Yes, cooking kills the virus extremely quickly (within seconds of reaching 70 degrees C)

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Yes, same as above.

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Yes, technically eating a cooked chicken from an outbreak zone is just as safe. The person that is cutting up (processing) the raw chicken would need to take proper sanitation and safety precautions as normal. Recommendations from relevant food inspection/sanitation authorities must be followed.

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The probability of humans being infected with avian influenza directly from birds is still extremely low, and individual feathers would be an even more remote source of infection. Children should not pick up or handle dead birds. If they have come in contact in an area where avian influenza is not present, proper hand washing is still prudent.

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If hunters are hunting in areas where avian influenza is currently infecting wild birds, they need to be exceptionally careful about good hygiene. Hunter associations should have more specific guidelines available to look at.

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Yes, all dead birds should be reported to authorities at this point in time. Local authorities will determine next steps.

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Yes, once again, proper hygiene such as hand washing is always warranted.

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That is a personal decision everyone must make every year. The guidance of human health authorities should be followed now and in the future as different vaccines become available.

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The origins are uncertain but from what is known of the general biology of the infection, and risk factors for its entry and spread, some areas stand out for further analysis. The presence of multiple virus types of high severity for poultry point at a supportive environment for disease agents to move in the poultry sector. Domestic poultry increasingly forms the basis for entry, spread and shift to high severity (virulence) of influenza viruses which in the past were mostly mild infections and confined to waterfowl. The dramatic growth in domestic poultry production is part of the explanation.

It is estimated that the Eastern and South-Eastern parts of Asia share a poultry population which approaches 6 billion birds (map). Major sub-populations are found around the rapidly expanding megacities. More than half of the domestic bird population is in medium to large scale intensive poultry holdings where fairly strict prevention and containment (´bio-security°) measures are in place. However, a sizeable part of the poultry population remains with the smallholder sector and an estimated total of 200 million farmers, each keeping about 15 birds, mainly comprising ducks, chicken, geese, turkeys and quails. The backyard or village poultry is composed of scavenging birds and open pens and exposed to virus carried by wild birds. Seasonal seeding of influenza viruses into backyard poultry systems by waterfowl migrating in the east and central Asian flyways (recognised migration routes from northern China/Siberia to south-east Asia and south and west Asia) allows regular addition of new viruses to the diverse domestic poultry virus pool and may explain some of the geospatial features of regional virus distribution.

However, the rapid spread of certain virus types implicates dissemination mechanisms within the poultry subsector itself, such as live poultry movements or transports involving infected materials. The risks from live bird markets appear the most obvious and have in the past been incriminated as a critical risk, and control point . The circulation of virus in backyard poultry may thus be readily explained. The mechanism of entry into and between intensive units must be further elucidated, since such units would be expected to operate with high levels of prevention (bio-exclusion), and entry might involve other routes besides live birds. Once high density industrial poultry areas become affected infection can explosively spread within the units, and the very high quantities of virus produced may be easily carried to other units, to humans, and into the environment. The above, largely hypothetical transmission cycle may be summarised as virus shifting from "the flyways to the highways and byways".

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The general approach to be selected and the combination of actions to be taken with regard to controlling marketing, imposition of movement restrictions, quarantine measures, culling, and any vaccination, varies according to the local set of circumstances and from country to country. There is no single solution applicable to all scenarios, and a balance must always be found to find effective, feasible and socially acceptable control measures that safeguard the short and long term livelihoods of farmers and the health of the population. It remains, however, that in the face of an emergency with multiple outbreaks suggesting Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI), levels of bio-security ( prevention and containment) must immediately be raised appropriate to the risk, and there must be early detection and rapid plus safe culling of infected groups of birds, and those considered in contact with them, in order to halt disease spread.

FAO organizes international expert panels to review the state-of-the-art in terms of scientific progress and to translate these findings into practical recommendations for the control and prevention of the disease. Collaboration with the OIE enables the consensus scientific position to guide the formulation of international guidelines and standards. This is a continual and dynamic process. Therefore, it is essential that country emergency plans are reviewed frequently and regularly in order to assimilate new scientific knowledge in this fast-moving field.

Until now the consensus has been to consider the presence of any HPAI virus in commercial poultry unacceptable. The rationale for this finds its origin in the risk of catastrophic losses in poultry production and also human health.

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Densely populated livestock areas are vulnerable to the introduction and spread of infectious diseases. Apart from livestock density also other factors are important such as the presence of forest reserves and open water bodies in the production area, movement of animals, contamination of lorries, feed and other supplies, and of course the hygiene on the farm, the processing chain and the markets. High concentrations of poultry and pigs are found in western Europe and eastern Asia. The Netherlands experienced a severe outbreak in the year 2003. Over twenty-five million birds had to be culled. Also some human infections occurred.

Hence, the current widespread infections of commercial poultry flocks in many countries of Asia is not a total surprise. The region is known to form an influenza epicentre where birds, other animals and humans live closely together in conditions where viruses have the greatest opportunity to pass from one species to another.

A number of conditions make transmission to humans of a variety of disease agents more likely, including poor sanitation of the chicken stalls in the retailed outlets, the presence of markets in the proximity to living areas, absence of central slaughtering facilities, and, the practice of slaughtering chickens at the retailed outlets.

More in general, the bird flu outbreaks can be considered as part of the process of global change. Traffic and trade dynamics create conditions for viruses, bacteria and parasites to hitch-hike around the world, affecting people, animals and ecosystems. Climate change alters the distribution and abundance of insect vectors, influences bird migration and livestock concentrations. Urbanization, income rise and dietary changes create an increase in the demand for animal production. Poultry industries are expected to continue to expand rapidly in most countries in Asia for the next two decades.

Outbreaks of Avian flu, SARS, foot-and-mouth disease, classical swine fever, Rift Valley Fever are all believed to reflect instabilities in the production environment and perhaps the general agro-ecology. FAO is exploring the linkages between disease occurrence, both in animals and for diseases in humans which are of animal origin, and environmental change, in order to better advise on health implications of production changes in the future.

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- Avian influenza usually spreads when live birds carrying infection are bought and sold, and by contact of birds with bird droppings on dirty equipment, cages, feed, vehicles or shoes/clothing

- Practising good hygienic practises (bio-security) is therefore an extremely important safety measure to prevent infection entering domesticated poultry ¬ all persons keeping or working with poultry should play their role in this

- Once the very severe type (HPAI) has been recognised in the trading environment or country, all persons working with poultry should greatly increase the level of hygienic practises to avoid bringing in virus (´bio-exclusion°) and to prevent virus exiting (´bio-containment°) if it has already entered a flock, village or region

- Poultry keepers and communities can take practical measures to avoid bringing in virus, and to reduce the risk of spread if it has entered

- SLAUGHTER of poultry is one part of bio-containment since the purpose is to prevent virus leaving a farm/village in live birds

- If good hygienic practises to prevent entry and exit are not in place the effect of slaughter policy is usually greatly reduced ¬ virus can leave a farm before signs are seen, and enter others

- Therefore hygiene practises are first line of defence and attack against epidemics of bird flu

- The main risks of virus entry are: bringing in live birds, bringing in objects such as animal and bird cages or feed that has been contaminated by birds, bringing in dirty (faeces contaminated) footware, vehicles, clothing, that has recently passed through animal markets or chicken or duck farms

- The main risks of virus leaving a region to another are: sale of birds to markets, exit of wild waterfowl which have visited backyard poultry units, people working or selling poultry carrying dirty footware, clothes, cages, to markets or bird farms

- The principles of bio-exclusion are to:

• to identify the most important routes by which virus can enter the unit

• to focus attention/actions to the most important routes of entry

• to keep up the level of activity until the risk period is over

The principles of bio-containment are:

• To To keep infection contained within poultry units, thereby reducing risk to neighbouring flocks, villages, zones and regions

• To act as soon as the risk is identified, since the flocks may already be infected before signs are seen

• To identify and apply practical means of reducing spread between birds

• To focus attention/actions to the most important routes by which virus could "move off the premises or village", and between groups or flocks

• Community-minded, since the act of containing infection assists the infection to die out, and speeds the work of authorities in control and eradication

- These principles can be used by responsible individuals and authorities at any level to develop practical guidance and advice

- Poultry keepers have a vital role in bio-containment, and authorities also to engage with livestock keepers (public awareness and communication) , and actions to promote compliance

- SLAUGHTER of infected poultry is only one part of bio-containment -the other part is played by people acting together to keep disease in and out

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Of course, in the current, fluid situation there is the urgency to stop the further spread of HPAI and revert to the situation of a more manageable level of incidence. As a next step, it will be important to reflect on the factors in the Asian poultry sector that led to this problem, and the health issues associated with further poultry sector development. Of paramount importance is the human health risks posed by HPAI flare ups and the threat emanating from the combination of wild bird reservoirs, backyard poultry and rapid industrialization.

Is there a means to effectively reduce the disease burden in the production environment? What can be done to separate and protect the health status of industrial poultry units in the proximity of urban centres? Are the concentrations of poultry and other livestock reaching levels whereby health threats require a re-thinking of where production is located? The importance of the smallholder sector must be taken into consideration - how to incorporate this important dimension of economic opportunity, where poultry form an integral part of sometimes complex agro-ecological systems vital to rural livelihood.

Ideally, risk management should encompass Sustainable Agriculture and Rural Development (SARD) considerations. This would start with a full recognition of the Regional dimension of the problem; . migratory birds, virus reservoirs and the poultry feed, production, processing and marketing circuitry, each span across the Region. The disease problems now arising may in part be explained by the dynamic structure of the poultry, and perhaps also pig sectors. The ongoing trends require to be clarified in order to identify the factors creating a higher risk of animal disease occurrence.

The HPAI crisis serves to indicate the need for a veterinary surveillance framework for early warning of disease risk at regional level, which should serve the needs of the agricultural and medical communities of the region, and the wider international community. Regional networks for epidemiological surveillance, typing of influenza and other infectious pathogens, vaccine banks, contingency stocks of ´updated° vaccines may all be necessary for timely early warning and effective action. Novel approaches and thinking will almost certainly be required.

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Soapy water and detergents are first choice for many items!!

- The avian influenza virus is more simple to destroy than many viruses since it is very sensitive to detergents which destroy the fat containing outer layer of the virus. This layer is needed to enter cells of animals and therefore destroys the infectivity.

- The virus survives well in water and simple washing may assist the virus to enter into areas where it is picked up by other birds.

- Therefore any washing to remove contamination should always be with detergents (soapy water) or specific disinfectants.

- The biggest danger is bird droppings -the virus likes moist, dirty conditions so it is essential to thoroughly disinfect items that have been in contact with bird droppings - cages, shoes, clothes before working with poultry/entry to a place where poultry are kept.

- Simple hygienic measures can reduce risk - but national authorities are encouraged to prepare and communicate specific guidance of each type of poultry enterprise.

- More guidance for veterinary services on selection and application of decontamination procedures is given in the reference below. Adaptation to the specific country circumstances will be needed.

Items and procedures
(source AUSVETPLAN Operational Procedures Manual, Decontamination - http://www.aahc.com.au/ausvetplan/decfnl2.pdf)