First, Mr. Secretary-General, allow me to extend my thanks to our host, Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini of Italy, for the excellent arrangements he has made for us. Florence is a spectacular setting, and a good one for our deliberations. The art and history enshrined in this magnificent city are a testimony to the achievements and the potential of the human spirit. They serve as a reminder of the fundamental reasons that have drawn us together as an Alliance, and of the values we seek to protect. Foremost among these, of course, is individual security, which allows the human spirit to flourish.

The Balkans

Our collective efforts in the Balkans reflect our concern to ensure the security of individuals of all ethnic origins in the region.

First, Canada condemns the intensifying repression within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The closure of the independent media, beatings of peaceful demonstrators, and arrests of OTPOR activists -- for the crime of expressing their desire for democratic change within their country -- are clear signs of the increasing desperation of a regime led by an indicted war criminal who has little but contempt for the wishes of his own people. These actions, aimed to prop up the authorities by stifling the inalienable right to freedom of expression, are instead crystallizing the desire in Serbia for peaceful democratic change. Slobodan Milosevic should listen to his people, end his campaign of repression, and present himself to the Hague Tribunal.

NATO has achieved some notable successes in the Balkans over the past year, most notably the return of hundreds of thousands of displaced Kosovars to their homes, greater political pluralism in both the Federation and the Republika Srpska, the strengthening of moderate parties, and the arrest of senior indicted war criminals. However, much work remains to be done. Violence in Kosovo persists. We are deeply concerned by the actions of extremists on both sides of the ethnic divide who seek to perpetuate conflict and further their own selfish interests. The Alliance must send a strong and clear message to these extremists. Their actions will not only undermine international support for Kosovo, but will also force KFOR [the NATO-led Kosovo peacekeeping force] and UNMIK [the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo] to take assertive measures against them.

We need to send a similar message to Bosnia, where almost five years after the signature of Dayton, obstructionism and extremism by hardliners who oppose the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accord, by -- among other things -- resisting the return of refugees, behaving in an accountable manner toward their own citizens, and perpetuating an economic system that allows corruption to flourish, continue to hamper the country's development. However, there have been positive developments. The recent municipal elections in Bosnia have installed, in many communities, a new leadership committed to serving all residents, fairly and equitably. There are good prospects for further progress in revitalizing the Bosnia leadership in the general elections this fall.

The international community must remain committed and vigilant in the Balkans. Organized crime, corruption and ethnic rivalry continue to necessitate an active role for SFOR [Stabilization Force] in Bosnia. The continued support of SFOR in encouraging further minority returns is an essential element in allowing peace to take root and become self-sustaining. We must continue to do everything we can to ensure that arrests of those indicted for war crimes continue. It is clear from the lack of negative reaction to the arrest of Momcilo Krajisnik that the Bosnian people themselves are glad to be rid of the worst elements within their communities. With recent positive developments in Croatia, we have an opportunity in Bosnia to demonstrate what can be achieved elsewhere in the region through persistent, patient and concerted effort.

Canada, for its part, will continue with its decade-long commitment to helping the people of the Balkans establish a durable, self-sustaining peace throughout the region. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Canadian Forces are about to assume command of Multinational Division Southwest, in partnership with our British and Dutch allies. Our military presence there will grow to approximately 1800 by October. In Kosovo, we are now providing some 130 police to UNMIK, along with corrections officials and police trainers to help address the continuing public security challenge in the province. At the same time, we are offering human rights and demining expertise, as well as development assistance to facilitate the establishment of a safe, democratic and multi-ethnic Kosovo.

Review of NATO's Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament Policies

Today, I will comment particularly on the Alliance's contribution to arms control and disarmament, National Missile Defence [NMD] and the European Security and Defence Identity [ESDI]. While the further enlargement of the Alliance is of importance to me, I will speak to this question tomorrow.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT] Review Conference made very encouraging progress last week in New York. At that Conference, we all made commitments to take practical steps to implement the Treaty. The nuclear weapons states [NWS] made particular undertakings, but there are obligations for us all.

As the world's pre-eminent security Alliance, we have a leadership role to play in realizing the promise of New York. Our ongoing review of NATO's non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament policies should set our agenda for doing so. First and foremost, we welcome the unequivocal undertaking by the NWS to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. This should be our headline goal.

However, we must ask ourselves what the members of this Alliance can do to help make this decision happen. The concluding document of the Review Conference outlined a number of practical steps for the NWS, including:

efforts to reduce nuclear arsenals unilaterally;
increased transparency with regard to their nuclear capabilities;
the further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons;
concrete measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons;
a diminished role for nuclear weapons in our security policies; and
the eventual engagement of all nuclear weapons states in the nuclear disarmament process.

We in NATO who live under the protection of the nuclear umbrella also have an obligation to support and work with the NATO NWS on these steps. We must all make our nuclear posture in NATO coherent with our non-proliferation and disarmament posture in New York and Geneva. We need to examine our own policy statements from the perspective on non-proliferation, and ask ourselves what further measures we can take to build confidence, to increase transparency and to advance disarmament.

In particular, we need to meet the challenge of reducing the political value that our own alliance ascribes to the possession of nuclear weapons, if we are to continue to convince others that they should not acquire nuclear arsenals of their own. In the NPT and in the Conference on Disarmament, we are confronted regularly with the argument that if nuclear weapons are good for NATO, then they are good for others too.

The contradiction in our declaration policy undermines the credibility of our non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. Last year in Washington, the Alliance declared that the salience of nuclear weapons has been reduced. This review process should demonstrate that NATO truly believes this to be the case.

Can we move a step further and say that the only purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter other nuclear weapons?

Can existing nuclear arsenals not be made safer through greater recourse to de-alerting and de-mating?

Can we not be more transparent about how many nuclear gravity bombs we have left, and where they are located?

Can NATO not unilaterally reduce the number of remaining bombs further, and call for proportional parallel action by the Russian Federation?

Could we not take these sorts of measures to increase confidence with others, especially Russia, in order to pave the way for greater Russian openness on their huge sub-strategic stockpiles?

Could we not encourage a codification of the 1991-1992 Russia-U.S. commitments regarding the reduction and dismantlement of sub-strategic weapons?

In deepening our dialogue with Russia on nuclear forces, could we not consider a limited data exchange on the explosive power, number and location of nuclear weapons? This could serve as a good confidence-building measure.

Could we not do more with Russia to share information on early warnings of missile launches?

Can we not promote a more inclusive arrangement to control the proliferation of ballistic missile technology?

And, if we are considering greater transparency with Russia, what about our own publics and other countries?

Should we not prepare a new comprehensive public statement of the Alliance's arms control and disarmament policies that is relevant for today and tomorrow, rather than for yesterday?

I urge you to regard our review process as an opportunity to seriously reflect on the questions I have posed.

In the last decade, NATO has done a great deal to advance arms control and disarmament. We need to ask ourselves what we will do for the next decade. The outcome of the NPT Review Conference provides a road map for where we need to go. Now, we need to find the political will to follow it.

National Missile Defence

One of the four criteria President Clinton established for informing an NMD [National Missile Defence] deployment decision was the impact on national security, including the views of the Allies. It is appropriate, therefore, that we use this last meeting of NATO at the Ministerial level before the President's potential decision to discuss the issue among us.

NMD raises serious issues for all of us. Our security -- Canada's, Europe's, and that of the United States -- is a direct function of global strategic stability. The lynch-pin of this stability is the ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile] Treaty. Russian-U.S. discussions continue with little sign that the Russians are willing to amend the Treaty at this time.

This situation raises the spectre of Treaty abrogation, and the potentially highly destabilizing reactions that this could set in motion -- in Russia and China, and possibly in India and Pakistan as well. A new arms race could be set in motion, one that would undermine the stability that we have all come to take for granted. We have to weigh a possible threat against an established and potentially worse one. Doing this is a major challenge.

I am encouraged that the U.S. wishes to take into account the views of its Allies in NATO. After all, the security of us all is at stake. I would appeal to the United States to take all the time it needs to fully explore the implications of a decision on NMD deployment, especially one taken unilaterally, to fully address the potential impact on the international security system, and to find a way forward that advances the security of the United States and all of its NATO Allies.

European Security and Defence Identity

Turning to ESDI, let me be clear from the outset: Canada supports ESDI as a means of strengthening the European pillar of NATO. Our foremost concern is the unity of the Alliance. NATO must remain the organization of first choice when it comes to ensuring security in Europe. It must not become simply the organization of last resort, a sort of last-ditch insurance policy for European security.

The EU and NATO need to develop -- now -- the close institutional links that will be essential to ensure a smooth, effective response to future crises. Co-operation and some clear understandings are especially important in two areas: first, the use by the EU of NATO's assets and capabilities; and second, the participation of non-EU Allies in future EU-led operations. Canada could never agree to modalities that would leave NATO without adequate control over the use of its assets and capabilities. It is also essential that the EU adopt an inclusive attitude toward non-EU Allies, recognizing the stake that all Allies have in ESDI and in crisis management.

As a transatlantic member of the Alliance and an active contributor to the missions in the Balkans, Canada has an abiding interest in European security. I have written to Minister Gamma to underscore the need to address Canada's unique position. I look forward to pursuing this with the EU Presidency, as well as within NATO.

Thank you.

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Last Updated: 2006-10-30	Top of Page	Important Notices