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Paayal Kot - 3 novembre 2006 HNA (#105 de 105)

1. What are the best ways to curb the proliferation of SALW in conflict-affected areas, considering both the demand and supply aspects of the problem?

The best defence against the proliferation of SALW in conflict-affected areas falls into three categories, awareness, education and eradication. Often in weak and failed states, threats to security are the underlying cause to many other problems such as the proliferation of SALW. The constant problem of insurgency and warfare takes an immense toll on the development of infrastructure in conflict stricken areas.

Awareness of the threat that small arms and landmines hold and the implications of there proliferation can be communicated by the intervening country. Educational programs must be set up that directly target women and children in order for this information to be disseminated and so that the domestic population will understand that the threat of SALW will affect them post-conflict and for years to come.

Eradication of SALW is equally important in conflict-affected areas. The elimination of SALW is extremely difficult in failed states because weak borders and infrastructure allow for the flow of arms to reach potential buyers and seller. Stronger security measures are needed with domestic and international help to ensure that the surplus of these weapons will be expunged or if possible destroyed.

The main underlying mechanism that must be maintained throughout dealing with the proliferation of SALW is the support of the international community. Goals and implementation must be sustained in order to restore security in a failed state. These nations depend on the commitments made by intervening countries and are often left in worse conditions when the international community exits without fulfillment of the plan. Programs must be implemented and infrastructure must be rebuilt in order for these states not once again fall into the hands of insurgency and conflict.

Albert Curtis - 3 novembre 2006 HNA (#104 de 105)

Barbara Birkett (#101)"Canada needs to push NATO to get its tactical nuclear weapons out of Europe and promise no first use..." Unless you are willing to fund and staff, by conscription if necessary, a military large enough to meet all threats solely by use of convetional arms, first-use tactical nukes are the logical answer. Especially now that the fall of the Soviet Union has resulted in reduced numbers of troops.

Ryan Romard - 3 novembre 2006 HNA (#103 de 105)

A constant theme seems to be presented in many postings. That is, by choosing to participate in the undermining of security of others, we are ultimately choosing to undermine our own security. This, perhaps, is pointing to the necessity for us to expand upon, or perhaps even develop a new conception of security.

Status quo security considerations tend to be strictly modeled around calculations of national power and the rational maximization of national interest. Under this model, solutions to security problems tend to either involve the use or threat of use of force, or are as we see more commonly today, relegated strictly to the realm of the technical/managerial solution.

The use of force and coercion only seems to breed more itself. What may seem to be perfectly rational security considerations and policies regarding the usage of force in the present often tend to be disastrous in the future. Modern history is replete with examples of this; The CIA overthrow in Iran, US action in Latin and South America, the training of the Mujahadeen to fight the Soviet Union, the list goes on. The threat or actual use of violence or sanction in "foreign policy hotspots" such as North Korea or Iran will spur only more conflict in the future.

On the other hand, the technical/managerial/regulatory approach to security issues tends to be too short sighted; attempting only to treat symptoms, while allowing the disease to develop further. It is certainly important on a certain, very practical, level to have international regulatory bodies, with teeth, to manage the reality that weapons of mass destruction are out there. This approach, however, fails to deal with the more fundamental sources of conflict, which is, in many ways, a *result* of the status quo world order.

We peruse an economic agenda (neoliberal corporate globalization) that increases inequality between and within nations. We are a major player in arms manufacturing and trade. We buy into a "conflict resolution (or conflict generation, depending on your viewpoint)" regime rooted in force, threats, and coercion. These things aid in the formation of an atmosphere that seems to conduct conflict, fear, and insecurity that will ultimately come around full circle to threaten our own security in an unintended manner.

We ought to encourage the development and propagation of a new security paradigm. Abandoning the state-military centric, border oriented, rational power calculating conception of security for an approach, perhaps borrowing from some of the ideas of Ghandi, coached in respect, understanding, and empathy. Dialogue rather than dictates. Only when we attempt to understand why, for example, so called rogue states seek to arm themselves to such an extent, will we be able to cope with such security issues on a meaningful level. Talk of empathy or genuine dialogue may be brushed off as "wishy washy" or "utopian fluff" to one possessing a hardline realist ideological outlook on the world, or to a proponent of the techno-managerial school. However, if we are test the status quo military and management approach to security on its results in achieving peace and stability, the results are, in my eyes, emphatic failure. Perhaps this approach to security is not the solution, but part of the problem.

Aaron Wechsler - 2 novembre 2006 HNA (#102 de 105)

It escapes me why Canada needs to push NATO tactical nuke out of Europe???

I am also puzzled by the statement that Bush administration eroded the norm of not using the nuclear weapons. Who did he nuke recently, remind me?

Barbara Birkett - 2 novembre 2006 HNA (#101 de 105)

Re your question about the relative urgency of various types of WMDs.

Chemical and Biological weapons could certainly create horrendous disasters, but with 27,000 nuclear weapons around, 5000 on high alert,with the ever present danger of accidental nuclear war(and we have come close on a number of occasions)nuclear weapons could wipe out civilization as we know it in a day.

Our first priority should be to get the NWS to take these weapons off high alert status.There are a number of ways this can be done, allowing more than half an hour to decide if a warning is real or false..We have also, with other non-nuclear powers, to convince the nuclear powers that such high alert status makes the world less, not more secure.

WE need to re-establish the norm against using any nuclear weapons which is being eroded, particularly by the Bush administration. THis erosion is provoking both horizontal and vertical proliferation.

As part of this norm we need a Nuclear Weapons Convention- one has already been drafted. Canada could play a role with other middle powers in promoting this as a contribution to the World Summit suggested by the BLix Commission.It could as well continue its work in trying to strengthen the NPT review process,and promoting action on the 13 Steps of the NPT 2000 Review. It could maintain its push for real work in the CD re Fissile Material Cut-Off and Prevention of An Arms Race in Outer Space or else through committees of the General Assembly if the CD cannot be made to work.

Canada needs to push NATO to get its tactical nuclear weapons out of Europe and promise no first use and to confirm negative security assurances.

All this does not negate the need for support and verification of the Biological and Chemical WEapons Conventions.