Canada in the World: Canadian International Policy

Video Interview Bruno Gruselle Subscribe to eNewsletter and/or Email Alerts and Podcasts

Video Interview (in French with English transcripts)

Note: The opinions presented are not necessarily those of the Government of Canada.

The international community’s major challenges	4 min 59 sec	Windows Media l QuickTime
Role of the commissions, the international community and the UN	5 min 36 sec	Windows Media l QuickTime
Success of treaties and institutions	4 min 27 sec	Windows Media l QuickTime

(Video players are available here: QuickTime | Windows Media)

I am Bruno Gruselle. I was an employee at the Department of National Defence until very recently. My positions were in the DND policy department, first taking care of non-proliferation issues, including missile proliferation issues, which I did for six years. I also looked after the Iraqi disarmament file and then, a few years ago, export control issues before coming here, where I am senior researcher once again in charge of missile proliferation and nuclear deterrence.

So, the first issue, in my opinion, is the issue of consistency in national control systems, particularly export control. Recent cases of procurement, for example purchases of nuclear systems, and particularly discoveries about the existence of a network of suppliers around Dr. Abdul Khan have shown that proliferation was able to take place only because these networks could rely on the weakness or vulnerability of a certain number of control systems, particularly in Asia and the Middle East. It seems to me that Security Council Resolution 1540, which deals with everything about controlling the flow of goods, is heading in the right direction, namely making national systems more effective and consistent, so that proliferation cannot grow by using the loopholes that exist in some countries.

The second major challenge, it seems to me, is that of the effectiveness of international means of verification, and particularly their ability to detect the countries that could, despite their commitment, start into proliferation activities. There have been three textbook cases since the 1990s: first of all, that of Iraq, where discoveries about the programs—be they nuclear, biological or chemical—showed and emphasized the fact that the means allocated for controlling countries’ international commitments had been highly inadequate. Even though, since then—in particular with the Iraqi experience, for example—the International Atomic Energy Agency has implemented consistent verification tools and means, but rather after the fact, we see today with Iran and North Korea that there are still holes. And in my opinion, today the question is knowing how to strengthen control and verification powers, particularly those of the International Atomic Energy Agency. It remains to be seen in this context how to force countries to commit themselves to such systems with the support of the international community, knowing that the tools already exist, such as the Agency’s strengthened guarantees. Strengthened guarantees are one system. You undoubtedly know that one of the IAEA’s missions is to verify the commitments of Non-Proliferation Treaty countries. For the moment, for most of the countries that have signed the NPT, these commitments translate into a simple verification of their use of fissile material, of uranium, but that’s all there is in most countries. Strengthened guarantees would force governments to make it easier for the Agency to verify compliance with their commitments on-site. So, that seems to me to be a second major challenge for the international community and for non-proliferation instruments.

Role of the commissions, the international community and the UN

With regard to the International Advisory Committee, it has general verification powers, meaning the power to verify the programs declared by governments. It also has special powers that include, by authority of the agreement, going to check that prohibited activities are not being conducted at a government’s non-declared site. These special powers have never been used, although a certain number of governments are suspected of having secret programs. So for me, this clearly shows that there is still a lack of determination on the part of the international community to allow this organization to take its mandate further.

And in your opinion, what is the source of this lack of determination?

It’s very difficult to put a finger on it. I don’t want to point fingers, all the more because in my opinion there is no single responsibility in the area. I would simply say that to the extent that a consensus of governments is necessary in order to use these powers, as soon as just one or two or three slow down the effort, there will be nothing. We’ll be satisfied with non-intrusive and general inspections. That said, from experience I can tell you that during inspections planned in advance on declared sites, in general—except with an extraordinary stroke of luck—you won’t find anything. In order to find something, you have to arrive without alerting the authorities and have the opportunity to go everywhere and look at everything. Moreover, that’s the type of powers the commissions had in Iraq. It is due to these powers that the commissions were able to detect the activities that Iraq had not declared, like for example the military biological program. Without these powers, I think that the Americans would have discovered a lot more in 2003. And why did the commissions have access to these powers? It’s because the Security Council was sufficiently united and determined to see that these powers were respected by the Iraqi government. So, once again, it’s a question of determination, the consensus of the international community, to see that the powers that have been established precisely in order to detect non-declared activities are used.

So, in my opinion, the UN has a crucial role. Once again, this is seen on the Iranian issue. There in no doubt in my mind about the fact that as soon as the Security Council once again wants to put the spotlight on an issue and the permanent and non-permanent members agree, we will be able to put forward non-proliferation instruments. International organizations that are not the UN, whether the European Union or the G8, for example, have a coaching role. Moreover, they can use their influence, both material and non-material—for example, the fact that the European Union signs a certain number of economic cooperation contracts with some governments to get these governments to improve their own control systems. Once again, we come back to the question of willingness. Moreover, this is what the United States does with a certain number of countries that are key to the flow of equipment and money, such as Singapore and Dubai. Cooperating with these governments by using its own arguments is what the European Union can do, as a structured organization, or even the G8, by getting its partners to coordinate their own policies. That’s what I think all these organizations can do. Like, for example, MTCR-type supplier groups, superior nuclear-type groups, which are specialized and can even carry out actions to raise the awareness of the governments or even their own industries.

Success of treaties and institutions

Once again, everything depends on the international community’s determination. What can be observed is that every time countries—or, in any case, the Security Council countries—have wanted to disarm a government or at least stop its proliferation activities, the results have been rather good. Once again, I am going to use Iraq, but the Security Council resolutions on the issue of the Iraqi retirement of weapons of mass destruction programs have at any rate led first the United Nations Special Commission and then UNMOVIC [the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission] to achieve, since 2001, a more or less complete disarmament of Iraq. The proof of this is that the Americans... well, the coalition that intervened in Iraq in 2003... was unable to find additional weapons on the basis of what the commissions had concluded regarding the status of the programs. In the context of the Iranian program, I find that the International Atomic Energy Agency has managed in very little time to get an idea about Iran’s activities, even if many questions remain. This being the case, the overall picture is not so clear, as I have stated, since, in the context of the Chemical Weapons Convention, for example, while there is an organization whose task is to verify governments’ commitments, this organization has a relatively low level of activity at the moment. And again, it is up to governments to show their determination, not necessarily to give this type of organization more powers—because the International Advisory Committee has a large number of powers—but to give it the opportunity to use them. A last point to make is that the outcome is really mitigated. There is still effort to be made in the case of the Biological Weapons Convention, for which there is no verification organization. So, I would say, a more or less positive outcome, but with mixed results.

And so, has the intervention of non-government organizations vastly modified the overall picture? It doesn’t seem so to me. What can be said, in my opinion, is that governments are, however, more open, more pressured by the existence of these organizations to make some efforts. This is an area that I am not very familiar with, but we have seen in the context of the Ottawa Convention banning landmines that the role of NGOs in getting governments to commit to making efforts regarding disarmament is not negligible. In the area of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, I do not have the feeling that NGOs have had much influence on governments. What there is perhaps is the commitment of governments with nuclear weapons, in the more or less long term, to disarm and finally get rid of their weapons. I am not very familiar with the issue, so I am going to answer in few words: I believe that governments will do it when they are ready and that the influence of non-government organizations will be marginal.

Last Updated:2006-10-03

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