



DEBRIEFING

Flight Safety is Everybody's Business

WRONG RADAR APPROACH USED **(18 June 03 – Occurrence #112488)**

An Aurora was being vectored to final approach for a precision radar approach (PAR) to runway 11. The PAR controller issued headings and descent instructions consistent with a PAR to runway 11. These were flown by the crew. However, the aircraft maintained right of the "ON Course" for most of the approach. At ¾ mile from touchdown, the pilot advised that he was taking over visually. The PAR was properly aligned to runway 11, thus presenting the correct radar picture however, after the approach, the controller noticed the cursor select switch was set to runway 29, when it should have been set to runway 11. The aircraft landed without incident.

Debriefing. Luckily, the aircraft was in VMC conditions. In this case, the controller had been involved in managerial duties prior to being called back into the shack to conduct the PAR. His focus had remained on admin problems resulting in his forgetting to verify the radar prior to conducting the PAR. Additionally, the controller did not recognize the cause of the irregular headings needed to maintain the final approach course until after the approach was discontinued. At the start of the shift, there had been three runway changes in a very short period of time. During this time the controller recalls performing the alignment check and the verification procedures on the PAR for Rwy 11. In this instance, the preventive measures involved briefings and administrative training on prioritization and time management. This example emphasizes how easily one can become distracted. Verification of control equipment by those using it must be carefully completed, every single time. For the controllers, have you developed a method to handle your clerical responsibilities when you control? To be an effective controller, the ability to blend operational and administrative duties is essential and could mean the difference between a successful, or disastrous, approach and landing. For the pilots, maintaining situational awareness even when under positive control could one day save your life.

AIRBUS NEAR MISS **(12 Apr 03 – Occurrence # 111784)**

During climb out from Halifax to FL330, a CC150 crew received a Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) Resolution Advisories (RA) - CLIMB while passing FL322. The autopilot was disconnected and the RA commands was

followed. Moncton Centre called and asked for "expedite climb" then "descend" and then "climb". The crew advised ATC of "TCAS CLIMB". Traffic was opposite direction at FL320. The TCAS - CLEAR OF CONFLICT call occurred at FL335. The threat traffic was estimated to have passed within 500 ft laterally of the aircraft.

Debriefing. The reaction of the crew in this case is to be commended, as it was letter perfect. The Transport Canada Advisory Circular No 0210 explains the need for accurate and prompt response to Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) and/or TCAS. Safety studies have confirmed that the significant safety benefit afforded by ACAS / TCAS could be seriously degraded by a deficient response to RAs. The midair aircraft collision near the Swiss-German border last summer is a prime example. The safety benefit of ACAS / TCAS has been eroded where the responses of pilots to RAs have been inadequate and where manoeuvres contrary to the RAs have occurred. Crews are reminded that they are authorized by GPH 204 Section 6 paragraph 580 subparagraph 6. and if applicable, by Aircraft Flight Manual (AFM) limitations, to deviate from their current Air Traffic Controller (ATC) clearance to the extent necessary to comply with a ACAS / TCAS resolution advisory or in case of an emergency. This is particularly important when issued an opposite avoiding instruction by an ATC who shall be notified as soon as possible of the deviation.

