SPEECHES

2000/20 CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY

NOTES FOR AN ADDRESS BY

THE HONOURABLE LLOYD AXWORTHY,

MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

TO THE SIXTH REVIEW CONFERENCE

OF THE PARTIES TO

THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION

OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

UNITED NATIONS, New York

April 25, 2000

(11:20 a.m. EDT)

In 1979, Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau wrote of "the terrible dangers that threaten humanity as long as nuclear weapons continue to be produced, and of our obligations as citizens and governments to face the consequences of this situation."

A generation later, the dangers have lost none of the potency, the obligations none of the urgency that they had when Prime Minister Trudeau first made these observations.

Without question, the risk of nuclear annihilation remains the greatest potential threat to human security.

Since our country gave up its own nuclear weapons capacity 50 years ago, Canadians have spent time, invested resources and given priority to working with others to build a strong international nuclear non-proliferation regime to lessen the threat.

With the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty [NPT] at its centre, the regime we have all painstakingly constructed over the past decades has served us well. It has proved its value and has produced results.

But while we can take satisfaction in past achievement, it is no guarantee of future security. In the realm of nuclear weapons threats and non-proliferation efforts, Cold War certainties of the 20th century are giving way to the shifting uncertainties of the 21st.

As a result, this Conference is an opportunity not only to review the NPT but to rewire its machinery in response to the new realities. What is at stake is nothing less than the future course of nuclear weapons attitudes and arsenals -- indeed, the very well-being of humanity.

The challenges are varied.

One real worry is the tendency of some to justify retaining nuclear arsenals as a defence against other weapons of mass destruction or as political status symbols.

No less disturbing are the ambitions of others to acquire nuclear capacity. Nuclear testing by India and Pakistan has added a frightening dimension to insecurity in the region of South Asia, and it has flagrantly violated international norms against nuclear proliferation.

Other issues have to do with the security, storage and disposal of fissile materials from dismantled warheads. Concern has grown about the possibility of illicit transfers of nuclear weapons-grade material and technology, as well as the irresponsible use by certain states, groups and individuals of their nuclear knowledge.

In still other quarters, there is a drift toward unilateral options -- a source of anxiety. In the United States, the rejection by the Senate of the CTBT [Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty] is a significant step backward, while the proposed unilateral National Missile Defence would have serious implications for the NPT regime.

In the meantime, the inexcusable impasse at the Conference on Disarmament has precluded any multilateral movement relating to nuclear disarmament, security assurances and prevention of an arms race in outer space, while over 50 States Parties to the NPT have still not concluded nuclear safeguards agreements with the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency].

To be sure, there have also been successes since we agreed five years ago to extend the NPT indefinitely.

The number of states remaining outside the Treaty has been reduced from 10 to only 4. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty has been negotiated and signed by the vast majority of states.

Nuclear weapons-free zones have been established in Central and South America, Africa, and the Pacific. The International Atomic Energy Agency has adopted measures that significantly strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of the nuclear safeguards regime.

There have been significant reductions in nuclear weapons and the elimination of entire weapons systems by the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom and France, as well as deep cuts in the nuclear forces assigned to NATO. The downsizing has contributed to a more stable security environment.

In addition, Russia recently ratified both START II and the CTBT -- a step we strongly commend. This provides a hopeful window of opportunity for disarmament efforts.

Developments over the past five years have been both positive and negative. But while the record may be mixed, one thing is sure: those who think the end of the Cold War somehow removed the threat of nuclear weapons need to think again. We all need to.

Yet the risks associated with nuclear weapons appear to have faded from the radar screen of international attention. Somehow, we seem to have lost our way -- or our will -- to defend the NPT regime resolutely, to keep its promises and honour its obligations.

The global nuclear non-proliferation regime cannot be allowed to wither by active design or malign neglect. On the contrary, there is a need for heightened awareness among our peoples and in our legislatures about the challenges. That need lay behind my government's consultation with our Parliament two years ago on nuclear issues.

Now is the time to re-affirm international commitment and to refocus global energy on strengthening the regime. This -- not the misguided appeal of unilateral action, whatever its source -- offers the best guarantee of our common security.

The NPT Review Conference is therefore an opportunity to identify shortcomings, to renew determination to build an effective, international regime, and to come to grips with the emerging threats to be addressed by that regime.

The tasks are clear. We must give new meaning to the basic deal underpinning the NPT: a promise by those without nuclear weapons not to acquire them, in exchange for a commitment by those possessing such weapons to eventually give them up. Along with that, we must give real meaning to the pledge of "permanence with accountability," made when the NPT was extended indefinitely.

These are certainly Canada's goals. Our approach is threefold.

First, we are committed to promoting and protecting the Treaty's universality. We must never slacken in our efforts to engage the four remaining NPT holdouts of India, Pakistan, Cuba and Israel, and to seek ways of obtaining their full adherence to the provisions of the Treaty. At the same time, we need to ensure that all States Parties keep their commitment to fulfilling their Treaty obligations.

Second, we will work to secure agreement on an updated Five-Year Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Action Plan containing concrete objectives and goals.

We are flexible on the format but unwavering on the principle. This program goes to the heart of the promise of real accountability made by both nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states. The promise was the basis on which many countries -- my own included -- agreed to extend the NPT indefinitely.

In our view, this means an action program designed to:

• complete work on the CTBT by finding a way to bring it into force sooner rather than later;

• end deadlock at the Conference on Disarmament and begin negotiations on a ban on fissile material production;

• continue START reductions in strategic and tactical nuclear weapons arsenals;

• stress the need for Russia and the United States to maintain the integrity of the Anti-Ballistic Missile [ABM] Treaty;

• call on other nuclear weapons states to enter into disarmament negotiations once the number of U.S. and Russian strategic warheads is reduced to the 1000-2000 range;

• extend the application of existing nuclear weapons-free zones and encourage new zones -- particularly in areas of tension, such as the Middle East and South Asia;

• promote the universalization of comprehensive IAEA safeguards in order to restrict the flow of materials and know-how needed for the development of nuclear weapons; and

• further improve verification and inspection capacity and effectiveness.

Canada is pressing for progress in all these areas. We are also calling for closer attention to another issue: restricting access to the means of delivering nuclear and other weapons -- notably, missiles.

A growing number of countries now possess, are developing or are acquiring missiles capable of delivering nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. Yet there exists no treaty, no code of conduct, no set of guidelines defining responsible behaviour in these areas. This is a matter that must be addressed.

One possibility advocated by some is to strengthen missile defences. However, there are serious concerns about whether strengthened defences would work, whether they would ultimately enhance or diminish security, and whether they would reinforce or damage the NPT regime.

Another option is to work at curtailing missile proliferation in the first place, and to make doing so a key part of a strengthened, global non-proliferation regime.

For example, the Missile Technology Control Regime [MTCR] could be made more effective by adopting stricter export controls on relevant technology and widening participation.

The Regime could also make an important contribution toward developing workable confidence-building measures, establishing universal norms to distinguish between responsible and irresponsible behaviour involving missiles, and backing this up with an effective verification mechanism.

Another solution that merits further thought is the creation of a joint early warning system. Efforts to deal with the Year 2000 bug demonstrated the capacity for wider international co-operation in monitoring, and the experience might have application in defending against ballistic missile attack.

A joint warning system might also be combined with a multilateral, rules-based method of reducing ballistic missile threats from non-traditional sources.

A stronger non-proliferation regime depends on effective global arrangements. It also depends on the willingness of individual countries and groups of countries to assess the validity of their own policies.

This is why Canada has been active in efforts now under way at NATO to review fully the Alliance's non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament options. NATO nuclear forces have already been reduced by over 80 percent. But more must be done.

The review will be presented to NATO foreign ministers in December and could also be used to engage Russia in the Permanent Joint Council. This willingness to explore further measures underlines NATO's commitment to advancing global arms control and disarmament. We trust that the review will be pursued with diligence and serious intent, as a signal that the NPT Article 6 bargain will be kept.

Finally, as the third strand of our approach, Canada will work toward a more robust NPT review and assessment process.

Agreeing on future goals is one thing; making sure they are implemented is quite another. With that goal in mind, we believe the NPT review process could be enhanced with a requirement to more frequently track, discuss and document movement toward translating our commitments into action.

Further, if we are to have real accountability, we need to have real transparency. Welcome moves in this direction are the naming of NGO [non-governmental organization] representatives to a number of delegations to this Conference (including my own), and the opportunity given to the NGO community to make its views known.

As we learned from the Ottawa Process, which culminated in a convention banning anti-personnel mines, the active contribution of NGO representatives can do a great deal to enhance the openness of our work, to involve people in the issues, and to mobilize public support and participation in our efforts.

The first resolution ever adopted by the UN General Assembly was one recommending that atomic weapons be eliminated from national arsenals. Ever since then, we have grappled with how best to constrain the nuclear genie.

Imperfect as it may be, the global nuclear non-proliferation regime provides the answer. A strong and effective NPT remains indispensable.

There are evident feelings of impatience with the nuclear deal, temptations to violate the NPT provisions, and a new set of non-proliferation threats and challenges, combined with a worrying drift away from international approaches.

Yet the NPT remains the most widely adhered-to security accord in history. And the reason is that despite the frustrations, the NPT and with it a global non-proliferation regime offer the best hope for minimizing the threat of nuclear annihilation, and the best vehicle for advancing our common security now and into the future.

We need to re-affirm the importance of the NPT here, and we must uphold the merits of multilateral solutions when non-proliferation is debated back home in our respective assemblies, parliaments and congresses.

It is therefore vital that the Review Conference succeed in advancing this agenda and not stand still. This is a responsibility we all carry as we turn our minds to the challenging work ahead. A safe and secure future depends on it.

Thank you.