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Telecom Decision CRTC 2006-15
Forbearance from the regulation of retail
local exchange services
Ottawa, 6 April 2006
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For additional
copies, please contact:
Documentation Centre
Canadian Radio-television and
Telecommunications Commission (CRTC)
Les Terrasses de la Chaudière
Central Building
1 Promenade du Portage
Gatineau, Quebec
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CRTC
Ottawa, Ontario
Canada
K1A 0N2
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This publication is available electronically:
http://www.crtc.gc.ca
This publication can be made available in alternative format upon
request.
Ce document est également disponible en français. |
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Telecom Decision CRTC 2006-15
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Ottawa, 6 April
2006 |
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Forbearance from the regulation of retail local exchange services
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Reference: 8640-C12-200505076
and 8640-A53-200403329 |
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Table of contents |
Paragraph |
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I. Introduction |
1 |
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II. Relevant legislative
background |
14 |
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III. Overview of local
exchange services forbearance framework |
18 |
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IV. Relevant market(s) |
24 |
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V. Local forbearance
criteria |
169 |
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VI. Scope of local
forbearance |
282 |
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VII. Review of local
forbearance |
474 |
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VIII. Transitional regime |
481 |
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IX. Aliant Telecom's
forbearance application |
490 |
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X. Other implementation
issues |
512 |
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In this Decision,
the Commission renders its determinations in the proceeding initiated
by Forbearance from regulation of local exchange services,
Telecom Public Notice CRTC 2005-2,
28 April 2005. The Commission sets out the details of the framework
for forbearance from the regulation of local exchange services (local
forbearance), including the local forbearance criteria, as well as
its determination on Aliant Telecom Inc.'s (Aliant Telecom)
application for local forbearance in 32 local exchanges in Nova Scotia
and Prince Edward Island. |
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The Commission
determines that residential local exchange services and business local
exchange services are in different relevant markets for the purposes of
the local forbearance framework. In addition, the Commission determines
that the appropriate geographic component of the relevant market, for
the purposes of the local forbearance framework, is for urban markets
the census metropolitan area, while for rural markets the appropriate
geographic component will generally be an economic region (ER) or a
combination of ERs. |
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The Commission
also determines that it is prepared to forbear from regulating local
exchange services in a relevant market where an applicant incumbent
local exchange carrier (ILEC) can demonstrate that: |
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- The ILEC has suffered a 25 percent market share loss in the
relevant market for which forbearance is sought;
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- The ILEC has, for the six months prior to the application, met
individual standards for each of the 14 specified competitor quality
of service (Q of S) indicators of the rate rebate plan (RRP) for
competitors, when the results are averaged across the six-month
period;
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- The ILEC has put in place the necessary Competitor Services
tariffs. In the case of an application for forbearance from regulation
of residential local exchange services, the ILEC has an approved
Competitor Services tariff for bundled asymmetrical digital subscriber
line (ADSL) available over loops not used for primary exchange service
(dry loops) as well as in conjunction with primary exchange service
(PES), and in the case of an application for forbearance from
regulation of business local exchange services, the ILEC has an
approved Competitor Services tariff for bundled ADSL available both
over dry loops and in conjunction with PES as well as approved
competitor Ethernet access service and transport service tariffs;
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- The ILEC has, where the Commission has required it, implemented
competitor access to its operational support systems in accordance
with Competitive local exchange carrier access to incumbent
local exchange carrier operational support systems, Telecom
Decision CRTC 2005-14,
16 March 2005; and
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- The ILEC has demonstrated to the Commission's satisfaction that
rivalrous behaviour exists in the relevant market.
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The Commission
also outlines the scope of forbearance to be granted under the local
forbearance framework. The Commission determines it to be appropriate to
retain only those powers and duties that are strictly necessary to
protect the interests of customers, particularly uncontested and
vulnerable customers, and to further competition. The Commission
determines that those powers and duties that relate strictly to economic
regulation should be removed in a forborne environment. The Commission
also invites proposals for an industry self-regulation scheme that would
permit an even greater degree of de-regulation in a forborne market, and
sets out its intention to review which, if any, remaining obligations
imposed on ILECs in forborne markets are still required. |
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The Commission
adopts certain transitional measures, as part of its local forbearance
framework, to aid in the development of sustainable local competition.
In this Decision, the Commission reduces the no-contact period under the
residential local winback rule from 12 months to three months, and
indicates its willingness to lift the local winback rule entirely where
an ILEC can demonstrate that it has lost 20 percent of its market
share in a relevant market and that, for the three months prior to the
application, it has met individual standards for each of the 14
specified competitor Q of S indicators of the RRP for competitors, when
the results are averaged across the three-month period. |
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The Commission
establishes data gathering procedures to facilitate the operation of the
local forbearance framework. The Commission also establishes expedited
procedures for processing applications for local forbearance and
applications for relief from the local winback rule. |
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The Commission
denies Aliant Telecom's application for local forbearance on the
basis that it does not meet the local forbearance criteria set out in
this Decision. The Commission indicates its willingness to consider
future applications by Aliant Telecom on an expedited basis. |
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I. Introduction
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1. |
In Review of
regulatory framework, Telecom Decision CRTC 94-19,
16 September 1994 (Decision 94-19),
following the coming into force of the Telecommunications Act
(the Act), the Commission developed a regulatory framework
for the telecommunications industry, pursuant to the Act, intended
to allow all Canadians, over time, ubiquitous and affordable access
to an increasing range of competitively-provided telecommunications
services. Decision 94-19 encompassed
a wide range of regulatory issues, including a framework for the introduction
of competition into the local services market, as well as an approach
for considering whether or not to refrain (forbear) from regulating
telecommunications services, pursuant to the forbearance responsibilities
that had been conferred upon the Commission under section 34
of the Act. |
2. |
The Commission
has, in a gradual and orderly manner, opened up monopoly-based
telecommunications markets to competition. In a number of markets, the
Commission refrained from regulation when it found there was sufficient
competition. Examples of services and markets for which the Commission
has forborne include: terminal equipment, mobile wireless services, toll
services, interexchange private lines, retail Internet services, wide
area networking (WAN) services, and certain data services. |
3. |
Local exchange services
have, historically, been provided on a monopoly basis by the incumbent
local exchange carriers (ILECs). The Commission found in Decision
94-19 that competition in the local
telecommunications market is in the public interest. |
4. |
In Local competition,
Telecom Decision CRTC 97-8, 1 May
1997 (Decision 97-8), the Commission
established a framework for local exchange competition in furtherance
of the Canadian telecommunications policy objectives set out in section 7
of the Act. |
5. |
Over the years,
the Commission has recognized, in several Decisions and in its annual
Report to the Governor in Council: Status of Competition in Canadian
Telecommunications Markets – Deployment/Accessibility of Advanced
Telecommunications Infrastructure and Services (Annual Monitoring
Report), that competitors, overall, had not gained a substantial market
share with respect to local exchange services since the issuance of
Decision 97-8. |
6. |
Recently, the
Commission has seen the beginnings of a marked increase in competition
in the local exchange services market. Local competitors made some
inroads, primarily in local business urban markets and to some degree in
local residential urban markets, in some parts of the country. This past
year has seen an accelerated roll-out in the residential local exchange
services market of facilities-based local exchange services offered by
competitors. While the consequences of this roll-out have yet to fully
develop, the initial results indicate that hundreds of thousands of
Canadians have chosen to switch their local residential phone service
from their local ILEC to a competitive telecommunications service
provider (TSP). |
7. |
The Commission
received an application from Aliant Telecom Inc. (Aliant Telecom), dated
7 April 2004, for forbearance from the regulation of residential local
exchange services (local forbearance) in 32 local exchanges in Nova
Scotia and Prince Edward Island. |
8. |
The Commission
considered it important, prior to disposing of Aliant Telecom's
application, to establish a framework for local forbearance
applications, which contained clear criteria that the Commission could
use to determine when it would be appropriate to forbear from regulating
local exchange services. |
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Process
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9. |
In Forbearance
from regulation of local exchange services, Telecom Public Notice
CRTC 2005-2, 28
April 2005 (Public Notice 2005-2),
the Commission initiated the present public proceeding, including
an oral consultation, in which it invited comments on the framework
for retail local exchange services forbearance and Aliant Telecom's
application. |
10. |
The Commission identified
the following principal issues in Public Notice 2005-2: |
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- What local exchange services should be within the scope of the
proceeding?
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- What is/are the appropriate relevant market(s) for forbearance
from the regulation of local exchange services, taking into
consideration both services and geographic areas? (relevant market(s))
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- What are the appropriate criteria to be applied to determine
whether the relevant market(s) is/are sufficiently competitive for
forbearance? (local forbearance criteria)
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- What Commission powers and duties should be forborne? (scope of
local forbearance)
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- What post-forbearance criteria and conditions should apply and
why? (review of local forbearance)
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- What is the appropriate process for future applications for
forbearance from the regulation of local exchange services?
(application process)
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- Should there be a transitional regime that provides ILECs with
more regulatory flexibility prior to forbearance and if so, under
what circumstances should the Commission: 1) lessen or remove
the existing competitive safeguards for promotions defined in
Promotions of local wireline services, Telecom Decision
CRTC 2005-25, 27 April 2005
(Decision 2005-25) and the
local winback rule as most recently amended in Regulatory framework
for voice communication services using Internet Protocol,
Telecom Decision CRTC 2005-28,
12 May 2005, as amended by Telecom Decision CRTC 2005-28-1,
30 June 2005 (Decision 2005-28),
2) permit the ex parte filing of tariff applications
for promotions, and 3) permit the waiving of service charges for
residential local winbacks? (transitional regime)
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- A determination on Aliant Telecom's forbearance application.
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11. |
The Commission
addressed the first of those issues, that is, what local exchange
services were within the scope of the proceeding, in List of services
within the scope of the proceeding on forbearance from the regulation
of local exchange services, Telecom Decision CRTC 2005-35,
15 June 2005, as amended by Telecom Decision CRTC 2005-35-1,
14 July 2005 (Decision 2005-35).
The remaining issues are addressed, as necessary, in this Decision. |
12. |
The Commission
received submissions, reply comments and/or responses to interrogatories
from Aliant Telecom; ARCH: A Legal Resource for Persons with
Disabilities, now ARCH Disability Law Centre (ARCH); Bell Canada and
Société en commandite Télébec (Télébec) (collectively,
Bell Canada/Télébec); Call-Net Enterprises Inc., now Rogers Telecom
Holdings Inc. (Call-Net); Canadian Cable Telecommunications Association
(CCTA); Coalition for Competitive Telecommunications (Coalition); Cogeco
Cable Inc. (Cogeco); Commissioner of Competition (Competition Bureau);
Public Interest Advocacy Centre on behalf of Consumer's Association of
Canada, National Anti-Poverty Association, and L'Union des Consommateurs
(collectively, the Consumer Groups); Cybersurf Corp. (Cybersurf); Bragg
Communications Inc. carrying on business as EastLink (EastLink); FCI
Broadband, a division of Futureway Communications Inc. (FCI), and Yak
Communications (Canada) Inc. (collectively, FCI/Yak); MTS Allstream Inc.
(MTS Allstream); Primus Telecommunications Canada Inc. (Primus);
Quebecor Media Inc. (QMI); Rogers Communications Inc. (Rogers);
Saskatchewan Telecommunications (SaskTel); Shaw Cablesystems G.P.
(Shaw); TELUS Communications Inc. (TCI); United Telecom Council of
Canada (UTC); Xit telecom inc., on behalf of itself, Xittel
telecommunications inc. and 9141-8077 Quebec Inc. (collectively,
Xit telecom) and Vonage Canada Corp. (Vonage). Several of these parties
also participated in the oral consultation. |
13. |
In this Decision,
the positions of the interested parties have necessarily been
summarized; however, the Commission has carefully reviewed and
considered the oral and written submissions of all parties. |
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II. Relevant legislative background
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14. |
The Act states
that all telecommunications services provided by Canadian carriers must
be provided under tariffs approved by the Commission, subject to
criteria set out in the Act. The Act also gives the Commission the
authority to refrain from requiring Canadian carriers to file tariffs
for approval, and from the exercise of certain other of its powers and
duties, in respect of services or classes of services, based on certain
findings of fact that the Act authorizes the Commission to make. |
15. |
The Commission
must, pursuant to section 47 of the Act, exercise its powers and perform
its duties under the Act with a view to implementing the Canadian
telecommunications policy objectives, which are set out in section 7 of
the Act as follows: |
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a) to facilitate the orderly development throughout Canada of a
telecommunications system that serves to safeguard, enrich and
strengthen the social and economic fabric of Canada and its regions;
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b) to render reliable and affordable telecommunications services of
high quality accessible to Canadians in both urban and rural areas in
all regions of Canada;
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c) to enhance the efficiency and competitiveness, at the national
and international levels, of Canadian telecommunications;
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d) to promote the ownership and control of Canadian carriers by
Canadians;
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e) to promote the use of Canadian transmission facilities for
telecommunications within Canada and between Canada and points outside
Canada;
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f) to foster increased reliance on market forces for the provision
of telecommunications services and to ensure that regulation, where
required, is efficient and effective;
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g) to stimulate research and development in Canada in the field of
telecommunications and to encourage innovation in the provision of
telecommunications services;
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h) to respond to the economic and social requirements of users of
telecommunications services; and
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i) to contribute to the protection of the privacy of persons.
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16. |
Section 34 of
the Act provides for forbearance from regulation as follows: |
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(1) The Commission
may make a determination to refrain, in whole or in part and
conditionally or unconditionally, from the exercise of any power or the
performance of any duty under sections 24, 25, 27, 29 and 31 in relation
to a telecommunications service or class of services provided by a
Canadian carrier, where the Commission finds as a question of fact that
to refrain would be consistent with the Canadian telecommunications
policy objectives. |
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(2) Where the
Commission finds as a question of fact that a telecommunications service
or class of services provided by a Canadian carrier is or will be
subject to competition sufficient to protect the interests of users, the
Commission shall make a determination to refrain, to the extent that it
considers appropriate, conditionally or unconditionally, from the
exercise of any power or the performance of any duty under sections 24,
25, 27, 29 and 31 in relation to the service or class of services. |
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(3) The Commission
shall not make a determination to refrain under this section in relation
to a telecommunications service or class of services if the Commission
finds as a question of fact that to refrain would be likely to impair
unduly the establishment or continuance of a competitive market for that
service or class of services. |
17. |
The legislative
provisions referred to in section 34 of the Act are set out later in
this Decision. |
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III. Overview of local exchange services forbearance framework
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18. |
In Decision 94-19,
the Commission adopted the concept of market power, commonly used
in economics and in competition law, as the standard by which to determine
whether a market is, or is likely to become, competitive. Under this
approach, the determination of whether or not to forbear from regulating
a service or class of services is based on a determination of the
relevant market in which the service(s) is/are offered and on whether
a firm has market power in that market. |
19. |
Decision 94-19
set out a three-step process for considering forbearance applications
(Decision 94-19 analysis): |
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- The first step is the identification of the relevant market. The
relevant market is the smallest group of products and geographic area
in which a firm with market power can profitably impose a sustainable
price increase. The definition of the relevant market is based on the
substitutability of the services in question.
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- The next step involves determining whether a firm has market power
with respect to the relevant market. As indicated, there cannot be
sustainable competition in a market in which a firm possesses
substantial market power. Market power can be demonstrated by the
ability of a firm to raise or maintain prices above those that would
prevail in a competitive market.
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- The last step is to determine whether, and to what extent,
forbearance should be granted.
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20. |
In deciding to establish
the local forbearance framework in this Decision, the Commission has
been cognizant of the dynamic nature of the local exchange services
market in which competition is developing rapidly. The Commission
is concerned that to subject every application for forbearance from
regulation of local exchange services in a relevant market to a full
Decision 94-19 analysis would run
the risk of delaying forbearance beyond the point at which regulation
was efficient and effective. |
21. |
The Commission has,
therefore, established a local forbearance framework in this Decision,
which sets forth criteria, that will enable it to reach more expeditious
determinations on ILEC applications for local exchange services forbearance
in particular relevant markets than would a full Decision 94-19
analysis in each case. The Commission considers that this framework
will enable it to determine whether forbearing in a particular relevant
market would be consistent with the requirements of section 34
of the Act without delaying the potential benefits of competition,
particularly facilities-based competition, to customers any longer
than is necessary. |
22. |
With respect to
the scope of forbearance, the Commission has decided, upon approval of a
local forbearance application, to remove those conditions and relinquish
those powers and duties which are solely matters of economic regulation.
The Commission will retain only those powers and duties which it
considers necessary, at this time, to protect the interests of
customers, particularly uncontested and vulnerable customers, and to
further competition. |
23. |
The local forbearance
framework set out in this Decision will apply to applications for
forbearance from the regulation of retail local exchange services
filed by those ILECs made parties to this proceeding—Aliant Telecom,
Bell Canada, MTS Allstream, SaskTel, Télébec and TCI, including
the former TELUS Communications (Québec) Inc. (TELUS Québec). Accordingly,
as set out in Public Notice 2005-2,
the Commission has applied the local forbearance framework set out
in this Decision to Aliant Telecom's application. |
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IV. Relevant market(s)
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24. |
The Commission
notes that, as set out above, the relevant market is the smallest group
of products and geographic area in which a firm with market power can
profitably impose a sustainable price increase. Each relevant market,
therefore, will have both a product and a geographic component. |
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Product
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25. |
The Commission
considers that several issues must be addressed to determine which
products belong in the relevant market for the purposes of forbearance
from the regulation of local exchange services: |
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- Are the local exchange services provided by competitors in the
same relevant market as those provided by the ILECs?
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- Are mobile wireless services in the same relevant market as
wireline local exchange services?
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- Do business and residential local exchange services belong in the
same relevant market?
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- If business local exchange services belong in a separate relevant
market from residential local exchange services, is there one relevant
market for business local exchange services or are there multiple
relevant markets for business local exchange services based on
different product characteristics?
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Are the local exchange services provided by competitors in the same
relevant market as those provided by the ILECs? |
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Positions of parties |
26. |
Aliant Telecom
submitted that the product component of the relevant market should
include the following local exchange services on the basis that these
services were provided by the ILECs, suppliers using the same technology
as the ILECs, or suppliers using other technologies that formed part of
the product component of the relevant market: ILECs' local exchange
services, including optional calling features; competitive local
exchange carriers' (CLECs) and resellers' local exchange services,
including optional calling features, provided through traditional
circuit-switched technology; cable local exchange carriers' (cable LECs)
local exchange services, including optional calling features, provided
over their networks; and voice over Internet protocol (VoIP) providers'
local exchange services, including optional calling features, provided
over an access connection to the customer that the VoIP provider does
not own. |
27. |
Bell Canada/Télébec, SaskTel and TCI supported Aliant Telecom's
submission. TCI submitted that it was undeniable that the local exchange
service provided by a full facilities-based CLEC was a substitute for
ILEC local exchange service as there was evidence of customers switching
service providers. |
28. |
The Consumer Groups
also generally supported Aliant Telecom's submission but added that
services provided by competitors must be provided on a stand-alone basis
to be considered close substitutes for ILEC services. |
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Optional calling features |
29. |
Aliant Telecom
submitted that although optional features were discretionary services,
not substitutes for wireline access, these should be included in the
relevant product market because customers can only purchase optional
features from the supplier that provides their access service.
Bell Canada/Télébec, SaskTel, the CCTA, Cogeco, EastLink, Rogers,
Cybersurf and MTS Allstream supported this view. |
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VoIP |
30. |
Aliant Telecom,
Bell Canada/Télébec, SaskTel, TCI, Cybersurf, MTS Allstream,
and UTC agreed that based on the Commission's findings in Decision
2005-28, VoIP was in the relevant
product market. The CCTA, supported by Cogeco, EastLink, and Rogers,
agreed that VoIP was in the relevant product market on the basis that
VoIP was a close substitute for circuit-switched local service. |
31. |
The Consumer
Groups argued that, at the time of their submission, VoIP services were
only weak substitutes for local exchange services. The Consumer Groups
submitted that a general finding that VoIP services were in the relevant
product market would be premature; however, it could be assessed on a
case-by-case basis. Restated in a later submission, the Consumer Groups
submitted that it would be inappropriate to treat access-independent
VoIP services as being in the relevant product market. |
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Secondary lines |
32. |
The Competition
Bureau suggested that the relevant product market might exclude
residential secondary lines. The Competition Bureau submitted that if
customers were to take services from a competitor as a secondary line
and perceived the secondary line to be of lower quality, this would
exert little competitive discipline on the primary lines.
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33. |
Aliant Telecom
submitted that it did not have a large base of secondary lines, and
further, its base had declined every year. Aliant Telecom submitted that
the demand for secondary lines was initially driven by the Internet;
however, the market for secondary lines had disappeared when customers
began to adopt high-speed Internet access (HSIA). Aliant Telecom further
submitted that the definition of primary versus secondary lines was
archaic and that the company had no way of knowing which lines in a
customer's home were primary or secondary. |
34. |
During the oral
consultation, TCI submitted that it could not make a practical
distinction between the first and secondary lines, but that secondary
lines likely represented a very small percentage of its business. |
35. |
The UTC submitted
that primary and secondary lines were the same. |
36. |
Shaw submitted that
it would be overly complicated to try to determine which line was
primary. Shaw submitted that it offered primary line service, but if a
customer wanted to use a primary line as a secondary line that was the
customer's choice. |
37. |
Rogers submitted
that the second line market was disappearing due to the decline in home
fax machines and dial-up Internet. |
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Bundles |
38. |
The Consumer
Groups submitted that a service that might be considered a substitute if
available on a stand-alone basis would likely cease to be a substitute
for many consumers if it were only available as part of a bundle. The
Consumer Groups acknowledged that some consumers will purchase
telecommunications services in bundles and do not require that local
exchange services be available on a stand-alone basis, but they also
argued that the evidence suggested that these consumers were in a
minority at present. The Consumer Groups argued that most consumers did
not consider a bundle a substitute for stand-alone service. The Consumer
Groups argued further that even those consumers that were willing to
purchase bundles recognized that bundles and stand-alone services were
in distinct markets. |
39. |
The
Consumer Groups submitted that any analysis of the
local exchange market must focus on close substitutes that were
available as stand-alone services. Consequently, the Consumer Groups
argued that it would be inappropriate to include service bundles in the
same relevant product market as stand-alone local exchange services. |
40. |
Bell Canada/Télébec submitted that residential customers were
increasingly demanding service bundles of voice, HSIA and broadcast
television services for their convenience and price. TCI submitted that
subscribers were likely to purchase voice, Internet and video services
in a bundle; however, this was a fairly recent phenomenon, and the
bundle should not be considered as part of the product component of the
relevant market. |
|
Commission's analysis and determinations
|
41. |
The Commission notes
that, in Public Notice 2005-2,
it indicated that retail local exchange services used by business
and residential customers to access the public switched telephone
network (PSTN) were within the scope of this proceeding. |
42. |
The Commission
notes that competitors market the local exchange services they provide
that access the PSTN as replacements for the ILECs' local exchange
services. Based on evidence presented in the course of this proceeding,
the Commission considers that competitors' local exchange services are
priced similarly, or at a discount, to the ILECs' local exchange
services. |
43. |
Based on market
share data and related evidence presented in the course of this
proceeding, the Commission considers that in areas where competitors
offer local exchange services, customers are willing and able to switch
service providers. |
44. |
In light of the
above, the Commission considers that the local exchange services
provided by competitors are in the same relevant market as the ILECs'
local exchange services. |
45. |
With respect to
the argument raised by the Consumer Groups that access-independent VoIP
services should be excluded from the relevant market, the Commission
notes that both Bell Canada and many competitors offer versions of
access-independent VoIP service. The Commission further notes that the
evidence indicates that these access-independent VoIP services are being
priced and marketed as substitutes for local exchange services. In light
of these considerations and the growing number of customers that are
substituting access-independent VoIP services for traditional ILEC local
exchange service, the Commission considers that access-independent VoIP
services are in the same relevant market as circuit-switched local
exchange services. |
46. |
The Commission
notes that optional features do not offer the same functionality as, and
are therefore not a substitute for, basic local exchange services. The
Commission notes, however, that optional features cannot be purchased on
a stand-alone basis, and as a result, customers that want optional
features must purchase them from the provider of their basic local
exchange service. In light of these demand characteristics, the
Commission considers that optional services are in the relevant product
market for the purpose of the local forbearance framework. |
47. |
With respect to
the separation of primary and secondary lines into different relevant
markets, the Commission notes that there is no difference between
primary and secondary lines from the perspective of product
characteristics, pricing and marketing, and substitutability. Both
primary and secondary lines offer the same functionality, features and
quality, and are priced and marketed in the same manner. The Commission
further notes the practical difficulties in monitoring secondary lines,
which were identified by a number of parties to the proceeding. The
Commission also acknowledges the reality that the demand for secondary
lines was largely driven by dial-up Internet and fax machines, and that
the demand for these lines is now in sharp decline as the use of dial-up
Internet and fax machines decreases. Accordingly, the Commission
considers that both primary and secondary lines are in the same relevant
product market. |
48. |
With respect to
the proposal made by the Consumer Groups to exclude bundles from the
same relevant market as stand-alone local exchange services, the Commission
notes that, as set out in Decision 2005-35,
bundles are simply combinations of individual services under a rate
structure. The Commission notes that ILECs and competitors are increasingly
bundling local telephone service, optional features, long distance,
Internet access, video and wireless services to satisfy the converging
communication needs of consumers. The Commission considers that a
significant number of customers are substituting, for ILEC stand alone
local exchange services, local exchange services from either the ILEC
or a competitor which are offered in a bundle. In light of this,
the Commission considers that local exchange services offered as a
component of a bundle are part of the same relevant market as those
same local exchange services offered on a stand-alone basis. The Commission
considers that the Consumer Groups' concern regarding the ongoing
availability of stand-alone local exchange service in a forborne market
is more properly addressed in Section VI – Scope of local forbearance. |
49. |
In light of the
above, the Commission concludes that local exchange services, including
VoIP services and optional features, provided by the ILECs, cable LECs,
CLECs, and resellers are all in the same relevant market, regardless of
whether they are purchased as a primary or a secondary line, or as part
of a bundle. |
|
Are mobile wireless services in the same relevant market as wireline
local exchange services?
|
|
Positions of parties |
50. |
Aliant Telecom and
Bell Canada/Télébec, supported by SaskTel, submitted that mobile
wireless services are in the same product component of the relevant
market as wireline local exchange services. Aliant Telecom submitted
that wireless service is a close substitute for wireline service, and
that the relevant market should include at least wireless-only users. |
51. |
Bell Canada/Télébec, supported by Aliant Telecom, submitted that the
fundamental purpose of both wireline and wireless services is to provide
two-way real-time voice communications to and/or from anyone, and that
wireless service provides the same functionality as wireline service in
terms of placing, receiving and managing calls. Bell Canada/Télébec
further noted that both wireline and wireless services provide 9-1-1
service and other calling features, and that with wireless number
portability (WNP), customers would be able to switch between wireline
and wireless service providers without changing telephone numbers.
Bell Canada/Télébec argued that these and other characteristics make
wireless service a close substitute for wireline service. |
52. |
Bell Canada/Télébec
submitted that a price per-minute analysis indicated that the
differences between residential wireline and wireless service prices was
small, and that the price comparisons supported the conclusion that,
from a price perspective, residential mobile wireless service is a close
substitute for residential wireline service. |
53. |
The CCTA argued
that wireless should only be considered a close substitute for wireline
if the services have similar functionality and there is evidence that a
significant number of consumers would replace their wireline service
with a wireless mobile service. |
54. |
The CCTA noted
that Primus offered a bundle that included both wireline and wireless
services and that Rogers offered a discount to customers that purchased
both Rogers Home Phone wireline service and Rogers wireless service. The
CCTA was of the view that if wireless and wireline services were
substitutes for each other, these types of bundled service offerings
would not make any sense, nor would they be purchased by consumers as
the consumers would be paying twice for services that provide the same
functionality. |
55. |
EastLink, Rogers,
Cogeco, QMI, and Shaw supported the arguments presented by the CCTA with
respect to the lack of substitutability between wireless and wireline
services. |
56. |
The Consumer
Groups did not consider mobile wireless services to be a close
substitute for local wireline services; rather, they argued that the
evidence in this proceeding indicated that mobile wireless service was
growing as a complementary service to traditional wireline local
exchange service, rather than displacing it. In the Consumer Groups'
view, mobile wireless services should not be considered as part of the
same product market as local exchange services for the purposes of a
forbearance analysis at this time. |
|
Commission's analysis and determinations
|
57. |
The Commission
notes that it has treated mobile wireless services as being in a separate
relevant market since the introduction of mobile wireless services
in Canada two decades ago. In Regulation of wireless services,
Telecom Decision CRTC 94-15, 12
August 1994, as amended by an erratum dated 8 September 1994, in Regulation
of mobile wireless telecommunications services, Telecom Decision
CRTC 96-14, 23 December 1996, and
in NBTel Inc. – Forbearance from regulating cellular and personal
communications services, Telecom Decision CRTC 98-18,
2 October 1998, the Commission decided to forbear from regulating
mobile wireless services on the basis that such services were in a
different relevant market from the wireline local exchange services
offered by the ILECs. The Commission reiterated this finding as recently
as Decision 2005-28. |
58. |
The Commission
considers that while the prices of wireline local exchange services and
mobile wireless services may be similar in some cases, the pricing
methodologies, particularly usage-sensitive pricing of mobile wireless
services, represent a fundamental difference in how the services are
priced. |
59. |
The Commission
considers that generally mobile wireless services are not marketed as a
replacement for wireline services. The Commission notes that there is
increasing evidence that several Canadian carriers offer bundles
consisting of both wireline and mobile wireless services, which would
suggest that the two services are not substitutes for each other. |
60. |
The Commission
notes that Statistics Canada has estimated in Residential Telephone
Service Survey, December 2004, that as of December 2004, only
2.7 percent of all households in Canada have replaced their wireline
services with wireless services. The Commission considers that
2.7 percent is very low in comparison to the 67 percent of all Canadian
households that have at least one subscription to mobile wireless
services. |
61. |
The Commission
considers that while some consumers are substituting mobile wireless
services for their wireline service, at present, the level of
substitution is not significant enough to provide a constraint on the
market power of the ILEC in a relevant market. |
62. |
In light of the
above, the Commission considers that mobile wireless services do not
belong in the same relevant market as wireline local exchange services
at this time. |
|
Do business and residential local exchange services belong in the
same relevant market?
|
|
Positions of parties |
63. |
The CCTA submitted
that although residential and business local exchange services served
the same fundamental purpose, these services were not substitutes for
each other for the following reasons: |
|
- Residential and business local exchange services were marketed and
offered differently;
|
|
- The prices for residential and business local exchange services
were different and did not move together;
|
|
- Business customers were generally not permitted to use residential
local exchange services for business purposes; therefore, it could not
be expected that a residential local exchange service would be
purchased as a replacement for a business local exchange service.
Further, the features and functionalities of residential service would
generally not meet the needs of a business customer;
|
|
- Although residential customers could subscribe to business local
exchange services instead of residential local exchange services, such
a choice would be unlikely given the price difference between the two
groups of services; and
|
|
- The Commission has consistently tracked the development of
competition in residential local exchange services market separately
from competition in the business local exchange services market.
|
64. |
QMI submitted that
residential and business local exchange services were not substitutes
for each other for the following reasons: |
|
- Qualitative differences in supply and demand characteristics
between the residential and business local exchange services markets
existed;
|
|
- Business local exchange services customers had service
requirements that were not easily substitutable with those of
residential local exchange services customers, either in terms of
functionality, use profiles or access technology; and
|
|
- The nature of customer inertia might be different in the two
markets.
|
65. |
Bell Canada/Télébec submitted that virtually all suppliers of local
exchange services had maintained residential and business distinctions
since the onset of local competition, and there did not appear to be any
lessening of those distinctions. Similarly, Aliant Telecom submitted
that, at the time of its submissions, ILECs were monitoring the use of
business and residential services to ensure that business customers did
not subscribe to the lower-priced residential service. |
66. |
Bell Canada/Télébec
also submitted that although it was technically possible to provide
business primary exchange service (PES) over residential facilities,
there would be differences between the traffic-driven resources required
to deliver business and residential PES as these services differ in
length of calls and number of call attempts. |
67. |
The UTC submitted
that single-line business and residential services were fundamentally
equivalent; however, the UTC also submitted that these were not
typically accepted as substitutes because carriers priced these services
differently and refused to allow business customers to use residential
services. For that reason, the UTC argued that it was appropriate to
consider single-line business and residential services as two markets.
The UTC submitted that the Commission would have to revisit this issue
if business customers were allowed to use residential access services. |
68. |
EastLink submitted
that residential and business services might have different cost
structures, with some business services requiring different facilities. |
69. |
In contrast,
MTS Allstream argued that residential and business local exchange
services were in the same relevant product market. |
70. |
MTS Allstream
submitted that there were no significant functional differences between
residential and business local exchange services with respect to either
demand-side or supply-side substitutability. MTS Allstream noted that
both residential and business local exchange services provide the user
with wireline access to and from the PSTN. MTS Allstream submitted that
the local service requirements of small business users were effectively
no different from those of residential users, especially with respect to
home office business customers. In this respect, MTS Allstream submitted
that 95 percent of business customers were small businesses. |
71. |
MTS Allstream
further argued that creating an artificial distinction between
residential and business local exchange services, which could result in
forbearance for one and not the other, could threaten competition for
both. |
72. |
MTS Allstream
submitted that both business and residential local exchange services
offered customers a variety of local options and features. MTS Allstream
further noted that some subscribers might choose only a subset of
optional features, while others take a broader range of features.
MTS Allstream submitted that the fact that different customers subscribe
to different optional features did not provide a basis for defining
residential and business local exchange services as distinct product
markets. |
73. |
MTS Allstream
argued that there were no technical reasons why any local service
offered to a business customer could not equally be offered to a
residential customer. However, MTS Allstream noted that there would be
an additional cost to deliver a digital trunk service over a local loop. |
74. |
Cybersurf
submitted that, to the extent that residential and business local
exchange services were closely substitutable absent regulatory rules
that separate the two types of services, both types of services would
belong to the same relevant product market. Cybersurf also argued that
premature forbearance in only one market segment would likely undermine
the objective of promoting competition across all segments of the local
market. |
|
Commission's analysis and determinations
|
75. |
The Commission
considers that although there may be some similarities in the functions,
features and quality of residential and business local exchange
services, there are also considerable differences in these services,
particularly for services provided to large or very large business
customers. The Commission considers that although it may be possible for
a service provider to offer business services through the use of
residential facilities, these services would likely only meet the needs
of small business customers with functional requirements similar to
those of residential customers. The Commission considers that in the
case of Centrex and Digital trunk services, for example, it is unlikely
that these services would be within the same relevant market as
residential local exchange services if only the product characteristics
were considered. |
76. |
Furthermore, the
Commission considers that the evidence on the record of this proceeding
demonstrates that business and residential local exchange services are
priced and marketed differently. The Commission also notes that all
ILECs have different tariffs for business services and for residential
services. The Commission notes, for example, that all ILECs offer
Centrex services that include pricing discounts dependent on the length
of the contract term and the volume of lines that the customer orders. |
77. |
Based on the above,
the Commission considers that business and residential local exchange
services are priced and marketed differently and that customers cannot
generally substitute residential local exchange services for business
local exchange services. |
78. |
Accordingly, the
Commission determines that business and residential local exchange
services are in separate relevant markets for the purposes of the local
exchange forbearance framework. |
|
If business local exchange services belong in a separate relevant
market from residential local exchange services, is there one relevant
market for business local exchange services or are there multiple
relevant markets for business local exchange services based on different
product characteristics? |
79. |
The Commission
notes that although it received several submissions both in support of
and opposed to dividing business local exchange services into distinct
relevant markets, the primary focus of the submissions filed in this
proceeding was with respect to residential local exchange services. Such
information as was provided with respect to business local exchange
services was often conflicting, particularly in terms of service
characteristics and substitutability. The Commission considers that the
record of this proceeding does not provide a complete picture of
business local exchange services in terms of the following: product
characteristics, pricing and marketing, regional differences in
offerings and substitutability. |
80. |
The Commission
considers that although the evidence on the record of this proceeding
does not definitively establish the need to divide business local
exchange services between multiple relevant markets, it equally does not
foreclose such a possibility. The Commission, therefore, intends, for
the purpose of the local forbearance framework established in this
proceeding, to treat all business local exchange services as being in
the same relevant market. However, the Commission is willing to
entertain applications for forbearance pursuant to that framework as
well as interventions with respect to such applications that propose a
division of business local exchange services into multiple relevant
markets. The Commission will examine the appropriateness of such a
division at the time of the application. |
81. |
The Commission
also notes the Coalition's suggestion that the Commission forbear from
regulating business local exchange services on the basis of customer
characteristics, e.g. forbear from regulating business customers that
obtain their business local exchange services through a request for
proposal (RFP) process. The Commission notes that such proposals are not
feasible under the provisions of the Act which, pursuant to section 34,
requires the Commission to continue to regulate or to forbear from
regulating on the basis of "a telecommunications service or class of
services." The Commission is not permitted to forbear from regulating a
class of customers. |
|
Geographic |
82. |
Parties suggested
several possibilities for the geographic component of the relevant
market(s) for the local forbearance framework, including the following: |
|
|
|
- the serving area of a full facilities-based CLEC;
|
|
- the local calling area (LCA);
|
|
- the local interconnection region (LIR);
|
|
- the province or the ILEC operating territory; and
|
|
- the census metropolitan area (CMA).
|
83. |
While parties
disagreed over which geographic component the Commission should adopt
as part of the relevant market, parties generally agreed that the
Commission should adopt a geographic component that reflects a social
and economic community of interest, that, for example, has substantially
similar local telecommunications market conditions, including common
pricing and marketing strategies, local service providers and local
service offerings; that is administratively practical and competitively
neutral; and that has well-defined, stable boundaries. |
|
Positions of parties |
|
Local exchange |
84. |
Aliant Telecom
supported the use of the local exchange for the following reasons:
forbearance applies to ILECs, so it was not unreasonable that the
parameters would be based on, or at least be consistent with, the ILEC's
business structure; the local exchange is the basic building block of
local telephone service; CLECs are required to obtain telephone numbers
in each local exchange where they offer service; and local exchanges
have evolved in the context of a single supplier with the privilege and
obligation to serve all customers. Aliant Telecom also argued that the
network and the local exchange structure have been based on social and
economic communities, that market entrants (including the cable LECs,
which have evolved their own networks as monopoly suppliers of broadcast
distribution service) deploy their facilities around the same social and
economic communities, and that their structure naturally tends to
parallel that of the ILECs. |
85. |
Aliant Telecom also
submitted that competitive conditions across some local exchanges were
sufficiently similar that the Commission might wish to aggregate these
local exchanges into broader geographic areas for purposes of
determining whether sufficient competition existed to forbear from
regulation. |
86. |
Bell Canada/Télébec
argued for the use of the local exchange for the following reasons: |
|
- The local exchange was a well-known administrative unit used by
local telephone service providers for years, and by CLECs that
describe their serving areas by local exchanges, and that utilize
telephone numbers that are assigned by local exchange;
|
|
- It was unlikely that there would be "pockets" within a local
exchange that were unserved by competitors, or would remain unserved
for long once entry had occurred in the local exchange, since a local
exchange was a relatively small area, and competitive entry and
expansion throughout the local exchange was relatively inexpensive
once entry had occurred in some portion of the local exchange; and
|
|
- There were no obstacles to obtaining data on competitive
conditions within a local exchange.
|
87. |
SaskTel submitted
that CLECs would only enter the Saskatchewan marketplace where it
made economic sense to do so, namely in the large urban centres. SaskTel
noted that in Saskatchewan the large urban centres were each served
by only one exchange. SaskTel submitted that CLECs competing in these
cities would only service these exchanges. Further, SaskTel noted
that in Decision 97-8 the Commission
concluded that "[t]he exchange system is both integral and necessary
to the general functioning of the network." |
88. |
SaskTel further
submitted that, for the purpose of establishing a framework for local
exchange forbearance, it did not make sense for the Commission to use
any definition of the relevant geographic market other than the local
exchange for several reasons, including, most significantly, that every
alternative encompassed multiple local exchanges, many of which, SaskTel
submitted, would not be the subject of meaningful competition in the
foreseeable future. |
89. |
The CCTA opposed
using the local exchange as the relevant geographic market. The CCTA
argued that to do so would ignore an ILEC's ubiquitous and entrenched
position across a much broader territory, would allow an ILEC to
leverage the advantages of its incumbency position to deter the
development of competition and would ignore the possibility of supply
responses from firms operating in contiguous local exchanges and result
in an overly narrow market definition. The CCTA also argued that the
local exchange was not competitively neutral as it was based on the
network architecture of the ILECs and dictated by the ILECs' legacy
technology. |
90. |
MTS Allstream
argued that ILEC local exchange boundaries were historical artifacts and
had no direct relevance to the coverage of alternative local service
networks or to the area over which competitors might choose to offer
local exchange services. In this respect, MTS Allstream submitted that
the local exchange was no longer the fundamental unit for the purpose of
interconnection and the calculation of contribution. |
91. |
EastLink submitted
that, as it rolled out local exchange service on a system-by-system
basis, the systems and processes it had developed to track subscribers
were based on how it tracked its cable services. EastLink submitted that
it would be inconsistent with the objectives of the Act, which
recognized that competition should be efficient and effective, for the
Commission to require it to report its subscribers on a local exchange
by local exchange basis. |
92. |
The Consumer
Groups submitted that the geographic component of the relevant market
should be sufficiently large to be administratively convenient and to
decrease the chance of significant market share variations over time.
The Consumer Groups also submitted that the use of the local exchange as
the geographic component of the relevant market could result in
thousands of forbearance areas. The Consumer Groups submitted that the
use of the local exchange did not make sense from an administrative
perspective and could not reasonably be expected to ensure that
regulation, where required, was efficient and effective. |
|
Serving area of a full facilities-based CLEC
|
93. |
TCI defined the
geographic component of the relevant market for forbearance from the
regulation of local exchange services as the serving area of a full
facilities-based CLEC—a CLEC that operated its own network, which was
physically independent of any other LEC's network, excluding
interconnection. |
94. |
TCI submitted
that the use of the serving area of a full facilities-based CLEC as
the geographic component of the relevant market was consistent with
the Commission's view in Decision 97-8
that "efficient and effective competition will be best achieved
through facilities-based competitive providers" and that "the
full benefits of competition can only be realized with facilities-based
competition." TCI submitted that it was not suggesting that non-facilities-based
or partially facilities-based competition could not constitute sufficient
and durable competition. TCI submitted that it had merely excluded
partially and non-facilities-based competition on the basis that,
consistent with the Commission's statement in Decision 97-8,
the Commission could be confident in the ability of full facilities-based
competition to protect the interests of users and to be durable. |
95. |
TCI argued that
its proposed geographic market was the most administratively simple and
reliable means of identifying those geographic areas where there was
sufficient competition to protect the interests of users. TCI argued
further that, by defining the forbearance area strictly by reference to
the presence of actual full facilities-based competition, it offered the
only test that avoided the problem of pockets of uncontested consumers. |
96. |
TCI noted the "unequivocal
direction" that the Commission provided in Decision 94-19,
where it submitted that "the relevant market is the smallest
group of products and geographic area in which a firm with market
power can profitably impose a sustainable price increase." TCI
submitted that this was the only legitimate consideration in the identification
of the relevant geographic market, and that all other considerations,
such as those regarding pricing and communities of interest, were
irrelevant and must be rejected. |
97. |
The Competition
Bureau submitted a diagram that illustrated a sample geographic
component of the relevant market. This diagram showed an area with cable
network; the area of local exchanges; the area outside the cable
network; and an area of wholesale regulation. |
98. |
The Competition
Bureau argued that the starting point in the analysis to define the
geographic component of the relevant market must be the overlapping
footprint of the ILECs' and the competitor(s)' networks since this
accurately defined the market in which users had the option of actually
choosing between competing suppliers (assuming that these suppliers had
been determined to supply substitutable products). |
99. |
Aliant Telecom
argued that a competitor's footprint could be smaller than a local
exchange. Aliant Telecom submitted that the use of a market smaller than
a local exchange would result in exchanges that were partly forborne and
partly regulated. Aliant Telecom expressed the concern that this would
create administrative burden, related to billing modification,
identification of customers and market shares in parts of an exchange,
multiple proceedings to determine forbearance, and constantly changing
forbearance boundaries. |
100. |
The Consumer Groups
submitted that the geographic area should be defined prior to beginning
a forbearance analysis, and that using the competitor's footprint
involved a moving target, which, among other things, was not conducive
to administrative efficiency. |
101. |
The CCTA submitted
that the idea of using the competitor's footprint as the geographic
component of the relevant market suffered from uncertainty and a lack of
consistency because the geographic component of the relevant market
would be driven by the actions of competitors in the markets, not by a
stable and neutral definition. The CCTA argued that, under this
approach, the Commission could not know in advance how many different
areas it would have to examine with respect to forbearance, and there
would be disputes over the forbearance areas in question. |
102. |
The CCTA submitted
that as the competitor's footprint continued to expand to increase
market coverage and customer base, the geographic component would shift
and/or expand over time, resulting in numerous forbearance applications
and burdensome data collection. The CCTA also submitted that, if
forbearance were granted to an initial serving area, it was not clear
how the forbearance criteria would be applied to each new increment of
this initial serving area. |
103. |
Rogers, Cogeco,
EastLink, and Shaw argued that the serving area of a full
facilities-based competitor was not stable over time, was not well
defined and was not neutral, in that it relied on the operations of an
individual company. |
|
LCA
|
104. |
The Coalition
submitted that the LCA was the appropriate geographic market for
forbearance from the regulation of local exchange services; the
Coalition submitted that the LCA was objective and relevant as it
reflected the community of interests of customers. The Coalition also
submitted that, from a supply and a demand point of view, the LCA was
the most meaningful geographic market. |
105. |
The Consumer
Groups and Cybersurf had both originally submitted that the LCA was the
appropriate relevant geographic market on the basis that it was familiar
to consumers; it reflected a community of interest; it was competitively
neutral; and it was of intermediate size, significantly larger than a
local exchange, but smaller than a province or an ILEC's operating
territory and would likely contain relatively homogenous competitive
conditions throughout. |
106. |
Both of these
parties subsequently switched their positions to support the LIR as the
appropriate geographic component of the relevant market, mainly due to
concerns over potential administrative problems with the LCA. |
107. |
Aliant Telecom,
Bell Canada/Télébec, the CCTA, and TCI argued that LCAs did not lend
themselves to identifying distinct geographic areas as there was a high
incidence of overlapping LCAs. |
108. |
MTS Allstream
argued that granting local forbearance on a narrowly-focused basis, such
as on an LCA-basis, would only serve to pre-empt the development of
local competition. MTS Allstream also submitted that there was no
justification for using the LCA boundaries as the basis of the relevant
geographic market, noting that these could be expanded over time. |
|
LIR
|
109. |
The CCTA submitted
that the relevant issue was the extent to which individual residences
should be aggregated to achieve a workable geographic component of the
relevant market. The CCTA claimed that the LIR, or, in certain
circumstances, an aggregation of contiguous LIRs was an appropriate
geographic market for the following reasons: |
|
- In the absence of demand substitution, supply responses suggest a
market definition based on one or more LIR(s);
|
|
- An LIR represents "a community of interest" – a grouping
of locations across which consumers shared common economic and
social interests, as established in Trunking arrangements for
the interchange of traffic and the point of interconnection between
local exchange carriers, Telecom Decision CRTC 2004-46,
14 July 2004 (Decision 2004-46).
This included areas where consumers had access to similar advertisements
and offers via the same local television programs, radio stations
and newspapers;
|
|
- An LIR closely approximates the geographic boundaries that are
likely to provide the basis for geographic price discrimination of
local service. It would be very difficult for LECs to profitably
sustain geographic price discrimination of residential local exchange
service across multiple small markets. It is more reasonable to expect
that geographic price discrimination in a competitive market will
occur on the basis of an aggregation of local exchanges. Uniform
pricing will occur as a result of the presence and service offerings
of competitors across the contiguous exchanges rather than within
individual local exchanges. It is highly unlikely that different
competitive conditions in individual local exchanges will lead to
geographic price discrimination on the basis of the local exchange. In
a competitive environment, geographic price discrimination on the
basis of the LIR is both more likely and more sustainable;
|
|
- An LIR represents a geographic market that is large enough to
prevent targeted pricing; and
|
|
- An LIR provides the best means by which to measure market power. A
narrow definition of the geographic market, such as the local
exchange, fails to take into account an ILEC's ubiquitous and
entrenched position across a much broader segment of its operating
territory. The ILEC would retain the advantages of its incumbency
position and could leverage these advantages to the detriment of
competition in the case of premature forbearance on a narrow
geographic basis. Through such means, an ILEC could prevent
competition from expanding.
|
110. |
Shaw submitted that
a competitor could provide service to any new area within an existing
LIR, without incurring additional sunk costs, in response to demand. |
111. |
Bell Canada/Télébec argued that supply responses did not suggest a
market definition based on LIRs. Supply responses, according to
Bell Canada/Télébec, referred to suppliers' ability to respond to a
hypothetical monopolist's price increase by expanding their services to
customers that would have been affected by the increases.
Bell Canada/Télébec argued that if a supply response could be expected
across an LIR, then it could be expected that similar competitive
conditions would exist across that area. They further argued that this
was typically not the case, and that there was no uniformity of
competitive conditions across LIRs. Bell Canada/Télébec submitted, for
example, that six years after EastLink's entry into the local market in
Atlantic Canada, it offered service in only one quarter of the exchanges
in the LIRs. |
112. |
Bell Canada/Télébec and TCI argued that the LIR did not represent a
community of interest. Bell Canada/Télébec submitted that the LIRs were
designed to improve the efficiency and lower the cost of network
interconnection into an ILEC's network and had little to do with
competitive supply of local exchange services. Bell Canada/Télébec
argued that the make-up of the LIR was driven more by the ILECs' network
architecture and their use of remotes than by any community of interest.
Bell Canada/Télébec submitted further that community of interest had
relevance in a market definition only to the extent that it implied that
there were demand and supply substitution opportunities within the
community. |
113. |
Bell Canada/Télébec
and TCI argued that targeted pricing considerations were irrelevant to
the definition of the geographic market. |
114. |
Aliant Telecom
argued that the LIRs were created to facilitate local interconnection
and did not reflect relevant geographic markets and that economic theory
did not play any role in the definition of the LIRs. Aliant Telecom
submitted that the LIRs were initially prescribed to be political
subdivisions, counties in the Maritime provinces, but were redefined to
provide that if a local exchange were to be served by a remote off of a
switch in another county, that local exchange would be added to the LIR
of the serving switch. |
115. |
Aliant Telecom
further argued that the LIRs did not reflect comparable competitive
conditions in areas within a given LIR. Aliant Telecom noted that Nova
Scotia had only four LIRs and that the Halifax LIR contained 62
exchanges, including several small rural exchanges located a
considerable distance from Halifax. Aliant Telecom submitted that the
competitive conditions in Halifax were irrelevant to the other rural
areas. Aliant Telecom further submitted that competition sufficient to
justify forbearance in the Halifax exchange would not justify
forbearance in these rural exchanges. Aliant Telecom also argued that,
conversely, the lack of a competitive entrant in the distant exchanges
had no relevance to competitive conditions in Halifax and should not
delay forbearance within the Halifax exchange. |
116. |
SaskTel submitted
that the revised LIR boundaries proposed by SaskTel, Aliant Telecom,
TCI and MTS Allstream as an alternative to those set out in Decision
2004-46 were regions of their
serving territories that reflected that local service was provided
directly from host switches and from remote switches that homed on
a host switch. SaskTel submitted that the adoption of these LIRs would
provide more efficient interconnection, present CLECs with greater
geographic reach from a single point of interconnection (POI), and
would greatly reduce the costs of interconnection, but that these
LIRs could no longer be viewed consistently as representing communities
of interest. Furthermore, SaskTel cited Decision 2004-46
where the Commission stated: "The Commission notes this Decision
does not modify the assignment of numbering resources, the dialling
plan and provision of service to subscribers. Also, local number portability
continues to provide service provider portability on an exchange basis." |
117. |
SaskTel disputed
the proposition that local competition would arise on an LIR basis, and
considered that it would be rolled out on an exchange-by-exchange basis.
SaskTel argued that competition was unlikely to reach more than a
handful of the 229 exchanges in Saskatchewan and that using LIR as the
relevant geographic market for forbearance would be problematic. |
118. |
In its reply
argument, the CCTA refined its rationale for supporting the LIR as the
geographic component of the relevant market with the following
submissions: |
|
- The LIR reflected a community of interests—a grouping of locations
across which consumers shared common economic and social interests,
as established in Decision 2004-46.
This included areas where consumers had access to similar advertisements
and offers via the same local television programs, radio stations
and newspapers;
|
|
- Each LIR described the area across which a facilities-based
competitor could supply its services through a single POI; and
|
|
- Using the LIR, rather than the local exchange, would ensure that
competitors would have the opportunity to establish themselves on a
scale sufficient to discourage targeted pricing. A local exchange was
simply too small a basis for a competitor to sustain operations and
withstand targeting by ILEC.
|
119. |
The CCTA contested
the suggestion that LIRs were too large and that forbearance on this
basis would result in pockets of consumers within a forborne market that
would not have access to a competitive alternative. The CCTA argued that
a facilities-based competitor established in the LIR could extend its
service anywhere in that LIR to constrain the market power of the ILEC.
In addition, the CCTA suggested that price caps and restriction on rate
de-averaging could be used to offset the risk of unwarranted price
increases by the ILECs in pockets where consumers were without
competitive choices. |
|
Province or ILEC operating territory
|
120. |
EastLink submitted
that, at least in the case of Aliant Telecom's application for
forbearance, the appropriate geographic component of the relevant market
was the province. |
121. |
EastLink proposed
that, in establishing the relevant geographic market, the Commission
should consider whether that specific market would create opportunities
or disincentives for the incumbent to engage in targeted behaviour; how
that market would impact competitors and their ability to respond to
ILEC behaviour; customers' expectations regarding services and pricing
within that market; and general indicators of incumbent market power
within that market. |
122. |
In EastLink's view,
the key to determining the appropriate geographic market was defining a
market boundary, within which, if forbearance were granted, the ILEC's
ability to engage in targeted behaviour would be limited. EastLink
argued that the larger the geographic market the less likely it was that
an ILEC would engage in targeted pricing. |
123. |
EastLink submitted
that it would not be able to respond to extreme pricing behaviour by
Aliant Telecom if Aliant Telecom's local exchange services were forborne
in one local exchange and not forborne in neighbouring local exchanges.
EastLink further suggested that if Aliant Telecom could blame the
regulator for its inability to reduce prices in local exchanges that are
not competitive, it could target the more competitive areas without
angering the customers in the non-forborne local exchanges. |
124. |
EastLink submitted
that its pricing was consistent throughout all of its serving areas
and that consumers expected this type of pricing. EastLink further
argued that, if the geographic market was provincially defined, then
ILEC pricing and other behaviour would be disciplined by competitors
and by the expectations of consumers within that market. EastLink
argued that consumers' expectations, pricing and service options had
all been previously recognized as relevant considerations in determining
the appropriate geographic market. The company cited Forbearance
granted for telcos' wide area network services, Order CRTC 2000-553,
16 June 2000, where the Commission determined that because
WAN services were neither priced nor offered on a route-specific basis,
the market was national or regional in scope. |
125. |
EastLink submitted
that Aliant Telecom's prices for local services were the same throughout
the province, and could support an argument in favour of a
territory-wide geographic market. In this respect, EastLink submitted
that Aliant Telecom's bundles were currently priced the same across the
Aliant Telecom's entire operating territory and that, in the last price
cap proceeding, Aliant Telecom sought an increase to its local exchange
service prices so that the price would be consistent throughout
Aliant Telecom's operating territory. |
126. |
EastLink submitted
that while some parties argued that a larger geographic boundary would
result in pockets of unserved areas, EastLink was of the view that such
a concern was not significant enough to warrant selecting a very narrow
market. EastLink suggested that if the Commission granted forbearance
where there were some small unserved pockets, it could mandate price
caps in those areas to prevent ILEC pricing behaviour that would take
advantage of the lack of competitive alternatives. |
127. |
QMI proposed that
the geographic component of the relevant market for a forbearance
analysis was the ILEC's operating territory. QMI submitted that an
ILEC's financial power and its potential ability to bring that power for
anti-competitive ends were not restricted to local exchange or other
arbitrary regional boundaries. QMI further submitted that local market
forbearance should be considered only after dominance had been dislodged
on a territory-wide basis. QMI submitted that only once meaningful
competition had taken root on a territory-wide basis would more
constructive competitive forces have the opportunity to prevail. |
128. |
QMI noted that
setting the ILEC's operating territory as the geographic component of
the relevant market could give rise to concerns about potential abuse of
customers in outlying regions if forbearance were granted too quickly
due to competition in urban areas. In this respect, QMI suggested the
development of a process whereby forbearance approval would be granted
based on conditions in the entire operating territory, but forbearance
implementation would take place on a region-by region basis. |
129. |
Primus submitted
that the most balanced method of defining the geographic component of
the relevant market would be to base forbearance on ILEC market share
across most, if not all, of an ILEC's operating territory, but some
high-cost serving areas (HCSAs) could be excluded at the Commission's
discretion. |
130. |
MTS Allstream
proposed that the appropriate geographic component of the relevant
market was the ILEC operating territory subdivided into HCSAs and
non-HCSAs. |
131. |
MTS Allstream
submitted that the definition of the geographic component of the
relevant market must include consideration of the impact of the market
definition on the objective of achieving broadly-based, sustainable
local competition. MTS Allstream argued that an ILEC had possessed an
"actual" monopoly rather than a "hypothetical" monopoly within its
operating territory not that long ago and, at that time, each ILEC was
able to raise local service prices on a profitable and non-transitory
basis throughout its operating territory. |
132. |
MTS Allstream
submitted that the state of competition could be measured at the
provincial or territorial level providing a more comprehensive view of
the scale of competitive entry in each ILEC's operating territory.
MTS Allstream further submitted that more granular information at the
local level could also be analyzed to give a better perspective of the
distribution of competitive entry. |
133. |
MTS Allstream
submitted that, for practical purposes, a division of the relevant
geographic markets into HCSAs and non-HCSAs was feasible at this time,
as it was unlikely that any significant degree of competition would
develop in HCSAs in the foreseeable future. MTS Allstream considered
that dividing provincial territories in this manner would allow for
forbearance where the forbearance test criteria were satisfied in
non-HCSAs. MTS Allstream further considered that, given that HCSAs were
currently subsidized and represented a relatively small percentage of
each ILEC's within-province customer and associated revenue base, there
would be very limited ability to leverage market power in HCSAs to
engage in anti-competitive tactics in the non-HCSAs, in the event that
the rest of the operating region were forborne. |
134. |
The Consumer
Groups and the Coalition submitted that a province or ILEC operating
territory was well-defined and provided an element of historical
integrity that might be viewed as a reasonable basis for market
definition purposes. However, these parties further submitted that
a province or operating territory was too large to be considered
appropriate, as competitive conditions in one city or region had little
necessary relationship to conditions in another city or region. |
135. |
Aliant Telecom
submitted that choosing a large area such as a province or serving
territory to ward off a non-existent threat of predation comes at the
cost of denying the benefits of full competition to customers in those
areas where competitors have become well-established. Aliant Telecom
submitted that the rationale for these choices was explained in terms of
limiting the ability of the forborne ILEC to engage in anti-competitive
conduct, but not based on economic principles of substitutability
followed in antitrust matters. |
136. |
Bell Canada/Télébec
submitted that the shortcomings of the LIR as the geographic component
of the relevant market pertained, with greater force, to the province or
ILEC operating territory. |
137. |
SaskTel submitted
that it would be inappropriate to define the relevant geographic market
as the province or HCSAs and non-HCSAs for the following reasons: the
areas were too broadly defined to represent a community of interest;
they were not representative of areas of consistent conditions of
competitive supply and demand; and they were not responsive to the
dispersion of the population of Saskatchewan. |
|
CMA
|
138. |
The UTC submitted
that the appropriate relevant geographic market for the purposes of
forbearance would be the metropolitan area served by the ILEC and cited
marketing considerations as the basis for its view. |
139. |
The Consumer Groups
submitted that in addition to LCAs and LIRs, other municipal boundaries
might also be appropriate to reflect an existing community of interest.
The Consumer Groups considered that the key point was to have a
geographic area that would make sense to consumers and would avoid
consumer confusion as to whether or not advertised service offerings
were available to them or not. |
140. |
SaskTel submitted
that, in most cases, CMA boundaries did not match SaskTel's exchange
boundaries. SaskTel listed the communities and rural municipalities
(RMs) contained within the Regina and Saskatoon CMAs and argued that
these smaller communities and RMs were not expected to attract local
service competitors any time in the foreseeable future. In this respect,
SaskTel noted that several of the small communities within the Regina
and Saskatoon CMAs were not served by the predominant cable
distributors, Shaw or Access Communications Co-operative. SaskTel
therefore considered that it would be inappropriate to rely on the CMAs
as the relevant geographic market for the purposes of forbearance of
local exchange services in Saskatchewan. |
|
Commission's analysis and determinations
|
141. |
The Commission
notes that the test for defining the geographic component of the relevant
market, as set out in the Competition Bureau's Merger Enforcement
Guidelines and adopted by the Commission in Decision 94-19,
is the smallest geographic area in which a hypothetical firm with
market power could impose a profitable, significant, non-transitory
price increase. In performing this analysis, what is important is
the buyers' ability and willingness to switch their purchases in sufficient
quantities from one geographic location to another in response to
changes in relative prices. The Commission notes that, according to
this approach, the geographic component of the relevant market for
local exchange services would be each location, as buyers would not
be willing to substitute calling from their location for calling from
another location. The Commission notes that the Competition Bureau
indicated, in this proceeding, that this would be too narrow a basis
to evaluate local forbearance. The Commission also considers that
it would be extremely impractical to evaluate local forbearance on
a location-specific basis. The Commission considers that there are
economic, social and practical factors that will allow locations to
be aggregated into a larger geographic area for the purposes
of determining the appropriate geographic scope of local forbearance.
Additionally, in Public Notice 2005-2,
the Commission noted that pursuant to section 47 of the Act
it is required to exercise its powers and perform its duties under
the Act with a view to implementing the telecommunications policy
objectives set out in section 7 of the Act. |
142. |
The Commission has,
in balancing those telecommunications policy objectives, applied the
criteria suggested by the parties to the proceeding, namely that the
geographic component should reflect: |
|
- an area with a social and economic community of interest, that has
substantially similar local telecommunications market conditions,
including common pricing and marketing strategies, local service
providers and local service offerings; and
|
|
- an area that is administratively practical, competitively neutral,
and which has well-defined, stable boundaries.
|
143. |
The Commission
considers that using the ILEC operating territory or province may result
in the ILECs continuing to be regulated in certain areas beyond the
point where regulation is necessary to ensure that the interests of
users of telecommunications services are protected. Such over-regulation
could serve to stifle innovation on the part of ILECs and could result
in competition developing in an unhealthy manner as competitors could
become overly reliant on the existence of regulatory protection.
Similarly, such a large geographic component for the relevant market
raises the very real possibility that forbearance could eventually be
granted based on competition which is concentrated exclusively or
primarily in urban core areas. Forbearance under such a scenario would
leave vast regions of a province or ILEC operating territory containing
many uncontested customers that will have lost regulatory protection
without gaining the protection that the discipline of market forces will
provide. In light of the above, the Commission considers that the ILEC
operating territory or a province is not the appropriate geographic
component of the relevant market. |
144. |
In the
Commission's view, the LIR suffers from similar problems as a potential
geographic component of the relevant market. Despite claims by some
parties that competitors can offer service across an entire LIR with
minimal incremental cost once a part of the LIR has been entered, the
Commission's observations of current market dynamics suggest that
competitive roll-out is not occurring in this manner. Competitors have
almost universally rolled out service in accordance with their own
existing network footprint which in most cases is smaller than an LIR or
in some cases crosses multiple LIR boundaries. The Commission notes that
in some cases an LIR can cover vast geographic regions in which very
different competitive conditions can prevail within different portions
of that LIR. The Commission is also concerned that the concept of an LIR
is primarily one which is currently determined primarily by
considerations of network architecture and the location of shared
host-remote switches rather than by social and economic community of
interest. As such, it is a geographic component that has minimal
relevance to the social and economic interests of the users of
telecommunications services, that is, the customers. The Commission
considers it important that the customers of telecommunications services
be able to have a clear picture of where forbearance has occurred or is
likely to occur. Few, if any, customers know which LIR they live in or
have any social or economic connection to "their" LIR. In light of the
above, the Commission considers that LIRs are not the appropriate
geographic component of the relevant market. |
145. |
The Commission
considers that using an LCA as the geographic component of the relevant
market would avoid some of the problems identified with respect to the
LIR and the ILEC operating territory or province, in the sense that
there would be many fewer uncontested customers in a forborne LCA and
also a significantly greater probability that common competitive
conditions will prevail across an LCA. The Commission considers that
there would also be a greater sense of social and economic community of
interest among customers in an LCA. |
146. |
However, the Commission
considers that LCAs also suffer from several weaknesses that make
their use as the geographic component of the relevant market problematic.
Many LCAs overlap, thus creating administrative complexity and regulatory
uncertainty in terms of the geographic area that is potentially the
subject of an application for local exchange services forbearance.
In addition, the borders of an LCA lack certainty. The Commission
notes that an LCA can change and expand over time, in accordance with
the rules laid down by the Commission in Framework for the expansion
of local calling areas, Telecom Decision CRTC 2002-56,
12 September 2002. The Commission considers that if one or more local
exchange(s) were added to a forborne LCA, complex issues would arise
with respect to the application of the existing forbearance decision
to the newly-added exchanges. On balance, the Commission considers
that the administrative problems with the use of the LCA render it
not appropriate for use as the geographic component of the relevant
market. |
147. |
The Commission
considers that administrative concerns also render TCI's proposal of
using the serving area of a full facilities-based CLEC unworkable for
the purpose of the local forbearance framework. The Commission notes
that TCI's proposal requires the collection of data on the state of
competition at the level of the postal code. The Commission is not
convinced that such data can be collected from all ILECs and competitors
with the necessary degree of accuracy and timeliness to allow for the
efficient and effective administration of the local forbearance
framework. In addition, the boundaries of the serving area of a full
facilities-based CLEC will likely be highly variable, at least
initially, and will not necessarily map to any existing administrative
unit or territory. Moreover, TCI's proposal would create artificial
incentives with regard to network roll-out. The Commission is also
concerned by the possibility inherent in TCI's proposal that the
geographic component of the relevant market has the potential to be, for
example, one building. In light of the above, the Commission considers
that the serving area of a full facilities-based CLEC is not appropriate
for use as the geographic component of the relevant market. |
148. |
The Commission
considers that using the local exchange as the geographic component of
the relevant market would have a number of advantages. First, the
Commission considers that it would minimize pockets of uncontested
customers. Such evidence of competitive roll-out that the Commission has
thus far indicates that where competitors provide service within a local
exchange they generally do so throughout the entire local exchange.
Similarly, several necessary steps that a competitor must undertake in
order to provide local exchange service are done at a local exchange
level. For example, local number portability (LNP) is implemented at a
local exchange level and telephone numbers are assigned by local
exchange. |
149. |
However, the
Commission considers that a local exchange by itself as the geographic
component of the relevant market would also have some weaknesses. The
Commission notes that although the local exchange may correspond to a
social and economic community of interest, as in the case of smaller
communities that are encompassed within a single local exchange, in
large urban centres, such as Vancouver, Montreal or Toronto, a single
local exchange is too small to adequately reflect the common social and
economic interests of customers. |
150. |
The Commission is
also concerned that such a small geographic component of the relevant
market is likely more prone to anti-competitive behaviour by the ILEC in
a forborne situation, through the use of targeted marketing or
otherwise. The Commission is concerned about the long-term effect of
such potential anti-competitive activities on sustainable competition. |
151. |
The Commission
notes that there are approximately 2,700 local exchanges in the ILECs'
operating territories. The Commission is concerned with the
effectiveness and efficiency of having approximately 5,400 different
relevant markets if it were to choose the local exchange as the
geographic component of the relevant market. The Commission considers
that the regulatory and administrative burden involved in potentially
processing such a large number of applications for local forbearance
would not assist with an orderly transition to a forborne environment. |
152. |
In light of these
concerns, the Commission considers that a local exchange, by itself, is
not an appropriate geographic component for the relevant market. |
153. |
The Commission
considers that the best approach to addressing the geographic component
of the relevant market is to adopt a method of aggregating local
exchanges that will allow the preservation of many of the advantages of
using the local exchange while addressing some of the concerns outlined
above. |
154. |
The Commission
considers that such an aggregation of local exchanges should, to the
extent possible, reflect a community of common customer economic and
social interests, as well as cover an area that has substantially
similar local telecommunications market conditions, including common
marketing strategies, local service providers and local service
offerings. |
155. |
In this way, the
Commission expects to minimize pockets of uncontested customers over a
larger geographic area, as well as any confusion among customers in
distinguishing between forborne and non-forborne geographic areas. |
156. |
In addition, the
Commission considers that such an aggregation of local exchanges should
be large enough to limit concerns about anti-competitive action on the
part of an ILEC after forbearance, but not so large as to effectively
delay forbearance beyond the point at which regulation is still
required. |
157. |
The Commission
also recognizes that aggregating local exchanges in an efficient and
effective manner for the purpose of the local forbearance framework may
require different approaches with respect to rural and urban areas.
Urban local exchanges, due to their higher concentration of population,
may be more easily grouped into aggregations of local exchanges with
common social, economic and market characteristics than rural local
exchanges which are more sparsely populated and which cover much larger
geographic areas. |
158. |
With respect to the
large urban core areas of Canada, the Commission considers that the best
approach to aggregating local exchanges is to aggregate all local
exchanges within a CMA, as defined by Statistics Canada. |
159. |
The Commission
considers that customers within a CMA will generally have common social
and economic interests. The Commission considers, for example, that the
local service providers will generally be the same throughout the CMA,
and common marketing and pricing strategies will generally be pursued by
those local service providers throughout the CMA. The Commission also
considers that a CMA is more stable and well defined than an LCA or a
competitor serving area and thus less subject to large changes in its
boundaries over short periods of time. |
160. |
The Commission
notes that aggregating urban local exchanges by CMA would result in
increased efficiency in regulation, as there are currently 33 CMAs in
Canada which cover over 65 percent of Canada's population. The
Commission considers that the CMAs also represent the areas that will
most likely experience the most rapid growth of local competition due to
their more concentrated populations and the presence of existing
competitor facilities in most, if not all, CMAs. |
161. |
The Commission
concludes that a CMA is large enough to limit concerns about
anti-competitive action on the part of an ILEC after forbearance, but
not so large as to effectively delay forbearance beyond the point at
which regulation is still required. |
162. |
The Commission
recognizes that some local exchanges at the outer edges of a CMA may
have portions both inside and outside the CMA. For ease of
administration, the Commission considers that the best approach to
address such overlapping local exchanges is to apply the same principle
the Commission uses in preparing its monitoring report, that is, those
local exchanges whose rate centres are inside the CMA boundaries will be
considered part of the CMA for the purpose of the local forbearance
framework, while those local exchanges that have rate centres outside of
the CMA boundaries will not be considered to be part of the CMA for the
purpose of the local forbearance framework. |
163. |
With respect to
the aggregation of those local exchanges that are outside of a CMA, the
Commission notes, as set out above, the greater difficulty in
aggregating local exchanges in more rural areas. The Commission
considers it necessary, therefore, to have a greater degree of
flexibility with respect to the geographic component of the relevant
market outside of CMAs in order to allow for recognition of the varying
social, economic and market conditions that will exist in different
parts of Canada. |
164. |
The Commission
does, however, wish to provide some guidance to parties on the
geographic component of the relevant market for those areas outside of
the CMA. This guidance, set out below, is based on the principles
outlined by the Commission above, namely that the geographic component
of a relevant market should reflect a social and economic community of
interest, where customers have common expectations of service and
pricing, should be administratively practical, competitively neutral,
and should have well-defined, stable boundaries. The Commission also
believes that any geographic component of a relevant market should
contain a sufficient number of customers to allow for sustainable
competition while not creating an overly large number of uncontested
customers. |
165. |
The Commission
considers that these principles can best be accommodated through the use
of another standard geographical classification used by Statistics
Canada. Specifically, the Commission considers that there is value in
using the economic region (ER) as a basis for aggregating local
exchanges outside of the CMAs for the purposes of the local forbearance
framework. The ER is a standard unit created by Statistics Canada to
have a geographic unit small enough to permit regional economic
analysis, yet large enough to include enough respondents that a broad
range of statistics can still be released. ERs may be economic,
administrative or development regions. Within the province of Quebec,
ERs are designated by provincial law; in all other provinces, ERs are
created by agreement between Statistics Canada and the provinces
concerned. |
166. |
The Commission
considers that the ER, or a combination of ERs, as the geographic
component of the relevant market outside of the CMAs, has several
advantages. Most ERs have a minimum population of 100,000, providing, in
the Commission's view, a sufficiently large population base to sustain
competition in the local exchange services market. In those cases where
an ER has a population below 100,000, the Commission may look to combine
ERs to achieve a population of 100,000 or greater. While an ER arguably
has a lesser social and economic community of interest than a CMA, the
Commission considers that the origin of the ER as a unit for measuring
regional economic activity, as well as the fact that its boundaries are
either defined by the provincial government (in the case of Quebec) or
as a result of negotiations involving the other provincial governments
(all other provinces) provides a measure of certainty that the ER does
reflect a level of economic and social integration across its geographic
area. The Commission also notes that ERs have the advantage of being
well-defined areas that are stable over time. There are currently 73 ERs
in the ten provinces across Canada thus allowing for an orderly and
efficient transition to a forborne environment by reducing the number of
local forbearance applications that will be required and thus also
reducing the associated regulatory and administrative burden. |
167. |
The Commission
considers therefore that as a guideline for areas outside of the CMAs,
ILECs should apply for relevant markets that include geographic
components composed of one or more ER(s) where the total population in
the geographic component is at a minimum 100,000. In Appendix A to this
Decision, the Commission has set out the geographic components for each
relevant market that meet this criterion as well as for each CMA. In
Appendix A, the Commission has adopted the latest criteria for defining
the CMAs and has also identified which local exchanges have been
assigned to each geographic component. The Commission notes that, for
ease of administration, where the boundaries of a CMA do not precisely
coincide with the boundaries of the ER in which the CMA is located, that
is, the ER is larger than the CMA and the population of the remainder of
the ER is less than 100,000, the Commission will consider the geographic
component of that relevant market to include the entire ER. Similarly,
where a CMA covers more than one ER, generally those portions of the ERs
which overlap with that CMA will be considered to be part of the same
relevant market. The Commission will, for the purpose of this framework,
refer to each such geographic component as a local forbearance region
(LFR). |
168. |
The Commission
reiterates, as set out above, that in the case of those areas outside of
the CMAs, it wishes to allow for a measure of flexibility to take into
account differing market and geographic conditions. To that end, while
the Commission has provided guidance on the LFRs outside of the CMAs, as
set out above, the Commission is willing to entertain applications for
local forbearance outside of a CMA, pursuant to the local forbearance
framework, which identify a different LFR from those set out by the
Commission in Appendix A. Where an applicant ILEC wishes to apply for a
different LFR than those set out in Appendix A, the Commission expects
that applicant ILEC to identify why its proposed LFR better achieves the
principles and objectives that the Commission has set out above in
coming to its conclusions on the appropriate LFRs. The applicant ILEC
should also address the impact of its proposal on adjacent LFRs. The
Commission also notes that to the extent that an applicant ILEC applies
for an LFR which contains a population below 100,000, a more in-depth
review of the economics of that particular proposed relevant market may
be required. The Commission also notes that while it expects the
boundaries of CMAs and ERs to change only gradually over time, it
expects that ILECs will base their applications for forbearance on the
CMA and ER boundaries which are in place at the time of their
application. |
|
V. Local forbearance criteria
|
|
Positions of parties |
169. |
Aliant Telecom
submitted that the criteria from Decision 94-19
were still relevant for assessing whether there was sufficient competition
for the Commission to forbear. Aliant Telecom submitted that
since many of the indicators of competition could be shown to exist
now in virtually all local exchanges in Canada, the Commission should
be able to establish a new process, as comprehensive as the Decision
94-19 framework that could produce
a decision much more quickly. Aliant Telecom suggested that the
Commission could reliably infer from observable data that competitive
conditions in a particular market were sufficiently competitive to
meet the standard of section 34 of the Act without repeating
the full analysis contemplated under Decision 94-19. |
170. |
Aliant Telecom
proposed a test that would use five percent actual ILEC loss of market
share in an exchange as a criterion for forbearance. Aliant Telecom
submitted that its proposed process would produce an expedited result
based on a clear objective test with the focus being an examination of
the market share of the ILEC in a particular local exchange or local
exchanges. Aliant Telecom submitted that its proposal was based on the
expedited process established by the Commission, under the
Broadcasting Act, to enable Class 1 cable systems to achieve
economic deregulation when pre-defined criteria are met. On the supply
side, Aliant Telecom submitted that, considering the competitive nature
of the local telephone market the supply availability component of the
criteria established for Class 1 cable systems, a competitive
alternative being available to 30 percent of households in an exchange
had already been achieved. Aliant Telecom submitted it had proposed a
more stringent demand side component of five percent loss of market
share in an exchange relative to the Class 1 cable system test, which
required that a cable provider no longer serve five percent of the
addresses it had previously served. |
171. |
Aliant Telecom
submitted that CLECs, cable LECs, and wireless providers have all made
substantial investments in extensive networks to supply customers with
alternatives to the ILECs' local wireline services. Aliant Telecom
submitted that with those networks in place and operating, there were no
significant barriers to expanding output to meet increased demand.
Aliant Telecom further submitted that VoIP providers faced low barriers
to entry and that over thirty had started offering service in Canada and
offered service in all major urban areas. Aliant Telecom proposed that
the Commission should, therefore, conclude that barriers to entry and
expansion were not a reason to continue to regulate the ILECs' local
exchange services. |
172. |
Bell Canada/Télébec,
supported by SaskTel, proposed what it suggested was an efficient
test for forbearance of local exchange services that took into
account the factors identified in Decision 94-19:
low barriers to entry, vigorous and aggressive rivalry by competitors,
technological innovation, customer awareness of competitive choices,
and the extent to which customers have exercised that choice. These
companies proposed, therefore, that the Commission should forbear
from regulating a service in any exchange where five percent
of the customers have opted for alternatives to the ILECs' regulated
local exchange services. In their view, the five percent represents
a milestone that enables one to see that customers are availing themselves
of competitive alternatives. |
173. |
Bell Canada/Télébec submitted that any loss of local share was in
addition to the evidence related to other competitive indicators – the
analysis of which sufficiently demonstrated that no service provider has
substantial market power. Bell Canada/Télébec argued that by limiting
the share calculation to the loss of connections, the metric did not
account for any usage substitution from other forms of communication,
such as cellular phones, instant messaging, text messaging, and email
and, therefore, understated the actual level of substitution taking
place. In addition, Bell Canada/Télébec argued that market share was a
static, backward-looking measure that underestimated the true level of
competition as it ignored the impact of new, strong competitors entering
the market, and the competition for the market as evidenced, for
example, by the presence of multiple bidders for business customer
contracts. Bell Canada/Télébec also argued that losing five percent
share of the local connections would imply that further share loss could
occur in the future; Bell Canada/Télébec submitted that this prospect of
continued share loss was sufficient to discipline the incumbent's
behaviour in the entire market where the loss occurred as there were
clearly one or more competitors with viable competitive offerings.
Bell Canada/Télébec further submitted that when competitors could
relatively easily expand to meet customer demand, even a small share
loss could discipline the incumbent. |
174. |
Bell Canada/Télébec, supported by SaskTel, submitted that a five percent
market share loss criterion by itself did not demonstrate a lack of
substantial market power. Bell Canada/Télébec argued that the lack of
substantial market power was demonstrated by the evidence of rivalrous
behaviour and wide-spread entry, the availability of low cost technology
to entrants and the lack of significant barriers to entry.
Bell Canada/Télébec submitted that the proposed five percent criterion
simply demonstrated that customers were attracted to competitive
alternatives and were purchasing them. Bell Canada/Télébec submitted
that if it were proposing a market share test for the purposes of
measuring market power, measuring shares on the basis of capacity, the
ability to provide service, would be more relevant. Bell Canada/Télébec
submitted that in those areas where cable LECs have configured their
networks to provide telephony services, the ILEC market share, measured
on the basis of capacity, was less than 50 percent. |
175. |
Bell Canada/Télébec and SaskTel submitted that evidence of the ease of
entry and supply expansion should be considered the key indicators that
a market was sufficiently competitive and hence should be forborne.
Bell Canada/Télébec and SaskTel submitted that the focus of an
assessment of barriers to entry involved determining the time it would
take for a potential entrant to become an effective competitor in the
relevant market in response to a material price increase.
Bell Canada/Télébec and SaskTel suggested that the evidence in this
proceeding demonstrated that competition in the local exchange services
markets in Ontario and Quebec was rapidly taking hold.
Bell Canada/Télébec and SaskTel also concluded that the introduction of
VoIP services was allowing for a new era of technology-based
alternatives, in contrast to the initial CLECs that offered services
using traditional telecommunications network solutions. |
176. |
Bell Canada/Télébec
and SaskTel submitted that, for purposes of calculating share loss in
residential markets, the Commission should examine the total number of
local connections, which should include, at a minimum, all local
connections provided by ILECs, CLECs, cable LECs, access independent
VoIP providers, and resellers, as well as the total number of
wireless-only households. |
177. |
Bell Canada/Télébec and SaskTel submitted that, for purposes of
calculating share loss in business markets, the Commission should
determine the number of local connections for each of the service
markets it had identified: business primary local services, Centrex
services and digital trunk services. Bell Canada/Télébec and SaskTel
submitted that the Commission should, at a minimum, include the
connections provided by ILECs, CLECs, cable LECs, access independent
VoIP providers, municipal electric utilities, and resellers, including
systems integrators. |
178. |
Bell Canada/Télébec also submitted that it had demonstrated that
barriers to entry in the local telecommunications market were low.
Bell Canada/Télébec argued that its submissions in this proceeding
provided evidence that demonstrated that there was facilities-based
competition on a broad scale with capacity commensurate to that of the
ILECs; that competitive rivalry was vigorous; that innovation and
technological change were evident in markets with new entrants
employing, in different ways, new IP technologies; that cable
competitors already had relationships with millions of customers and
offer a suite of communications services; and that customers were aware
of the competitive alternatives available to them. |
179. |
Bell Canada/Télébec
and SaskTel submitted that market shares, by themselves, were often
misleading indicators of market power in that they were backward-,
rather than forward-, looking and accordingly should be used cautiously.
Bell Canada/Télébec and SaskTel further submitted that while market
power required high market share, high market share alone did not
necessarily indicate market power. |
180. |
Bell Canada/Télébec and SaskTel submitted that while market share had
the advantage of being quantifiable, indicating that competitive
alternatives were available and providing evidence that customers were
willing to try alternative suppliers, with respect to establishing a
framework for local forbearance, the utility of market share was
limited. Bell Canada/Télébec and SaskTel argued that markets shares
often did not reflect the level of competition for the market. |
181. |
TCI proposed a
bright-line test, whereby in any geographic area in which the following
criteria were met, the Commission should determine that provision of
local exchange service was sufficiently competitive for the purposes of
forbearance under subsection 34(2) of the Act: |
|
Residential |
|
- A full facilities-based CLEC offering residential local exchange
service throughout its serving area; and
|
|
- That full facilities-based CLEC has five percent of the total
residential network access lines (NALs) and NAL-equivalents in its
serving area.
|
|
Business |
|
- A full facilities-based CLEC offering business local exchange
service throughout its serving area; and
|
|
- That full facilities-based CLEC has five percent of the total
business NALs and NAL-equivalents in its serving area.
|
182. |
TCI submitted the
rationale behind the first element was that facilities-based entry was
both the most effective method of eliminating any remaining ILEC market
power and the most likely to be lasting. TCI further submitted that full
facilities-based entry was the most stringent standard for competitive
entry and provided added assurance of the sustainability of competition
within the area served by the full facilities-based CLEC in question. |
183. |
TCI submitted that
the second element had its inspiration in the Commission's bright-line
test for cable television basic rate de-regulation. TCI submitted the
requirement that a full facilities-based CLEC have five percent of the
total number of residential or business NALs and NAL-equivalents in its
serving area was intended to demonstrate that users had access to a
viable commercial alternative and were adopting it, not that the ILEC
had lost a certain predetermined market share. |
184. |
TCI submitted that
with the entry of a cable LEC or any other full facilities-based CLEC
offering a wide variety of services over a single network, the ILEC lost
any market power it may have had. TCI submitted that in such a case,
market share was not relevant to the assessment of market power. TCI
noted that this was the context and justification for its two facilities
bright-line test. |
185. |
TCI submitted that
for access independent VoIP providers, the barriers to entry and limits
to supply side expansion were almost non-existent. TCI suggested that
the Commission had recognized this in Decision 2005-28
and that the current count of over 20 such competitors demonstrated
this. TCI further submitted that the availability of VoIP technology,
which facilitates inexpensive entry as a local service provider, combined
with the widespread adoption of HSIA services, rendered barriers to
entry in local exchange services markets almost non-existent. TCI
submitted that this limited the market power, irrespective of market
share, of the incumbent telephone company. |
186. |
MTS Allstream
submitted that the criteria for forbearance established in Decision
94-19 were specifically intended
to be applied to the telecommunications market, and for this reason,
were the appropriate criteria to use when determining if a particular
ILEC's local voice services market was sufficiently competitive to
forbear from regulation. |
187. |
MTS Allstream
argued that forbearance in the local exchange services market was
not appropriate at this time and should not be granted until all of
the forbearance criteria set out in Decision 94-19
had been met. |
188. |
MTS Allstream
submitted that the ILECs enjoy enormous advantages as a result of their
incumbency arising from their former monopoly position in the market,
for example, customer inertia, economies of scale and density, and the
ubiquity of their local access network. As well, in MTS Allstream's
view, there were several other significant technical, regulatory and
legislative barriers to entry in the local market which should be
largely eliminated before the Commission forbears. MTS Allstream
submitted that these included, but were not necessarily limited to, the
following: |
|
- unbundling of essential and near essential facilities to provide
circuit switched as well as Internet protocol (IP)-based local access
and transport services;
|
|
- elimination of contractual and technical barriers to migrate
Centrex local lines from an ILEC to a competitor;
|
|
- elimination of ILEC tariffs with long-term contracts and automatic
renewal;
|
|
- Category I Competitor Services pricing which reflects actual costs
to the ILECs;
|
|
- resolution of issues and successful implementation of competitor
access to ILEC remotes to permit competitors to provide voice services
to customers served by remotes;
|
|
- meeting competitor quality of service (Q of S) standards, to
ensure that the ILECs do not use their control over facilities to
delay delivery of essential and near essential services to
competitors;
|
|
- competitor access to the ILEC's operational support systems (OSS),
to provide CLECs with an equal opportunity to compete with the ILECs
for local customers;
|
|
- full disclosure by the ILECs of all written and unwritten access
agreements with multi-dwelling unit (MDU) owners;
|
|
- open ILEC-managed Internet platforms to competitors to allow
customers more flexibility in supplier choice;
|
|
- access to third-party infrastructures including municipal and
public lands, utility support structures, and commercial and
residential MDUs for new entrants to effectively roll out their
networks;
|
|
- resolution of issues related to local service inter-working for
ILECs' Centrex and managed IP voice services; and
|
|
- all issues related to implementation of Decision 2004-46
and Decision 2005-28 resolved
and Decision 2004-46 successfully
implemented.
|
189. |
MTS Allstream
further argued that any ILEC seeking forbearance in the local services
market should demonstrate that it has fully complied with all of the
Commission's rules related to competition in the local services market
and that there were no outstanding regulatory compliance proceedings or
issues relating to its conduct in the market. |
190. |
MTS Allstream
proposed that any ILEC seeking forbearance for its local service must
have met all competitor Q of S indicators for a consecutive 12-month
period prior to applying for forbearance. MTS Allstream submitted that
the ILECs' failure to meet competitor Q of S indicators had seriously
prejudiced the ability of competitors to deliver and provide local
telephony and other services to their customers in a timely and
predictable fashion. MTS Allstream submitted that this placed
competitors at a significant disadvantage relative to the incumbents in
the provision of local services. MTS Allstream submitted that the only
way to keep suppliers of underlying access and transport facilities from
using their control over those facilities to alter the competitive
context in their favour in a post-forbearance environment would be to
ensure that the ILECs were consistently meeting the competitor Q of S
indicators that had been established by the Commission. |
191. |
MTS Allstream
submitted that the analysis set out in Decision 94-19
had been employed by the Commission in reaching numerous other forbearance
determinations with more facility than the forbearance determinations
of most other regulators in the world. MTS Allstream submitted
that to now adopt alternative forbearance frameworks depending on
the entrant in question would be administratively costly and confusing
to all parties involved. |
192. |
MTS Allstream
argued that in the absence of a full evaluation of the local services
market, it would be entirely inappropriate to replace the Commission's
established forbearance criteria with an automated, bright-line market
share-based forbearance mechanism. |
193. |
MTS Allstream
argued that while it was of the view that market share-based forbearance
triggers or pre-conditions were inappropriate, it was critical that any
such thresholds that might be considered reflected a proper balance
between the ILECs' overall local market position and the scope of the
adopted relevant market definition. |
194. |
MTS Allstream
submitted that when it came to measuring market share there were already
measures of local market share based on revenues and on lines in the
Annual Monitoring Report and there was no need to modify these measures
or the frequency at which they are calculated. |
195. |
The CCTA, supported
by Rogers and Cogeco, submitted that the Commission should rely on a
two-part test, employing both objective and subjective elements: |
|
- The first part of the test would be a finding that a minimum
30 percent share of the relevant market was not served by the ILEC.
This threshold reflected CCTA's proposed definition of the relevant
market. The market share would serve as a necessary, but not
sufficient basis for forbearance, and would provide an objective basis
for proceeding to the second part of the test.
|
|
- The second part would rely on evidence that competitive
alternatives exist in the relevant geographic market on a pervasive
and sustained basis.
|
196. |
The CCTA,
supported by Rogers and Cogeco, submitted that in proposing a threshold
of 30 percent market share not served by the ILEC, it considered past
determinations by the Commission as well as the approach taken by
competition authorities in Canada and internationally. The CCTA,
supported by Rogers and Cogeco, submitted that in the case of the
Commission, it has previously found a market to be workably competitive
where the ILEC did not hold more than 70 percent market share, as in the
case of toll forbearance. |
197. |
The CCTA,
supported by Rogers and Cogeco, submitted that an approach to measuring
market share in the residential local exchange market was to consider
the proportion of the total number of households within a geographic
market that are served by the ILEC. The CCTA, supported by Rogers and
Cogeco, submitted that fewer than two percent of all households did not
subscribe to residential local exchange service and that all households
can be served by the ILEC. In their view, it should follow that
measuring market share on this basis would accurately reflect
the percentage of the market served and not served by the ILEC. The
CCTA, supported by Rogers and Cogeco, argued that another factor in
favour of this approach was that it would reflect households that were
not served by the ILEC because customers have decided to rely solely on
a VoIP reseller's service or a wireless service. The CCTA, supported by
Rogers and Cogeco, further submitted that calculating market share using
this approach could be derived using information just from the ILEC, so
the method was less sensitive to over or underreporting of lines served
by competitors. |
198. |
The CCTA, supported
by Cogeco, EastLink, Rogers and Shaw, proposed that a consideration
of the status of barriers to entry would form an essential part of the
second part of CCTA's proposed two-part forbearance test. The CCTA
submitted that the persistence of these barriers would prevent the
competitive marketplace from functioning in a manner consistent with the
intent of section 34 of the Act. |
199. |
Rogers and Call-Net
submitted that the Commission should ensure that the following issues
were resolved prior to forbearing from the regulation of any of the
ILECs' local exchange services: |
|
- full implementation of OSS access;
|
|
- full implementation and enforcement of Q of S for Competitor
Services, that is, ensuring that the ILECs meet the standards set;
|
|
- full implementation of asymmetric digital subscriber line (ADSL)
unbundling from retail local service by all ILECs;
|
|
- access to the transmission path from ILEC remotes to support
competitive provision of voice, video and data services to end users;
and
|
|
- full compliance by all ILECs with their obligations to file
tariffs for all local access and transport facilities and services
capable of supporting voice, video and data services, such as Ethernet
and ADSL facilities and next generation transport services.
|
200. |
Shaw submitted that
the Commission should use the approach originally developed in Decision 94-19,
which, in its view, was consistent with competition policy literature
and jurisprudence. Shaw also submitted that the Commission should
consider additional demand conditions, supply conditions and barriers
to entry. Shaw submitted that demand conditions considerations should
include an assessment of customers' willingness to switch local providers.
Shaw submitted that the Commission should also take note of the specific
supply conditions and barriers to entry that exist for local competition.
|
201. |
Shaw recommended
that an application for local telephone service forbearance be
automatically rejected unless the ILEC can show the following: |
|
- conclusive evidence that customers were no longer reluctant to
change local service providers when offered lower prices from
competitors;
|
|
- conclusive evidence that competitors had access to support
structures on terms that were at least as favourable as the terms the
ILECs enjoy and demonstration that delays, onerous and unnecessary
requirements and additional costs of accessing the ILECs' support
structure were eliminated;
|
|
- conclusive evidence that problems with access to rights-of-way and
access to buildings no longer existed and that the ILEC proposing the
forbearance of local exchange service did not have an advantage or
receive any preference, not available to CLECs, with respect to any of
these forms of access; and
|
|
- it had fulfilled its competitor Q of S obligations, and had
consistently done so for a period of 24 months, for services needed by
CLECs to provide local exchange services.
|
202. |
Shaw also
recommended that the Commission make a full assessment of the sunk costs
and time to entry, which in its view, act as a barrier to entry and can
make competition in the market unsustainable. |
203. |
Shaw submitted
that although a high market share was not a sufficient condition for
market power, it was an important indicator that market power might
exist. Shaw submitted that with market shares approaching 100 percent,
it was difficult to conclude that the ILECs did not have market power.
Moreover, Shaw also submitted that market share was now more significant
when considered in the context of the lower prices offered by
competitors. |
204. |
QMI submitted that
ILEC market share would clearly play a key, but not an exclusive, role
in any set of criteria for approving local forbearance. QMI submitted
that market share was a particularly powerful indicator in the present
circumstances. QMI submitted that the local exchange telephony market
was one characterized by effective saturation and substantial customer
inertia, due in large part to the essential nature of the service
itself. QMI noted that as a result, new entrants did not have any
meaningful scope for establishing themselves via a "grow the market"
strategy, as was the case in the television distribution market, the
Internet access market and the wireless market. QMI further noted that
except for a marginal degree of second line activity, new entrants must
establish themselves by winning customers away from the entrenched
incumbent. QMI submitted that in these circumstances, it was entirely
reasonable for the Commission to afford particular attention to
incumbent market share loss as a core criterion, indeed a gating
criterion, for forbearance. |
205. |
QMI recommended
that when an ILEC fell below 80 percent market share across its entire
operating territory the Commission should agree to consider an ILEC
application for local forbearance. QMI suggested that it was only at
this level of competitor penetration that the ILEC's ability to target
competitors' customers would be diluted sufficiently to afford
competitors a reasonable chance to survive in the local marketplace. |
206. |
QMI recommended
that the Commission adopt, for the purpose of assessing the local
residential market, a definition of ILEC market share equal to the
number of households purchasing local exchange services from the ILEC at
a specific date divided by the total number of households purchasing
local exchange services in the ILEC's operating territory. |
207. |
QMI submitted that
once an ILEC had filed market share data demonstrating that it had
passed this market share loss threshold for proceeding with a
qualitative local forbearance analysis, as validated by the Commission,
then the ILEC should be called upon to file evidence on the broader
supply and demand considerations necessary to conclude that forbearance
was factually warranted. QMI submitted that the list of considerations
should include, but not necessarily be limited to the following: |
|
- the number and type of competitors (facilities-based and
non-facilities-based);
|
|
- evidence of rivalrous behaviour in pricing and service
differentiation;
|
|
- evidence of the substitutability of allegedly competing services,
including an assessment of 9-1-1 service equivalency and the
availability of message relay service (MRS) and privacy features;
|
|
- the existence of fair and rational interconnection arrangements
(both circuit-switched and IP-based) between incumbents and new
entrants, with characteristics that one would expect to be arrived at
through free negotiations between parties of equal bargaining power;
and
|
|
- the ability of competitors to secure access to municipal
rights-of-way and multi-tenant buildings, whether residential or
commercial.
|
208. |
EastLink proposed
that the forbearance test should be a two-stage test, with the first
stage being an objective assessment of the incumbent market share loss,
measured by lost households and the second stage being an assessment of
subjective factors related to the market power of the incumbent and the
sustainability of the competition. EastLink submitted that in the first
stage, 30 percent loss of market share by the incumbent in its proposed
relevant market was a reasonable threshold to apply to initiate the
forbearance analysis. EastLink submitted that market share would not
assist in determining market power of a firm if competition did not
exist sufficiently throughout the geographic market. EastLink proposed
that the second stage of the test requires an analysis of whether
competitive alternatives exist on a pervasive and sustained basis. |
209. |
EastLink submitted
that, if the ILECs had more than 70 percent of the market then they
clearly had sufficient market power to impede or unduly impair the
establishment or continuance of a competitive marketplace. Further,
EastLink submitted that there would be no harm to the ILECs as a result
of waiting until they had lost a certain percent of the market before
performing the forbearance analysis. In EastLink's view, the ILECs have
sufficient flexibility today to compete and with 70 percent or more of
the market they would have the scope and scale to leverage market power
against entrants. |
210. |
EastLink
submitted, in addition, that part of the criteria for forbearance should
include a grace period – a period of time to recognize the need for the
competitor to recover some of its initial investment. EastLink submitted
that a major element of the viability and sustainability of a competitor
was the recovery of the investment made by that competitor. EastLink
submitted that the importance the Commission had placed on
facilities-based entry clearly indicated that viable competition must
take into consideration the reasonable investment environment and noted
that its investment was based on that understanding. EastLink submitted
that competitors, such as itself, that have made larger investments,
should have a longer period of time to recover that investment. With
regard to the timeframe for such a grace period, EastLink submitted that
the appropriate time period must be established on a case-by-case basis. |
211. |
EastLink submitted
that the calculation of its proposed threshold be based on the number of
households the ILEC lost. EastLink suggested that this approach to
calculating the loss seemed to be the most efficient and practical route
as it provided an avenue for minimal evidence to be submitted, by ILECs
only, and it counted actual households lost, so there was little risk
that the loss of second lines would also be counted. |
212. |
The Competition
Bureau noted that, as the Commission observed in Decision 94-19,
significant market share was a necessary, but not sufficient, condition
to find market power. The Competition Bureau submitted that a significant
market share indicated that consideration of additional factors was
required to assess the potential for market power. The Competition
Bureau submitted that one such factor, and a necessary condition for
the exercise of market power, was the existence of barriers to entry. |
213. |
The Competition
Bureau proposed that the Commission should adopt a structured rule of
reason (SROR) approach that could serve as the basis for streamlined
analysis of ILEC requests for local exchange service forbearance, once
the relevant product market had been identified. In the Competition
Bureau's view, this approach used the following set of conditions that,
if satisfied, should be sufficient for the Commission to conclude that
an ILEC did not possess market power in the provision of local exchange
services: |
|
- At least two independent facilities-based service providers must
exist, the ILEC and a facilities-based entrant, capable of offering
local service that has been determined to fall within the relevant
product market for ILEC local service;
|
|
- The entrant was able to obtain and retain a customer base;
|
|
- The entrant's variable costs of providing local service are
similar to or lower than the ILEC's variable costs of providing local
service;
|
|
- Neither the ILEC nor the entrant was capacity-constrained;
|
|
- There was evidence of vigorous rivalry between the ILEC and the
entrant in the provision of local service; and
|
|
- Industry characteristics are such that the ILECs are unlikely to
engage in anti-competitive behaviour.
|
214. |
The Competition
Bureau submitted that competition between two or more independent
facilities-based service providers was likely to be effective when most
of the costs of providing service are fixed and sunk. In the Competition
Bureau's view, if the marginal cost of using capacity was relatively
small and capacity was plentiful then competition between
facilities-based service providers was likely to be effective. In the
Competition Bureau's view, an assessment of a competitor's variable
costs of providing local service was, therefore, a necessary part of its
SROR test to determine whether or not an incumbent has market power. |
215. |
The Coalition submitted
that it supported the Commission's expressed intent to establish clear
criteria for local forbearance consistent with the framework set out
in Decision 94-19. The Coalition
suggested that the Commission should consider and adapt certain existing
forbearance models that have already proven to operate well and which
can serve as useful precedents. In this regard, the Coalition proposed
the Commission use either the model developed for deregulation of
the basic service rates for Class 1 incumbent cable television licensees
or the model developed for forbearance of interexchange private line
services. |
216. |
The Coalition
submitted that in the market for business local exchange services, the
Commission should adopt the following criteria for forbearance: |
|
- evidence of the existence of two or more providers offering
business local exchange services in an LCA; and
|
|
- evidence of the loss of market share of five percent or more by
the ILEC in the LCA. Such a loss would be measured from the time of
entry of the alternate service provider(s).
|
217. |
Vonage submitted
that market share could not be easily separated from other criteria for
determining an ILEC's market power. Vonage submitted that when the ILEC
retained a high level of market share, the Commission could take no real
comfort from other indicia that might suggest competition was rivalrous.
Vonage submitted that this was particularly so in the market for local
telephone services, where there are not only significant barriers to
entry form the perspective of the supply conditions but also a history
of an entrenched monopoly, ubiquitous network and customer inertia. |
218. |
Vonage argued that
in order to conclude that the ILECs no longer wielded substantial market
power such that competition was sufficient to protect the interests of
users, the Commission must be confident that the competitors' market
share gains were real, non transitory, and sustainable. Vonage submitted
that it was critical that the Commission resist the ILECs' urging to
deregulate their service on the mere promise, or even modest early
results, of this competition. |
219. |
Xit telecom
submitted that there was no single bright line test, whether set at five
or 30 percent which could prove that the level of competition had
attained a level that was both necessary and sufficient so as to ensure
that the public interest would be served by forbearance. |
220. |
Xit telecom
submitted that new facilities-based entrants, such as itself, intended
to enter the local telephone market once the terms and conditions of
interconnection had transitioned to IP such as to make entry
economically feasible and sustainable on a prospective basis.
Xit telecom submitted that squashing the ability of ILECs to force cost
prohibitive interconnection with all-IP CLECs was one of the most
important criteria of forbearance. |
221. |
The UTC submitted
that it might be difficult to develop a simple set of principles to
identify market power in a specific market; however, a short cut or
bright-line test might provide guidance in clear-cut cases. |
222. |
The UTC submitted
that market share was a good indicator of whether a market was
competitive. The UTC submitted that market share provides cogent
evidence of actual competitive entry into a market, of the
substitutability of the competitor's services for the incumbent's
services, and the ability of new entrants to gain a foothold in the
market. The UTC further suggested that market share was often used by
competition authorities as prima facie evidence of market power.
The UTC cited the Competition Bureau's Merger Enforcement Guidelines
where a 35 percent market share was used to identify mergers that
are unlikely to have anti-competitive circumstances. |
223. |
The UTC submitted
that it would be consistent with Canadian and European Community
competition law to use market share evidence as a bright-line test for
forbearance. The UTC submitted that, pursuant to the Canadian and
European practice, a market share of less than 35 percent would justify
forbearance on a bright-line test and a higher market share would
require a complete competition analysis. |
224. |
In Cybersurf's view,
there was no substitute for a solid market analysis along the lines
of a Decision 94-19 analysis in
order to avoid premature forbearance. Cybersurf submitted that unless
competitors of an ILEC in a relevant local exchange service market
hold at least a 35 percent market share, the ILEC should generally
not qualify for forbearance in that market. Cybersurf further submitted
that this was not the end of the analysis and that even if competitors
hold a market share equal to or greater than 35 percent in a
relevant market, an assessment of related demand and supply conditions
was also required before a determination regarding forbearance should
be made. |
225. |
Cybersurf suggested
that prior to forbearance, among other things, the following steps
must be taken: |
|
- The ILECs must fully unbundle and tariff all of the underlying
facilities and services used to provision ILEC local exchange
services, including those used by the ILECs to provision IP-based
local telephony services such as managed voice services;
|
|
- The issue of competitor access to ILEC remotes must be resolved,
fully tested and implemented;
|
|
- ILECs must fully meet all competitor Q of S indicators;
|
|
- Competitor access to ILEC OSS must be fully tested and
implemented;
|
|
- ILECs must fully comply with MDU rules;
|
|
- All issues related to local service interworking (including
interworking relating to Centrex and IP-based local telephony services
such as managed voice services) must be resolved;
|
|
- ILECs must demonstrate that all of their customer contracts for
Centrex service, including all customer specific arrangements and
Special Facility Tariffs that include Centrex-based services, have
been amended so as to include transition provisions that allow
end-user customers to migrate to the service platform of a competitor
without penalty and within a reasonable period of time; and
|
|
- Any facility or service that was in the nature of an essential,
near essential or bottleneck facility and/or service and that was used
to provision a retail telecommunications service (whether wireline,
VoIP, etc.) should be unbundled and made available through a
Commission-approved tariff prior to the offering of the retail service
in question.
|
226. |
Primus submitted
that the Commission's efforts to develop the appropriate criteria
for forbearance should focus on determining whether the ILECs have
market power, as set out in Decision 94-19.
Primus submitted that the Commission must also consider other factors
which, in its view, must be present to ensure that forbearance will
not impair the continuance of a competitive market after the decision
to forbear has been made. Primus submitted that, among other things,
a workable wholesale access regime, governed by tariffs approved by
the Commission, must be present before forbearance. |
227. |
In addition, Primus
proposed that from its perspective as a reseller, the following entry
barriers must be removed before the Commission should grant the ILECs
any kind of forbearance in the local telecommunications market as they
would facilitate the entry of the greatest number of competitors in the
local market: |
|
- full unbundling of essential and near essential facilities by both
the ILECs and the cable LECs;
|
|
- Competitor Category I Service rates for all ILEC and cable LEC
services in the nature of an essential service;
|
|
- changes to ILEC Centrex contracts to facilitate switching service
to a competitor;
|
|
- access to ILEC remotes; and
|
|
- ILEC compliance with local competition rules.
|
228. |
Primus submitted
that the Commission should base any evaluation of market share on the
number of local lines, or equivalents, served by the dominant service
providers. Primus submitted that other measurements, for example,
revenues or customer base, could have the potential to skew the results
of such tracking, depending on how these terms were defined, and might
not accurately represent the extent of the dominant supplier's market
power. Primus further submitted that local lines, or their equivalents,
were an objective measure by which to gauge market share. |
229. |
FCI/Yak proposed
the following: |
|
- The market was not workably competitive and forbearance was not
appropriate if an ILEC had a market share of 70 percent or greater and
a price premium of five percent or greater;
|
|
- Forbearance would not be appropriate if there was fewer than three
facilities-based competitors, including the ILEC, providing service in
the market;
|
|
- When an ILEC requests forbearance and has less than a 70 percent
market share or the price differential was five percent or less, the
ILEC must demonstrate that there was a steadily increasing competitor
market share. In particular, the ILEC must be able to show that
competitors' market share, in the relevant market, has increased by
five percent or more, in each of the previous 2 years;
|
|
- The ILEC must demonstrate it had met or exceeded all of the
competitor Q of S indicators;
|
|
- The Commission should reject an ILEC forbearance application if it
had made a determination, within the previous 12 months of receiving
the application, that the ILEC had engaged in anti-competitive
behaviour or had violated any of the Commission's competition
safeguards, including the winback and promotions restrictions and
tariff obligations;
|
|
- The ILEC must demonstrate that access to MDUs, rights-of-way and
support structures were available to local service providers on terms
and conditions equal to or better than the terms and conditions
available to the ILEC; and
|
|
- The Commission should assess the time to entry and sunk costs
confronted by CLECs, when considering any application for local
exchange service forbearance. This should include an opportunity for
potential and existing competitors to identify and explain the nature
and extent of these barriers to entry.
|
230. |
FCI/Yak submitted
that market share was a key indicator of the ILECs' size and dominance.
FCI/Yak suggested that, while other factors should be considered, a
market share equal to or in excess of 93 percent was a strong, if not
compelling, indicator of market power and that it was only in theory
that a company with overwhelming dominance and market share verging on
100 percent could also have little or no market power. |
231. |
Call-Net submitted
that the criteria for determining whether or not an ILEC exercises
market power with respect to local exchange services in its operating
territory were easy to list but difficult to apply. In Call-Net's view,
while market share alone was not determinative, it was clear that a high
market share combined with the existence of significant barriers to
entry such as bottleneck facilities, sunk costs, customer inertia and
limited market growth found in the local exchange services market
currently precluded a finding that an ILEC did not exercise market
power. Call-Net also submitted that markets with two competitors were
usually not as competitive as markets with three or more competitors.
Call-Net submitted that the risk of the exercise of market power due to
coordinated effects was increased as the number of competitors declined.
Call-Net submitted that the fewer the market participants, the easier it
was to reach an understanding and monitor compliance. |
232. |
Call-Net proposed
that as a pre-condition to forbearance, competitors be able to obtain
access to underlying access and transport services at appropriate rates.
Call-Net further proposed that the Commission cannot forbear unless
competitors have access, on non-discriminatory terms and conditions, to
all essential facilities that they must acquire from the ILECs. |
233. |
The Consumer
Groups submitted that in general, it would appear necessary to have at
least five competitors active in a market in order to assure robust,
effective competition. However, if any one competitor has more than
50 percent market share, the Consumer Groups suggested that that
competitor may be dominant and, therefore, additional factors would need
to be considered. The Consumer Groups proposed that a lower threshold
for the number of competitors seemed justified, provided that
forbearance was granted on a conditional basis that incorporated
safeguards and a mechanism to monitor and, if necessary, to terminate
forbearance. |
234. |
The Consumer
Groups proposed that it would be reasonable to consider forbearance in a
local exchange market if there were at least three service providers in
the market, each with a market share of five percent or greater, and the
ILEC's market share had fallen below 70 percent for at least 12
consecutive months. The Consumers Groups submitted that if the ILEC's
market share were to drop below 70 percent for at least 12 months, then
competitors would appear to be building a sustainable presence in the
market and this, in turn, would suggest that competition should continue
to evolve and consumers should benefit from both price competition and
service innovation over the long run. |
235. |
The Consumer
Groups submitted that, in some markets, a third facilities-based
competitor might not enter the market for some time, if ever. The
Consumer Groups submitted that if a situation were to develop where an
ILEC had lost significant market share – 30 percent or greater – in a
market where there were only two facilities-based suppliers, it would
not be unreasonable for the Commission to examine whether a
non-facilities-based competitor with five percent or more market share
would be able to constrain duopolistic behaviour. The Consumer Groups
proposed that this would require a detailed examination of factors such
as evidence of rivalrous behaviour, competitor churn rates, and
especially the opportunity for margin squeezing, the diminishment of
operational efficiency and comparable issues arising from the dependence
of the third competitor on the facilities and services of one of the
network operators. |
236. |
The Consumer
Groups emphasized that their proposed thresholds did not purport to
indicate that an ILEC would no longer have market power. The Consumer
Groups' submitted that the existence of significant barriers to entry,
together with considerable market fragmentation, strongly suggested that
an ILEC with a much lower market share would still enjoy some market
power. The Consumer Groups suggested, however, that it would be
reasonable for the Commission to forbear, in part and conditionally at
their proposed relatively high market share level in order to permit
consumers to enjoy the benefits of enhanced competition. |
|
Commission's analysis and determinations
|
237. |
Under the Decision
94-19 approach to forbearance, the
Commission considers that a market is not sufficiently competitive
if a firm possesses substantial market power. Market power may be
assessed by examining three factors: market share, demand conditions
that affect responses of customers to a change in price for a product
or service, and supply conditions that affect the ability of competitors
in the market to respond to a change in the price of a product or
service. The Commission noted, in Decision 94-19,
that high market share is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition
for market power; other factors must be present to enable a firm with
market power to act anti-competitively. |
238. |
In Decision 94-19,
the Commission considered that evidence of rivalrous behaviour was
also important with respect to assessing the degree to which a market
may be workably competitive. Evidence of rivalrous behaviour may include
falling prices, vigorous and aggressive marketing activities, or an
expanding scope of competitor activities in terms of products, services
or geographic boundaries. The Commission also considered that the
nature of innovation and technological change in the relevant market
may also be a useful indicator. Industries characterized by rapid
innovation in products, processes and technology tend to experience
greater price movements and new entry, thereby making it difficult
to exercise market power. |
239. |
As set out above,
the Commission, as part of the local forbearance framework established
in this Decision, has created a set of criteria that it is satisfied
will enable it to determine whether forbearing in a particular relevant
market would be consistent with the requirements of section 34 of
the Act, and hence whether forbearance should be granted, to the degree
set out in this Decision, in that relevant market. |
240. |
Outside of a
consideration of applicant ILEC market share, in establishing these
criteria, the Commission has focused on matters that are either
exclusively or primarily within the control of an applicant ILEC. The
Commission notes that several parties suggested criteria which are
mostly outside of the control of an applicant ILEC, such as ensuring
access to municipal rights-of-way, third-party support structures and
MDUs. The Commission considers that it would not be appropriate to make
such matters criteria for local forbearance. The Commission considers
that it would be unfair to an applicant ILEC for the Commission to
withhold granting local forbearance due to a matter over which the
applicant ILEC has little or no control. The Commission is also
concerned that withholding local forbearance under such circumstances
would increase the risk of delaying local forbearance in a relevant
market longer than necessary without substantially increasing support
for sustainable competition. The Commission also believes that matters
such as access to municipal rights-of-way, third-party support
structures and MDUs are matters of common telecommunications industry
concern and should be dealt with jointly by all Canadian carriers, and
not merely the ILECs. |
241. |
The Commission has
also not adopted the suggestions put forward by some parties for a grace
period to allow competitors to recover sunk costs prior to local
forbearance, nor has it adopted the suggestion that it should analyse
the variable costs as between competitors and an applicant ILEC in a
relevant market. The Commission is charged, under the Act, to, among
other policy objectives, foster increased reliance on market forces for
the provision of telecommunications services and to ensure that
regulation, where required, is efficient and effective. In the
Commission's view, it would run counter to this duty under the Act to
provide regulatory protection to competitors beyond the point at which
an applicant ILEC can exercise market power in a relevant market. The
Commission, equally, should not put itself into the position of
second-guessing or micromanaging the business plan of competitors by
reviewing their variable costs and comparing those variable costs to the
variable costs of an applicant ILEC. If an applicant ILEC can
demonstrate that it no longer can exercise market power in a particular
relevant market then the Commission considers that market forces should
be permitted to operate in that relevant market, within the scope of the
framework set out in this Decision, and it is incumbent on competitors
to adapt to that market reality. |
242. |
The Commission
considers that an applicant ILEC can demonstrate to the Commission's
satisfaction that it no longer can exercise market power in a particular
relevant market when that applicant ILEC can demonstrate that it has met
all of the following criteria: |
|
a) The ILEC has suffered a 25 percent market share loss in the
relevant market for which forbearance is sought (market share loss);
|
|
b) The ILEC has, for the six months prior to the application, met
individual standards for each of the 14 specified competitor Q of S
indicators of the rate rebate plan (RRP) for competitors, when the
results are averaged across the six-month period (competitor Q of S);
|
|
c) The ILEC has put in place the necessary Competitor Services
tariffs. In the case of an application for forbearance from regulation
of residential local exchange services, the ILEC has an approved
Competitor Services tariff for bundled ADSL available over loops not
used for primary exchange service (dry loops) as well as in
conjunction with PES, and in the case of an application for
forbearance from regulation of business local exchange services, the
ILEC has an approved Competitor Service tariff for bundled ADSL
available both over dry loops and in conjunction with PES as well as
approved competitor Ethernet access service and transport service
tariffs (Competitor Services tariffs);
|
|
d) Where the Commission has required it, the ILEC has implemented
competitor access to its OSS in accordance with Competitive local
exchange carrier access to incumbent local exchange carrier operational
support systems, Telecom Decision CRTC 2005-14,
16 March 2005 (Decision 2005-14)
(Access to OSS); and
|
|
e) The ILEC has demonstrated to the Commission's satisfaction that
rivalrous behaviour exists within the relevant market (rivalrous
behaviour).
|
|
Each of these
criteria will be discussed in greater detail below. |
243. |
The Commission
considers that these criteria are a package of requirements which will
satisfy it that an ILEC will no longer exercise market power within a
relevant market, and that none of the criteria by itself is sufficient. |
|
Market share loss |
244. |
The Commission
notes that the parties made extensive submissions on whether market
share should be used to measure an ILEC's market power within a relevant
market and, if so, at what level of ILEC market share loss or competitor
market share gain the Commission should forbear from regulating local
exchange services in a particular relevant market. |
245. |
The Commission
does not agree with those parties that argued that a market share
number, either applicant ILEC market share loss or competitor market
share gain, could by itself constitute a bright-line test justifying
forbearance in a particular relevant market. In the Commission's view, a
market share number provides an important measure, at a fixed point in
time, of the degree of success that competitors have had in a particular
relevant market in competing with the applicant ILEC. A market share
number, by itself, however, does not provide sufficient guidance on the
future sustainability of competition within that particular relevant
market. In order to be able to assess the future sustainability of
competition within that relevant market the Commission must also look to
the other criteria established in this Decision. |
246. |
The Commission
considers, as between applicant ILEC market share loss or competitor
market share gain in a relevant market, that applicant ILEC market share
loss is the better measure to use as part of the process to assess the
applicant ILEC's market power in a particular relevant market. The
Commission considers that using applicant ILEC market share loss has the
advantage of focusing attention on the impact of competition on the
applicant ILEC rather than on competitors. In the Commission's view, it
is the loss of customers to competitors by an applicant ILEC which best
demonstrates that an ILEC's market power may be diminished. In addition
the Commission notes, in passing, that the collection of data with
respect to ILEC market share loss is much less onerous on parties and
the Commission since it involves, primarily, the collection of already
existing data from the ILECs, rather than a host of data from
competitors in each relevant market. |
247. |
The appropriate
level of applicant ILEC market share loss was the subject of
considerable debate among the parties to the proceeding; with proposals
ranging from a low of five percent to a high of 35 percent. In the
Commission's view, setting the level of applicant ILEC market share loss
to be used as a criterion for the purposes of the local forbearance
framework is not a precise scientific exercise; nor did any of the
parties to the proceeding pretend that it was. The Commission considers
that the level of applicant ILEC market share loss should be set at a
sufficiently high level that the Commission can have confidence that a
critical mass of customers have decided to receive their local exchange
services from competitors, and as a consequence there is a wider
acceptance by customers within a relevant market of the reality of local
exchange service competition, and an openness to trying competitive
alternatives. In short, the Commission considers that the applicant ILEC
market share loss level should be set at a level that, when taken into
consideration with the other criteria, demonstrates that competition in
that relevant market is sustainable. |
248. |
The Commission
considers that below 25 percent market share loss competition in a
relevant market would be unlikely to be sustainable in a forborne
environment, while above this level, provided that the other forbearance
criteria set out in this Decision have been met, competition with the
accompanying benefits to consumers would be delayed too long. The
Commission finds that a 25 percent applicant ILEC market share loss
level strikes the right balance between these competing interests. In
light of these factors, the Commission considers that the applicant ILEC
market share loss number should be set at 25 percent. |
249. |
The Commission also
notes that there was considerable debate among the parties regarding
what should be counted in order to calculate any market share criteria.
Parties disagreed, for example, on whether market share should be
calculated based on lines or households. |
250. |
The Commission
notes that, with respect to the issue of what to measure in calculating
a market share number, parties to this proceeding generally proposed one
of four methods of measuring market share: Network Access Service (NAS)
or NAS-equivalents, households served, local connections and gross local
service revenues. |
251. |
The Commission
considers that in order for regulation to be efficient and effective any
method of measuring market share must be easy for parties to understand
and straightforward for parties and the Commission to implement and
administer. The Commission is also of the view that the market share
number should be calculated in as objective a manner as possible in
order to minimize any disputes or controversy over its accuracy. |
252. |
In light of these
considerations, the Commission considers that neither households served
nor gross local service revenues are appropriate methods for calculating
a market share number for the purposes of the local forbearance
framework. Both methods contain elements of subjectivity in terms of
determining what should be counted either as a household or as local
service revenues. The Commission is concerned that this subjectivity
leaves these measures more open to regulatory gaming than either NAS or
local connections. |
253. |
As between NAS or
local connections, the Commission considers that NAS is the preferable
measure of market share. NAS is a concept that the Commission has
previously used and that is familiar to all parties. The Commission's
existing data collection system already collects information on market
share by NAS from parties; as such the additional collection and
administration required under the local forbearance framework will
result in a minimal, incremental administrative burden on parties. By
contrast, the Commission notes that the concept of local connections is
a new one proposed in this proceeding that has not been previously
defined or used by the Commission or parties. The Commission also notes
that the concept of local connections as proposed in this proceeding
would include wireless-only subscribers who the Commission has found are
not within the relevant market at this time. The adoption of this
concept would, in the Commission's view, require an undue increase in
the administrative burden on parties in collecting and reporting data,
as well as measuring services which the Commission has found to be
outside of the relevant market. The Commission considers, therefore,
that an applicant ILEC's market share loss should be measured using NAS
and NAS-equivalents.1 |
254. |
The Commission
defines NAS and NAS-equivalents as follows: |
|
- A NAS is a wireline connection from a customer location to the
PSTN which includes 1) a telephone number, 2) a connection to the PSTN
and 3) access from the customer location to the service provider's
office. This definition measures total physical line connections.
|
|
- A NAS-equivalent is also a wireline connection from a customer
location to the PSTN. It also includes a telephone number and a
connection to the PSTN, but, in the case of a NAS-equivalent, access
from the customer's location to the service provider's office utilizes
a broadband Internet access. This definition measures the total
primary telephone numbers in service counted in the exchange that is
native to the primary telephone number.
|
255. |
The Commission will
refer to these two terms collectively as "local wireline connections"
for the balance of this Decision. |
|
Competitor Q of S |
256. |
The Commission
has, in a series of decisions beginning with Quality of service
indicators for use in telephone company regulation, Telecom
Decision CRTC 97-16, 24 July 1997
(Decision 97-16), established competitor
Q of S indicators to allow the Commission to monitor the
provision by the ILECs of certain services to competitors. Most recently
the Commission finalized the competitor Q of S indicators
as well as the Q of S RRP for competitors in Finalization
of quality of service rate rebate plan for competitors, Telecom
Decision CRTC 2005-20, 31
March 2005 (Decision 2005-20). |
257. |
The Commission
notes that CLECs depend significantly on the use of ILEC services such
as the provisioning and maintenance of unbundled loops, competitor
digital network services and other local network facilities, as well as
local number portability, in order to provide services to their own
customers. |
258. |
The purpose of the
Q of S regime for competitors is to ensure that all competitors receive
a Q of S from the ILECs of a sufficiently high level to enable the
competitors to compete fairly with each other and with the ILECs. |
259. |
In Decision 2005-20,
the Commission established minimum performance standards for each
of 14 competitor Q of S indicators, which the Commission
considered to represent the minimum standard of service that an ILEC
should provide to each competitor that receives services from that
ILEC. A listing of these indicators and the corresponding standard
which each ILEC must meet with respect to each competitor is attached
to this Decision as Appendix B. |
260. |
The Commission
considers that the achievement of this minimum standard of service by an
ILEC is an important factor in limiting an ILEC's market power and
helping to ensure that competition within a relevant market will be
sustainable. |
261. |
The Commission has
determined that, in order for an ILEC to qualify for forbearance in a
particular relevant market it will be required to show that for the six
months prior to the application, it has met the individual standards for
each of the 14 Q of S indicators for competitors, when the results are
averaged across the six-month period.2 |
|
Competitor Services tariffs |
262. |
In the Commission's
view, the ILECs' Competitor Services tariffs offer facilities,
functionalities and services that provide key inputs to services offered
by competitors and are therefore important to the promotion and
sustainability of local competition in a relevant market. |
263. |
For example,
Competitor Services permit competitors to provide retail high-speed
Internet service to customers over which VoIP local phone service can
also be provided. Competitor Services that make the ILECs' unbundled
local loops available to competitors, including facilities-based
competitors such as cable LECs, allow those competitors to extend the
area in which they offer telecommunications services beyond those areas
where they have facilities. |
264. |
The Commission,
accordingly, considers that tariffs for ILEC Competitor Services that
are required for the provision by competitors of local exchange services
should generally be in place prior to forbearance in a particular
relevant market being granted. |
265. |
The record of this
proceeding demonstrates that there is general agreement that the ILECs
have already put into place tariffs for the bulk of the Competitor
Services required for the provision of circuit-switched local exchange
services. |
266. |
The Commission
notes, however, that some parties submitted that additional ILEC
services, including ADSL access service on both a bundled and unbundled
basis, Ethernet access and transport services, IP packet prioritization
services, wavelength service, and IP-to-IP interconnection service
should be available as Competitor Services prior to an ILEC being
granted forbearance from the regulation of local exchange services in a
particular relevant market. |
267. |
The Commission
notes that certain ILECs have Competitor Services tariffs, in force, for
a bundled broadband access service based on ADSL technology (bundled
ADSL service). The Commission further notes that, if an ILEC's bundled
ADSL service is available over dry loops, a competitor may use that
service to provide high speed retail Internet service and local VoIP
service to a residential or business customer that has not subscribed to
PES service, whether from an ILEC or a CLEC, using an unbundled local
loop. For the purpose of this Decision, the Commission defines bundled
ADSL service as a bundled broadband access service based on ADSL
technology that provides ADSL access, transport and aggregation
functionalities. |
268. |
In light of the
importance of an ILEC's bundled ADSL services for the competitive
provision of local VoIP phone service, the Commission considers that an
approved Competitor Services tariff for bundled ADSL available both over
dry loops and in conjunction with PES should be a criterion for
forbearance from regulating local residential exchange service and local
business exchange services in a relevant market. |
269. |
The Commission
notes that competitors also use ILECs' Ethernet access and transport
services tariffs to compete in the local retail business market for
Ethernet services and further notes that certain ILECs have approved
tariffs for the provision of Ethernet service to competitors. The
Commission accordingly considers that an ILEC must also have in place
approved Ethernet access and transport service tariffs as a criterion
for forbearance from regulating business local exchange services in a
relevant market. |
270. |
With respect to
the other Competitor Services identified by some competitors as specifically
needing to be in place prior to an ILEC being granted forbearance
from regulation of local exchange services in a relevant market, the
Commission considers that such services are either already being dealt
with under the terms of other regulatory frameworks, such as the approach
to standardized IP-to-IP interconnection adopted in Decision 2005-28,
or are not sufficiently important to the promotion or sustainability
of local exchange competition to be made specific criteria for forbearance
at this time. |
271. |
The Commission
notes, however, that, as competition, technology and networks continue
to evolve, new Competitor Services may be approved that the Commission
may consider should be made part of the local forbearance framework as
criteria for forbearance. If, in the future, the Commission approves new
Competitor Services, the Commission will, at the time of approval of a
new Competitor Service, identify whether an ILEC must have approved
tariffs for that Competitor Service in place as a criterion for
forbearance under the local forbearance framework. |
|
Access to OSS |
272. |
In Decision 2005-14,
the Commission found that access to timely and accurate information
pertaining to customers was necessary for CLECs to be on an equal
competitive footing with the ILECs that already had such access. The
Commission found that the development and implementation of CLEC access
to ILEC OSS was necessary to eliminate barriers to effective competition
in the local exchange services market and directed Bell Canada
and TCI to develop and implement CLEC access to their OSS systems. |
273. |
The Commission notes
that, since Decision 2005-14,
both of those carriers have worked to implement CLEC access to their
OSS systems; and the Commission expects that such access will be implemented
in the near future. |
274. |
Aliant Telecom,
MTS Allstream and SaskTel are only required to develop and implement
CLEC access to their OSS once a CLEC indicates its willingness, by
signing an agreement of intent, to access their respective OSS
databases. Within 30 days of signing such an agreement, the affected
ILEC must file an implementation plan, for Commission approval, for CLEC
access to its OSS databases. |
275. |
Given the value of
OSS access to the promotion and sustainability of local exchange service
competition, the Commission considers it important that those ILECs for
which a framework for CLEC access to their OSS databases has been
established demonstrate an unequivocal commitment to implementing such
access where required under the OSS framework prior to being granted
forbearance under the local forbearance framework in a particular
relevant market. |
276. |
The Commission
considers that for those ILECs for which implementation of CLEC access
to OSS has already been mandated, that is, Bell Canada and TCI,
completion of that implementation, prior to the date of any application
for forbearance pursuant to the framework established in this Decision,
is a criterion for forbearance for those ILECs. |
277. |
For every other ILEC,
except Télébec and the former TELUS Québec, where the Commission has
approved an implementation plan pursuant to Decision 2005-14
the ILEC must demonstrate that it has developed and implemented that
plan prior to the filing of its forbearance application. |
278. |
The Commission
notes that the OSS framework does not apply to either Télébec or the
operating territory of the former TELUS Québec. The Commission
considers, therefore, that, at this time, no criterion with respect to
CLEC access to OSS applies to applications for forbearance under the
local forbearance framework relating to relevant markets in Télébec's
operating territory or in the operating territory of the former TELUS
Québec. If, in the future, the Commission establishes a framework for
CLEC access to OSS in these operating territories it will determine, at
that time, whether and to what extent a criterion relating to CLEC
access to OSS should be applied to applications for local forbearance in
those operating territories. |
|
Rivalrous behaviour |
279. |
The remaining
criterion for forbearance under the local forbearance framework relates
to the existence of rivalrous behaviour in the relevant market. |
280. |
Evidence of
rivalrous behaviour that may be provided by an applicant ILEC to
demonstrate that both it and the competitors offering local exchange
services in a particular relevant market are acting in a rivalrous
manner may include falling prices, vigorous and aggressive marketing
activities, or an expanding scope of competitor activities in terms of
products, services or geographic boundaries, as well as evidence of
rapid innovation in products, processes and technology. |
|
Commission conclusions on local forbearance criteria |
281. |
Based on the record
of this proceeding and the submissions of the parties, the Commission
considers that if an applicant ILEC can demonstrate that the local
forbearance criteria set out above have been met in a particular
relevant market then the requirements of section 34 of the Act for a
forbearance determination will have been met and that it will be
appropriate to forbear. |
|
VI. Scope of local forbearance
|
282. |
The Commission
notes that subsections 34(1) and (2) of the Act empower the Commission
to forbear in whole or in part, conditionally or unconditionally, from
the exercise of any power or the performance of any duty referred to
therein. |
283. |
The Commission
received submissions from parties with respect to the appropriate degree
of forbearance from its powers and duties set out in sections 24, 25,
27, 29 and 31 of the Act as well as with respect to certain obligations
imposed by the Commission pursuant to its powers under these sections. |
284. |
The Commission has
set out its conclusions with respect to each of those sections of
the Act below, dealing with sections 25, 29 and 31 first, as these
sections raise the fewest issues with respect to the scope of
forbearance. The Commission has then set out its conclusions with
respect to sections 24 and 27. |
|
Section 25
|
285. |
Section 25 of
the Act provides as follows: |
|
(1) No Canadian
carrier shall provide a telecommunications service except in accordance
with a tariff filed with and approved by the Commission that specifies
the rate or the maximum or minimum rate, or both, to be charged for the
service. |
|
(2) A joint tariff
agreed on by two or more Canadian carriers may be filed by any of the
carriers with an attestation of the agreement of the other carriers. |
|
(3) A tariff shall
be filed and published or otherwise made available for public inspection
by a Canadian carrier in the form and manner specified by the Commission
and shall include any information required by the Commission to be
included. |
|
(4) Notwithstanding
subsection (1), the Commission may ratify the charging of a rate by a
Canadian carrier otherwise than in accordance with a tariff approved by
the Commission if the Commission is satisfied that the rate |
|
(a) was charged
because of an error or other circumstance that warrants the
ratification; or |
|
(b) was imposed in
conformity with the laws of a province before the operations of the
carrier were regulated under any Act of Parliament. |
|
Positions of parties |
286. |
Aliant Telecom,
Bell Canada/Télébec, MTS Allstream, SaskTel and TCI were of the view
that the Commission should forbear completely and unconditionally from
the exercise of its powers and duties under section 25 of the Act. |
287. |
Call-Net was of the
view that the Commission could forbear from requiring ex ante
approval of rates under section 25 of the Act, but that the Commission
could retain the requirement that the ILEC perform an imputation test
and have it available in the event of a dispute. |
288. |
CCTA, supported by
Cogeco, EastLink, Rogers and Shaw, considered that the Commission could
forbear from section 25 of the Act in relation to ILEC retail
telecommunication services provided to end-users, including resellers. |
289. |
The Consumer Groups
were of the view that the Commission should forbear from section 25 of
the Act with respect to the approval of rates. The Consumer Groups
considered, however, that any forbearance framework would have to rely
on close monitoring of the performance of the market, including the
prices for local exchange services. |
290. |
Cybersurf submitted
that where a forbearance determination applies, an ILEC should not be
subject to the tariff requirements of section 25 of the Act. |
291. |
QMI submitted that
it would be prepared to consider a regime wherein the Commission would
forbear from section 25 of the Act. |
|
Commission's analysis and determinations
|
292. |
The Commission
notes that, in Forbearance – Services provided by non-dominant
Canadian carriers, Telecom Decision CRTC 95-19,
8 September 1995 (Decision 95-19),
it determined to forbear from the exercise of its powers and duties
under section 25 of the Act in respect of non-dominant carriers.
Similarly, in Decision 97-8, the
Commission determined to forbear from the exercise of its powers and
duties under section 25 of the Act in respect of retail
telecommunication services provided by CLECs to end-users, including
resellers. |
293. |
The Commission
considers that to require an ILEC in a forborne market to obtain prior
Commission approval of tariffs would generally place that ILEC at a
competitive disadvantage relative to the competitors offering local
exchange services in that relevant market. |
294. |
The Commission
considers that, where an applicant ILEC has met the local forbearance
criteria in a relevant market, it would be appropriate, with respect to
that relevant market, to forbear from exercising its powers and duties
under section 25 of the Act. |
|
Section 29
|
295. |
Section 29 of
the Act provides that: |
|
No Canadian carrier
shall, without the prior approval of the Commission, give effect to any
agreement or arrangement, whether oral or written, with another
telecommunications common carrier respecting |
|
(a) the interchange
of telecommunications by means of their telecommunications facilities; |
|
(b) the management
or operation of either or both of their facilities or any other
facilities with which either or both are connected; or |
|
(c) the
apportionment of rates or revenues between the carriers. |
|
Positions of parties |
296. |
Aliant Telecom,
Bell Canada/Télébec, SaskTel and TCI argued that the Commission should
forbear completely from section 29 of the Act. |
297. |
Bell Canada/Télébec
submitted that the Commission's powers under section 29 of the Act were
largely irrelevant to the local services that were within the scope of
this proceeding. Bell Canada/Télébec took the position, in this regard,
that the ILECs' agreements with LECs and other carriers for local
interconnection purposes were Competitor Services which were outside the
scope of this proceeding. |
298. |
The CCTA, supported
by Cogeco, EastLink, Rogers and Shaw, contended that the Commission
must, at a minimum, retain its authority to exercise section 29 of
the Act insofar as it relates to LEC services and agreements or involve
inter-carrier agreements. |
299. |
The UTC argued that
the Commission should retain section 29 powers in order to assist in the
retention of Commission jurisdiction over 9-1-1 and other public service
features of local service. |
300. |
The Consumer Groups
submitted that the Commission must continue to exercise its powers under
section 29 of the Act in order to ensure the existence of open systems
that facilitate full interconnection and interoperability of local
networks and to ensure full implementation of all policy objectives of
the Act. |
301. |
MTS Allstream
submitted that the Commission might need to retain its powers under
section 29 of the Act, at least in the early years of local
forbearance, in order to ensure that ILEC interconnection agreements
with other carriers remained consistent with the Commission's regulatory
framework for local competition as set out in Decision 97-8.
MTS Allstream noted in this regard that, at the present time,
all LECs, regardless of whether they are dominant in the market or
not, must obtain the Commission's approval for all interconnection
agreements entered into with other LECs. |
302. |
Xit telecom
submitted that the Commission should retain its duties to enforce all
dispositions of section 29 of the Act for the foreseeable future. |
|
Commission's analysis and determinations |
303. |
The Commission
notes that section 29 of the Act has little application to those local
exchange services which are within the scope of this proceeding. |
304. |
The Commission notes
further that inter-carrier agreements on Competitor Services, that
comprise the vast majority of the agreements requiring section 29
approval by the Commission, are not within the scope of the present
proceeding. Nor, as the Commission determined in Decision 2005-35,
are inter-carrier agreements related to certain services that have
a strong public interest component, notably 9-1-1 service and MRS.
Agreements relating to these services will accordingly still require
Commission approval pursuant to section 29 of the Act. |
305. |
The Commission
considers, therefore, that it will be appropriate for the Commission to
determine to forbear from the exercise of its powers and duties under
section 29 with respect to inter-carrier agreements, that are within the
scope of the present proceeding, in a relevant market where an applicant
ILEC has demonstrated that it has met the local forbearance criteria.
|
|
Section 31
|
306. |
Section 31 of
the Act states: |
|
No limitation of a
Canadian carrier's liability in respect of a telecommunications service
is effective unless it has been authorized or prescribed by the
Commission. |
|
Positions of parties |
307. |
Aliant Telecom,
Bell Canada/Télébec, supported by SaskTel, and TCI submitted that the
Commission should forbear from exercising its powers and duties under
section 31 of the Act. |
308. |
The Consumer
Groups, QMI and Cybersurf considered that the Commission could forbear
from section 31 of the Act. |
309. |
MTS Allstream
submitted that the Commission could forbear unconditionally from
section 31 of the Act, provided that all of the concerns raised by it
with respect to other issues in the proceeding had been dealt with. |
310. |
The UTC submitted
that the Commission needed to decide whether carriers should continue to
receive the benefit of the Commission-sanctioned limitation of liability
clauses or experience the burden of the Commission-imposed wording of
such limitations in a competitive market. |
311. |
The CCTA, supported
by Cogeco, EastLink, Rogers and Shaw, considered that the Commission
must, at a minimum, retain its authority under section 31 of the Act
insofar as it relates to LEC services and agreements or involve
inter-carrier agreements. |
|
Commission's analysis and determinations
|
312. |
The Commission
considers that, in a competitive market for local exchange services, all
carriers should be able to establish through negotiations with their
customers, the extent and scope of any limitations on their liability,
and that such limitations should not be mandated by the Commission. |
313. |
In view of the
nature and degree of competition in a relevant market in which an
applicant ILEC can demonstrate that the local forbearance criteria have
been met, the Commission considers that it will be appropriate to
forbear with respect to section 31 of the Act in that relevant market.
The Commission notes that any provision limiting liability in any
existing contracts or arrangements, as of the date of the Commission
decision granting forbearance in a relevant market, will remain in force
until its expiry. Such existing contracts or arrangements will be deemed
to terminate on the date or in the manner provided therein,
notwithstanding any contractual provisions governing extensions. |
|
Section 24
|
314. |
Section 24 of
the Act states that: |
|
The offering and
provision of any telecommunications service by a Canadian carrier are
subject to any conditions imposed by the Commission or included in a
tariff approved by the Commission. |
|
Positions of parties |
315. |
Aliant Telecom
submitted that the Commission should generally forbear completely from
section 24 of the Act, with the possible exception of imposing
conditions to satisfy specific public policy purposes. |
316. |
Aliant Telecom
supported maintaining the same social obligations on ILECs as were
imposed on CLECs in Decision 97-8,
with the exception of the customer confidential information provisions.
Aliant Telecom submitted that with passage of the Personal
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPED Act)
there was no longer any need to impose regulations on Canadian carriers
regarding the confidentiality of customer information. |
317. |
Aliant Telecom
specifically considered that all LECs should be subject to regulatory
obligations in respect of the following: public safety (9-1-1), MRS,
alternative billing formats for the blind, privacy protections relating
to optional services, telemarketing restrictions, and access with
respect to MDUs. Aliant Telecom considered that safeguards, if deemed
necessary, should be transparent and competitively neutral and should
apply to all service providers. |
318. |
Aliant Telecom
suggested that the Commission should not regulate how services are
offered in a competitive market from an economic standpoint. With
reference to the provision of a comprehensive telephone directory,
Aliant Telecom submitted that there were strong commercial incentives
for publishing a comprehensive white page directory, and that it would
not change its practice of providing directories in forborne areas while
continuing to provide them in regulated areas. |
319. |
Aliant Telecom
suggested that those matters covered by the ILECs' terms of service,
that is, providing assurances, processes and supplier obligations, were
part of a supplier's service and should not be directed by the
Commission in a forborne market. Aliant Telecom submitted that suppliers
should have the right to differentiate their services and the terms and
conditions under which the services were offered. Aliant Telecom argued,
therefore, that as a function of competition, various policies, such as
deposit and termination, should be matters of contract between sellers
and customers. |
320. |
Bell Canada/Télébec submitted that the Commission should forbear
substantially from its power to impose conditions under section 24 of
the Act. They argued that the retention and continued exercise of
Commission powers on speculative grounds created uncertainty for
industry stakeholders and was contrary to the policy objectives of
the Act. Bell Canada/Télébec was of the view that the Commission
should expressly specify those purposes for which it would retain its
condition-making power and forbear in all other respects. Bell Canada
submitted that the most efficient and effective means of attaining its
social objectives was for the Commission to retain section 24
condition-making power expressly for this purpose in future forbearance
decisions. |
321. |
Bell Canada/Télébec, supported by SaskTel, submitted that customer
safeguards should apply to all local service providers as a condition
under section 24 of the Act. Bell Canada/Télébec submitted that
conditions relating to confidential customer information were
unnecessary, duplicative and should be discontinued. |
322. |
Bell Canada/Télébec considered that a competitive market would ensure
customer needs are met, including customer demands for stand-alone basic
PES. In Bell Canada/Télébec's view, if service providers ignored
customer demands, they would not be able to compete. Bell Canada/Télébec
considered, therefore, that no regulatory safeguard or mechanism would
be required to ensure the availability of stand-alone basic PES. In
addition, Bell Canada/Télébec and SaskTel anticipated that all service
providers serving a forborne market would be able to agree, without
Commission oversight, on a competitively neutral and equitable basis to
fund the publication and distribution of white page directories to their
own subscribers. |
323. |
Bell Canada/Télébec, supported by SaskTel, submitted that approved terms
of service were neither desirable nor required. In Bell Canada/Télébec's
view, customers would migrate to other providers if the terms of service
were not fair, equitable and commercially reasonable. |
324. |
SaskTel submitted
that the Commission should expressly specify those purposes for which it
retained its section 24 condition-making power and forbear in all other
respects. SaskTel submitted that any safeguards, imposed by the
Commission, should be available to all consumers regardless of the
service provider. In SaskTel's view, therefore, any section 24
conditions established by the Commission should apply to all LECs. |
325. |
TCI recognized that
the Commission may wish to retain section 24 conditions, as it has in
several instances in the past, in the interest of the enforcement of its
non-price-related rules. TCI submitted, however, that any section 24
conditions should apply equally to CLECs and ILECs, and that ILECs
should not have any greater responsibilities for providing services to
meet public policy objectives than do their competitors. |
326. |
TCI was of the
view that mechanisms and safeguards were not necessary to ensure
stand-alone PES was made available. In TCI's view, market forces would
ensure that stand-alone PES would continue to be offered. TCI argued
that if one LEC ceased providing such service, other LECs would have the
incentive to address the market desiring stand-alone PES. In TCI's view,
new entrants usually focused on higher revenue producing customers;
therefore their initial offerings might be limited to bundles, but as
their business grew, they would expand their target market to include
customers that take less full-featured bundles and stand-alone services.
TCI also submitted that it would continue to produce its white pages
directory regardless of whether it was mandated to do so. |
327. |
TCI was of the view
that terms of service should not be regulated as market forces would
determine such terms. |
328. |
MTS Allstream
supported the Commission maintaining its section 24 powers. MTS Allstream
noted that, in Decision 97-8, certain
obligations were imposed on all LECs. MTS Allstream also noted
that resellers are required to comply with other safeguards as a condition
of obtaining service from a LEC. MTS Allstream was of the view
that if these obligations were suspended for an ILEC, they should
also be suspended for competitors. MTS Allstream submitted, generally,
that any section 24 conditions should apply equally to ILECs
and competitors. |
329. |
MTS Allstream
submitted that the Commission could retain ILEC stand-alone PES as a
section 24 condition. MTS Allstream was also of the view that the
current arrangement for the white pages directory could also be
maintained, under section 24, in a forborne market. |
330. |
The Coalition
supported maintaining section 24 of the Act to impose conditions that
met social policy objectives in order to protect the interests of users.
The Coalition suggested, however, that conditions designed to protect
the interests of users and to meet social policy objectives should apply
to all service providers equally. |
331. |
The Coalition
considered that competition would ensure that stand-alone PES was made
available at competitive rates. The Coalition suggested that, if there
was not sufficient demand or the service was not profitable, an
appropriate response might be to subsidize the provision of stand-alone
PES. The Coalition also considered that a white pages directory need not
be provided and produced by the ILECs alone. The Coalition submitted
that one directory could be funded by all LECs with cost sharing based
on local telecommunication revenues. |
332. |
The CCTA,
supported by Rogers, Shaw, EastLink, and Cogeco, submitted that an
appropriate starting point for imposition of conditions under section 24
of the Act would be those conditions applicable to other non-dominant
carriers, namely the CLECs. In the view of these parties, to the extent
that additional safeguards unique to ILECs were considered necessary,
such conditions should be justified by reference to residual market
power. The CCTA observed that forbearance would permit ILECs the
discretion to provide preferential treatment to needy customers where
warranted without need of Commission direction via tariff to validate
the preference. |
333. |
The CCTA,
supported by Rogers, Shaw, EastLink and Cogeco, maintained that it would
be difficult for one competitor to offer services only in a bundle if
another service provider offered these services on a stand-alone basis.
In the CCTA's view, supported by Rogers, Shaw, EastLink and Cogeco,
whether the Commission decides to forbear from regulating ILEC's local
service was not dependant on the ILECs' obligation to provide a
comprehensive directory; this obligation must be maintained because the
ILEC would most likely always serve the critical mass of customers
needed to support the compilation of a directory. The CCTA noted that
maintenance of this obligation would not prejudice the ILEC as it
carries with it the right to brand the directory service as well as to
receive revenues from enhanced listings and additional advertising. |
334. |
The CCTA, supported
by Rogers, Shaw, EastLink and Cogeco, submitted that the determination
in Local service pricing options, Telecom Decision CRTC 96-10,
15 November 1996 (Decision 96-10)
remained valid today, that is, that telephone service was affordable
to the vast majority of Canadians. The CCTA noted that, in Decision
96-10, ILECs were directed to implement
several measures to assist local telephone subscribers in managing
the affordability of service, for example, toll restriction at no
charge, instalment payment plans and other bill management tools. |
335. |
The Competition
Bureau was of the view that consumer protection laws and regulations
existed in the larger economy that could serve the telecommunication
sector well. The Competition Bureau recognized, however, that the
Commission might, in order to meet certain objectives of the Act, impose
safeguards. |
336. |
The Competition
Bureau considered that the Commission should only impose conditions on
forborne services where there was compelling evidence that competition
would not provide services deemed to be essential for consumers. The
Competition Bureau also suggested that conditions might need to be
imposed when the public interest and the need for national uniformity
required it. |
337. |
The Competition
Bureau considered that the maintenance of the confidentiality provisions
associated with access by law enforcement agencies to confidential
customer information might be required to satisfy both the public
interest and the need for national uniformity. The Competition Bureau
also suggested that certain safeguards, such as free toll blocking,
might need to be maintained in a forborne market. |
338. |
The Competition
Bureau considered that if the Commission were to regulate terms of
service after forbearing, there was the danger that the terms of service
mandated by the Commission would not be similar to those that would have
prevailed in a competitive market. |
339. |
The Competition
Bureau urged the Commission to make clear, in its forbearance decision,
the precise matters it intended to continue to regulate if it decided on
partial forbearance or to retain the right to re-regulate forborne
markets. According to the Competition Bureau, if the Commission were to
decide to regulate some, but not all, terms of service, it should
carefully delineate what activities it does intend to regulate. |
340. |
EastLink considered
that the ILECs should continue to be regulated under the same conditions
that govern CLECs. EastLink suggested that this would include retaining
jurisdiction under section 24 of the Act to address consumer safeguards
and to facilitate the achievement of the Canadian telecommunications
policy objectives. |
341. |
QMI submitted that
it would not object if the Commission maintained section 24 of the Act.
QMI was further of the view that ILECs could be mandated to continue to
provide stand-alone PES if the Commission felt it was necessary. |
342. |
Rogers considered
that the Commission should generally maintain section 24 powers. Rogers
submitted, in particular, that privacy requirements should be
maintained. Rogers also submitted that several other conditions relating
to social policy that were imposed on the ILECs' provision of local
exchange services were also imposed on local services provided by CLECs,
and through all LECs, on resellers including VoIP providers. Rogers
considered that these conditions should be maintained. |
343. |
Cybersurf submitted
that it would be appropriate to maintain section 24 powers and impose
conditions to safeguard consumers. Cybersurf was also in support of the
Commission retaining the general terms of service for the ILECs. |
344. |
FCI/Yak submitted
that consumer safeguards currently in place should be maintained.
FCI/Yak was also of the view that stand-alone PES should remain tariffed
to ensure it was available and affordable. |
345. |
Primus supported
the Commission maintaining section 24 powers and establishing conditions
to protect consumers. In addition, Primus submitted that the Commission
should impose a section 24 condition on the ILECs that would require
them to continue to provide stand-alone PES after forbearance. Primus
was also of the view that the white pages directory should continue to
be produced by ILECs. Primus supported general terms of service applied
to both tariffed and non-tariffed services. |
346. |
The UTC considered
that the Commission should retain the public service features of local
service, which, according to it, required the retention of section 24
powers. The UTC also considered that the public service features of
local service should be available from all local service providers. In
the UTC's view, a comprehensive directory would still be needed in a
competitive market. The UTC was of the view that, if the ILECs did not
want the obligation to provide the white pages directory, other service
providers would step forward to do so. The UTC was also of the view that
approved terms of service were not required as consumers are protected
by the Competition Act. |
347. |
Xit telecom was of
the view that the Commission should maintain section 24 powers and
conditions of service. |
348. |
The Consumer Groups
submitted that the Commission should not forbear from section 24 of
the Act and that all LECs should continue to be subject to regulatory
obligations. |
349. |
The Consumer
Groups submitted, specifically, that the ILECs, and all other LECs,
should continue to be subject to regulatory obligations in respect of
the following: protection of customer confidential information; public
safety (that is, 9-1-1 service); MRS; alternative billing formats for
the blind; privacy protections relating to local optional services;
telemarketing restrictions; and access to MDUs. The Consumer Groups also
submitted that the Commission should maintain the obligations associated
with privacy protections relating to optional services. The Consumer
Groups also considered that conditions such as toll blocking would
remain justified in a competitive market. |
350. |
The Consumer
Groups were concerned that, given the trend toward bundling
telecommunications services, absent regulatory intervention, a situation
could evolve whereby stand-alone basic PES would no longer be available
to customers. The Consumer Groups suggested that a situation where
customers were required to purchase services they did not want in order
to obtain an essential service could raise affordability issues for some
customers. |
351. |
In the Consumer
Groups' view, PES was an essential service and it would be unacceptable
for consumers not to be able to purchase it on a stand-alone basis. As
such, the Consumer Groups argued that the Commission should require
ILECs in a forborne market to provide basic stand-alone PES. In the
Consumer Groups' view, such a condition would not prevent the ILEC from
also offering basic local exchange service as part of a service bundle.
The Consumer Groups were also of the view that the ILECs' obligation to
provide a comprehensive white pages directory should be retained subject
to a requirement that all registered LECs in a forborne area contribute
to the cost of the directory creation and distribution. |
352. |
The Consumer
Groups considered that general terms of service should be applicable to
all LECs, in forborne markets, given that basic local residential
service was an essential service. The Consumer Groups expressed concern
that, in an area where an ILEC's local exchange services were forborne,
some customers could find themselves unable to obtain local telephone
service if the LECs serving that area were to require long-term
commitments or significant deposits as a precondition of providing
service. The Consumer Groups also suggested that customers that
experienced financial difficulties could find themselves unable to
retain their local exchange service if unduly harsh payment terms were
imposed. The Consumer Groups argued that the current ILEC terms of
service adequately protected the interests of customers and should be
maintained, or even extended to other service providers. |
353. |
ARCH submitted
that section 24 conditions should specify that telecommunication
services must continue to be provided consistent with all current
Commission decisions containing accessibility requirements for persons
with disabilities, including the decisions requiring the following:
billing statements; bill inserts and information on rates, terms, and
conditions of service to be accessible to persons with visual
disabilities; MRS; and mandatory teletypewriter (TTY) unit upgrades for
pay telephones. |
|
Commission's analysis and determinations
|
354. |
The Commission
notes that most residential and business customers residing in a
forborne market will be able to obtain service from at least two
competing TSPs. The Commission considers that the operation of market
forces will generally be sufficient to protect the interests of these
customers. The Commission considers, however, that there will be
exceptions where market forces may not be sufficient to protect the
interests of all users in forborne markets. |
355. |
The Commission
recognizes that for some customers, particularly residential customers,
the operation of market forces after forbearance may result in either a
loss of services on which they are reliant or potential increases in
prices for services which are essential to their daily lives. The
Commission also considers that there may be pockets of uncontested
residential and business consumers in forborne markets. The Commission
is also cognizant of the arguments raised by ARCH and the Consumer
Groups regarding the position of vulnerable customers, including persons
with disabilities, and their unique needs with respect to
telecommunications services. The Commission considers that market forces
alone may not be sufficient to protect the interests of these customers. |
356. |
The Commission also
notes that there are issues of privacy and accessibility to basic
telecommunications service that are common to all users of
telecommunications services which may not be adequately dealt with by
the operation of market forces. |
357. |
In light of these
concerns with respect to the social and economic requirements of users
of telecommunications services, and in light of concerns regarding the
need to keep service reliable and affordable in all parts of Canada, the
Commission has decided, at this time, that it will not refrain
completely from exercising its powers and duties under section 24 of
the Act in forborne markets. |
358. |
The Commission's
primary focus, with respect to its section 24 powers and duties, has
been to eliminate as much economic regulation as possible while
maintaining those section 24 powers and duties that are necessary, at
this time, to further policy objectives such as affordability,
accessibility, the availability of emergency services and privacy. |
359. |
The Commission
considers that its discussion of those section 24 conditions that it
initially intends to retain in a forborne market, under the local
forbearance framework, can usefully be divided into the following
categories: |
|
- obligations common to all LECs;
|
|
|
|
|
360. |
The Commission
notes that it has found it necessary to retain different section 24
conditions in forborne residential relevant markets than in forborne
business relevant markets. In general, the Commission has taken a
lighter regulatory approach with regard to business local exchange
services as it believes that the social objectives served by residential
local exchange services require a greater degree of regulatory oversight
in a forborne market. In this regard the Commission notes that
references simply to "customers" are intended to apply to both
residential and business customers; where the Commission intends that a
condition apply only to either residential or business customers it has
specifically identified the customer group. |
361. |
The Commission also
notes that, in addition to the specific conditions and circumstances
set out below, which it has determined are necessary to retain at this
time, it will retain its powers and duties under section 24 of the Act
in order to impose conditions should that prove necessary. |
|
Obligations common to all LECs |
362. |
The Commission
has in a number of decisions and orders imposed common obligations
on ILECs and CLECs relating to the offering and provision of
local exchange services. These include Decision 97-8;
Telecom Order CRTC 98-626,
26 June 1998; Confidentiality provisions of Canadian carriers,
Telecom Decision CRTC 2003-33,
30 May 2003, as amended by Telecom Decision CRTC 2003-33-1,
11 July 2003 (Decision 2003-33);
Decision 2005-28; Emergency
service obligations for local VoIP service providers, Telecom
Decision CRTC 2005-21, 4
April 2005; Follow-up to Emergency service obligations for local
VoIP service providers, Decision 2005-21–
Customer notification requirements, Telecom Decision CRTC 2005-61,
20 October 2005 and Provision of telecommunications services
to customers in multi-dwelling units, Telecom Decision CRTC 2003-45,
30 June 2003. Appendix C contains a summary of the major obligations
contained in these Decisions which encompass obligations that are
important both for encouraging competition and for promoting social
policy objectives. |
363. |
The Commission
notes that, with the exception of the customer confidentiality provisions
first established in Review of the general regulations of the federally
regulated terrestrial telecommunications common carriers, Telecom
Decision CRTC , 26 March 1986, as amended by Telecom Order CRTC 86-593,
22 September 1986 (Decision 86-7),
parties to the present proceeding were generally in agreement with
the proposition that the existing obligations that are common to all
LECs should continue to remain in force in a forborne market. |
364. |
The customer confidentiality
provisions, which were most recently modified in Part VII application
to revise Article 11 of the Terms of Service, Telecom Decision
CRTC 2005-15, 17 March 2005,
prohibit Canadian carriers from disclosing confidential customer information
without express consent of the customer, except in certain specified
circumstances. |
365. |
The Commission
notes that those parties, including Aliant Telecom and
Bell Canada/Télébec, that wish the Commission to lift the customer
confidentiality provisions, argued that the Commission should do so
because the existence of the PIPED Act rendered the Commission's
customer confidentiality provisions unnecessary and duplicative. |
366. |
The Commission also
notes, however, that it did not accept the same argument put forward
by the same parties in the proceeding leading to Decision 2003-33,
noting in the decision that it may choose to impose a different standard
of privacy protection pursuant to the Act than is required under
the PIPED Act. The Commission considers that, in the case of the customer
confidentiality requirements, it has chosen to impose a higher standard
of privacy protection than that which would be available under the
PIPED Act. The Commission considers that the higher degree of privacy
protection available to customers of telecommunications services through
the customer confidentiality provisions is even more relevant today
than when the provisions were first implemented, due to the advent
of new technologies and the emergence of electronic commerce, which
allow information to be more easily processed, rearranged and exchanged.
The Commission also considers that, as its own experience in dealing
with privacy issues has demonstrated, technical expertise and specific
telecommunications industry knowledge is often required to address
privacy-related issues in the telecommunications industry. |
367. |
In light of the
above and in light of the Commission's experience with the customer
confidentiality provisions, the Commission considers that market forces,
even buttressed by the provisions of the PIPED Act, are unlikely to
sufficiently protect the privacy interests of customers in a forborne
environment. The Commission considers, therefore, that the maintenance
of the customer confidentiality provisions and the Commission's ability
to use section 24 of the Act to address ongoing privacy issues in a
forborne market is necessary. |
368. |
With respect to
the other common LEC obligations set out in Appendix C, the Commission
considers that these obligations should continue to exist in a forborne
market. The Commission notes that it has retained these obligations with
respect to other forborne services, and has also maintained these
obligations with respect to the forborne local exchange services
provided by CLECs. The Commission notes that these common LEC
obligations provide a minimum floor of protection for all customers,
regardless of which LEC they choose as their local exchange services
provider. |
369. |
In light of the
above, the Commission will, in a forborne market established pursuant to
the framework set out in this Decision, retain its powers under
section 24 of the Act to the extent necessary to maintain the common LEC
obligations referred to in this section. |
|
Industry self-regulation |
370. |
The Commission
notes that, in broadcasting, industry self-regulation has proven to be a
successful model for achieving a relaxation of Commission regulation
while still achieving important public policy goals. The Commission
notes that both the Canadian Broadcast Standards Council and the Cable
Television Standards Foundation have been highly successful industry
self-regulatory bodies operating in the broadcasting industry. |
371. |
The Commission
considers that a properly designed industry self-regulatory system would
serve to address the concerns that underlie the common LEC obligations
listed above while, at the same time, freeing LECs in forborne markets
from regulation. |
372. |
The Commission
therefore invites LECs to establish an industry self-regulatory system
that would address the issues raised by these common LEC obligations.
The Commission would be prepared on application to approve an industry
self-regulatory system that adequately addresses these issues, and to
remove the requirement to adhere to those common LEC obligations for
those LECs who are participants in the approved industry self-regulatory
system. |
373. |
In the Commission's
view, an appropriate industry self-regulatory system would be one that
involved most, if not all of the LECs, that was designed in consultation
with groups representing customers, that set out clear rules and
standards and that provided a reliable mechanism for expeditiously
resolving customer complaints. |
|
Stand-alone PES |
374. |
The Commission
notes that, even in forborne markets established under the terms of the
local forbearance framework, there may remain pockets of uncontested
customers for whom the ILEC remains the primary or only LEC. |
375. |
The record of the
present proceeding indicates, moreover, that even where customers have
access to competitive suppliers, the focus of LECs in forborne markets
is likely to be on attracting high-use customers that generate high
profit margins. In this regard, the Commission notes that currently in
competitive markets only some CLECs offer stand-alone PES. CLECs
typically offer PES as part of a bundle, either with optional local
services or with services such as long-distance, video, wireless and
Internet. |
376. |
The Commission
considers that market forces will best protect the interests of
customers that reside in areas of forborne markets where multiple
competitors offer service and where customers wish to subscribe to
multiple telecommunications services from the same provider, whether
these services are in a bundle or otherwise. |
377. |
The Commission
considers, however, that for some residential customers, including those
for whom affordability of phone service is a serious issue, such as the
many disabled Canadians who live on limited incomes, the availability of
PES on a stand-alone basis is very important. |
378. |
In light of the
above, in order to ensure that accessibility and affordability are
maintained for residential customers in forborne markets the Commission
considers that ILECs should continue to be required to provide PES on a
stand-alone basis. |
379. |
Accordingly, the
Commission will require an ILEC to continue to provide stand-alone PES
to residential customers in a forborne market and will retain its powers
pursuant to section 24 of the Act to the extent necessary to maintain
this requirement. |
380. |
The Commission
considers that for business customers generally market forces will prove
adequate to protect their interests such that the Commission does not
need to mandate the provision of business stand-alone PES. The
Commission does note that, to the extent that issues arise with respect
to the treatment of uncontested business customers who wish to receive
business stand-alone PES, it has, as set out below, retained its powers
under subsection 27(2) to deal with any complaints regarding unjust
discrimination or undue preference. |
381. |
The Commission
also considers that in order to ensure that residential stand-alone
PES is available to all residential customers in forborne markets,
it will also be necessary to retain in forborne markets the ILECs'
obligation to serve with respect to residential stand-alone PES, as
set out in paragraph 31 of Telephone service to high-cost serving
areas, Telecom Decision CRTC 99-16,
19 October 1999 (Decision 99-16).
The Commission notes that any existing exceptions or limitations to
the obligation to serve would also continue in a forborne market. |
382. |
The Commission notes
that in Decision 99-16, it established
a basic service objective (BSO) for the ILECs, which included: individual
line local service with touch-tone dialling, provided by a digital
switch with capability to connect via low speed data transmission
to the Internet at local rates; enhanced calling features, including
access to emergency services, Voice MRS, and privacy protection features;
access to operator and directory assistance services; access to the
long-distance network; and a copy of a current local telephone directory.
The Commission considers that the residential stand-alone PES provided
by an ILEC in a forborne market should be provided in a manner consistent
with the BSO, and the Commission will retain its powers under section 24
to the extent necessary to maintain this objective. |
383. |
The Commission
notes that, in Forbearance – Regulation of toll services provided
by incumbent telephone companies, Telecom Decision CRTC 97-19,
18 December 1997, as amended by Correction to Forbearance – Regulation
of toll services provided by incumbent telephone companies,
Telecom Decision CRTC 97-19-1,
9 March 1998 (Decision 97-19),
it directed the ILECs to provide to the Commission and to make publicly
available rate schedules which set out the rates for basic toll services.
ILECs were required to update their respective schedules within 14
days to include any changes to the rates for basic toll service. |
384. |
The Commission
considers that, if a similar condition were imposed for residential
stand-alone PES in forborne markets, customers would be in a position to
monitor fluctuations in rates and be better able to judge the value of
the service bundles offered by ILECs. |
385. |
In light of the
above, the Commission considers it appropriate to require ILECs to
provide to the Commission and to make publicly available, rate schedules
setting out the rates for residential stand-alone PES, including
touch-tone and primary directory listing, as well as for connection
charges. The ILECs will be expected to update their respective schedules
within 14 days of any change to the rates for residential stand-alone
PES. |
386. |
The Commission
has also required ILECs to undertake service improvement plans (SIPs)
in order to extend and improve telecommunications service in furtherance
of its BSO as defined in Decision 99-16.
Normally a customer that requests service from an ILEC but whose premises
are not currently connected to the ILEC's network would be required
to pay the ILEC for the construction costs involved in establishing
such a connection. The Commission, in Decision 99-16,
in Regulatory framework for second price cap period, Telecom
Decision CRTC 2002-34, 30 May
2002 (Decision 2002-34) and in
Implementation of price regulation for Télébec and TELUS Québec,
Telecom Decision CRTC 2002-43,
31 July 2002 (Decision 2002-43),
established limits on the amounts that a customer and an ILEC would
have to pay, under a SIP, for the extension of telecommunications
services to unserved premises. The Commission also required that,
subject to certain conditions, customers be permitted to pay, in instalments,
large construction charges incurred under the terms of a SIP. |
387. |
The Commission
notes that these requirements were put in place to further the affordability
and accessibility of basic telecommunications services in unserved
areas. As such, the Commission considers it important that they be
maintained in a forborne market. In the absence of these requirements,
unserved customers in a forborne market might be put to substantially
greater expense in order to receive basic local service even where
a SIP, which covers their premises is in place. In light of this,
in a forborne market, the Commission will maintain the conditions
outlined in Decisions 99-16, 2002-34
and 2002-43, as amended, with
respect to limits on the customer's cost contribution and the ILEC's
capital cost criteria as well as the requirements with respect to
instalment payment plans for construction charges where a SIP is in
place which includes the LFR that is part of the forborne market.
The Commission will, therefore, retain its powers under section 24
to the extent that it is necessary to maintain these requirements. |
|
Other obligations |
388. |
There are certain
other ILEC obligations, a number of which are contained within the
existing ILEC terms of service and a number of which are directed
generally towards the protection of privacy and affordability, that the
Commission considers to be of sufficient importance to maintain, for the
time being, even in forborne markets. |
389. |
In Decision 86-7,
the Commission established terms of service that applied to all ILEC
tariffed services. These terms of service detail rights and obligations
that apply both to the ILEC and to the ILEC's customers. The Commission
has, from time to time, updated these terms of service to reflect
changes in services, technology and commercial practices. |
390. |
The Commission
considers that the terms of service, with certain exceptions discussed
below, cover matters that, in a forborne market, should be a matter of
agreement between the ILEC and the customer. The Commission considers
that, subject to these exceptions discussed below, market forces will be
sufficient to discipline the behaviour of ILECs with respect to their
terms of service. The Commission expects, however that, in a forborne
market, ILECs will notify their customers of any changes to the terms of
service at the time those changes are made. |
391. |
Those terms of
service that the Commission considers may need to be retained as
section 24 conditions are those related to: |
|
- ILEC-initiated suspension or disconnection of service;
|
|
|
|
- provision of telephone directories.
|
392. |
The Commission
notes that, while customer confidentiality requirements are also part of
the terms of service, it has already addressed these requirements in the
section above on common LEC obligations. |
393. |
In the
Commission's view, the suspension or disconnection of basic telephone
service is clearly among the most serious actions that an ILEC can take
with respect to a customer. In the Commission's view, it is important
that customers have every reasonable opportunity to maintain their PES.
The Commission will, therefore, require that the ILEC-initiated
disconnection or suspension of service policy contained in the terms of
service be maintained in a forborne market. The Commission will retain
its powers under section 24 of the Act to the extent necessary to
maintain this requirement. |
394. |
In Terms of Service
– Disconnection for partial payment of charges, Telecom Decision
CRTC 2004-31, 11 May 2004,
determined that ILECs were not permitted to suspend, disconnect or
threaten to disconnect a customer's tariffed services if that customer
made partial payments sufficient to cover the outstanding arrears
for tariffed services, whether or not there remained outstanding arrears
for non-tariffed services. Consistent with its retention of the ILEC-initiated
disconnection or suspension of service policy, as set out above, the
Commission considers it appropriate that, in a forborne market, an
ILEC not terminate a customer's residential stand-alone PES for non-payment
of other services where that customer has made partial payments sufficient
to cover the outstanding arrears for the residential stand-alone PES.
The Commission will retain its powers under section 24 of the Act
to the extent necessary to maintain this condition. |
395. |
The Commission
notes that the deposit policy currently mandated pursuant to the terms
of service limits the ability of the ILEC to require deposits from a
customer and places limits on the amount of any such deposits. |
396. |
The Commission
considers that an ILEC's deposit policy is directly related to the
affordability of telephone service, particularly for residential
consumers. The Commission considers that onerous deposit requirements
could negatively impact the penetration rates of PES for consumers,
particularly persons with lower incomes. As such, the Commission
considers it appropriate to maintain the existing deposit policy for
residential PES customers, as set out in the terms of service, in
forborne markets. The Commission will, therefore, retain its powers
under section 24 of the Act to the extent necessary to maintain this
obligation. |
397. |
The Commission
notes that currently, both residential and business customers are
entitled to receive, free of charge, a copy of the white and yellow page
telephone directories as part of their basic service. The Commission
also notes that a primary listing in the white pages directory is
included in the rate for basic service for residential customers and
that a primary listing in both the white and yellow pages directories is
included in the rate for basic service for business customers. |
398. |
The Commission
considers that the provision of the directories and the primary listings
are an integral component of basic telephone service. The existence and
availability of a comprehensive telephone directory facilitates the use
of telephone service for many customers and is a key tool for many
business customers, particularly small business customers. Yet it is not
clear that in a forborne market the operation of market forces would
result in residential and business customers receiving a comprehensive
phone directory and primary listings at a reasonable cost. |
399. |
The Commission
will therefore require an ILEC, in a residential forborne market, to
maintain the entitlement of its residential customers to receive copies
of the white and yellow pages directories and a primary listing in the
white pages directory, free of charge. The Commission will also require
an ILEC, in a business forborne market, to maintain the entitlement of
its business customers to receive copies of the white and yellow pages
directories and a primary listing in both the white and yellow pages
directories, free of charge. The Commission will retain its powers under
section 24 of the Act to the extent necessary to maintain these
obligations. |
400. |
The Commission
notes that the full terms of service will remain in force, in a forborne
market, for all those services outside of the scope of this proceeding
including Competitor Services. |
401. |
The Commission
notes that it has imposed on the ILECs several privacy and affordability
related obligations for the benefit of customers which it considers
should appropriately be retained in a forborne market. |
402. |
The Commission
notes that in Telecom Order CRTC 98-109,
4 February 1998, and in Télébec and TELUS Québec – Rates for unlisted
number service, Telecom Decision CRTC 2003-40,
20 June 2003, it required ILECs to provide Unlisted Number Service
(UNS) at rates that did not exceed $2.00 per month for residential
consumers. |
403. |
The Commission
further notes that all ILECs currently provision Call Trace service, at
a fixed rate per use, with a monthly cap of $10.00, for residential
consumers. |
404. |
The Commission notes
that in Call management service – Blocking of calling number identification,
Telecom Decision CRTC 92-7, 4 May
1992, the Commission required ILECs to provide free per-call blocking
of caller number identification information to all customers and also
required ILECs to provide free per-line blocking of caller number
identification information to certified shelters for victims of domestic
violence. |
405. |
The Commission
considers that these measures are important to the promotion of the
privacy of persons and should be maintained in a forborne market. The
Commission is concerned that, in the absence of a regulatory
requirement, these privacy-related measures could either be discontinued
or only be available at much higher rates. The Commission, therefore,
will require ILECs to maintain these conditions in a forborne market and
will retain its powers under section 24 of the Act to the extent
necessary to retain these conditions. |
406. |
The Commission notes
that, in Decision 96-10, it imposed
several obligations on ILECs to address concerns related to the affordability
of telephone service for residential customers. ILECs were required
to offer toll restriction service at no monthly charge, with no set-up
charge, and which included a one-time charge, of up to $10.00, to
deactivate the service. The Commission also required that the ILECs
allow payment of up-front connection charges to be spread over six
months. |
407. |
The Commission noted,
in Decision 96-10, that pursuant
to the requirements in their approved tariffs, the ILECs allowed customers
the option of having calls to 900/976 services blocked either at no
charge or for a one-time service charge of $10.00, and allowed the
blocking of usage-based calling features at no charge. |
408. |
The Commission also
notes that in 900 service – Agreements and consumer safeguards,
Telecom Decision CRTC 2005-19,
30 March 2005, it required the ILECs to waive first-time reasonably
disputed 900/976 service charges for residential consumers. |
409. |
The Commission
further notes that many ILECs, pursuant to approved tariffs, provide
rate discounts on various residential local exchange services to persons
with disabilities. |
410. |
The Commission
considers that the affordability obligations listed above are all
important requirements that serve to help ensure the affordability of
basic telephone service for customers. The Commission is not convinced
that the operation of market forces in a forborne market will result in
such protections being maintained. The Commission will, therefore,
require ILECs to maintain these obligations in a forborne market and
will retain its powers under section 24 of the Act to the extent
necessary to maintain these obligations. |
411. |
At the same time,
the Commission considers that the objectives and issues addressed by all
of the obligations referred to in this section are pertinent to the
services provided by all LECs, competing in forborne markets. The
Commission would, moreover, be prepared to consider having them
addressed within the industry self-regulatory system discussed earlier
rather than as LEC obligations. |
|
Section 27
|
412. |
Section 27 of
the Act states: |
|
(1) Every rate
charged by a Canadian carrier for a telecommunications service shall be
just and reasonable. |
|
(2) No Canadian
carrier shall, in relation to the provision of a telecommunications
service or the charging of a rate for it, unjustly discriminate or give
an undue or unreasonable preference toward any person, including itself,
or subject any person to an undue or unreasonable disadvantage. |
|
(3) The Commission
may determine in any case, as a question of fact, whether a Canadian
carrier has complied with section 25, this section or section 29, or
with any decision made under section 24, 25, 29, 34 or 40. |
|
(4) The burden of
establishing before the Commission that any discrimination is not unjust
or that any preference or disadvantage is not undue or unreasonable is
on the Canadian carrier that discriminates, gives the preference or
subjects the person to the disadvantage. |
|
(5) In determining
whether a rate is just and reasonable, the Commission may adopt any
method or technique that it considers appropriate, whether based on a
carrier's return on its rate base or otherwise. |
|
(6) Notwithstanding
subsections (1) and (2), a Canadian carrier may provide
telecommunications services at no charge or at a reduced rate |
|
(a) to the
carrier's directors, officers, employees or former employees; or |
|
(b) with the
approval of the Commission, to any charitable organization or
disadvantage person or other person. |
|
Positions of parties |
|
Subsection 27(1) |
413. |
Aliant Telecom was
of the view that the retention by the Commission of its powers under
section 27 of the Act in a forborne market to maintain retail Q of S
standards could have negative consequences, even though it would be
intended to protect customers. Aliant Telecom argued that if the ILEC
were required to adhere to retail Q of S standards, customers might feel
that the ILEC was the only provider that could provide good service,
thus causing market inertia. Aliant Telecom considered that in a
competitive market it was expected that service providers would offer
different levels of service at various price points. |
414. |
Aliant Telecom
also argued that competition would not likely increase prices in a
forborne market. Aliant Telecom submitted that its expectation was that
competition would drive prices lower, and customers would get increased
value for their money. Aliant Telecom submitted, therefore, that the
retention by the Commission of its powers under section 27 of the Act in
a forborne market to establish a price ceiling on rates for local
exchange services would be unnecessary. |
415. |
Bell Canada/Télébec, supported by SaskTel, considered that retail Q of S
standards were not required in a forborne market as market forces,
rather than regulatory oversight, would provide all service providers
with the incentive to maintain a high Q of S. Bell Canada/Télébec argued
that subscribers will switch providers if the Q of S deteriorated. |
416. |
In
Bell Canada/Télébec's view, a price ceiling on forborne local exchange
services would undermine the telecommunications policy objective of
fostering increased reliance on market forces and regulating only where
necessary. |
417. |
TCI, supported by
the UTC, was of the view that retail Q of S standards would no longer be
required. In these parties' view, providing a high Q of S was a way for
a provider to differentiate its services from its competitor's services
and to charge a premium for superior service quality. |
418. |
TCI, SaskTel, the
Coalition and Cogeco submitted that a price ceiling on forborne local
exchange services would be unnecessary if the Commission established the
proper geographic component of the relevant market for forbearance as
the proper geographic component would have very few uncontested
customers. |
419. |
The Coalition
considered that retail Q of S standards would no longer be required as
market forces would ensure that Q of S remained high. In the Coalition's
view, consumers of Internet and wireless services pick their providers
based on Q of S. The Coalition noted that the Commission does not
regulate Q of S for other forborne telecommunication services such as
Internet and wireless services. |
420. |
The Competition
Bureau submitted that, to the extent possible, the Commission should
refrain from imposing retail Q of S standards in a forborne market. The
Competition Bureau expected that, in a forborne market, retail Q of S
would reflect the interests of customers; customers would switch
providers if they were dissatisfied with the service quality. |
421. |
The Competition
Bureau submitted that if the Commission was concerned about the
potential for price increases post-forbearance, it could maintain price
cap regulation or impose a price ceiling. |
422. |
The CCTA, supported
by Cogeco, considered that the ILECs would have the incentive to
maintain high retail Q of S in a forborne market or risk losing
customers. The CCTA noted that the Commission did not maintain or
institute retail Q of S reporting requirements in other forborne
markets, such as long distance, cellular or Internet access. |
423. |
The CCTA, supported
by EastLink, Rogers, Shaw and Cybersurf, submitted that the Commission
could establish a price ceiling for stand-alone basic local service
rates of the ILECs to provide customers with a safeguard against unjust
or unreasonable rate increases. The CCTA noted that, in Decision 97-19,
the Commission had considered that the retention of a ceiling on basic
toll rates was appropriate. |
424. |
Shaw, supported by
Cybersurf, submitted that retail Q of S standards should be discontinued
unless it were demonstrated that competition does not provide a
sufficient safeguard in a relevant market. |
425. |
MTS Allstream,
supported by FCI/Yak, was of the view that retail Q of S standards would
not be required in a forborne market if there were robust competition.
In the view of these parties, customers would cancel service from a
service provider whose service quality had deteriorated. |
426. |
FCI/Yak submitted
that if there were pockets where there was insufficient competition, a
price ceiling would be appropriate. FCI/Yak was of the view that
stand-alone service should be tariffed to ensure it was affordable. |
427. |
Primus, QMI and
Xit telecom were of the view that retail Q of S standards would still be
required in a forborne market. |
428. |
QMI maintained that
the Commission would be making a grave error by allowing its definition
of relevant geographic markets to be driven by the need to safeguard
unprotected customers against abusive post-forbearance price increases.
In QMI's view, the better solution to the issue of uncontested customers
would be to impose a price ceiling on the last pre-forbearance price
level. |
429. |
The Consumer Groups
considered that any forbearance framework would have to rely on close
monitoring of the performance of the forborne markets, including retail
Q of S. The Consumer Groups proposed that ILECs be required to continue
to file retail Q of S reports with the Commission and that the
Commission would post those results on its website. |
430. |
The Consumer Groups
proposed that, as a condition of forbearance, the Commission should
establish a price ceiling on the last approved tariff rate for
stand-alone PES offered by the ILECs. |
431. |
The UTC submitted
that, in the event that an ILEC was forborne from regulation in a
relevant market which was not fully served by competing suppliers of
substitutable services, the Commission would need to impose safeguards
in order to prevent the ILEC from engaging in price discrimination
within that market and to protect customers with no competitive choice
from being overcharged. According to the UTC, these pockets of
uncontested customers would require Commission-price protection in the
form of a price ceiling. |
|
Subsections 27(2), (3) and (4) |
432. |
Aliant Telecom and
TCI were of the view that the Commission did not need to maintain
subsection 27(2) powers to address claims of unjust discrimination, as
the rights of disabled and other disadvantaged groups would be protected
by the Canadian Human Rights Act and the Canadian Human Rights
Commission in a forborne environment. |
433. |
Bell Canada/Télébec, supported by SaskTel, argued that the retention by
the Commission of its section 24 powers, in a forborne market, would be
preferable to the retention of subsection 27(2) powers, as conditions
would provide greater certainty to service providers and consumers
regarding the types of services required to be provided to those
subscribers. |
434. |
The Competition
Bureau submitted that once a relevant market was forborne, the
Commission must relieve the ILECs from non-discriminatory pricing
obligations in subsection 27(2) of the Act. |
435. |
The CCTA, supported
by Cogeco, EastLink, Rogers and Shaw submitted that the Commission must
retain its authority to exercise its powers and duties under
subsections 27(2), (3), and (4) of the Act, in a forborne market, so
that the Commission could respond to complaints alleging unjust
discrimination and undue preference in relation to services provided by
LECs both to end-users and to other carriers. |
436. |
The Consumer Groups
considered that the Commission must retain subsection 27(2) powers, in a
forborne market, to prevent unjust discrimination against disabled and
vulnerable persons because, in its view, market forces would not prevent
discrimination. |
437. |
In the Consumer
Groups' view, the Canadian Human Rights Act did not relieve the
Commission from its obligations under the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms or from meeting its social policy objectives in
the Act. The Consumer Groups considered that the rules of statutory
interpretation indicated that the Commission should exercise its powers
and fulfill its duties under the Act in a manner that was consistent
with the express intent of Parliament. |
438. |
It was ARCH's
position that the existence of another statute of general application,
such as the Canadian Human Rights Act, did not oust the claims
persons with disabilities were making for equal access to
telecommunication products and services under the Act. ARCH suggested
that the legal basis for these claims flowed from the fact that the Act
was subject to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom. |
439. |
ARCH noted that the
Commission had retained subsection 27(2) powers in many previous
forbearance decisions and further noted that the Commission had applied
subsection 27(2) of the Act to remedy discrimination against disabled
persons in the context of payphones and TTYs. |
440. |
In ARCH's view,
the experiences of disabled persons regarding terminal equipment and
wireless phones indicated that when the Commission had forborne from
exercising its powers under subsection 27(2) of the Act or had not used
those powers to ensure accessibility to persons with disabilities, it
had failed to discharge its legal obligation of ensuring that persons
with disabilities do not face discrimination in their access to
telecommunications services. |
441. |
ARCH submitted
that the Commission should only forbear if conditions were attached that
would ensure that local telecommunication services were provided on a
non-discriminatory basis to persons with disabilities. In ARCH's view,
telecommunications services should be required to meet future
conditions, which the Commission may impose from time to time to ensure
ongoing accessibility of telecommunications services for persons with
disabilities. |
|
Commission's analysis and determinations
|
|
Subsection 27(1) |
442. |
The Commission
notes that in considering subsection 27(1) it has examined the need to
retain retail Q of S standards in forborne markets and the need for a
price ceiling for residential stand-alone PES. |
|
Retail Q of S standards |
443. |
The Commission
considers that in a competitive market, customers can determine what
level of quality is appropriate and will switch providers if the service
quality becomes unacceptable. Consequently, the Commission considers
that in a forborne environment, it will be in the interest of the ILECs
to balance efficiency with service quality in order to offer a product
of reasonable quality at a reasonable price. The Commission considers
that if an ILEC were to fail to meet its customers' expectations for
service quality, customers will switch to a provider that offers service
of an acceptable quality. |
444. |
The Commission
further considers that the Q of S to uncontested pockets of customers
will likely be reasonable in forborne markets, even where there is no
alternate service provider. In the Commission's view, while it would be
possible for ILECs to reduce Q of S, doing so could negatively affect
the ILEC in the medium- to long-term. |
445. |
The Commission
considers that where an ILEC provides low quality service to a pocket of
uncontested customers in a forborne market, strong incentives will be
created for competitors to expand their services into that pocket. |
446. |
The Commission also
considers that ILECs generally have an interest in promoting and
protecting their brand. The Commission considers, therefore, that the
ILECs will be motivated to maintain their retail Q of S in forborne
markets. |
447. |
In light of the
above, the Commission considers that it is not necessary for it to
maintain its retail Q of S standards in a forborne market and it will
not, therefore, retain its powers under subsection 27(1) of the Act in
order to do so. |
448. |
The Commission notes
that the retail Q of S indicators are currently tracked
and reported by each ILEC across its entire operating territory. The
Commission expects the ILECs to develop the capability to report retail
Q of S results for only those areas which remain regulated.
Similarly, the Commission expects the ILECs to develop protocols to
address the provision of retail Q of S rebates in a relevant
market which transitions to a forborne environment during a retail
Q of S reporting cycle. The Commission expects that such
ILEC protocols will provide for pro-rated retail Q of S
rebates based on the period of time during the reporting cycle that
local exchange services rates were regulated in that relevant market.
Customer eligibility for such retail Q of S rebates will continue
to be established in accordance with the directives in Retail quality
of service rate adjustment plan and related issues, Telecom Decision
CRTC 2005-17, 24 March 2005. The
Commission will retain its powers under section 24 of the Act
to the extent necessary to ensure that the ILECs put in place and
observe these protocols. |
|
Price ceiling |
449. |
The Commission notes
that, in Decision 97-19, it established
a price ceiling for basic toll services to protect the interest of
customers. |
450. |
The Commission
notes that, while market forces will generally discipline ILEC rates for
most local exchange services in forborne markets, it has serious
concerns with respect to the plight of vulnerable and uncontested
residential customers. |
451. |
The Commission
considers it important to ensure that the affordability of essential
basic residential PES not be compromised in a forborne market. The
Commission is concerned that vulnerable and uncontested residential
consumers may not have access to stand-alone PES at affordable rates in
a forborne environment without a pricing safeguard. |
452. |
In light of these
concerns, the Commission considers that a ceiling on residential
stand-alone PES would be appropriate. The Commission considers that such
a ceiling would provide vulnerable and uncontested customers with a
safeguard against unreasonable rate increases in a forborne environment
while only minimally limiting the ILECs' pricing flexibility in forborne
markets. |
453. |
By contrast, the
Commission considers that market forces will likely discipline the rates
under which ILECs offer business local exchange services in forborne
markets, including to uncontested customers. The Commission considers
that should the rates for local business PES become unreasonable,
business customers will investigate other alternatives to meet their
telecommunications requirements. As such, the Commission does not
consider that a ceiling on business PES would be necessary. |
454. |
In light of the
foregoing concerns, the Commission finds it appropriate to maintain its
powers and duties under subsection 27(1) of the Act to the extent
necessary to impose a price ceiling on stand-alone residential PES. The
Commission notes that this price ceiling will apply to the most recent
approved rates at time of forbearance for stand-alone PES including
touch-tone and primary directory listing, as well as for connection
charges. In addition, the Commission notes that late payment, interest
and not sufficient funds cheque charges were not directly included as
part of the services under consideration in this proceeding, and that
the various charges contained in those tariffs currently only apply to
tariffed services. The Commission considers that these charges have a
direct impact on the affordability of residential PES service. As such,
the Commission considers that, at the time of forbearance, the applicant
ILEC will be required to modify its tariffs such that these charges and
the limits on them will apply to stand-alone PES in a forborne market. |
455. |
The Commission
notes that since this price ceiling would only apply to stand-alone
residential PES, as described above, ILECs will have the pricing
flexibility to offer bundles that include residential PES at competitive
price points. |
456. |
The Commission also
notes that it will also maintain its powers and duties under
subsection 27(1) of the Act to impose a price ceiling on those services
identified above under section 24 of the Act as being capped at their
existing rates. |
|
Subsection 27(2) |
457. |
The Commission
notes that when it has previously forborne from exercising its powers
and duties under subsection 27(2) of the Act, parties representing
consumer interests have argued that it has been to the detriment of
vulnerable consumers, particularly persons with disabilities. |
458. |
The Commission notes
that, over the years, it has been required to make determinations
mandating that the ILECs and competitors accommodate the needs of
persons with disabilities or vulnerable consumers. The Commission
further notes that in Decision 97-8,
the Commission retained its powers under subsection 27(2) of
the Act in relation to CLEC retail local exchange services. |
459. |
The Commission is
not convinced that the operation of market forces will serve to
discipline the behaviour of ILECs with respect to vulnerable customers
such as customers with disabilities. The Commission notes that it has
had, in the past, to address problems involving vulnerable customers
served by competitors that already operate in a largely unregulated
environment. The Commission considers that while the Canadian Human
Rights Act would provide some protection to vulnerable customers, it
would not be sufficient to deal with the concerns identified by ARCH and
the Consumer Groups in the present proceeding. |
460. |
The Commission
notes that, in Decision 97-8, it
retained its powers and duties under subsection 27(2) of the Act
so that it could respond to complaints alleging unjust discrimination
and undue preference in relation to services provided by CLECs to
both end-users and other carriers. The Commission did so to ensure
access to CLEC facilities to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness
of the Canadian telecommunications industry. The Commission considers
that the concerns expressed in Decision 97-8
with respect to the need to retain subsection 27(2) of the Act
in the case of CLECs apply with equal force in the case of ILECs in
forborne markets established pursuant to the local forbearance framework. |
461. |
In light of these
concerns, the Commission considers it necessary to retain its powers
under subsection 27(2) of the Act to address any issues that may arise
in forborne markets with respect to unjust discrimination or undue
preference in relation to the provision of or the charging of a rate for
a telecommunications service. |
|
Subsections 27(3) and (4) |
462. |
The Commission
considers that as a necessary consequence of its retention of section 24
and subsections 27(1) and (2) in forborne markets to the extent
described in this Decision it will also need to retain its powers and
duties under subsections 27(3) and (4) for the same purposes. The
Commission also considers it necessary to retain subsection 27(3) to the
extent that it relates to sections 34 and 40, dealing with
interconnection. |
|
Subsections 27(5) and (6) |
463. |
The Commission
considers it unnecessary to retain any of its powers under
subsections 27(5) and (6) of the Act in forborne markets. |
|
Other issues relating to the scope of forbearance
|
|
Competitor Services |
464. |
The Commission
notes that, when it forbears with respect to the regulation of a
service, it typically retains its powers to ensure that required
underlying ILEC facilities may be made available to competitors. The
Commission also notes that it has generally retained its powers
under sections 27 and 24 of the Act in order to retain the ability to
mandate that an ILEC develop new Competitor Services and arrangements.
The Commission considers that retention of these powers is important for
the purpose of promoting sustainable competition. |
465. |
Accordingly, the
Commission will retain its powers under section 24 and subsections 27(2)
and 27(4) of the Act to ensure ongoing access by competitors to
underlying ILEC facilities and functionalities and to permit the
creation of new Competitor Services and arrangements. |
|
HCSAs |
466. |
The Commission notes
that in Changes to the contribution regime, Decision CRTC 2000-745,
30 November 2000, it introduced a revenue-based contribution collection
mechanism and determined that those Canadian carriers providing residential
local exchange services in HCSAs would be entitled to receive money
in order to subsidize the provision of that service in the HCSAs.
The Commission notes that the current subsidy per residential NAS
calculation is made up of the following components: a) ILEC residential
PES costs, by band, per NAS per month, b) a 15 percent
mark-up for fixed and common costs, c) ILEC residential PES revenues,
by band, per NAS per month, and d) implicit (deemed) $5.00 per NAS
per month for optional local services. |
467. |
In a forborne
market, an ILEC will be able to lower the rates for its residential PES
without the need for Commission approval or review. The Commission notes
that a decrease in residential PES rates would normally lower the
average residential PES revenues, which would result in an increase in
subsidy. |
468. |
The Commission is
concerned, however, about the impact on the contribution collection
mechanism and the National Contribution Fund if Canadian carriers
operating in a relevant market were able to receive increased subsidy
due to the ILEC lowering its residential PES rates in a HCSA of a
forborne market. The Commission is also concerned that this situation
would allow the ILEC to recover the revenues lost from the price
reduction through increased subsidy. |
469. |
In light of the
above, the Commission finds that if an ILEC's residential PES rates in
an HCSA that is part of a forborne market are set below the tariffed
rate that was in force at the time forbearance was granted for that
relevant market, the ILEC is to use the tariffed rate at the time of
local forbearance to determine its average residential PES revenues for
subsidy calculation purposes. |
|
Review of scope of forbearance |
470. |
The Commission, as
set out above, has found it necessary to retain, at this time, certain
safeguards in order to protect customers. |
471. |
The Commission
recognizes that achieving the right balance between those obligations
that an ILEC must retain beyond those that other Canadian carriers are
subject to and the need for the free and innovative development of
competition is a difficult proposition. The Commission also recognizes
that both the operation of the markets and technology continue to evolve
and change such that those conditions that the Commission has deemed
necessary, at this time, to retain may, in the future, be unnecessary. |
472. |
In light of this,
the Commission is prepared to review all of the obligations imposed on
ILECs in forborne markets with a view to determining which, if any of
those obligations are still required and to the extent that they are
still required whether those obligations should be extended to other
Canadian carriers operating in those relevant markets. Such a review
will commence in the Commission's fiscal year starting 1 April 2009. The
Commission anticipates that the industry self-regulatory system may have
addressed many of these issues prior to the commencement of the review. |
|
Commission conclusion on the scope of forbearance |
473. |
In conclusion, the
Commission considers that, if the local forbearance criteria outlined in
this Decision are met in a relevant market, it will forbear from
exercising its powers and duties under the Act with respect to the
services within the scope of this proceeding to the following extent: |
|
- The Commission will forbear from all of its powers and duties
under sections 25, 27(5), 27(6), 29 and 31 of the Act;
|
|
- The Commission will retain its powers under section 24 of the Act
to maintain the specific conditions and obligations as set out above,
and to impose such new conditions as may be necessary in the future;
|
|
- The Commission will retain its powers under subsection 27(1) of
the Act in order to maintain a price ceiling on residential
stand-alone PES and the other services identified above, and its
powers under subsection 27(2) of the Act for the provision of
Competitor Services as set out above, and to address any issues of
unjust discrimination or undue preference; and
|
|
- The Commission will retain its powers under subsections 27(3) and
(4) to the extent necessary to support its retained powers and duties
under sections 24, 34 and 40 and subsections 27(1) and (2).
|
|
VII. Review of local forbearance
|
474. |
Parties to the
proceeding provided varying views regarding the possibility of
re-regulating a forborne market and the circumstances under which this
could occur. There was a general consensus that the Commission should
not adopt a system that would result in wild swings between
de-regulation and regulation. Parties also generally agreed that it
would be in circumstances of market failure that the Commission would
need to re-regulate. Where parties differed was with respect to the
kinds of indicators that should cause the Commission to believe that
market failure had occurred and re-regulation should be contemplated. |
475. |
In the Commission's
view, a decision to forbear from regulating local exchange service based
on the criteria outlined in this Decision should not be reversed easily,
based on temporary swings in a potentially volatile marketplace. |
476. |
The Commission is
also of the view that any post forbearance assessment of a particular
forbearance decision should be based on the facts present in an
individual relevant market and not on rigid rules that are applied
universally without reference to circumstances. |
477. |
The Commission
considers, therefore, that post-forbearance criteria that, if triggered,
would result in automatic re-regulation are not appropriate. A decision
to forbear from regulating local exchange services in a particular
relevant market indicates that the Commission has found that market
forces are sufficiently strong in that relevant market to discipline the
ILEC providing local exchange services in that relevant market and to
provide to customers in that relevant market the benefits of competition
in terms of price, quality and innovation. |
478. |
In the
Commission's view, it is only where the Commission has received evidence
demonstrating that market forces in a relevant market are no longer
sufficiently strong to discipline the ILEC providing local exchange
services in that relevant market that the Commission should initiate a
review of forbearance in a particular relevant market. Such evidence
could include a material reduction in the number of competitors offering
service in a forborne market, a material increase in ILEC market share
in that relevant market, a significant long-term decrease in the ILEC's
performance with reference to the competitor Q of S indicators or a
material sustained increase in prices to customers in the forborne
market. |
479. |
A request for a
review of forbearance in a relevant market may be initiated by a Part
VII application pursuant to the CRTC Telecommunications Rules
of Procedure. Alternatively the Commission, itself, may seek
comments from parties as to whether a review of forbearance should be
initiated in a particular relevant market. |
480. |
Should the
Commission consider that a review of forbearance is warranted, it will
conduct a further process to examine whether an ILEC has regained
sufficient market power within the particular relevant market such that
the achievement of the telecommunications policy objectives of the Act
or the continuance of competition sufficient to protect the interests of
users has or will be undermined in that relevant market. Should the
Commission so find, it may order that the particular relevant market be
completely or partially re-regulated on such conditions as the
Commission considers appropriate. |
|
VIII. Transitional regime
|
481. |
The Commission received
submissions from parties on both the general advisability of a transitional
regime as well as under what circumstances the Commission should lessen
or remove the existing competitive safeguards for promotions defined
in Decision 2005-25 and the local
winback rule, permit the ex parte filing of tariff applications
for promotions, and permit the waiving of service charges for residential
local winbacks (collectively, the competitive safeguards). |
482. |
With the exception
of the Consumer Groups and MTS Allstream, all parties opposed, for
varying reasons, the creation of a transitional regime. Some parties,
such as some of the ILECs, argued that a transitional regime was
unnecessary as certain of the proposed elements of such a regime, like
the removal of the local winback rule, should be implemented immediately
on a national basis and not as part of a staged transitional regime in
particular relevant markets. These same ILECs also reiterated the
position, which they had taken in a Part VII application filed by
Bell Canada and SaskTel dated 25 April 2005, that the local winback rule
was contrary to section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms. Other parties, such as many of the competitors, argued
that a transitional regime was inappropriate as the same proposed
elements, like the removal of the winback rule in a relevant market,
should occur only when an ILEC is entitled to forbearance in that
relevant market. |
483. |
The Commission is
not convinced that the competitive safeguards listed in Public Notice
2005-2 should be removed
immediately on a national basis as suggested by some of the ILECs.
As noted above, the local exchange services market is in a state of
rapid change. In the Commission's view, the state of local competition,
when considered on a national basis, has not reached levels that would
justify the immediate removal of these competitive safeguards at a
national level. |
484. |
The Commission
does consider, however, that the evidence on the record of this proceeding
demonstrates the need for an immediate modification to the winback
rule. In Call-Net Part VII Application – Promotion of local residential competition,
Telecom Decision CRTC 2004-4, 27 January
2004 (Decision 2004-4), the Commission
extended from three months to 12 months the no-winback period with
respect to residential local exchange service under the winback rule
on the basis of the market reality at that time, in which residential
local exchange competition was developing slowly and there were seemingly
limited prospects for growth in the near future. |
485. |
As set out above,
the evidence received by the Commission, leading up to this proceeding
and in the course of this proceeding, demonstrates that the local
exchange services market is rapidly evolving; more and more Canadians
have competitive options available to them for local exchange services
and hundreds of thousands of Canadians are choosing those competitive
options. In light of this new market reality, the Commission considers
that the 12-month no-winback period with respect to residential local
exchange service under the winback rule is no longer appropriate.
The Commission finds that the residential local exchange service no-winback
period is more appropriately set at three months, as it was prior
to Decision 2004-4. This change
will bring the residential local exchange service no-winback period
back into line with the no-winback period for business local exchange
service and also with the no-winback period imposed on cable LECs
in multi-unit dwellings with respect to winning back cable customers.
In the Commission's view, a no-winback period of three months is,
under current market conditions, sufficient and necessary to prevent
the ILECs from enjoying an undue or unfair advantage, or otherwise
benefiting unfairly, as a result of their enhanced ability to target,
in direct communications, former local exchange customers for winback
purposes. |
486. |
The Commission
therefore restates the local winback rule to be as follows: |
|
..an ILEC is not to attempt to win back a business customer with
respect to primary exchange service or local VoIP service, and in the
case of a residential customer of local exchange service (i.e. PES or
local VoIP service), with respect to any service, for a period
commencing at the time of the local service request and terminating
three months after that customer's primary local exchange service or
local VoIP service has been completely transferred to another local
service provider, with one exception: ILECs should be allowed to win
back customers who call to advise them that they intend to change
local service provider.
|
487. |
With respect to a
staged transition to forbearance, as proposed by some parties, the
Commission considers that there is some merit in providing ILECs with a
measure of preliminary regulatory relaxation prior to forbearance being
granted in a relevant market. The Commission considers that, where an
applicant ILEC can demonstrate that it has met the criteria, set out
below, in a relevant market, competition in that relevant market will
have reached a sufficient level that the ILECs' ability to use their
incumbency advantages to target competitors' customers for winback
purposes, in direct communications, will no longer provide them with an
undue or unfair advantage or otherwise provide them with an unfair
opportunity to win back former customers, and, therefore, the local
winback rule can be lifted. |
488. |
In light of the
above, the Commission is prepared to consider applications from an ILEC
requesting the removal of the local winback rule in a relevant market
when the applicant ILEC can demonstrate that it has lost 20 percent of
its market share in that relevant market and that, for the three months
prior to the application it has met individual standards for each of the
14 specified competitor Q of S indicators of the RRP for competitors,
when the results are averaged across the three-month period. |
489. |
With respect to
the arguments raised by the ILECs that the local winback rule, as
it existed prior to the release of this Decision, violates section 2(b)
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Commission
notes that it is today in Bell Canada and Saskatchewan Telecommunications'
request that the Commission stop applying the local exchange service
winback restrictions on the basis that they unjustifiably infringe
the right to freedom of expression in section 2(b) of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Telecom Decision CRTC
2006-16, 6 April 2006, releasing
its decision on the constitutionality of that local winback rule. The
Commission notes that the only difference between that local winback
rule and the new local winback rule set out above is that
the latter sets out a 3-month no-winback period for residential customers,
as opposed to a 12-month no-winback period in the previous rule. |
|
IX. Aliant Telecom's forbearance application
|
490. |
As indicated above,
the Commission decided to consider in this proceeding Aliant Telecom's
application for forbearance from the regulation of residential local
exchange services in 32 local exchanges in Nova Scotia and Prince Edward
Island. A number of parties made submissions either supporting or
opposing that application. |
|
Parties supporting Aliant Telecom's application |
491. |
SaskTel submitted
that Aliant Telecom's original application and the updated evidence
conclusively demonstrated that in the specified exchanges Aliant Telecom
did not have market power. |
492. |
TCI submitted that
Aliant Telecom's forbearance application should already have been
approved as the evidence before the Commission clearly showed that
Aliant Telecom did not have market power in the areas where
Aliant Telecom sought forbearance. |
493. |
Bell Canada/Télébec
submitted that, in Aliant Telecom's original application and updated
evidence dated 18 May 2005, Aliant Telecom has conclusively demonstrated
that in the specified exchanges EastLink was a significant and effective
competitor, and that Aliant Telecom did not have substantial market
power. |
|
Parties opposing Aliant Telecom's application |
494. |
Call-Net submitted
that Aliant Telecom's application was, and remained, premature.
Call-Net submitted that this fact was confirmed by the Commission's
determinations with respect to the ILECs', including Aliant Telecom's,
overwhelming dominance in the market for local exchange services set
out in Decision 2005-28. |
495. |
CCTA submitted that
the Commission should deny Aliant Telecom's application on the basis
that EastLink was not a viable entrant at this time and that forbearance
at this time could end a further roll-out of services by EastLink. |
496. |
Rogers submitted
that Aliant Telecom's application was premature and should be denied. In
Rogers' view, Aliant Telecom did not meet the forbearance criteria that
Rogers had proposed in this proceeding for the relevant product and
geographic markets. |
497. |
Cybersurf was of
the view that Aliant Telecom had not met the pre-conditions, which
Cybersurf had proposed, required for forbearance of its wireline local
exchange services at this time. |
498. |
EastLink submitted
that it was still too early to grant Aliant Telecom forbearance for its
residential local exchange services in the 32 exchanges. EastLink was of
the view that it had not achieved a sufficient foothold to be able to
withstand and respond to targeted behaviour by Aliant Telecom on an
ongoing basis. EastLink submitted that based upon its proposed
forbearance test and based upon the evidence currently before the
Commission, it was still too early to grant Aliant Telecom forbearance
for residential local exchange service for the 32 local exchanges
specified in Aliant Telecom's application. In EastLink's view, there was
insufficient evidence to indicate that in Aliant Telecom's territory
sustainable competition had been achieved to warrant granting
forbearance. EastLink submitted, therefore, that Aliant Telecom's
application for forbearance should be denied. |
499. |
MTS Allstream
submitted that there was little or no evidence of falling local prices
in Aliant Telecom's operating territory on the record of this
proceeding. |
500. |
The Consumer Groups
submitted that Aliant Telecom's application for forbearance should be
denied as it did not meet the criteria for forbearance proposed by the
Consumer Groups. |
|
Commission's analysis and determinations
|
501. |
The Commission indicated,
in Public Notice 2005-2,
that it would apply to Aliant Telecom's application the local forbearance
framework developed in this Decision, including the conclusions regarding
relevant markets and forbearance criteria. |
502. |
The Commission
notes that the 32 local exchanges in Nova Scotia and Prince Edward
Island, for which Aliant Telecom applied for residential local exchange
service forbearance, are located within four of the six LFRs which the
Commission has identified in Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island.
Specifically the 32 local exchanges are located in |
|
- Aliant Telecom LFR 12-01 Nova Scotia, Halifax CMA (Halifax LFR)
|
|
- Aliant Telecom LFR 11-01 Prince Edward Island, Prince Edward
Island ER
|
|
- Aliant Telecom LFR 12-03 Nova Scotia, North Shore ER
|
|
- Aliant Telecom LFR 12-05 Nova Scotia, Southern ER
|
503. |
With respect to
these regions, the Commission finds, based on the evidence presented in
this proceeding, that Aliant Telecom's market share loss is as follows: |
|
- Aliant Telecom LFR 12-01 Nova Scotia, Halifax CMA – 33 percent
|
|
- Aliant Telecom LFR 11-01 Prince Edward Island, Prince Edward
Island ER – 13 percent
|
|
- Aliant Telecom LFR 12-03 Nova Scotia, North Shore ER –
nine percent
|
|
- Aliant Telecom LFR 12-05 Nova Scotia, Southern ER – eight percent
|
504. |
The Commission
finds, therefore, that Aliant Telecom has met the market share loss
criterion of the local forbearance framework with respect to the Halifax
LFR. However as Aliant Telecom has not met the market share loss
criteria with respect to any of the other LFRs, it will not be necessary
to consider these LFRs with respect to the remaining forbearance
criteria. |
505. |
The Commission
notes that Aliant Telecom does not currently have an approved bundled
ADSL tariff. The Commission finds, therefore, that Aliant Telecom has
not met the Competitor Services tariff requirement for residential local
exchange forbearance. |
506. |
The Commission
notes that the record provides clear evidence of rivalrous behaviour in
the Halifax LFR. Both Aliant Telecom and EastLink are vigorously
competing for residential local exchange customers through the use of
bundles, promotions and extensive advertising campaigns. The Commission
considers, therefore, that Aliant Telecom has provided sufficient
evidence of rivalrous behaviour in the Halifax LFR. |
507. |
The Commission
notes that the access to OSS criterion is not applicable to
Aliant Telecom's application as the Commission had not approved an
implementation plan for access to Aliant Telecom's OSS prior to the
local forbearance application. |
508. |
With respect to
the competitor Q of S criteria of the local forbearance
framework, the Commission notes that Aliant Telecom has not met
the competitor Q of S criteria of the local forbearance
framework. Based on the reports received by the Commission from Aliant Telecom
covering the period of July 2005 until December 2005, 43 percent
of Aliant Telecom's six-month average performances for each competitor indicator
were at or above the minimum threshold required by Decision 2005-20.
In order to meet the competitor Q of S criterion for
local forbearance this number must be 100 percent. |
509. |
The Commission
notes that while Aliant Telecom's application was filed prior to the
creation of the current competitor Q of S regime, the Commission
considers it necessary to assess that application against all of the
criteria set out in its local forbearance framework including the
competitor Q of S criteria. In the Commission's view, achievement by an
applicant ILEC of the competitor Q of S criteria is of critical
importance in demonstrating that competition in the relevant market will
be sustainable. |
510. |
In light of the
above, the Commission denies Aliant Telecom's application for
residential local forbearance. The Commission notes that Aliant Telecom
can reapply for residential local forbearance when it can demonstrate
that it has met all of the local forbearance criteria in an LFR. The
Commission notes that with respect to the Halifax LFR Aliant Telecom met
all of the local forbearance framework criteria except the competitor
Q of S criteria and the Competitor Services tariff criteria. In this
respect the Commission is prepared to consider a new application for
residential local forbearance by Aliant Telecom in the Halifax LFR,
which demonstrates that Aliant Telecom meets all of the local
forbearance criteria, on an expedited basis. |
511. |
The Commission also
notes that Aliant Telecom does not, at this time, qualify for
the transitional measure of the removal of the local winback rule
as set out above. While Aliant Telecom has lost more than 20 percent
of its market share in the Halifax LFR, based on reports received
by the Commission from Aliant Telecom covering the three-month
period ending in December 2005, 50 percent of Aliant Telecom's
three-month average performances for each competitor indicator were
at or above the minimum standard required by Decision 2005-20.
Therefore it has not achieved sufficient results over the last
three reported months on its competitor Q of S indicators
in its serving territory to meet that criterion for the lifting of
the local winback rule in the Halifax LFR. |
|
X. Other implementation issues
|
512. |
In order to
implement the local forbearance framework outlined above, the Commission
needs to address the three following issues in this Decision: |
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- data gathering and calculating market share loss;
|
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- process for applying for local forbearance; and
|
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- process for applying for removal of the local winback rule
|
513. |
The Commission
received submissions from the parties to the proceeding on these issues
and has considered those submissions in reaching its decision. To the
extent that those submissions raised concerns that the Commission felt
needed to be addressed, it has done so in the above sections,
particularly Section V, and therefore will not summarize those
submissions here. |
|
Data gathering and calculating market share loss |
514. |
As set out above
in Section V, ILEC market share loss within the relevant market is an
important part of assessing whether or not an applicant ILEC has
demonstrated that forbearance within a particular relevant market is
warranted. As such the Commission will need to collect the necessary
data in order to allow both itself and other parties to know the amount
of ILEC market share loss within any particular relevant market.
Accordingly, the Commission will continue to require all TSPs to file
their annual data with the Commission for total local wireline
connections (TLWC) separately for residential and business local
exchange services by wire centre. |
515. |
The formula that
the Commission will use to calculate ILEC market share loss within any
particular relevant market will be as follows: |
|
ILEC market share loss = TLWC – the ILEC local
wireline connections
TLWC |
516. |
The Commission will
measure TLWC and ILEC local wireline connections based on the number of
NAS and NAS-equivalents reported for each relevant market. As set out
above, the Commission considers that the concept of NAS has the
advantage of being an already defined term, familiar to all parties, and
hence administratively simpler to use than other concepts suggested in
this proceeding. |
517. |
The market shares
of the "Incumbents", "Competitors (ILEC out-of-territory)" and
"Competitors (other)", as those terms are used in the Commission's
Annual Monitoring Report, will be calculated on an annual basis,
separately for business and residential local exchange services, for
each LFR, based on information submitted by all TSPs as part of the
Commission's Annual Monitoring Report process. These market shares will
be published, separately for business and residential local exchange
services, for each LFR, expressed in each case as a percentage, in the
Commission's Annual Monitoring Report in July of each year commencing in
2006. |
518. |
In addition, the
Commission will, for its own internal use, collect data on a quarterly
basis from each ILEC with respect to the number of NAS each ILEC has in
each relevant market. Each ILEC is required to file, with the
Commission, their local wireline connections by wire centre separately
for business and residential local exchange services for each LFR in its
operating territory within 45 calendar days from the end of each
quarter. Each ILEC will be required to make its first quarterly filing
beginning with the second quarter of 2006. The Commission notes that the
quarterly filing for the fourth quarter shall be filed by each ILEC as
part of its Annual Monitoring Report filings. The Commission does
not, at this time, intend to publish this quarterly data. |
519. |
The Commission
notes that at the time of an application for either forbearance or the
removal of the local winback rule, pursuant to the framework set out in
this Decision, the applicant ILEC is required to submit, with its
application, its market share loss for the LFR in question based on the
TLWC for that LFR. The Commission notes that the TLWC for a particular
LFR can be derived, by the ILEC, using the percentage market shares
published in the most recent Annual Monitoring Report. |
520. |
The Commission
further notes that it may, at the time of receipt of an application for
local forbearance, request further data, from the applicant or others,
that it deems necessary to determine whether local forbearance is
warranted in that particular case. |
|
Process for applying for local forbearance |
521. |
In establishing a
process for dealing with applications for local forbearance filed
pursuant to the framework set out in this Decision, the Commission
considers it important to provide a process that allows for timely
decisions to be rendered on such applications. Where an applicant ILEC
provides the necessary information, in the form required, the Commission
undertakes to make a determination on its application within the time
frames set out below. The Commission expects, after the first number of
applications have been determined, that it will be able to further
streamline these time frames. |
522. |
An ILEC should
submit an application to the Commission requesting forbearance in a
relevant market that contains evidence demonstrating that the criteria
set out in the local forbearance framework have been met. The
application should also list the tariff items and associated tariff
numbers of the services for which the ILEC is requesting forbearance.
The Commission notes that applications that are deficient in providing
all of the required information will be returned to the applicant ILEC. |
523. |
For ease of
administration and in order to increase efficiency, each application
should only be with reference to one relevant market. Upon receipt of
the application, the Commission will post the application to its
website. The applicant ILEC will, prior to filing, serve a copy of its
application on all registered CLECs and any other known TSP providing
local exchange service in the relevant market. Other parties that may be
interested in commenting on such applications for local forbearance will
be responsible for monitoring the Commission's website in order to be
aware of when such applications have been filed. |
524. |
The application
itself shall be divided into three parts: one part should contain the
submissions of the ILEC as to why it believes that it is entitled to
forbearance in the relevant market applied for; the next part should
contain all of the evidence on which the ILEC relies to establish the
accuracy of its submissions. The final part should include a draft
communications plan for the Commission's approval. The draft
communications plan should include descriptions of how the ILEC intends
to provide an explanation of local forbearance to customers in the
relevant market, information on the ongoing availability of stand-alone
PES in the relevant market and contact information to customers who have
questions or concerns. Submissions should be no longer than 25 pages,
including footnotes. The other parts of the application are not limited
in length. |
525. |
Any party wishing
to file comments on the ILEC's application for local forbearance should
file its comments with the Commission and serve the applicant ILEC with
a copy of its comments within 30 calendar days of the ILEC's application
being filed. Responding comments should be divided into two parts: the
first part should contain any comments of the responding party on the
ILEC's application for forbearance; the second part should contain all
of the evidence on which the responding party relies to establish the
accuracy of its submissions. The first part should be no longer than 20
pages, including footnotes. The second part is not limited in length. |
526. |
Reply comments may
be filed with the Commission and served on all other participating
parties by the applicant ILEC within 10 calendar days of the deadline
for comments. Reply comments should be no longer than 10 pages,
including footnotes. |
527. |
Within 50 calendar
days of receiving the ILEC's application, the Commission will determine
whether an interrogatory process is required to obtain further
information, and will either issue interrogatories within that same 50
calendar day period or issue a letter indicating that the record of the
proceeding is closed. Interrogatory responses will generally be required
within 10 calendar days. If an interrogatory process is required,
parties will be provided with a further opportunity to file with the
Commission and serve on the ILEC further comments within 10 calendar
days of the end of the interrogatory process and the ILEC will be
entitled to file and serve further reply comments within 10 calendar
days of the deadline for further comments. |
528. |
The Commission
undertakes, under normal circumstances, to complete its analysis and
issue its decision on the application for local forbearance within 80
calendar days of the close of the record. The Commission notes that it
has attached to this Decision as Appendix D a template providing further
detail on its expectations with respect to applications for local
forbearance made pursuant to the framework established in this Decision. |
|
Process for applying for removal of the local winback rule |
529. |
The Commission
notes that the process for determining whether the two criteria
established in this framework for the removal of the local winback rule
in a relevant market have been met should be straightforward and not
likely be subject to much, if any, dispute. As such, the Commission
believes that a streamlined process is appropriate for this type of
application. |
530. |
In order to receive
relief from the local winback rule in accordance with this Decision, an
ILEC must submit an application to the Commission that contains evidence
demonstrating that the criteria set out above for removal of the local
winback rule have been met. The Commission notes that applications that
are deficient in providing all of the required information will be
returned to the applicant ILEC. |
531. |
For ease of
administration and in order to increase efficiency, each application
should only be with reference to one relevant market. Upon receipt of
the application, the Commission will post the application to its
website. The applicant ILEC should, prior to filing, serve a copy of its
application on all registered CLECs and any other known TSP providing
local exchange service in the relevant market. Other parties that may be
interested in commenting on such applications for local forbearance will
be responsible for monitoring the Commission's website in order to be
aware of when such applications have been filed. |
532. |
The application
itself shall be divided into two parts: the first part should contain
the submissions of the ILEC as to why it believes that it is entitled to
relief from the local winback rule in the relevant market applied for;
the second part should contain all of the evidence on which the ILEC
relies to establish the truth of its submissions. The first part should
be no longer than 20 pages, including footnotes. The second part is not
limited in length. |
533. |
Any party wishing
to file comments on the ILEC's application for relief from the local
winback rule should file its comments with the Commission and serve the
applicant ILEC with a copy of its comments within 25 calendar days of
the filing of the ILEC's application. Responding comments should also be
divided into two parts: the first part should contain any comments of
the responding party on the ILEC's application for forbearance; the
second part should contain all of the evidence on which the responding
party relies to establish the truth of its submissions. The first part
should be no longer than 20 pages, including footnotes. The second part
is not limited in length. |
534. |
Reply comments may
be filed with the Commission and served on all other parties by the
applicant ILEC within seven calendar days of the deadline for comments.
Reply comments should be no longer than 10 pages, including footnotes. |
535. |
Within 45 calendar
days of receiving the ILEC's application, the Commission will issue
either a final decision disposing of the application or a letter
indicating that it is unable to reach a decision within that 45 day
period and indicating within what period of time it intends to dispose
of the application. The Commission notes that it has attached to this
Decision as Appendix E a template providing further detail on its
expectations with respect to applications for relief from the local
winback rule made pursuant to the framework established in this
Decision. |
|
Secretary General |
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This document
is available in alternative format upon request, and may also be examined
in PDF format or in HTML at the following
Internet site: http://www.crtc.gc.ca |
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Footnotes:
1 The Commission notes that while the
industry uses the terms NAS and NAL interchangeably, the Commission uses
each term for a specific purpose. For the purposes of the local
forbearance framework established in this Decision the Commission has,
for the reasons set out above, decided to use NAS.
2 The Commission notes that this six‑month
averaging does not apply to the RRP regime established in Decision
2005‑20.
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Appendix A
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