Emergency awareness & preparedness in times of low incidence

October 25-27, 2004
Montreal

Sensibilisation et préparation aux situations d'urgence en période de faible fréquence

It was June 23, 1985. Two pieces of baggage were checked at Vancouver International Airport. One was forwarded to Toronto, to be put aboard Air India Flight 182.

The plane stopped in Montreal and then departed for London, which was to be its last stop on its way to New Delhi.

When it arrived in Irish airspace, the aircraft received clearance from the Shannon air traffic control center.

Eight minutes later, it disappeared from the radar screen.

Flight 182 was at an altitude of 31,000 feet when a bomb concealed in a piece of baggage exploded, sending the Boeing 747 into the Atlantic Ocean just off the Irish coast.

All 329 passengers and crew members, including 182 Canadians, lost their lives.

The other piece of baggage was transported to Japan; it was to be loaded aboard Air India Flight 301, which was proceeding from Tokyo to Bangkok and then on to Delhi.

It never reached its destination. The bomb exploded in the baggage terminal at Tokyo's Narita Airport, killing two baggage handlers and injuring four other people.

This air disaster, the worst in Canadian aviation history, was to launch the largest criminal investigation ever carried out in Canada and lead to a reform of Canada's air transport security system.

Since that brutal wake-up call, Canada, on the initiative of Transport Canada, has developed and maintained one of the strictest aviation security systems in the world.

Before September 11, 2001, the air transport security control system and the way it was administered were largely unknown to the Canadian public. Airline carriers were responsible for screening passengers and their belongings at Canadian airports.

After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Canadian government immediately took steps to enhance the security capacity of the air transport system. The most significant measure was undoubtedly Parliament's approval, on March 27, 2002, of the creation of the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority (CATSA), a new Crown corporation responsible for several key aviation security services, including screening of passengers and their carry-on luggage, screening of non-passengers in restricted areas, enhancement of the restricted-area pass system in airports, supervision of the program for placing Royal Canadian Mounted Police officers on aircraft, and supervision of funding for police services in airports.

In Quebec, the first attack on an aircraft occurred on September 9, 1949. Albert Guay, a jeweller, took out a $10,000 insurance policy on his wife, Rita Morel, and had a bomb made, which he concealed in a parcel being carried aboard the plane on which his wife was travelling. Twenty-three passengers and crew members perished in the crash, and Albert Guay was hanged for these crimes.

Following the first aircraft hijackings in the 1960s, security measures were adopted, aimed mainly at preventing a terrorist from boarding an aircraft with a firearm, which seemed at the time to be the weapon of choice of terrorists. Subsequently, the matching of baggage and passengers also became a requirement; it was assumed that a terrorist would not blow up an aircraft in which he himself was a passenger.

The September 11 attacks forever changed our way of reacting, being proactive and predicting attacks on aircraft. We now know that some individuals will dare to convert a commercial aircraft into a missile. We know that thousands of individuals are prepared to die for a cause and to blow themselves up in an aircraft. And we know that baggage/passenger reconciliation is no longer a guarantee of prevention.

We also know that terrorists work in teams, that they are selected and trained, and that their families are rewarded for their sacrifices; that they belong to well-funded organizations possessing communication, coordination, planning and organizational resources similar to those of multinational corporations.

The September 11 attacks not only took the lives of nearly 3,000 victims; they also caused damage estimated at $US 40 billion. In addition, two wars have been triggered since then, one in Afghanistan and another in Iraq . These wars have taken the lives of tens of thousands more victims, and consumed hundreds of billions of dollars.

Immediately after the attacks, retail sales in the United States dropped by $US 6 billion (2.1%), orders for durable goods by $US 11.6 billion (6.8%), and industrial production in the United States by 1% in September, while stock-market indexes declined by between 7 and 9.7% (depending on the index).

Many airline carriers had to cut their flights by 30%; the tourism and hotel industry suffered enormously, and in the last four months of 2001, the U.S. economy lost 1.1 million jobs.

Today we are very much aware of the impact which these attacks had on the air transport and aeronautics industry. In Canada , the United States and Europe , many air transport companies had to place themselves under the protection of the law to avoid bankruptcy, and also lay off many of their employees. Those remaining had to consent to significant reductions in salaries and benefits. Bombardier saw the value of its shares collapse as a result of the financial difficulties of several of its clients, and laid off thousands of workers.

Some will say that the problems of this industry are not solely due to the September 11 attacks, for new carriers were born out of the turbulence. However, no one could claim that the September 11 attacks did not contribute greatly to these problems.

These attacks, and those which have occurred more recently in Russia, highlight the fact that we can no longer limit ourselves to trying to detect weapons and explosives on the assumption that terrorists in the future will use the same tactics they used in the past. On the contrary, today's terrorists are proud to die in their attacks, and we have to rethink the whole air transport security system.

In response to the earliest hijackings, we strengthened pre-board security screening. Following the attack on the Air India flight, we reacted by further strengthening our screening measures and instituting baggage reconciliation. We responded to the September 11 attacks by reorganizing our security systems and further strengthening our screening of passengers and their baggage.

We have to stop reacting. Now we have to be proactive.

It will be useless to deploy the most advanced technology and hire the best-qualified and best-trained search personnel: we will still be in a reactive mode. What we must do is enhance our capacity to predict.

I firmly believe that in the face of terrorism that is organized like the mafia, the organizations responsible for air transport security must coordinate at the international level, just as police forces do in order to more effectively fight organized crime. We must increase such opportunities to share our knowledge, our techniques, our technologies and our know-how.

CATSA is only one of a number of players in the air transport security system. We cannot be productive without working closely with our partners. In Canada , the RCMP and CSIS mainly receive intelligence, analyze it and transmit it to CATSA via Transport Canada . Rapid and effective exchange of intelligence is essential if we wish to be proactive and predict attacks, whether nationally or internationally.

The U.S. Senate Commission on the 9/11 attacks says:

"The biggest impediment to all-source analysis – to a greater likelihood of connecting the dots – is the human or systemic resistance to sharing information."

Connecting the dots. That's the challenge! But we also have to know what the dots are. The U.S. Senate Commission on the 9/11 attacks has demonstrated that a number of organizations responsible for security hold many pieces of information individually. But no one was able to connect these pieces before the attacks. That is why it is important for organizations responsible for receiving and analyzing intelligence to share their intelligence openly and quickly with the players responsible for ensuring air transport security.

Robert S. Mueller, the director of the FBI, says that we must improve our ability to predict and anticipate attacks, that we must be proactive. In his words:

"We have to develop the capability of looking around corners. And that is the change. That is the shift in focus particularly at [FBI] headquarters."

In the United States , the Chameleon Group has developed a risk assessment system called Predictive Profiling™. This technique is based on concentrating resources on actual threats and the method the terrorist will most probably use in order to carry out his attack. It is also based on the premise that each protected environment is unique and that the attacker, all other things being equal, will choose the path of least resistance. This method has been used by Israel for 34 years, with success.

Here on the screen is an example of the ultimate application of the Predictive Profiling concept.

Most terrorist attacks are planned long in advance. With vigilance and observation, one can detect the hostile intentions of individuals. This requires full utilization of our most valuable resource: human beings. Of course technology has an important role to play in detecting weapons and explosives. But for each technology deployed, there will be a terrorist looking for a way to work around it.

According to Chameleon, a terrorist will do his best to pass unnoticed and, in 90% of cases, between the time he decides to attack a target and the time he actually commits his crime, he will give no signal that can be detected. Our room to maneuver is therefore very limited. Also, it is quite rare for a security worker to be able to exercise his judgment solely on the basis of the terrorist's behavior. He must place this information in a context and establish the correlations with the information received – whence the importance of productive and speedy sharing of information.

We would point out here that Predictive Profiling has nothing to do with ethnic origin. Chameleon defines the process as follows: the process by which we gather information from an environment and analyze it for the purpose of assessing a behavior. In other words, it is a matter of analyzing the behavior of individuals on the basis of observable points, as a corollary to the intelligence received.

Such points might be the following: the individual's appearance or dress does not match his occupation; there are signs that the individual has recently shaved off his beard; the individual's name does not match the initials on his luggage; two individuals seem to be trying to conceal the links between them; the individual is paying cash for expensive merchandise; the individual is taking notes or taking pictures of security personnel; etc. Each of these factors should at least arouse suspicion.

I am aware that applying a Predictive Profile process may frighten some people. Society has accepted, especially as a result of the events of September 11, the additional security measures implemented in Canadian airports. We at CATSA are aware that our room to maneuver is limited and that we are walking the fine line between individual freedoms and the necessity of protecting the travelling public. We have never abused this power. And the legislator has laid out guidelines to control our actions and those of other interveners.

Application of the Predictive Profiling process would be an invaluable tool for protecting society from terrorist attacks whose consequences can be devastating, not only in terms of injuries and loss of life, but also in economic terms, as we demonstrated earlier.

But air transport security personnel cannot by themselves prevent terrorist attacks on air transport. They need a resource which at present is significantly underutilized, although it is qualified, large and available: namely, police forces and the large number of other peace officers and security officers.

When terrorists come to an airport to carry out their attack, they have already planned it. They have already obtained the necessary materials to make a bomb or weapons. They have met with each other and coordinated their plans. They have communicated with one another. They have purchased or rented a car. They have rented one or two apartments.

During this period, they have no dealings with airport security personnel. But they are likely to have dealings with the neighborhood police officer, the highway patrol officer or the security officer at the bank, shopping center, etc.

Let us take an example from the U.S. Senate report on the September 11 attacks, concerning the arrest of Ahmed Ressam, who was trying to enter the United States illegally with explosives for the purpose of blowing up Los Angeles International Airport . He arrived in Port Angeles on December 14 and waited for all the other vehicles to leave the ferry before he disembarked, believing that the last vehicle would not attract attention. He was wrong. The customs officers noted his nervousness and directed him to a secondary inspection site. He presented, by way of identification, a false passport and a Price Costco card registered under the same false name. When the customs officer began searching him, he panicked and tried to run away. He was arrested, and the inspectors found explosives hidden in the spare tire of his rented vehicle.

In Canada , there are roughly 60,000 federal, provincial and municipal police officers. In the United States , their number is estimated to be at least 750,000. They know their territory. They are called upon to take routine response actions. They are trained to recognize suspect behaviors in criminals. But will they be as skilled at recognizing similar behaviors in terrorists?

If might be thought that this immense resource is being made use of. But such is not the case – a situation which is deplored by Amotz Brandez, of the Chameleon Group, and Richard Mears, of the University of Maine , when they say that contrary to what is often argued, the number of police officers does not, in itself, guarantee enhanced security. It is rather the ability of police officers to recognize suspicious behaviors, their skill in assessing the threat, and the capacity of police forces to deploy strategies to counter it which have a decisive effect on the risk to public security which terrorists represent. That is, in fact, what I have been able to observe personally during my career as a police officer. 

Police officers are not adequately informed about the profile of a terrorist. How many of them would naturally suspect a child, a pregnant woman or a grandmother of delivering a bomb? How many are familiar with how terrorists operate? How many have preconceived ideas about the probable appearance of a terrorist, based on the images conveyed by the media?

How many could recognize a fake passport or citizenship card? How many are adequately documented on international terrorist movements? How many know the extent of terrorist activities in Canada ? How many have been made aware of possible targets for terrorist attack?

How many of you are capable of recognizing the terrorist among the persons in the photo on the screen? That is the dilemma. Terrorists do not always correspond to the stereotype.

Police officers, and to some extent security officers, parking-lot attendants and those who work directly or indirectly in the security field, have a crucial role to play in preventing and predicting acts of terrorism. If they intercept the terrorists in the community, the terrorists will never make it as far as the airport.

It is important that our first line of defence against terrorism, namely the police officers who patrol our streets, are familiar with our neighborhoods and develop a close relationship of trust with residents, merchants and local associations, receive training and pertinent information on terrorism and on the methods and techniques used by terrorists, and that they be well informed about the threat which terrorism represents.

It has been revealed that the terrorists who attacked the World Trade Center were intercepted by local police forces before the September 11 attacks, for minor traffic offences.

Edward J. Tully, a retired FBI officer, and E.L. Willoughby, the former chief of police of Salt Lake City, who analyzed the events leading to the September 11 attacks, say:

"it is logical to assume that this pattern of random interception will continue in the future. If and when similar situations occur, our local and state officers should have background knowledge by which to arrive at a reasonable suspicion."

During the 1980s, most police officers took multiculturalism and multiethnicity awareness courses. In the face of this new phenomenon, they needed training that would enable them to better understand the problem and to deal more effectively with minorities. I believe that these courses greatly contributed to improved police responses.

Today, we are faced with a different problem. The whole world is waking up to the threats of terrorism. So far, our country has been spared. But not Madrid , or Russia , or Israel , or Indonesia , to mention only a few.

I propose that all police officers, especially those patrolling the large cities and their surrounding areas, and those patrolling the airports, take training on terrorism and its ramifications. In June 2004, the Chicago police department, the police service of the State of Massachusetts , the Chameleon Group and the Maine Community Policing Institute developed a training program in this field for practical application at O'Hare Airport in Chicago . This is an example to be followed, one that would significantly enhance our capacity to prevent acts of terrorism.

We can reasonably expect the next terrorist attack to be very different from previous ones. Will it be a group of individuals seeking to board an aircraft, each with a component of a weapon that they will reassemble once aboard? Will it be a ground-to-air missile launched from the area surrounding an airport? Will it be weapons hidden in the food, beverages or newspapers being loaded aboard an aircraft? Will it be a bomb concealed in an aircraft's cargo hold? Will it be a target less well protected than the aircraft, and therefore more vulnerable? No one knows. But we do know that terrorists reinvent themselves continually, and that our best chance of success is to reinvent ourselves as well.

Fortunately, CATSA, since its creation, has not had to manage any crisis brought about by a terrorist attack. Let us hope that this never happens. But we are prepared. We operate an operational coordination center, and at each of the screening lines at the airports under our control we are installing video cameras, to which our communication center is linked by closed circuit. In the event of a breach of security, we can respond quickly and effectively.

Over the coming days, we will be enriching our knowledge, sharing solutions to common problems and dialoguing with strategic national and international partners; and above all, we will be building new networks, which are at the very basis of the intelligence-sharing process.

This conference will enable each of our organizations to validate the steps we have taken to respond to a crisis and to be even better prepared when a crisis occurs. Such a period of calm is just the right time to test our systems and measure our capacity to respond effectively to a crisis.

It was with eagerness and enthusiasm that I agreed to participate in this conference. I look forward to hearing you and discussing with you.

Thank you, and have a good conference.

The Economic Cost of Terrorism, by Brian W. Westbury, published by the U.S. Department of State

September 10, 2002

The 9/11 Commission Report – Page 416, 13.3

Principles of Predictive Profiling, SafeSpaces.com. Statement made on May 30, 2002

Principles of Predictive Profiling, SafeSpaces.com, Chameleon Group, Inc.

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The Emerging Role of Law Enforcement – The Chameleon Group

The Emerging Role of Law Enforcement – The Chameleon Grou