Remarks by Jacques Duchesneau, C.M., President and CEO, Canadian Air Transport Security Authority

5^th Annual International Counterterrorism Conference
Public Private Partnerships

Washington, DC
April 20-21^st, 2006

CATSA's Role in Aviation Security

CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY

Introduction

I would like to start my speech this afternoon with a story that we share with screening officers. It is a story about a truly inspirational person. It is a story about someone who was left for dead and survived. We tell this story to screening officers so that they fully understand the impact and importance of their work.

On November 24, 1985, EgyptAir 648 took off from Athens, Greece en route to Cairo. Ten minutes into the flight, three terrorists, calling themselves "The Egypt Revolution", hijacked the aircraft.¹

As they tried to take control, a sky marshal intervened, killing one of the hijackers. A gun battle ensued at 35,000 feet. With the fuselage punctured by gunfire, the plane was forced to make an emergency landing at Malta.

The hijackers threatened to kill a passenger every 15 minutes until they received fuel so they could fly to Algeria. We can only imagine the unbearable tension and fear that must have been on that plane as each passenger wondered who might be next.

When the smoke finally cleared on that Thanksgiving weekend in 1985, 59 passengers would lie slain.² One of those victims, left for dead, survived. Her name is Jackie Pflug.

As part of our ongoing training program for screening officers, we share with them the story of Jackie Pflug. Her message brings home in very graphic terms the need for constant vigilance at the screening checkpoints in our airports.  

Although this story is over 20 years old, the message remains crystal clear. There is no room for error in our business. None at all. If we fail just once there are political, economic and social impacts.

My responsibility, as President and Chief Executive Officer of the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority is to ensure that terrorists do not use our civil aviation system to unleash terror like this ever again.

Allow me to briefly explain who we are and what we do.

Who We Are and What We Do

CATSA was created in the wake of 9/11. Our mission is to protect the public by securing critical elements of the Canadian air transportation system and our responsibilities are very specific. They are pre-board screening, hold baggage screening, non-passenger screening, and the implementation of restricted area identification cards. In addition, we provide assistance to a program very similar to the United States Air Marshall Program, called the Canadian Air Carrier Protective Program. We also provide assistance to help enhance policing at airports.

Canada is second only to Russia in size – spanning six time zones, yet with a population that is only about a 10 th that of our southern neighbours. Our east and west coasts are gateways to Europe and Asia. And Toronto and Montreal are major hub cities for international through-traffic to the US.

This translates into 37 million passengers, 60 million pieces of luggage and one million non-passengers that have to be screened every year. It is a substantial task carried out in 89 major airports across the nation by over 4,000 contracted screening officers.

To support them, we have deployed over 2,500 state-of-the-art pieces of equipment including explosive detection devices, and Closed Circuit Television systems.

We have made great progress since 9/11.

On January 1, 2006, CATSA delivered one of the principal components of our mandate with the implementation of 100% screening of hold baggage, exceeding the international standard set by ICAO to address the high risk associated with explosives in checked baggage. Not only have we achieved this target, we have gone further. We're now screening baggage on most domestic commercial passenger flights as well.

In addition to screening passengers and their belongings, CATSA has also achieved success working in the restricted area of the airport. Specifically with the implementation of our Restricted Area Identification Card which utilizes cutting edge biometric technology. In fact, it is the world's first dual national biometric card. The addition of biometrics, along with centralized databanks, allow for the positive identification of the cardholder, and gives us the ability to track, in real time, the issuance, verification and cancellation of passes. The program helps ensure that restricted items are not brought into secure areas. To date, 30,000 airport workers at 9 of Canada's major airports are enrolled in the program. Once enrolment is complete, 120,000 airport workers will be registered at 29 airports.

There is also another side to our security story, which speaks to the partnership theme of this conference.

Public Private Partnerships

We like to think of our screening officers as primary partners. But technically they are not our employees.

We deliver this service by contracting with private sector service providers. They take care of recruitment, administration and HR management of screening officers.

We do the training, certification, set performance standards, and provide oversight and quality assessments. Our field managers oversee screening operations and liaise with service providers at airports.

We ask a tremendous amount of our screening officers. There are not many jobs that require you to have all your powers of concentration brought to bear for an entire shift – requiring you to make fast decisions about every person and piece of baggage that goes by.

That's why we spend so much time and effort on training, – which in terms of quality and quantity - has more than doubled since 9/11.

Last summer my senior staff and I traveled to airports across Canada to meet with service providers, screening officers, airline and airport authorities – all who have a vested interest in our security operations at the airport.

We were particularly keen to hear the first-hand perspectives of the screening officers. We asked them to challenge us, to tell us what is working and what isn't, and to suggest improvements. And that they did!

No matter what concerns they raised - one thing was very clear - they are very proud of what they do. If there is a lesson to be learned here, it is the following: treat your screening officers well. Acknowledge the importance of what they do – publicly and often. It is not only the right thing to do – it will pay dividends in keeping your airports in reliable hands at those critical points of departure - by people who know they are valued and valuable.

On other fronts, we continue to work very closely behind the scenes with our domestic partners, including Transport Canada, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service, all of whom play important and interlocking roles in airport security.

In fact, late last month marked the debut of the first Canadian Aviation Security Conference. It brought together all major stakeholders in aviation security; from government departments, to airport authorities, airline representatives, transportation associations and the academic community. Although it was a national conference, we were very pleased with the international attendance and participation, in particular our American colleagues. We were very pleased to have as one of our guest speakers, Mr. Kip Hawley, Assistant Secretary for the Department of Homeland Security and the Transportation Security Agency.

In truth, there is a blurring of the lines between national and international interests. Given the extensive interconnectedness of the global transportation system, we are only as secure as the weakest link. A failure in one country can contaminate the entire system. So clearly cross-fertilization of ideas and intelligence is critical. To that end, CATSA has established the International Forum for Security Screening in Aviation. Once a year, heads of like-mandated agencies from around the globe gather to share experiences and best practices.

Cooperation is easy to preach, but difficult to achieve. It requires time and trust, and the International Forum gives us a good jumping off point.

And of course the matter of tri-partite cooperation on security matters was undoubtedly a topic of discussion late last month when American President George W. Bush met with Mexican President Vicente Fox and Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper at the Peace and Prosperity Partnership meeting in Mexico.

If our leaders are taking the issue seriously, we need our citizens to do exactly the same.

1985 is a significant year, not only because of the highjacking of EgyptAir, but also because June 23^rd, 1985 was the date of the Air India bombing and up until that time, the date of the world's worst-ever act of aviation terrorism.

As you know, Air India Flight 182 exploded over the Atlantic Ocean, south of Ireland. All 329 people on board were killed, 82 were children and 280 were Canadian citizens. It was the largest mass murder in Canadian history.

One hour earlier, at the Narita International Airport in Japan, an explosion occurred in the baggage terminal, killing two baggage handlers, and injuring four others. The bomb in that bag was intended for Air India Flight 301 with 177 passengers and crew on board, bound for Bangkok.

This event marked a significant turning point for aviation security not only in Canada but around the world.

The changes to airport security and screening operations after the Air India bombing were widespread. Some of these new measures included, passenger/baggage reconciliation, a more extensive and detailed regulatory framework and criminal background checks for airport employees to name a few.

This system was considered adequate until suicide hijackers turned fully-loaded passenger planes into flying missiles on September 11, 2001.

In Canada, perhaps because we have not experienced first hand a 9/11 tragedy, not since Air India, we need to be mindful of growing complacency in the general public. We need to continue engaging them with the notion that security is their business too – and we need them to be our partners in keeping their ears and eyes open.

Now is not the time to rest on our laurels and complacency is surely a recipe for disaster. The face of terrorism is changing and we need to be ahead of what could be the next threat.

The Changing Face of Terrorism

The metaphor I like to use to describe terrorism is that it is like a virus.

We try our best to inoculate ourselves against the diseases these viruses carry but they are constantly mutating – often invisible and almost always lethal.

The face of terror has morphed into a thousand disguises – and methods – with no target off-limits. Yet paradoxically the viruses have become a brand name, as they show up nightly on our television screens.

And like all viruses, terrorists hide in the shadows, and yet can explode in our faces without warning. They seek out our weaknesses– moving from the hard targets of airports to the softer targets of trains in Madrid and buses in London.

In Canada we are under no illusions about threats to our own security.

We have substantial forces in Afghanistan, fighting alongside our coalition partners, and Al-Qaeda has singled us out as one of the countries "targeted for terror."³

So - as we look at the state of affairs in 2006, will our airports continue to be in the cross hairs of the terrorists?

Despite the incredible improvements in airport screening in Canada and around the world, aircraft and airports will always be an attractive target because of the economic impact and the symbolism that they represent. Terrorists well know that threatening to bring down an aircraft speaks to the collective fear of citizens who feel they are no longer in control of their own destiny.

But if the face and nature of terrorism are changing how then can we best manage the unexpected?

Managing the Unexpected - New Solutions to New Challenges

I am reminded of what the British scholar Paul Wilkinson said: Fighting terrorism is like being a goalkeeper. You can make a hundred brilliant saves but the only shot that people remember is the one that gets past you.

This is clearly not how we want to be remembered.

We need to continue to deter terrorists by building new layers of defence in our security systems - with new practices and technologies.

I compare airport security to the layers of an onion. Each layer must work closely together to protect the core and most important part of the onion - the aircraft and its passengers.

At the outer layers the allied security agencies – domestic and international - offer vital information on potential threats. That information has to be managed in a timely manner and if we have an Achilles heel, it might be here. At last year's conference I talked briefly about the natural tendency of managers to "push" information down the line when perhaps pooling information is a much more effective way to go. When we think of weakest links, the inefficient management of information must be near the top of the list.

As we get closer to the center of the onion, we get closer to dealing with real threats in real time. Biometrics will prove to be an incredible shield in our armour but if we grow too dependent on its use it could prove to be a chink rather than a shield. Although this technology would seem foolproof, I would never want it to entirely replace an observant set of eyes spotting the wrong person in the wrong place at the wrong time.

In the terrorist attack of 9/11 box cutters were the weapons of choice. We have become experts at intercepting prohibited items such as knives, guns and box cutters. So what is the next weapon? And where and how will it be used? Certainly screening hold baggage is critical. But we need to think outside the box. Will the next weapon be biological? A nerve agent? Will it even come from inside the plane? What about perimeter security around the airport? And how secure is the air cargo system? From highjackings, bombs in suitcases, to using aircraft as missiles, what will be the next threat? MANPADS or IEDs?

We have to re-invent and re-invigorate ourselves on a continuing basis to make sure that we have the best security systems, the best training, and the best tools to do our job.

That's why being proactive and pre-emptive is our guiding modus operandi.

To that end, we are in the process of developing a counter-terrorism model for our operations that is based on the idea of being an AGILE security authority. I use the word "agile" in the literal sense of being fast and flexible.

But it is also an acronym that stands for Assess, Guard, Intervene, Learn, and Evolve.

It is more than a clever play on words.

AGILE speaks partially to successful past practice and partially to future intention. It is still in its early stage of development, yet but it is part model, part template and even a sort of mantra around our offices.

The first phase of this model is Assess. We need to better understand the environment that we are working in and this includes learning about terrorist motivations, intentions, ideologies and capabilities. It is in this area that we work closely with our partners in the security community to learn about the nature of the terrorist threat around the world.

The second phase is Guard. By building improved layers of defences that guard the traveling public, our airports and our airplanes against terrorist attacks.

The third phase is Intervene. We need to ensure that we have sufficient mechanisms to intervene in the event of an incident that threatens the security of our operations.

And finally, Learn and Evolve. These two phases are critically important to ensure that our practices and our procedures remain relevant and effective.

Taken together – principle and practice – will give us a system that is both flexible and proactive. AGILE in short.

Conclusion

It is with strategies like AGILE that we hope to anticipate the unexpected. That's our role – not allowing surprises on our watch.

9/11 took the world by surprise and the aviation world immediately shut down. As it opened back up, necessary security precautions were taken at our airports. Failure is not an option. The consequences of letting down our guard for even a second, are too horrendous to contemplate.

In 1985, Margaret Thatcher said in a speech to the American Bar Association⁴ the following: "We must try to find ways to starve the terrorist and the hijacker of the oxygen of publicity on which they depend".

It seems to me that this is as true today as it was in 1985. Our job is to cut off their air supply by denying them access to our airlines and our passengers. By not just dealing with the unexpected, but by anticipating the unexpected. It is as simple and as complex as that.

Despite the perilous nature of the endeavour, I am not a pessimist in these matters. What we set out to do in the post-9/11 reality of aviation security, we have successfully accomplished. But our work is not done, and I believe – with our collective resolve and cooperation – we will be able to overcome these challenges.

Thank you very much.

1- Story details taken from an article appearing in M Magazine September 2005 "A Look Back 20 Years Ago" by Steve Mallia

2- 54 died of smoke inhalation, 5 of bullet wounds.

3- Address by the Prime Minister, the Right Honourable Stephen Harper, to the Canadian Armed Forces in Afghanistan, March 13, 2006.

4- To the American Bar Association in London, July 15, 1985