NEWS RELEASES

June 6, 2001 (2:10 p.m. EDT) No. 76

TOP SECRET DOCUMENTS FROM 1956-57 SHED LIGHT ON

SUEZ CRISIS

John Manley, Minister of Foreign Affairs, today welcomed the publication of the latest volume in the Documents on Canadian External Relations series published by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. Volume 22 is the first of two volumes covering the period from January 1956 to June 1957.

"Canada has a distinguished history in the field of foreign relations," said Mr. Manley. "While aspects of policy may change, there remain constant themes that represent the ideals and interests of our nation. These documents say a great deal about who we are."

Foremost among the subjects included in this volume is Canada's policy toward the Middle East, including our role in the Suez Crisis.

In July 1956, Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal and Anglo-French-Israeli forces attacked in order to regain control of the canal. The volume draws on material from the Department's Top Secret and Confidential files to tell the story of the Suez Crisis from Canada's perspective. Among other things, it documents Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent's harsh and unforgiving reaction to the news of the attack and, most importantly, traces the efforts of Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, Lester B. Pearson, to prevent a major war in the Middle East. For his work in creating the United Nations Emergency Force, heralded as the invention of modern peacekeeping, Pearson was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957.

"Lester B. Pearson's success in defusing the Suez Crisis, fully documented here for the first time, is an enduring source of pride for all Canadians and continues to inspire our role in the world today," Mr. Manley added.

The volume also documents Canada's activities in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1956-57 and reprints recently declassified Canadian reports on closed meetings of NATO defence and foreign ministers. It covers in detail Canada's Mutual Aid contributions to Germany, Belgium and Turkey, and Pearson's efforts to lead the Alliance toward a new basis for transatlantic co-operation.

The years 1956-57 were also a period of great progress in the development of the modern Commonwealth. In addition to tracing Canada's ongoing contribution to the association's early foreign-aid program, the Colombo Plan, Volume 22 documents Canada's response to decolonization in Cyprus, the British West Indies and Ghana.

Decolonization was also an important theme at the United Nations at that time. Canadian efforts to mediate between the developed and developing worlds are richly documented in the material on the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly. The volume's coverage of the 11th General Assembly includes material on the Law of the Sea deliberations, the Canadian decision to declare a 12-mile limit, and a frank assessment of the state of the United Nations in 1957 by the respected diplomat John Holmes.

Documents on Canadian External Relations is a continuing series that publishes the most important documents on the evolution and implementation of Canadian foreign policy. The first volume was published in 1967, and the series now covers the years 1909 to 1957, with the most recent volumes appearing simultaneously in print and on-line at www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/hist.

A second volume of documents on the same period, January 1956 to June 1957, is expected in spring 2002. It will cover Canada's relations with the United States, the Soviet Union, Eastern and Western Europe and the Far East.

Volume 22 of Documents on Canadian External Relations is edited by Greg Donaghy, a historian in the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. It is available from:

Canadian Government Publishing

Public Works and Government Services Canada

Ottawa, Ontario

K1A 0S9

Tel: (613) 956-4800

Fax: (613) 994-1498

e-mail: publishing@ccg.gcc.ca

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A Backgrounder with highlights from the documents is attached.

For further information, media representatives may contact:

Sanjeev Chowdhury

Press Secretary

Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs

(613) 995-1851

Media Relations Office

Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada

(613) 995-1874

Backgrounder

HIGHLIGHTS FROM VOLUME 22 (1956-57) OF

DOCUMENTS ON CANADIAN EXTERNAL RELATIONS

(All documents are available on-line at www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/hist.)

Canada and the Suez Crisis

• On May 10, 1956, Lester B. Pearson, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, met with his American counterpart, John Foster Dulles, during the NATO ministerial meeting in Paris. Dulles explained U.S. difficulties in supplying Israel with fighter aircraft and asked Pearson if Canada could fulfill that role. (Document 39)

• On July 27, 1956, in response to Egyptian President Nasser's decision to nationalize the Suez Canal, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden told Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent that "[w]e cannot allow Nasser to get away with this act of expropriation." St. Laurent responded with sympathy, but prophetically warned Eden that "the use of force in present circumstances -- even as a last resort -- will be surrounded by risks and difficulties." (Documents 75 and 78)

• On November 1, 1956, St. Laurent's Cabinet gathered to learn about the conflict in the Middle East. For the first time, Pearson unveiled his proposal to resolve the crisis by implementing an immediate cease-fire and providing "substantial police forces stationed on the Israel-Arab borders to keep peace." (Document 117)

• On November 4, 1956, in the small hours of the morning, the United Nations General Assembly voted to adopt a Canadian resolution calling on the Secretary- General, Dag Hammarskjöld, to examine the possibility of creating a "police force" for the Middle East. Pearson reported that the "Secretary-General, who has been very pessimistic this past week, took some hope from the fact that the U.K. had not rejected the resolution out of hand." (Document 130)

• On November 7, 1956, French and British forces agreed to a cease-fire, and the final resolution establishing the United Nations Emergency Force was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower promptly telephoned St. Laurent to tell him "that he did not know of any government that had acted more admirably in the present crisis than that of Canada." (Document 142)

• On November 12, 1956, Pearson met the Egyptian Ambassador to the United Nations, Omar Loutfi, in the Drake Hotel, New York. Loutfi astounded Pearson by declaring that Canadian troops would not be welcomed in Egypt as part of the peacekeeping force. While he wrestled with this problem in New York, Pearson urged the Prime Minister to keep it strictly secret, as the reaction in Canada would be "consternation and anger." (Document 152)

• From December 11 to 14, 1956, Pearson attended the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting in Paris. Topping the agenda was the poor state of the Alliance after the Suez Crisis, and the badly strained relations between Britain, France and the United States. Pearson was not optimistic that the damage could be readily repaired. "I would say," he cabled Ottawa, "that this Council session confirmed that the breach between Washington and London and Paris is a serious one...A distrust has arisen between them -- both personally and officially -- which is going to persist for some time." (Document 582)

• In mid-December 1956, Pearson stopped off in London for a brief visit to discuss Anglo-Canadian relations. The result was a series of long and "embarrassingly frank" discussions with leading members of the British Cabinet on Britain and the Suez Crisis. Many of Eden's colleagues expressed "growing doubts of his [Eden's] physical and temperamental suitability to face the problems ahead" and felt he should go. Selwyn Lloyd, the British Foreign Minister, categorically denied that the British knew of the Israeli invasion plans in advance (unlike the French, who had supported the Israelis) and said that London's real fear was that Israel would attack Jordan instead. The British would then have to intervene alongside Nasser's Egyptian army since both Egypt and Britain were allied with Jordan. Pearson found it "strange -- and a shade unhealthy" that Eden's colleagues were so willing to discuss his condition with a member "of another government." The exception, Pearson said, was Harold Macmillian "who was more inclined to worry about his own woes" than those of his leader. (Document 202)

Other Issues

• On June 14, 1956, the Prime Minister of New Zealand, Sydney Holland, called on Pearson for what turned out to be a surprisingly candid exchange on Canadian and international politics. Pearson gave Holland a frank account of the continuing Pipeline Debate in the House of Commons, where the opposition tactics had left "the Cabinet in despair." Pearson was just as forthright in describing world leaders. He thought British Prime Minister Eden had become "irrational and emotional on the issue of Cyprus" and he described U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower as "worked up and irrational over China." (Document 694)