



SITREP

A PUBLICATION OF THE ROYAL CANADIAN MILITARY INSTITUTE

THREATS AND CHALLENGES IN THE 21ST CENTURY

(U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Val Gempis)

A B-2 Spirit bomber refuels from a KC-135 Stratotanker during a deployment to Andersen Air Force Base, Guam.

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FROM THE EDITOR'S DESK

In recent months, the government of Canada has made two relatively significant decisions regarding Canadian defence policy. Canada will not participate formally in US plans for an active defence against ballistic missiles. but the government has promised an infusion of over \$12 billion over the next five years. The highly anticipated (and long-delayed) International Policy Review and Defence Policy Statement will soon be released, but these two decisions will likely have an impact on and be reflected in the eventual outcome of the review.

We are therefore very pleased that Col Brian S. MacDonald, Chair of Defence Studies and Acting Executive Director of the RCMI, will be able to shed some light on the continuing financial and procurement problems of the Canadian forces, in the article "Budget 2005, Defence Procurement and the Fourth 'D'."

The threat posed by failed or failing states, and the "responsibility to protect" citizens of such states, will likely be featured quite prominently in the policy review process. The problems and complexities of such a *de facto* "state building" role is the subject of an article written by Mr. Douglas Mason, a freelance writer and policy analyst who is a member of the RCMI, titled "Failed States: Securing Stabilisation and Security Through Aid, Governance and Recovery."

This interest in failed states did not emerge out of a vacuum, but has been informed by the significant Canadian Forces deployments to Afghanistan over the last few years. This role will be increased in the next few months, as Canada stands up its first Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) for the country. An excellent overview of the PRT concept is provided by Mr. Mark Sedra, the Cadieux-Léger Fellow at the Policy Research Division (CPC) of Foreign Affairs Canada, in an article titled "The Provincial Reconstruction Team: The

Future of Civil-Military Relations?"

The recent Canadian decision on missile defence, and the manner in which it was handled, took many defence analysts by surprise. Missile defence proponents argue that this has violated an important defence principle in Canada-US relations, and will likely have a highly detrimental impact on the relationship with our southern neighbour. Opponents, on the other hand, are both happy at the outcome of the decision, and are confident that Canada-US strategic relations will continue to prosper.

This issue concludes with two articles that seek to expand the nature of the Canadian debate on missile defence. In "Canada, Missile Defence and The Potential for Strategic Instability," I have sought to provide strategic context to American plans for missile defence, by examining it alongside recent developments in the country's nuclear strategy and counterproliferation policy.

We are also very fortunate to have Dr. George Lindsey, RCMI member and formerly a senior defence scientist at the Department of National Defence, provide an examination on the potential of overhead surveillance cooperation as an alternative means to facilitate Canada-US aerospace cooperation, in the article "The Role for the Canadian Armed Forces in the Defence Against Terrorism."

We hope that you, our readers, find these articles interesting and informative. We also look forward to any comments and feedback. ■

Sincerely,

David S. McDonough
Editor of *SITREP*



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BUDGET 2005, DEFENCE PROCUREMENT AND THE FOURTH "D"

by Colonel (Retd) Brian S. MacDonald

Our prediction that by the time the February issue of *SITREP* reached our readers the new International Policy Statement and associated Defence Policy Statement would have been released turned out to be rather wide of the mark, but we are relieved to learn that it will have been released by the time that this issue of *SITREP* reaches our readers!

In the meantime, we do have the 2005 Budget Statement's promises of significant funding increases planned for the Defence Budget, amounting to a total of \$12.8 billion dollars over the next five years. This will include \$6.3 billion to cover the costs of expanding the personnel base of the Forces by 5,000 regulars and 3,000 reserves.

It will also include \$2.9 billion for new medium capacity helicopters, new logistic trucks, new utility aircraft, and a new Joint Task Force 2 (JTF2) facility. In addition, another \$3.8 billion for capital renewal is promised for projects to be defined once the Defence Policy Statement is finally issued.

Cynics will point out that only \$500 million of this new money will be made available in the 2005-06 budget year, plus another \$600 million in the following budget year. By the 2006-07 budget year, the new money total finally breaks the Billion Barrier with a \$1.558 billion total, and then hits its stride in the final two years of the Five Year Plan when the remaining \$10.170 billion shows up.

And, "Oh, by the way," the fine print reveals that the "Left Hand" (the Expenditure Review Committee) has required the Department of National Defence (DND) to find savings in "Service Delivery, Procurement, Property Management, Departmental Initiatives and Employee Benefit Savings," amounting to \$200 million a year in "Baseline" funding, to be given back to "The Centre."

The Bottom Line, by the "Percentage of GDP" share measure, is that there is certainly no significant move upwards until 2007-08.

Meanwhile, of course, "Rustout" continues.

One of the odd comments heard when the "Rustout Reality" was pointed out, was that there really was more money which could have been made available, but DND was simply incapable of absorbing any more money at the moment – that even if they were given it, they wouldn't be able to spend it.

When this statement resulted in gales of guffaws and splutters of disbelief amongst the rows of defence critics and analysts, it was quietly pointed out that last year DND had been given an authority to "carry forward" \$400 million of budgeted money which it simply hadn't been able to spend in the previous year.

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This recalls the comments made in the 2003 *Report of the Minister's Advisory Committee on Administrative Efficiency*, which is another of the increasingly long string of thorough and competent reports quietly gathering dust on government shelves, while their many useful and helpful recommendations are being cheerfully ignored.

The Report identified one of the key reasons that DND can't "Absorb" more capital money than it is getting as the length of the Procurement Cycle – the time consumed in the process from the point that a capital need is first formally identified, until the actual procurement project is ultimately "Closed Out."

The Committee noted, and their work was validated by further analysis by the Auditor-General of Canada, that it took, on average, 14-16 years for a Capital Project to make it through the Procurement Cycle. More to the point, the Committee observed, was that it took, on average, 11 years from identification of need to the point that a contract could be signed, and the contractor could begin to cut metal.

But let's let the Committee speak for itself:

"The Committee finds that Defence's internal process for defining requirements and approving capital projects takes too long (nine years out of the average 15-16 year process required to procure major equipment), involves too many successive reviews, occupies too much senior management time for little added value, and fails, from a process perspective, to distinguish between common goods and complex weapons systems."

The Committee discovered that the current DND timelines were as follows:

From Need Identification to Preliminary Approval – 44 months
From Preliminary Approval to Effective Approval – 49 months
From Effective Approval to Contract Award – 14 Months
From Contract Award to Initial Delivery – 12 Months
From Initial Delivery to Full Operating Capability – 58 Months
From Full Operating Capability to Closeout – 12 months

It is at this point that we need to compare the 16 year Procurement Cycle to some other cycles, like the Treasury Board amortization tables which project a maximum 20 year life cycle for military vehicles, a maximum 20 year life cycle for aircraft, or a maximum life cycle of 25 years for ships.

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FAILED STATES: SECURING STABILISATION AND SECURITY THROUGH AID, GOVERNANCE AND RECOVERY

by Douglas Mason

How to engage with failed or failing states has emerged as one of the greatest contemporary security and development challenges. Such countries have governments unable or unwilling to provide their citizens with core state functions of basic services, infrastructure, security and justice. Frequently at war or unstable themselves, they export conflict and instability to their neighbours and are a menace to their own citizens whose rights they abuse, either actively or through neglect and dysfunction.

Previously such states had been regarded as the hardcore of an economic development challenge for the third world – how to promote progress toward stable and accountable government with effective national institutions able to guarantee basic needs and generate economic growth and poverty reduction on a sustained basis? This task has gained urgency from recognition that it is essential on security grounds. Failed states are a source of global security threats, as actual or potential sources of terrorism, drug smuggling, money laundering, organised transnational crime and the flow of refugees. They are generally unable to exert sovereignty or police their own territories sufficiently to deter sanctuary for negative non-state actors that pose a threat to their own or western interests abroad. That failed states include all the most grave current trouble spots, from Afghanistan and Iraq to Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo, serves to underline the scale of the challenge.

Although it is agreed that engagement to stabilise failing states is both necessary and urgent, a research and praxis frontier exists regarding the empirical testing and interplay of mechanisms and appropriate conditions for achieving this. Although peacekeeping capabilities are important components for intervention in cases of *in situ* conflict or disputed government legitimacy, experience has highlighted the central role of state building and an associated mix of policy tools and factors involving aid, governance and legitimation.

The Complexity of State Building

Interventions in failed states are facilitated by the principle of qualified sovereignty; that there is a duty to protect populations from serious abuses, and that the rights of people in this regard supersedes the rights of states to do what they wish with their own citizens. This principle has underpinned the international interventions of the past two decades whether invited or uninvited, with or without United Nations (UN) sanction. It is also the

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premise for the current international peace building and state building operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. These interventions have also shown the effective limits of projecting military power in the absence of two important conditions: domestic and international legitimation for the intervention, and capacity for effective state building to reverse the erosion of institutional capacities that have generally preceded or engendered collapse into conflict and instability.

State building is complex and intractable – there is no clear, easily replicable model for how it can be achieved, while the output from efforts are both long-term and have an inherently high risk of failure. Essentially, it requires the establishment of representative government as well as security and institution building to create the conditions under which human safety can be guaranteed and economic development and poverty reduction can take place. This covers the long run objective of improving governance, particularly building the capacity of domestic institutions, something which is qualitatively difficult to achieve and has a long record of historical failure. Its importance is underlined by the fact that it carries considerable synergies and positive externalities regarding security, political participation and economic well being. Growth economics has long recognised the importance of effective institutions to economic development, as these establish the rules under which a nexus of thousands of private transactions take place, underpinned by market incentives, protection of property rights and enforceable contracts.

Governance Failures Limit Assistance for Failing States

Governance problems and institutional weakness are endemic to failing states, compounding economic stagnation, erosion of government legitimacy, and competition for state and other resources. This lends itself to vicious cycles as decline and instability reinforces isolation. A particular source problem is the inability or unwillingness of these states to build the preconditions which are necessary for attracting international aid, foreign direct investment and growth. That includes macro-economic stability, respect for property rights, equitable application of the law and competitive markets, as well as human rights and political fair play. Moreover, progress tends to be undermined by negative phenomenon in political economy as many of these conditions, including independent institutions and transparency, tend to be inimical to elite interests which benefit from economic distortions and corruption.

A relationship exists, therefore, between governance and donor conditionality which balances compliance (good policy)

with incentives (international aid). Typically, this plays out through the adjustment programmes – a set of agreed policy reforms – established for a given country, together with the main multilateral development institutions, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. Failure can be counted in the many such programmes involving the weakest and most poorly governed states in the world where minimally acceptable performance cannot be established, leading to the breakdown or temporary suspension of engagement. Without the positive endorsement of a regular IMF lending programme, generally a poverty reduction and growth facility (PRGF), aid from western governments and other agencies is generally unavailable except for emergency and humanitarian assistance.

Performance requirements remain a grave challenge for international engagement with failing states. Relaxation of benchmarks has tended to be resisted (correctly) for the reason that this leaves intact the economic and other policy failures that are the cause of decline, or endorses corrupt governments, letting them and governing elites off the hook regarding the consequences of their policy choices. In the case of failing states, however, hazard arises from the fact that tougher donor conditionality in the face of policy dysfunction is counter-productive when this is likely to lead to a rupture in aid rather than improved governance, or where minimally acceptable policies cannot reasonably be guaranteed under conditions of war and instability. Under these circumstances disengagement leads to isolation and further instability. Moreover, the rewards of poor governance – rent seeking and corruption – can be more lucrative to governing elites than aid and other positive incentives. This explains how policies which are destructive for a country as a whole can continue for a very long time as local elites entrench themselves, as the experience of Burma, the former Zaire and present day Zimbabwe attest.

New Policy Tools Needed to Engage with Failing States

Effective policy tools to engage with failed states are needed by western governments and development institutions, with particular focus on prevention. Research estimates that the cost of a single country falling into the status of a failed state at US\$82 billion, meaning that prevention could have the highest rewards. Policy makers have signalled a desire to work more effectively with fragile states, stop them from failing, prevent them from slip-



Photo Courtesy of Webshots.com

Failing states, as a source of numerous potential global security threats, will represent one of the most complex challenges to face the international community in the 21st century.

ping into war, and improving their capacity for economic and political management. Such engagement requires expanded capabilities, commitments and policy changes, including:

Maintain engagement with failing states, and where necessary this may require a more creative response to performance problems. Development agencies have signalled a desire to respond to this with lead taken by the World Bank which has developed a targeted assistance mechanism, the Low Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) initiative, in recognition that "difficult partnership" countries lack the capacity or inclination to use the finance that is available for poverty reduction effectively due to instability, political paralysis and the break down of decision making. LICUS, which identifies 30 such at risk countries that are home to 500 million people, allows engagement to continue including, vitally, technical assistance and regular contact with other decision and policy makers. "Membership" of the programme is meant to be transitory, until the country concerned can move out of risk and into regular assistance. Similar interest has been generated by bilateral and other multilateral agencies including the UN, the UK's Department for International Development, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the US State Department, whose resources can all be marshalled in the context of LICUS countries.

Strong, active and **sustained diplomatic intervention** is necessary to engage with and stabilise weak states. This points to the importance of in-country capability, including embassies, human resources, good intelligence (information) and regular contact with local decision-makers in the countries concerned, many of which are the subject of weak diplomatic coverage, largely because they have traditionally been regarded as econom-

ic and political backwaters. As yet evidence is not conclusive that western diplomatic resources have been increased substantially in weak and failing states.

Fast response capabilities for aid, money and technical support are required. Aid agency decision making is typically slow moving, with long and cumbersome procedures for project approval and disbursement. New and faster capabilities are needed if assistance is to be timely, involving fast-disbursing projects with high impact. The trouble experienced in managing international aid for Afghanistan, only a fraction of whose aid pledges have been disbursed three years after the fall of the Taliban – despite the fact that, together with Iraq, it is the greatest global security priority for state building and post-conflict reconstruction – well illustrates this problem. Establishment is needed of a standing fund, with ear-marked financial resources together with expertise and resources that can flow to countries in conflict quickly.

Dependable, **easily deployable peace building capacities:** effective peace building and peacekeeping capabilities are needed to stabilise failed states, and this needs to include a willingness to train and deploy military assets with specialised operational abilities, including rapid airlift capability. The quality of contributions to peacekeeping operations need to be addressed. Typically UN peacekeeping operations are staffed by the militaries of contributor nations from the developing world, often extremely weak states themselves, as western countries have shied away from providing troop and other commitments; under these circumstances, criticism of weak UN capabilities that result is disingenuous.

Promote broad based growth: Economic growth and poverty reduction are required to help address the conditions that contribute to instability, in order to end cycles of conflict and economic collapse. This needs to include continued, strong engagement to build capacity and promote effective policy that will produce growth.

Chaos Versus the Burdens of Empire

Failed states involve hard political decisions and uncomfortable choices for policy makers. The scale of the problem and the level of dysfunction and misery, involving a very large portion of the poorest people in the world, make inaction indefensible. Interventions, however, face political challenges not seen since the end of western colonialism. Intervening where local authorities have failed, whether on humanitarian or other grounds, may produce legitimacy problems serious enough to cause mission failure or bog down the occupying authority in difficult or unwinnable conditions. To students of history, this recalls the burdens of empire.

Interventions, particularly involving regime change, are meant to be of short duration, while establishing self-sustaining institutions and capacity that make exit possible. However, the governing administrations so established create legitimacy deficits that weaken the new institutions and compromise the quality of political participation and consent required for them. These are now the difficulties experienced by the US occupation in Iraq and similarly, the UN protectorate in Kosovo and the international presence in Afghanistan. This is most acute in regard to Iraq and points to the uncomfortable conclusion that the US presence there itself has become a source of weakness and failure in state building and stabilisation. By exposing the limits of American military power and unilateral action, the struggles to stabilise Iraq have underlined the importance of state building and legitimacy. In the process, it has contributed to a substantial policy change: a global campaign to promote "liberty" and spread the basic building blocks of stable government and international development to the failing states of the world is now at the centre of the Bush administration's foreign policy and security agenda – in short, state building. ■

The views expressed are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute or its members.

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And we might also compare the 16 year Procurement Cycle to the Treasury Board determined life cycle of some of the other components of DND equipment, like weapons systems (5 to 10 years), informatics hardware (3 to 5 years), and informatics software (1 to 10 years).

The interesting question, of course, is why this enormous delay in the path to Effective Approval takes place. Perhaps a part of it stems from Industry Canada's description of the contract approval process:

"The winning proposal will be selected based on an overall evaluation of the Bidder's:

- (a) technical solution;
- (b) the bid price (and schedule)

- (c) the risk associated with the proposed solution; and,
- (d) the IRB proposal."

Since Industry Canada is the determining agency for evaluating the IRB (Industrial and Regional Benefits) proposals, it just may be that the process of satisfying their non-defence objectives may impact the strangely meandering defence procurement timelines.

It really is a pity that Franz Kafka never had the opportunity of writing about the Canadian Department of National Defence. ■

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THE PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM: THE FUTURE OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS ?

by Mark Sedra

In Afghanistan today, few issues are as divisive and contentious as the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) concept. It has become the focal point of a global, often acrimonious, debate on civil-military relations in post-conflict or "complex development" situations. Introduced by the US-led coalition as a means to "win hearts and minds," the PRT was a response to growing public resentment of the Coalition military presence in the country and to international criticism of the apparent disconnect between Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and the wider reconstruction and stabilization process.

By the end of 2004, despite the establishment of 19 PRTs across Afghanistan, no overarching framework or strategic guidelines have been established for PRT deployments, and the wider debate on the subject remains polarized. Non-governmental humanitarian agencies (NGHAs) have argued that PRTs curtail the "humanitarian space" within which humanitarian organizations operate. Military actors in Afghanistan have taken a number of steps to assuage the legitimate concerns of humanitarian organizations, yet a gulf of understanding between their positions remains.

At the core of this gulf is the shifting role of the military in the post-Cold War era. As the threat of interstate conventional war has receded and that of failed states and humanitarian crises has come to the fore, the military has been forced to adopt new multi-dimensional operational doctrines. This has forced military and humanitarian actors to operate in the same space and time. While the military has emphasized the need for "complementarity" in this new situation, humanitarian groups have been wary of its impact on their ability to remain impartial, neutral and independent. Nowhere is this tension more pressing than in contemporary Afghanistan

The Government of Canada is at the forefront of the global debate on civil-military relations, having established its own set

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of guidelines for civil-military cooperation and having been a major supporter of the Stockholm and Ottawa conferences on "Good Humanitarian Donorship." With Canada set to establish a PRT in 2005, an opportunity exists to set an important precedent for civil-military relations in Afghanistan and elsewhere.



Photo Credit: CF Combat Camera KA2004-R101-294d

The Canadian Forces have had a very robust peace support role in Afghanistan.

The Origins of the PRT Concept

From the initial planning stage of Coalition military operations, the US military emphasized the vital importance of civil-military affairs, or CIMIC activities. In December 2001, the Coalition established a Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (CJCMOTF) to oversee civil affairs activities, and deployed Coalition Humanitarian Cells (CHLCs) in several key urban centers across the country. The mission of the cells was multifaceted: to "win hearts and minds" among the Afghan population; to secure the support of local communities by showing "the benign face of the Coalition;" to jump-start reconstruction efforts; and to gain positive publicity for the war effort in the US.

From the outset, relations between NGHAs and the CHLCs were problematic, primarily due to the proclivity of CHLC personnel to

operate in civilian clothing and travel in unmarked vehicles. NGHAs objected to Coalition activities on the grounds that it duplicated their own efforts and threatened their staff by blurring the lines between military and civilian actors. Consequently, the NGHAs rejected invitations to attend weekly CJCMOTF coordination meetings or to participate in joint planning and project selection. In response to mounting criticism, CHLC personnel began to don military uniforms in early 2004, yet relations between the two sides remained strained.

In November 2002, in an effort to reinvigorate the flagging reconstruction process and contain growing anti-Coalition sentiment, the Coalition introduced a plan to establish Joint Reconstruction Teams (JRTs). While more robust than the CHLCs, the initial aims of the new structure did not diverge sub-

stantively from its predecessor. Before the JRTs could be deployed, the US, on the advice of the Afghan Government, renamed the units Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

More important than the change of name was the new mandate that accompanied it. According to a set of PRT Working Guidelines issued by the Office of the US Ambassador in February 2003, the primary goals of the PRTs are as follows: to extend the influence of the central government outside of the capital; provide a security umbrella for NGHAs to operate; facilitate information sharing; and carry out small-scale reconstruction projects.

Teams ranged in size from 50-120 personnel and were composed of civil affairs soldiers, Special Forces, and regular army units, as well as representatives of USAID, the State Department, and the Department of Agriculture.

The first Coalition PRT was established in the eastern city of Gardez on February 1, 2002, and this initiative was gradually internationalized, with Britain establishing a PRT in Mazar-e Sharif, New Zealand in Bamiyan and Germany in Kunduz. When NATO assumed command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in August 2003, it embraced the concept, and committed itself to establish PRTs across the country. By early October 2004, NATO completed the first phase of its PRT deployment plan, establishing units in the nine northern provinces of the country. Current NATO planning calls for a phased counter-clockwise deployment across the country, though lack of resources and political will continue to hamper the planned expansion.

Reactions to the PRT Concept

NGHAs have identified a number of deficiencies in the PRT concept, such as: its lack of military strength to confront insecurity; its inadequate pre-deployment consultation of NGHAs and local stakeholders; its ambiguous mandate and legal standing; its lack of "institutional memory" due to rigid personnel rotation schedules; and its potential for compromising the role of humanitarian agencies through the implementation of aid projects. According to Paul Barker and Paul O'Brien of CARE International, one of the largest international NGHAs operating in the country, "the PRTs have neither the resources nor the mandate to engage seriously in either reconstruction or security."



Soldiers from the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (3 PPCLI) Battle Group disembark from a US Army CH-47D Chinook helicopter, to search the Tora Bora caves as part of Operation TORII.

PRT Models

The internationalization of the PRT concept has led to the introduction of several PRT models. "There's no cookie-cutter solution for PRTs...one size doesn't fit all," Lt. Gen. David W. Barno, the Commander of US and Coalition forces in Afghanistan, stated in May 2004. In a country as diverse as Afghanistan, uniformity in PRT structure is impractical – each PRT must be tailored to meet local conditions. This, however, does not obviate the need to entrench a broad set of guidelines to inform PRT behavior. The differences in the main PRT models can be attributed more to the approach and vision of the individual implementing countries than a desire to customize the concept to meet local conditions. Two dominant PRT models have emerged over the past year.

US Model

The US model has attracted much of the criticism directed at the PRT concept, specifically on its inordinate focus on implementing small-scale, "quick-impact" development projects; its tendency to operate out of uniform and in unmarked vehicles; and its use of aid conditionality.

Another contentious issue concerns the ambiguity surrounding its political identity and underlying objectives. While Lt. General Barno has affirmed that the PRT was established to "meld" the security and reconstruction missions of the US and "extend the reach of the central government," many of its activities are geared primarily to advance the military objectives of Operation Enduring Freedom. It has become clear over the past three years that the goals of OEF and that of the wider Afghan

reconstruction process can be incompatible. An incident highlighting this reality took place in Ghazni province in 2004, where the Coalition fired rockets at a village, and mistakenly killed nine children and one man. PRT personnel, arriving to implement development projects, were later rebuffed by the local community.

UK Model

The UK PRT model, operationalized in Mazar-e Sharif, is considered to be the closest approximation to the NGHAs vision of the PRT. A 2004 Report of Save the Children, UK, praises the PRT for "having a more precise 'concept of operations'." Security sector reform, support to institution-building, and the promotion of economic development have been identified as its central priorities. It has also positioned itself as a vital intermediary between local factions.

The security-centric orientation of the UK PRT has met the demands of local and international NGHAs. Although the limited combat capacity of the team prevents it from undertaking offensive operations to combat insurgents and limit the power of local warlords, it remains highly visible in the community, embarking on regular patrols in high-risk areas. Its presence alone has deterred militant attacks and the outbreak of large-scale factional clashes.

PRT Guidelines

Devising uniform guidelines for any program implemented on a country-wide level in Afghanistan risks ignoring the complexity of the situation on the ground. However, it is important to set broad parameters for PRT action, to guide the establishment of new PRTs and reformulate existing PRT structures. The following set of recommendations seeks to provide an outline of parameters that can be put in place.

- **PRTs should focus on security**
The PRTs should exploit their comparative advantage by directing their resources to security rather than reconstruction activities. The presence of a PRT, while largely symbolic, will serve as a powerful deterrent to violence and factional tension. However, a PRT should not be seen as a substitute for ISAF expansion.
- **PRTs should refrain from providing humanitarian assistance unless in emergency situations**
It is clear that NGHAs in Afghanistan are better placed to deliver humanitarian assistance than military actors in most situations. Accordingly, PRTs should not engage in activities that are traditionally the purview of humanitarian actors or well-placed local NGHAs, such as the areas of health, education, water, and the provision of food aid. Only in extreme emergencies, such as a humanitarian catastrophe or natural disaster, should this policy be overridden.

- **PRTs should focus on infrastructural rehabilitation and security sector reform rather than "quick impact" development projects**

An area where PRTs could make a significant contribution to the reconstruction process is in the rehabilitation of government infrastructure and capacity at the local level (e.g. the refurbishment and provision of equipment for offices and facilities) and support for security sector reform (e.g. training and mentoring of Afghan security forces, support for the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants).

- **PRT activities should be clearly differentiated from those of humanitarian actors**

In several regions of Afghanistan, the risk to humanitarian actors have increased over the past year. However, this must be viewed in the overall context of the security situation. The targeting of aid workers represents a pragmatic tactical shift in the approach of anti-government spoiler groups more than it does growing confusion regarding the distinction between military and civilian actors. Regardless, stringent measures must be taken to clearly distinguish humanitarian workers from their military counterparts.

- **PRTs must be "owned" by local communities and the central government**

As the PRT is intended to be a vehicle to expand the writ of the central government throughout the country, Afghan stakeholders should have decisive influence over their design and direction. A representative of the government should be embedded in each PRT and, along with local community leaders, should participate in the process to determine what projects the PRT undertakes.

- **PRTs should institutionalize coordination mechanisms with NGHAs**

It is incumbent on the PRTs to form good operational relationships with local NGHAs that will allow them to draw on their wide experience. Information sharing is one practical area where both sides can derive mutual benefit. An important caveat, however, is that any intelligence garnered by military forces from NGHAs must be handled responsibly. If local communities perceive the NGHAs as agents or informants for the PRTs, it could undermine their legitimacy and credibility.

Recommendations for Canada's Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)

The establishment of a Canadian PRT offers an opportunity to set a new standard for how PRTs are structured and operated in

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CANADA, MISSILE DEFENCE AND THE POTENTIAL FOR STRATEGIC INSTABILITY

by David S. McDonough

In February of 2005, Prime Minister Paul Martin declined formal participation in US plans for an active defence system against ballistic missiles. The Canadian role would be limited to a recent amendment in the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) agreement, which would allow NORAD's Integrated Attack Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment (ITWAA) capabilities to be used in missile defence operations. Any possibility that this role would be expanded, to include more substantial Canadian participation in missile defence operations, has temporarily ended.

Ballistic missile defence (BMD) has been a hotly debated issue in Canada, and despite the government's recent declaration for non-involvement, it is likely that we have not seen the end of the debate. The decision appears to have been based on the need for political expediency by a minority government – whether a comfortable majority government would keep this position remains to be seen.

Missile defence is, however, an issue intimately connected to US nuclear weapons policy. The 2002 *Nuclear Posture Review* (NPR), and the prominent inclusion of BMD alongside strategic nuclear and conventional weapons, makes this relationship abundantly clear. The wisdom of examining this issue in isolation, without understanding the strategic nature of this US initiative, can certainly be questioned.

This lack of strategic appreciation is unfortunate. During the Cold War, Canadian defence planners did recognize that this country's participation in US plans for air defence carried strategic implications to the US nuclear deterrent. Given the controversy over the American plans for its nuclear deterrent, an understanding over the strategic context of missile defence is very much needed. Whether the government has done, or will do such analysis remains to be seen.

Strategic Implications of Air Defence

Early in the Cold War, the United States perceived that it faced a serious threat from the Soviet Union's development of nuclear-armed bombers. With the Soviet deployment of the TU-4 bomber, alongside its steadily growing arsenal of nuclear fission bombs, the US envisioned the possibility of a Soviet disarming first-strike. This was made all the more likely given that the US had no air defence or early warning capability. As a result, the United States began to emphasize a number of continental defence measures, including early warning radar networks (which would extend beyond the Arctic Circle) and the deployment of

conventional and nuclear-armed interceptor squadrons and surface-to-air missile batteries.

It was during this time Canada felt pressure to participate in continental air defence. The need for Canadian participation was clear – the most direct routes for Soviet bombers to reach the 48 central US states was over Canadian territory. After some initial hesitancy, a Canada-US Military Planning Group (MPG) was formed to examine continental air defence requirements in 1953. Completed in 1954, the MPG Report was very strong in its advocacy of air defence coordination with the United States. By 1958, integrated operational coordination took place under the auspices of the North American Air Defence Command.

Canada's involvement in continental air defence did not take place in a strategic vacuum. As argued by Dr. Andrew Richter, this decision was heavily informed by Canadian recognition of the strategic nature of air defence, and its relationship to the US nuclear deterrent. Defence scientists in the Department of National Defence (DND), such as George Ignatieff and R. J. Sutherland, were well aware of the vulnerability of US Strategic Air Command (SAC) to the Soviet nuclear arsenal, and the negative impact that this could have on strategic stability between the superpowers.

This does not imply that Canada was in any way involved in US nuclear planning – Canadians were, at the most, limited to obtaining early warning information via NORAD, which would be given to the appropriate nuclear weapons authorities in the United States. But the threat to the US nuclear deterrent was seen to necessitate Canadian cooperation in air defence, which would in turn mitigate the vulnerability of SAC to a Soviet first strike, and therefore, restore strategic stability – Soviet first strike capabilities, or even the perception of such capabilities, was not considered in our interest. Air defence was therefore viewed not in isolation, but rather, in its relationship to the US nuclear deterrent.

With the advent of the ballistic missile, NORAD's early warning capabilities were reconfigured to deal with these new delivery systems. Canadian defence planners, however, recognized that missile defence was also intimately linked to the US nuclear deterrent. Active defences against such weapons – when combined with a nuclear emphasis on "counterforce" targeting and "decapitation" strikes – were considered to provide "damage limitation" capabilities. In other words, if the United States contemplated a pre-emptive first-strike against the Soviet Union, active defences would be able to limit the damage of any residual Soviet retaliatory capabilities. This would reduce the effectiveness of a Soviet nuclear deterrent, and therefore, negatively impact strategic stability.

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Missile defence is an enabler for US military interventions and regime change campaigns against proliferating rogue states – a vision for US-led “counterproliferation wars” in the 21st century.

Active Defences in the New Triad

The Bush administration has both recognized the inherently strategic damage limitation capabilities of missile defence, and placed it squarely alongside US nuclear policy.¹ As President Bush noted in a 2001 speech to the National Defense University, “We need new concepts of deterrence that rely on both offensive and defensive forces. Deterrence can no longer be based solely on the threat of nuclear retaliation. Defenses can strengthen deterrence by reducing the incentive for proliferation.”

This would be codified in the 2002 *Nuclear Posture Review* and its concept of the New Triad. On one hand, the New Triad envisions “offensive strike systems,” which would include nuclear *and* conventional weapons, specially designed for counterproliferation missions against “rogue states” or – to the use the more diplomatic term – “states of concern.” New counterforce capabilities are considered necessary against the growing threat posed by nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) facilities and those hard and deeply buried targets (HDBTs) capable of protecting both NBC stockpiles and command and control facilities.

On the other hand, the New Triad also advocates the development and deployment of a multi-layered and global missile defence architecture against short-, medium- and long-range ballistic missiles. Such a system would be used to protect the United States against the potential long-term threat of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), as well as its forward deployed forces and/or allies against the more immediate threat of shorter range missiles. As the NPR notes, missile defence would complement offensive strike systems by “enhancing deterrence and still saving lives if deterrence failed.”

The linkage between these two components of the New Triad is in the process of being implemented. In 2002, for example,

Space Command (SPACECOM) was merged into Strategic Command (STRATCOM). This meant that the new STRATCOM, which traditionally dealt with US nuclear war planning, would also have responsibility over US space assets and the new mission of “global missile defence.” It remains to be seen whether active defences will play a direct role in US nuclear war plans, such as the Single Integrated Operating Plan or SIOP (recently renamed Operations Plan or OPLAN 8044). The relationship between STRATCOM and the “regional commanders” also requires further delineation. But it is likely that STRATCOM will have significant Command and Control, Battle Management and

Communications (C2BMC) responsibilities for missile defence.²

The central rationale for the New Triad is the threat posed by the “horizontal proliferation” of NBC weapons and delivery systems to rogue states. While lacking any semblance to the strategic power of the Soviet Union, they do pose an interesting problem for US nuclear deterrence – in the event that the US did have to intervene, for reasons of regime change for instance, there would be very little constraint on the behaviour of rogue states. The traditional nuclear arsenal and its threat of nuclear annihilation would thereby lose its deterrent value. At that point, rather than deterring an NBC-armed rogue state, the US might find *itself* deterred from such an intervention.³

The New Triad is a means to eliminate the possibility that the US might be deterred in such circumstances. It is an enabler for US military interventions and regime change campaigns against NBC-armed rogue states – a vision for US-led “counterproliferation wars” in the 21st century. New, more specialized counterforce weapons are seen as making deterrence more credible and, in the event of a chemical or biological (CB) attack, retaliation more feasible. Most controversially, new nuclear capabilities may even be viewed as first-use weapons for pre-emptive strikes. Defences are seen to directly support such nuclear capabilities, by reducing the impact of any rogue state retaliatory missile attacks – possibly armed with NBC weapons – during a US-led counterproliferation campaign.

Missile Defence and Strategic Stability

Canadian defence planners should place missile defence in strategic context. Under the Bush administration, the context is a nuclear weapons policy that emphasizes the development of new counterforce capabilities for the targeting of rogue states.

Counterproliferation now occupies a central position in US nuclear doctrine and, perhaps more importantly, in its nuclear war plans. Missile defence should therefore be seen, not as a defensive tool against unprovoked attacks, but as an integral adjunct to an aggressive US nuclear weapons policy.

The New Triad and its emphasis on sophisticated counterforce capabilities and multi-layered missile defence deployments, while explicitly directed at and rationalized by NBC-armed rogue states, will be a source of concern for both Russia and China. Both countries could perceive these capabilities as giving Washington the potential for a splendid first-strike, and would have to make modifications to their own arsenals in order to compensate for that possibility. This is more of a concern for China, with its small but growing arsenal of ICBMs, but even Russia would have to prepare to deal with the increasingly sophisticated US arsenal of strategic offensive and defensive capabilities.

Whether this will actually have a direct impact on the strategic stability between the US and these established nuclear powers is a little more ambiguous. It is true that both Russia and China will likely have to make technical and policy modifications to their nuclear arsenal, to better assure the viability of their respective deterrents. However, the relationship that the US has with both countries is reasonably stable. Strategic stability is, at least for the moment, relatively robust.

Unfortunately, it is uncertain whether this stability will not continue into the future – the Bush administration appears to be intent on attaining grand strategic primacy or, in the Pentagon's parlance, "full spectrum dominance" over any potential peer competitor. This provides a far more worrisome environment for the New Triad's emphasis on what can be termed "nuclear primacy," and increases the possibility that strategic stability will indeed gradually deteriorate and an arms race dynamic will take hold.

In contrast, strategic stability between the US and its rogue state adversaries has rarely if ever been characterized as robust, and US policies will likely continue to even further erode these fragile relationships. On one hand, the US may be given a *false* sense of security on its ability to deal with NBC-armed rogue states. The US may falsely believe that its more credible nuclear capabilities can be used to deter a rogue state's NBC capabilities during a regime change campaign (i.e. intrawar deterrence), and that a missile defence system could be used as a shield in the event that intrawar deterrence fails. The temptation for counterproliferation wars as a means for dealing with rogue states might then increase, and could lead to conflicts which feature the use of NBC weapons – by both rogue states or the United States.

On the other hand, it is unlikely that rogue states will be dissuaded from pursuing NBC capabilities. In fact, the effect will likely be just the opposite – rather than being dissuaded, rogue states will perceive such a deterrent as being necessary to deter the US from intervention. Furthermore, the New Triad, by emphasizing damage limitation and specialized counterforce capabilities, could be perceived as representing a pre-emptive, first-strike posture – this could lead to rogue states adopting destabilizing

employment strategies for their own NBC deterrents, such as a variant of a "launch-on warning" posture or the prepositioning of smuggled NBC devices on the territory of the US or its allies.

Implications for Canada

It is true that Canadian involvement in missile defence would have strong operational and functional benefits – our access to US space assets would increase, NORAD would be strengthened and we would have a "seat at the table" on this vitally important US initiative. It is also true that the manner in which Canada has decided to decline participation could have been handled far more astutely, whether one is for or against a missile defence system.

However, the immediate benefits aside, an examination of the strategic context for missile defence – as an integral part of the New Triad's emphasis on counterforce and counterproliferation – does raise important questions on any future Canadian involvement. Missile defence is not solely a defensive system, nor is it a policy that can be isolated from other developments, either US nuclear policy or its growing fixation on grand strategic primacy. It may be tempting to believe that missile defence is limited to NORAD and to continental defence, but such a view obfuscates the global counterproliferation role for missile defence – it is a shield for the New Triad's offensive strike systems.

There may even be logic behind such a shield. After all, the US and its allies may rightly need to undertake interventions and regime change campaigns against rogue states. Canada may even be involved in the counterproliferation wars of the 21st century. But in order to realistically formulate its policy, Canada should begin to recognize the linkage between missile defence and nuclear weapons, a linkage that is far more concrete than the Canadian fears over the still hypothetical danger of space weaponization. ■

Notes:

¹ Previous administrations have also noted the linkage between missile defence and nuclear force structure. A good example is under the Reagan administration, when the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) and the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) undertook studies noting the potential impact of defensive weapons to the US nuclear deterrent.

² According to a recent study, a BMD system "will be a global organization with each node depending on other nodes for the system to work correctly. There are few instances of such a global battlespace control." The report goes on to note that STRATCOM is one of the few examples of such a system.

² Rogue states do not, as yet, have ICBMs capable of reaching the continental United States (CONUS). but regional allies, basing areas and troop deployments would still be vulnerable to shorter range missiles – such "triangular deterrence" could be sufficient for the United States to refrain from interventions.

The views expressed are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute or its members.

THE ROLE FOR THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES IN THE DEFENCE AGAINST TERRORISM¹

by Dr. George Lindsey

During most of the twentieth century, the priorities for the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) were to be able to make significant contributions to multilateral military operations, in countries far from Canada. The expected operations were major wars, fought in alliance with much larger countries, against other large and powerful countries. The hostilities were expected to take place in theatres far from Canada. There were ample roles for the Canadian army, navy, and air force.

But during the Cold War, when the USSR acquired long-range bomber aircraft armed with nuclear weapons, Canadian territory became important for the early warning of intercontinental air attack, crucial for the survival of the bombers of the USAF Strategic Air Command, and for active defence against the Soviet bombers. The binational North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) was created, with the DEW Line, the Mid-Canada Line, and the Pinetree Lines of radars, plus air bases and fighter interceptors in Canada. This role was primarily one for the air force.

Then came Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Against this threat, warning was possible, but interception extremely difficult. The US achieved satisfactory warning with radars located in Alaska, Greenland, and England, and later by geosynchronous satellites able to detect the heat emitted by the propulsion rockets of ICBM. The US undertook two large but ultimately terminated programs for interception, entitled "Safeguard" and "Strategic Defense Initiative," and are now in the process of beginning the deployment of a third program, with the first phase to be armed with Ground-based Midcourse Interceptors. So far, none of these programs have sought to deploy equipment in Canada, and Canada has rejected a request for cooperation in the program.

During and after the end of the Cold War, the CAF also

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Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), like the Altair pictured above, provide one potential platform for the overhead surveillance of North America.

undertook the role of peacekeeping, usually under the aegis of the United Nations, and again to be carried out in countries far from Canada. Although these operations were very different from those encountered in major wars, the structure, equipment and training of the CAF have remained much as they had been before.

The greatest participation in peacekeeping has been by the army, but there have also been significant roles for the navy and the air force.

Geographical Aspects of Defence of North America Against Terrorism

In the twenty-first century, the primary threat to the security of North America is posed by terrorism. While most of its leadership and training is located in countries far from Canada, terrorism's potential targets are scattered all over the world, including Canada, but especially the United States.

Geography is an important factor for the problems of designing the defence of Canada or the United States against terrorism. As is evident when looking at a spherical globe, and was a dominant factor in the defence against the Soviet bomber threat, the shortest routes from Europe or Asia to most of the central forty-eight United States pass over Canada or parts of the Atlantic or Pacific Ocean that are closer to Canada than to any other country. And Canada's population (only 11% that of the USA) is concentrated in the southern extremities of a total area larger than that



Large areas of Canadian territory is sparsely populated – as shown in this photo, taken during Exercise Narwhal in the Canadian North. This can pose significant security and sovereignty problems.

of the USA, leaving huge areas in the centre of Canada sparsely populated, and its extreme north virtually empty except for a few small installations.

In addition to the requirement to survey approaches to and arrivals in Canada, by air and by sea, protection of the United States requires effective monitoring of possible terrorist activities on the land of Canada, including its thinly populated areas, as well as its adjacent waters, and of the air above both of these. Important vulnerable targets include the dams, generating stations, and long transmission lines which produce and transmit electrical energy to the south, and the pumping stations and long pipelines that deliver oil and gas.

The conduct of the surveillance of these vast areas would be the responsibility of the air force and the navy, while that of boarding and inspecting ships at sea may also require contributions from the coast guard and customs and immigration agencies.

Defence against terrorism also calls for activities overseas, many of them roles for Canadian embassies, intelligence agencies, immigration officials, and inspectors of cargoes loading for shipping to Canada. However, there are important roles for armed forces better described by such labels as "peace enforcement," "counter-terrorism," "stabilization," "reconstruction," or "nation building" than by "peacekeeping." It seems probable that Canadian participation would be as part of multinational efforts, perhaps sponsored by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the United Nations, and would likely require the

major contribution to be from the army.

Apart from activities overseas and on the approaches to North America, a major component of the defence against terrorism must be exercised inside Canada. This includes inspections at the entry points of seaports and airports, collection of intelligence regarding suspect activities, reducing the vulnerability of likely targets, and preparing to minimize the casualties and damage caused by an attack. Much of the responsibility for this type of service must come from police, fire departments, and medical agencies, but the armed forces could play important roles, not only in dealing with the terrorists, but also in transporting help to stricken areas, providing treatment of casualties, and control of the spreading of noxious materials.

It would seem that the main responsibility for this military service would fall on the army. Because rapid reaction and a familiarity with the area under attack would be important, it could become a major activity for reserve units. This would be a considerable change from their traditional roles of preparing for large wars and providing reinforcements for the regular forces engaged in overseas peacekeeping, and could affect the types of Canadians likely to become recruits.

The Modern Capabilities of Overhead Surveillance

The solution to the problems of providing adequate surveillance over the sea approaches to North America and of the sparse-

ly inhabited regions of central and northern Canada, is very dependent on the remarkable advances in remote sensing, the ability for modern instruments to detect many forms of activity occurring at a great distance from the sensor.

If the sensor is located on an elevated platform (a tower, atop a mountain, or on an aircraft, or a satellite), and consequently presented with an extended direct field of view of the nearby surface of the earth, it can detect activities over a wide area of territory. If the sensor's platform is moving, a much greater area can be surveyed, although only intermittently.

A sensor looking down at a large area of the surface of the earth (or the sea), with the objective of detecting a few small objects of interest, is confronted with a large background of strong reflections from other objects (the sea, the ground, foliage, etc.). However, modern technology allows the sensors to detect colour, heat, or motion, which distinguish a target of interest from the stronger background. Images taken at intervals can be compared to show what has changed in contrast to the stronger but usually nearly constant background.

The degree of detail useful for identification of a target of interest that can be discerned by a sensor depends on the wavelength of the radiation (electro-optical devices provide better resolution than do the longer wavelengths of radar), as well as on the distance to the target. The images taken by a satellite hundreds or thousands of miles above the earth cannot achieve the detail that the same sensors could produce if they were in an aircraft flying at an altitude of a few thousand feet, and a helicopter or an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) could do even better from a few hundred feet.

These characteristics of overhead surveillance suggest that Canada should combine with the United States for the surveillance of the air and sea approaches to North America and of activities within Canada. The US already has very capable (and very expensive and constantly improving) space-based systems in service, covering the entire surface of the globe, which should provide the initial detections of suspect terrorist activity. But with these high altitude sensors, the resolution for detail of the images obtained may be inadequate to determine what is there, and whether or not further attention needs to be paid to it. But if the objects are in or near Canadian waters, or inside Canada, the follow-up should be the responsibility of Canada, and the first step would probably be to send an aircraft fitted with modern sensors to obtain more detailed information regarding the suspect target.

An Expanded Role for NORAD

The obvious agency to assume control of these surveillance activities would be NORAD, already well established for the purpose of bilateral aerospace defence. But NORAD's proven capability for surveillance of the sky (detection of high-flying aircraft against the empty background of space), needs to be extended to include improved capabilities for detection and interception of low-flying aircraft and cruise missiles (which could be launched from terrorist ships near the North American coast), and for mar-

itime surveillance, including inspection of ships at sea.

Canada would need to acquire a sufficient number of heavy long-range aircraft (possibly of a type also employed for air-to-air refuelling) fitted with the latest sensors and communications equipment, as well as helicopters and UAVs fitted with some of the sensors. Significant costs would be involved. And the navy would need to be able to deliver inspectors to board ships at sea.

Whether or not it were made part of the NORAD responsibility, the Canadian army would have to be able to overpower terrorists established in Canadian territory.

Sovereignty and the Canadian Arctic

When the costs of programs needed for defence are being assessed against all the other Canadian requirements, it is usually assumed that the military program will produce few financial returns for the Canadian population other than those obtained by the industry which manufactures whatever equipment is procured, (and this is often not a Canadian firm). But the development of an effective overhead surveillance of the Canadian Arctic also offers the promise of many benefits of great value to the nation, apart from defence.

One potential contribution is to support Canadian claims of sovereignty over areas in which there are, or may arise challenges. There are unsettled boundaries between Canada and the USA. One is in the Beaufort Sea between Alaska and the Yukon, an area with great potential for extraction of oil and gas. Another, farther south, concerns the Dixon Entrance between British Columbia and Washington State, already a productive area for fishing. The most important challenge could be over the Northwest Passage, which may generate disputes if global warming or the need for transportation of oil stimulates its frequent use by international shipping. Canada may find it necessary to assume increased responsibility for safe passage, requiring forecasting of ice cover and weather.

Other Benefits Offered by Overhead Surveillance of the North

The environment of the Arctic regions are being threatened by the spread of pollution, much of it generated by industrial activities in the built-up areas to the south, conveyed northwards by rivers or through the air, but some also caused by oil spills, and waste from refineries and other industrial works in the north. The hostile Arctic climate delays many of the natural processes which absorb or counterbalance many of the deleterious effects in more southerly latitudes. Some of the modern sensors are able to detect, locate, and measure pollution. They are especially capable for detection of pollution of the sea, whether in the Arctic or farther south.

Apart from questions of sovereignty, it is important for Canada to be able to control the activities in her internal waters, territorial seas, and contiguous economic zones. These activities include fishing, pollution such as discharging of ship waste, and prospecting. All of these activities can be observed by overhead

surveillance of the water, and in the case of prospecting, the land as well.

There are many other activities, in all of Canada as well as its North, that would benefit from effective overhead surveillance. Examples of what could be made available include surveillance and management of forest fires, floods, spreads of agricultural maladies, and search and rescue, both on land and sea.

Priorities for the Canadian Armed Forces

The opinion offered in this paper is that the most serious current security threat to Canada and the United States is that of terrorism, and that the possible means to combat it lie overseas, on the sea and air approaches to North America, in the sparsely inhabited regions of Canada, and in the built-up regions where most of the most valuable and vulnerable targets are situated.

The Canadian armed forces can play a role in each of these areas. Significant contributions to overseas operations and to protection of likely targets in Canada will need an expanded and appropriately equipped and trained army. Adequate contributions to overhead surveillance of the sea, air, and land in the North American region will require costs for the navy, and especially for the air force.

As regards relations with the United States, it seems certain that they will appreciate what is done by Canada for the defence of North America in and on the approaches to the continent, prob-

ably more than on what can be done by Canada overseas, or in its own cities. Moreover, if the US judges that effective overhead surveillance and subsequent control of terrorist activities on the lands and waters of Canada are essential for their own security, and Canada is not going to provide this, then the Americans will have an understandably strong incentive to come and do it.

The Canadian government should recognize that the expenses devoted to the creation of an effective overhead surveillance system designed primarily for defence of North America against terrorism would probably be repaid many times over by its contributions to developments in the Arctic, in other sparsely inhabited regions of Canada, and in the economic zones of our neighbouring seas, to say nothing of the significant contribution that it would make for our relations with the United States and the protection of North America against terrorism. ■

Notes:

¹ The contents of this article were largely the result of discussions held in the study group on North American Security organized by the National Capital Branch of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs.

The views expressed are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute or its members.

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Afghanistan. A Canadian PRT model should mirror its British equivalent in the adoption of a peace-building and security approach. It should differ by dedicating greater attention to the improvement of local governance and judicial reform – areas that have received insufficient attention and where Canada can add significant value.

A Canadian PRT could carry out a number of specific functions including:

- training and mentoring for civil servants, judicial personnel and local security forces;
- support for the Afghan Stabilization Programme (ASP), an Afghan initiative to rebuild local governance capacity and infrastructure at the district and provincial levels across the country;
- support to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process; and
- serve as an interlocutor for local disputes and a link to the central government.

Conclusion

The situations in Afghanistan and Iraq have clearly demonstrated that the task of winning the war in today's world pales in

complexity to that of winning the peace. While the former has traditionally fallen within the domain of the military, the latter has also increasingly been looked upon as a military responsibility.

As the role of the military has broadened, it has overlapped with the mandates of civilian aid agencies, causing significant friction. The initial reactionary positions adopted by NGHAs have gradually given way to a more open and fluid process of redefining the concepts of neutrality, independence and impartiality that have formed the bedrock of humanitarian action. The complexity of this enterprise is reflected in the debate on the PRT in Afghanistan. The emergence of new PRT models – ones more attuned to NGHAs concerns – has shown that the goals of humanitarian organizations and the military are not incompatible, and in fact can be mutually reinforcing. ■

Notes:

¹ The term 'non-governmental humanitarian agencies' (NGHAs), which is utilized throughout this paper, encompasses national and international humanitarian non-governmental organizations (NGOs); the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC); and the humanitarian agencies within the UN system.

² A US PRT in Zabul Province distributed leaflets that threatened to halt aid if useful intelligence was not provided. The practice was discontinued due to public criticism.

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