Government Response to the Tenth Report of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts
RECOMMENDATION 1
That deputy ministers be designated as accounting officers with
responsibilities similar to those held by accounting officers in the United
Kingdom. Features of this arrangement must include, but not limited to,
the following:
- The personal duty of signing
the financial accounts described in his or her letter of appointment.
- The personal responsibility
for the overall organization, management and staffing of the department and for
department-wide procedures in financial or other matters.
- Ensuring that there is a high
standard of financial management in the department as a whole.
- Personal responsibility for
all powers and authorities either delegated or directly held.
- Ensuring that financial
systems and procedures promote the efficient and economical conduct of business
and safeguard financial propriety and regularity throughout the department.
- Ensuring that the department
complies with parliamentary requirements in the control of expenditure with
particular attention ensuring that funds are spent only to the extent and
purposes authorized by Parliament.
- As accounting officers, the
personal responsibility of deputy ministers for negligence and wrongdoing does
not diminish over time.
RECOMMENDATION 2
That as accounting officers, deputy ministers be held to account for the
performance of their duties and for their exercise of statutory authorities
before the House
of Commons Standing Committee on Public Accounts; and
RECOMMENDATION 3
That the following procedures be adhered to when deputy ministers (as
accounting officers) are in disagreement with their ministers regarding
administration and operation of their departments:
- The deputy minister must
inform the minister if he or she has objections to a course of action proposed
by the minister.
- If the minister still wished
to proceed, the deputy minister must set out his or her objections to the course
of action in a letter to the minister stating the reasons for the objections and
the deputy minister's duty to notify both the Auditor
General of Canada and the Comptroller
General of Canada.
- If the minister still wished
to proceed, he or she must instruct the deputy minister in writing to do so.
- If instructions to proceed
are received in writing, the deputy minister must send copies of the relevant
correspondence to both the Auditor General of Canada and Comptroller General of
Canada.
RECOMMENDATION 4
That the government endeavour to retain deputy ministers in their
positions for periods of at least three years; however, their responsibilities
are in no way diminished should their tenure be less then the recommended three
years.
The government welcomes the Committee's contribution to the discussion of
strengthening public sector accountability and appreciates the Committee's
effort and detail in its analysis of ministerial and deputy ministerial
accountability in Canadian government.
In responding to the Committee's report, the government has chosen not to
provide detailed responses to each of the Committee's specific
recommendations. Taking into account other related activities currently
underway, including the Commission of Inquiry
into the Sponsorship Program and Advertising Activities, led by Mr. Justice
John Gomery, and the preparation of a review of the responsibilities and
accountabilities of ministers and senior officials, the government is giving
active consideration to a number of measures to strengthen accountability in
order to improve public sector management that will be elaborated upon in the
coming months. Nevertheless, the government would like to take this
opportunity to provide some general observations about the accounting officer
concept and current Canadian practice.
It is the government's position that the Committee's report contains a
number of apparent misconceptions about the existing ministerial and deputy
ministerial accountability system. The report conveys the general
impression that there is ambiguity in the current system; however, there is no
ambiguity with regard to the assignment of accountability – ministers are
responsible for and accountable to Parliament
for the overall management and direction of their departments, whether
pertaining to policy or administration and whether actions are taken by
ministers personally or by unelected officials under ministers' authority or
under authorities vested in them directly.
Nor is there ambiguity in the accountabilities of deputy ministers.
Deputy ministers are accountable to their ministers (and ultimately, through the
Clerk
of the Privy Council, to the Prime Minister)
for the discharge of their responsibilities, as outlined in legislation or in management
policies approved by the Treasury
Board. Even when senior officials support the accountability of
ministers by providing information publicly, such as when appearing before
parliamentary committees, they do so on behalf of their ministers. These
officials are answerable to Parliament in that they have a duty to inform and
explain. They do not have direct accountability to Parliament and may
neither commit to a course of action (which would require a decision from
ministers) nor be subjected to the personal consequences that parliamentarians
may mete out.
The government also notes a number of specific points in the Committee's
report with which there is disagreement. For example the report states,
"Once a minister has departed from a portfolio, no one can be held accountable
by Parliament for what was done during that minister's tenure" (page 6,
paragraph 2). In fact, the current minister is accountable for
taking corrective action, as appropriate, as well as for answering
questions. Holding a former minister accountable to Parliament would not
make sense because that person no longer has any authority to take corrective
action. The logic of this is all the more apparent when the former
minister is no longer in government, for example following a change in
government after a general election. Further, if a
former minister is accused of unlawful conduct, as opposed to mismanagement, he
or she is subject to the same processes of the justice system as anyone else.
The report states "ministers are answerable, but not fully accountable to
Parliament for what is done by non-departmental agencies and other arm's
length organization with the powers assigned to them by statute" (page 6,
paragraph 4). It is true that ministers are not accountable, but rather
answerable, for matters that are explicitly removed from their purview.
Thus, for example, ministers are not accountable for the decisions of tribunals
or the day-to-day management of agencies and Crown corporations. However,
ministers are accountable for arm's length entities in their portfolio at a
systemic level - for example, to ensure that the right individuals are
appointed, that the right framework legislation and corporate plan are in place,
that the organization has received broad policy direction consistent with its
mandate, and that the organization delivers on its mandate.
Further, the report states that "Ministers are accountable for the actions
of officials if these actions are broadly reflective of ministerial direction,
and they are accountable for actions taken or not taken in relation to prevent
(sic) errors or wrongdoing that could reasonably have been anticipated, but they
are not directly accountable for the errors or wrongdoing of officials
themselves" (page 7, paragraph 2). This inappropriately equates
accountability with blame – ministers are accountable for all
actions of their officials in that they must explain and take action to correct
as appropriate, but ministers are subject to personal consequences only where
the matter can be attributed to their own inappropriate action or failure to
act.
Finally the report describes as a "major weakness" the fact that deputy
ministers are not accountable for their statutory authorities "to the ultimate
sources of those authorities … the Parliament of Canada" (page 15, paragraph
2). However, Parliament creates many statutory obligations – under the Income
Tax Act, for example – but this does not give Parliament authority to
oversee compliance or enforce the law. That is a function of the
executive.
The government also has some general observations about the accounting
officer model and the current deputy ministerial system in Canada. The government notes that the responsibilities of accounting officers are very
similar to those of a deputy minister under the Financial
Administration Act and Treasury Board policies. Similar to
accounting officers, deputy ministers are responsible for financial regularity
and probity; economy, efficiency and effectiveness; financial and management
systems for departmental programs and public property. Further, deputy
ministers regularly appear before parliamentary committees to provide
information and explanations concerning the administration of the department and
programs under their authority.
Without further clarification, the government has concerns regarding the
Committee's recommendation that deputy ministers be held to account "before"
the Committee. The government notes the distinction made by the Committee
between accountability before Parliament and accountability to
Parliament. If accountability before Parliament means the rendering of a
factual account of what was done and answering questions to provide information
and explanations before a parliamentary committee, it is difficult to see how
that would differ from the existing system, whereby deputy ministers are
answerable to parliamentary committees.
The government also has concerns regarding the 'special procedure' of
documenting and reporting an overruling by the minister, particularly if it were
required in the context of any "disagreement with their ministers regarding
administration and operation of their departments". There is nothing
currently to stop a deputy minister from requesting written instructions from
his or her minister. However, systematically formalizing and potentially
making public any disagreement on administrative or operational matters
runs the risk of significantly undermining the working relationship between
ministers and deputy ministers that is essential to the effective operation of
government departments.
The appointment of deputy ministers is based on the operational and policy
needs of the government. The length of a deputy minister's term in a
position in no way diminishes his or her accountability and
responsibility. Deputy ministers typically have significant depth and
breath of experience and expertise, and they remain accountable for the
performance of their departments regardless of the duration of their
assignment. However, the government does make best efforts for deputy
ministers to remain in position for a number of years to ensure stability and
continuity for the organization. A review of deputy ministerial
assignments over the last ten years indicates that deputy ministers have served
on average almost 3.5 years per assignment during that time.
Putting aside specific consideration of the accounting officer model, a core
issue in the Canadian context is the need to clarify the expectations of
ministers and deputy ministers in exercising their management responsibilities
and accountabilities. The concerns about clarifying who is responsible for
what, which in part have given rise to the suggested introduction of the
accounting officer model as a solution, are being directly addressed by two
specific government initiatives that will clarify expectations, the assessment
of performance and the meting of consequences. These are: i) the
consolidation and streamlining of the suite of Treasury Board management
policies; and ii) the continuing development and implementation of the Management
Accountability Framework.
To hold individuals accountable for their performance in fulfilling delegated
responsibilities, it must be clear, through the Treasury Board's management
policies, who is charged with doing what. The government is streamlining
the Treasury Board suite of management policies – both by reducing the number
of policies and by simplifying the content of each policy – in order to focus
the management policy suite more narrowly on the core principles of sound public
management. The renewal of Treasury Board policies is ongoing and will
reinforce the essential control and management systems deputy ministers must
have in place in their departments.
The Management
Accountability Framework (MAF) was developed in 2003 to set out the
management expectations of deputy ministers with respect to ten broad elements
of management. The MAF is currently being used in three related
ways. First, it clarifies the expectations for management that pertain to
deputy ministers and the standards that should guide departmental
practices. Second, the Treasury
Board Secretariat is using the MAF as a key tool in the monitoring and
oversight of departments by doing assessments of management performance and
using these as the basis of discussion between the Secretary
of the Treasury Board and deputy ministers of departments in order to
establish management improvement priorities. Third, the MAF is also being
used in determining the consequences of management performance, as the
assessment of departmental performance against the MAF, among other things, is
considered by the Clerk of the Privy Council, in consultation with the Committee
of Senior Officials, in making recommendations on the performance ratings of
deputy ministers to the Prime Minister. Finally, in the future, the MAF
will be the basis for reporting on whole-of-government management performance.
In conclusion, these two initiatives, unto themselves, will go a long way to
strengthen accountability in a manner consistent with the overall approach to
improving public sector management initiated by the government and within
Canadian traditions and realities.
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