction and considered that entitlement ought to be based on the language spoken at home; it requested that this change be made. The proposed submission to

Privy Council, revised to conform to this Treasury Board directive, was agreed to by Armstrong and subsequently approved by Order in Council PC 1968-13/288 (15 February 1968). This was the first “Education Allowance — Canada”, which was set at \$1,300 per pupil per year, available as of 1 April 1968. In summary, the Education Allowance, given under provisions applying to the elementary and secondary levels up to Ontario Grade 13 or the equivalent, covered:

- expenses incurred by the member for tuition fees, prescribed textbooks and other compulsory fees; and
- board and lodgings, in addition to return travelling expenses to the approved school, subject to maximum amounts provided in the regulations.

Close monitoring of the maximum amount of the Education Allowance by DGDEP since 1968 and constant liaison between that office and Statistics Canada (regarding the food, accommodation and transport price indexes) have caused the level of the allowance to be adjusted over the years. In 1986, it was \$5,500 per eligible child.

Authorization to introduce the “Education Allowance — Canada” in 1968 was without doubt an extraordinary advance for the military. Existing programs were not enough to ensure that the children of personnel serving in Canada would receive satisfactory instruction in either of the country’s official languages without having to lay out considerable sums. When they served in isolated locations or in some other circumstances, members of the Forces did not always have access to good schools, regardless of language of instruction. The most practical way of solving this problem was approval of an education allowance in Canada.

However great this achievement might be, we must repeat that it was far from ideal from the standpoint of family life. Allard, for his part, tried again to sell his idea of a boarding school in a memorandum signed by the VCDS, F.R. Sharp, which was studied by the Defence Council on 27 November 1967. Its title was “Provision of Education Facilities for Children of French Speaking Members of the Armed Forces of Canada”. It recalled that, on 9 August 1966, a discussion of the Education Allowance had touched on two other points. The first was the failure of the experiment with “bilingual” classes in Petawawa; the second was the idea of a boarding school, which deserved to be explored. Allard, according to the document, had discussed it with Hellyer, who had agreed in principle that discreet study of the possibility should continue.

The CDS Advisory Committee concluded that the Defence Council should then be asked for permission to give an independent group a mandate to examine secondary education for dependants hoping to pursue university studies in Quebec. Allard was aware that prominent Quebecers were ready to carry out such a study, and consequently, his memorandum recommended action. If the Council agreed, the CDS would approach responsible citizens and the Quebec Department of Education to set up the study group. All solutions should be considered, including a boarding school operating under the aegis of a private corporation. All the financial implications of each solution, including possible provincial subsidies and donations from citizens, would be examined. National Defence would provide the necessary statistics. The working group's recommendations would then be placed before the Defence Council, but they would in no way be binding on the Department up to this stage.<sup>43</sup> On 27 November, Léo Cadieux, who had been the Minister for about two months, stated that he wanted more time to consider the recommendations.<sup>44</sup> That was the boarding school's death knell.

This did not prevent officials from still seeking to improve the lot of Francophones' children. On 12 December 1967, Letellier asked Morin what might be the financial implications of offering French schools to Francophone children. Letellier stressed that the changes taking place (French Language Units) would have a far-reaching impact on the language makeup of all the bases involved, except Valcartier. For 1968-69, the Education Allowance was already expected to cost \$650,000. But since the number of Francophones was liable to increase quickly in some locations, because of FLUs, might there be repercussions on the amounts allocated for educating Francophone children?<sup>45</sup>

Two days later, Morin replied. He had studied the bases which would be affected. Most were in Quebec (Valcartier and Bagotville). Since Quebec had a good bilingual school system, this part of the changes should cost nothing. In Edmonton and Halifax, however, much would have to be done. In the case of Edmonton, Morin's office had made informal contacts with local authorities, who had expressed a wish to provide classes in French if demand warranted. French school boards in the Edmonton area approved this approach. At worst, the number of Francophone pupils in Edmonton and Halifax would have to be multiplied by \$1,300 if local resources were unable to respond to Defence's expectations.<sup>46</sup> It seems clear that, at this stage, officials did not know how many Anglophone Navy children would be prepared to study in French. Referring back to Chapter 12, we recall that the new French-language vessel would be operated by seamen already enrolled, most of whom were serving in Halifax. The odds were heavy that most of them had already given up and were having their children educated in English. At Edmonton, where several hundred Francophones in the Airborne



Regiment were to be sent, the demand could be greater. However that may be, in neither case would anything new be done before 1969.

In that year, the Nova Scotia Department of Education and the Dartmouth School Board concluded an agreement with National Defence providing for the establishment of a curriculum in French at the elementary level for children of Francophone Forces personnel serving in the Halifax region and wishing to study in their own language. For the secondary level, arrangements were made with the Dartmouth Academy, a private school.

In 1968, as we have seen, subject to the Minister's approval, the CDS decided to move 1<sup>st</sup> Commando of the Airborne Regiment from Valcartier to Edmonton. At a meeting in his office on 6 May 1970, Léo Cadieux stated that he would agree to this move on the one condition that the children of members of the Commando, a large majority of whom were Francophones, could be educated in French. The Minister asked Colonel Morin to make the necessary arrangements with provincial education authorities. Alberta's Deputy Minister of Education, Dr T.C. Byrne, stated over the telephone that education entirely in French could not be authorized because of Alberta's *Education Act*. Notified of this decision on 20 May 1970, Cadieux immediately telephoned Marc Lalonde at the Prime Minister's Office, who promised that the following day he would appoint Dave Thomson as a special envoy to R.C. Clark, Alberta's Minister of Education. Thomson would be accompanied by a member of the DGDEP, Claude M. Régimbal. During their meeting, Clark agreed to the creation of a French school at CFB Edmonton as a private establishment. This opened the way for 1<sup>st</sup> Commando to move west. The school opened on 1 September 1970, and Francophone children of Airborne Regiment members were able to pursue their studies there in French.

It is clear, however, that the real program to create French-language schools began in 1969 with the enactment of Bill C-120. Institutions teaching both official languages had existed for a long time in Quebec before then. Since English was the only or the predominant language in public schools in the other provinces, it was extremely difficult to give children of Francophone families living outside Quebec an opportunity to attend schools where French was the language of instruction. Up to 1969, the majority of children of Francophone families were forced to attend schools where English was the language of instruction, except in Quebec and overseas, but from 1969 on, the Department decided to overcome that difficulty. Steps were taken to set up a new school or expand an existing one to offer programs with French as the language of instruction each time a significant need was identified.

Since then, the Department of National Defence has taken giant strides to guarantee equal educational opportunities for children of Francophone and Anglophone families by making individual arrangements with public or private schools where the language of instruction corresponded to the provisions of the *Official Languages Act* and the language used at home or by establishing the necessary schools. Major-General D.A. McAlpine formed a working group on education of Armed Forces children, which he chaired from September 1972 to January 1973. Colonel Rent Morin (DGDEP) replaced him on 1 February 1973. Representatives of DGDEP, DGBB and the Directorate Military Manpower Distribution were active members of the committee, which had as its main object ensuring compliance with the principle of equal opportunities for the instruction of military dependants in either of Canada's official languages.

At the committee's second meeting on 2 October 1972, a DGBB representative made a presentation on relations between the Department's B and B program and education of military dependants. In 1971, each Forces member's Personnel Record Resume were identified as to desired language of instruction for children.<sup>47</sup> At the time of his October 1972 presentation, the DGBB had conducted a computerized survey of Francophone Forces members serving outside Quebec. The results indicated that a large number of them would enrol their children in French classes if any were available nearby. The following are the names of the bases and the number of military dependants eligible for schooling in French at that time:

CFB Borden	234	CFB Kingston	90
CFB Gagetown	131	CFB North Bay	57
CFB Petawawa	107	CFB Calgary	39
CFB Chatham	105	CFB Greenwood	35
CFB Cold Lake	95		

Over the next three years, energetic intervention by DGDEP aimed at achieving the working committee's objectives led to the opening of elementary schools or classes operating in French at all the above bases and also at Chilliwack, Esquimalt and Halifax and the Mont Apica and Moisie radar stations. The Chairman of the working group, accompanied by one or more committee members, visited the bases at Borden, Chilliwack, Chatham, Cold Lake, Comox, Esquimalt, Edmonton, Gagetown, Greenwood, Kingston, Petawawa and Summerside to determine the need for French classes or monitor the progress of new French classes. This committee, which ceased operations in 1977 but could be revived by the DGDEP if the need was felt, played an important role in the establishment of French schools at bases where the Francophone minority had been compelled for so many years to

send their children either to English schools or to private French schools when there were any, and pay the costs themselves.

In 1986, the Department's schools provided French education in the following establishments:

Chilliwack, BC	Bagotville, Que
Comox, BC	Moisie, Que
Esquimalt, BC	Mont Apica, Que
Cold Lake, Alta	St-Hubert, Que
Borden, Ont	Valcartier, Que
Kingston, Ont	Chatham, NB
Petawawa, Ont	Greenwood, NB
Trenton, Ont	Lahr, West Germany
	Baden-Soellingen, West Germany

The above-mentioned schools usually had classes from junior kindergarten to Grade 8. As a general rule, not enough Francophone students were enrolled at higher levels to justify setting up Francophone secondary schools, except for *École Général Georges-Vanier* in Germany. When the number of students allowed, some years of secondary schooling in French were offered at CFB Valcartier and CFB Saint-Hubert and also at CFS Mont Apica.

Not all these changes were brought about in the same way. Municipal school boards offered a French program subsidized by National Defence from Grade 1 to Grade 7 at CFB Halifax and from Grade 1 to Grade 6 at CFB Gagetown. In addition, after 1974 the Department funded an English and French kindergarten at Gagetown, because New Brunswick did not recognize kindergarten as part of the public elementary program. Although Quebec's school system conformed to the official languages system almost perfectly, it caused some problems in the 1970s.

Relations between the Department of National Defence, on the one hand, and the Minister, Deputy Minister and senior officials of the Quebec Department of Education (MEQ), on the other hand, were in general characterized by co-operation, despite fleeting difficulties. For some twenty years, MEQ and DND officials negotiated with a view to handing over all schools located on bases to the province, together with responsibility for teaching the dependants of personnel stationed there. Between 1973 and 1976, this plan was more or less abandoned. Although some progress was made at meetings between June and October 1977, the resignation of the Assistant Deputy Minister of MEQ, Sylvester White, who had firmly supported National

Defence, was largely responsible for the breaking off of discussions in the following year. The draft agreement tabled at the last meeting on the subject, held in Québec on 18 April 1978, was completely unacceptable to Defence officials. The provincial officials who had taken part in negotiations during the period 1976 to 1978 were no longer with the Department of Education, and the new group seemed less interested in solving what it called “federal problems”.

Meanwhile, two important statutes had been passed. The first, Bill 22 (the *Official Language Act*), was passed by the Quebec National Assembly on 31 July 1974. It proclaimed French to be Quebec’s official language. This did not pose serious problems for the Department, except that it required a greater effort to implement some aspects of its bilingualism program in Quebec. As for education, suffice it to quote an extract from Chapter V of the Act: “The school boards and regional school boards shall continue to provide instruction in English.”

Bill 101, the *Charter of the French Language*, was more restrictive. Passed by the Quebec National Assembly in June 1977, it stated that education provided in elementary and secondary schools would be in French, except in the case of certain children who fulfilled the necessary conditions to attend English schools. The children of parents temporarily residing in Quebec could be exempted. This bill did not apply to DND schools on military bases in Quebec. It had a serious impact, however, on Anglophone and Francophone children of Forces members attending English municipal schools in the province, unless the parents had obtained temporary residence status under a provincial regulation. Such temporary residence status was discussed at a special meeting in Québec on 8 June 1977 between the DGDEP and the MEQ Deputy Minister and Assistant Deputy Minister. At that meeting, the Quebec Deputy Minister expressed the opinion that, unlike large corporations such as Bell Canada, General Motors or Alcan, which could submit briefs to obtain exempt status, it would be inappropriate for the Department to make official representations on behalf of the Armed Forces. He believed the best way to proceed in the circumstances would be to send a senior officer to see the Premier of Quebec, René Lévesque.

As a result, on 10 June 1977, the DGDEP proposed that the ADM(Per) give the task to the Commander Mobile Command, Lieutenant-General Jacques Chouinard. As the regional commander, he already had direct access to the Premier. Nothing was done immediately, however. On 30 June 1977, the Assistant Deputy Minister of MEQ sent a memo to his Minister explaining in detail the federal Department’s problem, supported by statistics

on the number of children per region, level of schooling, religion and so forth. This information had been given to him by DND staff the previous week. On 5 July 1977, the Minister of Education presented a brief to the Quebec Cabinet, and the following day sent a copy to the Premier, asking for a decision. During a telephone conversation with the DGDEP on 6 July 1977, White again stressed the need to send a senior officer to call on Premier Lévesque. General Dextraze and Lieutenant-General Chouinard were mentioned.

On 10 July 1977, Lieutenant-General Chouinard called Premier Lévesque to inform him of the concerns aroused by Bill 101 in the Armed Forces. They had a very friendly discussion. The Premier admitted from the outset that he had not himself envisaged the Act's repercussions on the Armed Forces, as distinct from civilians who entered and left the province. He promised to study the question and call Chouinard back. He called the next day and this time proved to be well aware of the consequences of Bill 101 for the Forces, stating that he did not see any cause for concern on the Forces' part and that the Act contained an automatic exemption provision. A few days later, White learned from Colonel Morin that a regulation was being drafted which authorized consideration of the children of Forces' members posted to Quebec to be temporary residents of the province and thus eligible to be educated in English if they so wished. This regulation, number 77-48-7, was approved by provincial Order in Council 2851-77, dated 24 August 1977.

At the western edge of Canada, in British Columbia, problems also arose. In 1973, when Defence was pursuing its objective of making the Forces more mobile and effective, families of Francophone personnel had to be moved to BC, where there was almost no education in French. Since written requests by the Deputy Minister of Defence to the British Columbia Department of Education produced little result, it was decided in August 1973 to send a delegation from NDHQ headed by the DGDEP to meet with the Minister of Education, the Honourable Eileen Dailly. She received the group together with senior officials from her Department. National Defence's request to provide schooling in French at John Stubb Memorial School at CFB Esquimalt was refused, even though the school, built with federal funds, had been given to School District 62 in Sooke twenty years before. However, Dailly proposed to the Department in a letter of 22 August 1973 that a private school be established which would not come under British Columbia public schools legislation. She added that the Department of Education and the school board could do no more. A private school designed for children of Francophone members at CFB Esquimalt accordingly opened in the fall of

1973, in a temporary building. Today, it is known as *École Victor G.-Brodeur*\* and offers an excellent French elementary program from kindergarten to Grade 8. A similar scenario unfolded elsewhere in BC, at Chilliwack, where a private school opened for children of Francophone members. This school, located in mobile facilities, is known as *École La Vérendrye*. It gives courses in French according to provincial standards at the entire elementary level.

A problem of another order deserves note here: the freedom to choose the language of instruction. Let us recall that the Defence Council had given Forces' members freedom to choose the language of instruction for their children, and the Minister had agreed to this principle at the 193<sup>rd</sup> meeting of the Defence Council on 9 August 1966. The draft Order in Council which followed the Defence Council decision also mentioned freedom of choice. Treasury Board hesitated to approve free choice, although it favoured entitlement based on language used at home. The DGDEP was thus ordered to revise the brief it had submitted to Treasury Board accordingly. The question was also put to the Director of the Special Bilingualism Secretariat, who agreed with the Treasury Board about deleting the "freedom of choice" mentioned in the brief on the Education Allowance — Canada. After Bill C-120 was enacted, and in accordance with the B and B Commission's recommendation, Commissioner of Official Languages Keith Spicer wrote to the Deputy Minister that Defence "should allow all DND parents to make a free choice of language of education and that any present regulations preventing such choice should be amended to reflect this policy."

The question of freedom of choice gave rise to a number of complaints by Anglophone members of the Forces during the period 1968 to 1975. In 1975, an Anglophone officer submitted a grievance claiming that the CF was not providing transportation for his children to the French school on the base. The French school had been established for French-speaking children, but admitted some English-speaking pupils. Because the language used at home was English and the principle of freedom of choice had not been granted, the officer's children were refused permission to attend the French school and be transported there free of charge. The CDS supported the redress of the officer's grievance, and directed the Assistant DM(Per) "to get the regulations re-written to allow English and French members to educate their children in the language they selected — to ensure that we write regulations to reflect the spirit of what the government is trying to do". The DGDEP met with the

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\* Named after one of the four Francophone senior officers who served in the RCN during the First World War (Volume I, p 101).

Commission and, together with Treasury Board officials, sought to make the required corrections to existing regulations.

After months of meetings and lengthy correspondence between the three federal agencies, the Department received a letter from the Privy Council Office on October 1978 containing a statement of policy that “as a general rule, employees should not receive allowances or other benefits to enable their children to be educated in their second official language”. This was the final word on the question of freedom of choice. Clearly, the Commissioner of Official Languages had not succeeded in convincing Privy Council Office or Treasury Board officials. This said, the fact remained that as far as possible, National Defence offered the same educational opportunities to Anglophone and Francophone children, enabling them to attend a public or private school where the language of instruction corresponded to the spirit of the *Official Languages Act* and the language spoken at home, even when it involved extending the services offered by a Departmental school so as to meet this requirement.

Giving Francophone children living outside Quebec an opportunity to attend schools where French was the language of instruction remained difficult, however. While the problem is less acute in some locations outside Quebec where French and English are both used as languages of instruction, in particular some schools in Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, Ontario, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, British Columbia and the Territories, problems will occur until such time as French comes into general use as a language of instruction in public schools, or if it is so at present, until such time as the use of French is sufficiently widespread to meet the Department’s requirements as far as implementation of French schools is concerned in certain geographic areas.

To fill this gap, each time the need is felt, the Department plans to continue setting up a school or expanding the services already provided by one of its schools so as to offer education programs in French. Let us also note that French immersion courses are offered at various levels in Defence establishments located at Cold Lake, Edmonton, Shilo, Kingston, North Bay, Ottawa, Petawawa and Chatham.

Equal access for Forces dependants to education in the child’s mother tongue is clearly one of the issues which has been handled very well since the 1960s. By building more French-language schools on Anglophone bases in areas where there was no education in French, Francophone members were definitely made more mobile, as was widely acknowledged in 1970.<sup>48</sup> This

substantial improvement became even more marked during the 1970s, despite some criticisms, which were very slight compared to what we have encountered on other issues.

One criticism was levelled at the extent of the financial aid given to parents to keep their children in appropriate schools where none was available on or near a base.<sup>49</sup> It is hard to imagine how a private or corporal in 1971 could have, out of the \$1,700 then offered, met the needs of a child he had to leave in Montreal to continue studies in French after he and his wife had moved to Esquimalt, for example. Nevertheless, the solution offered by the subsidy has been and still is used, despite its obvious shortcomings, and has been adapted to meet the demand.\*

During the 1973 briefing tour, schooling for children in their own language was discussed, but as a fairly marginal issue. A few fears only were expressed by Francophones.<sup>50</sup> However, the majority of members who had school-age children in 1973 had joined the Forces long before 1966-67 and thus had accepted the rules of the game then prevailing.

In 1981, when Deputy Minister C.R. Nixon replied to the consistently aggressive P. Deniger, an MP on the Special Joint Committee on Official Languages, he could name over 20 bases in Canada and Europe where French was a language of instruction.<sup>51</sup> This was certainly a positive point which the Department was right to view with pride and which fortunately pleased Deniger. Nevertheless, at this same meeting Senator Guay attacked Defence for not having a French-language school at CFB Shilo, Manitoba, which he said had “a great many French speakers from Quebec”.<sup>52</sup> The DGOL tried to dispute that, stating that only 4 percent of those at Shilo were Francophones. Guay quickly dismissed that assertion. Lieutenant-General G. Thériault then put forward an argument which seems rational to us in view of what we know of the Forces as they were in the 1960s and 1970s. According to Thériault, in peacetime Francophones were not transferred to bases where there was no schooling in French. “Therefore, we must assume that the francophones in Shilo whose children go to English schools do so because of a choice made by their parents”.<sup>53</sup> Let us add that Senator Guay raised the question of Shilo again at the 1987 meeting of the Standing Joint Committee on Official

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\* Thus subsidies can be obtained for second-language training when a young Anglophone moves from an English-speaking province to Quebec, even if he is to be educated in English there. A subsidy is also possible to complete secondary schooling in English in Ontario if the family has moved to British Columbia, for example, so as not to disrupt the end of a study program which can differ considerably from province to province.



Languages with Defence. Deputy Minister D.B. Dewar on that occasion confessed that he was completely ignorant of any developments which might or might not have occurred at Shilo.<sup>54</sup> In fact, CFB Shilo then had an immersion school encompassing kindergarten to Grade 6.<sup>55</sup>



# 18

## The Civilian Response to the Official Languages Act<sup>\*</sup>

### Scientific, Professional and Technical categories (1966-75)

As noted in the previous volume (Chapter 6, pp 173ff), some of the recommendations on bilingualism in the Glassco Report were followed up and applied to civilians at National Defence. Those later put forward by Prime Minister Pearson, in May 1963 and April 1966 (see Volume I, Appendix NN) also targeted this category of employees. In April 1966, Pearson identified two groups of people to whom his directives would not apply immediately: the military (we are now familiar with their efforts to put the concept of B and B into action) and public servants in technical, professional and scientific positions. How were the Prime Minister's instructions followed up at Defence for these latter categories?

In August 1966, ADM(Per) James A. Sharpe asked G.H. Avery, Director Civilian Personnel Human Resource Planning (DCP-HR), Lieutenant-Colonel Morin of DGDEP and Flying Officer Noël de Tilly to discuss the future of B and B in those categories.<sup>1</sup> On 15 September, after these consultations, Avery sent the results to the Director General Civilian Personnel (DGCP), K.R. Scobie. Here is where we find part of the answer Armstrong gave Hodgson in September 1966. The work then being done by the Classification Review Program Office hindered the immediate establishment of a bilingualism project for DND civilians, because positions still classified as technical could become administrative, as had often happened since the review began. The Avery Report noted that Defence could not isolate its civilian employees; they could not count on having a complete career at DND. Thus any bilingualism program developed for members of the above-mentioned categories working at DND had to give them an opportunity to take language courses which would qualify them for positions in other departments.

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<sup>\*</sup> This chapter and Appendix A to this volume owe much to the research of Liliane Grantham; we are most grateful to her.

As a general rule, Avery went on to observe, the Department's professional, scientific and technical staff did not come into direct contact with the public. This work was handled by their superiors, who were often in the military. However, these groups often needed both languages to deal with colleagues or direct junior employees, who might be English- or French-speaking. It was also important for those involved in selecting new employees to be able to interview candidates in the language of their choice. Finally, in identifying bilingual positions, geographic location would be very important.<sup>2</sup>

In his letter accompanying the study, Avery acknowledged that his paper was general. He believed, however, that the subsequent discussions envisaged in Hodgson's initial letter in June (Volume I, Chapter 7, pp 200-201) would enable all those details to emerge little by little. In brief, Avery's view was that the bilingualism program for the categories in question would consist essentially of language courses (in effect, French courses) for people occupying very specific positions.

On 31 October 1966 came the turn of the Defence Research Board (DRB), an agency with close ties to Defence, to make its contribution. Most of its employees belonged to the categories under study. The DRB sent Hodgson a report entitled *Defence Research Board Participation* in French. The basic document, dated 19 October, was approved at the 66<sup>th</sup> meeting of the DRB on 27 October, according to the transmittal letter signed by the Chairman of the Board, Dr A.H. Zimmerman.<sup>3</sup>

This paper, which was the DRB's follow-up to Pearson's speech and Hodgson's June letter, summarized the history of bilingualism at the Board and traced the path it wished to follow in future. What did it stay? Before 1963, bilingualism requirements were filled by recruiting. From 1963 on, English-speaking employees in Ottawa and Québec began to become bilingual by means of language courses offered locally. The following year, the Board's bilingualism training was discontinued for employees in Ottawa-Hull; the Public Service Commission had taken over. Some employees at the Canadian Armament Research and Development Establishment at Valcartier were still taking French and English courses at Université Laval in 1966.

The authors of the document then described the Board's bilingualism requirements. The heaviest requirements for oral and written communications were at the research establishment in Québec. However, even at that establishment, English was the main language.<sup>4</sup> A fairly large number of English-speaking scientists could read French, but as a general rule they could not communicate easily in that language. On the other hand, French-speaking

scientists hired until recently had a good enough command of English.<sup>5</sup> One of the difficulties facing Anglophones who had taken French courses and wanted to maintain the skill they had lately acquired was that they were often subsequently transferred to positions in English-speaking regions — as we saw earlier on the military side. Anglophone civilians needed French in Quebec and, to some extent, in Ottawa. For Francophones, English was necessary everywhere. An estimated 15 percent of scientists at DRB were bilingual, but a far higher percentage could read both languages. At the Canadian Armement Research Development Establishment (CARDE) in Québec, 42 percent of employees were Francophones, while 25 percent of the Anglophones who worked there had mastered French.

DRB members had to use French in their contacts with prospective employees and with French-Canadian universities and institutions when dealing with questions relating to training, recruiting and research grants. In addition, French was used in relations with the press and in preparing for visits by French officials to Canada and by Canadian officials to Europe. The DRB had an attaché at the Canadian Embassy in Paris and several others at NATO, where bilingualism was important. Broadly speaking, the DRB had little direct contact with the public (as Avery had also written a few weeks earlier), and its employees rarely needed to be bilingual in order to perform their duties effectively.<sup>6</sup>

Next the “training program” was discussed. The number of applications for language courses submitted in the Ottawa-Hull region was compared to the smaller number which the DRB was able to accept. Later, the report focussed on the number of people who had taken second-language courses at Ottawa-Hull and Québec. The following summarizes that data.<sup>7</sup>

Table 62

**DRB MEMBERS WHO TOOK SECOND-LANGUAGE COURSES**

Area	Type of courses	Number of students		
		1963—64	1964—65	1965—66
Ottawa-Hull	Written French (1 hour a day)	35	12	32
	— half-time	—	1	4
	— full-time	—	2	—
Université Laval	French language training	—	38	34
	English composition and report writing	—	12	15

Readers will already have noted a certain similarity between the status of French at the DRB and that prevailing elsewhere at National Defence, on the military side, in 1966. The “program proposal”, as the last section of the document sent to Hodgson was called, was not new, and hence we shall present only its highlights. Although the Prime Minister’s 6 April speech excluded the DRB for the time being from the coming reforms, the Board would continue its language training program. Candidates for courses would be selected from the following categories of employees:

- a. incumbents in positions where bilingualism might be required;
- b. qualified senior personnel;
- c. officers available for training periods; and
- d. officers already having some command of the other language.

The document asserted that, outside Quebec, a very small number of bilingual people was needed. Nevertheless, increased bilingualism would benefit the DRB, and bilingual personnel would have access to positions requiring bilingualism outside the Board. All available language courses, whether part-time or full-time (the latter were offered in Ottawa-Hull or Quebec City for Anglophones and in Toronto for Francophones) would be used. The same applied to the one hour a day sessions (which were said to be of questionable value) and evening courses.

Plans were also made to identify positions where bilingualism would be required or desirable.<sup>8</sup> Staff members would be encouraged to acquire the necessary skill in both languages and to use the one that they had just learned both at work and outside. Lastly, the program to be introduced would be coordinated with general government policy by liaison with the Special Bilingualism Secretariat headed by Hodgson.<sup>9</sup>

None of all this was revolutionary, of course. Essentially, it was based on second-language courses, mainly French for Anglophones. There was nothing about the proper place of French in research, or the percentage of Francophone researchers or of DRB grants to Canada’s Francophone researchers or universities. Moreover, the project was surprisingly shallow. What was the total percentage of Francophones at DRB, and in its upper echelons in particular? This question, like many others, was not addressed by the scientists. One final judgment regarding this document: the French text produced by the DRB was obviously a translation of the English, but such a

bad translation that any bilingual Francophone would have done well to consult the “original”.

DRB reported to the Minister of Defence but had great freedom of action. The Deputy Minister of National Defence was aware that Hodgson had communicated directly with Chairman Zimmerman, of the DRB, but he wanted the latter to send him a copy of his correspondence with Hodgson. He also wanted co-ordination between the DRB and the Department.<sup>10</sup> Zimmerman readily agreed to this, and wrote on 31 October that two of his managers had maintained informal relations with Roger Lavergne, the DGDEP.<sup>11</sup>

On 30 June 1967, after consulting all interested parties in the various departments, the federal Cabinet reached decisions on B and B for the professional, scientific and technical categories. These may be summarized as follows:

- the Public Service Commission and scientific departments or agencies should intensify their efforts to recruit Francophones, in these three employment categories, who were not necessarily bilingual;
- members of those categories should remain eligible for language training on a voluntary basis; given this, employees should not be financially compensated if they had to take such courses outside working hours;
- those destined for or likely to be placed in executive positions should be included in the Public Service Bicultural Development Program;
- arrangements should be made for the technical, scientific or professional vocabulary of the second language to be taught to those who had enough command of the language and needed such terms; the necessary glossaries should be created by the Translation Bureau, the PSC and the departments concerned working in cooperation;
- the PSC Bilingualism Secretariat should work with scientific departments and agencies to identify tasks or projects in which Francophones could participate in French;
- to facilitate the implementation of this last concept in an appropriate setting, high priority should be given to second-language training for immediate supervisors in units where French language enclaves

would be formed; correspondingly lower priority for access to language training would be given to supervisors at higher levels of supervision;

- the departments and agencies concerned should strengthen their professional links with the country's Francophone universities and with the Quebec Government's scientific services.<sup>12</sup>

We note that these Cabinet decisions were more restrictive than the program put forward in the fall of 1966. More Francophones were now wanted, although no specific objective was set nor was any means identified by which the desired increase would be achieved. The creation of French Language Units was also suggested, even though the term was not used. In short, the agencies involved, including the DRB, were being pushed to solve the B and B question internally in a much more comprehensive way than Defence scientists had contemplated.

A significant change occurred at the Board before Bill C-120 was enacted. In March 1967, Dr Leon J. L'Heureux became Vice Chairman of the Board. Born in Gravelbourg, Saskatchewan, L'Heureux had earlier headed the Valcartier Research Establishment. He was the first Francophone to attain such a high position since the DRB had officially come into being on 28 March 1947. On 5 June 1969, L'Heureux replaced Dr R.J. Uffen, who had followed Zimmerman as Chairman.<sup>13</sup> Then in July came the Official Languages Act, which was to come into force on 7 September and would be binding on the Board.

The English version of the DRB's program was ready in May, the French version in June. This time the translation was much better, but still had some mistakes. Entitled *DRB Policy on Bilingualism*, it sought to identify the measures necessary to comply with the government's wishes by 1975.

First of all, the authors briefly summarized how the issue had progressed at the Board, in particular since 1966. Then the Board's individual characteristics were outlined. English, it noted, was the common language among scientists in particular and at National Defence in general. The document also noted that 30 percent of DRB employees were Francophones, but did not go into details of their job categories and place in the Board's structure. Next came the factors most likely to bear on the policy to be followed by the DRB in implementing the Official Languages Act. Among these we note:



- a greater number of French Language Units in the Armed Forces;
- the presence of the Research Establishment at Valcartier, where efforts at bilingualism had been made “well before any statement of policy was laid down by the government.”<sup>14</sup> French would grow increasingly important at Valcartier because the majority of supporting staff and a significant number of professionals spoke French. Some Francophones were unilingual, as were many Anglophones. This required a measure of bilingualism among supervisors and administrators, at Valcartier as well as Ottawa;
- communications outside the Public Service or with other government departments and agencies and aspects relating to career and policy since the Cabinet’s decision of 30 June 1967.

In light of the above, the DRB’s general policy on bilingualism was stated as follows:

- bilingual capability would be offered when necessary;
- administrative services should be able, as soon as possible, to serve every Board employee in his or her mother tongue;
- external communications should be conducted on an equally urgent basis in the language of the individual or institution addressed;
- employees living in a bilingual district or those whose careers might be advanced should be encouraged at all times to study the other language;
- lastly, the mix of Francophones and Anglophones should be improved, by either recruitment or transfer.

Implementation priorities would have to be defined. The plan divided them in two: those relating to internal operations and those relating to external communications. Firstly, let us consider the internal aspect. The policy was that senior personnel should have or acquire an adequate command of their second official language. At least one out of the four most senior positions at headquarters would be held by a bilingual person; ideally, in the long term, all should be bilingual. The program went on to list sections and sometimes even positions in Ottawa which should be bilingual. After these personnel matters, the document dealt with establishments, dividing them into three

groups on the basis of their geographic location or personnel makeup: Valcartier; centres in a bilingual district; and others.

Clearly bilingualism should prevail at Valcartier. "It is worth adding that this establishment, because of its unique position of a laboratory which is already mostly bilingual, can and should play a leading part in the implementation of bilingualism throughout the whole Defence Research Board."<sup>15</sup> Two other establishments were located in the National Capital Region (NCR), considered to be a bilingual district even though not yet officially recognized as such. Here a special effort was to be made to increase Francophone representation.

The careers of those working elsewhere in Canada for the Board were not covered by these measures. They would be encouraged to take second-language training, and if they were transferred to a bilingual district, they would be offered an opportunity to take immersion. As for establishments in foreign countries, "all positions in the Paris office shall always be held by bilingual personnel. With regard to the Washington and London offices, it is desirable that, when possible, one Defence Scientist Staff Officer (DSSO) position in each of these two locations be held by a bilingual officer."<sup>16</sup>

Another section of the plan was entitled "Administration". It discussed administrative documents, which in future should be produced mainly in both languages. "Notwithstanding the fact that scientific communications are carried on mostly in English, nothing should prevent a scientist from publishing the results of his work in either of the two official languages."<sup>17</sup>

Turning to means of implementation, the policy briefly listed three: language training, recruiting of scientists and administrators, and temporary assignments for bilingual employees. Referring then to Valcartier, the DRB expressed its pleasure at already having a place "where Francophones might appropriately work together in their mother tongue."<sup>18</sup> This is an interesting observation in light of the many previous assertions that English was the language of science.

Next came external communications. Efforts would be made to improve communications with French-language universities by exchanging scientists with them and ensuring that they had representation on DRB committees and subcommittees. At the same time, the Board would seek more information on research facilities in French-Canadian industry, thus acknowledging that there had hitherto been little collaboration with that component of society. Finally, the report noted "that the Quebec government shows a growing interest toward research", but also "that in the present context, every dialogue, even

of a technical nature, between the federal and provincial governments, includes a political aspect. Therefore, the committee recommends that for the present, only informal contacts be carried on in order to get a better idea of the plans of the Quebec government concerning research.”<sup>19</sup>

In brief, the Board adopted the idea that bilingualism would be very strong in Quebec and make itself felt somewhat in the National Capital Region. Still, nothing was said about the place to be held by French Canadians in the Board. In fact, this plan was totally vague throughout at this point, noting simply that a concept close to military FLUs already existed at the Valcartier establishment. The Board nevertheless seemed to have decided to hire more bilingual Francophones than before 1966, and more importance would be attached to employees’ language qualifications and to second-language training. Similarly, further efforts would be made to administer Francophones in their own language. As for FLUs, the DRB was so active that the Chairman of the Treasury Board was able to announce on 17 August 1971, following the same process described in Chapter 12 above for 1970-71, that the DRB had created 28 FLUs, all located at Valcartier, which had 445 employees divided among the various jobs listed.<sup>20</sup> More than five years had therefore been needed to give effect to one of the decisions taken by Cabinet in June 1966.

Table 63

French Language Units at DRB (Valcartier)	Approximate number of employees
Aerodynamics	6
Compositions	9
Electronics	7
Electro-optical Phenomena	8
Hypersonic Laboratory	10
Instrumentation	11
Library	7
Maintenance and Construction	112
Personnel	4
Photography	3
Plasma Physics	3
Polymers	7
Printing and Photo	9
Process Engineering	7
Publications	5
Radiography	2
Range Instrumentation	7
Records	3
Records Office	4
Special Instrumentation	4
Special Projects	7
Stores	29
Systems	7
Systems Research	11
Transport	36
Trials	13
Wake Analysis	2
Workshops and Drafting	<u>112</u>
	445

On 1 April 1974, the DRB was restructured. All activities relating to research and administration, Board personnel and the administration of the Defence Industrial Research Program were brought within the Department. Responsibility for administering Defence-oriented university research grants was transferred to the research councils recently set up by the government (the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council and the Science Research Council). The DRB lost its title. Its functions were divided in two: Chief

Research and Development (CRAD), reporting to ADM (Mat), and Operational Research and Analysis Establishment (ORAE), reporting to ADM (Policy). As of that date, employees of these two agencies, including those working in detachments all across the country, all came under the Public Service Employment Act, which had not been the case previously.<sup>21</sup> Statistical tables later in this chapter show the employment categories we have discussed, demonstrating the progress made by Francophones and bilingualism.

Before turning to the civilian program properly speaking, let us add a few relevant details about the period 1947 to 1974. Over the years, the Board had worked closely with British and American agencies and people, which led to international recognition for the Board.<sup>22</sup> In addition, especially at first, many of its leading scientists came from Britain. As a result, the Board was essentially an English-speaking machine. In Valcartier, only some administrative services were in French. Elsewhere (in Ottawa, Halifax, Downsview, Suffield and Esquimalt) no French was used. When we began studying the Board in 1982, we quickly saw that it would be impossible to audit the 55,000 files of all kinds, including 15,900 research projects, which the Board had opened over its 25 years. According to an estimate by information services staff, twelve studies at most had been conducted in French (.075 percent), and of the total files in all areas, probably no more than that were in French (.0002 percent).<sup>23</sup> Did this percentage reflect the relative importance of French as a language of work according to Board authorities? In any event, it certainly did not represent the proportion of money contributed by Canada's Francophones to the DRB through the federal taxes they paid during that period.

The various chairmen of the DRB sat on the Defence Council during those years. They most definitely were aware of what Brooke Claxton, the Minister of National Defence, said during the Korean War about giving Francophones more prominence on the military side. The scientists did not then seize the opportunity to analyse their own situation, which, it is true, does not appear to have been criticized by the Minister. Later, in the 1950s, studies by the Board on some of the conditions affecting Francophones in the Forces (Volume I, Chapter 6) were written in English by both Jacques Brazeau and Marcel Chaput, later a militant separatist.

We have seen how the DRB reacted to Pearson's speech in 1966, to the Official Languages Act and to the government's 1970 call for the creation of FLUs. Let us go back to this subject in order to connect it with the identification of bilingual positions, an aspect of the question of bilingualism on the civilian side of the Department to which we shall return later.

Although FLUs at the DRB were subject to the same criteria as any other, there were some anomalies in relation to the guidelines (see Chapter 12). When positions at the Valcartier Establishment were identified in 1973-74, it was found that the 132 scientific and professional positions in units it contained were distributed as follows: 80 bilingual, 42 French essential and 10 English essential. In August 1974, two reasons were given for the last group: it would give English-speaking recruits who wanted to learn French a chance to do so, and allow a harmonious balance at the scientific level to be maintained.<sup>24</sup> This state of affairs was not accepted from the first and was discussed with Treasury Board. Finally, on 24 January 1975, the Assistant Secretary of the Official Languages Branch at Treasury Board, M. Morley, approved the ten positions on condition that the same number was designated French essential outside the Province of Quebec.<sup>25</sup>

If it was reasonable to attempt the creation of the right mix of unilingual Anglophones and Francophones at Valcartier, it was less clear to the Chief Research and Development that the converse should be done elsewhere in Canada: unilingual Francophones with Anglophones. Indeed, Morley's proposal led to further discussions and counter-proposals which, among other things, resulted in the problem of the ten French-essential positions to be designated outside Quebec being laid on the doorstep of ORAE, which for all practical purposes worked in Ottawa, unlike its counterpart, which had teams all over. However, Dr G.R. Lindsey, the fluently bilingual man who had headed ORAE since 1975, was no more enthusiastic than his colleague. On 14 February 1975, he presented his views to the ADM (Pol) in a brief study with an interesting appendix entitled *ORAE experience with scientific Francophone staff*, from which we have taken the quotations below regarding Francophone scientists.

Prior to 1969, according to Lindsey, DRB management conducting the work continued by ORAE had only two Francophone scientists. One of them was Chaput, "who came to work only in the rare intervals between political meetings at which he was expounding separatism".<sup>26</sup> From 1969 onward, following the policy adopted by the Board, a persistent effort was made to recruit Francophone staff. In fact, 33 percent of recruits were Francophones. They were placed in positions designated "either French or English" or English essential, since there were very few bilingual positions at entry level. Each of the Francophones recognized that as scientists they needed "to have or acquire a reasonable command of English".<sup>27</sup>

The Francophone recruits who had joined over the past six years fell into two main groups:

- recruits already “acclimatized” to the English-speaking environment, usually from outside Quebec. Some but not all “may be more at home with the English language than with French”.<sup>28</sup> Dr Lindsey gave four names and stressed that they were still working in ORAE;
- recruits “not acclimatized” to English and with little spoken English. Most of these came from Quebec. They stayed about two years, long enough to become bilingual before looking for a job in Quebec. Seven names were given but only one, who came in 1969, was still with Lindsey and his group.

There was a third category of fluently bilingual Francophones who were first class in their fields. However, they were not recruits but, in most cases, young military officers with university training who came to ORAE to complete their years of required service before accepting a civilian position elsewhere at salaries with which ORAE could not compete.

Nevertheless, in about seven years the Establishment’s Francophone staff had increased from one to seven. This was a fine advance, but 21 Francophones were needed to achieve the 28 percent targeted throughout the Department. At this rate, the percentage was expected to be achieved in about 1985. Accelerating the process would be difficult. First, all applications from Francophones qualified for the various positions were still far below the desired 28 percent. In fact, in allocating one third of recruit positions to Francophones, ORAE was forced to disregard the merit system. Since the “acclimatized” category had yielded the most success, Lindsey suggested that ORAE could move faster by concentrating recruiting on that group and “forgetting the completely unacclimatized recruits from Quebec.”<sup>29</sup>

Lindsey strongly believed that the designation of French-essential recruiting positions would be “counter-productive” for ORAE, concentrating recruiting on the unacclimatized group. He observed:

Members of the “don’t stay” group are at most 60% effective overall; they may be 50% effective during the first year, almost 100% in the second, and when they leave we probably have to do without anyone for six months until we can find a replacement. This is not only a continuous drain on ORAE working manpower, but moreover the number of retained francophones does not grow....

A closely associated concern is the very severe effect on the intake of staff with the necessary scientific qualifications into ORAE. It is quite difficult enough if there are no restrictions at all. In a typical year we might be looking

for one mathematician with knowledge of computers, one physicist, one aeronautical engineer .... Facing intense competition from other government departments as well as other employers, and in the face of a disinclination to choose defence as a career, we would be very lucky to get our six as specified. If we now have to insist on a number having a language requirement and then know that they cannot be 50% effective for the first year and have a high probability of leaving during the second year, the prospect for intake at the junior level becomes extremely depressing.

It should be noted that this history is applicable to scientific staff only. In the case of technical and support staff, 8 out of 39 consider themselves to be of francophone origin, and we have not encountered any serious difficulties as a result of language requirements.<sup>30</sup>

This document, written in 1975 by a bilingual scientist, is noteworthy in more than one regard. Readers will have noted that by focussing exclusively on positions designated French essential, the author was able to disregard completely the essential point, namely the place of Francophones and their language in the scientific work performed by this part of the federal Public Service. This aside, neither did the author have to dwell on the steps to be taken to change the situation. Roughly speaking, ORAE took refuge in the position DRB had fortified since 1966, that English was the language of science. Hence Francophones either had to be already assimilated into English when they arrived (or “acclimatized”, to use the “scientific” term) or to become assimilated as soon as possible. Nothing was said about what should be done in Ottawa to make the work environment more receptive to the French fact, and thus perhaps retain more “unacclimatized” scientists. We shall not comment on the desire of the head of ORAE not wanting to recruit “unacclimatized” Francophones (Quebecers), or the fact that he had no significant problems with Francophones at lower ranks of his organization, who had no doubt learned to acclimatize.

How was all this resolved? On 4 July 1975, the ADM (Per), W.R. Green, wrote to Morley that Halifax, Downsview, Suffield and Esquimalt could not designate French-essential positions “since this would require the identification of an extensive number of bilingual positions for supervision and support services.”<sup>31</sup> This left only the National Capital Region with its 235 scientific positions. Of these, only five could be designated French essential, and this represented “a significant effort on behalf of the units involved.”<sup>32</sup> However, 50 positions designated either English or French could possibly be staffed by unilingual Francophones. “The greatest difficulty encountered was the fear expressed that in many scientific disciplines, the supply of competent francophone scientists may simply not be available.”<sup>33</sup> Green’s proposal was officially approved by Treasury Board on 24 July.<sup>34</sup>



As noted, little attention had been given so far to offering a receptive work environment to Francophone scientists at Defence. In the fall of 1975, further to the June 1973 Resolution, a Treasury Board circular to all departments called for units working in French (UWFs) to be created in the National Capital Region. While the military were asked to adapt and implement this directive,<sup>35</sup> civilians had to follow all of it. What was the purpose of this circular? To increase the number of UWFs in the Ottawa-Hull region in order:

- to promote the use of French at all levels in the Public Service;
- to improve opportunities for career progression in French by establishing UWFs in diversified functions and by ensuring that they would include the largest possible number of occupations;
- to establish a receptive environment for unilingual Francophones by allowing them to work in French; and
- to promote and improve the use of French among bilingual Anglophones.<sup>36</sup>

Naturally, this 12-page circular in side-by-side bilingual format was embellished by various provisions regarding communications to and from UWFs (similar to those of military FLUs, discussed in Chapter 12), position identification criteria (10 percent should be in the scientific and professional category), and the designation of such units. As to the identification of UWFs, it was stipulated that “departments and agencies will submit to Treasury Board, by November 15, 1975, a proposal to identify those units which will become units working in French.”<sup>37</sup> By 31 January 1975, Treasury Board expected to receive a plan for progressive designation of the units which had initially been identified.

At National Defence, the DGOL had to communicate with all sectors, including CRAD and ORAE, in order to comply with Treasury Board’s wishes. ORAE replied on 14 October to the request that it set up UWFs. Brigadier-General H. Peters, Lindsey’s assistant at the time, wrote a long paper in several sections addressed to the ADM (Per). Peters wrote that he supported the objectives which the government was seeking to achieve, namely to have more Francophones working in French in the National Capital Region at all levels, but he felt that too much was being asked in too short a time. He recommended instead a long period of discussions and general planning before getting into the kind of details that appeared in the circular. Peters believed that the proposal would create two unilingual communities

which would hinder the progress achieved by bilingualism. He then wrote two paragraphs about general difficulties with UWFs. Many specifics, for example, had not been studied thoroughly, and this compelled those responsible for providing information about UWFs to interpret methods of implementation, sometimes optimistically. Unions which had not been consulted were furious and had gone to the newspapers. Moreover, there was what Peters called “the exclusivity of the French language group,<sup>38</sup> which required that Anglophones who joined it have a standard of French rarely achieved even by native Francophones. This attitude, as viewed by General Peters, would penalize the English-speaking population who tried to join with Francophones in these units.

That was not all. Peters outlined ORAE in three rather repetitive paragraphs. Defence scientists (Public Service DS Group) had to serve in several Defence establishments if they aspired to climb the career ladder. But those establishments mainly used English and unilingual Francophones did not have access to them, which obviously affected their career ambitions. Multidisciplinary teams were often formed, and it would be impossible to attach a unilingual Francophone to them. ORAE, furthermore, was unique, and could not easily find other staff elsewhere. Indeed, in other places of employment, including the Forces, similar restrictions existed which so far had been insurmountable. Foreseeing that one day the administration would collapse in the attempt to implement all the directives it received, he wondered whether the Public Service would not eventually have to switch to the Belgian system, which he described as duplicating everything, once in French and once in Flemish, which was the opposite of bilingualism and ineffective in the bargain.

A third of the way through his arguments, Peters finally began to answer the question put to him. In brief, to set up a UWF meant deflecting six Defence scientists and one official from the Administrative and Foreign Service Category (in other words, 10 percent of ORAE strength). It was neither feasible nor desirable, he said, to make an ORAE unit work in French, for the reasons presented above; regardless of what was done, the methodology and information sources used by ORAE would still be in English. Instead of creating such a unit, “all of the directorates should move toward a bilingual capability, not unilingual.”<sup>39</sup>

If, however, Francophones insisted on working entirely in French in perpetuity, a group would have to be found with which they could interact. The Valcartier Establishment was ideal, especially because it shared interests with ORAE in systems analysis and computer science. “We could thus make an approach towards the Belgian model.”<sup>40</sup>

Directly above the suggested UWF, the supervisor would have to be a director or perhaps a director general. At first, it would be better not to specify the unit's field of operation, especially because none was ready at present to work in French. Instead, it was better to designate a field of expertise of great interest to the clientele, so that French communications would be both concentrated inside the unit and disseminated outside. This pointed to mathematics and statistics. When the UWF's specialization was identified, recruiting possibilities also had to be taken into account.

On the basis of the number of people he had calculated would have to be involved, Peters surveyed the possibilities: one unit with seven people or two or three smaller units. This said, two ORAE directors had already suggested that they might create one or more units working in French. Thus there was obvious good will, but it could evaporate if one carried on insisting that these units report directly to senior management supervisors. If all the objections and concerns raised were dismissed, and officials insisted that the circular be implemented, Peters described in one paragraph the proposal he would make. Essentially, it would be to create a French-language directorate to carry out computers and systems analysis.

He concluded by stating: "It should be clear from the foregoing discussion that there is no enthusiasm, and considerable dismay, at the prospect of forming a UWF in ORAE."<sup>41</sup> In brief, his advice was first to consolidate B and B achievements before rushing into new ventures which would restrict all movement for ten or twenty years.



Léon L'Heureux was the first French Canadian to head the Defence Research Board, from 1969 to 1977. (UPFC RE 74-755)



Squadron Leader (Major) Louis Noël de Tilly was one of the very first to blaze the long trail of an official languages plan for civilians at National Defence. He also served on the interdepartmental committee struck in the late 1960s to examine the entire question of B and B.

Peters' letter, which seems to waver between agreeing and refusing to set up a UWF, was basically an outright refusal to comply with Treasury Board's request. On 10 November 1975, following various discussions between the parties involved (ORAE, ADM (Per) and DGBB), ORAE advised that it would be unable to comply with Treasury Board's request and would not identify possible UWF's within its organization.<sup>42</sup> Earlier, on 7 November, a working group struck to study all the implications of such units, for ORAE among other bodies, had concluded that the Establishment could not have units working in French, largely for the reasons cited by Peters: it would greatly reduce flexibility and the opportunities afforded for transfers to other units for any unilingual Francophones belonging to such a unit.<sup>43</sup>

Our main reason for presenting Peters' reply is to demonstrate the attitude which still existed in 1975 in the "closed club" of Defence scientists. The Treasury Board circular on units working in French in the National Capital Region had no tangible results. Negative criticism (some of it justified) carried the day. For how could there be units working only in French in Ottawa, a city serving all of Canada, whose official languages were English and French? A look at the annual reports of CRAD and ORAE, the two bodies which replaced the DRB, shows that they still made very little use of French even in 1987. Bilingualism in this sector is progressing at a snail's pace.

### **The civilian program — 1966 to 1983**

Emphasis on the Department's scientific categories should not totally eclipse what occurred elsewhere on the civilian side.

Civilians at Defence do not enjoy the comparative independence of the military. This calls for an explanation. Nearly everything relating to the careers of the Department's civilians comes under agencies such as Treasury Board and the Public Service Commission. Major decisions regarding bilingualism and biculturalism have been taken outside the Department. Within DND, they have simply been applied, as is done throughout the Public Service. Hence it is not surprising that there was no program on the civilian side of the scope of those we have seen on the military side. Let us be quite clear: this does not mean that the actions taken by the civilians were less effective in consequence.

Now let us review briefly what we saw in Chapter 7 regarding the implementation of B and B on the civilian side of the Department. This will take us to January 1967. We shall bear in mind that:

- an April 1965 administrative circular called for some forms and services to be bilingual, particularly in Quebec;
- DM Armstrong's reply to Hodgson in September 1966 showed that the only existing civilian program was based on language courses, and before even thinking about going further, the Department was waiting for the completion of the major review of positions then in progress in the Public Service.

In point of fact, immediately after Prime Minister Pearson's April 1966 speech, civilians were no more prepared than the military to formulate a specific course of action. Furthermore, there does not appear to have been a civilian Allard to provide the necessary leadership in a venture which entailed so many changes. Even on questions which were believed to have been long since resolved, confusion and division reigned.

The developments surrounding the competition to fill a clerk typist position at 11 TSU, discussed in Chapter 7 (Volume I, p 205), serve as a backdrop for what followed. Between the lines of the documents cited below — and sometimes right in their text — are references to this affair, which was not resolved until over 18 months after the position was declared vacant. This was long enough to allow many people to express their views frankly.

On 28 April 1966, J.P. Dostaler, Director Civilian Personnel Administration (DCPA), notified his superior that within the Directorate General Civilian Personnel, they hardly knew which way to turn on the question of the knowledge of both languages required of supervisors in Quebec supervising unilingual Anglophones or Francophones.<sup>44</sup> The fact was, Dostaler explained, that the Associate Minister had decided in 1960 that bilingualism requirements would be applied to supervisory positions in the Province of Quebec and to all those whose incumbents were in contact with the public. In so doing, he was simply repeating the directives issued by the Department in 1948 and 1952. DND's most recent intervention, however, had arrived in the administration manual: "In any office that employs persons who are competent in the use of either the English or the French language only the immediate supervisors of such persons shall be sufficiently competent in the knowledge and use of the appropriate language to give proper direction to such persons."<sup>45</sup>

These conflicting policies were bound to create difficulties. According to Dostaler, who had been screening posters for competitions located in Quebec, the situation was crystal clear, to judge by the memorandum from Associate Minister Paul Mathieu, a supervisor had to be bilingual. The administrative

manual, on the other hand, opened the door to a situation which was then common, especially in the Montreal area: a supervisor could be unilingual if his staff was bilingual. Most commonly, of course, the unilingual supervisor was an Anglophone and his bilingual staff were Francophones. This meant that, as of 28 April 1966, over three weeks after Pearson's speech, officials were still debating questions which had been overtaken by events. Here, as elsewhere in the Department, a better distribution of powers between Francophones and Anglophones would not be achieved painlessly.

The controversy identified by Dostaler did not end on 16 November 1966. F.E. Haughian, Director Civilian Personnel Services (DCPS), delivered a memorandum to his supervisor, K.R. Scobie, regarding language requirements for positions to be filled in the Province of Quebec. After reviewing many considerations, ranging from the British North America Act to the *Public Service Act* by way of Pearson's speech, he concluded that the Department's 1960 policy — which had been watered down, as we have just seen — was too restrictive. In brief, not all supervisory positions had to be bilingual. What was needed was to take into account the knowledge of both languages that was really required in order to do the work. Instead of designating certain positions as bilingual, it would be better to encourage bilingualism by means of language training, which would offer the advantage of moving in the general direction laid down by the government while not violating the merit principle.<sup>46</sup> Nine days later, Scobie passed his subordinate's memo on to ADM(Per) James E. Sharpe, commenting only that he had discussed it with the author.<sup>47</sup>

These two documents were taken up by Colonel René Morin on 15 December, apparently at the request of Sharpe or of T.C. Morry who sometimes replaced Sharpe in an acting capacity. Morin began by briefly surveying the background of developments in bilingualism since 1962 and the Glassco Report. He concluded from this that fundamental changes were in progress and that many of those affected would react emotionally to preserve the traditional positions with which they were familiar. These emotionally charged arguments had to be set aside, and steps had to be taken so that directives on bilingualism were rooted in justice for all, common sense and mutual understanding.

The second part of Morin's memorandum directly attacked what Scobie had advocated a month earlier. Since Pearson's statement in April, it was no longer proper, when dealing with bilingualism in the Public Service, to use Public Service manuals which had not yet been amended to reflect the new policy. Yet that was precisely what Scobie and Haughian had done. Morin

then went over what Pearson had said, interpreting it along lines much more consistent with the Primer Minister's thinking. He concluded that departments would be missing the boat if they approached competitions for federal Public Service positions in Quebec without adopting the new breadth of vision which Pearson had called for. No longer could directives regarding bilingualism for a very small sector be formulated without first taking into account the overall state of the problem. Morin rejected Haughian's conclusions, including his assertion that there were too many bilingual positions in Quebec. Morin suggested this would run counter to the spirit and the letter of what Pearson had said. In addition, Colonel Morin recommended that the Department adopt a bilingualism policy which would enable it within a reasonable time to meet the objectives set by the Prime Minister. A fair and active program, as he called it, would succeed if it rested on firm and clear instructions.

The inevitable problems would be overcome if the directives succeeded in covering the four areas discussed earlier in Chapter 7 (Volume I, p 204), as conveyed by Armstrong word for word to Hodgson the following January. Armstrong presented them as principles on which a future bilingualism program for the civilian side should be based. Let us repeat them here:

- a statement clearly defining the status of the two official languages and opportunities for their use;
- designation of bilingual positions in such a way as not to prejudice any incumbents' rights;
- the possibility of publishing in both official languages; and
- an intelligent language training plan.

Turning next to bilingual positions, Morin suggested the consideration of two criteria: the geographic location and the function of the position in question. To Morin, it was clear that all Public Service positions in Quebec would be classified bilingual, together with those in the National Capital Region. In addition, regions with 30 percent or more Francophones would have bilingual positions. Morin regarded all Quebec as bilingual. The view prevailed at the Department until 1969, when *Le Devoir* successfully attacked this line of thinking (see Volume I, Chapter 8, p 237). We should bear in mind that at that time the CDS was Allard, the stoutest defender of Francophones imaginable. Nowhere do we find him or anyone else protesting against this view of Quebec. Morin thus shared what seems to have been the prevailing perception of Quebec at the DND.



Among Morin's many other suggestions, we note the following:

- establishment of a committee to ensure designation of bilingual positions;
- making publications and forms used by public servants available in bilingual format in Quebec and the National Capital Region;
- in regions with 30 percent Francophones, making bilingual printed matter available for bilingual positions;
- increasing translation resources in order to speed up the production of the necessary work instruments;
- updating the military dictionary known as Chaballe; and
- setting up a special committee on language training for civilians, which would work with the committee on bilingual positions to plan a practical, career-oriented course.<sup>48</sup>

This document, which included a section on the military, did not eradicate all difficulties, implemented as it was gradually over the years, always in response to pressure from outside National Defence. In the short term, Morin's thoughts were to result in the January letter of intentions discussed earlier.

Backward-looking attitudes remained firmly rooted for the time being. Scobie, for example, informed the Deputy Minister on 21 December 1966 that the Department could not comply with the request of the B and B Commission that in future the majority of selection board members be competent in the official language selected by the candidate they were interviewing. Scobie even drafted a long letter for Elgin Armstrong's signature which, to summarize, asked that the question be reconsidered and a more gradual approach adopted.<sup>49</sup> According to the files in our possession, this letter was never sent by the Deputy Minister. He was intelligent enough to have it read over by someone else (probably Noël de Tilly), who did not hesitate to make copious notes about Scobie's text.<sup>50</sup>

At this juncture an unusual event took place. In Book III of the English version of the B and B Commission Report, we read that as of 1 February 1967, only three federal departments, among them National Defence, had "precise and comprehensive directives."<sup>51</sup> on the recruiting of bilinguals in regions which had substantial minorities using one of the country's two

official languages. That at least is how Elgin Armstrong, on 15 December 1969, interpreted the content of paragraphs 319 and 320 of the Commissioners' work, when he wrote a briefing note for his Minister in anticipation of the tabling of the report in the House, scheduled for two days later.<sup>52</sup> Armstrong refrained from citing the "comprehensive directives", which did not exist. As for those relating to Quebec, they do not seem to have been exceptionally precise, to judge from the exchanges we have just seen.

On 17 March 1967, the Public Service Employment Regulations updated the standards which had been provided in 1962 so that bilingual services would be offered in areas where French and English were used. They stated in paragraph 4 that in order for the services which departments had to provide to the public to be effective, deputy ministers had to take steps to ensure that there were employees in each unit, with an adequate command of English or French. Each deputy minister, in accordance with all general or specific Public Service Commission directives, should do what was required in order to achieve the following objectives:

- where forty per cent or more but less than sixty per cent of the public served by the unit have the English language or the French language, as the case may be, as their mother tongue, every employee in the unit shall be sufficiently proficient in both those languages to permit the functions of the unit to be performed adequately and effective service to be provided to the public so served;
- where ten per cent or more but less than forty per cent of the public served by the unit have the English language or the French language, as the case may be, as their mother tongue, the minimum number of employees in the unit who are sufficiently proficient in both those languages to permit the functions of the unit to be performed adequately and effective service to be provided to the public shall be such that in the aggregate the number is in the same proportion to the total number of persons on the staff of the unit as the said percentage is of the total number of persons comprising the public so served; and
- every employee who is in a position that requires the performance of duties of a supervisory nature shall be sufficiently proficient in the English language or in the French language or in both languages, as the case may be, as will permit effective direction to be given to the person supervised.
- Where in accordance with any directive of a specific or of a general nature of the Commission, but subject to subsection (3), ten per cent or more of the public served by a unit have the English language or the French language, as the case may be, as their mother tongue,

proficiency in both those languages shall, notwithstanding anything in these Regulations, be regarded in every case in which such proficiency is not an essential qualification for a position as a desirable qualification for the position.

- For the purposes of subsection (2), where the unit is the headquarters office, or a part thereof, that is located in the National Capital Region, as that expression is defined in the National Capital Act, the public served by the unit shall be deemed to be all the people in Canada.<sup>53</sup>

The following subparagraph added that when staffing specialists considered that English and French would be used in positions, they could include in the statement of qualifications required for those positions that knowledge of both official languages was desirable.

Paragraph 5 stated that unless the Public Service Commission (PSC) had decided otherwise, the staffing officer, after taking the preceding paragraph into consideration, should include knowledge of English, French or both languages, as appropriate, among the qualifications sought in the prospective incumbent of a position. In addition, he should determine what level of knowledge of each language or both languages was required in listening, speaking, reading and writing.<sup>54</sup>

Section 20 of the Public Service Employment Act stated that federal public servants had to know and be able to use English or French or both at levels deemed appropriate by the PSC so that departments could discharge their duties to the public effectively.<sup>55</sup>

It was no use. On 25 May 1967, F.E. Haughian wrote again to Scobie. He began by describing the case of 11 Technical Service Unit (TSU) as far as it had progressed to date. In brief, there were objections in Montreal to the inclusion of bilingualism among the requirements of a clerk 3 position. The logic of the military brass there was straightforward: there was no need to be bilingual, since all the work was done in English; the employees supervised by the clerk had no contact with the public, and in fact, no position in that unit was or would be designated bilingual. Furthermore, eight of the 22 existing employees who could apply for the position were unilingual English. They would be eliminated automatically if, as Ottawa asked, the position were classified bilingual essential. Haughian then proceeded on to what the Minister had lately laid down regarding supervisory positions in Quebec: all would require knowledge of both the country's official languages. Haughian was not pleased with that decision. He fully supported the developments in Montreal,

and announced that he would seek approval from a higher level for conducting the competition without specific language requirements.<sup>56</sup>

Haughian did not make clear which superior he wished to approach. Was he thinking of going right to the Prime Minister? We may doubt this, for in June 1967, it was the Associate Deputy Minister (Per), a superior of Scobie's, who commented on Haughian's memorandum and rejected it. Sharpe suggested to Armstrong that he ask 11 TSU to make bilingualism a requirement of the position.<sup>57</sup>

In the event, 11 TSU reluctantly did as it was asked. But this was not the end of the resistance to change. In the same memorandum, Sharpe commented on something Scobie had written on 24 April regarding language requirements for positions in Quebec, on the basis of the Public Service Employment Regulations as amended the previous month.

According to Scobie, departments could comply with those regulations and still have unilingual Anglophone supervisors on condition that all the employees under them in a particular unit were bilingual. As Sharpe pointed out, to accept this would be to move backward from what had existed at Defence since 1948, at least in theory, regarding supervisory positions in Quebec. Furthermore, Scobie seemed to have forgotten that the Public Service Employment Act presupposed that the public to be served comprised all Canadians, including Public Service employees, who had a right to demand to be supervised in English or French. In short, Scobie's views should be rejected, although it must be recognized that language requirements for positions would be the key to any bilingualism management directive. This said, the Department first had to possess such a directive. In this regard, Colonel Morin's proposal of the previous December deserved more thorough study, even if some aspects would have to be made to comply with the Public Service Employment Acts.<sup>58</sup>

On 9 June, Armstrong called a meeting on the question, which Scobie attended. It was simply agreed that much more discussion was needed before formulating a specific directive on language requirements of positions.<sup>59</sup> Another meeting was held on 13 June, this time in Scobie's office. Those invited were Colonel Morin, Haughian, Dostaler and G.A. Blackburn, a PSC representative. In the minutes prepared by Scobie on 26 June, a very narrow interpretation of what was in progress predominated. The conclusion was five recommendations, containing both good and bad ideas from the standpoint of the B and B program. The first two essentially formulated the idea of a survey to be conducted by commanding officers of military bases in Quebec, aimed at identifying the mother tongue of all employees, whether civilian or military.

Also mentioned was an evaluation of civilians' language knowledge, loosely based on CFAO 9-34, to be conducted after the PSC provided guidelines.

The next three recommendations related to language requirements of positions. They allowed Haughian to continue his rearguard action:

- for every position open to candidates from outside a base or unit, language knowledge requirements, which ought to be listed as “essential” or “desirable”, should be determined in accordance with the results of the local survey conducted by commanding officers regarding their employees' mother tongue;
- for positions open to those already working in a unit — in most cases, promotion opportunities — knowledge of both languages should be “desirable” if there were unilingual candidates, unless the nature of the duties of the position were such that knowledge of both languages should be rated “essential”;
- for supervisory positions, knowledge of both languages should be “essential” only when bilingualism was necessary in order to direct employees effectively.<sup>60</sup>

We note that in Haughian's very first recommendation he acknowledged that there existed the concept of a public which encompassed civilian and military officials. In the main, however, he continued to uphold the principle that a unilingual English supervisor could supervise bilingual Francophone employees.

Scobie's minutes were forwarded to Armstrong by Sharpe the same day, together with a brief note containing two recommendations on the language requirements of positions which simply repeated what Scobie had written.<sup>61</sup> This time, unlike in November 1966, Scobie committed himself by supporting his subordinate's ideas.

Armstrong was not content with this. He submitted both documents to someone — probably Louis Noël de Tilly again — for comment. The commentator rejected the conclusions, judging them to be a step backward from what had been done since 1948.<sup>62</sup> On 10 July 1967, Armstrong received a call from Roger Lavergne, who was responsible for B and B on the civilian side, asking that any decision on language requirements be postponed until he returned to his office after his English course in Toronto. He also stressed that it would be better to await the release of the B and B Commission report, expected shortly, which would surely give guidance as to the path to follow.<sup>63</sup>

In the event, nothing concrete happened until 1973: no general directive on B and B for civilians at Defence, nor any specific criteria for determining the language requirements of positions. At a higher level, however, events moved ahead. On 31 July 1969, Cabinet reached conclusions on the division of responsibilities between the agencies which would manage B and B in the Public Service. For this purpose, it studied a lengthy document prepared by the Secretary of State Department, which laid down the foundations of an official languages program.

The main objectives would be to ensure the equality of status of the French and English languages and “to maintain and reinforce French and English speaking communities where they are established as minorities.”<sup>64</sup> The federal Public Service should acquire the competence necessary to serve the public and communicate with the public in both official languages; reflect the linguistic and cultural values of English- and French-speaking Canadians; and create a climate in which public servants from both language groups would work together toward common objectives, “using their own language and applying their respective cultural values, with each understanding and appreciating those of the other.”<sup>65</sup> On the question of competitions, the document stated that results would be based on merit. However, “knowledge of one or other or both of the official languages may be one of the elements of merit.”<sup>66</sup>

As we know, Bill C-120 was already looming on the horizon and inspiring many to act. On 4 August 1969, an official named Labonté put forward the outline of a B and B program for civilians at Defence. We have been unable to locate this document, but a memorandum the following autumn referred to it, dismissing it because it was so brief (less than one page) that its scope could not be grasped.<sup>67</sup>

The following 15 December, Armstrong wrote to the Minister that the program for civilians was “almost ready” and would be released in January 1970.<sup>68</sup> When the Prime Minister, in a letter dated 13 July 1970, stressed that the first responsibility for deputy ministers, as a management objective, was to implement B and B in their departments,<sup>69</sup> civilians at Defence remained silent. The September 1970 response on the status of B and B at Defence was mainly concerned with activity on the military side (see Chapter 9).

Although the major objectives had been spelled out for all departments, the civilian side of DND did not commit itself. On 22 July 1971, the Deputy Minister was still writing imperturbably to the Minister that, with the military plans taking shape, the civilians were preparing to discuss matters with the military in order to harmonize the plans and programs of the two groups to

achieve some degree of co-ordination in the Department.<sup>70</sup> What were these civilian plans and programs, apart from the lists of employees given to the Language Bureau so that they could take its courses? In point of fact, until fall 1971, very little was actually done to set up a real plan for civilians. It must be admitted that DND was not the only offender. However, the situation at Defence was undoubtedly complicated by a combination of circumstances. First of all, Allard's strong personality and the great initiatives taken by the military automatically left the less visible part of the Department, its civilian side, in the shade. Although the number of civilians at Defence made it one of the largest departments, the unpopularity of B and B which we have already observed may have caused senior civilian authorities to lower their profile even further in this area. In any case, that is the distinct impression we gather when we see that everything in practice, relating to the civilian side rested in the hands of one military employee, Major Louis Noël de Tilly.

Let us examine briefly the tell-tale case of Noël de Tilly and the Advisory Committee on Bilingualism, chaired by a civilian. This body could have been very active at all times, but most of its work occurred in the summer of 1969, as we noted in Chapter 9. In the fall of that year, its chairman, Roger Lavergne, died suddenly. His place was taken in the winter of 1970 by T.G. Morry, ADM(Mat). In March, the three members of the Advisory Committee, including Colonel Chassé, met informally to review its mandate. On 31 August, the Committee held its eighth meeting since inception. Major-General Dextraze, then Assistant Chief of Personnel Policy and Resource Management, saw fit to attend. Only one item was on the agenda: a study of the program and plan to implement B and B in the Forces. Only changes relating to the form of the document followed that meeting; the latter is mainly remembered by a minor drama which was then being played out and ended in the summer of 1971 with the demise of the Advisory Committee.

There were disagreements in August 1970. On one side was Colonel Chassé, undoubtedly supported by the military establishment. On the other side was Major Louis Noël de Tilly, who for some years had been working at the Directorate General Dependents Education Programs. At that time, the DGDEP reported to the Deputy Minister, not the CDS. For about three years, several departments had had a bilingualism adviser position. Defence had been content until 1970 to have this role played by de Tilly without giving him the official title. Finally an adviser position was created, and Noël de Tilly won the competition. He officially took up his duties as a civilian on 1 September 1970. Long before this happened, however, he would sign documents and attend interdepartmental meetings as the Department's unofficial adviser. At the same time, he was active as the Defence representative on the interdepartmental

committee. Serving as secretary to the committee for a time, he frequently put forward ideas which were adopted and followed up. Within the Department, he was often called upon to comment on directives or drafts relating to bilingualism. He was also a member of the Department's Advisory Committee on Bilingualism (DNDACB), struck in 1967.

This committee made up the rest of the picture. On 17 August 1970, the Deputy Minister, commenting to the CDS on a letter sent to him by the Prime Minister on 17 July which described the responsibilities of certain agencies and persons (including deputy ministers) for implementing bilingualism in the Public Service, wrote: "It is indicated, therefore, that we should continue to rely on the DND Advisory Committee on Bilingualism to provide co-ordination and leadership in this area."<sup>71</sup> What type of co-ordination and leadership could be provided by an advisory committee which had met a grand total of seven times since it was set up in October 1967 to deal with a subject as crucial as B and B had been since that time? We may well wonder.

On 25 August 1970, Louis Noël de Tilly sent Chassé a document which he called *A Guide for Planning B and B Within the Department* (this was nearly four years after the Ross Committee was struck). Curiously, as Chassé noted several times, the document repeated exactly, sometimes verbatim, the directives issued by the CDS or very closely resembled what appeared in the draft circulating in the Department at the same time. Thus it brought nothing new, except that the author stressed that it was only a guide, since it was "up to higher authorities such as DNDACB to recommend the optimum approach."<sup>72</sup> The same day, the unofficial bilingualism adviser, Noël de Tilly, commented on the program and plan to implement B and B in the Forces drawn up by Chassé. Although he agreed with the philosophy which emerged from it and with the objectives set forth, de Tilly made suggestions which he felt the CDS Advisory Committee should consider. Let us note immediately that the revisions made to the plan before it was released incorporated very little of what Noël de Tilly had proposed. Sometimes he went further than studying the immediate concern, and explained how a particular goal should be achieved. That was precisely what Chassé and his team would have to address after the implementation plan was adopted. Noël de Tilly's intervention consequently had a very poor reception from Colonel Chassé, who added a note to the document addressed to Major-General Dextraze on 27 August. We cite it:

1. This is the craziest document or critique I have yet read. If Major Noël de Tilly wishes to build a reputation for himself by making remarks on a basic document written by a group which has been



working on this subject for over two years and revised by two general officers, that is his affair.

2. I believe we have wasted enough time already without wanting to venture into such nonsense. The ACB should have been dissolved a long time ago, with its Chairman who does not even speak French.<sup>73</sup>

On 31 August, Dextraze attended the meeting to defend his program, which was endorsed without major criticisms, in the presence of Noël de Tilly, a member of the Committee in good standing.<sup>74</sup> That September, the Advisory Committee held its last meeting, at which it studied the information which the Department was supposed to give the Prime Minister by 30 September. Nothing happened after that until 15 June 1971, when Dextraze, promoted to Lieutenant-General and Chief of Personnel, wrote to J.G. Morry, who was now his equal, to inform him that since the Committee had met nine times in four years and not once since September 1970, it could not have been effective. If, in Morry's view, such a committee was still needed, Dextraze believed that its mandate should be changed to give it a true co-ordinating role, addressing only broad issues.<sup>75</sup> After that there are no further traces of the ACB until another was formed in 1978, as we have seen, to revise the 1972 program in light of the 1977 Special Report of the Commissioner of Official Languages.

As the months and years went by, Noël de Tilly was well aware of the ambiguity of his situation. On 10 August 1967, Robert Elie, Assistant Director of the Interdepartmental B and B Secretariat, gave National Defence a statement of the duties which a potential adviser would perform in the Department and the place he or she could occupy in the organization chart.<sup>76</sup> Lavergne acknowledged receipt of the memorandum on 24 August and assured Elie that it would be answered in September.<sup>77</sup> In the event, it was not until December that Noël de Tilly sent a letter, this time to N.M. Morrison, one of the secretaries of the B and B Commission, stating that he was performing the duties of adviser.<sup>78</sup> Two years later, in a letter he wrote to Jean Côté, Assistant Director of the Bilingualism Secretariat, de Tilly felt compelled to clarify the fact that within his Department there was still no civilian bilingualism adviser position. A military employee, de Tilly himself, was more or less playing that role, by both serving on the Department's Advisory Committee and effecting liaison with the Language Bureau and other agencies such as the Secretariat.<sup>79</sup> Since the position did not really exist, however, he could not take advantage of the independence that would result in other circumstances. Nevertheless, as his immediate supervisor chaired the Advisory Committee on Bilingualism, he was still able to be active in the field of B and B.<sup>80</sup>

In the circumstances, it was no doubt understandable that little structure was given to a civilian program. Noël de Tilly alone could not both solve day-to-day problems and make long-term plans. A large part of his energies was devoted to the interdepartmental committee, to judge from what is in the files he deposited in the Directorate of History. He had to keep his superiors informed about his activities on that committee, not to mention the documents to be annotated and commented upon for their guidance,<sup>81</sup> or interventions he had to make.<sup>82</sup> Finally, he also had to attempt to correct flagrant violations of the Official Languages Act. In February 1971, for example, he wrote to the Director of Personnel Administrative Services, J.P. Dostaler, to point out that several of the documents coming from the latter's were in English only. This ran counter to all the decisions made at the various Defence Council meetings and also the Prime Minister's explicit wish, as expressed in his letter of 23 June 1970, which required that within two years such documents should no longer be issued except in both official languages. Noël de Tilly wanted to know when Dostaler planned to comply with that requirement.<sup>83</sup> Dostaler replied one month later. Acknowledging that Noël de Tilly's remarks were justified, he informed him that his office would henceforth issue all its administrative orders, instructions and memoranda accompanying circulars aimed at civilians in both official languages. He took the opportunity to point out that messages intended for all employees and competition posters already complied with the law.<sup>84</sup>

Obviously, interventions of this type did not form a very precise action plan, at least on paper. It is far from impossible, indeed, that Noël de Tilly knew where he was going in the long term, although he did not have time to put his vision in writing.

Nevertheless, the outline of a plan emerged slowly. Early in 1969, in response to a request from the Under Secretary of State, Deputy Minister Armstrong ordered an inventory of civilian bilingual positions to be drawn up with a view to creating a detailed bilingualism plan aimed at all management levels. Armstrong maintained, however, as in 1966, that it was almost impossible for the civilian side of the Department to implement a real bilingualism program before the military had firmly established theirs.<sup>85</sup> Six months later, he asked officials to undertake an in-depth analysis of the situation throughout the Department.<sup>86</sup> Administrative Services were not slow to give an answer, which may be summed up as follows. It was necessary to create bilingual positions, mainly among secretaries (typists) and administrative support staff, in order to serve civilian employees and the public in both official languages and to encourage these employees and senior managers and their families to take second-language courses.<sup>87</sup> These courses would be given in Quebec City and Toronto. The report made it clear that

nearly all the French documents available in the Department came from Translation, and in most cases did not arrive until long after they had been distributed in English.

Since the impetus had been given, the Advisory Committee on 20 August 1969 approved the establishment of a subcommittee which would review the issue of language training in the Department for civilian and military personnel. Chaired by Major Alexandre Taschereau, the subcommittee made the following recommendations:

- that courses offered at Canadian Forces Language School be open to the Department's civilians, initially in particular to those with the civilian equivalent of the rank of major in the Forces and below;
- that the Saint-Jean residences be accepted as they were by these civilians until they were replaced;
- that the needs of civilians on French training be clearly identified and included in any plans to expand this type of course at Canadian Forces Language School.<sup>88</sup>

This part of the Taschereau group's endeavours yielded no results. One reason was that military bases were organized for language courses given only to the military. The other was that language training for the Department's civilians was the responsibility of the PSC alone.

When Armand Letellier returned to Defence in August 1971, the picture had changed little. Nothing had yet been done to prepare realistic plans and programs for civilian employees. Noël de Tilly briefed Letellier about the situation and the frustrations he was experiencing. Despite Treasury Board directives, little had happened for civilian employees, he acknowledged. Letellier wrote:

He showed me the correspondence on this subject that had been exchanged between Morry and the Deputy Chief of Civilian Personnel. This correspondence quite clearly illustrated the negative climate of relations and the deadlock that existed in the civilian program.<sup>89</sup>

At this stage, the idea of integrating the civilian and military programs was already in the air. Lieutenant-Colonel Fournier wrote a memorandum to this effect on 8 April 1970.<sup>90</sup>

The following month, Lieutenant-General Dextraze echoed the Fournier's analysis. While the DGBB had eighteen co-ordinators for the bilingualism program in the Armed Forces, there was no equivalent for the Department's 27,000 civilians, he wrote. He was afraid that, without specific directives, civilian employees would feel lost when final bilingualism plans for the military were released. He suggested the co-ordination of the civilian and military plans, while recognizing that the Department was faced with a unique situation and that civilian personnel were covered by PSC bilingualism policies. Dextraze recommended the creation of a position which would be responsible for the program, under his civilian assistant.<sup>91</sup> The file remained pending, even though Morry seemed ready to co-operate, according to his reply of 3 June,<sup>92</sup> and though Dextraze wished to pursue the matter.<sup>93</sup>

General Dextraze warned Armand Letellier, when the latter rejoined the Department, that he "would have to confront problems on the civilian side of the Department, as there was no structured program". However, he was not to point his efforts in that direction, but to concentrate on the most urgent matter, the military plan and program.<sup>94</sup> Then, on 30 August, Bob Snidal of the Deputy Minister's office approached Letellier with the idea of adding a section for civilians to the DGBB. There thus seemed to be agreement in high places that the military and civilian plans would have much together on the B and B front at Defence. This implied laying aside the measure of competition between the two which had occasionally turned bitter but, more importantly, was unequal, since the civilian adviser was still without assistance and was overloaded by the quantities of tasks he had to perform.

Treasury Board's impatience and the advent of a new and dynamic Deputy Minister, Sylvain Cloutier, speeded up the entire process. First, Noël de Tilly quickly had to submit a Departmental plan for civilian employees covering the years 1971-1973 to Treasury Board. This was followed by a five-year plan some months later.<sup>95</sup> The plan for 1971-73, hurriedly thrown together, offered nothing original, and closely resembled what the military had already implemented. It may be summed up:

- development of the military and civilian plans would be pursued within a single organization and ultimately as a single joint plan for both sides of the Department;
- the development of the civilian program would require six person-years in 1971-72 (\$92,000) and eighteen in 1972-73 (\$230,000). These amounts included the costs of any travel and courses as well as part-time employees;

- while the organization was put in place, the highest priority for its employees would be to measure precisely where the Department stood as regards the language composition and bilingualism capabilities of its civilian component. A survey of civilians at DND, complemented by assessments, had been in progress since the spring of 1970; and
- when required, detailed plans, including the makeup and training of human resources and identification of bilingual positions, would be completed and submitted for approval and to obtain the funds deemed necessary.<sup>96</sup>

Cloutier went on to observe that the enterprise depended for its success on the approval of three proposals:

- the funds needed for the program in 1972-73;
- a substantial increase in translation services; and
- the additional request for human resources.<sup>97</sup>

In addition to this plan, Noël de Tilly prepared a draft organization chart which showed the DGBB having a civilian section with a staff of eleven, who would operate under the leadership of a director for the administration of civilian programs. Cloutier, who was mainly concerned with the final phase of the restructuring of headquarters, which entailed integrating the civilian and military sides, immediately dismissed this chart. He still, however, wanted Defence eventually to have only one B and B program for the two very disparate elements which made up his Department.<sup>98</sup>

In these circumstances, it seems inevitable that the civilian program would eventually become the responsibility of the DGBB. In December 1971, at the suggestion of Noël de Tilly (who was preparing to move to another department), Letellier proposed to the ADM(Per) that a task force be “placed under the direction of DGBB with the responsibility of developing, as a first step, detailed plans and programmes for bilingualism and biculturalism for the civilian work force”.<sup>99</sup> It was not until the following 1 June, however, that the Directorate (Civilian) of Bilingualism and Biculturalism (D Civ BB) was officially established. Its duties were to co-ordinate and implement B and B programs for civilians at Defence. Within this Directorate there were four sections whose duties were to collect data on bilingualism and make evaluations; to conduct research and develop plans; to ensure compliance with language requirements of positions; and to co-ordinate all language training.<sup>100</sup>

Before leaving the Department's bilingualism adviser, it is worth summarizing the final report submitted by Noël de Tilly when he left this position. This will help us understand the priority given to planning for civilians. Among the matters which deserved attention, Noël de Tilly (who was the first and last bilingual adviser) referred to complaints from the Commissioner of Official Languages which had not yet received a reply, and the questionnaire on French Language Units. In both cases, the adviser served first and foremost as a conduit; much of the work on complaints and all the work on the FLU questionnaire were done by DGBB. Another questionnaire from Pierre Coulombe, who conducted a study for Treasury Board on B and B in the various departments, remained without an answer from the civilian side, although the Forces had made their contribution. Other correspondence with parties outside DND was more active. A case in point was the request to the PSC for \$10,000 toward the cost of hiring language teachers and the designation of senior officials to take language courses.

As for internal correspondence, Noël de Tilly devoted a brief paragraph to noting that the B and B plan for civilian employees was then being discussed by Dextraze and Morry. Major developments to come were foreshadowed on visual bilingualism and bilingual services that would be offered at the new NDHQ (now called the Major-General George Parkes Building).<sup>101</sup>

Between the departure of Noël de Tilly, at the end of 1971, and the arrival of Ian Dewar as D Civ BB, in June 1972, little was done except to take advantage of the impetus given the preceding October. Treasury Board's insistence on obtaining a comprehensive B and B plan for Defence even aroused fears at one time that the application for human and financial resources for the military program would be delayed.<sup>102</sup> When the five-year plan entitled Program to increase bilingualism and biculturalism in the Canadian Armed Forces was submitted on 7 April 1972 (it was revised on 26 July), it contained little on the civilian side. It nevertheless mentioned an increase of 27 person-years in the DGBB staff, including seventeen to occupy the new sections of D Civ BB and ten to replace employees due to go on language training. The actual program was confined to second-language training by the PSC. More specifically, Treasury Board was asked to and did approve:

- the B and B plan for civilians;
- the 1972-73 budget, including \$565,000 and 27 person-years;

- the 1973-74 forecasts, including the same 27 person-years and a budget of \$602,805; and
- the inclusion of the above-mentioned resources in the forecasts required for 1974-75 and 1976-77.<sup>103</sup>

In April 1972, however, there was not in fact any concrete B and B plan for the Department's civilians. No French Language Unit had been created for them, although civilians attached to the 'Valcartier, Bagotville and Saint-Jean bases and to radar stations in Quebec usually worked in French because of their very close links with military employees in the FLUs surrounding them. In this connection, let us add that in 1974, integration of the DRB within NDHQ led to the substantial addition of FLUs on the civilian side, which we have already noted.

In 1973, the section on the civilian program in the briefing presentation on B and B at Defence was meagre, very general and, most of all, representative of the existing situation. The Department, it stated, was required, in accordance with the objectives laid down in 1971 by Treasury Board, to produce a five-year plan by which it would achieve the required number of bilingual employees. Mention was also made of future changes in the selection of candidates for language training and the evaluations of 2,000 employees in the Ottawa-Hull region, which would begin in fall 1972.

Even as this message was being conveyed to military and civilian Defence employees across Canada, matters were beginning to be organized, although until 1979 there was no central plan co-ordinating the various activities relating to the development of B and B among civilian DND employees. The first factor was the arrival of Ian Dewar, D Civ BB, under the leadership of DGBB Letellier. The second was the application to Treasury Board in 1972 prepared by Noël de Tilly for Cloutier. The third factor were activities which had been in progress for some time, albeit poorly co-ordinated: second-language training or tests and identification of bilingual positions. It was the last-named activity which served as the B and B program for civilians at Defence for several months.

### **Identification of bilingual positions**

This matter had been discussed at Defence, like every other department, since 1966. Pearson's speech and the Official Languages Act had given the impetus. It soon became clear, however, that not all departments were handling the issue in the same way. At first, there was no co-ordination at all, even within departments, including Defence, where civilians and the military

clashed. We saw in Chapter 15 that the half-hearted attempt at a joint operation to identify language requirements of civilian and military positions failed. We are also aware that after this failure late in 1972, preparations began for what was to become the June 1973 Parliamentary Resolution. This fostered progress in the civilian program at Defence and overcame a certain hesitation by describing clearly and officially the procedures for departments to follow in identifying positions. According to the Treasury Board directives set forth in circular 1973-88, which translated the Resolution into very concrete terms, the first step was to identify those positions that called for knowledge and use of French and English, either to serve the public or to enable the Public Service of Canada to operate in accordance with the law. This had to be done by 31 December 1973, by which time a designation plan would be ready showing the dates by which designated positions would be occupied by bilingual employees over the five-year period ending 31 December 1978. The second step was to identify unilingual positions, in other words those where French was essential, those where English was essential and lastly those where either language could be used.

Even after this, all did not run smoothly. To achieve its ends the entire DGBB had to be reorganized. The Director Civilian Bilingualism Programs (DCBP) became the Co-ordinator Language Requirements for a few years. In December 1976, the old title came back into use: Director Bilingualism Program (Civilian Personnel). This Directorate then had two sectors: the Official Languages Administrative System (OLAS) and the Official Languages Information System (OLIS).

OLAS was set up jointly by the Treasury Board Secretariat and the PSC to ensure implementation of Treasury Board guidelines on language requirements of positions. The Defence OLAS was responsible, like its counterparts bearing the same name in other departments, for the entire implementation of the program set up to identify and designate positions and also for training incumbents who did not meet the language requirements of their positions.

OLIS, on the other hand, was a centralized system used to create files on civilian positions and their incumbents. The information it provided facilitates management of the official languages program. This division had two main duties:

- to collect and input data to maintain the most recent information on the Department's civilian positions, by means of Official Languages Input Forms (OLIFs); and



- to generate data which enable OLIS to give back the information it contained in the form of periodic reports for the benefit of managers, employees and so forth. These data were regularly analysed in order to evaluate the progress of bilingualism within the Department on a sound footing.

But let us return to 1973. We cannot speak of major changes without at least a brief mention of employees' very legitimate concerns about the repercussions of such changes on their lives. On 20 July 1973, Ken Green, national Secretary-Treasurer of the Union of National Defence Employees, wrote to the Deputy Minister that according to his information, supervisors could complete official languages information forms on positions in their jurisdiction without informing his employees of the contents of those documents which affected them or the reasons which had led to the conclusion that a position occupied by a particular person was being designated bilingual or unilingual English or French.<sup>105</sup> This type of procedure left much to be desired in the union's view, for although it was the position that was identified, it could well be the employee currently holding it who would suffer the consequences. The Deputy Minister replied with an explanation that employees would always have priority in the implementation of position identification policies. Dewar immediately planned a briefing session to inform union members about how the system operated.<sup>106</sup> The explanations must have satisfied union leaders, since the process continued on smoothly. In any event, the June 1973 Parliamentary Resolution left no doubt that very high priority was given to the protection of non-bilingual employees, who were the most worried in the circumstances.

The objectives of the Resolution may be summed up as follows:

- competitions for bilingual positions would be open both to bilingual candidates and to unilingual candidates who had officially indicated their willingness to become bilingual;
- any unilingual incumbent of a bilingual position could choose to take language training and become bilingual, or be transferred to another unilingual position with the same maximum rate of pay as the position previously occupied; or if he declined such a transfer, he could keep the position even if it had been designated bilingual;
- employees who, as of 6 April 1966, had had ten consecutive years of service in the federal Public Service and had worked in it continuously since then would be entitled to apply, without having to

indicate a willingness to become bilingual, for any position which had been identified for later designation as bilingual; and

- language training at public expense would be offered to unilingual public servants and those from outside the Public Service who were appointed to bilingual positions.<sup>107</sup>

Treasury Board Circular 1973-1988 presented these objectives in greater detail. Thus it was quite clear that no injustice was going to be perpetrated. Dewar also succeeded in reassuring union leaders about the information process which would accompany the identification and designation of positions.

We note that Co-ordinator of Language Requirements (CLR) Dewar was the key player in the working group formed at Defence and chaired by Major-General Duncan McAlpine. Treasury Board granted Dewar additional resources to give him appropriate support in his new duties. Of the 35 person-years and \$275,400 he received in this way, part was exclusively allocated to hiring term clerks to help alleviate the additional workload of the initial identification phase.<sup>108</sup> One of the CLR's first activities was to organize briefing sessions at Canadian Forces bases in Canada and abroad, so as to ensure that commanding officers, their senior officers and personnel supervisors understood clearly the new directives in the Parliamentary Resolution.\* This part of the operation ran very smoothly, despite a few unavoidable but insignificant slips.<sup>109</sup> We must point out that, in the previous months, DGBB had organized similar sessions at bases to explain the scope of the military program, and this experience was certainly useful to Dewar and his team.

For the reader's benefit, we must explain here the criteria which had to be followed in identifying positions. As a general rule, public servants had to be able to work in the official language of their choice. In French-speaking regions, supervision and internal services were supposed to be available in French, as they were in English in English-speaking regions. Consequently, there was no need to provide supervision and internal services in both

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\* For an excellent summary of the civilian program's beginnings in summer 1973, see Letellier, *DND Language Reform*, pp 156-160. Pp 166-168 examine the results of the position identification operation, completed before the Treasury Board deadline. Note that 60 percent of positions supervising civilians were held by military personnel, who were subject to the same evaluation criteria as civilians, as we observed, except that senior authorities at DND decided to exempt brigadier generals and higher, to Letellier's great dismay.

languages in either of these types of areas. In some areas, however, such as the National Capital Region and others where both official languages were in relatively common use in both government offices and the surrounding environment, it was reasonable for employee supervision and central services to be provided in both official languages. On the basis of the geographic distribution of French-speaking and English-speaking Canadians, essentially the same regions were identified in 1973 as were designated bilingual in 1977, namely:

- the National Capital Region;
- the Province of New Brunswick;
- the bilingual region of Montreal, namely the counties of Deux-Montagnes, Ile de Montréal and Ile Jésus, Laprairie and Vaudreuil;
- the bilingual regions of “other parts of Quebec”, namely the counties of Bonaventure, Gaspé-Est, Brome, Compton, Huntingdon, Mississquoi, Richmond, Sherbrooke, Stanstead, Argenteuil and Pontiac (in the last-named county, excluding the areas located in the National Capital Region);
- the bilingual region of Eastern Ontario, with the counties of Glengarry, Prescott, Russell (excluding the areas located in the National Capital Region) and Stormont; and
- the bilingual region of Northern Ontario, namely the counties of Algoma, Cochrane, Nipissing, Sudbury and Timiskaming.

This list of bilingual regions applied to all federal departments and agencies and normally governed the provision of bilingual services within the PS and to the public. For their internal bilingual operations, departments and agencies had to identify certain jobs as bilingual. Positions involving direct supervision of Francophone or Anglophone subordinates were those:

- classified in the Executive Category;
- responsible for the grievance resolution procedure in accordance with the Public Service Staff Relations Act and grievances regarding classification;
- required for internal services, such as personnel and training services and administrative, financial, information and library services;

- required to provide central services to other departments, such as staffing, training, translation and consultation; and
- necessary in head offices and main offices outside the above-mentioned geographic regions in order to ensure continuity of the services already given in the regions concerned.<sup>110</sup>

Thus all civilian positions in the Department were identified in the first stage of the process. The initial figures compiled by OLIS came out in December 1974 and were as follows:

total number of positions:	32,442
bilingual positions:	3,645
English-essential positions:	24,200
French-essential positions:	2,289
English or French positions:	2,308 <sup>111</sup>

Of the 32,442 positions identified, 28,382 were filled and 4,060 were the subject of competitions.

Now let us turn to the 3,645 bilingual positions on which rested the introduction of the entire system as of 1973. This total was broken down as follows:

vacant positions:	653
incumbents who met the standards:	1,076
incumbents who did not consent:	859
incumbents who refused a transfer:	821
incumbents to be trained by Dec 1978:	1,042 <sup>112</sup>

In order to comply with the language requirements of positions whose incumbents were on second-language training or refused to take training or accept a transfer, some administrative arrangements had to be made. Examples were: entrusting duties which required some knowledge of the second language to competent staff; making temporary organizational changes; setting up bilingual reception services so as to reroute requests in the official language not used by the incumbent; and even, in many cases, creating another position to serve the public speaking the second language, when no other solution was possible. As we can see, acquired rights were well protected, and there were no injustices for people whose positions had been designated in an official language category for which they did not have the language qualifications.

The designation phase was carried out rapidly. Dewar's group spared no effort and worked long hours of overtime to complete the work on time, in other words by 27 December 1973.<sup>113</sup> Subsequently, however, the pace slowed because they encountered several obstacles. The main ones were:

- the inability of the Language Bureau to accommodate the large number of employees who enrolled in its courses;
- the difficult situation of supervisors caused by the decrease in the Department's civilian strength; and
- personal reasons which kept incumbents from agreeing to take continuous courses.

Treasury Board also realized that the established criteria for evaluating positions did not always correspond to the real needs for language reform. In September 1977 the Board consequently published, with the co-operation of the PSC, a document calling for directors to review the language resources of their organizations with the aim of conducting another language identification of the following positions:

- a. all civilian positions in regions designated bilingual; and
- b. in unilingual regions, all positions identified as bilingual, those identified French or English essential and those identified as unilingual in the language of the linguistic minority of the province in question.

Table 64 gives figures for the progress of the civilian program from 1974 to 1983.

Table 64

## LANGUAGE STATUS OF CIVILIAN POSITIONS AT DND

Total number of positions identified	1974		1978		1983	
	32,442	100%	36,304	100%	37,001	100%
Bilingual positions	3,645	11.2	4,468	12.3	5,020	13.6
Qualified incumbents of bilingual positions	1,076	29.5	2,284	51.1	3,613	71.9
English-essential positions	24,200	74.6	27,396	75.4	27,767	75.0
French-essential positions	2,289	7.1	2,656	7.4	2,836	7.7
Either-or positions	2,308	7.1	1,784	4.9	1,378	3.7

We can see that in 1974, only 29.5 percent of bilingual positions were filled by qualified incumbents. In December 1978, 51.1 percent were adequately filled, and in December 1983 the figure was 71.9 percent, while 28.1 percent of bilingual positions were unfilled. It is also interesting to note that the number of civilians increased by 12.32 percent from 1974 to 1983 while bilingual positions increased by only 2.3 percent.

In 1974 there were 28 SXs\* in the Department and in 1978 there were 24. All of them worked in the National Capital Region and were bilingual. By 1983 the figure was 143, and the heaviest concentration was still in and around Ottawa-Hull; 71.33 percent of these positions were identified as bilingual and 57.84 percent were occupied by qualified incumbents, as the next table shows. But should not all these positions have been declared bilingual according to the criteria we have seen?

\* Civilian positions equivalent to brigadier-general and above.

Table 65

**PERCENTAGE OF QUALIFIED INCUMBENTS COMPARED TO  
TOTAL NUMBER OF BILINGUAL POSITIONS BY CATEGORY**

Group/Category	<u>1974</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1983</u>
	%	%	%
01: Executive (SX)	28.50	45.80	57.84
02: Scientific and professional	35.20	71.86	81.13
03: Administrative	22.32	56.00	62.39
04: Technical	30.80	56.33	70.69
05: Administrative support	38.49	48.97	78.08
06: Operational	65.44	33.12	87.82

We now wish to draw the reader's attention to Table 66, which shows clearly where the Department's heaviest concentration of Francophones lay, in the Scientific and Professional Category with 27.39 percent. The category with the smallest concentration was the Executive class with 12.40 percent. Nevertheless, some progress had been made; in 1978, the Commissioner of Official Languages pointed out that, among civilian personnel at Defence, Francophone representation was under 10 percent in the upper echelons. By 1983, that figure was 12.40 percent.<sup>114</sup>

Table 66

**DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC SERVANTS BY EMPLOYMENT  
CATEGORY AND FIRST OFFICIAL LANGUAGE**

Year	Executive		Scientific & Prof		Admin & For Svce		Technical		Admin Support		Operational	
	E %	F %	E %	F %	E %	F %	E %	F %	E %	F %	E %	F %
1974	95.80	4.10	84.45	15.55	89.48	10.52	87.22	12.78	81.45	18.55	82.79	17.12
1978	94.45	4.70	78.34	21.66	74.98	25.02	80.33	19.68	80.79	19.21	82.66	17.34
1983	87.60	12.40	72.61	27.39	80.47	19.53	78.97	21.03	78.83	21.17	81.57	18.43

To close this section, we note that tables 65 and 66, which give figures up to 1983, were very promising for the Scientific and Professional Category. This situation continued through 1986, since after the Commissioner depicted the state of bilingualism at DND in sombre shades, he wrote, "The only bright spot in this gloomy picture: Francophones represent 28.4 percent of employees in the Scientific and Professional category."<sup>115</sup> Perhaps there is a lesson to be learned from that observation. We saw in the first part of this chapter that the

DRB had not produced very specific plans regarding B and B within its structure. Yet there is no doubt that however vague the intention expressed from above may have been, it raised awareness of the question very substantially. This category seems to have reaped part of the dividends of these policy statements. The reader will have no difficulty connecting this performance on the civilian side with that of the Army on the military side. Since the same causes seem to have the same effects, we may regret that Deputy Minister Armstrong did not give all the attention that could be wished to B and B in the 1960s. Nevertheless, French continued to hold a very minor place even in the scientific sector, as noted in the first part of this chapter. Let us add to this a symptomatic recent observation. In December 1989, when an opportunity arose for the Operational Research and Analysis Establishment and the Directorate of History to co-ordinate efforts on a project, one of the authors was told that he would complicate the life of his colleague in ORAE enormously if he submitted the written contribution he was supposed to prepare in French.

As for the designation of positions, the adventure did not end once and for all at Defence in 1973. The initial results of this exercise were amended over the years as Treasury Board issued ever more detailed and precise directives. Each new position had to be screened according to a series of factors which situated it in terms of language. Each competition for a position left vacant by an incumbent was also screened. In the National Capital Region alone, the Director Personnel Requirements (Control), who was responsible for approving the determination of the language requirements of a position, had to approve some 2,800 designations a year. In the regions, civilian regional co-ordinators, who will be discussed later, were charged with this task by the same Directorate.

The civilian side of DND has been subjected to less pressure than its military counterpart to observe the official languages policy. However, difficulties have occurred in language designation, which after all lies at the heart of the B and B program in the Public Service.

Thus the Commissioner of Official Languages recommended in his 1977 special report that the language requirements of all positions, military or civilian, be constantly reviewed in order to ensure that they reflected real imperatives and that the required level of second language knowledge corresponded fully to the need to perform the duties of the position appropriately.<sup>116</sup> In C.R. Nixon's October 1978 letter to Max Yalden, this specific recommendation was rated "partially implemented".<sup>117</sup>



In 1981, Lalande of the Commissioner's Office expressed regret at the very end of the session of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons that officials had chosen to ignore the position of official languages among the Department's 35,000 civilians. He noted what the preceding tables have already given us to understand, namely that at the beginning of the 1980s, Francophone strength was concentrated in the Operational Category. He deplored the fact that senior executives were not sufficiently bilingual. He also noted the disturbingly tiny proportion (3 percent) of technical work instruments in French, which was a major limitation on the use of French in the workplace.<sup>118</sup> As we can see, none of this was very different from what we have observed among the military, especially as regards technical work instruments, which were used by both civilians and the military indiscriminately.

Deputy Minister Nixon's reply to Lalande was in the same vein as all the earlier ones we have seen. He pointed out that the Department's civilian officials in Quebec worked in French. Those at NDHQ, he asserted, did not provide service to the public, except for those responsible for purchasing.<sup>119</sup> Let us note this exception and ask how Nixon had understood the 1973 guidelines, in particular as they pertained to bilingualism in supervisory positions.

This type of leadership was bound to cause problems, which emerged in the form of 90 complaints to the COL in 18 months between 1985 and 1987 regarding language designation of civilian positions at DND. Some of the complainants thought too many positions were classified "English essential". Although about 75 percent of these complaints proved not to be warranted, the Commissioner undertook a special study.<sup>120</sup> The Department, now aware of the problem, took pains to revise its Civilian Personnel Administrative Order 4.23, entitled *Language Requirements of Civilian Positions*. It was reissued in October 1987 with a new version and clarifications of the designation guidelines issued 14 years earlier.

Without citing all the contents of the special study by the Commissioner of Official Languages, let us look at some major facts which Nixon's 1981 response could have led us to anticipate. The report mentioned that the Department's management was not adequately informed about appropriate language requirements for civilian positions. Furthermore, Defence sought to justify its decision not to designate some civilian positions bilingual with assertion that work instruments were in English only, and that this was the only language used in the workplace. In this connection, the document pointed out that those language designation criteria which reinforced linguistic inequality

had to be removed. The document went on to observe that, above all, management had to understand and assume its responsibilities, and authorities responsible for official language matters had to play a more active role in reminding people of their language rights and obligations.<sup>121</sup>

Two divisions at NDHQ were singled out by the special study: the Director General Maritime Engineering and Maintenance (DGMEM) and the Director General Procurement and Supply (DG Proc S).

Knowing what we do about French in the Canadian Navy, we are not surprised to learn that English was still the only language used in DGMEM at NDHQ in 1987. The case of DG Proc S, which had the same problem, is quite a surprise, because Nixon stated in 1981 that this was the only sector where civilians were in contact with the public. Yet the Commissioner's 1987 report noted that the division still seemed to have difficulty understanding why bilingual positions were necessary when all the work was done in English.<sup>122</sup> There were fears that bilingualism meant all positions would be bilingual, since supply was geared to service.<sup>123</sup> As we can see, B and B had not made much progress in this sector and we may wonder, as the survey did, whether DGOL had approached this division (and if so, how?) to explain what was meant by the active offer of services in both languages which a Department was required to make to the public and which supervisors had to make available to their subordinates. The future will demonstrate how these general suggestions and the more specific recommendations in the 1987 report have been followed up.

When the report was released in the fall of 1987, it did not emerge into a total vacuum. The complaints mentioned earlier had caused many people to think. Then came the presentation to the Standing Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons, which on this occasion, unlike in 1981, gave part of its time to B and B on the civilian side. Thus Deputy Minister Dewar had barely completed his opening presentation before Jean-Robert Gauthier, MP, rose to assert that that very morning he had telephoned the offices of several senior officials of the Department and each time had been asked whether he spoke English. "So much for service to the public,"<sup>124</sup> he concluded. He had been in contact with civilian secretaries, except at the office of the CDS, where he found a unilingual Anglophone captain. Dewar had no answer to these allegations, which included his own secretary. He admitted that she could not hold a long conversation in French, but suggested that a colleague in the office ought to take over in such situations.<sup>125</sup>

Dewar had announced in his speech that he had just ordered a review of the language requirements of civilian positions. Gauthier challenged him,

saying, "I am shocked to read your text. I could pick out a great many sentences from it that sound like verbiage".<sup>126</sup> Later Gauthier returned to the attack, disputing the fact that 93 percent of positions identified as bilingual to serve the public were adequately filled, as Dewar had just asserted in his presentation. At this stage, the Deputy Minister had to agree that, as in his own office, there were cases among those 93 percent where the incumbent of the position might not be bilingual and would "have to call on a colleague".<sup>127</sup>

Gabriel Desjardins, MP, asked why civilian Francophone participation had levelled off at 20 percent for the past few years and was only at 13 percent among senior managers. While acknowledging that these percentages were too low, Dewar based his reply on the hope of seeing the picture improve following the study of designations he had ordered. He also made the pertinent point that in recent years there had been less mobility in the Public Service. In connection with what his predecessor Nixon had stated in 1981, Dewar acknowledged that, even if English was necessary at NDHQ because so much of the documentation was in that language, many positions should be designated as bilingual "because of their supervisory or other requirements".<sup>128</sup> The Commissioner had recommended this in his 1986 annual report, which noted the many complaints about incorrectly identified positions.

It was during this presentation that criticism was levelled at M.E.S. Healey, who as ADM(Mat) was responsible for the sector that had given rise to most of the complaints regarding designation of positions. Citing precise data for 1985 and 1986, Gauthier, was able to prove that not one of the staffing actions in Healey's jurisdiction over the past two years had involved a position where French was essential. Nearly 85 percent of the openings were rated "English essential", while the rest were "bilingual". Healey, who had given an affirmative answer to Hamelin when asked whether a Francophone could work for him, was nevertheless unable to confirm or deny Gauthier's assertions with their very detailed figures.<sup>129</sup>

Several lessons can be drawn from this 1987 confrontation, but we shall stress two. The first is that the civilian side of the Department, which in general attracted less attention than its military counterpart on B and B, was hardly in better shape than the military, especially at NDHQ, where nearly all its management positions were located. Nixon's statement in 1981, and the fact that it was not corrected until 1987, after dozens of complaints had been filed, baffles the authors.

The second lesson is, the obvious one, that the MPs and Senators of the Joint Committee were better prepared in 1987 than their predecessors had been

in 1981. Well briefed with facts and statistics, they were not about to be led astray in the fields on which they had decided to focus their attention.

### **Language training**

A need should be identified, we think, before action is taken to fill it. But although it is fairly easy to identify cases of civilians who took second-language training long before 1966, it is harder to discover documents which analyse needs (in this case, identification and designation of bilingual positions) before the 1970s. In this chapter, we discussed identification (logically) first before turning to training. Yet the former operation did not begin until after 1966, and did not become serious until 1973, while the latter operation was launched much earlier. We observed this earlier in the case of the scientific, technical and professional categories and that of Roger Lavergne, who was already bilingual but went to Toronto for a year to learn English.

The PSC had been giving language courses in a highly organized way since 1964. The system was organized in July 1968, by a circular calling for intensive courses of four or six hours duration. The student selection scale gave priority to the Executive and Administrative and Foreign Service categories and then to supervisors in the Scientific and Professional and Technical categories and so on.<sup>130</sup> In addition, Treasury Board directive 686059 of 17 April 1969 authorized departments to reimburse employees for fees incurred for refresher courses outside working hours. However, except in the case of correspondence courses, students had to attend an institution accredited by the PSC Language Bureau and agree to take a test when asked.

In 1969, civilians at Defence, no doubt because they had a yardstick for comparison, believed that PSC courses did not yield the desired results. The civilian side of DND turned to Canadian Forces Language School (CFLS), whose teaching methods had appeared to give better results — for the military at least. A study conducted in February 1970 by the Taschereau group on behalf of the Advisory Committee on Language Training shed some light on the situation. In particular, it praised the CFLS language laboratories at Saint-Jean for making it easier to learn a language. Moreover, the school's pedagogical approach using immersion techniques seemed more beneficial than the PSC's, where courses were given in three sessions of three weeks each, with a gap of nine weeks between sessions. CFLS students qualified faster, thus becoming able to occupy a bilingual position sooner.

Matters progressed no further, however. The Commandant CFB Saint-Jean agreed to accept civilians, but he was afraid they would find the military

accommodations he had available were unsuitable.<sup>131</sup> Moreover, the study showed that the dearth of personnel at CFLS would hinder effective development of policy and implementation of language tests. In the end, it was recommended that responsibility for teaching languages to civilian employees be left with the PSC.

The transfer of responsibilities in 1972, which we studied in Chapter 15, naturally did not affect civilian students at DND, although the civilian language teachers “left” the Department. We may be sure that everything relating to civilians’ careers — and thus whether or not they took courses — always depended on civilian authorities at DND. This was despite the fact the official in charge of administering second-language courses for civilians as well as the military for most of the period 1971 to 1983 was a member of the Forces, Major and later Lieutenant-Colonel Alexandre Taschereau, Director Language Training. Eventually PSC courses were overhauled: their length and continuity were increased in response to identified needs and in order to further the cause of bilingualism. The next table gives an overview of the results achieved up to 1983, and needs no comment.

Table 67

**LANGUAGE TRAINING  
DECEMBER 1974 TO DECEMBER 1983**

Language taught	Success	Not completed*	No test req'd	Lang level not achieved	Training not mandatory	Total (employees)
English	427 38.68%	73 6.61%	172 15.58%	9 0.82%	423 38.31%	1,104 100%
French	1,925 39.25%	373 7.60%	669 13.63%	211 4.30%	1,727 35.22%	4,905 100%
Total	2,352 39.14%	446 7.42%	841 14.0%	220 3.66%	2,150 35.78%	6,009 100%

\* This includes not only dropouts but also occasional course cancellations because of inadequate enrolment. This also applies to Table 68 as well.

In 1983, when 1,078 DND civilian employees took second-language training, 618 followed basic courses and 460 refresher courses. Let us subtract from this total those who did not require tests (343) and employees whose training was not mandatory (370). This produces the following figures:

Table 68

**LANGUAGE TRAINING RESULTS FOR 1983**

Language taught	Success	Not completed	Lang level not achieved	Total (employees)
English	65 65.66%	32 32.32%	2 2.02%	99 100%
French	144 54.14%	116 43.61%	6 2.26%	266 100%
Total	209 57.26%	446 40.55%	8 2.19%	365 100%

**Regional co-ordinators**

On the civilian side, the bilingualism program really got off the ground in 1973, when the Parliamentary Resolution was passed in June. It quickly became clear, as had been the case with the military, that contact had to be made with the thousands of DND employees working at bases all across Canada, many of whom remained confined to the same city throughout their working life.

In order to implement government policy and to conduct identification of civilian positions on military bases, five regional co-ordinator positions were created, one each in Halifax, Montreal (Saint-Hubert), the National Capital Region (Ottawa), Winnipeg and Esquimalt. The supplementary person-years provided by Treasury Board for official languages were used for this purpose. The Esquimalt position was later eliminated and the area placed in the hands of the civilian regional co-ordinator in Winnipeg, who covered the entire Western region, which had a little over one hundred bilingual civilian positions to staff. Each co-ordinator was supported by a clerk 3, paid for by the same resources.<sup>132</sup>

Most of the work fell, as we might expect, to the co-ordinator responsible for Quebec, who was posted to Saint-Hubert with the Military Co-ordinator of Official Languages. Mobile Command HQ served about a hundred units and sub-units scattered all over Quebec.

The military co-ordinator served as official languages policy adviser. His civilian counterpart was more of an extension of the PSC in the regions, where he had to enforce Treasury Board directives regarding the identification of civilian positions in the Department. The regional co-ordinator of official

languages for civilians at Saint-Hubert, André Mathieu, was present at the birth of the program and stayed at his post until 1987. He has an interesting story to tell. He spoke of sudden upheavals when the time came to conduct a linguistic identification of civilian positions in the Province of Quebec. Before fully understanding how government policy would be applied, many employees had the impression that they were going to lose their jobs (we recall the concerns conveyed by their union representatives in Ottawa). Repeated briefings were needed at first so as to give employees the correct information and calm them down. Mathieu remembered clearly those sessions held with the co-operation of DGBB personnel (Dewar in particular) and their calming effects.

Then came the systematic review of all positions and their linguistic identification. In 1975, the identification had to be done again in some detachments, such as 202 Workshop, 25 Supply Depot and 2 Technical Services, to name only a few.<sup>133</sup> It soon became clear that some positions originally classified as unilingual French or English should be bilingual. Pressure had been brought at these locations by several Francophone employees, who had to communicate daily with their supervisors in English, either where they worked or at NDHQ offices. Added to this was the fact that documentation at the time was in English only, as were technical manuals. We have already seen how slowly translation of technical manuals progressed. As of 30 October 1975, a total of 4,930 positions had been identified in Quebec and reviewed by competent managers and the Co-ordinator of Language Requirements in Ottawa.<sup>134</sup> In 1979, 4,000 civilian employees were working in French.<sup>135</sup> Today, these detachments have 5,500 civilian employees; 3,000 occupy bilingual positions. The remaining 2,500 are either unilingual French or unilingual English.<sup>136</sup>

We realize how much work is now done at Saint-Hubert when we see that 53 percent of the DND civilian bilingual positions are concentrated in Quebec. Together, Quebec and the National Capital Region account for 88.4 percent, compared to 6.7 percent in Ontario, 3.7 percent in the Maritimes and 1.2 percent in the West.<sup>137</sup> These factors probably account for the inequality of bilingual service to the public across Canada, especially in oral communications.

### **The official languages program (civilian)**

In 1977, as was noted in Chapter 9, two documents forced the Department to revise its position on B and B. The first was the fall 1977 Treasury Board/Public Service Commission policy statement; the second followed in December, as the special report of the Commissioner of Official Languages.

We have already seen that these seeds did not fall into completely barren ground in terms of B and B among DND civilians. In 1972, the civilian program submitted to Treasury Board requested person-years to prepare a B and B plan for civilians. They were granted, but these meagre resources were sucked into the vortex of the identification and designation of bilingual positions. Subsequently, they had to be spent on administering language courses, which included time-consuming arguments with Treasury Board in order to obtain additional person-years to fill the positions of those on course.<sup>138</sup> Personnel were also taken up with assessments of individual second-language knowledge, OLIS and OLIF, or revision of the language characteristics of the hundreds of positions which came up at NDHQ each year. There was thus no time for thinking about the long term.

In 1977, the COL noted the lack of any specific B and B program for civilians. He also pointed out that the eighteen employees under the Coordinator of Language Requirements were too pressured by regular Treasury Board requests to have the time to draw up a plan. He suggested that the necessary resources be liberated in order to develop an official languages policy directed to the needs of civilian employees which could be “made available to all civilian employees, implemented and the results monitored. The policy should be designed *inter alia* to make French the normal language of work in most establishments in Quebec and to redress the balance of Francophones and Anglophones in management positions.”<sup>139</sup>

The co-ordinating committee then set up by the DGOL had the goal of rewriting the 1972 military plan, as we have seen, and also working up the first plan for civilians. It was ready in 1979, several months before the military plan. Its introduction consisted of a brief description of the Department’s role and organization. In essence, it contained the same elements as were presented to the military, including the description of DND official languages policy with its emphasis on the “one-force” concept. The civilian document did not yet explain what this concept was, as was done in the military plan. The point to note is that, for civilians at DND, the 1979 plan was the first point of entry into the subject. It was not a reworking of an existing document, as was the case for the military.

The introduction was followed by a description of the official languages situation on the civilian side of Defence. To paint this picture, various sources were used at NDHQ, including OLIS and the network of regional B and B coordinators, as they were still called in the document. In the three main sectors covered by the 1977 Treasury Board/Public Service Commission directive (service to the public, language of work and participation of Canada’s two



main language groups) there were weak areas. As regards service to the public, the plan noted that there were few complaints involving civilians, but 814 of the 2,032 bilingual positions identified for this function were held by unilinguals, many of whom had incumbent's rights.<sup>140</sup> French as a language of work was, in most cases, a meaningless concept. Often, work tools were available only in English. Moreover, "the personal rapport between supervisor and subordinate is sometimes impeded by a linguistic impasse",<sup>141</sup> "In general, English is the predominant language of work in DND",<sup>142</sup> even though the use of French was definitely increasing, especially among civilians working in Quebec. Finally, in the preceding sections we have had an opportunity to observe that total Francophone representation and percentage representation of Francophones at senior levels were still inadequate in 1983. The distribution of positions between bilingual and unilingual English or French which we observed earlier was very representative of the Department. The 1979 civilian plan conveyed this both in words and in many statistical tables.<sup>143</sup>

The third part of the plan, its *pièce de résistance*, was entitled *Objectives, goals and activities*. In effect, like the military plan, it quantified and scheduled certain objectives. Starting from the situation as described, the aim was to make progress in order to be able to present to Treasury Board, as it had requested in 1977, annual reports showing a precise measurement of progress achieved.

The following three main objectives were presented:

- to increase the capability to provide service to and communicate with both the public and DND personnel in accordance with the Official Languages Act;
- to provide to the maximum extent possible the opportunity for Departmental personnel to have a career and to work in the official language of their choice; and
- to ensure that the Department achieved an equitable participation of both official language groups, protected their linguistic rights, and reflected their cultural values.

As we can see, the first two goals were fairly vague; "to increase the capability" and "provide to the maximum extent possible" are expressions which leave ample room for interpretation when the time comes to write an annual report. Instead of relying on such internal annual reports, it is better to look to external evaluations, such as those by the Commissioner of Official

Languages. There were still many shortcomings in 1986. For example, with regard to equitable representation, which seemed to be the most specific of the three objectives, the Commissioner noted that in 1986 20 percent of civilians were Francophones but that the proportion slid to 13 percent among senior management. Only 9.9 percent of those working for the Department in Quebec were Anglophones.<sup>144</sup> Comparing these results with the projections in Annex R, which show this objective being achieved in 1983,\* the reader can gain an idea of this civilian program's success rate.

Two points deserve note, however. The first is that the plan focused on equitable representation at the regional level, and the Commissioner's figures were for the Department as a whole. They seem difficult to compare. If all regions had achieved their percentages, Francophones should have made up about 27 percent of DND civilians instead of 20 percent. Secondly, the 1979 objective, unlike that set by the military, did not include the concept of proportional representation at all levels.

To round out this picture, it should be mentioned that the other two 1979 objectives suffered the same fate as the one pertaining to equal representation. Thus, concerning service to the public, complaints were being made about infringements committed by telephone receptionists and commissionaires in 1986.<sup>145</sup> As for the documents we mentioned earlier, which sought to establish French as a language of work in the National Capital Region, they also applied to civilians as well as the military.

As we write this (summer 1989), the Department is engaged in the process of revising both the civilian and the military programs. This is in large part because of the repeated pressure exerted from outside, by the Commissioner of Official Languages and the Joint Committee on Official Languages. On the whole, although their allegations are sometimes slightly distorted, they reflect the true situation of official languages in the Department. It is interesting to note, from this standpoint, that a recent information brochure produced by National Defence reformulated the first two main objectives in the 1979 plan in much more categorical terms. They now read as follows:

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\* We know already that in 1987, the objective was still far from having been met.

- to provide services to and communicate with the public and the departmental community in the official language of their choice in accordance with the Official Languages Act; and
- to provide the opportunity for departmental personnel to have a career and to work in the official language of their choice.<sup>146</sup>

The third one, on equal representation was left unchanged.

The brochure in question replaced another produced in 1982, which had repeated the 1979 objectives. Our biggest surprise is that in 1979 they were accepted at all levels, including Treasury Board, even though they disregarded the Official Languages Act.



However important economic and political situations may be in a country's scale of social values, unless national feeling is strongly developed, the country suffers; its people lack cohesion.

[...]

National feeling has improved since the turn of the century. Old imperialist prejudice has gradually melted away and the idea of an independent Canada has spread throughout the country. Two different interpretations have resulted from this. The French-Canadian element thinks Confederation created a bilingual and bicultural nation and French has rights all across Canada. In this view, Confederation resulted from an agreement between two groups which became equal partners in the same enterprise. As a general rule, the English element does not view Confederation in this light. It recognizes the rights of French in the Province of Quebec, in Parliament in Ottawa and in federal courts, but not elsewhere. For all practical purposes, Canada is an English-speaking country with one bilingual province, Quebec. Nevertheless, today there are a number of English-Canadians whose attitude is close to that of French Canadians.

In politics, in economics and in culture, the two elements are closer together. Social relations are not so strained as at the turn of the century. People are more willing to engage in dialogue.

Lucien Brault

*Le Canada au XX<sup>e</sup> siècle*  
Toronto: Nelson, 1966,  
pp 325-326

# CONCLUSION

The subject we have dealt with throughout these two volumes is crucially important, because the underlying issue of the work is national unity, in both peace and war. During the period under study, in the view of most Canadians, defence remained in the background except in times of major international crisis. The rest of the time there was almost continual indifference. Active service was compulsory for only a few years between 1867 and 1987. The reserve or militia forces consisted of volunteers recruited locally, or at most regionally. Canadian centres are separated by vast distances, and Canada is under-populated in relation to the area to be defended. And, of course, there are two major language groups. In the light of all these factors, experts will acknowledge that a direction must be firmly defined and maintained if cohesion is to be effected and maintained. What has been done within the military to promote national unity, and, more specifically, to represent the minority French language group and its language?

The first volume showed very emphatically that, from the perspective presented above, nothing concrete was done until the First World War. There were, of course French-speaking militia units, mainly concentrated in the infantry, and a few training brochures were translated, sometimes by translators themselves who believed French texts were necessary and were willing to carry out the task at their own expense. But when Canada began to set up its own regular forces, beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, the firmly-rooted British military spirit prevailed. Language of work, traditions and uniforms derived from the motherland, which had been responsible for defending Canadian territory since 1760.

As for the presence of the French language, an incident in the House of Commons in December 1880 is significant. British General R.G.A. Luard had received a letter in French from one of his volunteer officers in Quebec City, and had returned it with the note "Please translate in English". The Minister of Militia and Defence, Adolphe Caron, a Francophone from Quebec, had to defend his principal officer in the House while assuring his questioner that such an incident would not happen again and Ottawa would in future be directly responsible for translation.<sup>1</sup> This shows what a French-Canadian minister thought about the place his mother tongue should hold in his department.

A few years later, when Canada decided to become involved in major international crises (South Africa and the First World War), the Francophones who made up 30 percent of the country's population were very lukewarm. As long as only volunteers were used, the domestic situation remained fairly stable. As soon as government authorities opted for conscription in 1917, however, they met with fierce opposition from Francophones, which destabilized the country's political situation for years to come. The French Canadians who did volunteer to go overseas in 1914 discovered, moreover, that the army they were asked to join did not represent them at all. We have seen the pressure that had to be brought to bear before the *22<sup>e</sup> bataillon (canadien-français)* was created. Since the federal government had always given very low priority to defence activity, its failure among Francophones was only one aspect of the broad picture of widespread lack of preparation which was evident from the initial months of the war of 1914-1918.

As we have seen, none of the Department's senior officials, whether Francophone or Anglophone, had enthusiastically addressed the concept of a cohesive force which would reflect both major language groups before 1914. Some senior British officers, such as Major-General E.T.H. Hutton, had indeed made some efforts in this direction, but these were quickly dismissed by their Canadian employers.

After the First World War and the series of socio-political disappointments it inflicted on Canadians, very little was done to correct the situation which had prevailed. The *Royal 22<sup>e</sup> Régiment* was incorporated into the permanent forces as of 1920, a step in the right direction. But the non-permanent militia continued in the same Anglophone groove. While the situation in the Army was far from ideal, it was even worse in the Navy and Air Force. Again, the absence of serious efforts to integrate Francophones into the mainstream should be viewed in the light of the importance Canadians attached to their defence between the wars. This aspect of national policy sank into deep obscurity after 1919. Canada went to war in 1939 with a permanent force of under 4,200. Given this, why would there have been a demand to create a structure which would welcome Francophone recruits and turn them into soldiers, sailors or airmen working in French?

Francophones in the permanent forces were rare and their language was barely used. There was still no plan on the horizon designed to integrate the French-language component into the defence of the country. An interesting fact should be noted. In March 1925, the *Société Saint-Jean-Baptiste* in Montreal passed a resolution calling for the federal government to give preference when hiring public servants to candidates who knew both the

country's official languages. Various authorities in Ottawa, including G.J. Desbarats, Deputy Minister of Defence, were notified of this resolution by a circular letter. Desbarats hastened to reply that National Defence already required that officers applying for a commission in the permanent forces know French.<sup>2</sup> Therefore, this demand would not apply to his Department. What Desbarats asserted was true, but what was the practical application of this policy? There was no structure to measure with any accuracy the actual level of second-language knowledge among Anglophone officers in the permanent forces.

Thus Canada arrived at the Second World War without coming to grips with the issue of integrating Francophones into its defence forces. The socio-political management of the troubled years 1939-1945 was based strongly on the experience of the previous war, and was on the whole successful. On the other hand, the forces engaged in fighting were, broadly speaking, managed from the standpoint of language as if nothing had been learned since 1914-1918. The armed forces remained English in tradition and attitude. Unilingual Francophones wishing to serve their country militarily in their own language had no choice but the infantry. Indeed, there were many cases of people volunteering for armoured units<sup>3</sup> or the artillery who were sent to the infantry because their English was not good enough.

This was not all. A fundamental lack of understanding still prevailed, and during the war, future Minister of Defence Léo Cadieux had to spend part of his time in the Army intelligence branch preparing a brochure entitled "ABC's on French Canada"<sup>4</sup> To educate the country's Anglophones, Cadieux was led to answer such subtle questions as "What is French Canada?" "What is a French-speaking Canadian?" This was very far, as we can see, from the kind of planning which would produce a unified defence force. But that idea was beginning to grow in many minds, including that of Jean V. Allard, as we see from his memoirs.

Let us make one observation. In 1944, the crew of the British aircraft carrier HMS Nabob consisted largely of Canadians, including about a hundred French-Canadians. The captain wrote a report on 10 April 1944 listing a series of problems created by the application of British naval regulations to Canadians and by the occasionally strained coexistence between British and Canadian sailors. None of his Canadians, whether Anglophones or Francophones, was happy with their lot. But the French-Canadians, a minority within the group, had alone accounted for over 50 percent of all cases of insubordination, including desertion. They were simply not in the right place, and one solution, he suggested, would be to assign French-Canadians to ships with Francophone officers.<sup>5</sup> What was obvious to Horatio Nelson Lay, nephew



of Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King, did not penetrate Canadian minds for another 28 years.

After the Second World War ended, Canada went back to its old habits. Its forces were brutally demobilized and returned to the concept which had prevailed until 1939, when the need for permanent forces was finally acknowledged: the military ought to be small and ready to form a framework for the volunteer force which would be raised during the next war. In the Army, fresh attention was nevertheless devoted to the place which should be given to Francophones, as is shown by the study of this question conducted by Brigadier J.P.E. Bernatchez. Unfortunately, it had little concrete result.

The true beginnings of a major plan still did not materialize in the 1950s, despite many facts which, taken together, suggested that this concern might become crucial. Thus the Canadian brigades in Korea (1950-1954) and Germany had a large contingent of Francophone infantry; the Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean was founded; most Army training schools had bilingual instructor positions; the translation of regulations and official history proceeded apace; and many inquiries sought to identify the conditions for Francophones and their language in the three services.

A new surge of Quebec nationalism in the early 1960s lent impetus to far-reaching reconsiderations at the federal level, in which Defence was caught up. The minority report of Mr. Justice Therrien of the Glassco Commission, followed by Colonel Ross's study, swayed thinking toward integration of Francophones at a time when sweeping changes were occurring in the organization of the Forces. The personal commitment of those in office, from L.B. Pearson to Allard by way of Paul Hellyer and Cadieux, made it possible to launch a series of reforms which were brought together in 1972 in the first real program to integrate Francophones into the Canadian military. Thus we had to wait 105 years after Confederation, until the country had gone through two major wars and two minor ones (South Africa and Korea), before it was officially recognized that Canadian defence required the full participation of all its citizens, including the millions of Francophones who lived in this country. These people, it was finally concluded after a very long journey, had to be treated fairly and their cultural characteristics, including language, had to be acknowledged and respected.

Before the 1972 plan was finalized, it had to withstand several attacks directed at all or part of it. Already, the 13 January 1969 directive on the utilization of Francophone personnel sufficiently reflected Allard's will and thinking to elicit a reaction from some Anglophones. Fearing that their

unilingualism would become a handicap, they insisted on being offered an opportunity to become bilingual.<sup>6</sup> Throughout the process which led to the 1972 plan, we saw the prevailing fear that a parallel army would emerge following the changes which had already occurred, including the creation of French Language Units, and those changes which were clearly in store. Curiously, these opponents of change blocked out of their field of vision the splits which had been partly caused by the historical fact of unilingual English Forces. Some, however, made no mistake. Air Vice-Marshal Bob Cameron concluded on 1 August 1969, after a lengthy study of the program which Allard had set in motion, that, if the coming program succeeded in integrating the country's Francophones, its cost would be minimal in terms of its positive effect on national unity.<sup>7</sup>

Once the plan was firmly in place in September 1972, fresh attacks were directed at it. Some Francophones claimed that the equality promised to them was being quickly compromised, if only by the percentage of bilingual positions they had to fill in comparison to their Anglophone colleagues. We shall not dwell longer than necessary on the complaints and fears elicited by the program. Most of them were entirely understandable given the extent of the readjustment which people had to make. There were complaints about the poor quality of some of the French films sent to FLUs, unilingual English signs, the lack of French-language schools or the denial of permission for some Anglophone children to attend them, the inadequate level of French achieved by Anglophones in language school, and many other matters.

In our opinion, there are two points to be remembered about the implementation of the plan. On the one hand, it gave a definite boost to Francophones and their language in the Forces. On the other hand, however, it caused very real disappointments among both those who implemented the plan and those who opposed it.

The passage of time from 1966 to 1987 did not wipe out all the anomalies we have had ample opportunity to list in our two volumes. In 1987, Francophones made up over 27 percent of the strength in the Canadian Forces, one of the goals set by Allard. However, Francophones were over-represented at the lower levels (recruits, privates and corporals; officer cadets, second lieutenants and lieutenants) and under-represented everywhere else. Moreover, in some military occupations where they had been notably lacking until the 1960s, the deficit had not been made up — far from it. And what about training, where Francophones made impressive gains between 1969 and 1972 and then advanced at a snail's pace for a few years, before regressing in some respects in the early 1980s? We should remember that Lieutenant-General Dextraze wrote in 1971 that FRANCOTRAIN would be a major test

of the seriousness of the Canadian Armed Forces in their expressed wish to treat their Francophones fairly.

While bilingualism was almost wholly confined to Francophones, French courses for Anglophones figured very prominently in all the plans of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Unfortunately, none of the objectives was achieved, and in 1987 there was talk of the year 2000 as the final deadline for achieving the goals that had been set for 1987 as far as the number of bilingual Anglophones was concerned. Was it a mistake in the early 1970s to weld bilingualism onto the existing system instead of seeking to integrate it, and in particular the French component, into the military operations of the Forces? The easy answer to this question is yes. But given the conditions of the day, which included strong psychological resistance to everything called B and B, we are forced to give a more qualified answer. Perhaps small steps were the only tactics with any chance of success in the medium term.

Overall, a great deal was accomplished formally to acknowledge that coherent national defence required that Francophones be integrated as fully as possible into military institutions. The military built a framework for receiving recruits and enabling them to live in French, which served both Francophones and bilingual Anglophones. However, it is obvious to any impartial observer that there is a very long way still to go.

Why are the Forces so far from their goal in 1987? Were the deadlines set at first too optimistic? We would be inclined to say so, especially as far as the number of Anglophones to be made bilingual was concerned. As for the other elements, we believe that, even if the goals of the program could not be fully achieved by 1987, they could and should have been much further advanced. This would have required much tighter control over the implementation of the plan, especially from the mid-1970s on.

In 1972, three years after the launching of FRANCOTRAIN designed to introduce French into a training which essentially had been given only in English for two centuries, was it right that critics could successfully attack the very principle underlying the existence of the new system? Should they have been allowed, as they were, to exaggerate the defects they saw in FRANCOTRAIN and in the process to change its direction radically? Should the Francophone training division have been abolished so soon after its creation? Complaints about the lack of bilingualism among Francophones emerging from FRANCOTRAIN were given centre stage and treated in a way which neglected the broad perspective. When budget considerations began to outweigh national unity, the inevitable occurred.

The extremely harsh indictment of Defence's lack of progress in the 1977 Report of the Commissioner of Official Languages shocked authorities. Nevertheless, they made use of it to review gradually what had been decided in 1972. This was the moment chosen by the official responsible for implementing the plan to assert that, since 1972, the Department had been too successful in promoting equality for unilingual Francophones and not successful enough with respect to bilingualism. Yet all the facts pointed to a more negative conclusion. The Joint Committee on Official Languages which met in November 1981 saw all its fears and questions deflected. Yet it was already clear that the 1987 deadline could not be met. To put the plan back on track effectively would have meant taking the Commissioner's 1977 report very seriously and implementing its major recommendations without delay.

We have used that report many times in Volume II and demonstrated its relevance. Departmental authorities, for their part, decided to dismiss it out of hand, convinced as they were that they were moving along the right track. The problems raised in 1977 would be solved in due course. Statistics we have compiled show that in 1983, five years after the Commissioner made his 175 recommendations, only 20.7 percent of those in the area of communications alone (which accounted for 80 percent of the report) had been implemented in full. In that year of 1983, fourteen years had passed since the Official Languages Act had come into effect, and the Departmental plan had been operating for eleven years.

Indeed, year after year the public could follow the progress of a policy which was seriously falling short of its goals. In his 1985 Annual Report, the Commissioner of Official Languages wrote:

We received 110 complaints in 1985, more than double the number in the previous year and an all-time record for the Department....

Twenty-six complaints related to aspects of service to the public, including notices, printed matter and documents, advertising and communications of various kinds.<sup>8</sup>

In 1987 there were 137 complaints, most of them also relating to service to the public. A lengthy document had been prepared by the Secretary of State Department in 1969 to explain the roles of the Official Languages Act and of the Commissioner. It stated:

In practice, justified complaints should be few and far between if all departments take the requirements of the Act into account and assign the appropriate priorities to them.<sup>9</sup>

After all we have read about just one Department, could we call these forecasts anything but hopelessly unrealistic?

In 1987, anyone unfamiliar with the history of Francophones and their language in the Canadian Forces would have received very mixed and contradictory signals. There is no doubt that by this date, serious efforts had been made to enable Francophones to have a career in their mother tongue. In this connection, it is noteworthy that the major military bases in Quebec operate very largely in French, as was not the case in the 1960s. Contacts with the public, routine orders and signs are generally in both languages and French predominates in Quebec. Even outside Quebec, it is often possible for a Francophone member and his family to be served in French. It also seems by 1987 that the concept of French Language Units was irreversible. Moreover, the Department exercised unique leadership in an area of provincial jurisdiction by providing education in the language used at home from kindergarten to Grade 13 or the equivalent to children of Canadian Forces members serving in Canada and overseas\*. This accomplishment alone definitely made Francophone members more mobile, raised their morale and helped prolong their careers. Since 1985, a series of initiatives have been launched at NDHQ to promote French as a language of work. We should also not forget the relevant administrative orders, which have been bolstered and clarified for over fifteen years, concerning the French language and the francophone presence in the Canadian Armed Forces.

If an observer, after taking note of these positive facts, began to dig a little beyond them, he would perceive another, equally important, reality. For 1987, as readers will remember, saw the Commissioner of Official Languages issue a special report harshly critical of Defence and give it special prominence by submitting it to the Privy Council. This initiative was followed by the Department's appearance in May before the Standing Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on Official Languages, where all the difficulties which we have pointed out and were already well known to the experts were exposed for public view. The Committee spoke about the failure of the 1972 plan. Many questions and innuendoes exposed the acculturation and assimilation problems of Francophones which still persist.

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\* This aspect of DND activities has been discontinued since 1992, due to several circumstances, including the repatriation of our NATO troops serving in Germany, which we shall leave to others to relate.

General Allard sent a long document on this last-named subject to Quebec Premier Robert Bourassa in 1986. At the close of a section he entitled *Bilingualism: for French-Canadians only*, he wrote:

From one standpoint, however, the [1972] plan works well: it continues to be a wholesale anglicization machine, nearly as effective as before 1966. In 1986, despite the fine rhetoric and some substantial successes, the fact remains that Francophones are anglicized by the Forces and that Anglophones do not bear their fair weight of institutional bilingualism.<sup>10</sup>

It is difficult to avoid Allard's conclusion or not to confirm Commissioner D'Iberville Fortier's disillusionment in May 1987. Why must we always have the impression that we are at the zero point in the field of official languages, he asked. Are they outside the Constitution and the law voted by Parliament in 1981? By virtue of their role, which is to protect society, the Armed Forces should take the lead in official languages. In fact they lag far behind.<sup>11</sup>

The Commissioner did not confine his criticism to the military, but also attacked the Department's civilian side, whose senior hierarchy was only 13 percent Francophone. On the civilian side of the Department, it is worth noting that the first steps toward bilingualism were hindered by difficult obstacles. At the very outset, directives for implementing government decisions were unclear. Until they were written precisely and realistically, too much co-operation could not be expected from anyone, especially not from Defence, where a civilian program, it was said, was more complicated to implement because of the close association between the military and civilian elements. With the advent of the June 1973 Parliamentary Resolution, a bilingualism plan finally developed for the identification of civilian positions.

This naturally led to intensive teaching of the second official language. Although this program made a fairly good start, despite the many points of conflict at the start, and made significant progress, the results still showed weaknesses. In December 1983, for example, Francophone participation in civilian senior executive positions was only 12.4 percent (13 percent in 1987). Only 13.5 percent of all positions were identified as bilingual, in 1983, and while 82 percent of incumbents met their language requirements, too high a number was still at the elementary level of second-language knowledge. Furthermore, bilingual positions were unevenly distributed across the country: 88.4 percent in Quebec and the National Capital Region; 6.7 percent in the rest of Ontario; 3.7 percent in the Maritimes; and 1.2 percent in the West. It is not surprising that there were sometimes problems with service and that French was little used in many places of work. Because of this weakness, the

Department was still often forced to resort to translation for various forms of written communication with the public and Francophone employees.

Although 19.8 percent of civilian employees in 1983 had French as their mother tongue, only 7.6 percent of positions were classified “French only” and for only 3.7 percent could either language be used. When we examine the success rate in language courses (57.26 percent) and the dropout rate (40.55 percent), we wonder about the quality of planning. Despite this overwhelming evidence, some people could still wonder in 1985 whether there was room for unilingual Anglophones at Defence. “The unequivocal answer is Yes”.<sup>12</sup> In fact, one of the criteria established for the military in 1968, but also applied to civilians, was that Anglophones’ careers should not be affected by major changes aimed at promoting the use of the French language.

In closing, it is essential to make clear that recent policy-makers are not entirely to blame for what was after all a lack of vision which stretched back many years and had deep historical roots. Even viewing the past twenty years, distinctions must be made. The differences between expectations of 1972 and the achievements of 1987, on the military side, resulted from the slowing down of the process in the 1970s, not from the new generation which has taken over the controls in the past ten years.





# **APPENDICES**



**AGENCIES RESPONSIBLE FOR B AND B  
AT THE GOVERNMENT LEVEL (1963 TO 1987)**

**1. May 1963**

The Government formed a Special Cabinet Committee on Government Organization and Bilingualism, chaired by the Honourable Maurice Lamontagne, then President of the Privy Council.

**2. July and August 1963**

Two important groups were formed: the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism in Canada, on 19 July, and the Interdepartmental Committee on Bilingualism, on 2 August. The latter's responsibility was to advise the Special Cabinet Committee on Government Organization and Bilingualism regarding action to be taken to promote bilingualism in the Public Service and, more specifically, regarding development of a bilingualism program covering the next four years (1963-1967). The Interdepartmental Committee's membership consisted mainly of the deputy ministers of twelve federal departments, who eventually delegated their duties to lower-level representatives, including Louis Noël de Tilly of the Department of National Defence.

**3. June 1966**

A Special Secretariat on Bilingualism was created within the Privy Council Office. Taking over from the 1963 Special Committee, it was to work closely with the Public Service Commission, Treasury Board and all the deputy ministers and heads of federal Crown corporations to draw up bilingualism policies.<sup>1</sup>

**4. June 1967 to December 1969**

At a meeting on 30 June 1967, Cabinet decided that, in order to achieve its goal of giving equal status to both official languages in professional, scientific and technical fields in the federal Public Service, high priority should be given to second language training for supervisory staff rather than those occupying positions at higher administrative levels.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Organization of the Government of Canada (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966), p 61. (Revised January 1967).

<sup>2</sup> DG Hist, 90/444, file 1211-1 vol II, "Records of Cabinet Decision", para (f).

In the summer of 1968, the Special Secretariat on Bilingualism and some Treasury Board officials asked whether, as regards bilingualism in the Public Service, Treasury Board exercised all the responsibilities for managing the Public Service which devolved on it under the *Financial Administration Act*.<sup>1</sup> Accordingly, a proposal was made that a new section be opened at Treasury Board to deal with second-language training and general administration of the procedures to follow in implementing official languages policy.

In the last quarter of the 1968-69 fiscal year, however, Cabinet decided to make the Secretary of State Department responsible for implementing bilingualism programs in federal institutions.<sup>2</sup> In order to achieve its goal, the Secretary of State Department immediately created four branches reporting to the Assistant Under Secretary of State. Their respective areas were:

- bilingualism programs
- social action
- language administration
- research and planning.

The *Official Languages Act* came into force on 7 September 1969. Soon after, Book Three of the Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism was released under the title *The Work World*. It led to further changes.

## 5. 1970

A committee of senior officials (chaired by the Under Secretary of State and including the Secretary of the Treasury Board, the Clerk of the Privy Council and the Chairman of the PSC) was struck to work on bilingualism directives. Responsibilities were divided up. Planning for the development of bilingualism in the Public Service went to the Secretary of State Department, but this general responsibility could not be separated from the statutory responsibilities of Treasury Board and the PSC.

The PSC's duties in this field arose out of the *Public Service Employment and Regulations Act* and section 40(4) of the *Official Languages Act*. In brief, it was charged with two particular sectors of personnel administration, namely staffing and training.

As for Treasury Board, its powers and duties on official languages were set forth in the *Financial Administration Act*: it dealt with the formulation and execution of

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<sup>1</sup> PAC, RG 55, vol 1150, file 4500-6 part 2, "Division of Responsibilities".

<sup>2</sup> *Report of the Secretary of State of Canada for the fiscal year ending 31 March 1970*, p 3.

government policy on bilingualism as it related to the Public Service. Its mandate was to develop directives on employee training, pay, benefits and so forth.<sup>1</sup>

## 6. 1971

Further changes were made. The task of implementing bilingualism policy within the Public Service was assigned to Treasury Board. Staff training was in the hands of the Public Service Commission. The Secretary of State Department retained bilingualism expansion programs, administered by the Social Action Branch and the Language Administration Branch.<sup>2</sup>

A new element was added in the division of tasks: in accordance with the recommendations of the Royal Commission on B and B, Book V, Cabinet decided to make the National Capital Commission responsible for co-ordinating bilingualism policies within the National Capital Region, and person-years were included in its budget for this purpose.<sup>3</sup>

## 7. 1973

Under the Resolution on Official Languages passed in June 1973, Parliament instructed the Public Service Commission to take the necessary steps to implement the principles of the bilingualism policies put forward by Treasury Board for approval. Since then, the Board has continued to issue broad directives governing these matters and has allocated or refused the financial and human resources needed or deemed necessary by departments.

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<sup>1</sup> DG Hist 90/444, file 1211-2, "Record of Cabinet Decision", CAB, No 803-69.

<sup>2</sup> PAC, RG 55, vol 1150, file 4500-2, 5 April 1971.

<sup>3</sup> DG Hist 90/444, file 1211-1, vol III, "Record of Cabinet Decision", 28 October 1971.



**CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
OF THE B AND B COMMISSION  
ON THE CANADIAN FORCES**

Apart from war-time periods of high manpower need, and the existence of the *Royal 22<sup>e</sup> Infantry Régiment*, the Canadian military organization has made little effort to establish a situation which would permit Francophones to enter the Forces and pursue a military career in their own language and within the framework of their own culture. Recent changes in the military organization in this regard have been mainly inspired by government policy for the achievement of a greater measure of bilingualism. As in the federal Public Service, however, these changes have not been primarily aimed at creating conditions that would permit French to become a viable language of work.

English is still the language of organization and of communications for the military, with the use of French permitted only in cases specified by regulation. This inequality in the official status of the two languages has led members of the Forces to assume that the English language must be used in all military activities unless there is a specific provision to the contrary.

Our study of the Canadian Forces has documented the fact that, as in the rest of the federal Public Service, Francophones are confronted with strong pressures to work in English and to use the language extensively outside their work situations. These pressures permeate the entire military way of life and increase with seniority and rank. For Anglophones, of course, this situation contributes to the maintenance, growth, and fulfilment of their own language and culture; but for Francophones, it tends to neutralize personal development and inhibit cultural and linguistic expression. The very fact that the Francophones who have been in the Forces longest have experienced the greatest loss of their cultural and linguistic characteristics is conclusive evidence of the strength and persistence of the acculturation process. The Francophones who are less affected by this cultural change are the F-1s of the army — that is, the personnel who have had some opportunity to work in French, and who have been stationed in Quebec for a good part of their careers. This group, of course, includes the members of the *Royal 22<sup>e</sup> Régiment*.

The total distribution of Francophones in the hierarchy of rank shows a relative absence of Francophones among senior NCO's and senior officers, despite the fact that their qualifications, seniority, and age would seem to put them in a position at least as advantageous as that of Anglophones. Furthermore, many Francophones either leave the Forces early or at least envisage a shorter career and indicate more limited ambitions of promotion to high rank.

The measures to ensure equality between Francophones and Anglophones must be aimed at radically transforming the present situation and ending the existing inequality in the official status of the two languages. Therefore, **we recommend that the**

*National Defence Act* be amended so as to recognize officially the equality of the two languages, and to establish a system of procedures which would guarantee the application of the ensuing language rights. (Recommendation No 25)

The official recognition of the equality of the two languages and of the obligation to implement this equality would be ineffective without the necessary institutional changes. Our recommendations for the Canadian Forces have two aims: first, to ensure basic language rights and conditions of equality for individuals in the military organization and those who have dealings with it and, second, to establish the organizational framework necessary for the creation, maintenance, and growth of a sizable and functionally integrated French-language work milieu. In drawing up our recommendations we have taken full account of the specific nature and role of the military in time of war as well as in time of peace.

### **Basic language rights and conditions of equality**

Canadian military life is closely regulated by a whole system of rules and regulations, orders, notices, directives, and forms. For the purposes of equality these documents must be available in the two official languages simultaneously. By the same token, the quality and prestige of the French language as used in the forces must be raised, and French must be used more frequently for the drafting of documents. Therefore, we recommend:

- (a) that the Queen's Regulations for the Canadian Forces, Canadian Forces Administrative Orders, Canadian Forces Supplementary Orders, notices, directives, forms, and other documents of this nature be drafted jointly and issued simultaneously in both official languages; and
- (b) that the practice of originating almost all documents in English and subsequently translating them into French cease at once. (Recommendation No 26)

Until very recently there was no published glossary or lexicon of military and organizational terms appropriate to the Canadian defence institution. In March 1969, an "English-French — French-English Military Dictionary" was published in Ottawa. It is to be hoped that it will ensure the compatibility of words and expressions, in the two languages. Therefore, *we recommend that the "English-French — French-English Military Dictionary" be the official source for military and organizational terms and expressions used in the Canadian Forces and that it be continuously revised by a permanent team of experts.* (Recommendation No 27)

The presence of both Francophones and Anglophones in a military organization that affords official and practical recognition to the two official languages implies that disciplinary procedures and claims for the protection of an individual's fundamental linguistic or other rights should be heard in the language of his choice. Therefore, *we recommend that in all disciplinary procedures, both verbal and written, an individual*



*have the right to choose which of the official languages will be used; and that he have a right to formulate his personal complaints and grievances in the official language of his choice; and that a system of appeal be established in respect of these rights.* (Recommendation No 28)

Because the Canadian Forces are on a volunteer basis, their members, while accepting the demands inherent to military life, are preoccupied with the repercussions of these demands on their family life, and particularly on their children's education. This concern is critical for those wishing to have their children educated in French because, outside Quebec, very few schools available to military personnel offer adequate instruction in that language. Furthermore, postings available in Quebec are proportionately very few in number.

We believe that in general the department of National Defence should, with the help of the provinces, organize French-language schools or classes before considering the payment of the costs involved in sending a child away from home as provided for in recent policy. Therefore, *we recommend that the Department of National Defence provide for French- and English-language instruction of dependent children:*

- (a) by keeping up-to-date personnel records of the language or languages of instruction in which individual service members want their children to study and by giving full consideration to these preferences in the case of each new posting;
- (b) by co-operating with provincial authorities in the organization of French-or English-language schools or classes wherever the proportion of personnel seeking such instruction justifies it; and
- (c) by paying — without any form of language test — all financial costs incurred by parents in sending their children away from home to study in French or English when such schooling is not available or cannot be organized on or near a military base. (Recommendation No 29)

Although the Canadian Forces are already providing some measures for the well-being of personnel and their dependents, this role must be re-oriented to give recognition to the French cultural and linguistic elements in the Forces. There must be adequate Francophone representation on decision-making bodies and provision for financial and other contributions that would provide Francophone personnel with the cultural facilities (newspapers and magazine, films and records, radio and television, libraries, and so on) that they cannot obtain through normal military channels or by majority decisions in paramilitary or mess associations. Therefore, *we recommend that in the formulation of regulations, rules, and conventions governing social, cultural, leisure, commercial, and financial activities, the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces recognize officially and in practice the linguistic and cultural equality of the two language groups.* (Recommendation No 30).

The military should have such means of contact, relations, and communications with the surrounding community as to respect completely its linguistic and cultural character. Men on duty at the gates, telephone operators, those responsible for local purchases, and all those in similar posts should be able to communicate in one or both of the official languages in response to local realities. In addition, the image and public presence projected by the military in Canada and abroad must reflect the equality of the two language groups. Thus, the Department of National Defence, the Canadian Forces, and all its major components should always be identified in both languages on publications, forms, markings, signs, crests, vehicles, ships, aircraft, equipment, buildings, and so on. Therefore, *we recommend that the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces take all necessary measures to ensure that in their relations with the public they fully respect the linguistic and cultural duality of the Canadian population, both within the country and abroad* (Recommendation No 31)

### **Creation of a functionally integrated French-language work milieu**

Up to this point we have recommended measures applicable to all personnel and to the Canadian Forces as a whole. But the creation, maintenance, and growth of a functionally integrated French-language work environment will require changes in the organizational structures that will permit French to become a viable language of work and of military operations. Such a milieu will help attract and retain a greater number of Francophones and will enable a good many of them to pursue their entire career in French.

In Chapter X we recommended that the French-Language Unit become a basic organizational and managerial principle for the federal Public Service. The purpose of the French-Language unit — to establish French as a viable language of work — applies equally to the Canadian Forces. However, the creation of French-language units will have to take into account the organizational and operational methods of the Forces, and the peculiar nature and relatively short duration of the military career.

We envision as a first and major measure the establishment of a large formation or sector where French will be the military language of work. This sector must be broad in scope and fully integrated into the total organizational structure so that a milieu will be established where the French language will be fully accepted and will exist in a dynamic state of development. It will give a new life to French beyond the bounds of a base or unit. The constitution of the French-language sector, and particularly its size, will make possible and realistic the growth of a French military language of work which is at the same time uniquely Canadian. The French-language sector will be able to function only under conditions that ensure its existence and viability, without compromising its military role.

The French-language sector must be large enough to provide opportunities for a sizable proportion of Francophone personnel to pursue their complete careers in French. To realize itself fully, the French-language sector will have to be located

where it can be fully supported by a strong Francophone community. The creation of such a large and functionally integrated French-language sector presupposes a major allocation of such resources as personnel fully trained or retrained in French. Manuals and all other means necessary for expressing in French the complex realities of the military profession must also be made available.

No existing formation in the Canadian Forces can readily fulfil these requirements. The Royal 22<sup>e</sup> Régiment has been able, through the years, to function in French to a certain degree and there is no doubt that its everyday language has been French. However, lacking up-to-date French manuals and instructors and officers who have received their training in French, the technical and operational language has never really been French. It is through the personal efforts of dedicated officers and men and the milieu in which they live that the French language has been able to keep more or less abreast of the rapid military evolution affecting the Régiment. The latter has been able to offer a congenial milieu for Francophones, but French has not achieved the status of a language which expresses the technical and operational realities.

We believe that, given its nature and size, and because it offers a wide range of specialities and includes some of the functions where Francophone personnel are already present in fair number, Mobile Command comes closest to the requirements of a French-language sector. This command is the central operating formation of the land components of the Forces. It also includes some air components and the possibility of some sea components. A number of its bases and Units, including the Royal 22<sup>e</sup> Régiment, are in or near the province of Quebec. Thus, the French-language sector could operate within the structure of Mobile Command and account for about half its personnel. Therefore, *we recommend*:

- (a) that a French-language sector be created within Mobile Command;
- (b) that French be the military language of work within this sector;
- (c) that the sector include land and air units, as well as bases and other functional components; and
- (d) that the French-language units and bases be situated in French-speaking areas of the country. (Recommendation 32)

The structure and arrangements for communications in the two languages which we propose for Mobile Command are illustrated in Figure 28.<sup>1</sup> The linguistic structure is fundamentally dualistic up to the senior level of responsibility in Mobile Command; at this level, individual bilingualism must be mandatory. As in the French-language units of the Public Service, the basic components of the French-language sector — the military bases and units — will have French as their language of work.

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<sup>1</sup> Authors's note: Figure 28 appears in Chapter 12 of this book.

French- and English-language sectors cannot coexist within an integrated military formation such as Mobile Command without an efficient communications network. Therefore, some basic rules have to be established in order to regulate the choice of the language of communications throughout the whole military organization. *We recommend:*

- (a) that each base and unit within Mobile Command be designated as either a French-language or an English-language base or unit;
- (b) that the bases and units of one language group communicate in their own language with bases and units of the other language group and with the rest of the Canadian Forces; and
- (c) that communications from superior formations be sent in the language of the base or unit which is to receive them. Recommendation No 33)

Thus, communications between the two sectors would always be sent in the language of the sector which originates them and would always be received through a bilingual post. Communications from Headquarters would be in French when directed to the French sector and in English when directed to the English sector.

For example, a French-language unit will send a message in French to a bilingual post at an English-language base. The reply will be sent back in English and received through a bilingual post in the French-language unit. The English-language unit will communicate the same way. This same French-language unit will send and receive messages in French when communicating with Mobile Command Headquarters. The same rule will apply at the middle and lower level of the Headquarters. Communications between the French-language sector and English-language components outside Mobile Command, including Canadian Forces headquarters, will be subject to the same rules.

Obviously, bilingualism will not be demanded of all military personnel but only of those holding specified bilingual positions. The types and degrees of bilingualism needed in the various bilingual positions could be identified, since liaison operations between the sectors would have many dimensions, and different levels of bilingual ability will be necessary in the different types of bilingual positions. The qualifications demanded of candidates for bilingual positions will be best determined after a study of the communications networks necessary for the proper functioning of the French-language sector within Mobile Command and in its relations with the rest of the Canadian Forces. Therefore, *we recommend:*

- (a) that bilingual positions within Mobile Command be formally designated;
- (b) that the level of bilingual proficiency be set for each of these positions;

- (c) that such positions, including those requiring full bilingual proficiency, be filled according to set criteria of proficiency; and
- (d) that personnel be trained or retrained in order to attain the required level of bilingual proficiency. (Recommendation No 34)

Personnel should not be required to join the French-language sector, but those who choose to do so must be able to function effectively in French. Many Francophones after a long period of service in the Forces find it difficult to work in French; many more, having been trained in English, now find it easier to work in this language. A French-language unit manned by such individuals would likely revert to English as the main language of work. The capacity to work in French must thus be the general rule for all those seeking entry into the French-language sector. Where this capacity is inadequate, appropriate retraining would be given. Therefore, *we recommend that all personnel who wish to serve in the French-language sector receive, where necessary, professional training in French before being posted to that sector.* (Recommendation No 35).

Despite retraining courses, the relative scarcity of Francophones with certain specializations may still make the staffing of the French-language difficult. To overcome these difficulties it will probably be necessary to accelerate the promotion of qualified personnel. Therefore, *we recommend:*

- (a) that, where necessary to staff the different positions in the French-language sector of Mobile Command, qualified personnel who can exercise their duties in French be rapidly promoted; and
- (b) that the authorized rank and promotion quotas be adjusted so as to make this possible. (Recommendation No 36)

We have focused our attention on the creation of a French-language sector in Mobile Command because we believe that it is the minimum essential for giving Francophone citizens and their language their rightful place in the Canadian Forces. It must therefore be treated as the first priority. However, if Francophones are to be able to have a full career in the Canadian Forces and if the French-language sector is to receive necessary support from the rest of the Forces, Francophone participation and the use of French as a military language of work must be extended into the other commands and, most importantly, to Canadian Forces Headquarters. Therefore, *we recommend the progressive establishment of French-language units at Canadian Forces Headquarters and in commands other than Mobile Command.* (Recommendation No 37) We shall not go into further details on the implementation of this structural change. However, we suggest that our recommendations for both Mobile Command and the federal Public Service should serve as a useful basis for this reform as well as for deciding on the kind and location of French-language units to be established.

If long-term viability and development are to be achieved, the French-language sector will need support services in the French language. The different units required to support the sector and to ensure the training of personnel in French are to be found throughout the Forces, but three support Commands — Air Transport, Materiel, and Training — maintain particularly close relations with Mobile Command.

Since Air Transport and Materiel Commands will have to provide important services to the French-language sector, they should strive to organize themselves so as to be able to offer services in French. For example, all equipment requisitions coming from the French-language sector will be made to Materiel Command in French.

For the future of the French-language sector, Training Command is undoubtedly the most important support command. All professional and specialized military instruction comes under this Command, while Mobile Command is responsible for on-the-job or operational training.

Because of their important role, Training Command and Mobile Command should have all the means necessary for the instruction, training, and retraining of personnel in French. We think that in this field the Forces could make extensive use of French-language technical, professional, and university institutions already in existence in Quebec and elsewhere in Canada, and abroad (Belgium, France, and Switzerland, for example). The editing, adapting to French, or simple translation of manuals and other teaching aids could also be done in collaboration with French-language educational institutions in Quebec or elsewhere. With these objectives in mind, *we recommend that Training and Mobile Command make available to the French-language sector instructors qualified to teach in the French language, as well as French-language manuals, texts and teaching aids; and that, when required, they call upon French-language technical and technological institutions and universities in Canada and abroad.* (Recommendation No 38)

For several years now, the Forces have maintained high-quality schools for the teaching of English. All of them were recently integrated into the framework of the new Canadian Forces Language School at Saint-Jean, where French is also being taught on a limited basis. This integration at Saint-Jean should assure the continued development of language teaching. However, Francophones bound for the French-language sector should no longer be taught English at the start of their military career but rather after a certain period of service and only if judged necessary for their professional advancement. When personnel — Francophone or Anglophone — need to become bilingual to fill new positions, then and only then should they be sent to language school to acquire a working knowledge of the second language. In this way all recruits destined for the French-language sector would start learning their military role immediately in French. Therefore, *we recommend that recruits and previously trained personnel who intend to join the French-language sector not be required to take English courses unless and until their professional development so requires.* (Recommendation No 39)

Officer training is particularly important, and we have studied with interest the numerous documents on the role and rationale of the three military colleges of Kingston (RMC), Saint-Jean (CMR), and Royal Roads. In view of recommendations made by the Royal Commission on Government Organization (the Glassco Commission), Royal Roads may soon be disbanded. Consequently our recommendations do not take it into account.


Since the main role of a military college should be to give the officer cadet a sound university-level education in his own language, we believe that the Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean should be a French-language institution, and that it should give courses in the French language up to the level of the bachelor's degree. This means increasing its present programme of one preparatory year and two university years to a programme of a preparatory year and four university years. When this programme is completed, CMR should become a degree-granting institution, much like RMC which already gives a full university course. Therefore, *we recommend*:

- (a) that the existing Royal Military College at Kingston continue to be an English-language institution and that the Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean become a French-language, degree-granting institution with analogous curricula; and
- (b) that there be a strong emphasis on the teaching of French at the Royal Military College at Kingston and on the teaching of English at the Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean in order to develop bilingual proficiency among future officers. (Recommendation No 40)

To oversee the rapid establishment and effective functioning and maintenance of the French-language sector, we believe that a new body analogous to the language bureaux recommended for the federal Public Service will be necessary in the Canadian Forces. We emphasize that this must be a new body since its duties cannot be carried out by an existing body. The language bureaux of the federal Public Service are to report directly to the deputy minister of the department or agency concerned. For the Forces, it seems appropriate to place this responsibility at the level of the four existing branches (Figure 29). *We recommend that a Canadian Forces language bureau be established as a fifth branch at Canadian Forces Headquarters, and that it be made responsible for the planning, implementation, and co-ordination of the organizational measures needed to guarantee the realization of our recommendations within the Canadian Forces.* (Recommendation No 41)

There are many other measures which could be taken to aid the Canadian Forces in creating a strong and dynamic French-language milieu, but the military can better judge needed measures, once the major structural and other recommended changes are set in motion. The most crucial of these in transforming the Forces into a bilingual and bicultural institution is the creation of a French-language sector, since it will provide both a viable base for the use of French in all activities and larger career possibilities for Francophones.

**THE LANGUAGE BUREAU AT  
CANADIAN FORCES HEADQUARTERS**  
(Figure 29)





**IMPLEMENTATION PLAN TO INCREASE BILINGUALISM  
AND BICULTURALISM IN THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES  
(12 FEBRUARY 1971)**

**Aim**

1. To formulate an implementation plan to increase bilingualism and biculturalism in the Canadian Armed Forces in accordance with the Official Languages Act which will expand existing arrangements in order to foster an equitable representation of personnel of both founding groups at all rank levels and in every area of responsibility.

**Implementation**

2. The implementation plan to promote bilingualism and a more equitable francophone representation in the Canadian Armed Forces will be phased as follows:
- a. Both founding groups are to be proportionately and equitably represented throughout the rank and trade structures and at all levels of responsibility of the Canadian Armed Forces. Until such time as there is a 28 percent francophone personnel inventory available in the Canadian Armed Forces, our goal will be to approximate, in officer ranks above the rank of captain and in other ranks down to the rank of corporal, the percentages of francophone officers and men respectively in the Canadian Armed Forces. This will be achieved progressively and as quickly as possible with due regard to the interests of both language groups.
  - b. Qualitative language requirements [will] be established for specific positions on individual establishments by 1 Sep 71.
  - c. Forty percent of the Canadian Forces officers of the rank of Lieutenant-colonel and above, and 35 percent of the remainder of the Forces are to attain the acceptable level 4 of bilingualism by 1 Apr 76, and 60 and 55 percent respectively by 1980.
  - d. A survey of the Canadian Armed Forces bilingual personnel resources is to be conducted through a language testing programme to be completed by 1 Dec 72.
  - e. Career policies for the manning of bilingual positions are to be reviewed and updated to meet the priorities outlined in the policy on bilingualism. In achieving this, the transitional arrangements must demonstrably attain the goal as rapidly as possible while retaining maximum confidence of individuals and unit effectiveness.

- f. The plan for designating 28 percent of the positions of the Force structure as francophone positions will be completed by 1 Apr 71. Unit establishments will be amended in accordance with the plan by 1 Sep 71.
- g. Career and promotion policies are to be formulated by 1 May 71 to rectify the inadequate francophone representation in the rank and trade structure.
- h. Comprehensive language training policies and programs are to be expanded to meet the priorities enunciated in the policy on bilingualism.
- j. The number of candidates on French language training at the Canadian Forces Language School (CFLS) will be increased to 480 per year beginning 1 Jan 71.
- k. A formal request is to be made to PSC Language Bureau to increase the participation of Canadian Armed Forces personnel on the PSC French Language Training Programme by an additional 200 candidates per year beginning 1 Sep 71.
- m. Subsidized language training in both official languages will be approved for selected personnel who wish to take language training at schools or universities beginning 1 Sep 71.
- n. Funds will be made available to Base Commanders to institute French or English language training on their base where requirements are justified, beginning 1 Sep 71. The Office of the Secretary of State will be approached regarding the availability of such funds.
- p. An advanced French language refresher course will be conducted for selected personnel prior to their appointment to bilingual positions. This course will begin Sep 71.
- q. An appropriate language training programme similar to that of CMR will be developed to permit RMC and RRMC cadets to attain the prescribed level of bilingualism prior to graduation. This programme will begin Sep 71.
- r. The curricula of Staff Schools and Staff College will be developed to introduce the usage of French as of Sep 71. Such may be started in elementary exercises gradually progressing to a more advanced form of teaching.
- s. Mini schools and library facilities will be established at Command Headquarters and major bases to assist personnel in the practice and retention of their second language as of Sep 71.

- t. A policy will be formulated to post language training graduates to predominantly French or English-speaking units or areas on completion of the language course. This policy is to be formulated by 1 May 71.
- u. Records of military personnel are to show the language or languages of instruction in which individual service members want their children to study and consideration of these preferences will be given at the time of posting. The updating of personal records will be implemented immediately.
- v. Procedures will be instituted to evaluate and record the official languages proficiency of candidates upon enrolment, as of 1 Jun 71.
- w. A policy is to be formulated by Jun 71 to give appropriate weight to language capabilities along with other skills in determining careers, postings and capacity for advancement.
- x. French will be the working language within predominantly French-speaking formations and units. To this end, each base and unit will be designated as either a French-language or an English-language base or unit. Bases and units of one language group will communicate in their own language with bases and units of the other language group and with the rest of the Canadian Forces. Communications from superior formations will be sent in the language of the base or unit which is to receive them.
- y. QRs, CFAOs, CFSOs, notices, directives, forms and other documents of this nature will be drafted jointly and issued simultaneously in both official languages.
- z. All disciplinary procedures will be conducted in the official language at the choice of the accused individual.
- aa. Translation facilities will be provided to Command Headquarters, schools, etc. beginning Sep 71 and the positions to provide for the hiring of translators will be established soonest and completed by 1 Jan 73.
- bb. Command OPI system is to be instituted to effect liaison with DGBB on matters relating to bilingualism.
- cc. vigorous and convincing information programme will be conducted to publicize the objectives of the policy on bilingualism and personnel apprised on how this policy will affect them.
- dd. Elements where French will be the working language will be established on an experimental basis at CFHQ and within Commands. DGBB will be responsible to draw up a plan which will be both realistic and feasible in the

light of the limited French-speaking human resources in the Canadian Armed Forces.

- ee. The Director General of Bilingualism and Biculturalism will be responsible for the coordination of the implementation plan under the Chief of Personnel who is the OPI.

**TERMS OF REFERENCE  
OFFICIAL LANGUAGES CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE**

**GENERAL**

1. The Official Languages Coordinating Committee (OLCC) is an advisory committee of senior officers whose responsibilities place them in the best position to make judgements and recommendations dealing with the formulation and implementation of DND official languages policies and programs.

**ORGANIZATION**

2. [...]

**FUNCTION**

3. The function of the OLCC is to review and recommend for approval changes to the policies, objectives and programs contained in the Departmental Official Languages Plans and to review progress of implementation on behalf of ADM(Per).

**REPORTING**

4. The OLCC reports through ADM(Per) to the CDS and DM for final departmental approval of official languages policies and programs.

**TERMS OF REFERENCE**

5. The terms of reference for the OLCC are as follows:
- a. gives advice and guidance in the formulation of official languages policies, programs and related goals and activities;
  - b. reviews and recommends to ADM(Per) for approval, new or amended policies and programs and related goals and activities for inclusion in the military and civilian Official Languages Plans;
  - c. recommends to ADM(Per) for CDS and DM approval, departmental progress reports on the OLPs which are prepared for submission to the Treasury Board and which are subsequently made public when tabled in Parliament.

**MEETINGS**

6. The OLCC will normally meet quarterly starting in October 1979. Special meetings on a more frequent basis will be arranged if necessary.



**CHAPTER 2 (PARAS 47 TO 50) OF THE OFFICIAL  
LANGUAGES PLAN (MILITARY), 1980:  
CANEX SERVICES**

1. The Canadian Forces Exchange System (CANEX) is a system of retail sales outlets operated at CF bases, stations, units and ships for the benefit of military personnel and their families. CANEX operates small department stores, grocery stores, service stations, snack bars, vending machines and, at a few locations, certain minor outlets offering other products or services such as beauty parlors and barber shops.

2. CANEX is basically self supporting but there is a degree of public support, mainly at isolated units. There are about 3,900 non-public fund employees working for CANEX at all levels from executives to stock-room clerks. CANEX employs approximately 1300 full-time and about 2600 part-time personnel. The military complement of the CANEX system is made up of 148 military personnel employed in 67 locations in Canada and abroad.

3. Since there is no single MOC\* devoted to CANEX operations and because its military component of officers and other ranks is selected from many MOCs, the degree of bilingualism and the capacity to provide services in both official languages may vary extensively at a given time and/or location depending on resources available. Every effort is made, however, to provide such services wherever they are required and, as well, where a need is anticipated.

4. In support of DND objectives, CANEX has established the following goals and activities:

*Goal 2.25.* To provide, by 1983, a full range of services in both official languages to patrons and employees where there is significant demand.

*Activity 2.25.1.* To encourage unit commanders, through their CHQs,\*\* to hire a number of bilingual or unilingual employees of the minority language group, where appropriate.

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\* MOC: Military Occupation Classification.

\*\* CHQ: command headquarters.

OPI\* — Commands

OCI — ADM(Per)/DGPS

*Activity 2.25.2.* To effect liaison with career managers annually to ensure that bilingual military replacements are provided wherever required, especially on those bases where FLUs are located.

OPI — ADM(Per)/DGPS

*Activity 2.25.3.* To continue the practice of issuing all CANEX publications, forms, advertisements, general correspondence and signs in bilingual format.

OPI — ADM(Per)/DGPS

*Activity 2.25.4.* To encourage unit commanders, through their CHQs, to enter into concession agreements with persons or firms that can provide services in both French and English where required.

OPI — ADM(Per)/DGPS, CHQs

*Activity 2.25.5.* To ensure that the essential services provided at CANEX HQ and through primary contact areas such as switchboards, personnel office, administrative office, and operation sections, can be provided in both English and French.

OPI — ADM(Per)/DGPS

*Activity 2.25.6.* To amend appropriate CANEX directives to state clearly that the CANEX objective is to provide service to patrons, employees and the public in accordance with the departmental objectives.

OPI — ADM(Per)/DGPS

*Goal 2.26.* To establish by 31 Jul 82 linguistic requirements for all CANEX positions, whether full-time or part-time, public or non-public.

*Activity 2.26.1.* To examine each CANEX HQ position to determine the language requirements of the job and to annotate the positions accordingly.

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\* OPI: office of primary interest.



OPI — ADM(Per)/DGPS

*Activity 2.26.2.* To request each unit, through the appropriate CHQ, to examine its CANEX positions to determine the language requirements of the job and to note the positions accordingly.

ON — ADM(Per)/DGPS

OCI — Commands

*Activity 2.26.3.* To ensure that for each military position in CANEX HQ due consideration is given to linguistic requirements.

OPI — ADM(Per)/CPCSA

OCI — DGPS

*Activity 2.26.4.* To ensure that for each civilian position in CANEX HQ due consideration is given to linguistic requirements.

OPI — DGPS

*Goal 2.27.* To continue to provide publications, correspondence, signs, and advertisements of equal linguistic quality and prominence in both official languages.

*Activity 2.27.1.* To maintain a qualified translator on CANEX HQ staff for NPF translation tasks.

OPI — ADM(Per)/DGPS

*Activity 2.27.2.* To utilize the services of the Translation Bureau for public translation tasks.

OPI — ADM(Per)/DGPS



**TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE  
COMMAND COORDINATORS BILINGUALISM AND  
BICULTURALISM**

The Command Coordinator Bilingualism and Biculturalism (CCBB) is responsible to the Commander for:

- a. advising the Commander and senior staff on policies and programmes related to Bilingualism and Biculturalism;
- b. advising the Commander and senior staff on the bilingual requirements of the Command;
- c. disseminating information on bilingualism and biculturalism to the personnel within the Command;
- d. coordinating all policies and directives related to bilingualism and biculturalism within the Command;
- e. coordinating and monitoring the programmes related to bilingualism and biculturalism within the Command;
- f. providing assistance in the evaluation of translation facilities;
- g. establishing direct liaison with DGBB on matters related to the B&B programmes within the Command; and
- h. establishing direct liaison with unit commanders within the Command to advise and assist them in the promotion of the B&B programmes.



**TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE COMMAND COORDINATOR  
OFFICIAL LANGUAGES (CCOL) FOR MOBILE  
COMMAND HEADQUARTERS**

**GENERAL**

1. The CCOL is intended to be an adviser to the Commander in the implementation of the Military Official Languages Plan (MOLP).

**ROLE**

2. The CCOL will, with the support of the Commander and his staff, give visibility and stimulus to DND's official languages programs by acting as the catalyst who guides the majority population to a realistic approach and understanding of DND's official languages policy and objectives.

**KNOWLEDGE**

3. The CCOL must be familiar with the following documents;
- a. the Official Languages Act;
  - b. the Parliamentary Resolution 1973;
  - c. Treasury Board Policies and Guidelines for the implementation of Official Languages Plans;
  - d. DND MOLP;
  - e. CFAOs and other instructions or directives relating to Official Languages in DND;
  - f. Wenz Report;\*
  - g. REMARS;\*\*
  - h. policies concerning language training programs.
4. In addition, the CCOL must become fully conversant with NDHQ computer

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\* This report is discussed in Chapter 15.

\*\* Reports on resources administration.

programs which identify bilingual positions and bilingual personnel resources in the CF.

## **DUTIES**

5. In fulfilling his role, the CCOL will perform the following duties:
  - a. coordinate, through appropriate military and civilian staffs, the implementation of the MOLP;
  - b. advise on the provision of bilingual service to the public and to the military, DND civilian and dependent populations including CANEX and other non public funds activities;
  - c. coordinate the identification and designation of military positions;
  - d. review all Establishment Change Proposals for linguistic requirements; e. submit internal/external reports;
  - f. advise and assist Francotrain projects;
  - g. monitor and advise on the provision of translation and terminology services;
  - h. promulgate policy directives related to Base Language Training Centres funded by NDHQ and FMC HQ;
  - j. promote base language training program for the military and their dependents;
  - k. investigate and coordinate reply to complaints relating to official languages;
  - m. coordinate the administrative arrangements for language testing other than that which is an integral part of the continuous French Language Course;
  - n. ensure that all aspects of visual bilingualism are portrayed in accordance with current directives;
  - p. provide financial assistance to Base language training program supported by FMC HQ;
  - q. Ensure liaison with and advise the Civilian Regional Coordinator Official Languages (RCOL) on all military matters which may affect civilian employees;

- r. staff all policy documents related to official languages (military);
- s. administer the Official Languages program budget;
- t. supervise the private tutorship program for senior executives;
- u. attend conferences in Canada and abroad.





**CHAPTER 12 OF THE OFFICIAL LANGUAGES PLAN  
(MILITARY), 1980 CANADIAN FORCES COMMUNICATION  
COMMAND (CFCC)**

1. The role of CFCC in the CF is to provide:
  - a. strategic communications, including telephone systems, narrative message systems and data communications for intercommunication with —
    - (1) NDHQ, command HQs, bases and stations in Canada;
    - (2) Canadian Forces Europe;
    - (3) Canadian Forces formations, units and elements deployed on UN duties;
    - (4) Canada's military allies;
  - b. supplementary radio and radio direction finding for Canada and its military allies; and
  - c. central data services.
2. The Command HQ, located in Ottawa, exercises command through regional Communication Group Headquarters located in Ottawa, Halifax, Montreal, Trenton, Winnipeg and Vancouver. The Canadian Forces Supplementary Radio System (CFSRS) is a formation under command of CFCC. CFSRS HQ is collocated with the Command HQ. The system comprises stations in the following locations:
  - a. Alert and Inuvik, NWT;
  - b. Bermuda;
  - c. Gander, Nfld;
  - d. Masset, BC; and
  - e. Leitrim, Ont.
3. The Command has a personnel establishment of 6050, including 1560 in the Communication Reserve and 1058 civilians. These personnel are grouped into units and detachments and widely distributed across Canada in some 80 geographic locations in support of CF establishments. Communication Groups, comprising regular

and reserve force units, are responsible for the provision of communications and the training of the Communication Reserves in their regions.

4. Except for CFSRS stations, CFCC units (communication groups, squadrons and detachments) are lodgers on bases and stations of other commands. Necessarily, the units of this Command must participate actively in the Official Languages (OL) activities of host bases and stations.

5. The following general goals have been set for the Command:

Goal 12.1. To ensure that CFCC personnel participate in the evolution of OL activities, wherever they may be stationed.

Activity 12.1.1. To keep all units of CFCC up to date on the DND OL Plan, including goals and activities of other commands.

OPI — CCLO

Activity 12.1.2. To ensure, beginning 1 Apr 79, that all units of CFCC report on the sufficiency of, and their participation in, host base and station OL programs in their quarterly (Commrep 22) reports.

OPI — COS

Activity 12.1.3. To include, by 1 Jan 81, a situation report on the application of OL policy in the Command Inspection Report.

OPI — COS

Goal 12.2. To provide bilingual telephone operator service at bases and stations across Canada where CFCC has the responsibility for telephone operators, wherever there is a significant demand.

Activity 12.2.1. To continue to fill CFCC's telephone operator positions across Canada with bilingual telephone operators, wherever required.

OPI — SSO ADM(Per)

Activity 12.2.2. To participate, in conjunction with NDHQ/DCEPR, in Activity 2.5.2, regarding the investigation of the practicability of using the Canadian Switched Network (CSN) to ensure that access is available to bilingual telephone operator services.

OPI — COS

Goal 12.3. To increase the opportunity for Francophones in CFCC to work in French.

Activity 12.3.1. To request NDHQ to designate the units, both regular and reserve, of 71 Communication Group in Quebec as FLUs in accordance with the following timetable:

- a. in 79/80: 711 Comm Sqn; 715 Comm Sqn; 713 (Beauport) Comm Regt. 714 (Sherbrooke) Comm Sqn; and
- b. at a date to be determined: 71 Comm Gp. HQ.

OPI — DCOS SP

Activity 12.3.2. Deleted (see activity 3.6.1)

6. Certain units of the CFSRS are independent stations. These are CFS Alert and CFS Inuvik, NWT; CFS Masset, BC; and CFS Bermuda. All of these stations are in Category I or II of the Significant Demand Guide at Annex A. The significant demand is created by the presence of Francophone military personnel and dependants. There is no significant demand resulting from the local population. The Command goals for the above CFSRS stations, in addition to those stated above are as follows:

Goal 12.4. To provide essential services to Francophone DND military personnel and dependants at CFSRS stations.

Activity 12.4.1. To continue to review the establishment positions in essential services at CFSRS stations to ensure that they have been correctly identified.

OPI — Comd CFSRS

Goal 12.5. To continue to recognize the cultural aspirations of members of both official languages groups and their dependants at CFSRS stations.

Activity 12.5.1. Deleted (see activity 2.13.1.)

Activity 12.5.2. To continue to stimulate the development of French cultural and recreational activities.

OPI — Comd CFSRS



**LIST OF BASES WITH CO—ORDINATORS  
OF OFFICIAL LANGUAGES**

**Maritime Command**

CFB Esquimalt  
CFB Halifax

**Mobile Command**

CFB Calgary	CFB Petawawa
CFB Gagetown	CFB Shilo
CFB London	CFB Valcartier
CFB Montreal	

**Air Command**

CFB Bagotville	CFB North Bay
CFB Chatham	CFB Ottawa
CFB Cold Lake	CFB Summerside
CFB Comox	CFB Toronto
CFB Edmonton	CFB Trenton
CFB Greenwood	CFB Winnipeg
CFB Moose Jaw	

**Canadian Forces Training System**

CFB Borden	CFB Kingston
CFB Chilliwack	CFB Saint-Jean
CFB Cornwallis	

**Canadian Forces Europe**

CFB Lahr  
CFB Baden-Soellingen



**EXTRACT (PP 21-22) FROM THE COL REPORT ENTITLED  
THE SYSTEM OF OFFICIAL LANGUAGES  
CO-ORDINATORS, 1984**

The Commissioner of Official Languages recommends that the Department:

- a. examine and, where appropriate, expand the system of co-ordinators by designating co-ordinators at NDHQ and in the groups, and personnel responsible for official languages for the stations and units;
- b. examine and review the nature of the duties of the co-ordinators in place, and establish terms of reference for new co-ordinators, giving priority to the implementation of official languages policy and information;
- c. reaffirm and, where appropriate, redefine the departmental role of the DGOL, and include therein continuing responsibility for harmonizing the actions of official languages co-ordinators and other personnel responsible for official languages;
- d. examine the hierarchical set-up of language schools established on the bases and identify the administrative structure most appropriate for the promotion of the official languages programme;
- e. ensure that decision-makers are specifically accountable for the implementation of the official languages programme and that they give support to official languages co-ordinators;
- f. provide official languages co-ordinators with the bilingual support staff and office equipment they need to perform their duties efficiently;
- g. identify selection and development criteria for the duties of official languages co-ordinators;
- h. appoint to the position of co-ordinators candidates who are both competent for the administration of programmes and adequately fluent in both official languages; and
- j. provide co-ordinators with a period of theoretical or practical training that corresponds with their terms of reference.





## APPENDIX K

### FUTURE FRENCH LANGUAGE UNITS ACCORDING TO THE PROGRAM ADOPTED AND IMPLEMENTED IN 1972

1971 to 1974: *HMCS Montcalm* and *HMCS Donnacona*  
Reserve Support Unit (Montreal)  
*ERFC*  
CFLS  
CFB Saint-Jean  
Communication Group  
Field Investigation Unit  
Montreal Recruiting Unit CFB Valcartier Hospital  
CFB Valcartier Dental Unit  
Reserve Support Staff (Montreal)

1972 to 1975: CFB Montreal

1973 to 1976: Rescue Squadron  
All-Weather Interceptor Squadron (Bagotville)  
Medium Range Transport Squadron

1974 to 1977: CFB Bagotville

1975 to 1978: Montreal Supply Depot  
CFS Val d'Or  
CFS Senneterre

1976 to 1979: Supply and Maintenance Ship  
CFB Valcartier Tactical Helicopter Squadron  
Destroyer 280

Among other FLUs scheduled to come into existence by 1990 were the following:

- 7 radar stations
- 1 submarine
- 1 minesweeper
- 1 air technical unit
- 1 band
- 2 communication squadrons
- 1 maritime patrol air squadron.



## APPENDIX L

### FLUS AS OF 1 SEPTEMBER 1972\*

#### 1. In 5<sup>e</sup> Groupement de combat:

- QG du 5<sup>e</sup> Groupement de combat
- 5<sup>e</sup> Régiment d'artillerie légère du Canada
- 12<sup>e</sup> Régiment blindé du Canada
- 5<sup>e</sup> Escadron de génie du Canada
- 2<sup>e</sup> R22<sup>e</sup>R
- 3<sup>e</sup> R22<sup>e</sup>R
- 5<sup>e</sup> Bataillon des services du Canada
- 5<sup>e</sup> Unité médicale
- 5<sup>e</sup> Unité de contrôle aérien tactique \*\*

#### 2. Elsewhere

- *Détachement de l'École des armes de combat*
- Musique du R22<sup>e</sup>R
- 430<sup>e</sup> Escadron tactique d'hélicoptères
- 433<sup>e</sup> Escadron d'appui tactique
- 1<sup>er</sup> Commando aéroporté
- 1<sup>er</sup> R22<sup>e</sup>R
- BFC Valcartier
- École technique des Forces canadiennes
- Le navire Skeena

#### 3. Three experimental units

- Mobile Command HQ administrative services
- CFB Bagotville CO's office and administrative services
- Directorate Recruiting and Selection

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\* The terms used here may differ slightly from current usage. Thus *5<sup>e</sup> Groupement de combat* (1972) became *5<sup>e</sup> Groupe-brigade*, *5<sup>e</sup> Unité médicale* (1972) is now *5<sup>e</sup> Ambulance de campagne*, and so forth.

\*\* This unit, like all those of the same type, was disbanded after 1972.



## APPENDIX M

### NEWLY DESIGNATED FRENCH LANGUAGE UNITS (65/82, 7 September 1982)

UNIT NAME	LOCATION	TOTAL STRENGTH
<i>Centres de recrutement des Forces canadiennes</i>	Headquarters	4
	Quebec City	9
	Trois-Rivières	9
	Chicoutimi	9
	Rimouski	9
	Montréal	36
	Sherbrooke	9
	Saint-Jérôme	8
	Sept-Iles	6
	Rouyn	6
Hull	6	
<i>Base des Forces canadiennes Saint-Jean</i>	Saint-Jean	332
<i>Base des Forces canadiennes Montréal</i>	Montréal	501
<i>Base des Forces canadiennes Valcartier</i>	Valcartier	1,021
<i>Détachements, 15<sup>e</sup> Unité dentaire</i>	Valcartier	19
	Saint-Jean	15
	Montréal	2
	Québec	2
	Bagotville	7
	Montréal	11
<i>5<sup>e</sup> Peloton de la police militaire</i>	Valcartier	33
<i>Stations des Forces canadiennes</i>	Chibougamau	111
	Lac Saint-Denis	107
	Mont Apica	134
	Senneterre	112
	Moisie	128
<i>École des recrues des Forces canadiennes</i>	Saint-Jean	122
<i>Dépôt régional de matériel médical</i>	Valcartier	9

<i>Détachements, personnel de soutien de la Force régulière</i>	Montréal	76
	Québec City	25
	Sherbrooke	10
	Noranda	3
	Saint-Hyacinthe	5
	Rimouski	6
	Chicoutimi	3
	Trois-Rivières	4
	Shawinigan	4
	Lévis	11
Hull	4	
<i>711<sup>e</sup> Escadron des communications et détachements</i>	Valcartier	
	Headquarters	63
	Bagotville	5
	Chibougamau	3
	Moisie	3
	Mont Apica	3
Québec City	3	
<i>71<sup>e</sup> Escadron des communications et détachements</i>	Saint-Hubert	57
	Lac Saint-Denis	3
	Senneterre	3
	Saint-Jean	4
<i>Quartier général du 72<sup>e</sup> Groupe des communications</i>	Saint-Hubert	28
<i>Détachements 71<sup>e</sup> Groupe des communications (supporting 713<sup>e</sup> Régiment des communications [BeauportJ and 714<sup>e</sup> Escadron des communi- cations (Sherbrooke) Réserve)</i>	Beauport	3
	Sherbrooke	3
<i>Algonquin</i>	Halifax	240
[In 1985] <i>425<sup>e</sup> Escadron d'appui tactique</i>	Bagotville	166

## APPENDIX N

### FRANCOTRAIN CFAO 9-53

(Revised version of 19 September 1986)

#### GENERAL

Director Individual Training (DIT) is the NDHQ co-ordinator for the Francotrain Program. This program was designed to provide all CF members the opportunity to undertake in-service training and professional development courses in the official language of their choice to the greatest extent possible. The CF program is substantial — over 1200 in-service training courses are conducted for 132 military occupations.

Considerable progress has been made towards increasing the number of courses available in both official languages. However, the essential requirement to have a knowledge of English in some military occupations makes it impractical to provide certain training completely in French. In such cases, and as a progressive step leading towards the full development of all other courses in the French language, the application of tutorial assistance is considered appropriate.

#### DEFINITIONS

In this order the following definitions apply with regard to the language of instruction on CF courses:

##### English (E)

means the conduct of a course given or almost entirely given in English by fluent English-speaking training staff, and most if not all course material is available in English.

##### French (F)

means the conduct of a course given or almost entirely given in French by fluent French-speaking training staff, and most if not all course material is available in French.

##### Tutorial assistance (TA)

means the conduct of a course given in one of the official languages where assistance has been made available to the trainees in the other official language. Assistance is available in one of three levels of services in the other official language [see below].

## **OBJECTIVES**

The objectives of Francotrain are:

- a. to create conditions of equal opportunity for all members of the CF by making all in-service training and professional development courses available in both official languages to the greatest extent possible; and
- b. to improve the rate of retention of francophones through a reduction in both training failures and voluntary releases.

## **PRIORITIES**

The ultimate objective of providing training and professional development in the official language of the members [sic] choice requires that the Francotrain Program continues to be enhanced in all CF training establishments and schools. In the future, improvements will normally be the result of planned stages: training conducted only in English will be upgraded through progressive levels of tutorial assistance, until, finally, training will be offered in both official languages. When it is not practicable to conduct a specific course in French, the objective should be to provide the highest level of tutorial assistance.

The priorities for the maintenance and development of Francotrain within CF training establishments and schools are:

- a. the conduct of Recruit and Basic Officer Training;
- b. the conduct of Military Occupation Qualifying Training;
- c. the conduct of Officer and Non-Commissioned Members advancement training;
- d. the conduct of Occupation Specialty Training;
- e. the conduct of Leadership and Professional Development Training; and
- f. the conduct of Refresher/Continuation Training.

## **DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION**

All Designated Commands and Training Agencies shall develop a program to provide instruction in both official languages in accordance with the objectives and priorities set out in [earlier] paragraphs.

Tutorial assistance shall be identified as having one of the following levels of assistance available:



- a. Tutorial assistance level 1 (TA 1). This assistance involves:
- (1) ensuring that the instruction is given by a bilingual instructor; or
  - (2) when a bilingual instructor is not available, having an instructor or supervisor provide explanations in the other official language as required;
  - (3) making available in bilingual format at least 25 per cent of the reference material used by the trainees;
  - (4) developing a system of mutual assistance among trainees; and
  - (5) ensuring tutorial assistance is available during all tests, examinations and evaluations.
- b. Tutorial assistance level 2 (TA 2). This assistance involves:
- (1) all aspects of TA 1;
  - (2) making available in bilingual format at least 50 per cent of the reference material used by the trainees;
  - (3) making available to trainees a bilingual format lexicon and/or a technical vocabulary course that is particular to the course or discipline; and
  - (4) making available to trainees at least 50 per cent of audio-visual training aids in both official languages.
- c. Tutorial assistance level 3 (TA 3). This assistance involves:
- (1) all aspects of TA 2;
  - (2) making available to trainees at least 75 per cent of the reference material used by the trainees;
  - (3) making available to trainees at least 75 per cent of audio/visual training aids in both official languages; and
  - (4) making available to trainees all tests, examinations and evaluations in both official languages.

The further development of Francotrain capability for a given course shall be the responsibility of the Designated Command and should normally follow the progression outlined [above].

## **REVIEW AND REPORTING**

All Designated Commands and Training Agencies shall indicate the language of instruction scheduled for a course in the course schedule chart (CF-780). This may be achieved by inserting the language of instruction with the course serial number (eg, “8601 TA 2”). Additional information concerning the language of instruction may be inserted in the prerequisites and remarks section of the CF-780 (eg, “all serials available with TA 3”).

All CF training establishments and schools shall report through their Designated Command to DIT any improvement or degradation in their Francotrain capability. When a loss in capability has occurred, reasons for this loss shall also be reported.

DIT reports annually to the Director General Recruiting Education and Training (DGRET) the status of the Francotrain Program. The report includes the language of instruction available for all in-service courses, planned activities to implement improvements to the program and details of the lack of personnel/material resources which impede expansion of the program. This report is based on a Francotrain Management Information System maintained by DIT in consultation with Designated Commands and Training Agencies, for the purpose of recording plans and reviewing the progress of the CF Francotrain Program.

## APPENDIX O

### TRAINING OF NON-COMMISSIONED MEMBERS IN FRENCH IN LAND COMBAT ARMS IN 1984 FROM THE REPORT *FIFTEEN YEARS AFTER*

#### Infantry

The combat arm is undeniably where the most notable progress has been achieved in recent years. There are still some problems with translation and terminology, but on the whole, a great deal of training can be said to have taken place in French. All training in classification courses and in all levels of trade qualification courses is available in French and can be given in French. The only exception is that because of the shortage of Francophone candidates for the TQ 7 level, the course has not yet been given in French. On the last occasion, however, it was given in both languages.

As soon as a new levy of soldiers has completed *École des recrues des Forces canadiennes (ERFC)*, they go to *École de combat du R22<sup>e</sup>R* at CFB Valcartier to take the TQ 3 course. All the remainder of their training is then taken at the Infantry School in the Combat Training Centre (CTC) at CFB Gagetown. Training is given in French by Francophone instructors. The same applies to young officers in the three classification phases.

There are two difficulties facing Francophone trainees, however:

- a. the support company does not have the necessary resources to provide fair support in both languages; and
- b. they live in an English environment for several months.

These two difficulties cause problems, especially for young people. Those at the higher ranks can overcome them easily, since most are well accustomed to them. A recommendation will be made regarding the support company, and the cultural problems posed by the environment will be discussed later.

Most staff meetings are conducted in English, since with few exceptions, school officials and instructors are Anglophones. Only the Francophones are bilingual at the functional level or above.

#### Armour

After leaving *ERFC* at CFB Saint-Jean, young Francophone recruits are posted to *12<sup>e</sup> RBC* at CFB Valcartier. There they take their TQ 3 qualifying courses, and then [...] they must go to Armour School at CTC, CFB Gagetown to take the rest of their training. Many believe that a considerable effort is expended to make this discipline more French.

However, a very high proportion of the school's officials, 85 percent, are Anglophones. Moreover, 91 percent of those in bilingual positions do not have the required level of bilingualism. Even if French is used by teachers in classrooms, English is the working language. Staff meetings are conducted in English.

Among the problems identified, such as translation and terminology and lack of bilingual resources and teaching material in French, school authorities have singled out one which is worth recounting in detail and viewing from a different perspective. Some Francophone sergeants from *12<sup>e</sup> RBC* are ready to take training at the TQ 6 level so as to advance to the rank of warrant officer. They are unilingual [...] What should be done with these prospective candidates? [...] [tutorial only] assistance could be given in French. The solution is to send these soldiers to take language training at the Language School at CFB Saint-Jean, in the hope that they have the ability to learn a second language. This sets a Francophone's career one year behind his Anglophone colleague's. If we view these Francophone sergeants from the standpoint of fifteen years after, we should be fairly satisfied and pleased with the progress achieved. Instead of being a problem, they should be a model for Francophones. It is recurring situations of this type which have prompted the Infantry School to offer more and more training in French for higher and higher ranks.

The support squadron has difficulty providing support in French for an exercise carried out by Francophone trainees. Thanks to careful deployment of individuals, trainees can take their training in French[...].

## **Artillery**

The artillery want all their young soldiers to be taught doctrine in standardized form, regardless of which language group they are in. Accordingly, they have centralized training at TQ 3 level at Combat School at CFB Shilo, Manitoba. This course, formerly given at CFB Valcartier, is now taught at an English base in Western Canada which has 8.5 percent Francophones. Even more surprisingly, the chief instructor who is to some extent responsible for the standardization and consistency of doctrine for both language groups understands only English and is wholly unable to assess the quality of doctrinal teaching by Francophone instructors. Why have these young Francophones been taken to a totally English-speaking environment for standardization when the School has not acquired the necessary tools to achieve it?

At a meeting with 26 young Francophones[...] various complaints or grievances were voiced. The most common related to the lack of language proficiency among those who ran the School[...] They felt at a disadvantage, and often diminished[...]

Subsequently, they will have to take the rest of their training at the CTC Artillery School, CFB Gagetown, in similar conditions to those experienced by trainees at the Armour School. [In the] support battery, [...] French-English representation is close to the national average[...] [but] as at *5 RALC* at *5 GBC*, representation is not equal at all

ranks[...] None of the officers are Francophones and only one is at all bilingual or shows even a moderate knowledge of the second language.

Most of those questioned in the regiment state that after reaching the rank of sergeant, it is essential to learn English terminology or otherwise face a limited career in the artillery. To avoid this trap, greater bilingualism must first be promoted among Anglophones, and then Francophones must be given an opportunity to work in troops where French must be used.

### **Military and field engineering**

Even if courses were available in French for officers who had chosen military engineering, no course would be given in French because the Military Engineering School at CFB Chilliwack, BC, has no resources available for this, not even tutorial assistance. Some trainees have expressed a wish to have tests in bilingual format[...]

For non-commissioned members, a distinction must be drawn between support trades such as field engineer and service trades such as water and sanitation technician. Let us examine the situation in the field engineer trade. TQ 3 and TQ 5 training is available and given in French. These courses are offered at the Engineering School, CFB Chilliwack. With scarcely more Francophones than CFB Shilo, Chilliwack poses problems for Francophone teachers and trainees similar to those listed above: terminology, translation, documentation and services are available in limited quantities, if at all.

The reality is fairly harsh for Francophones who have chosen a support trade for which training is provided at the Engineering School. It is a real bastion of English. Nothing is available in French at the TQ 3 and TQ 5 levels. Furthermore, Francophone instructors have to teach trainees in English even though some students know very little of that language[...]. Once a lesson is over, the Francophone instructor must give tutorial assistance to young trainees who demand it, as they have not understood what they were taught in English[...], the same Francophone instructors are sometimes forced to explain to someone in their cultural group that poor knowledge of their second language prevents them from continuing their training in the trade. The trainee is then shunted onto the sidelines until a solution is found. In earlier years, they were sent to the infantry [...].

This means that in order to take basic training in some trades, candidates must go to a language school, lose a year in their career and run the risk of being rejected. To speak plainly, an English-speaking citizen of Canada can enter the military if he or she shows an interest and an ability to learn a given trade. A French-speaking citizen of Canada must also show an interest and an ability to learn a given trade and in addition must be able to learn a second language, since the majority must know English in order to continue their training.

This does not happen only at the Engineering School in CFB Chilliwack. It is also the case at CFB Borden for vehicle technicians, medical assistants and so forth.

At this stage, we must ask how the law would solve this problem if the Human Rights Commission had to study these cases in light of the *Canadian Charter of Human Rights*.

There is a long way to go to alleviate the difficulties, and treat Francophone members fairly when they take their training. The problems raised here come from only one area of training, combat arms, the area which is doing the most for Francophones in the Forces.

## APPENDIX P

### LIST OF CFAOs RELATING TO OR AFFECTED BY OFFICIAL LANGUAGES PROGRAMS

CFAO NUMBERS	CFAO TITLES
2-14	Translation, Terminology and Interpretation Services
2-15	Official Languages
9-21	Canadian Forces Language Training, Qualifications and Testing — Official languages
9-53	Instruction in the language of choice (ILC) (Francotrain)
19-25	Summary Trials
19-28	Information Function
36-39	Signs and Markings in the Canadian Forces
53-14	Audio Visual Services
54-1	Education of Children — Overseas
54-3	Education of dependants — Availability of educational facilities
54-5	Education of Children — Canada
57-5	Unofficial Service Newspapers
57-12	Publication Management Policy
61-11	Bilingual Ceremonial Programs
111-1	Courts Martial — Administration and Procedure





## **APPENDIX Q**

### **CFAO 36-39 — 8 AUGUST 1986 SIGNS AND MARKINGS IN THE CANADIAN FORCES**

#### **PURPOSE**

1. This order outlines the policy for signs and markings in the Canadian Forces, in Canada and abroad, in conformity with the Official Languages Act and the complementary Federal Identity Program.

#### **COMPLEMENTARY ORDERS AND PUBLICATIONS**

2. Supplementary instructions are contained in:
- a. CFAO 2-14, Translation, Terminology and Interpretation Services; and
  - b. CFAO 2-15, Official Languages.

#### **DEFINITIONS**

3. In this order:

- markings means the lettering affixed directly to equipment, eg, aircraft, vehicles and materiel.
- sign means any temporary or permanent lettered board or other display used to identify personnel, offices, buildings, property, or roads, or to provide direction or information.

#### **APPLICATION**

4. The Official Languages Act provides that English and French languages enjoy equal status in all respects. Therefore, the two official languages shall be visually presented with equal prominence, ie, in exactly the same colors and with identical style, size, and weight of type.

#### **PRECEDENCE**

5. Precedence of language on signs and markings shall be determined by the official language of the majority of the population of the province or territory where they will be displayed. Thus, French shall have precedence in Quebec and English in the other provinces and territories. The order of precedence shall be left to right on horizontal arrangements and from top to bottom on vertical arrangements. Single language markings on opposite sides of equipment are not permitted. On equipment that will be

displayed internationally, such as aircraft, the English markings shall be given precedence.

#### OFFICIAL VERSION

6. Proper grammar in both languages shall be the criterion governing the use of words on signs and markings. NDHQIDTTC (Director Translation and Terminology Coordination) will provide the official translations of signs and markings as required (refer to CFAO 2-14).

#### CATEGORIES

7. For ease of reference all Canadian Forces signs and markings will belong generally to one or more of the following categories:

- a. official signs;
- b. common use signs (labels on materiel included);
- c. operational signs and markings;
- d. commemorative signs; and
- e. temporary signs.

#### OFFICIAL SIGNS

8. Official signs are those that are permanent in nature, on or adjacent to a building, property or base entrance. In this context “building” means a headquarters, hospital, depot, hangar, living quarters, air movements unit, base exchange, recreation centre, etc.

9. If a unit title has not been translated, its unit name signs shall be in unilingual format. However, a building identified by a unilingual unit name sign and not otherwise readily identifiable as belonging to DND shall also be marked with a bilingual official sign identifying it as a DND building.

#### COMMON USE SIGNS

10. Common use signs or labels are those of an informative or directive nature, used for stairs, elevators, fire equipment, exits, canteens, rest rooms, traffic signs, safety signs, box or crate content labels, etc. Where provincial laws allow, international traffic symbol signs are acceptable in lieu of bilingual signs.

## **OPERATIONAL SIGNS AND MARKINGS**

11. Operational signs provide identification associated with the operation of any building, unit, base, formation, equipment, etc, such as a building directory, field headquarters, unit locations, appointment board, and office and room identification. Operational markings identify aircraft, watercraft, vehicles and equipment.

## **COMMEMORATIVE SIGNS**

12. Commemorative signs are those that commemorate individuals, units, places, happenings, occasions, etc.

## **TEMPORARY SIGNS**

13. Temporary signs are those signs of a non-permanent nature such as those used in construction projects, tented camps, displays, exhibitions, and sports days.

## **GRAPHIC SYMBOLS**

14. The use of standardized graphic symbols is encouraged. Where these symbols are practicable, they are preferred to bilingual signs and markings.

## **RESPONSIBILITY**

15. Specific responsibilities for bilingual signs and markings are designated as follows:

- a. The officer commanding a command is responsible for overall supervision of signs and markings within the command, ensuring that the bilingual nature of Canada is reflected throughout the command by display of appropriate signs and markings according to the provisions of this order.
- b. Base and station commanders are responsible for maintaining a high standard of signs and markings in their areas of responsibility, and ensuring all such signs and markings conform to this order.

## **IMPLEMENTATION**

16. This order shall be implemented as follows:

- a. All signs and markings shall conform to this order.
- b. Foreign manufacturers or suppliers of equipment shall be encouraged to comply with the intent of this order when providing material to DND. To this end, contracting authorities should ensure that a standard clause clearly stating the requirement for all suppliers to provide “signs and markings” in

both official languages for all equipment purchased or leased on a medium or long-term basis is included in all contracts. (Treasury Board guidelines govern contracting with civilian agencies.)

- c. In exceptional circumstances, where the implementation of this order is manifestly impractical or unreasonable, ie, existing carved stone inscriptions on memorials or engraved raised lettering on existing cast metal plaques, the existing unilingual version may be acceptable. On equipment that is too small for both languages, the use of symbols standardized within DND or with outside agencies (CSA — Canadian Standards Association, CGSB — Canadian General Standards Board) will be the accepted norm.

## APPENDIX R

### OFFICIAL LANGUAGES PLAN (CIVILIAN) OBJECTIVE 3 APRIL 1979

To ensure that the Department achieves an equitable participation of both official language groups, protects their linguistic rights, and reflects their cultural values.

Goal	Activities
The Department will strive towards attaining by 1983, a balanced representation of both official languages groups in proportion to their distribution in the regions. (Annex A to this section contains the percentages by regions as well as the percentages at each DND establishment.)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1.1 DGCIVP [Director General Civilian Personnel] in concert with the regional directors and responsible managers will strive for an equitable participation of both official languages groups, based on their proportional representation in the regions. (For equitable participation details see Annex A to this section.)</li><li>1.2 DGCIVP will evaluate the impact of attrition on equitable participation by utilizing present studies and conducting others as required.</li><li>1.3 As positions become vacant in the NCR and in bilingual regions, the Department will re-assess the language requirements of these positions in order to enhance participation of both official languages groups ie, creating unilingual positions, either/or positions, imperative staffing, transfers etc.</li><li>1.4 In the NCR and in bilingual regions DND through commands, groups, and responsible managers, will gradually modify the identification of its unilingual positions to ensure an equitable</li></ol>

representation of minority  
linguistic groups.

- 1.5 The Special Assignment Pay Plan (SAPP), the Career Assignment Program (CAP) and any other special training program will continue to be utilized to promote francophone and anglophone participation.

# Notes





## Chapter 9

1. Letter from Chassé to Allard (in French) accompanying the draft, 10 June 1969. 1211-1 (DIBP) in the Letellier Papers (DG Hist, 90/444), file 1211-0, vol. I, *Bilingualism Policy* (hereinafter *Bil. Pol.*, vol. I).

2. DG Hist, DCM 274, 9 September 1969 and chapter 8 of vol. I, p. 238.

3. DG Hist, 73/1223, file 1117, F.R. Sharp (CDS) to the CP, 16 September 1969. 4. DG Hist, 90/444, op. cit., Chassé to the CP, 2 October 1969.

5. The CP passed this on to the CDS on 14 September. The Defence Council received it on the 17<sup>th</sup>. On the 23<sup>rd</sup>, the DGDEP, who headed the advisory committee, received a copy. The CP's civilian assistant had received it on 10 October. Circulation of the document can be traced in *ibid.* and DG Hist, 90/444, file 1211-0, vol. II, *Bilingualism and Biculturalism*. Changes that took place in the various versions can also be seen.

6. DG Hist, DCM 282, 17 December 1969.

7. DG Hist, 73/1223, file 1117, Sharp to the CP, 30 December 1969.

8. NDRMS, 1211-0, vol. 6.

9. DG Hist, 90/444, file 1211-0, vol. II. Memo from LCol C. Tousignant, Director of Public Relations/Chief of Defence Staff (DPR/CDS), to the CDS, 26 January 1970.

10. *Ibid.*, 51211-0 (CDS) to the DM. 11. *Ibid.*

12. *Ibid.* Sharp's interest in the Canadian presence at Colorado Springs can be explained in part by the fact that he was Assistant Commander in Chief of NORAD from January 1969 until his return to Ottawa as CDS the following September.

13. *Ibid.*

14. DG Hist, 90/444, file P1211-1, vol. II, DIBP to the DGEP, 15 December 1969.

15. DG Hist, 90/444, file 1211-0, vol. II. Armstrong to Macdonald, 15 December 1969.

16. *Ibid.* Chassé to the Advisory Committee on Bilingualism (DND/ABB), 15 January 1970.

17. Ibid., Armstrong to Robertson, 29 January 1970.
18. DG Hist, 90/444, file 1211-0, vol. III, J.R. Chisholm, Secretary of Defence, to the Associate Deputy Minister (Materiel) on 27 February. Along with this memo from Chisholm to Morry are the four Privy Council documents.
19. DG Hist, 90/444, file P1211-1, vol. H, *Bilingualism and Biculturalism*.
20. Ibid. 1211-0 vol. II, op. cit.
21. Ibid. Cabinet Memorandum sent to Defence, dated 16 April 1970.
22. DG Hist, 90/444, S1211-1, vol. III, memo 51211-1, Director Policy Control and Coordination/CDS (DPCC/CDS), Col A.C. Bowes to the secretaries of the major branches of the Department, 30 June 1970.
23. *House of Commons Debates*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Session, 28<sup>th</sup> Parliament, vol. VIII, Ottawa, 1970, pp. 8487-8489.
24. NDRMS, 1901-203/009, 25 May 1970.
25. DG Hist, 90/444, 1211-0, vol. II, op. cit., Message BPA/CP-2, 3 March 1970.
26. NDRMS, 1211-0, vol. 6. Moreover, Turcot showed his annoyance at not being consulted, contrary to what he had been given to understand. No doubt as the highest ranking Francophone in the CAF he felt responsible for these matters, as had Bernatchez and Allard before him (Allard, *Memoirs*, p. 343 and others).
27. DG Hist, 90/444, op. cit., BPA/CP to the DCPRM, 11 March 1970.
28. Ibid.
29. These developments can be followed DG Hist, 73/1223, file 1119 and file 1120 or in NDRMS files 1211-0, vol. 6 or in DG Hist, 90/444, file 1211-0, vol. II, III and IV.
30. DG Hist, DCM 301, 21 December 1970.
31. *House of Commons Debates*, 3<sup>rd</sup> Session, 28<sup>th</sup> Parliament, vol. IV, Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971, pp. 3781 to 3783.
32. NDRMS, 1211-0, vol. 6 and ss2a of Appendix C.
33. DG Hist, 90/444, file 1211-0, vol. II, memo from BPA/CP to the CP, 24 April 1970 and to the DCPRM on 30 April.

34. DG Hist, 73/1223, file 1119. Letter signed by Major-General Dare for the CDS, 16 September 1970.
35. DG Hist, 90/444, file 1211-1, vol. II. Comments from the CDEE on the B & B program, dated 16 October 1970.
36. *Ibid.*, file 1211-1, vol. III. *Comments raised by Commands and CDEE on the Proposed Program on ...*, 26 October 1970.
37. See DG Hist, 90/444, file 1211-0, vol. III for various documents related to the 4 November meeting, including decisions reached.
38. DG Hist, DCM 301, 21 December 1970.
39. DG Hist, 90/444, file 1211-1, vol. III. Remarks from Chassé on the comments from MARCOM, 22 October 1970.
40. See Chassé's letter to R.H. Snidal, Director General Policy Development and Review, dated 15 June in DG Hist, 90/444, file 1211-1, vol. III.
41. DG Hist, DCM 301, 21 December 1970.
42. Armand Letellier, *DND Language Reform: Staffing the Bilingualism Program 1967-1977* (Ottawa: DND, 1987) pp. 69 ff. (hereinafter *Reform*).
43. CDS to the Minister, 21 July 1971, "*Status Report on Bilingualism and Biculturalism in the Canadian Armed Forces*". DG Hist, 73/1223, file 1120). Note: the CP had been asked to begin on 1 April 1971 to produce these reports on the program implemented in February 1971 (CDS to the CP, 15 January 1971. DG Hist, 73/1223, file 1120).
44. NDRMS, 1901-40/80, vol. 2, Message NDHQ PEC/OL, 17 October 1978.
45. The reader can follow the comings and goings of staff by consulting the 1971 quarterly reports from DGBB. They are collected in the DG Hist, 90/444, in the file *Reports and Returns — General*, vol. 1, (hereinafter *R & R*).
46. Treasury Board Circular 1971-21, 9 March 1971 in DG Hist, 90/444, *Costing and Funding B & B Programmes*, vol. II.
47. Defence Management Committee minutes, 3<sup>rd</sup> meeting, 29 November 1987. See also letter from Minister Donald Macdonald to the CDS, 25 June 1971, in DG Hist, 73/1223, file 1120.
48. DG Hist, 90/444, file 1211-0, vol. III, CP Directive 42/71 signed by Lieutenant-General J. Dextraze, 8 March 1971.

49. Ibid., memo from Commodore R.H. Falls, Assistant CP (Mil), 22 March 1971.
50. Ibid., Message CDS 52, 16 March 1971, sent to the large units and Commands asking them to delete two (sic) words in the first line of subsection 2f of the implementation plan in English. “The plan for designating 28 percent [of the positions] of the Force structure...”
51. Ibid., 24 March 1971 memorandum to those who attended the meeting on the 23<sup>rd</sup> from Fournier, acting DGBB.
52. DG Hist, 90/444, *R & R*, vol. I, op. cit. Prepared by the DGBB, the report was sent through the usual channels to the CP on 30 March 1971. It did not reach the Minister until 26 April, after going to the Deputy Minister.
53. DG Hist, 73/1223, file 1119, vol. III, CDS to the CP, 1 September 1970.
54. DG Hist, 90/444, file 1211-0, vol. III, Pollard to the CP (Dextraze), 7 June 1971.
55. DG Hist, 73/1223, file 1120, status report (1 April to 30 June 1971), dated 21 July (from the CDS to the Minister, via the Deputy Minister).
56. Ibid., Macdonald to Sharp, 25 June 1971.
57. DG Hist, 90/444, file 1211-0, vol. 111, Commodore Falls, DCP (Mil) to the CG, 23 July 1971. The memo was written by the DGBB for Falls’s signature.
58. Ibid. Pollard to the CP, 10 August 1971.
59. Ibid. Leteffier to the A/DGBB and the DBPR, 16 August 1971.
60. NDRMS, 1211-14-3, vol. 2, Letellier to Falls, 18 August 1971.
61. Ibid, and DO Hist, 90/444, file 1211-11-3, *French Language Units, vol. I* (hereinafter *FLUs-I*).
62. Ibid., Letellier to Falls, 18 August 1971.
63. DG Hist, 90/444, file 1211-0 vol. III, Dextraze to the CG, 24 August 1971.
64. Ibid., *FLUs* file, op. cit., Letellier to the A/CG, 21 September 1971.
65. Ibid., file 10 — *Annotations of Positions — 2 — Bilingual*, (hereinafter *A of P*), DOOM situational report on these activities, 8 September 1971.
66. DO Hist, 73/1223, file 1120. See notes from the AIDPCC/CDS to the Sec. CP, 24 September and 8 October 1971.

67. DG Hist, 90/444, file 160-8, *Reports B & B — I General* (hereinafter 160-8). Cloutier to Johnston, 1 October 1971.

68. Ibid., file P1211-11-3, *French Language Units — Vol. II*, (hereinafter *FL Us-2*). Cloutier to ADM(M) and DCP (Mil).

69. Ibid., file 1211-1, vol. III. Memorandum to the CP.

70. Ibid., discussions between the CP and the CG on 72/28, 27 October 1971.

71. DG Hist, 73/1223, file 1120. CDS Advisory Committee 19/71, 17 November 1971.

72. Ibid., Minutes of 3<sup>rd</sup> meeting of the Defence Management Committee, 29 November 1971. We note that they had begun to refer to the units that were to be neither French nor English language units as National Units. The question of placing some Francophones outside of FLUs arose very quickly. In October 1970, Air Transport Command had suggested that in its case Francophones be concentrated as far as possible in Ottawa and Edmonton. Bringing them together in this way would mean that the whole system could better provide them with services in their own language. But in the fall of 1970 there was still no official name for this type of unit. (90/444, 1211-1, vol. III, MGen A.E. Hull to NDHQ, 7 October 1970).

73. CDS Advisory Committee 1971, op. cit.

74. NDRMS, 1211-14-3, vol. 3 or in 1211-0, vol. 7. DM to the CG, Vice-Admiral H.A. Porter, 14 December 1971. Cloutier followed these modifications closely, as can be seen in these two files.

75. DG Hist, DCM 322, 10 April 1972.

76. DG Hist, 90/444, file 60 — *Colleges — B and B in the CMCs — Vol. 1 — General*, (hereinafter *CMCs*). CP Directive 70/71, 12 November 1971, signed by Major-General Laubman for Lieutenant-General Dextraze, CP.

77. Letellier, *Reform*, p. 77.

78. Ibid., p. 87.

79. As recalled by S. Bernier, who had inside experience of this period.

80. The reader will remember that on this same date the DGBB and several officers from the CG were appearing before the CDS Advisory Committee to defend a new series of criteria concerning 72/28. No one was idle.

81. Letellier, *Reform*, pp. 91-110.

82. Ibid., p. 42.

83. DG Hist, 90/444, file 20-2, vol. I — 20 — *B and B — 2 — Plans and Programs* (hereinafter *Plans & Prog.*). Memo from the DGBB to DCP (Mil) Laubman, 15 December 1971, written by Lieutenant-Colonel C. Tousignant.

84. Report of this meeting in DG Hist, 73/1223, file 1120.

85. DG Hist, 90/444, *Plans & Prog.*, minutes of the 6<sup>th</sup> meeting of the Committee and the B & B documents discussed.

86. DG Hist, DCM 322, 10 April 1972.

87. Letellier, *Reform*, p. 107.

88. DG Hist, DCM 322, 10 April 1972 and *Reform*, pp. 107-8.

89. DG Hist, DCM 322, 10 April 1972 and authors' archives, *Program to Increase Bilingualism and Biculturalism in the Canadian Armed Forces* (hereinafter *Program to Increase B & B*).

90. Ibid.

91. DG Hist, 90/444, file 70 — *Costing and Funding B & B Programmes — Vol. II* and 68 — *Base Development St-Jean, Vol. I*. Both these files contain the letter of approval and the amendments with which, Kroeger wrote, their experts were already familiar.

92. DG Hist, 90/444, *R & R*, op. cit. Report on bilingualism situation, 20 January 1971, prepared by the DGBB. Also in this file is a copy of the report prepared in the summer of 1970 which was rejected. In DG Hist, 90/444 file 1211-1, vol. II, there is the 18 June 1970 Cabinet request and the initial response that was deemed unsatisfactory.

93. Ibid., letter from Armstrong to the Minister accompanying the report, 29 January 1971.

94. Ibid., memo from Col Bowes to the SSO CP, 15 March 1971. 95. Ibid.

96. DG Hist, 90/444, file 1211-0, vol. III, memo from Fournier, acting DGBB, to all OPIs.

97. DG Hist, 90/444, file 1211-1, vol. III.

98. Ibid., document 1211-1 (DGBB), 28 September 1971 and as recalled by S. Bernier.

99. See contents of this 16 September 1971 item (no. 6.8) in DG Hist, 90/444, R & R, vol. I.

100. For more information on the atmosphere at the time and a summary, see Letellier, *Reform*, pp. 73 and 90. Documents concerning the meeting are in NDRMS, D1211-0, vol. 7, and DG Hist, 90/444, file 1211-1, vol. III and *R & R*, vol. 1.

101. See the excellent study by Major-General E.R. Loomis, DC, *The Impact of Integration, Unification and Restructuring of the Functions and Structure of the National Defence Headquarters*. (A Supporting Paper to NDHQ Study 51/85 report) (Ottawa: DND, 1985).

102. DG Hist, 90/444, file 1211-0, vol. III, Treasury Board Circular 171-21, signed by A.W. Johnson, 15 March 1971.

103. Ibid., file 1211-1, vol. III, Treasury Board Circular 1971-112, 25 August 1971, signed by A.W. Johnson.

104. Ibid., file 70 — *Costing and Funding B & B Programmes — vol. II*. This contains the questionnaire, responses and various comments from DGBB staff involved.

105. Ibid., file D1211-10-1, *Reports and Returns — General, vol. II* (hereinafter *R & R, vol. II*). Memo from Roland Morency to H.B. Seriglinton, Director Research and Planning Branch at Treasury Board, 3 December 1971.

106. Relevant correspondence is found in *ibid.*, file 1211-0, vol. III. Memorandum to Cabinet signed by Gérard Pelletier and Robert Andras, 5 April 1971; the May 3 memo from Morry to the CP and the reply prepared by Fournier for the CP's signature two days later.

107. Ibid., file 1211-1, vol III, memo from Letellier to the DBPR, dated 9 September 1971.

108. NDRMS, D1211-14-3, vol. 2. Adamson to the VCDS, 16 November 1971.

109. Letellier, *Reform*, p. 222-3. See also at DG Hist the Pariseau Papers, 84/331, vol. 107 which contains ADM(Per) Instruction 15/76 headed "The Primary Reserve (P Res) — Bilingualism and Biculturalism Guidelines".

110. *Official Languages Plan (Military)*, 1980, [hereinafter *OLP(M)*] in the Pariseau Papers, 84/331, vol. 4, Directorate of History.

111. NDHQ Directive D3, dated 20 February 1973, is very clear on this matter. The DGBB then reported to the ADM (Personnel), formerly the CP.

112. Letellier, *Reform*, pp. 228-234. M. Letellier's military and civilian career was to end on this unfortunate note on 7 November 1977.

113. NDRMS, 1211-9, vol. 6. Nixon to Spicer, 29 July 1977.

114. Ibid., LGen K.E. Lewis, DCDS, to the DM, 2 August 1977; Lieutenant-General K. E. Lewis, DCDS, to the DM, 2 August, 1977; Major-General W.G. Leach, Surgeon General, to the DGBB, 5 August 1977; L.E. Davies, ADM(Fin), to the DM, 5 August 1977; Lieutenant-General R.M. Withers, VCDS, to DM, 8 August 1977; Colonel A. E. Beaupré, Assistant Judge Advocate General/Judge Advocate in Chief JAGA/JAC to the DGBB, 8 August 1977; Lieutenant-Colonel A. Taschereau, DLT, to the DGBB, 8 August 1977; J. R. Killick, Chief Supply, to the DM, 8 August 1977; Colonel J.G. Boulet, A/DG Info, to the DM, 9 August 1977; Brigadier General D.R. Baker, A/CPD, to the DGBB, 9 August 1977, Brigadier-General C.J. Gauthier, Director General Departmental Administrative Services (DGDAS), to the DM, 9 August 1977; Brigadier-General J.B. Tucker, Director General Personnel Services (DGPS), to the DGBB, 11 August 1977; J.R. Morin, DGDEP, to the DGBB, 12 August 1977; and G.A. Sullivan, PEC/BB, to the ADM(Per), 16 August 1977.

115. Authors' archives. Letter from Lieutenant-General James C. Smith, ADM(Per), to his colleagues at NDHQ and to generals and commanding officers, 12 September 1979.

116. Ibid. Yalden to Nixon, 13 July 1979.

117. Ibid., ADM(Per) Smith, 12 September 1979, op. cit.

118. Official Languages Commission — Special studies. *Special Study — Department of National Defence*, Ottawa, December 1977, p. 11, recommendation no. 2a (hereinafter *OLC 1977*). Recommendation no. 1 was in the same vein. The section headed Summary and Conclusions (p. 2) stated these recommendations.

119. Ibid., recommendation no. 3.

120. NDRMS, 1211-9, vol. 7, Pitfield to Nixon, 6 April 1979.

121. NDRMS, 1214-25, vol. I. Memo from Smith to Lewis, 10 February 1978. 122. Ibid., Lewis to Smith, 16 February 1978.

123. FMC 1211-0, vol. 8. Letter from Smith, ADM(Per), to commands, 26 September 1978.



124. In the *OLP(M)*, published in June 1980, a chapter was devoted to each command: Chapter 8, Maritime Command; Chapter 9, Mobile Command; Chapter 10, Air Command; Chapter 11, Canadian Forces Europe; Chapter 12, Communication Command; Chapter 13, Canadian Forces Training System.

125. Minutes of the DGOUCCOL/RCOL meeting on June 26 and 27 in 1214-25, vol. I, DGOL office file.

126. Ibid.

127. FMC 1211-0, vol. II. Minutes of the Defence Management Committee's 294<sup>th</sup> meeting, held on 12 April 1979 (hereinafter DMC, 12 April 1979). The DGOL's April 12 presentation gave a good, though brief, summary of what had occurred on the previous 16 and 19 January before the same group.

128. Ibid. The text was in English for the oral presentation and in French in *OLP(M)*, p. 1-1, op. cit.

129. *OLP(M)*, op. cit.

130. In English in the minutes of the 12 April 1979 meeting (op. cit.) and in French in *OLP(M)*, p. 1-2.

131. A 25 July 1974 CDS directive authorized this change based on the Census. Cited in *OLP(M)*, p. 2-5-2.

132. Minutes of the 12 April 1979 meeting, op. cit. 133. Ibid.

134. Ibid.

135. FMC, 1211-0, vol. 12. Letter to commands from Admiral R.H. Falls, 19 March 1980.

136. Ibid.

137. Authors' archives. TB 4510-20/N252, 11 March 1982.

138. Authors' archives. FMC 1211-13(Adm.) Letter from Dabros to Sullivan, 8 July 1982.

139. Authors' archives, circular 1982-65.

140. *Official Languages Annual Plan, 1983-1984*. Section I: Military. Department of National Defence, 31 March 1983, 43 pages in the English version (hereinafter *Plan 83-84*).

141. CFTS HQ (Trenton), file *Bil. Gen.*, 1211-1, vol. 14. Letter from ADM(Per) dated 7 July 1983.

142. *Plan 83-84*, op. cit., p. 27.

143. *Ibid.*, p. 26.

144. Authors' archives. Letter from Lieutenant-General Manson, ADM(Per), to major branches at NDHQ, Ottawa, 12 March 1986 [1211-0 ADM(Per)].

145. *Ibid.*

146. *Ibid.*, minutes of the DMC's 393<sup>rd</sup> meeting, 31 August 1987.

147. *Ibid.*, "Official Languages Policy", *Personnel Newsletter* no. 7/87, pp. 1 and 2, signed by both the Chief of the Defence Staff and the Deputy Minister of Defence.

148. *Ibid.*, Beatty to Fortier, 7 December 1987.

## Chapter 10

1. CFOO 3.0, subsection 5, 1 May 1982.
2. DG Hist, 90/444, file 1211-0, vol. 11. Instruction from Laubman to his units, 16 September 1969.
3. Ibid., file 1211-0, vol. I, Chassé to the CP, 15 September 1969.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., file 1211-1, vol. II, Rear-Admiral M.A. Porter to NDHQ, 19 October 1970.
6. FMC No. 26 (hereinafter No. 26). Memorandum from Lieutenant-Colonel B.V. Genge (for the CDS), S1211-0 (DPCC/CDS), 30 December 1970.
7. Ibid., DMRE 1008, 261400Z Jan 71, *CHQ Estb — Bilingual and Bicultural Program*. Message to CANDEFCON, CANLIFCOM, CANFOREUR, CANMARCOM, CANMOBCOM AND CANTRAINCON.
8. DG Hist, 90/444, file 1211-0, vol. III. Message from MARCOM, RCEOC 163, dated 28 January 1971, to the Directorate of Manpower Requirements and Establishments (DMRE) in Ottawa.
9. Ibid., Memo from DCBB to the Directorate of Manpower Distribution and Control (DMDC) which approved the request from Halifax. This approval was then sent to Halifax.
10. No. 26, CANFORCEHED to CANMOBCOM, 011400Z Mar 71.
11. Ibid., COMP 8028 — 151630Z Feb 71, FMC to CANFORCEHED.
12. DG Hist, 90/444, file 1211-0, vol. III. Message Svcs 8104 from Mobile Command to NDHQ, 17 February 1971. One of the reasons mentioned was that this position would become in English the Senior Staff Officer B and B, or SSOBB. Jokes were made about this abbreviation.
13. Ibid., file P1211-14, which contains the agenda for this meeting.
14. Ibid., *R & R*, vol. 1, report from the CDS to the Deputy Minister, 26 April 1971.
15. *Program to Increase B & B*, op. cit., p. 23 (Activities 009 and 010) and Appendix F.

16. Memorandum FMC 1211-1 (CCB and B) signed by Brigadier-General James C. Smith, sent to Mobile Command bases, 23 January 1974. Taken from file 8 of CCBB of FMC.

17. Commissioner of Official Languages. *Second Annual Report, 1971-1972*, Ottawa, Information Canada, 1973, p. 192.

18. DG Hist, 90/444, file 160-8, DGBB report on a visit to Gagetown dated simply "March 1973".

19. *Brief for Base Commander*, prepared by Major Pinault, 1 June 1978, in the Official Languages 1976-1981 file at CFTS Trenton.

20. DG Hist, 90/444, file 160-8, DGBB report, March 1973, op. cit.

21. *COL 1977*, op. cit., pp. 26 and 27.

22. *Ibid.*, pp. 14 and 15.

23. Message PEC/OL 32, 17 October 1978, from Mobile Command HQ to its units.

24. Chapter 9 of *OLP(M)* deals with Mobile Command. See in FMC 1211-0, vol. 9, the report Ouimet made to his superior on a CCOL-DGOL meeting held in Ottawa on 13 and 14 December 1978; the other CCOLs, impressed by Mobile Command's plan, of which they had been given a copy, stated that they intended to copy it. See also the minutes of this meeting in 1214-25, vol. 1, a file kept by DGOL which confirms Ouimet's above mentioned report and what he wrote in "Aide-memoire for Mr. Belzile and Mrs. Montgéraud" (October 1982) found during a search at Mobile Command from 15 to 17 February 1984 (hereinafter Aide-memoire).

25. DMC, 12 April 1979, op. cit.

26. See, for example, minutes of the DGOL-CCOL and RCOL meeting, held in Ottawa on 26 and 27 June 1979, in 1214-25, vol. 1. DGOL kindly allowed us to consult this file, which it still has.

27. Commissioner of Official Languages report, *Language Audit, National Defence, The System of Official Languages Co-ordinators*. Ottawa, May 1984, pp. 1 and 2 (hereinafter *Language Audit*).

28. *Ibid.* pp. 3 and 4.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 6.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 8.

31. Appendix D of the minutes of the Official Languages Coordinating Committee, 1 May 1980, DGOL file 1214-25, vol. 1
32. This matter can be followed in, among others, file 1211-1, vol. 8, *Bilingualism — General*, at Training System HQ, Trenton.
33. Ibid., vol. 9. Message COMDT 23, 27 November 1980, (Training System, NDHQ).
34. Annotation handwritten by Major P.J. Aubin, Official Languages Co-ordinator at Training System, on *Language Audit*, 31 August 1984.
35. COL. *Language Audit*, p. 19.
36. DG Hist, 90/444, file 168-8, report by Letellier, March 1973, op. cit.
37. Mobile Command file FMC 1211-1, vol. 6, ECP-FMC 83/73, CFB Gagetown, 12 April 1973.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid., Saulnier to the COS ADM, 23 November 1973.
40. FMC 1211-1, vol. 8. Letter from Smith headed “Establishment of Permanent Base Positions for B & B Support”.
41. Aide-memoire, op. cit., p. 1.
42. See undated, unsigned note which no doubt came from Ouimet reviewing the events surrounding the B & B affair at Petawawa between April 1977 and August 1979 (*Pilot Project — Official Languages — Response Cell — CFB Petawawa* in FMC 1211-0, vol. II. File held at Saint-Hubert). Hereinafter *Pilot Project*.
43. Ibid.
44. Aide-memoire, p. 1.
45. Ibid.
46. Minutes of the meeting in DGOL file 1214-25, vol. 1. See also Aide-memoire, p. 2.
47. FMC 1211-0, vol. 8. Memo of 29 August 1978 from the A/COS Adm headed “B & B Coordinator Pilot Project — CFB Petawawa. (Written by Lieutenant-Colonel J.M.G. Ouimet.)

48. Aide-memoire and *Pilot Project*.
49. FMC 1211-0, vol. 8 (letter and plan in English) or vol. 9 (letter and plan in French).
50. FMC 1211-0, vol. II. ADM(Per) Lieutenant-General James C. Smith to Lieutenant-General J.J. Paradis, Commander of Mobile Command.
51. Aide-memoire, p. 2. Also p. 2 of *Pilot Project* which mentions Message D Comd 47 of 6 March 1979 sent to Smith by Mobile Command.
52. DMC, 12 April 1979, op. cit.
53. FMC 1211-0, vol. II. The letter, written by Ouimet in his direct and none too diplomatic style, was signed as it was by Paradis, who thus approved its terms. See also Aide-memoire, p. 2 and 1211-0, vol. H in Mobile Command's files, where there is a note from Ouimet to his superior, dated 7 May, suggesting the following to him. The DGOL was to visit Saint-Hubert on 14 May. The Commander should ask him for a firm commitment concerning the 19 posts FMC wanted. If the DGOL refused, the letter suggested that FMC withdraw its support for the Official Languages Plan (Military); NDHQ should realize that FMC could not do everything on its own.
54. Minutes of this meeting in DGOL file 1214-25, vol. 1, op. cit.
55. FMC 1211-0, vol. II. Letter from Smith to Paradis.
56. Ibid., Paradis to Smith. See also Aide-memoire, p. 2.
57. Authors' archives., letter from Yalden to Nixon, 13 July 1979, op. cit.
58. FMC 1211-0, vol II, Smith to Paradis.
59. Authors' archives., letter from the CDS dated 19 March 1980, headed "Authority for Implementation — Military and Civilian Official Languages Plans".
60. FMC, 1211-0, vol. II.
61. Aide-memoire, p. 2.
62. *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and of the House of Commons on Official Languages*, Issue 26, 19 November 1981, p. 51 (hereinafter *Joint Committee, 19 November 1981*).
63. Ibid.

64. Aide-memoire, p. 4.

65. At the time the Minister of Defence visited Calgary between 7 and 10 October 1980, rapid translations were made on cardboard of various signs that up to that time had been in English only. This was done only in areas and buildings the Minister was supposed to visit. Some time later the CDS also came to Calgary. After these visits, the temporary signs were taken down. (Account of a Francophone former officer who was there at the time and was on the committee organizing the visit). Let us hope that they have since been replaced by permanent signs.

## Chapter 11

1. *COL 1977*, p. 198.
2. As recalled by one of the authors, Captain Bernier, who was working at the DGBB at the time. We do not recall any statistical study — and have found none in the archives — determining that this fraction of 13% was a valid figure for those who would choose French.
3. DG Hist, 90/444, file 1211-1, vol III. Rear-Admiral H.A. Porter to NDHQ, 10 October 1970.
4. *Ibid.* Chassé's remarks on MARCOM's comments, 22 October 1970.
5. *Ibid.*, file P1211-1, vol. II, *Bilingualism and Biculturalism*, containing Osly's letter.
6. *Ibid.*, file P1211-1, vol. III. Commodore D.L. Hanington, for the CDEE, Major-General W.A. Milroy, 16 October 1970. We note that Hanington also disagrees with setting a percentage of Francophones to be reached, because this proportion fluctuated. Doubtless he forgot that the principle of justice underlying the program automatically included a corrective measure for percentages if the situation called for it.
7. *Ibid.*, Chassé's 22 October 1970 remarks on the CDEE's comments.
8. *Ibid.*, Lipton's comments on the draft, 5 October 1970.
9. *Ibid.*, comments by Major-General A.C. Hull, 7 October 1970.
10. *Ibid.*, comments by Brigadier-General R.M. Withers, Northern Region Headquarters, 2 October 1970.
11. *Ibid.* Message Comd CFE 58, 19 October 1970.
12. Granatstein, J.L., *Canada 1957-1967. The Years of Uncertainty and Innovation*. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1986), p. 259. (Lalonde to Pearson, 5 December 1967; Granatstein took this quotation from Pearson's archives.)
13. *Ibid.*, p. 259-260. Pitfield to Pearson, 1 March 1968.
14. Minutes of a meeting of the CCOLs and the DGOL held in Ottawa on 6 March 1981, dated 19 March 1981, held in DGOL file 1214-25, vol. 2.
15. *Ibid.*
16. These remarks are found in DG Hist, 90/444, file 1211-1, vol. III.



17. Ibid., comments by Chassé, 14 October 1970.
18. Ibid., comments by Turcot, 8 October 1970.
19. Ibid., comments by R. M. Withers, 2 October 1970.
20. A copy of this speech is found in DG Hist, 90/444, file P1450-1, vol. 1.
21. Ibid.
22. Letellier, *Reform*, pp. 206-207.
23. *Official Languages in the Canadian Forces. Military personnel.*, (Ottawa: National Defence, August 1982), 22 pp. plus annexes.
24. *Official Languages in the Canadian Forces.*(Ottawa: National Defence, 1987), 21 pp. plus annexes.
25. DG Hist, 90/444, file 1211-0, vol. III. Chassé to the CDS, 28 October 1970.
26. NDRMS, Minutes of DC meeting 301, 21 December 1970, op. cit.
27. DG Hist, 90/444, file 1211-1, vol. III, Bourgeois to the BPA/CP, 13 January 1971.
28. Ibid. Memo from TC, 21 April 1971.
29. Ibid., reply written by the BPA/CP, 27 April 1971.
30. Ibid. Memo from Major F.J. Devlin of the BPA/CP to LCol J.R. Beveridge, DSD/CDS, 3 May 1971.
31. Ibid. Macdonald to L.C. Raymond, 19 April 1971.
32. DG Hist, 90/444, file 1211-0, vol. III. Chief of Technical Services at CFB Trenton to the base Commander, 10 June 1971.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid. Commander of CFB Trenton to the General commanding Air Transport Command, 17 June 1971.
35. Ibid., Hull to the Commander of CFB Trenton, 25 June 1971.
36. Ibid., Hull to the CDS, 2 July 1971.

37. Ibid., Dextraze to the generals commanding, 22 July 1971.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. References to these speeches are found in DG Hist, 90/444, files 1211-1, vol. II, P1211-14 and F1450-1, vol.1.
41. DG Hist, 73/1223, file 1120. Minutes of a meeting of the CDS Advisory Committee held on 30 June 1971.
42. Authors' archives. Message CANFORGEN 052 ADM(Per) 121, 25 November 1987.
43. Ibid.
44. DG Hist, 73/1223, file 1118. Armstrong to R.G. Robertson, 29 January 1970, op. cit.
45. DG Hist, 73/1223, file 1119. Cabinet memo, 16 April 1970, op. cit.
46. DG Hist, 90/444. File 1211-0, vol. III, Message Comd CFE 58, 19 October 1970.
47. DG Hist, 90/444, file 1211-0, vol. III, document P1211-0 (DGBB), 3 June 1971, addressed to Deputy Chief of Personnel — Military.
48. Ibid., DCP (Mil) to the DGBB, 10 June 1971.
49. Ibid., Hanna to Boyle, 13 July 1971 and Boyle to Hanna, 14 July 1971.
50. DG Hist, 73/1223, file 1120. Minutes of the 30 June meeting and related documents, op. cit.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid. Page 3 of Annex A to the minutes. Our italics.
53. See DG Hist, 90/444, file 1211-1, vol III, a document entitled "A Proposal Concerning the French-English Balance in the CAF and the Public Service of Canada" prepared for Training Command by Dr J.E. Mayhood, a scientist. It was Mayhood who made this proposal on 30 October 1970. But what an unscientific study it was, starting with a false premise — that 28% of Francophone posts would be filled in 1975 — which, according to Mayhood, would cause incredible injustices to Anglophones. His proposal aimed to create the desired equal opportunities for Francophones while

causing as little injustice and resentment as possible among Anglophones. Let us look at Mayhood's calculations: Anglophones held 73,915 posts, Francophones 15,749; 12,900 posts would be added, all for Francophones; this would mean 72/28 in the CAF with a strength of 102,965. In 1970, the CAF still had 89,000 members, but were supposed to be reduced to 82,000 by 1972. In sum, Mayhood wanted the government to reverse its position and bring the Forces back up to a ceiling above 100,000. This was scarcely realistic and Mayhood admitted this unconsciously when he himself wrote that by using his method they would achieve the desired proportional representation in the CAF with 82,000 [sic] men.

54. DG Hist, 73/1223, file 1120., minutes of a 30 June 1971 meeting, op. cit., p. 4.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid. See also the 2 July 1971 memo from Colonel A.C. Bowes to the Secretary of the CP, where the CDS's assistant summed up the conclusions of the 30 June discussion.

58. Ibid. Pollard to Armstrong, 5 July 1971.

59. Ibid. Sharp to Armstrong, 8 July 1971. See also the letter from Minister Donald Macdonald to the CDS, 25 June 1971, op. cit.

60. Ibid. Colonel B.V. Genze to Bowes, 8 July 1971.

61. DG Hist, 90/444, file 1211-1, vol. III. Major F.J. Devlin to the DGBB, 30 August 1971.

62. Ibid., file 20-2, vol. I. Report prepared by the DGBB for the CP's military assistant, 15 December 1971.

63. Letellier, *Reform*, pp. 75-79.

64. DG Hist, 90/444, file P1450-1. Letellier to Boyle, 25 January 1972.

65. Ibid.

66. Authors' archives. Letter 5640-1 (CP), 17 October 1972, headed "Canadian Forces Promotion System — Bilingual and Bicultural Goals".

67. Ibid.

68. Minutes of the meeting of the CDS Advisory Committee, 30 June 1971, op. cit.

69. DG Hist, 90/444, file 20-2, vol. I. Boyle to Davies, 5 December 1972.
70. Letellier, *Reform*, pp. 89-97.
71. DG Hist, 90/444,160-8, document dated 28 December 1972. Similar documents (questions and answers) were also written on 12 and 18 December.
72. Ibid., Hanna to Letellier, 7 March 1973.
73. Ibid., various notes dated from 7 to 14 March 1973 attached to Hanna's report.
74. Ibid., Newell to Letellier, 8 March 1973.
75. Ibid.
76. Ibid., Hanna to various specialized offices, 9 March 1973.
77. Ibid., White to Letellier, 15 March 1973.
78. Ibid., Arsenault to Letellier, 19 March 1973.
79. Ibid., Hanna to Letellier, 17 April 1973 (about his visit to Winnipeg, 20-23 March 1973).
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid., Arsenault to Letellier, 11 June 1973.
83. Ibid., Hanna to Letellier, 12 September 1973.
84. Ibid.
85. File 1214-24, vol. 1 (DGOL office), minutes of the meeting of the CCOLs and RCOLs in Ottawa on 26 and 27 June 1971. Remarks by Lieutenant-Colonel Bélanger, CCOL at Air Command.
86. DG Hist, 90/444, 160-8. Ross to Letellier, 30 November 1973.
87. Ibid., where the reader can follow the Chief of Personnel's itinerary.
88. Ibid., 160-8, DGMU to the CPM, 21 November 1973.
89. *Debates*, House of Commons, vol. XII, 28 April 1976, pp. 12959-60.

90. DG Hist, 90/444, 160-8, op.cit.
91. Authors' archives. Paradis to CDS Falls, 11 March 1980, FMC 5350-1-Comd, *Francophone Representation in the Canadian Forces*, 9 pages with annex.
92. Ibid..
93. Ibid.
94. Ibid. Paradis cited a document signed by one of his predecessors on 1 April 1974 where the same suggestion had been made [FMC 5641-2 (Comd) 1 Apr 74]. We have not seen this document; the suggestion it contained was not in any case followed up.
95. *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and of the House of Commons on Official Languages*, 17 November 1981, Issue No. 25, p. 32, (hereinafter *Joint Committee, 17 November 1981*).
96. Ibid., p. 34.
97. Ibid., p. 34.
98. Authors' archives. FMC 4705-1 (Comd), *Study on Official Languages Training — FMC Comments*, 8 July 1982, Belzile to the ADM(Per).
99. Authors' archives. *Discussion Paper — Representation*. Unsigned, undated document, probably written by Lieutenant-Colonel C. Roy in 1986.
100. DG Hist, 90/444, file 150-2, *Recruiting — Francophones, vol. I*, Hutchins to Boyle, DGPP, 1 February 1971.
101. Ibid., Boyle to Dextraze, 7 July 1971.
102. Ibid., Boyle to Chassé, 30 June 1971.
103. Ibid., Boyle to Chassé, 27 August 1971.
104. Ibid., Chassé to Milhomme, 2 September 1971.
105. Ibid., Chassé to Boyle, 8 September 1971.
106. Ibid., Boyle to Chassé, 9 September 1971.
107. Ibid., Letellier to Laubman, 28 September 1971.
108. Ibid., Laubman (A/CP) to Boyle (DGPP), 14 October 1971.

109. Ibid., Hutchins to Chassé, 21 October 1971.

110. Ibid., Dextraze to Laubman, 28 October 1971. In this note, Dextraze summarizes for Laubman the discussions in a meeting he had had on the 15<sup>th</sup> with Hutchins about recruiting Francophones.

111. Ibid., Turcot to Sharp, 29 November 1971.

112. Ibid., study of the DPRC-4 sent by Hutchins to Dextraze, 30 December 1971.

113. Ibid.

114. Ibid. This appears to be in Letellier's writing.

115. Ibid.

116. NDRMS, file 1211-14-3, vol. 3, Dextraze to Cloutier, 5 January 1972.

117. Ibid., Cloutier to Dextraze on the same date. Such basic changes led to a revision of the mathematical model. One of the authors well remembers the agitation caused by these last-minute alterations, which required another reworking of the draft program.

118. DG Hist, 90/444, 150-2, op. cit., Tousignant to Hutchins, 9 May 1972.

119. Ibid., AIDGPP (Hutchins) to the A/CP, 11 September 1972.

120. Ibid., Tousignant to Letellier, 11 September 1972.

121. Ibid., Hutchins to Letellier, 13 October 1972 and Letellier to Tousignant, 23 October 1972.

122. Ibid., file 20-3, *Vol. I — B & B — 2 — Plans and Programs*, Hutchins to Letellier, 20 January 1972.

123. Ibid., file 150-2, op. cit., Boyle to Dextraze, November 1972.

124. Ibid., Letellier to Boyle, 17 November 1972.

125. Ibid.

126. These questions are all found in reports written after the briefing tours, in *ibid.*, 160-8, vol. I.

127. Ibid., Lieutenant-Colonel J.G. Despault, acting DRS, to Major Arsenault, acting DBPR, 16 March 1973.

128. See *Joint Committee, 17 November 1981*, in which those appearing for the Forces at times touched on their recruiting methods (pp. 48 and 49). DG Hist, 90/444, file 150-2, and certain questions in the House (for example, *House of Commons Debates*, vol. V, 18 April 1975, question no. 1079 and vol. XI, 16 February 1976, p. 10966, question no. 3820), reading the newspapers and listening to radio or television will provide the reader with information on methods used and the target audience.

129. See, for example, the 11 March 1980 letter from Paradis to Falls, which we have cited previously, as well as the amended objective of the 1980 OLP(M), which we mentioned in Chapter 9.

130. *Ibid.*

131. Letellier, *Reform*, pp. 130 to 132.

132. *Joint Committee, 17 November 1981*, op. cit., Lieutenant-General H.A. Carswell, ADM(Per), to the Committee.

133. DG Hist, 90/444, 150-2, op. cit., Hutchins to Letellier, 13 October 1972. 134. *Ibid.* 160-8, op. cit., Hanna to Letellier, 28 May 1973. 135. File 1214-10 at DGOL. Davies to Sullivan, 17 July 1978.

136. *Ibid.*, NDHQ Study Directive 1/78, dated 2 February 1978. The study was to be completed the following 1 October.

137. Minutes of DMC meeting 294, op. cit. (in FMC, 1211-0, vol. II).

138. *Joint Committee, 17 November 1981*, p. 51.

139. Banville, Christina. “La Réserve navale en plein essor” [Naval Reserve experiencing growth], *The Sentinel*, no. 4, 1989, pp. 22-3 and minutes and evidence of the Joint Standing Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on Official Languages, Issue no. 21, 26 and 27 May 1987, pp. 31 and 32 (hereinafter *Joint Committee, May 1987*).

140. *Summary Evaluation of Francophone Participation in MARS and MARE Classification*, 1983 (hereinafter *Summary Evaluation*). Thériault’s directive is annexed to this study, which the authors have in their archives.

141. *Ibid.*, p. vi.

142. *Ibid.*, p. 7.

143. *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10.

144. Ibid. p. 11.
145. Ibid., p.12.
146. Ibid. p. 19.
147. Ibid. P. iv
148. Ibid.
149. Ibid. p.20.
150. Ibid., p. 21.
151. Ibid., p. 3.
152. *Joint Committee, May 1987*, p. 41.
153. DMC meeting, 12 April 1979, op. cit.



## Chapter 12

1. DG Hist, 90/444, 1211-0, vol. I, Tellier to Armstrong, 30 January 1970.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., Armstrong to Robertson, 29 January 1970.
4. Ibid. These decisions taken by Cabinet on Book III of the B & B Report on 30 April 1970 were sent to Defence with a covering memorandum from D.J. Leach dated 5 May.
5. NDRMS, 1211-0, vol. 6.
6. Ibid., and 1211-14-3, vol. 1.
7. NDRMS, 1211-14-3, vol. 1.
8. DG Hist, 90/444, *FLUs-I*, Pollard to the General Commanding Air Defence Command, 24 August 1970 and subsequent messages exchanged between NDHQ and the Command.
9. Ibid., Louis Noël de Tilly to the chairman of the DND Advisory Committee on Bilingualism, 21 September 1970.
10. NDRMS, 1211-14-3, vol. 1. Armstrong to Léger, 30 October 1970.
11. Ibid.
12. There were definite difficulties regarding compliance with Bill C-120 in the AMUs. On 27 September 1971, the Minister of Defence, Donald Macdonald, after a trip to Europe flying on Forces' airplanes, complained of the lack of bilingualism at Trenton and on the airplanes. He wanted matters to start changing gradually on 1 January 1972. This was done (DG Hist, 73/1223, file 1121).
13. DG Hist, 90/444, file 1211-0, vol. III. Notes dated from 1 December 1970 in preparation for the presentation the CDS was to give to the Minister later in the month (op. cit.).
14. NDRMS, 1211-14-3, vol. I, Léger to I. G. Morry, ADM(Per), 17 December 1970.
15. Ibid., Dextraze to Morry, 2 February 1971.
16. Ibid., Morry to Dextraze, 15 February 1971.

17. Ibid., Dextraze to Chassé, 15 February 1971.

18. Ibid., Chassé to Dextraze, 1 March 1971.

19. Ibid., Morry to Armstrong, 8 March 1971. Morry's letter was accompanied by all the documents requested by the Office of the Under Secretary of State. For example, each of the Department's FLUs had a sheet describing the linguistic composition of its personnel and containing some remarks. It is quite obvious that with regard to composition of personnel, the DR was worst off among the experimental FLUs.

20. DG Hist, 90/444, *FLUs-I*, Assistant CP (Mil) to the Director Military Manpower Distribution (DMMD), 31 May 1971 and DGBB to the DGP, 29 September 1971.

21. NDRMS, 1211-14-3, vol. 2.

22. Ibid., Armstrong to Carson, 5 May 1971, following a study done the preceding March and April within the existing FLUs and the "experimental" units to be formed, traces of which are to be found in this same file.

23. DG Hist, 90/444, *FLUs-I*, memo D1211-0 (DBA) to the Assistant to the CP (Civilian), 27 February 1971, signed by Morry.

24. Ibid., Barron to the Commanding Officer of Mobile Command (for D Cos Civ Pers), 12 March 1971.

25. Ibid., Message SVCS 3510 from CANMOBCOM to CANFORCEHED [DCP (Civ)], 6 April 1971.

26. Ibid., Message DCP Civ 1082, 16 April 1971.

27. NDRMS, 1211-14-3, vol. 2.

28. Ibid., Dextraze to Morry, 15 July 1971.

29. Ibid. This was not the only subject of the letter. It said that the experiment would start in three months; that it would follow Circular 1970-95; that it would be possible to increase or decrease the number of FLUs during the experiment, although the latter was not advised; and that existing FLUs, like the others, should adhere to the communications scheme. The progress of FLUs should be closely monitored so that the necessary evaluations and studies could be properly conducted.

30. Ibid., letter signed by R. Morency.

31. Ibid. Both messages are found here.

32. Ibid., Noël de Tilly to Morry, 13 October 1971.
33. DG Hist, 90/444, 1211-11-3, op. cit., Letellier to Noël de Tilly, 9 October 1971.
34. Ibid., Morry to Bourgeois, 22 November 1971 and reply, 21 December 1971.
35. Ibid.
36. DG Hist, 73/1223, file 1117.
37. NDRMS, file 1211-14-3, vol. I. All messages mentioned are in this file.
38. DG Hist, 90/444, *FL Us-I*, E.F. Elcock, DGOM, to the DGBB, 29 March 1971.
39. Ibid., Fournier to Elcock, 1 April 1971.
40. Ibid., Elcock to Fournier, 16 April 1971.
41. NDRMS, 1211-14-3, vol. 1, op. cit., Sharp to Macdonald, 22 April 1971.
42. Ibid., Macdonald to Sharp, 25 June 1971.
43. NDRMS, 1211-14-3, vol. 1, op. cit., Both messages are in this file, including the 30 March 1971 refusal (DO 1020).
44. DG Hist, 90/444, 1211-0, vol. 111, op. cit., Pollard to Dextraze, 10 August 1971.
45. NDRMS, 1211-14-3, vol. 2, memorandum dated 5 November 1971, addressed to the CDS, op. cit.
46. Ibid., Message Comd 177, 23 August 1971.
47. Ibid., Message DGBB 70, 3 September 1971.
48. Authors' archives. "Tentative List of French Language Units", Annex A to P1211-0 (BPA/CP), dated 1 December 1970.
49. DG Hist, 90/444, 1211-0, vol. 11, op. cit., Pollard to Dextraze, 10 August 1971.
50. NDRMS, 1211-14-3, vol. 2.
51. Ibid., Message DBPR 115.
52. Ibid., vol. 3. For what happened to *5<sup>e</sup> U de CAT*, see Appendix L.
53. Ibid.

54. Ibid. Message DO 70 to all Forces.

55. Authors' archives, communiqué, 7 September 1982, AFN:65/82.

56. DG Hist, 90/444, *FLUs-II*, DGBB to the DGPC, 29 September 1971.

57. In June of 1970, the Captain of the *Ottawa* wrote a report on the operation of his unit. We have earlier mentioned one element of this (Volume I, p. 230). Another is that according to Simard, there was a possibility of creating a second French language ship in 1971 (NDRMS, 1211-14-3, vol. 2, op. cit.). Chassé, for his part, believed that the increase in numbers of Francophones in the navy was not sufficient to warrant another FLU. Let us leave things as they are for the time being, he said (DG Hist, 90/444, file P1211-16, *French and English Ship Crews*, Chassé to Dextraze, 10 July 1970). That did not prevent MARCOM from asking on 20 August that the possibility mentioned by Simard be studied (see this message in DG Hist, 90/444, 1211-14-3, op. cit.) That is no doubt why the DGPC referred to this possibility in May 1971. The additional naval FLU, the *Algonquin*, was not formed until 1982.

58. DG Hist, 90/444, *FLUs-I*.

59. Ibid., Pollard to Dextraze, 14 May 1971.

60. Ibid., Message COS Adm 66 from Mobile Command, 4 May 1971, addressed to the DGBB who sent it to the DMPC.

61. Ibid. Annotation by Tousignant, dated 20 May 1971, on the memorandum from Pollard.

62. Ibid., Fournier to Falls, 21 May 1971.

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid., Falls to Fournier, 31 May 1971.

65. NDRMS, 1211-14-3, vol. 2. Leighton to Tousignant, 6 August 1971.

66. Ibid., Tousignant to various CFHQ officials, 15 September 1971.

67. Ibid., DGBB to the FLUs, through the commands, 23 December 1971.

68. Ibid., vol. 3, Lieutenant Serge Bernier to Lieutenant-Colonel Clément Tousignant, 14 February 1972.

69. Ibid., Brigadier-General Duncan A. McAlpine to Admiral D.S. Boyle, military assistant to the CP, 2 June 1972 and McAlpine to Letellier, 5 June 1972.

70. Ibid., DGCP 49, 4 March 1972.
71. Ibid., Bernier to Tousignant.
72. DG Hist, 90/444, *FLUs-II*, minutes of 13 June 1972 meeting, prepared by the meticulous Colonel Hanna, ADGGBB, 16 June 1972.
73. Ibid., file 20-33, vol. 1, *B and B Plans and Programs*. Bachand to Brigadier-General J.I. Davies, DGPC, 3 November 1972.
74. Ibid., Davies to Boyle, 4 December 1972. Note that among the measures to be taken to alleviate the lack of Francophones and bilingual Anglophones, Davies suggested possible “extraordinary measures” for promotion, which we mentioned in Chapter 11.
75. Ibid. Boyle to various people including Letellier and Davies, 5 December 1972.
76. Ibid. Hanna to members of the DGGBB, 12 December 1972.
77. Ibid., Hanna’s minutes sent to Letellier, 12 March 1972; Letellier to Boyle on the same day and Boyle to several persons including Letellier, 15 March 1972.
78. Ibid., Davies to Boyle, 4 December 1976.
79. Information briefing in DG Hist, 90/444, 160-8.
80. DG Hist, 90/444, *FLUs-II*, op. cit., Boyle to Letellier, 5 December 1972. Boyle wrote that they needed to make this abundantly clear.
81. See DG Hist, 90/444, 160-8, op. cit., for questions raised at the various briefing sessions in 1973, including the session at Saint-Hubert on 6 March 1973.
82. NDRMS, 1211-1, vol. 1.
83. Ibid.
84. Ibid.
85. Authors’ archives. Cadieux, Interview, pp. 8-10 and Allard, Interview, pp. 22-23.
86. DG Hist, 90/444, file 1211-2, *Use of Official Languages — General*, Lavergne to the JAG, 25 August 1969 (hereinafter 1211-2).
87. Ibid., JAG to the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, 2 September 1969.

88. Ibid. Under Secretary of State for External Affairs to the JAG, Colonel Simpson, 30 September 1969.

89. Ibid., Simpson to Lavergne, 7 October 1969.

90. 73/1223, file 1118.

91. *B and B Commission Report*, Book 1, op. cit., p. 335.

92. Armstrong to Robertson, 29 January 1970, op. cit.

93. DG Hist, 90/444, 1211-0, op. cit.

94. DG Hist, 73/1223, file 1119.

95. DG Hist, 90/444, op. cit., Lieutenant-Colonel B.V. Genge, Defence Council military secretary to the secretaries of heads of CF branches, 3 March 1970, informing them of Cabinet's 12 February decision.

96. DG Hist, 90/444, 1211-1, vol. III, op. cit., comments by Brigadier-General R. Withers and Major-General M. Lipton on the draft of the B and B Implementation Plan, dated respectively 2 and 5 October 1970.

97. Ibid., reaction from Chassé, dated 14 October 1970, op. cit.

98. Ibid., reaction from Chassé, dated 15 October 1970, op. cit.

99. Ibid., Turcot to Sharp, 8 October 1970.

100. Ibid.

101. Ibid., 1211-0, vol. III, memorandum from the Technical Services Section at CFB Trenton, dated 10 June 1971, op. cit.

102. DG Hist, 73/1223, file 1120

103. NDRMS, 1211-14-3, vol. 2, op. cit.

104. Ibid., vol. 1, Pollard to Dextraze, 26 April 1971.

105. Ibid., Fournier to Sec CP, 7 May 1971.

106. Ibid., Fournier to DCP (Mil), 17 May 1971.

107. Ibid., Dextraze to Pollard, 31 May 1971 (memorandum prepared at DGBB, however), and DG Hist, 90/444, 1211-1.

108. Ibid., Fournier to Tousignant, 26 June 1971.
109. DG Hist, 90/444, 160-8, op. cit.
110. Letellier, *Reform*, pp. 180-183, where the reader will find a summary of the tribulations of this dossier.
111. *DND Language Reform — Staffing the bilingualism Programs 1967-1977*, p. 181.
112. *COL 1977*, p. 169.
113. Ibid., pp. 169-174.
114. Authors' archives. CFAO 2-15 (revised on 6 March 1987) and *OLP(M) 1980*.
115. *OLP(M)*, chapter 3, part 2, Table 3-1 and related notes.
116. CFAO 2-15, op. cit.
117. Légaré, *Le français dans l'Armée canadienne*, op. cit.
118. DG Hist, 90/444, file 4705-1, *Training Language*, vol. 1, Letellier to Captain P. Dupuis, 5 February 1968 (hereinafter *Trg Lang 1*).
119. Ibid.
120. Ibid., Allard to Armstrong, 5 June 1968.
121. Ibid., Armstrong to Hodgson, 20 June 1968.
122. Ibid., Hodgson to Armstrong, 26 June 1968.
123. Letellier, *Reform*, pp. 60 and 65.
124. DG Hist, 90/444, file BDF 1211-4, vol. 1.
125. Letellier, *Reform*, pp. 165-66.
126. Ibid.
127. Authors' archives. Presentation, 1 February 1988, under cover of memorandum 1211-7-2 DG Sec exec, dated the previous 27 January, all prepared by Lieutenant-Colonel Yves Falardeau.

128. Ibid., 1211-11-3, vol. 1, op. cit. Memorandum from Colonel Hanna, 6 October 1971. DG Hist, 90/444, 160-8, op. cit.

129. See in NDRMS 1211-14-3, vol. 2, note 2 written on a memorandum from Noël de Tilly by the Director Bilingual Planning and Research (DBPR), Lieutenant-Colonel J.A.C. Tousignant, for the attention of the DGBB, 1 December 1971.

130. NDRMS, 1211-14-3, vol. 3. Letter from the DGBB addressed to the FLUs, 23 December 1971, accompanied by the Treasury Board questionnaires.

131. Table taken from the personal archives of one of the authors, who had to supervise operation of the FLUs from a distance between 1972 and 1975. Captain Bernier had asked for the computer statement which provided the data for column three of this table.

132. DG Hist, 90/444, 1211-1, op. cit., DGBB 75, 10 November 1971.

133. Authors' archives. From a report on these visits which took place between 21 and 24 February 1972. The report is dated 1 March 1972 and was written by Lieutenant S. Bemier, a member of the visiting team.

134. DG Hist, 90/444. *A of P*, Laubman to the generals commanding and to the chiefs of branches and training, 19 May 1972.

135. Ibid., file 90 — *FRANCOTRAIN*, vol. 1. Draft of a report entitled *Training of Francophones in the Operational Trades* [MARC 4983-2 (TRG)], October 1973, unsigned.

136. Letellier, *Reform*, pp. 188-9.

137. NDRMS, 1211-14-3, vol. 3, op. cit.

138. Yalden to Nixon, 13 July 1979, op. cit.

139. Authors' archives. Tables 15 and 16 are in *15 Ans après-15 Years After*, Annex B to DGBC 1325-1 (OP), 18 April 1985, p. 16 (hereinafter *15 Years After*).

140. Allard, *Memoirs*, p. 48.

141. Ibid., p. 319 ff.

142. Gravel, op. cit., p. 111.

143. *15 Years After*, p. 30.

144. Ibid., pp. 32 and 36.



145. Ibid., pp. 33 and 36.
146. Ibid., p. 39.
147. Ibid., p. 34.
148. Babinski, Micheline, *Language of Work — Department of National Defence*, Ottawa, September 1982, p. 1 and pp. 16 to 20.
149. Authors' archives. Document FMC 1211-13 (Adm), vol. 26, Brigadier-General W.J. Dabros to Sullivan, 8 July 1982.
150. Authors' archives. Minutes of the 3<sup>rd</sup> MARCOM/FMC BCOL Working Study held at the Citadel in Quebec City, 4 and 5 May, 1983 (hereinafter *3<sup>rd</sup> Working Study*, p. 54).
151. *15 Years After*, pp. 32 and 36.
152. *3<sup>rd</sup> Working Study*, p. 37; see also pp. 15 and 16.
153. *Joint Committee, 17 November 1981*, pp. 47, 52 and 54 and *Joint Committee, 19 November 1981*, pp. 36-41.
154. *Joint Committee, 19 November 1981*, p. 36.
155. Ibid.
156. Ibid.
157. Ibid, pp. 37, 38.
158. These remarks were made to the BCOLs. See *3<sup>rd</sup> Working Study*, pp. 4 to 19.
159. *15 Years After*, pp. 17 to 21 and Recommendation 2, p. 113.
160. DGOL file 1213-3, vol. 2, Collier to the CDS, 16 and 18 October 1978.
161. Ibid., Smith to Collier, 6 December 1978.
162. *3<sup>rd</sup> Working Study*, p. 27. See also the announcement of this Naval Reserve move which was already foreseeable in *Joint Committee, 17 November 1981*, pp. 42, 44.
163. DGOL file 1214-25, vol. 1, memorandum, 26 October 1978, on FLUs outside Quebec in view of the revised plan.

164. Authors' archives. Treasury Board Circular 1975-111, 25 September 1975.
165. Letellier, *Reform*, pp. 196 to 201, 212-13.
166. *Joint Committee, 19 November 1981*, p. 42.
167. *Joint Committee, 17 November 1981*, pp. 53-54.
168. *Official Languages Annual Plan, 1983-1984*, 31 March 1983, p. 11.
169. Authors' archives. COL, *Report Submitted to the Governor in Council (National Defence)*, Ottawa, January 1987, six pages plus four annexes describing the situation using three specific cases (hereinafter *COL 1987*).
170. Authors' archives. *Briefing to the Minister of National Defence on the Commissioner of Official Languages Special Report*, 16 February 1987, 30 pages (hereinafter *Briefing Minister, 16 February 87*). In spite of its unilingual title, about 30% of the presentation's text is in French, as was the text for two of the twelve transparencies used.
171. Authors' archives. *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on National Defence, 2<sup>nd</sup> Session, 33<sup>rd</sup> Legislature, Tuesday 19 May 1987, Issue No. 11, pp. 8, 21* (hereinafter *Defence Standing Committee, May 87*).
172. *Briefing Minister, 16 February 87*, pp. 23-24.
173. Authors' archives. *Presentation to ECOL, Monday 18 April 1988*.
174. *Defence Standing Committee, May 87*, pp. 19-21.
175. *Joint Committee*, p. 19 and pp. 26-29.
176. *Ibid.*, p. 29. On the subject of care and medical files in French, see Letellier's comments in *Reform*, pp. 144-46. A 1973 complaint was in exactly the same vein as Madame Blouin's 15 years later. The COL at the time, Keith Spicer, had insisted that care be given in French but favoured keeping files in English only.
177. *Ibid.*, p. 36.
178. *Defence Standing Committee, May 87*, pp. 31-32. Exchange between Senator J.P. Guay and Deputy Minister D.B. Dewar.
179. Authors' archives. Letter from Dick to D'Iberville Fortier, 26 June 1987.
180. *Ibid. Defence Management Committee — Summary Record of the 393<sup>rd</sup> Meeting — 31 Aug 87*, p. 10 (hereinafter *DMC, 31 Aug 87*).

181. Ibid., p. 11.

182. Ibid., pp. 6 and 7.

183. Ibid. *Assessment of the Last 15 Years on Bilingualism to 1 April 87*, DGOL, 26 November 1987, annex A (hereinafter *Assessment Last 15 Years*)

184. Ibid. Letter from Beatty to Fortier, 7 December 1987.

185. Ibid.

186. Ibid.

187. DG Hist, 90/444. *Costing and Funding B & B Programmes — Vol. II* file containing aide-memoires, memoranda and references to this question, which was dealt with for the most part in December 1973 and January 1974, although there were some earlier attempts in November 1973. Dr W.A.B. Douglas has the relevant documentation in his files.

188. Letellier, *Reform*, p. 202. See also “*L’ennemi est coriace, soutient la Defence — Preponderance de l’anglais*”. *Le Droit*, Ottawa-Hull, Wednesday 20 May 1987, p. 3. Authors’ archives.

189. *COL 1977*, pp. 160, 162, 165 and 170. This states, among other things, that our military attachés, even those in Paris and Brussels, had to write their information reports to be sent to Ottawa in English.

190. Letellier, *Reform*, pp. 202.

191. Ibid., p. 187.

192. Ibid., pp. 204-5. See also *Debates*, 1<sup>st</sup> Session of the 30<sup>th</sup> Parliament, 1 December 1975, vol. IX, p. 9578 (exchange between the Prime Minister and J.P. Nowlan, Member for Annapolis Valley) and vol. XII, p. 12506 (exchange between Nowlan and Richardson on the same subject).

193. *Debates*, op. cit., p. 12506.

194. DG Hist 84/111. Page 7 of message from the CDS, 13 September 1982, sent to all commands.

195. Letellier, *Reform*, p. 199.

196. See *Debates*, op. cit., vol IV, p. 3930, where doubts are openly expressed about his profession of faith in B and B.

197. In any case, it was frustration that was felt between May 1974 and June 1975 by one of the authors, to whom Letellier gave the task of managing the file of designation of new FLUs in accordance with the plan approved in April 1972.

198. According to a note found in the files of Training Service HQ (Trenton) under the number 1211-1, vol. 14 (Bil. Gen.).

199. *McLaws Report*, p. 4-2.

### Chapter 13

1. DG Hist, Training Command Instruction 2/68.
2. 2. D. Hist, CFOO 5.3.5, 1 April 1968.
3. Letellier, *Reform*, pp. 11 ff.; Allard, *Memoirs*, p. 278.
4. DG Hist, 90/444, *Bilingualism in the Canadian Armed Forces* file. According to the terms of memorandum TC 5000-0085/00 [MILTRG] dated 1 December 1966, summarized in a letter dated 16 February 1968 by Major-General R.C. Stovel, head of Training Command.
5. Ibid., TC 4705-4 [A/COS TRG], 14 December 1967, summarized by Stovel on 16 February 1968.
6. Ibid., TC 4705-4 [COMD], 19 January 1968, summarized by Stovel in February.
7. Ibid., Stovel to Allard, 12 February 1968.
8. See P1920-4203/60 (DT), Colonel S.V. Radley-Walters to VCDS F. Sharp, 6 March 1968, in DG Hist, 90/444, *Trg Lng I*.
9. Letellier, *Reform*, pp. 26-34.
10. Ibid., pp. 33-4.
11. DG Hist, 90/444, *Bilingualism in the Canadian Armed Forces* file, Stovel to Allard, 12 March 1968.
12. Ibid., file 4705-1, op. cit., Radley-Walters to several addressees, 29 April 1968.
13. Ibid., file 1180-1, *Coordinating Conference on Bilingualism (Dare Study)*, P4705-4 P1210-3 (DTPP), 24 May 1968, addressed to the Program Revision Bureau (PRB); also in NDRMS, D 1211-13-2, vol. 2.
14. See S1210-3 (CDS), 12 April 1968, in NDRMS D1211-13-2, vol. 2.
15. DG Hist, 90/444, file 4705-1, op. cit., DBTT\* 4-4 (Auriat) to the DBTT, December 1968 (no exact date).

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\* We have found no mention of a DBTT at HQ in 1967-1968. However, Auriat was DTPP 4.4 (Director Training Plan Programs). Later a federal public servant, Auriat remembered very clearly the report and its context at the time.

16. *Ibid.*, S4500-1 (CDS), 13 December 1968, minutes containing the decisions made at the 11 December meeting.

17. See D6/69, 14 February 1969, signed by Allard, in NDRMS 1211-23, vol. 1, and CFOO 5.1, 14 July 1969.

18. CFOO 5.1, *op. cit.*

19. D6/69 (Allard), *op. cit.*

20. *Ibid.*

21. *Training Command, Project FRANCOTRAIN, Training Development Plan, Part ONE (Phase I and II), Part Two (Phase III)*, NDRMS, file 1211-23, vol. 1.

22. *Ibid.*

23. The reader can follow the changes described in this paragraph and read the 13 August 1969 amendment [S1470-280/C3-6 (CDS)J in 73/1223, file 1117.

24. CFOO 5.7.2, 26 June 1969. *Canforger 70*.

25. Message CP 41, 4 June 1969, to CO of Training Command in DG Hist, 90/444, file 90 — *FrancoTRAIN, vol. I* (hereinafter *Franco, vol. I*).

26. Chassé to Lavergne, 15 January 1970, *op. cit.* Armstrong to Robertson, 29 January 1970, *op. cit.* This acceptance was sent to Cabinet on 16 April 1970 in the report presented to Cabinet by the Privy Council experts, *op. cit.*

27. DG Hist, 90/444, *Franco, vol. I*, BGen B.S. Guimond, CO of *LADIF*, to Carr, 30 October 1969, in his first quarterly report on *LADIF* operations. This file also contains another report from Guimond to Carr, dated 1 December 1969, putting forward the same solutions.

28. *Ibid.*

29. *Ibid. Trg Lng I*, Captain (N) R.W. Edwards, Director Posting and Careers Sea Ops and Engineering, to Chassé, 18 December 1969. A memorandum from BGen R.S. Graham, of Training Command, dated 21 May 1970, confirms that the situation in sea courses had been corrected in April, as had been provided for (in *ibid.*, vol. 2).

30. *Ibid.*, *Franco, vol. I*, Guimond to Carr, 30 October 1969.

31. Training Command's approval was obtained for the memo's content. Following this the CDS Advisory Committee studied it on 29 April. See minutes of this meeting in DG Hist, 73/1223, file 1119.

32. Ibid., Item 1111 — Francotrain Briefing — presented by DGDP (Director General-Defence Program), 29 April 1970, at the Committee's 11/70 meeting. The contents of the CP's March memorandum had already been discussed at the 21 April meeting. The items appearing in the summary provided are also found in the minutes of DCM 291, 15 June 1970, *ibid.*

33. See what Major-General J. Dextraze said on this subject at the CDS Advisory Committee meeting on 21 April, *ibid.* This was further developed by Colonel G. R. Hale, Director of Training, at the Defence Council on 15 June 1970.

34. The minutes of the 15 June meeting are very clear on this latter point, *ibid.*

35. See 9 July 1970 memorandum from Major J.A.C. Arsenault, of the CDS's office, to the Director General of the program concerning amendments to the two directives resulting from the 15 June decisions, *ibid.*

36. The two amended documents (D 6/69 and D 5/70) are in *ibid.*

37. DG Hist, 90/444, *Trg Lng II*, BGen R. S. Graham, 21 and 25 May 1970: two memoranda both addressed to a long list of interested parties, including the CDS.

38. *Ibid.*

39. DRAEC, 212-2, vol. 1.

40. See the correspondence between Turcot and Hennessy in June and July 1970 in DG Hist, 90/444, file 1211-1, vol. III, *op. cit.*

41. DG Hist, 73/1223, file 1120, Sharp to Dextraze, 25 June 1970.

42. *Ibid.*, CDS Directive, 31 July 1970 (also in NDRMS 1211-0, vol. 6).

43. DG Hist, 90/444.1211-0, vol III, Dextraze to heads of commands, 27 July 1971.

44. *Ibid.*, *Franco vol. I*, Guimond to CO of Training Command, 9 October 1970 and 30 April 1971.

45. *Program to Increase B and B*, p. 9. In the summer of 1970 it was naturally possible to speak very positively about FRANCOTRAIN and its future when answering questions from Cabinet. See DG Hist, 90/444, 1211-1, vol. III and *R & R*, *op. cit.*

46. Memorandum S1211-10 (A/DPCC/CDS), 4 November 1971, in files of the officer responsible for FRANCOTRAIN at DGRET in Ottawa (hereinafter DGRET).

47. NDRMS, 1211-23, vol. 3, *Training Command, Review of Project FRANCOTRAIN with particular reference to implementation of Phase III*, 9 February 1972.
48. DG Hist, 90/444, *Franco, vol. I*, report by Guimond, 16 June 1972.
49. Ibid., CDS Directive S5/72 [S1211-1 (CDS)], 6 July 1972.
50. Ibid., presentation prepared in 1974 by Major J.L.C. Filiatrault.
51. Allard, *Memoirs*, pp. 226-227.
52. DG Hist, 90/444, *Franco, vol. I*, Tousignant to Letellier, 14 September 1972.
53. Ibid., Letellier to Tousignant, 19 September 1972. See also Letellier, *Reform*, p. 129, for an outline of the practical and idealistic points of view expressed within the DGBB at the time of this 1972 study.
54. DG Hist, 90/444, *Franco vol. I*, minutes of the 52<sup>nd</sup> meeting of the Defence Management Committee, Item 1 — Project Francotrain — Phase III, 2 April 1973.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid and NDHQ Implementation Directive D9, 9 May 1973, which repeats the conclusions of the April DMC meeting, in file 4500-1 (*LADIF*) at DGRET in Ottawa.
57. Ibid., DG Hist, 90/444 and 4500-1 (*LADIF*) at DGRET.
58. DG Hist, 90/444, *Franco, vol. I*, Letellier to the DT and DCP (Mil), 6 July 1972.
59. Ibid., CDS to Training Command, 22 November 1972, and to Dextraze, 23 November 1982.
60. Ibid., Message C Prog 92, 27 February 1973; 15 June 1973 Memorandum explaining that there was to be a permanent representative in Ottawa.
61. Ibid. A memorandum from Colonel R.H. Manson [1901-280/C3-6 (DIT-4), 22 March 1973) stated that all correspondence from *LADIF* to Ottawa would go to the DGETC for information.
62. Ibid., ADM(Per) Milroy to VCDS Hull, 10 December 1973, and correspondence related to this matter.
63. Message ADM(Per) 110, 8 September 1976 in DGRET.



64. Ibid., Gagnon to Milroy, 24 November 1975.
65. DG Hist, 90/444, *Franco, vol. I*, Rear Admiral P.S. Boyle (acting CP) to heads of Commands, 16 May 1973.
66. Ibid., Milroy to several persons, October 1973.
67. Ibid., Milroy to Hull, 7 January 1974.
68. Ibid., memorandum from Filiatrault, undated.
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid., E.S. Baker, DGMU, to Milroy, 21 January 1974, concerning the content of the 17 January meeting.
71. Ibid., Baker to Milroy, 31 January 1974, concerning the meeting on the same day.
72. Ibid., letter to DGRET, 23 January 1974.
73. Ibid., Gagnon to Milroy, 20 September 1974.
74. Ibid., 160-8, Captain W.A. Dehnke of the CPD office to the executive assistant to the ADM(Per), December 1973.
75. Ibid., *Plans & Prog.*, study by Lieutenant-Colonel J.R. Bachand, 30 November 1972.
76. Ibid., report of briefing tour to Halifax and Shearwater taken by Colonel Hanna and Lieutenant-Colonel J. Lehman on 28 February and 1 March 1973.
77. Ibid., Hanna to Letellier, 12 September 1973.
78. Ibid., *Franco, vol. I*, D/DGBB and DGETC, 9 March 1973.
79. Ibid., *Plans & Prog.*, minutes of 9 March 1973 meeting, written by Hanna on 12 March.
80. Ibid., *Franco, vol. I*, Colonel H.P. Lagacé (DG *LADIF*) to Colonel Hanna, 21 March 1973.
81. Ibid., TCHQ study [4820-2 TCHQ (AIR TRG)], 26 January 1972, cited in a 16 June 1972 report on Training Command operations.
82. Ibid.

83. Ibid., *Situation Report — Project Francotrain*, 15 January 1973.
84. Ibid., Boyle to Milroy, 15 January 1973.
85. Ibid., DGP to DGETC, 15 January 1973.
86. Ibid., Boyle to generals commanding, 16 May 1973, op. cit.
87. NDRMS, 1211-23, vol. 8 (hereinafter *Naval and Air Study*), Annex B of *Project FRANCOTRAIN Phase III, A Study on Naval and Air Operations Training, An ADM(Per) Study*, May 1974.
88. Ibid.
89. DG Hist, 90/444, *Franco, vol. I*, Hanna to the DG LADIF, also Letellier to Gagnon, 2 January 1974.
90. Ibid., Letellier to McLaws, 25 August 1973.
91. Ibid., MARC 4893-2 (TRG), 24 October 1973.
92. Ibid.
93. Ibid.
94. Ibid.
95. Ibid., 160-8, op. cit.
96. Ibid., *Franco vol. I*, Letellier to Gagnon, DG LADIF, 21 November 1973.
97. *Naval and Air Study*.
98. Ibid., Letellier to Gagnon, 2 January 1974.
99. Ibid., Paradis to Gagnon, 5 March 1974.
100. Ibid., Thériault to Gagnon, 18 March 1974.
101. DG Hist, 90/444, *Franco vol. I*, Forest to Letellier, 9 January 1974.
102. *Naval and Air Study*, Boyle to Gagnon, 28 March 1974.
103. Ibid., Brigadier-General W.H. Vincent to Gagnon, 12 March 1974 and Message COS 44 from Trenton, 11 April 1974.

104. Ibid., Colonel O. Warner (for Brigadier-General K.C. Lett) to Gagnon, 28 February 1974.
105. Ibid., Leir to Gagnon, 14 February 1974 and Carr to Gagnon, 7 March 1974.
106. Ibid. See first pages of the report.
107. NDRMS, 1211-23, vol. 8, Directive ADM(Per) 8/74, 16 July 1974.
108. Letellier, *Reform*, pp. 183-185.
109. Ibid., pp. 211-212.
110. NDRMS, 1211-3, vol. 9, Lewis to the ADM(Per), 26 May 1976.
111. Ibid., Gagnon, DG *LADIF*, to Letellier, 16 July and Letellier to Gagnon, 26 July 1976. Major-General J. Paradis, CPD at the time, was also in agreement, signing note no. 2 on Gagnon's letter of the 16<sup>th</sup>.
112. Ibid., Paradis to P.E. Larose, Superintendent of the Translation Bureau, Secretary of State Department, 30 July 1976.
113. DG Hist, 90/444, *Franco vol. I, Situation Report — Project FRANCOTRAIN*, 15 January 1973.
114. Ibid., Letellier to the ADM(Per), 15 February 1973.
115. The reader can follow this debate in 1973-1974 in *ibid.*
116. NDRMS, 1211-23, vol. 8, Brigadier-General L.V. Johnson of Training Command to LADIF, 28 May 1975.
117. Authors' archives. *Study on the Francotrain Program*, DGOL, 20 August 1985, Annex D (hereinafter *Study Francotrain*).
118. *COL 1977*, pp. 187, 188.
119. Ibid., pp. 27, 28.
120. Ibid., p. 187.
121. Ibid., p. 190.
122. Ibid., p. 191.

123. *Ibid.*, pp. 191,192. One of the authors, J. Pariseau, went through this experience as a bilingual instructor at the Infantry School from 1955 to 1960.

124. *Ibid.*, pp. 192, 193.

125. We have consulted secret Security Directorate files on this matter. What the COL suggested is correct. We totally agree that documents of the kind that we were able to read should be kept secret — but not for the reasons given by those who signed them, however.

126. *COL 1977*, p. 193.

127. *Ibid.*, p. 194.

128. DND. *Review of Achievements of DND Bilingualism and Biculturalism Program*, Ottawa, 1974, p. 102 (hereinafter *Review 1974*).

129. *COL 1977*, p. 190.

130. *Ibid.*, p. 188a.

131. NDRMS, 1211-9, vol. 6., C.R. Nixon to K. Spicer, 29 July 1971. See also note 114 to Chapter 9.

132. *Study Francotrain*, St. Aubin to Smith, 22 September 1977 and Adm(Per) Instruction 8/74, *Francotrain III — Sea and Air Operations Training (Revised September 1977)*.

133. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

134. *Ibid.*, p. 6 (quotation from Treasury Board Circular 1977/46: *Official Languages in the Public Service of Canada: a Statement of Policies/Les langues officielles dans la fonction publique au Canada: Déclaration de politiques*, prepared jointly by the Secretariat of the TB and PSC, Ottawa, September 1977.

135. NDRMS, 1211-9, vol. 6, Nixon to Yalden, 20 March 1978.

136. NDRMS, 1211-9, vol. 7, Nixon to Yalden, 25 October 1978.

137. NDRMS, 1211-23, vol. 9. Minutes of 17 October 1979 Mobile Command Council meeting, dated 7 November 1979, study and meetings attached.

138. Files of the CCBB at St-Hubert, vol. 12, Liston to Ouimet, 8 June 1979.

139. *Ibid.*, Paradis to Smith, 11 March 1980. Paradis concluded that the navy should not be required to achieve proportionate representation. Francophones who wanted to

go to sea should be informed that only English was used in this arm. Francophones should be grouped together where they could live and work in French, in the army and, in part, the air force. FLUs would feel the effects of this as would FRANCOTRAIN, which, by concentrating on certain job categories, would not have to stretch its meagre resources of Francophone instructors as thinly. The authors cannot endorse this point of view, which for all practical purposes would ban unilingual Francophone Canadians from the navy and several air force categories.

140. *OLP(M)*, p. 2-6-1.

141. *Ibid.*

142. *Ibid.*, p. 2-6-2.

143. *Ibid.*

144. *Ibid.*, p. 2-6-3.

145. *Ibid.*

146. *Ibid.* See also *Review 1974*, p. 102.

147. *Ibid.*

148. Roy, C. (Major). *L'enseignement du français dans les FC*, an April 1980 study that Major Roy decided to conduct while he was at Staff College; Roy retired as a Lieutenant-Colonel.

149. *Joint Committee, 17 November 1981*, p. 39.

150. *Joint Committee, 19 November 1981*, p. 38.

151. NDRMS, 1211-1, vol. 13. Thériault to C Eval, 23 March 1983.

152. Slimman, *Summary Evaluation*, p. iv.

153. *Ibid.*, p. 16.

154. *Ibid.*, p. v.

155. *Ibid.*, p. vi.

156. *Ibid.*, p. 8.

157. *Ibid.*

158. Ibid., p. 17.

159. Ibid., p. 18.

160. Ibid., p. 27.

161. Ibid., pp. 32 and 33.

162. *Plan 83-84*, p. 12.

163. Ibid., p. 13.

164. *15 Years After*, p. 76.

165. Ibid., p. 79.

166. Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages, *Report Submitted to the Governor in Council (National Defence)*, Ottawa, January 1987, Appendix D.

167. Ibid.

168. *Study Francotrain*, Annex A, Lieutenant-General J.E. Vance to the DGOL, 3 October 1984 and 4 March 1985. DGOL Guy Sullivan assured us in 1984 that he initiated the study after realizing the great difficulties existing in this area.

169. Ibid., pp. 20-24.

170. Ibid., p. 16.

171. Ibid., Fox to Sullivan, December 1985. The document *Study Francotrain* contains reactions to the Stenberg report, an essential part of the file. The reader can follow some of the steps in the revision of CFAO 9-53 in NDRMS 4500-44.

172. Ibid., Grenier to Sullivan, 19 November 1985.

173. Ibid., Commodore D.N. Macgillivray to Sullivan, 22 November 1985.

174. Ibid., Message DCOS TRG 197, 20 November 1985.

175. Ibid., Megill to Sullivan, 16 December 1985.

176. Ibid., Major-General D.F. Gardland to Sullivan, 6 November 1985 (acknowledgement of receipt) and 20 February 1986 (summary of comments from Air Groups received at Air Command, Winnipeg).

177. Authors' archives. Major D.I Stenberg (E03/OL) to the SEO, 18 October 1985.

178. Ibid.
179. *COL 1987*, D'Iberville Fortier to Paul Tellier, 12 January 1987.
180. Ibid., p. 3.
181. Ibid., p. 3.
182. Authors' archives. *Briefings to the Minister of National Defence on the Commissioner of Official Languages Special Report — 16 February 1987*, p. 13.
183. Ibid.
184. Ibid., p. 15.
185. Ibid., p. 16.
186. *Joint Committee, May 1987*, pp. 7 and 8.
187. Ibid., pp. 23 and 24.
188. Authors' archives, Associate Minister Paul Dick to Fortier, 25 June 1987.
189. Ibid., Message CP-Per 137, 15 September 1987.
190. Ibid., Minutes of DMC meeting 393, 31 August 1987.
191. Ibid.
192. See NDRMS file 4500-44.
193. Authors' archives. Beatty to Fortier, 7 December 1987.
194. Authors' archives. *Assessment of the Last 15 Years on Bilingualism to 1 April 87*. DesBesquets to the ADM(Per), 26 November 1987 (hereinafter *Assessment*).

## Chapter 14

1. Castonguay, Jacques, *Le collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean* (Montreal: Méridien, 1989), 288 pp. (hereinafter *Castonguay, CMR*). Jean-Yves Gravel, "La fondation du Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean" in RHAF, vol. 27, no. 2, September 1973, pp. 257-280, reprinted in J.Y. Gravel, ed., *Le Québec et la guerre* (Montreal: Boreal Express, 1974), pp. 109-132. R.A. Preston, *Canada's RMC, A History of the Royal Military College* (Toronto: UTP, 1969), 415 p. Preston has published a second volume on the history of RMC, *To Serve Canada* (Ottawa, University of Ottawa Press, 1991).

2. Painchaud, Louis. *Le bilinguisme à l'Université* (Montréal: Beauchemin, 1968), 248 p.

3. Ibid., p. 217.

4. NDRMS, file 1211-280/C2-2 contains correspondence on this subject.

5. Allard, *Memoirs*, pp. 163-168.

6. See, for example, *Mémoire de la Fédération des Sociétés Saint-Jean Baptiste du Québec aux Ministres de la Défense nationale*, 1959, 34 pp., reprinted in *Le Devoir*, which recommended, for example, that *CMR* be able to grant diplomas and that it become more French. Group Captain J.G. Archambault, Commandant of *CMR*, accepted the principle of complete programs but insisted that the college remain bilingual (*Final Report of the Commandant, CMR* 1960, 32 p.). This report contained a 16-page appendix which commented paragraph by paragraph on the brief from the *Fédération des SSJB*, entitled "Comments from the Commandant of *Collège Militaire Royal de Saint-Jean* on a Brief presented to the Minister of National Defence by *La Fédération des Sociétés Saint-Jean-Baptiste du Québec*". The Commandant of *RMC* however, opposed the idea of degrees being granted by *CMR*. (*Comments by RMC on the Brief by La Fédération des Sociétés Saint-Jean-Baptiste du Québec to the Minister of National Defence*, 1959, 30 pages).

7. In addition to the brief from *La Fédération des SSJB*, see L. Hervieux and P. Fréchette, "Non au Collège Militaire" in *Le Quartier Latin*, Université de Montréal, 5 December 1963. This article, written by two former officer cadets at *CMR*, decried the lack of French at *CMR*. It was reprinted by several other student newspapers in Quebec. The Painchaud report was also very critical of the situation at *CMR*.

8. Forest, Louis, *Mémoire sur le bilinguisme, CMR* 1962, 13 pp. Some of the suggestions made by Forest, who taught French, were taken up and adapted to establish a set of bilingualism classifications. At the same time, the difficulties encountered by Francophones at Kingston were being studied. See G.R. Tougas, *Report on the Teaching of French and of the Position of French-speaking Cadets in the Service Colleges*. Royal Military College of Canada, 1962, 15 pp. The author, who



was head of the Modern Languages department at RMC at the time, pointed out the difficulties encountered by a Francophone officer cadet completing in English a course begun in French at *CMR*.

9. See, for example, Douglas M. Cox, "A Proposal for a Program of Canadian Studies" in *Culture*, XXIV, 1 (March 1963), pp. 33-36, (Two years of "college" in one's own culture and mother tongue followed by two years in the other language and culture.) The same author wrote "The Canadian Dialogue", *Culture*, XXV, 1 (March 1964), pp. 46-52. (To understand another person we must have an attitude of understanding, not merely comprehend his language.)

10. Authors' archives, memorandum from Commodore W.P. Kayes, Commandant of RMC, entitled "Bilingualism at RMC", dated 17 December 1968.

11. *Ibid.*

12. *Ibid.*

13. Chassé to Lavergne, 15 January 1970, *op. cit.*

14. Armstrong to R.G. Robertson, 29 January 1970, *op. cit.*

15. Memorandum to Cabinet, 16 April 1970, *op. cit.*

16. Allard, *Memoirs*, pp. 268-9, where this committee is mentioned as well as one of the conclusions which he hoped it could reach but did not materialize: bringing together all officer development centres in Ottawa.

17. NDRMS, 1211-0, vol. 1. Lavergne to the Director General Manpower Management (copy to Letellier), 17 October 1967.

18. DG Hist, 82/140, *Report of the Officer Development Board*, March 1969, pp. 26-29 of vol. 2 (hereinafter *RODB*).

19. DG Hist, 1326-1569. Major-General W.A. Milroy to DG Hist, 28 January 1970, Appendix 1 to Annex 4.

20. *Ibid.*, Appendix 2.

21. *RODB*, vol. 2, p. 331.

22. NDRMS, 1211-280/C2-2, vol. 1. Major-General W.A. Milroy, 29 January 1971. See also CFOO 1.17, 6 February 1970.

23. NDRMS, 1211-280/C2-1, vol. 1 S1211-1 (CDS), 27 February 1970 cited in Milroy to the CP, 30 April 1971.

24. NDRMS, 1211-280/C2-2, vol.1, and 5570-20-7, vol. 1. "*Presentation to Advisory Board, Bilingualism at CMCs*", 23 January 1971.
25. Ibid.
26. NDRMS, 1211-280/C2-2, vol. 1. General F.R. Sharp, 18 February 1971.
27. CDEE Directive 4/71, *Bilingualism at CMCs*, 24 February 1971, NDRMS, 1211-280/C2-2, vol. 1 and 5570-20-7, vol. 1.
28. NDRMS, 1211-280/C2-2, vol. 1, Milroy to the CP, 30 April 1971.
29. Ibid., Annex D.
30. Ibid., Annex B.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. DG Hist, 90/444, 1211-0, vol. III, Fournier to Dextraze, 10 May 1971. (memo prepared by Tousignant). Dextraze to Comdt CDEE.
34. NDRMS, 1211-280/C2-2, vol 1, P1211-0(A/DGGB), 7 June 1971. (This reply was apparently written by Colonel Hanna, who had just taken up the position of A/DGGB. But the directive and the meaning behind it would have come from Dextraze.) See also *ibid.*, Major M.C. Stewart to Milroy, 11 June 1971.
35. Ibid., Major M.C. Stewart to Milroy, 11 June 1971.
36. Ibid., Lieutenant-Colonel A.C. Moffat to Rear-Admiral R.W. Murdoch, 10 September 1971. See also CDEE to the Minister, 8 October 1971 in NDRMS, 5570-20-7, vol. 1.
37. NDRMS, 1211-280/C2-2, vol. 1, Dextraze to Murdoch, 30 September 1971.
38. Ibid., Murdoch to Dextraze, 13 October 1971.
39. DG Hist, 90/444, 1211-1, vol. III, aide-memoire from the DGGB to the CP, 25 October 1971.
40. Ibid. *CMCs*, Laubman to Hutchins, 23 November 1971.
41. Ibid., Dextraze to the CDEE, 2 December 1971.

42. Ibid., Murdoch to Hutchins, 14 December 1971, where reference is made to a meeting on 7 December attended by Dextraze. Hutchins to Murdoch, 17 December 1971. Letellier to Hutchins, 23 December 1971.

43. NDRMS, 1211-280/C2-2, vol. 1, CDEE to the CP, 31 December 1971 and CP to the CDEE, 24 January 1972. See also *Program to Increase B and B*, p. 22.

44. Letellier, *Reform*, pp. 124-5. See also, in DG Hist, 90/444, *Plans and Prog.*, Letellier's 15 December 1971 report to the assistant to the CP, which repeats that the plan of action for military colleges reverses a governmental decision; the Deputy Minister would have to be consulted, he added.

45. NDRMS, 1211-280/C2-2, vol. 1, Dextraze to Murdoch, 24 January 1972.

46. Ibid. *Terms of Reference — Academic Advisor for Study on Implementation of Courses in French Language for Francophone Cadets in RMC*, 21 December 1971.

47. Ibid., Monsignor Jacques Garneau to Rear-Admiral R.W. Murdoch, 28 January 1972.

48. Ibid., Colonel R.C.K. Peers to Murdoch, 4 February 1972 and Brigadier-General W. Lye, Commandant of RMC, to Murdoch, 24 February 1972.

49. Letellier, *Reform*, pp. 121-126.

50. NDRMS, 1211-280/C2-2, vol. 2, *Memorandum to Cabinet*, 30 June 1972 and note from General F.R. Sharp to the DM, 29 June 1972. See also minutes of DMC meeting 20, 31 July 1972 and A. Kroeger to S. Cloutier, 29 September 1972.

51. Letellier, op. cit.

52. DG Hist, 90/444, 160-8, which contains the 1973 briefing, op. cit.

53. NDRMS, 1211-280/C2-2, vol. 2, Commander P.C. Fortier of RMC, to Director of Education at NDHQ, 21 February 1974.

54. Letellier, *Reform*, pp. 177-8.

55. NDRMS, 1211-280/C2-2, vol. 2, Colonel A.P. Wills, Director of Education, to the DGBB, 28 February 1974.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid. "Report to the Defence Management Committee on Bilingualism and Biculturalism in DND", 6 December 1974.

58. D. Hist., *Royal Military College of Canada Calendar 1973-74*, CMC, Kingston, p. 1.

59. *Royal Military College of Canada, Report of the Commandant, 1975-1976, Part I*, pp. 44-45.

60. Authors' archives. Press release, 8 March 1975, in *The Gazette* [Montreal].

61. *Ibid.*, editorial in the *Kingston Whig Standard*, 8 March 1975.

62. *Ibid.*, written report from McAlpine subsequent to his conversation with MacDonald.

63. *Ibid.*, *Report of the Commandant, 1975-1976*, pp. 37-38.

64. *Ibid.*, 1975-76, *Part I*, pp. 44-45.

65. *Ibid.*, 1977-78, *Part I*, p. 50.

66. *Ibid.*, 1978-79, *Part I*, p. 52.

67. *Annual Report of the Commandant 1979-1980, Part I*, p. 66.

68. *Ibid.*, 1980-81, *Part I*, p. 67.

69. *OLP(M)*, p. 2-6-5.

70. Information obtained by telephone from RMC in February 1988 (conversation between Bernier and Bernard Hamel, Services Officer at RMC).

71. *OLP(M)*, p. 2-6-4.

72. *Plan 83-84*, p. 13.

73. *Joint Committee, 19 November 1981*, pp. 39-40.

74. *Ibid.*, p. 44.

75. *Joint Committee*, May 1987, pp. 20 and 24.

76. *COL 1977*, pp. 195-6.

77. *Ibid.*, p. 196.

78. George Stanley, "Military Education in Canada, 1967-1970" in H.J. Massey, ed., *The Canadian Military, a Profile* (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1972), pp. 187-189; Colonel

A.P. Willis, "A New Professional Development System for Canadian Forces Officers" in *CDQ*, vol. 3, no. 2, fall 1973, pp. 36-43.

79. NDRMS, 5579-10-20-7, vol. 1, Major-General W.A. Milroy to the CP, 27 January 1971. These directions were in the same vein as comments Hanington sent to Milroy on 16 October 1970 concerning the section of the draft B & B program dealing with these schools and colleges (note from Hanington to Chassé, 16 October 1970, in DG Hist, 90/444, 1211-1, vol. III, op. cit.). They also reflect the exchanges the Commandants of these institutions had with Milroy on 14 and 15 January 1971 at a meeting partly devoted to this matter. All of this was repeated on 16 February 1971 in Directive CDEE 3/71 — *Introduction of Studies in the French Language*, which can be found in DG Hist, 90/444, *CMCs*.

80. NDRMS, 5570-20-7, vol. 1, Brigadier-General D.S. MacLennan to the CDEE, 15 March 1971.

81. *Ibid.*, Colonel C.L. Kirby to the CDEE, 2 April 1971.

82. *Ibid.*, Brigadier-General C.S. MacLennan to the CDEE, 15 March 1971 and Colonel FT Harris to the DMMD, 20 May 1971.

83. *Ibid.*, Colonel P.E. Chassé to the DCP(Mil), 29 April 1971.

84. *Ibid.*, MacLennan to the CDEE, 12 July 1971.

85. *Ibid.*, Murdoch to the Commandant of CLFCSC, 13 August 1971.

86. *Ibid.*, Brigadier-General F.W. Wooton to the CDEE, 7 September 1971.

87. *Ibid.*, Commodore W.P. Hayes to the CDEE, 21 September 1971.

88. *Ibid.*, Rear-Admiral Murdoch to the CP, 1 October 1971.

89. *Ibid.*, Letellier to the CP, 22 October 1971. See also Letellier, *Reform*, pp. 121-2.

90. *Program to Increase B and B*, p. 22 (Activity no. 145). The paragraph of the presentation read at the time of the 1973 briefing tour repeated the terms of the program almost word for word (see DG Hist, 90/444, 160-8).

91. NDRMS, 5570-20-7, vol. 1, Brigadier-General F.W. Wooton to the CDEE, 26 July 1972.

92. *Ibid.*, Commodore W.P. Hayes to the CDEE, 29 August 1972.

93. *Ibid.*, Letellier to the DCP, 19 September 1972; Murdoch to the Commandants of the three institutions, 25 September 1972.

94. NDRMS, 5570-20-7, vol. 3, Brigadier-General F.W. Wooton to the D Edn, 5 September 1973.

95. *Review 1974*, pp. 89-90.

96. NDRMS, 5570-20-7, vol. 3. See Major-General J.J. Paradis to the DPED, 17 December 1975 and Letellier, *Reform*, p. 179 (for 1974).

97. *COL 1977*, pp. 197-99.

98. *OLP(M)*, p. 2-6-7.

99. *Ibid.*, p. 2-6-7.

100. *Plan 83-84*, p. 13.

101. *Plan sur le bilinguisme*, pp. A-39 and A-40.

102. *Briefing to Minister*, p. 14.

103. "Canada's National Defence College" in *External Affairs, XXIII*, 10, October 1971; Colonel A.P. Willis, "A New Professional Development System for Canadian Forces Officers" in *Canadian Defence Quarterly/Revue canadienne de Défense*, vol. 3, no. 2, fall 1973, pp. 39-40.

104. Authors' archives. These details are from a letter concerning these events from Rear-Admiral S. Mathwin Davis, who was Commandant of the College in 1971-1972, to the Director History dated 13 September 1983.

105. *Ibid.* and NDRMS, 5570-20-7, vol. 2, General F.R. Sharp to the DM, 8 February 1972.

106. NDRMS, 5570-20-7, vol. 2, Rear-Admiral S.M. Davis to the CDEE, 24 March 1972.

107. *Ibid.*, Davis to the CDEE, 27 April 1972.

108. *Ibid.*, Colonel J. Hanna to the CDEE, 24 May 1972.

109. *Ibid.*, Rear-Admiral R.W. Murdoch to the CP, 2 June 1972.

110. *Ibid.*, Lieutenant-General D.C. Laubman to the CDS, 20 June 1972.

111. Ibid., Lieutenant-General A.C. Hull, 13 July 1972.
112. Ibid., Letellier to the CDEE, 24 July 1972.
113. Ibid., Lieutenant-General D.C. Laubman to the CDS, 31 July 1972.
114. Ibid., General Sharp to the CP, 31 August 1972.
115. NDRMS, 1211-280/C2-2, Colonel A.P. Wills to the DGBB, 28 February 1974.
116. One of the authors, J. Pariseau, attended this September 1985 conference in company with the Deputy Minister and the Chief of the Defence Staff.
117. Authors' archives. Rychard A. Brûlé, (student of Course XLII) to the Commandant of the NDC, in a 12 June 1989 memorandum.

## Chapter 15

1. DG Hist, Kardex 324.009(D500), *Quebec Command Adm. Order No 1*, 2 July 1952. (CATS mandate as of 1 September 1952).
2. Ibid., letter from CO CATS to HQ Eastern Quebec Area, 18 November 1952.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., HQ Que Comd Directive, 30 March 1953.
5. Kelly, L.G., *Language Training in the Armed Forces*, Ottawa, Report No. 23, Royal Commission on B and B, February 1966, pp. 20-25.
6. DG Hist, Kardex 324.009(D500). F. Dostie to Brigadier F.S. Fleury, 8 April 1953.
7. Ibid., HQC 5022-V5, 10 January 1958.
8. Ibid., Message Que Comd to HQEQA, 29 April 1958.
9. Ibid., SDI, Letter No. 58/78, 8 December 1958 and SDI Letter No. 59/16, 28 April 1959.
10. DG Hist, 1326-1865. Compiled from Annex A of annual historical reports from the *Dépôt du R22<sup>e</sup>R* between 1959 and 1968.
11. Kelly, p. 32.
12. DG Hist, Training Command Instruction 2/68; CFOO 5.7.1, 6 February 1970.
13. CFOO 5.7.3, 1 May 1968.
14. DG Hist, naval file *HMCS D'Iberville*, *DPR Armed Forces News*, RCN 20/52, HQ, 30 January 1952. See also J. Eayres, *In Defence of Canada*, vol. III, pp. 132-133 and Gravel, *Le Québec et la guerre*, pp. 112-3.
15. DG Hist, *HMCS Montcalm* file, Cdr. K.L. Miller to Dr. T.W. Cook, Human Resources Research Section, DRB, 17 November 1952. Miller's document was entitled *Effects of Language Differences on Organisation and Training*.
16. Ibid.
17. DG Hist, *HMCS Hochelaga* file.
18. DG Hist, 90/444, *Trg Lng I*. Minutes of the 5/67 meeting in Ottawa of the Individual Training Organization.



19. Kelly, p. 15.
20. DG Hist, *Report No. 81*, pp. 11-14. RCAF Org. Order 13/51, 20 March 1951.
21. DG Hist, *RCAF Diaries*, Saint-Jean (18-8) and Trenton (21-3).
22. DG Hist, RCAF Org. Order 5.7.3, 1 January 1955.
23. DG Hist, RCAF Org. Orders, 1 April 1959 and 9 September 1960.
24. Kelly, pp. 10-11.
25. NDRMS, 4705-6, vol. I, RCAF RO 273, 13 November 1964.
26. Ibid., memorandum from the DPCAF to the DTO, 12 March 1965.
27. DG Hist, RCAF Org. Order, 1 June 1964.
28. Kelly, pp. 41-2.
29. NDRMS, 4706-6, op. cit., DT4-4 (F/L L.N. de Tilly) to DT4, 8 June 1966.
30. Ibid., A/DGTR to DPGE, 19 May 1967 and PSC Bulletin 67-1.
31. DG Hist, CFOO 5.7.3, 1 May 1968.
32. Message CANFORGEN.039 (D014), 1 March 1972 in CFOO 5.5.3, 5 September 1975.
33. CFOO 5.42, 19 August 1968.
34. CFOO 5.42, 1 December 1979.
35. DG Hist, 91/237, memorandum P4705-1 (DT), 10 January 1966.
36. Ibid.
37. Legaré, op. cit. pp. 228-9.
38. DG Hist, 91/237, letter from the British War Office addressed to DND and other NATO countries, 26 July 1966.
39. Ibid., letter D47405-1 (DGEP), 29 September 1966.
40. DG Hist, 90/444, *Trg Lng I*, letter from Ruth E. Addison of the PSC to Letellier, 17 November 1967.

41. DG Hist, 91/237, letter from Assistant Deputy Minister James A. Sharpe to the Director Vocational and Trades Training at Manpower and Immigration, 13 October 1966.

42. Ibid. All documentation is found here, including the agreement given by the Minister of Education Jean-Jacques Bertrand to Jean Marchand, Minister of Manpower, on 8 February 1967.

43. DG Hist, 90/444, *Trg Lng I*; all material relevant to this agreement is found in this file.

44. See all related correspondence, including minutes of meetings between Defence and the PSC for 1971 to 1973 in *ibid.*, files 110-3 *Language Training-3 — CFLS (Two-phase English Language Training), vol I* and 110 — *Language Training-2 — Div of Resp Between DND and PSCLB, 110-2, vol. I*.

45. Ibid., *Trg Lng I*. DT-4 (Birch-Jones) to the A/DGTR, 13 June 1967.

46. Ibid., 1180-1, *Coordinating Conference on Bilingualism (Dare Study)*, DTPP to the PRB, 24 May 1968.

47. Ibid. *Trg Lng I*, *op. cit.*, minutes of an 11 December meeting, signed by Colonel Ramsay Withers. See also 73/1223, file 1117.

48. DG Hist, 90/444, *Trg Lng I*, 10 June 1968.

49. Ibid., 1211-0, vol. II contains this exchange of correspondence.

50. Ibid., *Trg Lng I*, Major Taschereau, Chairman of the sub-committee, to its members, 2 December 1969.

51. Ibid., minutes of the 11 December 1968 meeting.

52. Ibid., Chassé to Morry, 24 February 1970.

53. Ibid. *Trg Lng II*. BPA/CP to the Chief Librarian, 20 May 1970.

54. Ibid., file P1211-1, vol. II, *Bilingualism and Biculturalism* (hereinafter P1211-1 (II), B&B). *Totem Times*, 22 January 1970.

55. DG Hist, 73/1223, file 1119. Minutes of DC meeting 291, 15 June 1970.

56. DG Hist, 90/444, file F1211-16. *French and English Crews*, report by Simard, 25 June 1970 and comments by Chassé, 10 July 1970, addressed to the A/CP (Mil).

57. Ibid., *Trg Lng II*, report by Brigadier-General R.S. Graham of TC, dated 21 May 1970, commenting on FRANCOTRAIN.

58. Ibid., *Trg Lng I, Study of French and English Language Training (FELT) in the CF, 1970 and beyond*, December 1970.

59. Ibid., Carr to Sharp, 2 April 1971.

60. Ibid., 1211-1, vol. III, Withers to Chassé, 2 October 1970.

61. Ibid., Chassé's remarks, 15 October 1970.

62. Ibid., Hanington to Chassé, 16 October 1970.

63. Ibid., Chassé's remarks, 22 October 1970.

64. Ibid., ADC to Chassé, 5 October 1970. The same comment concerning a possible drop in operational effectiveness due to language courses was made to Chassé by Major-General A.C. Hull, Air Transport Command, on 7 October 1970.

65. Ibid., Chassé's comments, 14 October 1970 and those of 26 October 1970 in 1211-0, vol. III, op. cit.

66. Ibid., 1211-0, vol. III, Turcot to Chassé, 8 October 1970. Chassé's comments on Turcot's memorandum contained a long diatribe concerning the point already mentioned by ADC, namely the impact that language courses would have on the effectiveness of the CAF if they were given to thousands of military personnel at the same time. Turcot had only written a short sentence about this, saying that this question would have to be considered and the response of Ottawa and the commands would have to be co-ordinated.

67. Ibid., *Trg Lng I*, D.S. Boyle, 19 April 1971.

68. Ibid., Fournier to D.S. Boyle, 19 April 1971.

69. Ibid., Boyle to his DT, 21 April 1971.

70. Ibid., Boyle to his DT, 7 May 1971.

71. Ibid., Fournier to Boyle, 31 May 1971.

72. Ibid., message DLT-311 to COMTRAINCOM, 7 July 1971. See also *Terms of Reference for CFHQ Language Training Agencies*, in file 110-3, *Language Training-3 — CFLS*.

73. Ibid., *Trg Lng I*. See draft response prepared by Tousignant, 23 April 1971 and Boyle to Carr, 17 May 1971.

74. Ibid., Message CP-317, 16 July 1971.

75. Ibid., *Trg Lng II*, Message DGBB-18, 3 March 1971. 76. DG Hist, TB circular 1971-21, 9 March 1971.

77. DG Hist, 90/444, *Trg Lng II*, Message DLT-33, 29 March 1971.

78. Ibid., CP Instruction 3/71, dated 31 May 1971.

79. Ibid., summary of document read by Hanna at Winnipeg, 23 July 1971. See also, in 1211-0, vol. III, letter from D.G. Hartle of Treasury Board to T.G. Morry, ADM(Mat), 16 June 1971 or in *110- Language Training-2* (hereinafter *110-Lng Trg*).

80. Ibid., Hanna, 23 July 1971, Winnipeg.

81. Ibid., Fournier to commands, 18 June 1971, where a liaison was set up for regional or local administrative control of students.

82. Ibid., file P1211-19, *Costing DGBB Financing* (hereinafter P1211-19) Macdonald to Pelletier, 7 July 1971.

83. Ibid., *R & R, vol. II*. Report on B and B activities submitted to the DM, 22 July 1971, covering the period 1 April to 30 June 1971.

84. Ibid.

85. Ibid., *Trg Lng II*. Communiqué, 23 July 1971.

86. Ibid., *R & R, vol. II*. Report to the DM, 26 July 1971, for the period 1 January to 31 March 1971.

87. Ibid. See the minutes of the CDS Advisory Committee meeting, 9 June 1971, a good part of which was spent on this problem.

88. Ibid

89. Ibid

90. Ibid

91. Ibid

92. Ibid., file P1211-18 —*Language Training* (hereinafter 1211-18 *Lng Trg*), which contains correspondence between Ottawa and Winnipeg about this very question, between 28 June 1971, the date of the last proposal from Winnipeg, and 29 July 1971, the day Message CP-318 agreed to this project and added that the DT was the sole person to be contacted on this subject at CFHQ.

93. Ibid., P1211-14, *NATO Conference on Special Training*, which contains a copy of the minutes written by Hanna.

94. Ibid., Laubman to Milroy, 28 September 1971.

95. Ibid., file 110-3, *Language Training-3 — CFLS*, vol. 1, DT 2-3 to his superior, 28 September 1971.

96. Ibid., Letellier to D.S. Boyle, 30 September 1971.

97. Ibid., Lieutenant-Colonel G.T. Whittington of TC to the CDS, for the DLT, 8 December 1971.

98. Ibid., Letellier to Colonel Hutchins, 17 December 1971.

99. Ibid., Hutchins (signed by R. MacGregor) to Letellier, 23 December 1971.

100. Ibid., DGBB to the CG, via CP Dextraze, 9 February 1972.

101. Ibid., Milroy to Sharp. 10 March 1972.

102. Ibid., memorandum from MacGregor, March 1972 and from Tousignant, 13 April 1972.

103. Ibid., *Plans and Programs*, letter from DM Cloutier to Morry and Boyle, DCP(Mil), 15 October 1971, which recommended beginning these discussions as a follow-up to the conditions issued by Treasury Board on 16 June.

104. Ibid., *110-Lng Trg, 110-2 DND/PSC Language Agreement —vol. II*, where the reader will find all the correspondence summing up the transactions in both intra-departmental meetings on this topic and those bringing together representatives of the two government agencies. Treasury Board agreement was granted by TB 711752, which is dated 1 June 1972 but states that the Treasury Board decision was taken on 25 May.

105. Ibid., *110-2 DND/PSC Language Agreement — vol. II*, op. cit., minutes of 24 May 1972 meeting. This theme recurs frequently in the documentation in the files cited in the previous reference.

106. Ibid.

107. Ibid. *110-Lng Trg*, Charles Lussier, Commissioner of the PSC of Canada, to Sylvain Cloutier, 14 March 1972.

108. Ibid.

109. Ibid.

110. Ibid., minutes of the previously cited 12 January 1972 meeting where the CO of CFLS expressed a desire to keep these military personnel and, according to Hanna, the Language Bureau did not object. On the other hand, Training Command recommended on 7 February that the military presence be confined to the area of research and development (Brigadier-General R.P. St. John to Letellier). See also Letellier to the DGCP, 16 March 1972, as well as 110-3 *Language Training-3*, Brigadier-General A.S. Graham, DGOM, to Letellier, 8 May 1972 and on the following 18 May, DLT to the Director Establishments and Personnel Requirements Evaluation.

111. Ibid. *110-Lng Trg*, Union of National Defence Employees to J.H. Barron, 9 February 1972, and Letellier to Barron, 21 February. On 9 February, the Union wrote that they had met with Barron on this matter on 25 January and he had said he knew nothing about this question. On 18 January, Barron had written to the DGBB after having read the minutes of a December 1971 meeting where a great deal had been said about hiring teachers but no representative from the Civilian Personnel office at Defence was present. There would have been fewer errors in these minutes if he or one of his assistants had been at the meeting, Barron wrote forcefully. Ibid., file 110-2 *DND/PSC Language Agreement*, vol. II, Barron to Letellier, 18 January 1972.

112. Ibid. *110-Lng Trg*, containing the notes written in Ottawa to prepare for the planned 20 June 1972 visit and the report of same written by Hanna the following 20 July. Message DGBB 22, 7 July, sent to all military and civilian units in the Department repeats these conditions.

113. Ibid., Message CP312, 16 March 1972, to the DT.

114. Ibid., *Principal Points Discussed at a Meeting Held at Training Command HQ — Winnipeg, 14 January 1972*, written by Hanna on 21 January 1972.

115. Ibid., all the steps resulting from what at the outset was supposed to be only a formality are contained here.

116. Ibid., and 110-2 *DND/PSC Language Agreement* — vol. II.

117. Ibid. *110-Lng Trg*, all documents are found here, including the minutes of the important 27 July 1973 meeting, written by Hanna on 31 July.

118. Ibid., Letellier to Boyle, 18 June 1973.

119. Letellier, *Reform*, p. 116.
120. DG Hist, 90/444. *110-Lng Trg*, letter to NDHQ for Letellier, 24 July 1973.
121. *Program to Increase B & B*, Activity 066, p. 12.
122. See DG Hist, 90/444, *Plans & Programs* and FLUs-2, where various persons, including the CP, D.S.Boyle, intervened to support the necessity of such a directive.
123. *Program to Increase B&B*, op. cit.
124. Letellier, *Reform*, pp. 163-5.
125. DG Hist, 90/444, R & R, Reports from the DLT, 22 September and 20 November 1971, sent to the DBPR demonstrate that these activities were already well in hand by September but the subsidized courses at private schools which had been promised were having difficulty getting started.
126. *Program to Increase B & B*, p. 8 (activity 043 on annotation) and p. 16 (activities 109 and 020 on testing).
127. Letellier, *Reform*, pp. 169 ff.
128. See NDRMS D1211-0, vol. 4 and 5 and DG Hist, 90/444, files 1211-7, *Bilingual Positions — General* and 10-2, *Annotations of Positions — Bilingual*, vol. I and II.
129. Letellier, *Reform*, pp. 50-58.
130. DG Hist, 90/444, file BDF-1211-4, vol. I, DMRE to the General Commanding TC, 27 September 1967 and several documents in 1211-7, *Bilingual Positions — General*, concerning the designation operation to, begin on 28 July 1966 and be completed by 12 July 1967. The discussion on the flexibility of designation occurred mainly at TC, to which CFB St-Jean belonged.
131. Ibid., 1211-7, *Bilingual Positions — General*, General Commanding Mobile Command to CFHQ, 6 April 1971.
132. Ibid., *Ministerial Inquiry*, C142-3 and McAlpine to Letellier, 10 September 1971.
133. Ibid., Letellier to Tousignant, 24 July 1972.
134. Ibid., Tousignant to the DGBB and several other members of the office, 28 September 1972 and letter from the Director General Program Control (D Prog C), to all commands and major offices at NDHQ, 2 October 1972, which explains in detail

the criteria for designation of a bilingual position and the level of bilingualism required for each. The document essentially repeated that of 28 September.

135. Ibid., Tousignant, 28 September 1972.

136. Ibid., Dewar to Letellier, 11 October 1972.

137. Ibid., Hanna to Letellier, 12 October 1972.

138. Ibid., Hanna to Tousignant and Letellier, 18 October 1972.

139. Ibid., Tousignant to Letellier and Dewar to Letellier, 30 October 1972.

140. Ibid., 10-2, *Annotation of Positions — Bilingual*, vol. I, Tousignant to the SEC ADM(Fin), 26 January 1983.

141. Ibid., *Trg Lng*, vol. II, DT 2-3-2 to General Commanding TC, 20 May 1972.

142. Ibid., R & R, report from the CDS to the DM, 26 April 1971.

143. Ibid., DLT to the DBPR, 22 September 1971.

144. Ibid., *B & B Plans and Programs*, 20-2, vol. I, report of Lieutenant Colonel R.I. Bachand, 30 November 1972, cited above.

145. Ibid., and *FLUs-I*, minutes of a meeting on 13 June 1972, op. cit.

146. Ibid., 1211-0, vol. III, memorandum, 10 June 1971, written by the Technical Services Section at CFB Trenton, op. cit.

147. *Program to Increase B & B*, p. 17.

148. DG Hist, 90/444, R & R, Vice-Admiral H.A. Porter to all, 10 April 1972.

149. *Program to Increase B & B*, pp. 2 and 3.

150. Ibid., pp. 3 and 4 of Annex D.

151. Ibid. and file 160-8, in text of 1973 information briefing, op. cit.

152. In the House, February 1976, Minister James Richardson replied to a question that the CAF had 1,856 unilingual Francophones in 1972-1973, 3,018 in 1973-1974 and 6,038 in 1974-1975. House of Commons, *Debates*, vol. XI, 16 February 1976, p. 10966.

153. *Program to Increase B & B*, op. cit.



154. See, for example, minutes of the CDS Advisory Committee meeting 27/70, held on 10 November 1970, 73/1223, file 1117.

155. Minutes of DC meeting 322, 10 April 1972.

156. DG Hist, 90/444. 110-3, *Language Training-3 — CFLS*, DGBB to the DT, 10 July 1972 and file 68, *Base Development Saint-Jean*, vol. I, Message DGP 970 sent to the commands concerned, 11 August 1972.

157. Ibid., *Base Development Saint-Jean*, vol. I, minutes of Defence Management Committee meeting, 10 October 1972 and memorandum to the DGQ, 13 October prepared by the CDS's office.

158. Ibid., text of presentation made by Colonel Gordon Forth, CO of CFLS, for the base CO, who was absent at the time.

159. Archives of Captain Serge Bernier, member of the committee responsible for organizing this ceremony at CFB Saint-Jean.

160. DG Hist, 90/444, *Base Development Saint-Jean*, vol. I, memorandum from Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell, 17 September 1970, op. cit.

161. Minutes of Defence Committee meeting 301, 21 December 1970.

162. DG Hist, 90/444. P1211-19, note from Elcock, 16 April 1972.

163. Ibid., 1211-0, vol. III, memorandum, 10 June 1971, from the Technical Services Section of CFB Trenton, op. cit.

164. Ibid., Macdonald to Pelletier, 7 July 1971.

165. Ibid., *Trg Lng I*, op. cit.

166. Ibid., P1450-1, vol. I, *Briefings Presentation etc.* — Speech by Sharp on a visit to SHAPE in Belgium, between 23 and 28 April 1972.

167. Ibid., 1211-18 *Lag Trg*, DLT to the Assistant DGBB, 5 August 1971.

168. Ibid., 160-8, text of presentation, op. cit.

169. Ibid., report from Hanna, 12 September 1973.

170. Authors' archives, Boyle to all commands, 17 October 1972.

171. Ibid., *Plans & Programs*, Hanna, 12 September 1973.

172. Ibid., 160-8, report on briefing tour to Gagetown, 24 and 25 April, 1973.
173. Ibid., report from Hanna, 12 September 1973.
174. Ibid., 1211-0, vol. III, memorandum, 10 June 1971, from Technical Services Section at CFB Trenton, op. cit.
175. Ibid., *Plans & Programs*, Davies to Boyle, 4 December 1972.
176. Ibid., Boyle to Davies and Letellier, 5 December 1972. See also Hanna, 12 December.
177. Ibid., 160-8, op. cit.
178. Ibid., questions at Saint-Hubert on the afternoon of 6 March 1973.
179. Ibid., 1211-0, vol. III. Chassé's comments, 26 October 1970.
180. Ibid., 1211-0, vol. III, Dextraze to commands, 22 July 1971, op. cit.
181. Ibid., *FLUs-2*, minutes of a meeting organized by McAlpine, 13 June 1972 (dated 16 June).
182. Ibid., *Plans & Programs*, Hanna, 12 December 1972.
183. Ibid., 160-8.
184. Ibid., 1211-0, vol. III, 10 June 1971 memorandum from the Technical Services Section at CFB Trenton, op. cit.
185. Ibid., 1211-1, vol. III, 29 September 1971 report (also in *R & R*).
186. Ibid., 160-8, problems concerning BLTP brought up by visitors from Ottawa during the briefing tour in 1973.
187. Ibid.
188. Ibid.
189. *110-Lug Trg*, Boyle at an 8 May 1973 meeting; the minutes are dated 15 May 1973.
190. Ibid. *Plans & Programs*, minutes of a 9 March 1973 meeting.
191. Ibid., *110-Lng Trg*, minutes of the 8 May 1973 meeting, op. cit.

192. Ibid., file 70, *Costing & Funding B & B Programs* (hereinafter 70-vol. II), Lieutenant-Colonel Labelle to the DMPC, 29 August 1973.
193. Ibid., 160-8, Ross to Letellier and others, 30 November 1973.
194. Ibid., *Franco, vol. I*, Letellier to Boyle, 15 February 1973.
195. Ibid., 160-8, report of Hanna's and Lehmann's visit to Halifax and Shearwater, 28 February-1 March, 1973.
196. Ibid., *Plans & Programs*, minutes of 9 March 1973 meeting, op. cit.
197. Ibid., *110-Lng Trg*, Deane to Cloutier, 18 October 1972.
198. Ibid., 160-8. See reports of the tour, including questions and fears expressed by the audience.
199. Letellier, *Reform*, pp. 123-126.
200. NDRMS, 1211-280/C2-2, vol. I, which contains everything concerning the Blackburn/Duplantie study.
201. *OLP(M) 1980*, Chapter 6, Part 2.
202. DG Hist, *Annual Report of the Commandant of RMC, 1979-1980*.
203. DG Hist, 90/444, 1211-0, vol. III. Dextraze, 22 July 1971, op. cit.
204. Ibid., 160-8, report by Hanna, 12 September 1973.
205. Ibid., *Trg Lng I*, ADGBB to the DLT and DBPR, 16 June 1971.
206. *Review 1974*, p. 36. See pages 28 to 38 concerning other data mentioned above.
207. Letellier, *Reform*, pp. 169-176, 191-194, 207-210 and 213- 220.
208. For more about this task force see *ibid.*, pp. 225-26 and 230.
209. *COL 1977*, p. 205.
210. *Ibid.*, p. 205.
211. *Ibid.*, pp. 203-6.
212. *Ibid.*

213. *Ibid.*, p. 207.
214. DG Hist, 90/444. P1211-19, memorandum from Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell, 17 September 1970, *op. cit.*
215. Authors' archives, summary of questions and answers, 5 March 1973 at Saint-Hubert.
216. *COL 1977*, pp. 233-235.
217. *Ibid.*, pp. 37-38 and authors' archives, Nixon to Yalden, 25 October 1978.
218. Authors' archives, Nixon to Yalden, 25 October 1978.
219. Minutes of DMC meeting 294, 12 April 1979, *op. cit.* pp. 5, 8, 10, and 11.
220. Authors' archives, Maurice LeClair to C.R. Nixon, 13 August 1979.
221. *OLP(M)*, p. 2-14-2.
222. Authors' archives, Falls to all commands, 19 March 1980.
223. *Ibid.*
224. DGOL, 1214-25, vol. I. Minutes of the DGOL-CCOL-RCOL meeting in Ottawa on 26, 27 June 1979.
225. *Ibid.*, where the reader can follow the twists and turns of this affair.
226. Aide-memoire, p. 3, and conversations with Charles Trottier, co-ordinator of teaching for all bases in eastern Canada, between 15 and 17 February 1984, when Serge Bernier spent a period working at Mobile Command HQ.
227. DGOL, 1214-25, minutes of the meeting on 26 and 27 June 1979, *op. cit.*
228. *Ibid.*, 1213-3, vol. 2, Vice-Admiral A.L. Collier to the DGOL, 14 July 1978.
229. NDRMS, 1213-3, vol. 2. MARCOM to NDHQ, 16 October 1978.
230. *Ibid.*, Smith to MARCOM, 6 December 1978.
231. *Ibid.*, Simard to Brigadier-General R.L. Bell, Director General Personnel Careers Officers (DGPCO), 4 June 1982.
232. *Ibid.*

233. Ibid., Bell to MARCOM, 4 May 1984.
234. *Joint Committee, 19 November 1981*, p. 40.
235. Ibid., p. 46.
236. Ibid., p. 48.
237. Ibid., pp. 47 and 48.
238. Authors' archives. *A Study on Official Languages Command and Control, Training and Infrastructure (Military)*, 15 March 1982, 48 pp. (annexes and tables). (Hereinafter *McLaws Report*.)
239. Ibid., p. 4-4.
240. FMC 1211-1, *SSO Lang Trg Working File*. Minutes of annual meeting of the CCOLs in Ottawa, 11 to 13 May 1977.
241. Aide-memoire, p. 3 and FMC 1211-0, vol. II, Message ADM(Per) 093, August 1979, in which Smith rejects this idea: "I must advise that we have deferred consideration of making language training a career course for anglophones and francophones...".
242. C. Connor and H. Marr, *Description and Documentation of the Bilingualism Model, ORAE Project Report No. 315*, Ottawa, May 1987.
243. *McLaws Report*, p. 1 3-3, 3-4 and Annex C.
244. FMC 1211-0, vol. II, *Study on Official Languages Training —FMC Comments*, 8 July 1982. (Hereinafter *FMC Comments — 82*).
245. Handwritten notes by Major P.S. Aubin in the margin of the COL 1983 report. Files from CCOL at CFTS, consulted in August 1984.
246. *McLaws Report*, Annex E.
247. Ibid., p. 6-1.
248. *OLP(M)*, Chapter 6.
249. *Plan 83-84*, pp. 4-6.
250. *3<sup>rd</sup> Working Study*, pp. 19-21.
251. Ibid., pp. 21-25.

252. Ibid., p. 9.
253. Ibid., pp. 11-12.
254. Ibid., pp. 14-16.
255. Ibid., p. 24.
256. *15 Years After*, p. 19.
257. *3<sup>rd</sup> Working Study*, pp. 34-36 ff., including 47-48.
258. Ibid., pp. 28 and 47-8.
259. *15 Years After*, p. 56.
260. Ibid., p. 18.
261. Authors' archives, *Policy Paper — Military Second Language Training* [from the CDS], 14 January 1986, p. 8 (hereinafter *CDS, 14 January 1986*).
262. Ibid., p. 12.
263. Ibid., pp. 12-17 and *Personnel Newsletter 6/85*, 31 December 1988, p. 3.
264. *RODB*, vol. 2, pp. 26-29 (entitled *Linguistic and Bilingual Requirements*) and p. 73.
265. DG Hist, 90/444, *CMCs*, DGBB to the Director General Careers Development, 10 November 1972. The DGBB made several quick suggestions on this date that B & B objectives be superimposed on the program recommendations. He appeared unhappy about the omission and seemed to be intervening in this issue uninvited, with no illusions.
266. Ibid. *Personnel Newsletter 6/85*, 31 December 1985, p. 3.
267. Ibid., p. 4.
268. Ibid., p. 5.
269. *CDS, 14 January 1986*, op. cit, pp. 22-3.
270. Ibid. p. 25.
271. Ibid., p. 29.

272. Authors' archives. Instruction ADM(Per) 6/85, p. 10.
273. Ibid., pp. 13-14.
274. Ibid., pp. 24-25.
275. Ibid., pp. 25-35.
276. *15 Years After*, pp. 51-52.
277. Ellis, R.T., (Major). *Development of Improved Selection Methods for French Language Training, Research Report 86-4* (Toronto: Canadian Forces Personnel Applied Research Unit, 1986), pp. VII and VIII.
278. Ibid., p. VIII.
279. Ibid.
280. Authors' archives. *MSLTP Implementation Directive 2/86 — Criteria for Military Second Language Training Courses*, 29 August 1986, p. 12.
281. Ibid., p. 19.
282. Ibid., p. 29.
283. Ibid., p. 32.
284. *COL 1987*, p. 1.
285. Ibid., p. 4.
286. Ibid.
287. *Briefing Minister*, pp. 16-17.
288. Ibid., pp. 19-23 and 29-30.
289. *Standing Committee — Defence, May 1987*, p. 11.
290. Ibid., p. 26.
291. Ibid., pp. 27-28.
292. Ibid., pp. 14-15.
293. Ibid., p. 23.

294. *Joint Committee, May 1987*, pp. 12 and 32.
295. *Ibid.*, p. 11.
296. *Ibid.*, p. 15.
297. *Ibid.*
298. *Standing Committee — Defence, May 1987*, pp. 14 and 15.
299. *Joint Committee, May 1987*, p. 17.
300. *Ibid.* pp. 22-23.
301. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
302. *Standing Committee — Defence, May 1987*, p. 26.
303. *Joint Committee, May 1987*, p. 24.
304. *Ibid.*, p. 29.
305. *Joint Committee, May 1987*, p. 32.
306. Authors' archives, Dick to Fortier, 25 June 1987.
307. Minutes of DMC meeting 393, 31 August 1987.
308. *15 Years After*, p. 23.
309. *Ibid.*
310. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
311. Authors' archives, *Personnel Newsletter 8/87*, p. 8.



## Chapter 16

1. *Military Dictionary, English-French/French-English*, Colonel J.H. Chaballe, prepared under the direction of the Chief of General Staff, Canada, 1945, p. viii of Introduction.
2. NAC, RG 24, vol. 17630, file 013-3, correspondence between L. Pacaud, co-secretary at the Canadian High Commission in London, and G.J. Desbarats, ADM-DND, 30 April 1923.
3. *The Canadian Annual Review — Federal Administration and Politics — 1943*, Castell Hopkins, pp. 94-95. Also *Debates, House of Commons, Fifth Session — Seventeenth Parliament*, 1934, Index p. 30, *Bureau for Translation Bill*.
4. Authors' archives, Annex E, p. 1 of Chief of Personnel directive 6/72, NDHQ, April 1972.
5. NAC, RG 24, vol. 17630, file 013-3, report on the Bureau for Translation, 28 February 1940.
6. Beaulieu, A. and J. Hamelin, *Les journaux du Québec de 1764 à 1964*, Québec, 1965, p. 127, no. 1085 — *Le Nationaliste*, 1904-1922 — nationalist weekly; p. 133, no. 1132 — *l'Ordre*, 1934-1935 — nationalist daily; p. 149, no. 1265 — *La Renaissance*, 1935 — political and literary weekly.
7. NAC, RG 24, vol. 1506, file 683-1-32, *The Official History of the Canadian Forces*, DG Hist to the CGS, 20 September 1937.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid., letter from Mrs Asselin to the CGS, 2 February 1939.
10. The Bureau had several names: the [TRANS] Army Technical Translations Bureau, the Bureau of Bilingual Publications and the Army Language Bureau. But it was to remain for a long time under the direction of the Director of Military Training.
11. NAC, RG 24, vol. 5589, file NSS 10-1-6, *Translating Training Documents into French* by Colonel J.K. Lawson, Dir Mil Training at the CGS, 9 July 1941.
12. *National Defence Annual Report, Fiscal Year ending 31 March 1942*, p. 13.
13. NAC, RG 24, vol. 5589, file NSS-10-16, August 1941.
14. Ibid., 20 August 1941.
15. Ibid.

16. NAC, RG 24, vol. 5589, file NSS-10-1-6, Cossette to the VCNS, 29 October 1941.

17. Ibid., Mills to the Minister, 19 December 1941.

18. DG Hist, 112.3S2009(D36), letter from Wing Commander James A. Sharpe, Secretary for Air, to Colonel Henri DesRosiers, DM/Def. (national) (Army), 12 December 1942.

19. Ibid., *Bureau of French Publications*, memo from the DMT to the CGS, 7 January 1943.

20. Ibid., list of manuals translated, letter from Colonel J. Chaballe to M. Séguin, 29 March 1943.

21. NAC, RG 24, vol. 5589, file NSS-10-1-6, memo from J.P. Chevassu to ADM A.B. Coulter, 23 May 1943 and memo from J.P. Chevassu to the Superintendent of the Translation Bureau, 13 April 1943.

22. Chaballe, J.H., *Military Dictionary/Dictionnaire militaire*. Ottawa, 1945, King's Printer, Introduction, p. viii-ix.

23. *National Defence Annual Report, Fiscal year ending 31 March 1945*, p. 41.

24. Glassco Report by the Royal Commission on Government Organization, December 1962, vol. 3, chap. 6, vol. 3, p. 103.

25. NAC, RG 24, vol. 17630, file 013-2, *Bilingual Signposts, Letterheads & Pamphlets*, 27 June 1950.

26. DG Hist, 1435-2, *French Canadian Rep in Canadian Armed Forces*, letter from Brigadier J.P.E. Bernatchez to Brigadier J.V. Allard, 31 October 1950 and Allard's reply dated 8 November 1950. See also Allard, *Memoirs*, p. 164.

27. The report lists a total of 180 publications in French. We note that in fact there are 72 Canadian manuals rather than the 63 mentioned. If we add the available numbers, the correct sum is 190.

28. NAC, RG 24, vol. 19402, file S1435-2, *Appendix D, French Language Training Manuals*, 15 December 1950.

29. PAC, RG 24, vol. 19042, file 013-2, vol. I. *French version of King's Regulations* by Major C. Falardeau, Sec Pers Members Committee to the Sec Defence Council, 25 April 1951.

30. Ibid., note from the AMP to the CAS, 7 May 1951.

31. *Ibid.*, Defence Council meeting no. 54, 31 May 1951.
32. NAC, RG 6,G2, vol. 741, file 33-SS-T-1, *Unit Survey Report, National Defence Section, Bureau for Translation, Secretary of State Dept.*, 25 February 1953.
33. The first French-language edition, as well as the December 1966 corrected edition, indicates that this volume was published in 1957. This is incorrect; it should read: 27 April 1959.
34. NAC, RG 6,G2, vol. 743, *History of the Second World War — translation*, James A. Sharpe to P. Daviault, Bureau for Translation, and reply, 30 June and 11 July 1960.
35. DG Hist, *Bilingualism*, vol. 1, 1961 to July 1968. Associate Minister to Chairman, Chief of Staff, 19 December 1961.
36. *Ibid.*, personal and confidential memorandum, 27 December 1961.
37. We cannot determine who originally had the idea of expanding the Translation Bureau in Quebec, because the Glassco Report, published in December 1962, mentions this expansion in almost the same terms that Deputy Defence Minister E.B. Armstrong used the previous April.
38. NAC, RG 24, vol. 17630, file 013-04, vol. 1. Translation requirements in Quebec, Armstrong to Miquelon, 6 April 1972.
39. *Ibid.*, 5 July 1962.
40. *Ibid.*, Sévigny to Halpenny, 5 October 1962.
41. *Ibid.*, Paul Mathieu, Assistant Deputy Minister, to Jean Miquelon, 21 January 1963.
42. Glassco Report, chap. 6, p. 104.
43. NDRMS, 1210-6, vol. 1, *Royal Commission on B & B — Simultaneous Translation Equipment*, D Comm S to the D Sec DS(A)3, 23 August 1965.
44. NDRMS, 1895-3, vol. 1. Canadian Army training manuals publication section, notes from 1 May 1964 and 22 March 1965.
45. LaRivière, Jacques, *Document de travail/Working document*, Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, 1965, in NAC, RG 24, vol. 5589, file NSS 10-1-6.
46. DG Hist, 90/444, file BDF 1211-4, vol. 1, *Brief on Translation of Training Publications & Precs*, by Clavel.

47. Ross Report, p. 95.
48. DG Hist, 90/444, BDF 1211-4, vol. 1, *Production of French Edition Training Manuals*, by Clavel.
49. Ross Report, op. cit.
50. Ibid., p. 130, recommendations 28, 30 and 31, or Appendix PP of Volume I.
51. DG Hist, 90/444, file 1211-3, James A. Sharpe to Caldwell, Sec DS, 22 March 1966.
52. Ibid., Caldwell to Sharpe, 14 April 1966.
53. Ibid., 1211-4, vol. I, Message Comd 15, 17 March 1967, from Valcartier; reply by Colonel Hogarth and memorandum from Letellier, 9 May 1968.
54. Ibid., Sutherland to the DM, CDS, ADM(Per) and DGEP, 8 November 1967. At this meeting, the Cabinet also agreed in principle to federal government aid for creating university degrees in translation and subsidies for students of translation who would then be required to work for the government for a certain number of years.
55. Ibid., memorandum from Lavergne, November 1967.
56. Ibid., Lavergne to Chassé, 6 January 1969.
57. Ibid., BDF 2910, *Publications — General*, W.H. Nichols, CFHQ Pubs, to Caldwell, 13 February 1968 and directive from Caldwell, 15 February.
58. Ibid., Nichols to Caldwell, 15 February 1968 and Letellier to Nichols, 5 April 1968.
59. DG Hist, 90/444, 1211-3-2, memorandum from W.P. Maguire, Director Management Services, 23 November 1967.
60. Ibid., 1211-3-2, DGEP to the DMIS (Directorate of Management Information Systems), 15 November 1968. Noël de Tilly to DMANS (Directorate of Management Services), 16 July 1969 and DMANS to DGEP, 22 July.
61. Ibid., BDF 1211-4. See experimental documents prepared by Alistair Fraser for P.M. Pitfield in December 1967.
62. Ibid., BDF 2910, Nichols to Letellier, 6 December 1968.
63. Ibid., 1211-3, memorandum from Fournier, 9 October 1969 and 12 February 1970.

64. Ibid., 1211-1, vol. III, Lieutenant-Colonel D. Newell, Director Translation and Terminology (DTT), to Letellier, 21 September 1971 and P1211-4, vol. II, Newell to the Bureau of Government Publications, 7 October 1971.

65. Ibid., 1211-3, vol. II, Lieutenant-Colonel W.E. Grant of the CDS's office, to secretaries of CFHQ branches, 30 November 1971.

66. Ibid.

67. Ibid., *R & R*, B and B report, 10 November 1971.

68. Ibid., Grant to branch secretaries, 3 December 1971.

69. Letellier, *Reform*, pp. 60 and 119.

70. DG Hist, file on Brigadier-General Marcel Richard, brief to the *Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism* submitted by Lieutenant-Colonel M. Richard, 13 August 1964. See also DG Hist, 90/444, *R & R*, Richard to Letellier, 25 October 1967 and Letellier to Richard, 30 October 1967.

71. NDRMS, SI210-3(CDS), 16 April 1968. *Bilingualism in the Canadian Armed Forces*, Annex A, p. 13.

72. Ibid., BDF 2910, Fournier to Laurent Clément, Director of Terminology at the Secretary of State Department, 21 March 1968.

73. NDRMS, SI210-3, letter from Fournier to Richard, 26 March 1968 and Letellier, *Reform*, *op. cit.*

74. Ibid., 2921-A-AO-121-EO01X000, vol. 7

75. Ibid., 1211-0, vol. I, Chassé to Armstrong, 15 January 1970. Armstrong to Robertson, 29 January. Then, in 1211-0, vol. III, the action taken by Cabinet on the recommendations of the report commented upon by Defence.

76. DG Hist, 90/444, *R & R*, where the reader will find the relevant correspondence from which we have previously quoted extracts.

77. See Letellier, *Reform*, p. 31.

78. See in DG Hist, 90/444, all of file P1211-4, vol. II which contains a collection of exchanges between the Director Implementation Bilingual Plans and units of the Forces, most of which took place after Message DIBP-25, 25 August 1969 was published. See also 1211-3, where Chassé wrote to the Commander of Administration CFHQ to tell him that henceforward all current orders would have to be produced in both languages, 29 August 1969; and 1211-2 (*Use of Official Languages — General*)

where Lavergne pointed out to Chassé certain anomalies that would have to be changed at CFHQ, 22 August 1969, and Chassé did the same with regard to the DCPRM, 27 August 1969.

79. Ibid., BDF 2910, Lagacé to Allard, 6 December 1968 and Fournier to François Richard (at Valcartier), 2 April 1969 in DBF 1211-4, vol. 1.

80. Ibid., 1211-4, vol. II, Fournier to the CFDC, 18 September 1969. See also, P1211-16, *French and English Ship Crews*, report by Lieutenant-Commander Simard, 25 June 1970, objecting to the fact that CFHQ wanted everything translated at great expense when much already existed in French. This is what held up publication of manuals in French, he claimed. See also Chassé's unequivocal reply on 10 July, forcefully denying this accusation, and alleging that much was borrowed from the French and Belgians.

81. Ibid., 1211-4, vol. II, Chassé to the DGMPDR (Director Manpower Policy Development & Review), 19 November 1970.

82. Ibid., 1211-0, vol. I, op. cit.

83. Ibid., 1211-0, vol. III, op. cit.

84. Ibid., R & R, 26 April 1971 report to the Minister.

85. Ibid., 1211-4, vol. II, ADM(Per) T.G. Morry (for E.B. Armstrong) to Léger, 5 July 1971.

86. Ibid.

87. Ibid., Léger to Cloutier, 16 September 1971.

88. Ibid.

89. Ibid., R & R, report on B and B at Defence, 10 November 1971.

90. Ibid., 1211-1, vol. III, Chassé, 13 October 1970.

91. Ibid., BDF 1211-4, vol.1, memorandum, 9 April 1969, from Fournier stating that \$65,000 had been provided in 1969-1970 for translation contracts related to FRANCOTRAIN.

92. Ibid., P1211-4, vol. II. Chassé to the Deputy Minister, 3 November 1970, in which Chassé, citing the relevant items in the *Treasury Manual of Financial Authority and Procedures*, asked Armstrong's permission to hire contract workers, given the demands of FRANCOTRAIN. H. Mayer, Superintendent of the Translation Bureau, to

Armstrong, 9 March 1971, stating that he agreed with this approach, which had been submitted to him, 15 February.

93. Ibid., LADIF to Dextraze and Dextraze to the VCDS, 16 September 1971.

94. Minutes of DC meeting 307, op. cit.

95. Information given to Jean Pariseau in a telephone conversation with Lieutenant-Colonel J. Kitson, 18 May 1983.

96. DG Hist, 90/444, BDF 2910, Chassé to the DPSO (Director Personnel Support Operations), February 1969. See also Allard's note, March 1969, cited in Chapter 12.

97. NDRMS, 1211-4, vol. II, Godbout to Elcock, 10 May 1971.

98. Ibid., 1211-14-3, vol. 2, Elcock to Fournier, 31 May 1971 and DG Hist, 90/444, BDF 2910, Newell to Elcock, 4 June 1971.

99. NDRMS, 1211-14-3, vol. 2 and Message DO 90, 23 September 1971.

100. Authors' archives. Message C Prog 88, 17 August 1977 and memorandum from Major-General D.G. Loomis, Chief of Program, to Letellier, 12 August 1977. The road to this result was long and winding, according to one of the authors, Jean Pariseau, who had been delegated to represent the Directorate of History on the committee set up to study this matter. Some rapidly taken decisions were left in limbo for weeks and months, before a new process of reflection took place and the same conclusions were reached.

101. DG Hist, 90/444, P1211-14, minutes of the weekly meeting of the DGBB directors, 23 November 1971. See also P1211-14, vol. II, Noël de Tilly to the Department's Translation Section Chief. 12 February 1970, where he stressed that Snidal is responsible for the matter at DND.

102. NDRMS, 1901-60/104, vol. 1, *Regulations, Orders, Manuals and Pamphlets*. Note from the Sec DS, Brigadier R.L. Purves to the CG, 1 December 1964.

103. This is the reason for the many well-expressed and practical interventions, which take the wishes of the government into account, written by Nichols to Letellier and Chassé, in DG Hist, 90/444, BDF 2910 and 1211-4, vol. 1, concerning co-ordination of English/French printing and the specialized equipment and personnel that this would require.

104. NDRMS 1901-60/104, vol. I. *CDS Study Directive S16/69, Centralization and Control of Graphic Arts, CFHQ Publications and Related Services*. General F.R. Sharp, CDS to Chief of Technical Services, 3 September 1970.

105. DG Hist, 90/444, 1211-3, Chassé to the DGPS(DC), 8 December 1969.
106. NDRMS 1901-60/104, vol. 1, op. cit.
107. NDRMS 1901-60/104, vol. 3, *Canadian Forces Publication — Contract Assistance*, memorandum from B.F. Deshaw (A/DSDDI), 21 February 1972.
108. NDRMS, 2900-46, vol. I, *Translation of Canadian Forces Publications*, prepared by Captain A. Gagné and recommended by Major D.J. Perreault, 23 June 1972.
109. Files of Major Paul Clavel, letter from the DGBB, Armand Letellier, to the Sub-Section Chief, Translation Bureau — Quebec, 23 January 1973.
110. DG Hist, 90/444. 1211-0, vol. III, meeting organized by Lieutenant-Colonel J.R. Beveridge, 29 April 1971, for example, on the priorities of side-by-side publications when the Department acquired the appropriate methods for printing. File P1211-4, vol. II contains a memorandum from Newell (19 October 1971) intended to be a draft of directives concerning use of services his Directorate offered and priorities to be followed; another written on 30 November by Colonel W.E. Grant asked recipients at NDHQ to state precisely their future needs.
111. *Program to Increase B & B*, pp. 18-19.
112. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
113. DG Hist, 90/444, *110-Lng Trg-2, Treasury Board Minute 704250*, 16 June 1971.
114. *Ibid.*, P1211-4, vol II, Gouin to Fournier, 27 July 1971 and Fournier to Gouin, 29 July.
115. *Ibid.*, *R & R*, report on B & B, 22 July 1971, covering the period from 1 April to 30 June 1971.
116. *Ibid.*, P1211-4, vol. II, Letellier to Newell, 13 December 1971.
117. Letellier, *Reform*, pp. 119, 120 and 161 ff.
118. Authors' archives. *Presentations to the Executive Committee on Official Languages (ECOL) — 1 February 1988*, including a report on introduction of computer-assisted translation — ADG Hist, 90/444S and LOGOS, pp. 24-32 (hereinafter *Presentations, February 1988*).
119. *Program to Increase B & B*, p. 19.



120. *Presentations, February 1988*, a proposal to create a course in editing administrative French, pp. 14-23.
121. *Program to Increase B & B*, p. 20.
122. *Ibid.*, pp. 20-21.
123. NDRMS, 2900-46, vol. 1, *Status Report — French Translation of CFP*, p. 9, Annex F, 1895-3 (DTTS), 15 December 1972.
124. *Review 1974*, section D.
125. NDRMS, 1211-6-0, vol. 1, DGOL meeting, 7 June 1978, paragraph 6, comments by Lieutenant-Colonel C. Blais, DTTC, 31 March 1978.
126. NDRMS, 2900-46, vol. 6, progress report on translation of general and administrative publications, issued by NDHQ (DTITC), 31 March 1978.
127. *Review 1974*, p. 43.
128. *Ibid.*, pp. 40-50.
129. *Ibid.*, p. 51.
130. *Report to the Defence Management Committee on Bilingualism and Biculturalism in DND*, 6 December 1974, p. 6 of Annex C. (Hereinafter *Report B and B — DND — 1974*.)
131. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
132. *Ibid.*
133. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
134. *COL 1977*, p. 210.
135. *Ibid.*, p. 210.
136. *Ibid.*, p. 211.
137. *Ibid.*, p. 213.
138. *Ibid.*, p. 214.
139. *Ibid.*, pp. 211 and 22.

140. Ibid.

141. Ibid., pp. 210-211.

142. Ibid., pp. 17, 18.

143. Ibid., p. 26.

144. Authors' archives, Nixon to Yalden, 25 October 1978, op. cit.

145. One of the fears raised in 1971 by members of the Technical Services Section at Trenton was in fact about the damage that could result from an inaccurate French technical translation which, they said, would be more serious than the results of an inaccurate translation of administrative terms. (DG Hist, 90/444, P 211-0, vol. In, memorandum of 10 June 1971, op. cit.). Let us note, without engaging in a debate, what harmful effects can be caused by young unilingual Francophones who have only English technical manuals to work with.

146. Chandiooux, John, "Histoire de la Traduction automatique au Canada", *META*, vol. 22, no. 1, March 1977, p. 56.

147. Minutes of DMC meeting 894, 12 April 1979, p. 10 of Annex A.

148. Ibid., pp. 10 and 11 of Annex A.

149. *OLP(M)*, p. 2-3-7.

150. Ibid.

151. Ibid., p. 2-3-9.

152. Ibid., p. 1A-3.

153. Ibid., p. 1-2.

154. Ibid., p. 2-9-3.

155. Letellier, *Reform*, p. 162.

156. DG Hist, 90/444, 1211-4, vol. 2, Director Technical Resource Management (DTRM) to the Chief Technical Services, 2 November 1970.

157. Authors' archives. Study directive, 30 November 1973, entitled *Bilingual Technical Documentation*, signed by major-General D.W. Goss, Chief Engineering and Maintenance and J.R. Killick, Chief Supplies.

158. Ibid.
159. Ibid., *Bilingual Technical Documentation, Report of the Special Study Team*, April 1974, 56 pp. plus annexes.
160. Ibid., *Summary Memorandum to the Defence Management Committee from ADM(Mat)*, 5 June 1974.
161. Ibid., memorandum from Brigadier-General J.G. Mumford, Secretary of the DMC, 12 July 1974.
162. Ibid., *An Overview of Bilingual Work Instruments*, 14 December 1979, pp. 5 and 6.
163. Ibid., pp. 1-5.
164. Ibid., see their comments on pp. 6 and 7.
165. Ibid., pp. 2, 5, 6 and 9.
166. DGOL, 1214-25, vol. II, minutes of the 6 March 1981 meeting of the OLCC, dated the following 19 March.
167. NDRMS, 1711-6-0, vol. I, minutes of this 8 January 1981 meeting.
168. *Joint Committee, 19 November 1981*, p. 41. Intervention by Deputy Minister Nixon who decided to take over from Lieutenant-General Carswell. Carswell (pp. 39-40) gave such a confused answer to a question about translation that it is quite possible that none of the MPs present understood it.
169. FMC, 1211-0, vol. II or 1211-6(Adm), containing a memorandum dated 15 July 1982, which describes the new situation. See also in 1211-6 a letter to all units in the command dated the following 12 August and signed by Brigadier-General W.J. Dabros.
170. DG Hist, 90/444, BDF 1211-4, vol.1, message from Valcartier to Saint-Hubert, 30 October 1967, followed by correspondence between Saint-Hubert and Ottawa in January 1968 (Message DMRE 68, 9 January 1968 to Saint-Hubert; reply from Compt 3095 for DMRE, the following 15 January; DMRE 70 again to Saint-Hubert on 22 January). DG Hist, 90/444, 1211-7, *Bilingual Positions — General*, (hereinafter 1211-7), Message Compt 3119 from Mobile Command for the DMRE, 24 January 1968, and reply on the 26<sup>th</sup> from the DMRE 2-2-3, who agreed to this special arrangement.
171. Ibid., P1211-4, vol. II, Newell to Y.J. Lacoursière, Assistant Superintendent of the Bureau for Translation, 8 November 1971.

172. 3<sup>rd</sup> Working Study, pp. 49-50.

173. Ibid., p. 54.

174. Ibid., p. 42.

175. See *15 Years After*, pp. 83-84.

176. 3<sup>rd</sup> Working Study, pp. 54-55.

177. Authors' archives. *Exigences en matière de bilinguisme lors de communications écrites* [Bilingual requirements for written communications], memorandum 1211-20(DGOL), 17 September 1985.

178. 3<sup>rd</sup> Working Study, pp. 28-33; this situation existed at CFB Calgary and CFB Shilo, for example.

179. File of Mr Jean Délisle, transcript of remarks by Philippe LeQuellec, Assistant Under Secretary of State (translation), written by Roch Blais in October-November 1982.

180. *Plan 83-84*, p. 4.

181. Ibid., p. 6.

182. Ibid., p. 7.

183. Ibid., pp. 36 and 37.

184. *Summary Evaluation*, op. cit., p. 28.

185. Authors' archives, abridged minutes of DMC meeting 357, 19 September 1983.

186. Ibid.

187. Ibid

188. Ibid

189. Ibid

190. Ibid

191. *Study FRANCOTRAIN*, p. 18.

192. Ibid., pp. 17-20.

193. *Ibid.*, p. 24.
194. *COL 1987*, pp. 1-3 and Appendix B.
195. *Briefing Minister*, pp. 27-29.
196. *Ibid.*, pp. 6-10.
197. *Standing Committee*, pp. 5-7 and 17-18.
198. *Joint Committee May 87*, pp. 7, 15, 17, 18 and 34.
199. *Ibid.*, p. 27.
200. Authors' archives, Dick to Fortier, 25 June 1987.
201. Minutes of DMC meeting 393, 31 August 1987, p. 10; comment by General Commanding MARCOM.
202. *Assessment*, p. 31 of Annex A.
203. *Ibid.*, Annex A, p. 32.
204. *Ibid.*, pp. 10, 12, 13, 17 and 25.
205. Authors' archives, Service Paper by Lieutenant-Colonel S. Viel (D'ITC), 22 April 1988, sent to DGOL DesBecquets, para. 13, p. 6. This document was distributed on 25 April to members of the Executive Committee on Official Languages.
206. *Ibid.*, Lieutenant-Colonel Y. Falardeau to C.J. Gauthier, DG Exec Sec.
207. *Ibid.*, Service Paper, p. 4.
208. DG Hist, 90/444, BDF 1211-4, vol. 1, *Canadian Forces Newsletter*, August 1966.
209. *Ibid.*, 1211-3, memorandum, 21 April 1970, SAP to BPA/CP.
210. *Ibid.*, BDF 1211-4, vol. 1, memorandum from Lieutenant-Colonel Brown, Assistant to the Director General Air Operations, to the Director Search and Rescue Operations, 30 September 1968.
211. *Ibid.*, Message CST 29, 15 February 1968.
212. *Ibid.*, minutes of CDS meeting 28/67.

213. Ibid., Message COSOPS 48, 5 September 1968.
214. Ibid., memo from Brown, op. cit.
215. Ibid., Sharp to Allard, 3 October 1968.
216. Ibid., Chassé to Caldwell, 10 October 1968.
217. Ibid., 1211-0, vol. I, CP to the CTS, 27 August 1969.
218. Ibid., 1211-0, vol. II, CACCOMCYP(Pers 300), 3 September 1969.
219. Ibid., Message Pers 774, 4 September 1969.
220. Ibid., note from Chassé, November 1969.
221. Ibid., Message CANFORBASE London, 4 September 1969 and reply from Chassé through his DIBP 50, 11 September 1969.
222. Ibid., Message LOG 1717, 9 September 1969.
223. Ibid., Chassé to the CP, 15 September 1969.
224. Ibid., memorandum from Lilley to his directors, 4 September 1969 and Chassé to the CP the following 15 September.
225. Ibid., 1211-2, following an unsigned report from Air Defence Command, dated 5 November 1969.
226. Ibid., Message DGW 283, 7 November 1969.
227. Ibid., P1211-1, vol. II, Chassé to the D SECUR, 10 December 1969.
228. DG Hist, 73/1223, file 1120, memorandum from the Director Technical Resource Management (DTRM) to the CTS, 2 November 1970.
229. Ibid.
230. COL, *First Annual Report, 1970-1971*, p. 81.
231. DG Hist, 90/444, 1211-0, vol. III contains all relevant documentation.
232. Ibid., P1211-20, Dextraze to the General Commanding Mobile Command, 22 November 1971.
233. Ibid., memorandum L1211-0 (DTRM), 18 December 1970.

234. Ibid., P. 1211-3-2, draft, 23 June 1971. Also see P1211-4, vol. II, Newell to the CO of CFS Shelburne, 20 July 1971.
235. Ibid., P1211-3-2, Letellier to the Deputy Chief Construction Engineering (DCCE), 25 January 1972.
236. COL, *Annual Report 1972-1973*, pp. 286-306.
237. See 1984 *Manual of Abbreviations for the Canadian Forces*.
238. DG Hist, 90/444, P1211-3-2, DGBB to the DCEE, 25 January 1972.
239. Ibid., 160-8, ADGBB to ADC, 30 March 1973.
240. Ibid., report on this trip, which took place between 28 May and 1 June 1973.
241. Ibid., 70 — *Costing and Funding Programme Control Board Meeting, 20 Sept 1973*, **DGBB** to the DCEC, 13 June 1973 (hereinafter *PCB, Sept. 73*).
242. Ibid., VCDS to the ADM(Per), 27 June 1973.
243. Ibid., ADM(Mat) to the VCDS, 30 July 1973.
244. Ibid., VCDS to the ADM(Per), 9 August 1974, DGBB to the ADM(Per), 13 August 1974.
245. *Report on Bilingualism, December 1974*, Annex F, p. 4.
246. *Review 1974*, p. 77.
247. *COL 1977*, p. 54.
248. Ibid., p. 20.
249. Authors' archives. Annex A to a letter from Nixon to Yalden, 25 October 1978.
250. *3<sup>rd</sup> Working Study*, pp. 28-33 and 45.
251. *Assessment*, p. 11. Among the documents consulted, which all mention shortcomings in this area, the reader should see *OLP(M)* and the minutes of the OLCC meetings which have already been cited many times, especially the May 1984 meeting.
252. NDRMS, 7334-34, *DG CANEX Planning Handbook*, 29 February 1968, Chapter 3, item 303.

253. DG Hist, 113-44(D1) *Historical Narrative NDHQ 1934-1944 Regimental Funds Boards, 1940-1944*, p. 1.

254. *Ibid.*, p. 2

255. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

256. DG Hist, 133.44/56 (DI) *Unit Mess and Canteen Funds Inst.*, July 1943, p. 17.

257. DG Hist 75/97, brochure *Maple Leaf Services, Serving the Canadian Army*.

258. NDRMS 1695-0, vol. 1, *Non-Public Fund Activities*, memorandum from J.R. Douglas, Director Review, to Doctor J.C. Arnell, ADM(Fin), 26 July 1968.

259. NDRMS, 7441-71-3, vol. 1, *Reference Council — Minute of the 229<sup>th</sup> Meeting — 7 September 1967*, item III, Report of the Non-Public Fund Study Team.

260. NDRMS 1670-0, vol. 1, *Non-Public Funds Directive 2/68, Part A, Canadian Forces Exchange System — Statement of Planning Policy*, 15 July 1968, signed by Brigadier-General C.H. Mussells.

261. NDRMS, 7331-68-4, vol. 2, *Non-Public Funds Directive 15/68, Part A, Canadian Forces Exchange System, Identification of Exchange System Activities*, signed by Mussells, 18 November 1968.

262. NDRMS, 1655-2, *Non-Public Fund Directive 15/68*, memorandum from Chassé to Mussells, 9 December 1968.

263. NDRMS, 1695-2, vol. 1, *Policy and Criteria, Personnel Support Programs*, Armstrong to Sharp, 2 September 1970.

264. NDRMS, 1655-2, *Exchange System Forms — Bilingualism*, memorandum from Major J.E. Norenus, DCO 4, to DCO 3, 26 November 1971.

265. NDRMS, 1211-14-3, vol. 2, DGPS to the DGBB, 3 August 1971.

266. *Program to Increase B & B*, p. 23.

267. *Review 1974*, Section F, Bilingual Services, p. 78.

268. NDRMS, 1655-2, *B & B Program Review*, memorandum from Major L. Weber, 29 December 1975.

269. *Ibid.*



270. NDRMS, 1655-2, *Bilingualism Policy*, memorandum from A.T. Bowlby to the Director, 10 January 1973.

271. *Ibid.*, note from Butcher to Bowlby, 29 January 1973.

272. NDRMS, 5145-6, *Condition of Service — Canex Study*, 14 March 1972.

273. NDRMS, 1688-1, vol. 1, *Training Status and Progress Report — Report Two for Period 12 May to 6 June 1973* and memorandum from Major J.O.M. Leblanc, 6 June 1973.

274. *Ibid.*, *Handover — CANEX Training*, memorandum from Major J.O.M. Leblanc, 20 January 1975.

275. NDRMS, 1655-2, *CANEX Operations*, letter from Lieutenant-Colonel L.J.R. Lortie to the DGBB; attached is a letter from R.A. Munro, Marketing Manager, Kraft Foods Ltd., to John Poirier, Store Manager, EX Super-Market, Medley, Alberta, dated 22 November 1973.

276. DG Hist, 90/444, 160-8, report on a visit to London, Lahr and Baden between 28 May and 1 June 1973.

277. NDRMS, 1655-1, *B & B Program Review*, Weber, 29 December 1975.

278. NDRMS, 1670-0, vol. 2, *Correspondence to Bases/Stations/individuals/Suppliers*, memorandum from B.W. Park, 16 February 1977.

279. NDRMS, 1655-2, G. Morin, Manager, CANEX department store, CFB Valcartier, to the Exchange System Central Office, 17 September 1976.

280. NDRMS, 1655-2, *Bilingualism Co-ordinator*, Colonel D.J. McLaws, Director CANEX, 4 April 1977.

281. NDRMS, 1655-2, *Translation — Advertising and PR Material*, memorandum from A. Ross Harvey to McLaws, July 1977.

282. NDRMS, 1655-2, *Translation of Official Correspondence*, Tucker to Letellier, 4 August 1977.

283. NDRMS, 1655-2, letter from Principal Jean-Louis Lévesque, *Ecole Général Georges Vanier*, Lahr, Germany, to Letellier, DGBB, 28 February 1977.

284. NDRMS, 1655-2, “Complaint Concerning Bilingualism”, Gauthier to Letellier, 18 March 1977.

285. NDRMS, 1670-1, vol. 3, “Book Sales”, Moore to McLaws, 26 September 1977.

286. NDRMS, 1670-1, vol. 3, "Exchange Purchasing Magazine and Book", Message BX0059, 18 January 1978.
287. NDRMS, 1670-1, vol. 3, "CANEX Supplier — Book & Paperback in English and French", memorandum from McLaws, 7 February 1978.
288. NDRMS, 1670-1, vol. 3, *CANEX Merchandise Offer*, Bulletin N-309-RO-09, 1 June 1978.
289. *COL 1977*, pp. 96-102.
290. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
291. *Review 1974*, pp. 78-9.
292. *COL 1977*, p. 97.
293. *Ibid.*, p. 37.
294. Authors' archives, Nixon to Yalden, 28 October 1978.
295. NDRMS, 1350-1211, vol. 1, *Non-Public Funds, Yalden to Nixon, 13 July 1979*.
296. *Assessment*, Annex A, pp. 22, 23.
297. DG Hist, 90/444, 1180-1, memorandum P4705-4 (DTPP), 24 May 1968 and draft of this document in P1210-3-4705-1, the previous 19 April, accompanied by a note from Colonel Radley-Walters.
298. *Ibid.*, P1211-19, memorandum from Campbell, 31 August 1970.
299. *Ibid.*, Radley-Walters, 19 April 1968.
300. *Ibid.*, Campbell to Chassé, 17 September 1970.
301. *Ibid.*, 1211-1, vol. III, Major-General M. Lipton, 5 October 1970.
302. Minutes of DC meeting 301, *op. cit.*
303. DG Hist, 90/444, *R & R*, Armstrong to Macdonald, 29 January 1971. The same figures are found in the June 1970 report Chassé prepared for Cabinet, which as we recall had asked a series of questions about B & B in the CAF, among them questions about the sums devoted to promoting bilingualism. (See *ibid.*, questions from Cabinet of 15 and 18 June 1970 and responses from the Department worked out over the weeks, in particular Chassé to the CDS office, 11 September 1970.)

304. Ibid. DGBB to DGPROG, 9 February 1971.
305. Ibid., Annex A to a memorandum from the DGBB, 12 October 1971.
306. Annex G to a document prepared by Hanna, 4 November 1971, which we have already cited numerous times.
307. DG Hist, 90/444. P1211-19, Fournier and Boyle to the CP, 16 April 1971.
308. Ibid., 1211-1, vol. III, Macdonald to A.H. Abbott, 19 April 1971.
309. Ibid., P1211-19, CDS to the CTS, 22 April 1971 and *Trg Lng I*, memorandum, 15 July 1971.
310. Ibid., P1211-19, Fournier to the Secretary to the CP(Fin), 21 June 1971.
311. Ibid., *Trg Lng I*, minutes of meeting of the CDSAC, 9 June 1971.
312. Ibid., *110-Lang Trg, Treasury Board Minute 704250*, 16 June 1971.
313. Ibid., P1211-19, Macdonald to Pelletier, 7 July 1971.
314. Ibid., aide-memoire sent to the Deputy Minister, 6 October 1971.
315. Ibid., see Dextraze to Sharp, 20 September 1971; aide-memoire from Hanna, 1 October 1971 (in 1211-1, vol. III); aide-memoire from the DBPR to the Deputy Minister, 6 October 1971.
316. Ibid., 1211-1, vol. III, aide-memoire, 1 October 1971.
317. Ibid., 160-8, Cloutier to the Secretary of Treasury Board, 1 October 1971.
318. Ibid., P1211-19, aide-memoire to Cloutier, 6 October 1971.
319. Ibid., Sharp to Cloutier, 12 October 1971.
320. Ibid., 70 — vol. II, J.P. Connel to Sylvain Cloutier, 10 December 1971, in which Connel refers to decisions taken on 25 November concerning additional resources for B & B at Defence for 1971-1972.
321. Ibid., P1211-19, DGBB to the D Fin S, 10 December 1971.
322. Ibid., *Plans & Prog*, DGBB to the DCP(Mil), 15 December 1971.
323. Ibid.

324. Ibid., 70 — vol. II, Tousignant to Hanna and Letellier, 23 December 1971.

325. Ibid., Tousignant to Taschereau, 13 December 1971 and, in *Plans & Prog.*, the text of the review of activities Tousignant carried out the following 17 December at one of the co-ordination meetings chaired by Laubman, which were attended by representatives from offices involved in working out the B & B program.

326. *Program to Increase B & B*, p. 24.

327. Ibid.

328. See, for example, in DG Hist, 90/444, 70 — vol II, notes prepared by Tousignant in preparation for a co-ordination meeting held on 14 January 1972, where he said, for example, that a finance officer would check over every cost with those making proposals and that a complete budget would be ready for 25 January.

329. Ibid., VCDS Dare to CP Dextraze, 18 January 1972.

330. Letellier, *Reform*, pp. 105, 106 and 109. Also see DG Hist, 90/444, *Plans & Prog.*, minutes of the DMC meeting held on 14 February 1972.

331. In particular in 70 — vol. II, *Plans and Prog.*; 68 — *Base Development St-Jean, vol. 1*; 110-3, *Language Training — 3 — CFIS, vol. I* and *CMCs*.

332. Ibid., 70 — vol. II, memorandum, 28 April 1972.

333. Ibid., Hanna to Cloutier, 12 June 1972 and memorandum, 19 May 1972.

334. Ibid., Cloutier to Kroeger at Treasury Board, 27 July 1972.

335. Ibid., and Kroeger to Cloutier, 29 September 1972 in 68 — *Base Development Saint-Jean, vol. I*.

336. Ibid., 70 — vol. II, Tousignant to the DO, 11 January 1973.

337. Ibid., *Plans & Prog.*, CP to the DMC, 2 October 1972.

338. Ibid., Letellier to the ADM(Per), 20 October 1972.

339. Ibid., CP to the Director General Personnel Requirements, Control and Recruiting (DGPRCR), 26 October 1972.

340. Ibid., 70 — vol. II, Colonel E.N. Henderson, DMPC, to Hanna, 31 October 1973. Treasury Board also agreed to 434 additional military positions that had nothing to do with B & B. The ceiling was then 82,320.

341. Ibid., Tousignant to the DGBB directors, 18 October 1972 and, in *Plans & Prog*, Letellier to the CP, the previous 2 October.
342. Ibid., minutes of a 14 December 1972 meeting, written up on 19 December.
343. Ibid., *PCB*, *Sept 73*, memorandum from Hanson, 16 February 1973.
344. Ibid., data from a more general table in the note mentioned above.
345. Ibid., P1450-1, vol. I, 1973 briefing and authors' archives. Questions raised at the B & B briefing, 5 March 1973, at Saint-Hubert, where Letellier referred to supplementary P/Ys when answering a question asked by Colonel Cheriton.
346. Ibid., 110-2 DND/PSC Language Agreement — vol. II, minutes of a meeting held on 8 May 1973, signed 15 May, which was attended by middle-level members of the CAF, discussing, among other things, use of the supplementary P/Ys.
347. Ibid., *PCB*, *29 Sept 73*, A/DBPR (Hanson) to D Budget "A", 29 May 1973.
348. Ibid., 70 — vol. II, Tousignant (memo prepared by Hanson) to Letellier, 25 January 1973.
349. Ibid., *PCB*, *29 Sept 73*, Hanson to Letellier, 25 June 1973.
350. Ibid., 70 — vol. II, D. Morley, Under Secretary at Treasury Board, to Cloutier, 6 July 1973.
351. Letellier, *Reform*, pp. 163-165, and DG Hist, 90/444, 70 — vol. II, which contains all the documentation to which Letellier referred to write the above mentioned pages.
352. DG Hist, 90/444, 70 — vol. II, D.S. Boyle to Letellier, 10 August 1972 and, in P1211-19, the memorandum from Tousignant dated 9 March 1972 which states the sum provided to cover moves in 1972-1973 — \$248,000 after the 10% cut.
353. Ibid., 70 — vol. II, Message SPECTRG 747 from Borden to NDHQ, 5 July 1973; approval by Colonel R.H. Manson (A/DGETC) passed on to Letellier on 6 July; Hanna to Manson, 31 July.
354. Ibid., 110-3 Language Training — CFLS, Lieutenant-Colonel M.A. Rose to Tousignant, 8 March 1972.
355. Ibid., 70 — vol. II, minutes of this meeting dated 14 September 1972 and many documents concerning the matter in *68-Base Development Saint-Jean*, vol. I (hereinafter *68-Base vol. I*).

356. Ibid. *68-Base vol. I*, which contains the minutes of this meeting.
357. Ibid., Kroeger to Cloutier, 4 August 1972.
358. Ibid., memorandum from Hull, 15 September 1972 and, in *Plans and Prog.*, the minutes of the DMC 19 September meeting.
359. Ibid., *68-Base vol. I*, Kroeger to Cloutier, 25 October 1972.
360. NDRMS, 5570-20-7, vol. 2, DBPR 3 to the DBPR, 23 June 1972.
361. Ibid., 70 — vol. II, Hanson to Tousignant, 25 June 1973.
362. Ibid., Tousignant to Letellier, December 1972. See also, concerning use of funds for 1971-1972, Hanson to Tousignant, 16 November 1972 and Tousignant to the Director Personnel Careers (DPC), 22 November.
363. Ibid., *110-Lng Trg*. Reports of DND/PSC meetings held on 6 and 19 September and 11 October 1972; see also in 70-vol. II, reports of meetings held on 14, 19, and 22 September 1972.
364. Ibid., 70 — vol. II, minutes of the 19 July 1973 meeting.
365. See *Review May 74*, p. 76.
366. DG Hist, 90/444, 70 —vol. II.
367. Ibid., *PCB Sept 73*, Letellier to ADM(Per) Milroy, 13 August 1973.
368. Ibid., memorandum from Lieutenant-Colonel D. McLaws, 10 September 1973.
369. Ibid., 70 — vol. II, minutes of the meeting of the PCB (9/73) held on 20 September, signed 2 October.
370. Ibid., McLaws to the D Budget “A”, 29 October 1973.
371. Ibid., McLaws to the D Budget “A”, 10 and 18 October 1973; Message DBPR 268, 17 October.
372. Ibid., McLaws to the DPSCU, 31 October 1973.
373. Ibid., Letellier to the Director General Personnel Group Services (DGPGS), 3 December 1973.
374. Ibid., L.E. Davies to the ADM(Fin), 3 December 1973; ADM(Fin) to ADM(Per) on 4 December; ADM(Per) to ADM(Fin) and the DGBB, 12 December;

McLaws to Letellier, 18 December (Captain G. Girard was the person responsible at DGBB).

375. Ibid., Baker to Milroy, 21 January 1974, concerning the meeting on the 17<sup>th</sup>.

376. Ibid., Milroy to T.C. Greig, ADM(Fin), 6 February 1974.

377. Ibid., J. Richer to Letellier, 28 January 1974.

378. *Review 1974*, p. 109. A good summary of allocation and use of resources for B and B is found on pages 104-110.

379. See the exhaustive breakdown in *B and B Report — DND — 1974*, Annex G (8 pp.).

380. DG Hist, DGBB, *Formation Linguistique après 1978. Politique et programme*, 23 December 1976 in 1212-5-TD 6309 — DGBB, p. 20.

381. Authors' archives, Minutes of DMC meeting 294, Appendix 2.

382. Authors' archives, Maurice LeClair, Secretary, Treasury Board, to Nixon, 13 August 1979.

383. Ibid., Admiral R.H. Falls, 19 March 1980.

384. *OLP(M)*, p. 2-16-2.

385. *Official Languages Annual Plan, 1983-1984*, p. 24.

386. Ibid., p. 21.

387. Authors' archives, 3<sup>rd</sup> *Working Study*, p. 22.

388. Ibid., *MSLTP — Implementation, 31 December 1985*, p. 39.

389. Ibid., *FY 86/87 Language Training Costs*.

## Chapter 17

1. DG Hist, *Militia General Order 92*, October 1897.
2. Ogle, Rev. R.J., *The Faculties of Canadian Military Chaplains* (Ottawa: U of O Press, 1956), p. 7 (hereinafter *Canadian Chaplains*).
3. DG Hist, CRO, 15 March 1917.
4. Ogle, *Canadian Chaplains*, p. 8; H/Maj W.T.Steven, *In This Sign* (Toronto: Ryerson, 1948), pp. 8 ff.
5. DG Hist, *Report of the Ministry, Overseas Military Forces of Canada 1918* (London: OMFC, n.d.), pp. 409-410.
6. O’Gorman, Major J.R., “Canadian Catholic Chaplains in the Great War, 1914-1918” in *Canadian Catholic Historical Annual Report 1939-1940*, pp. 71-83.
7. Ibid. This refers only to Catholic chaplains, the total number in Canada being 66. See also Beattie, Major W., *The History of the Canadian Chaplain Services, The Evolution of the Chaplain Corps, 1918-1921*, MS at DG Hist, n.d., n.p.
8. DG Hist, CRO 5737, 21 July 1919.
9. Ibid., GO 161, 1 June 1921.
10. Extrapolation from the 1919 Militia List.
11. DG Hist, GO 221, 22 November 1939, effective 15 October 1939; also Ogle, *Canadian Chaplains*, pp. 13-14.
12. Calculated from the list of names in Stevens, *In This Sign*, Appendix D, pp. 167-182.
13. Extrapolated from Pierre Doyon, *Aumônerie catholique dans la MRC de 1939 à nos jours*, (Ottawa: MA thesis, Univ. of Ottawa, 1968), pp. 30-33 and G.N. Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada* (Ottawa: KP, 1952), vol. II, p. 322.
14. Stacey, C.P, *Arms, Men and Governments* (Ottawa: Info Canada, 1970), p. 422.
15. Extrapolated from the Graduation List of Officers, Canadian Chaplain Service (Roman Catholic), 25 October 1945 and Canadian Army Chaplains (RC) Overseas, 30 November 1944, 30 June 1945 and 31 December 1945; copies at the Principal Chaplain’s office (RC), NDHQ, Ottawa.
16. Ogle, *Canadian Chaplains*, p. 17.



17. Calculated from the list of names provided in Hon. W/C Minton C. Johnston, *Sky Pilots in Blue*, MS, DG Hist DND, pp. 141-149.
18. Calculated from the list of chaplains in Jacques Castonguay, *Au-delà du feu*, Montréal, 1967 (English version *Unsung Mission*), pp. 169-173 in English.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 54.
20. DG Hist, The RCN List for January 1947, pp. 78-79. There were as well three part-time chaplains and two honorary chaplains. According to Waldo E.L. Smith, *The Navy Chaplain and His Parish* (Ottawa: QP, 1967), p. 209, there were only six Protestant and four Catholic chaplains.
21. *Ibid.*, The RCN List, January 1950, pp. 115-116.
22. *Ibid.*, the Canadian Army (CA) List Part I, 1 October 1947, p. 101.
23. *Ibid.*, The CA List, Part I, 19 April 1950, pp. 195-197.
24. *Ibid.*, The CA List, Part I, 15 April 1948, p. 114.
25. *Ibid.*, The CA List Part I, 19 October 1948, p. 114; 1 April 1949, p. 111.
26. *Ibid.*, The RCAF List, April 1<sup>st</sup>, 1947, p. 26.
27. There are no statistics on Francophones for this period but it is known that in 1958 enrolment of Francophones had increased to make up 17% of the Forces. This figure does not take into account the high rate of attrition among Francophone recruits. H. Forbell, *Armed Forces Historical Study, Part III, the RCAF* (Ottawa, Royal Commission on B & B, 1965), p. 27.
28. DG Hist, The RCAF List, April 1<sup>st</sup>, 1959, p. 27.
29. Ogle, *Canadian Chaplains*, p. 22; CAO 49-3.
30. DG Hist, The Canadian Army List, 1947, p. 101.
31. *Ibid.*, *The RCN List (Active Officers' Chaplain List)*, April 1952, pp. 116-117, April 1955, pp. 232-233, January 1958, pp. 356-357, January 1961, pp. 3-58 and 59, April 1964, pp. 3-57 and 58; *The Canadian Army List (Regular Officers)*, April 1952, pp. 173-174, March 1955, pp. 113-116, March 1958, pp. 167-170, March 1961, pp. 174-177, March 1964, pp. 211-214; *The RCAF List (Regular Force Chaplain List)*, April 1952, p. 44, April 1955, p. 72, February 1958, p. 80, February 1961, pp. 71-72, February 1964, p. 53; *Canadian Forces Officers' List (Regular)*, October 1967; MRC — p. 65, RCA Ch C — pp. 221-222, ARC — pp. 436-437, 1970 — 263-266, 1973 — pp. 251-254, 1976 — pp. 249-252, 1979 — pp. 249-252.

32. Authors' archives. Document 5306-2 (DGDEP), 11 March 1987.

33. CFAO, 54-5, 21 February 1969 version, p. 11.

34. This number has been the subject of criticism. At one time, instruction in English was organized if the parents of at least 10 Anglophone children requested it, while instruction in French was only provided if the parents of at least 25 Francophone children requested it. The formula is now the same for both language groups: about 10 children.

35. Allard, *Memoirs*, p. 243.

36. Several conversations between Allard and Bernier since 1982 have touched on the transportation problem. Memoranda concerning the boarding school idea can be found in the Allard archives at DG Hist or NDRMS 1211-1, vol. 1.

37. Allard, *Memoirs*, p. 243.

38. All documents mentioned in this paragraph are found in NDRMS 1211-1, vol. 1.

39. Allard, *Memoirs*, p. 279 and pp. 324-5.

40. NDRMS, 1211-1, vol. I, *Position Paper*, 11 March 1966.

41. Minutes of DC meeting 193, 9 August 1966.

42. Minutes of DC meeting 234, 27 November 1966. Letellier's style marks this document, designated S1210 — 2 D Sec DS — 6.

43. *Ibid.*

44. *Ibid.* See also in DG Hist, 90/444, file 1211-0, vol. 1, the note from R.J. Sutherland, Secretary of the Defence Council, to the CDS, 30 November 1967, which repeats Cadieux's reply.

45. DG Hist, 90/444, file 1211-0, vol. 1, Letellier to Morin, 12 December 1967.

46. *Ibid.*, Morin to Letellier, 14 December 1967.

47. *Ibid.*, file 1211-0, vol. III, memorandum from Lieutenant-Colonel K.A. Wark to the DGBB, 5 April 1971.

48. *Ibid.*, comments written by Chassé, 26 October 1970, *op. cit.*

49. *Ibid.*, memorandum from Technical Services Section, CFB Trenton, 10 June 1971, *op. cit.*

50. Authors' archives. *Questions Raised at the B & B Briefing*, 5 March 1973.
51. *Joint Committee, 17 November 1981*, pp. 35-36.
52. *Ibid.*, p. 45.
53. *Ibid.*, p. 46.
54. *Joint Committee, May 1987*, p. 31.
55. Information obtained from Warrant Officer Claude Girard at the DGDEP office.

## Chapter 18

1. Memorandum from Avery to the DGCP in the DG Hist, 91/237.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., Zimmerman to Hodgson, 31 October 1966.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., Armstrong to Zimmerman, 25 October 1966.
11. Ibid., Zimmerman to Armstrong, 31 October 1966.
12. DRAEC, 212-2, vol. 1. Cabinet decisions taken at a meeting on 30 June 1967, notice given on 7 July 1967 by D.S. Leach, who was responsible for Cabinet documents.
13. Authors' archives. Press release, June 1969.
14. DG Hist, 84/126, envelope 1, file 101, which contains the Council's policy in both languages. See also Jean Pariseau, *B & B at the Defence Research Board, 1947-1975* (Ottawa: DG Hist MS, 1982), which contains a critical approach to this policy.
15. Ibid
16. Ibid
17. Ibid
18. Ibid
19. Ibid
20. DRAEC, 212-2, vol. 1, DRB 212-2 DS&D, 16 August 1971 and Message DGBB 66, 17 August 1971.

21. NDRMS, 158-1 (DGDAS), Message DRBC 106, 27 February 1974.
22. See, for example, *Canada, White Paper on Defence* (Ottawa: QP, 1964), p. 27.
23. Telephone conversation between Jean Pariseau and Mrs. B.J. Campbell, DSIS (DGRDS/CRAD), 13 August 1982.
24. DRAEC, 212-2, vol. 2, 212-1 (DREV 0100), 16 August 1974.
25. DRAEC, 212-2, vol. 2, G.R. Lindsay, C/ORAE to the ADM(Per), 14 February 1975.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. DRAEC, 212-2, vol. 2, W.R. Green to D. Morley, 4 July 1975 (corrected draft).
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. DRAEC, 212-2, vol. 2, D. Morley to W.R. Green, 24 July 1975.
35. Authors' archives. Circular 1975-111, 25 September 1975.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. DRAEC, 212-2, vol. 3, Brigadier-General H. Peters, Assistant, ORAE, to the ADM(Per), 14 October 1975.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. DRAEC, 212-1, vol. 3, Peters to the ADM(Per), 10 November 1975.

43. NDRMS, 1211-10-3, memo from the ADM(Per), 7 November 1975.
44. DG Hist, 91/237, Dostaler to the DGCP, 28 April 1966.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid., Haughian to Scobie, 16 November 1966.
47. Scobie to Sharpe, 25 November 1966.
48. Ibid., Morin to Morry, 15 December 1966.
49. Ibid., Scobie to Armstrong, 21 December 1966, in reaction to a letter from Jean Charron, Secretary, Civil Service, to the Deputy Minister, dated 6 December 1966.
50. Ibid.
51. *Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Book III, The Work World* (Ottawa: September 1969), p. 118. The French version of the report, p. 122, speaks of “*directives précises et globales en matière de langue de communication*”.
52. DG Hist, 90/444, 1211-0, vol. I, Deputy Minister to the Minister, 15 December 1969.
53. Regulation cited in the *Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Book III, The Work World* (Ottawa, September 1969), pp. 130-131.
54. These extracts from the regulation have been photocopied and placed in DG Hist, 90/444, file 1211-0.
55. Ibid.
56. NDRMS D1210-2, Haughian to Scobie, 25 May 1967. All correspondence concerning this case is in this file and in DG Hist, 91/237.
57. Ibid., Sharp to Armstrong, 7 June 1967.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid. See summary in D1210-2, DCBS to the DGCP, 26 June 1967.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid., Scobie to the Deputy Minister through the ADM(Per), 26 June 1967.

62. There are unsigned handwritten notes on the memo mentioned in note 61.
63. Other handwritten notes on the same documents, signed by Armstrong, 10 July 1967.
64. DG Hist, 90/444, 1211-2. Document from the Secretary of State dated 16 July 1969, sent to Defence on 13 August.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid., 1211-0, vol. II contains a draft of Labonté's reply and 1211-0, vol. I, memorandum from the DCPC, C.S. Lafontaine to the ADM(M). Lafontaine briefly discusses the plan provided by Labonté.
68. Ibid., file 1211-0, vol. I, Armstrong to the Minister, 15 December 1969.
69. Ibid., letter from P.E. Trudeau, 13 July 1970.
70. DG Hist, 73/1223, file 1119, note from Armstrong on the progress report on B and B (April to June 1971) signed by the CDS, for the Minister, 21 July 1970.
71. DG Hist, 90/444, 1211-0, vol. II, Armstrong to Sharp, 17 August 1970.
72. Ibid., file 1211-1, vol. III, Noël de Tilly to Chassé, 25 August 1970.
73. Ibid., Chassé to Dextraze, DCPRM, 27 August, 1970.
74. Ibid., minutes of this meeting.
75. Ibid., *Plans and Prog.*, Dextraze to Morry, 15 June 1971.
76. NDRMS, D1211-0, vol. 4, Elie to Armstrong, 10 August 1967. 77. Ibid., Lavergne to Elie, 24 August 1967.
78. Ibid., Noël de Tilly to Morrisson, 18 December 1967. Noël de Tilly signed as Squadron Leader and Departmental Advisor on Bilingualism.
79. DG Hist, 91/237, Section "A", vol. 4, de Tilly to Côté, 17 October 1969.
80. Ibid.
81. See, for example, the approving comments made by Noël de Tilly to Morry on the joint CP-CG memorandum dated 17 November 1971 concerning the application of

the 72/28 principle in the Forces, in NDRMS, file 1211-14-3, vol. 3, Noël de Tilly to the ADM(M), 1 December 1971. In *ibid.*, vol. 2, there is a memorandum from the bilingualism advisor, dated 18 November 1971, suggesting that a civilian position be created to be a liaison between the military FLUs and the hundreds of civilian employees who gravitated around these units or were even part of them. This was never followed up.

82. The 5 July 1971 letter from Minister Macdonald to Secretary of State Gérard Pelletier, asking for funds to be injected directly into B & B at Defence, includes an Appendix III, prepared by Noël de Tilly, in which the latter set out the need for civilians in translation at DND — 18 positions in all, including 16 translators and revisers, who could deal with the requirements of the Minister, the DM, the DG Info, the JAG, the DRB and the emergency measures organization. See DG Hist, 90/444, P1211-4, vol. II, Macdonald to Pelletier, 5 July 1971.

83. DG Hist, 90/444, D1211-4, vol. II, Noël de Tilly to the DPAS, 5 February 1971.

84. *Ibid.*, Dostaler to the DBA, 4 March 1971.

85. *Ibid.*, letter from DM E.B. Armstrong to Jean Côté, Assistant Director, Bilingualism Secretariat.

86. DG Hist, 90/444, 1211-1, 19 June 1969.

87. DG Hist, 91/237.

88. DG Hist, 90/444, 4705-1, vol. I, *Interim Report*, 24 February 1970, Col. P.E. Chassé, Bil. Policy Asst/CP to T.G. Morry, Chairman, ADD.

89. *Reform*, p. 111.

90. NDRMS, D1211-0, vol. 7, p. 12 of the document cited above, produced on 4 November, on the history of the DGBB and of B & B at Defence.

91. DG Hist, 90/444, 20 May 1971, P1211-1, vol. III, Dextraze to Morry and Letellier, *Reform*, pp. 111-113.

92. NDRMS, D1211-0, vol. 7, *op. cit.*

93. DG Hist, 90/444, P1211, vol. III, *op. cit.*

94. Letellier, *Reform*, p. 78.

95. *Ibid.*, p. 111-113.



96. DG Hist, 90/444, file 190, Deputy Minister S. Cloutier to Sec of the TB, 1 October 1971, *Plan for Achieving Bil. Objectives — DND Civilian Program*.
97. Ibid.
98. Letellier, *Reform*, p. 112.
99. DG Hist, 90/444, 1211-0, vol. IV, 8 and 9 December 1971; Letellier, *Reform*, p. 113.
100. NDRMS, 1901-40/80, vol. I, Sec. CP to the DGOM, memorandum, 17 May 1972.
101. DG Hist, 90/444, 160-8, Noël de Tilly to the Director General Manpower Policy Development and Review, 20 January 1972.
102. Ibid., *Plans and Prog., Status Report — Bilingual and Bicultural Programs*, 15 December 1971.
103. Ibid., files 190, vol. I, 70 — vol. II and *68-Base, vol. I*, which contains the letter of approval from Treasury Board.
104. Ibid., 160-8, copy of information briefing presented at various bases.
105. Ibid., file 10-2, vol. II, *Annotation of Positions*, Green to the Deputy Minister, 20 July 1973 (hereinafter *Annotations, vol. II*).
106. Ibid. contains the rest of the correspondence on this matter.
107. Authors' archives. Parliamentary resolution adopted by Parliament in June 1973.
108. Ibid., 70 — vol. 1, *Costing & Funding*, 15 and 29 August 1973, correspondence between A. Letellier, DGGB and Jacques Richer of TB, also 70-vol. II, Marley, at TB, to Cloutier.
109. In DG Hist, 90/444, *Annotations, vol. II*, there is a comment from Hanna, Letellier's assistant, stating that some people found shortcomings in the preparations for information meetings. Major Conliffe of Lahr telephoned Hanna on 12 September to say that he had not received documents that he was supposed to distribute before the arrival of Dewar's team, who would be there in two days. On the 13<sup>th</sup>, Halifax complained to him about the lack of certain necessary documents.
110. DGOL, file DGOL(Civ) — Briefings, 28 April 1975 (file held at DGOL).

111. DGOL file, OLIS, “[TRANS] Language status of positions by categories and regions”.

112. *Ibid.*, and DND, DGOL(Civ) — Briefings, 28 April 1975.

113. Letellier, *Reform*, pp. 166 to 168.

114. *COL Annual Report*, 1978, p. 113.

115. *Ibid.*, 1986, p. 111.

116. *COL 1977*, p. 17.

117. Authors’ archives. Nixon to Yalden, 25 October 1978, *op. cit.*

118. *Joint Committee, 17 November, 1981*, p. 53 to 55, See also *COL 1977*, p. 33 where the same remark we mentioned in Chapter 16 was made.

119. *Ibid.*, pp. 54-5.

120. COL, *Special Study. Language Designation of Civilian Positions, National Defence*, September 1987, pp. 3-4.

121. *Ibid.*, p. 1.

122. *Ibid.*, p. 12.

123. *Ibid.*

124. *Joint Committee, May 1987*, p. 9.

125. *Ibid.*, p. 10.

126. *Ibid.*

127. *Ibid.*, p. 30.

128. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

129. *Ibid.*, p. 38.

130. DG Hist, 90/444, *Trg Lng I*, memorandum dated 9 January 1969.

131. *Ibid.*, *Interim Report on Language Training prepared at the request of the DND Advisory Board on Bilingualism*.

132. Ibid., 70-vol. II, DGBB to the DGPGS, 3 December 1973.
133. NDRMS, 1212-2-9, vol. 5, *Report on a visit to 202 Workshop, 25 CFSD and 2 CFTSA*, Montreal, 23 to 27 June 1975.
134. Ibid., Major-General Paradis to J.J. Noreau at TB, 21 November 1975.
135. *COL Annual Report, 1979*, p. 120.
136. Telephone interview granted by André Mathieu to Liliane Grantham of DG Hist, NDHQ, in the fall of 1986.
137. *Annual Report of the COL, 1981*, p. 151, and p. 123 of the 1983 report.
138. See, on this subject, DG Hist, 90/444, *Costing and Funding B & B Programs — vol. II*, where the reader will find all internal correspondence for late 1973 and early 1974 regarding a meeting with Treasury Board to convince the Board that in 1974-1975 Defence would need 4.3 million dollars and 309 additional person/years (in addition to the resources obtained in 1972-1973 and 1973-1974) to meet its B & B objectives for civilians.
139. *COL 1977*, p. 32.
140. *Official Languages Plan (Civilian)*, Ottawa, National Defence, April 1979, p. 2-3.
141. Ibid., p. 2-2.
142. Ibid., p. 2-3.
143. Ibid., pp. 2-3 to 2-5 and 2-8 to 2-42 for tables.
144. *COL Annual Report, 1986*, pp. 111.
145. Ibid., p. 110
146. *Official Languages — Department of National Defence — Civilian Employees* (Ottawa: National Defence, 1986), p. 4.

## Conclusion

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2. Authors' archives, extract from minutes of the *Conseil général de la Société Saint-Jean-Baptiste de Montréal* meeting on 23 March 1925 (with English translation). Letter from SSJB chief secretary Jean Guérin to Deputy Minister G.J. Desbarats, 31 March 1925. Reply from Desbarats to Guérin (date illegible).
3. See on this subject, for example: Jean-Yves Gravel, *L'histoire du Régiment de Trois-Rivières* (Trois-Rivières: Bien Public, 1982).
4. *ABC on French Canada* (Ottawa: *Le Droit*, 1946, 35 pages). Thousands of copies were printed during the war, and in 1946 it was translated and published in French as *ABC sur le Canada français*.
5. DG Hist and authors' archives. ADM116045, report by Commodore Horatio Nelson Lay, 10 April 1944.
6. Authors' archives, file 180.003 (D8), *Report from 101 Transport Flight on employment of French/English personnel*, sent to the General Commanding Air Transport Command, 10 July 1969.
7. Cameron, AVM (ret.) Bob, "Bilingualism in Defence", *Winnipeg Free Press*, 1 August 1969, p. 10.
8. *COL Annual Report, 1985*, p. 104.
9. DG Hist, 90/444, *Use of Official Languages — General* file, document entitled *Implementation of the Official Languages Act*, 16 July 1969 (studied by Cabinet on 31 July 1969).
10. Authors' archives. General Jean Victor Allard. *Les Canadiens français dans nos forces armées*, p. 4.
11. *Joint Committee, 27 May 1987*, pp. 39 to 42.
12. Authors' archives. *Communiqué*, 10/1985, p. 5. Monthly brochure published by the Associate Assistant Deputy Minister (Personnel), DND.

# **SOURCES**



## Sources

These two volumes are based on a variety of primary and secondary sources. The closer we came to the end of the period under study, the more we relied on primary sources.

### Primary Sources

Chapters 5 to 8 of Volume I and all those in Volume II are almost entirely dependent on primary sources. The most important of these are listed below.

Archives of the Directorate of History, Department of National Defence, in particular the papers of Louis Noël de Tilly, Colonel R.L. Raymont, colonel Armand Letellier, General Jean V. Allard and Major Jean Pariseau (one of the authors). The minutes of the Defence council, the Chief of the Defence Staff Advisory Committee and the Defence Management Committee should also be included under this heading.

The relevant files of certain commands (Mobile Command and CFTS) and major offices of National Defence Headquarters were also used. Among these we should name the documents of the Director General Official Languages, the Director Individual Training and the Operational Research and Analysis Establishment.

The large and impressive archives of the National Defence Records Management System have received a great deal of attention over the years. The following is a list of the numbers and subtitles of files of special interest. The first title of each is “official languages”, but we have omitted this for the sake of brevity

1211-0	(official languages, policies — 13 vols)
1211-1	(“ ”, general — 8 vols)
1211-4-0	(“ ”, biculturalism, policy — 1 vol)
1211-6-0	(“ ”, translation, policy — 1 vol)
1211-6-1	(“ ”, translation, policy — 1 vol)
1211-6-3	(“ ”, translation, policy — 5 vols)
1211-6-4	(“ ”, translation, services — 4 vols)
1211-6-5	(“ ”, translation, interpretation — 1 vol)
1211-6-6	(“ ”, translation, films — 4 vols)
1211-6-7	(“ ”, revision, writing, administrative interpretation, 1 vol)
1211-6-8	(“ ”, translation, authorization — 2 vols)
1211-7-0	(“ ”, terminology, policy — 1 vol)
1211-7-0	(“ ”, terminology, general — 4 vols)
1211-7-2	(“ ”, terminology, automation 4 vols)
1211-7-4	(“ ”, terminology, research — 3 vols)
1211-8	(“ ”, dependents educations — 1 vol)
1211-9-	(“ ”, official languages act — 6 vols)
1211-9-2	(“ ”, draft CFAOs — 4 vols)
1211-11	(“ ”, bilingual markings, signs and posters — 2 vols)

1211-11	(language requirements, civilian personnel, 6 vols)
1211-12	(“ ”, recruiting, production and shortage of Francophones — 2 vols)
1211-13	(“ ”, reports and returns — 8 vols)
1211-13-2	(Ross Report — 2 vols)
1211-13-3	(official languages, reports and returns, surveys — 3 vols)
1211-14	(“ ”, establishments and bilingual units — 1 vol)
1211-14-3	(“ ”, FLUs — 6 vols)
1211-14-4	(“ ”, evaluation of FLUs — 5 vols)
1211-17	(“ ”, conferences and meetings — 3 vols)
1211-21	information program — 2 vols)
1211-22	(“ ”, financing — 6 vols)
1211-22-2	(“ ”, financing, supplementary resources — 5 vols)
1211-23	Francotrain project — 8 vols)
1211-23-2	Francotrain project, situation report — 1 vol)
1211-24	facilities non public funds (NPF) — 1 vol)
1211-25	(“ ”, inquiries — 1 vol)
1211-29	(“ ”, books, pamphlets and brochures — 1 vol)
1211-31	(“ ”, statistics — 2 vols)
1211-32-2	(“ ”, monitoring — unilingual correspondence — 2 vols)
1211-250/0	(“ ”, medical services — 2 vols)
1211-280/C2-1	(“ ”, Canadian Forces colleges — 1 vol)
1211-280/C2-2	(“ ”, colleges Canadian military — 3 vols)
1211-280/C3-13	(“ ”, command units — Air Command, 1 vol)
1211-0105	(“ ”, Canadian Forces Base Gagetown — 1 vol)
1212-0	(“ ”, civilian, policy — 1 vol)
1212-1	(“ ”, civilian, general, 1 vol)
1212-21	(“ ”, civilian, positions — 3 vols)
1212-2-2	(“ ”, civilian, NDHQ, ADM(Pol) — 1 vol)
1212-2-3	(NDHQ, ADM(Pol) — 2 vols)
1212-2-4	(NDHQ, ADM(Mat) — 3 vols)
1212-2-5	(NDHQ, ADM(Fin) — 3 vols)
1212-2-6	(NDHQ, ADM other components, 2 vols)
1212-24	(official languages, FLUs and UWFs — 2 vols)
1213-0	(“ ”, language requirements, military, policy — 1 vol)
1213-1	(“ ”, general — 1 vol)
1213-2	(“ ”, identification program — 29 vols)
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1213-5	(“ ”, language requirements, military, resources — 2 vols)
1213-6	(“ ”, visits — 1 vol)
4706-6	(languages training, French — 3 vols)
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We also had access to Secretary of State and Treasury Board documents kept at DND, and to the documentary archives and publications of the Office of the



Commissioner of Official Languages. In addition, we consulted many studies, most of them in the sources cited above, as shown in the notes.

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There are numerous, especially up to World War II. We present here a short selection of titles.

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