

Alberta Automobile Insurance Rate Board Review of Profit Level for Automobile Insurance

A Submission by Facility Association

November 8, 2006

1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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3 Facility Association operates two types of residual market mechanisms in Alberta: Risk 4 Sharing Pools and the "traditional" type, referred to simply as the Residual Market. Due to 5 their size and characteristics, the Risk Sharing Pools expose companies to an additional 6 element of financial risk that is largely beyond their control. To the extent that risk is 7 correlated with potential return, insurers ought to be able to pursue a higher level of return 8 to compensate for a higher level of risk. Residual Market risks have historically been 9 priced without a cost of capital provision included in the rates for those risks. Future 10 Residual Market rate filings will include a cost of capital provision. Solvency regulators 11 require member insurers to maintain capital to support their share of Residual Market 12 premiums as if those premiums were their own (i.e., they are treated as Direct Written 13 Premium of the member). That capital carries with it a real cost that must be paid. If a cost 14 of capital provision is not included in Residual Market rates, then the industry profit 15 provision for voluntary risks must include a component to cover that cost in voluntary 16 rates.

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18 **BACKGROUND**

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Facility Association is an administrative mechanism that administers involuntary residual market automobile insurance on behalf of the voluntary/private sector automobile insurance industry across Canada. Created by the industry and empowered by statute, Facility Association's mission is to guarantee the availability of automobile insurance coverage for consumers who require it to legally operate their vehicles. Facility Association has a full-time staff of twenty people and a network of outsourcing arrangements.

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In Alberta, Facility Association administers the Alberta Risk Sharing Pool (in reality, two Pools – one for Grid and the other for Non-Grid risks) for private passenger vehicles. It also administers the traditional Residual Market for non-private passenger vehicles and a very small "Residual Market Segment" (with very tightly defined risk criteria) for private passenger vehicles.

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34 Because all licensed automobile insurers must participate in the residual markets 35 administered by Facility Association according to specified sharing formulas, their financial results are subject to greater volatility and uncertainty than would otherwise be the case. As well, because Residual Market rates are set without a cost of capital provision, the necessity of assigning capital to support the Residual Market premiums can be expected to act as a "drag" on member capital that could be employed pursuing voluntary business. Participation in the Residual Market also imposes additional costs on Facility Association member companies for such expenses as premiums taxes, health levies, and compliance.

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THE RESIDUAL MARKETS - AUTHORIZATION

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In Alberta, Facility Association administers the Risk Sharing Pools and Residual Market
as authorized by its Plan of Operation, which is approved by the provincial Superintendent
of Insurance. (The Plan may be viewed and downloaded at <u>www.facilityassociation.com</u>.)
All companies licensed to sell automobile insurance in Alberta are required to abide by the
provisions of the Plan.

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For risks ceded to the Alberta Risk Sharing Pool(s), the Plan requires Facility Association to maintain and report separate financial results for those risks that are subject to the premium grid and those that are not. This creates the need for two Risk Sharing Pools, commonly referred to as the Grid Risk Sharing Pool and the Non-Grid Risk Sharing Pool. Both are for private passenger automobiles only. All financial results of the Alberta Risk Sharing Pools and the traditional Residual Market stay in Alberta. That is, they are not spread across the other jurisdictions Facility Association serves.

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60 THE RISK SHARING POOLS - OPERATION

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Essentially, a Risk Sharing Pool is a residual market that acts as an industry-wide reinsurance mechanism that is largely invisible to consumers and intermediaries. A consumer buys insurance in the normal way, and the application is forwarded to a company underwriter. The underwriter assesses the risk, decides whether to keep it on the company's own books or to transfer the risk to the Risk Sharing Pool, subject to the operational rules and eligibility guidelines of the Pool.

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For both Alberta Risk Sharing Pools, companies receive an expense allowance to covercosts such as those incurred for acquisition, policy issuance, policy administration and

71 claims servicing. That expense allowance is set annually by the Facility Association Board 72 of Directors in consultation with the Superintendent. For both Pools, companies are 73 required to submit 100% of all premiums for all coverages on a policy and are eligible for 74 100% reimbursement of eligible claims and related expenses. Financial results of the Pools 75 are shared among companies based on the proportion of a company's private passenger 76 automobile exposures not ceded to a Risk Sharing Pool divided by the number of industry 77 private passenger automobile exposures not ceded to a Risk Sharing Pool. As Facility 78 Association is simply an administrative mechanism, all companies receive a monthly 79 report reflecting the operations of the Pool, providing them with the amounts they are then 80 required to book into their own financial statements.

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The two Pools differ primarily in the number of risks companies can transfer to each. For the Grid Risk Sharing Pool, companies can transfer risks without limit. This lack of limit is based on the philosophy that companies are required to accept risks for which they have no control over price and, therefore, little or no control over the financial results of that business. For the Non-Grid Pool, companies can transfer up to 4% of written exposures not transferred to the Grid Pool. This Pool is designed to help companies cope with the "take-all-comers" environment in the province.

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90 In a competitive market, most insurers tend not to target the entire universe of private 91 passenger automobile risks. Insurers generally each have their areas of expertise and a 92 healthy competitive marketplace tends to allow a proper mix of generalist and 93 specialist/niche private passenger automobile writers. Moreover, because it is a practical 94 impossibility to have a perfect price for every risk, most insurers choose to have risk 95 eligibility rules to complement and protect their respective pricing structures. An 96 underwriter faced with a requirement to accept a greater degree of risk than that 97 contemplated by the company's classification system and rates can transfer that risk to the 98 Non-Grid Pool. The Non-Grid Pool has a relatively low limit to ensure that it does not 99 become used as a marketing tool. That is, without such a limit, companies could 100 deliberately adopt a strategy of under-pricing certain risks to attract new customers. 101 Because these risks could then be transferred to the Non-Grid Pool, and because of the 102 way all insurers share in the results of the Pool, this would amount to companies growing 103 their businesses at the expense of their competitors.

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The key point here is that Risk Sharing Pools are designed as mechanisms to promote stability in the marketplace by making it possible for companies to accept risks they believe are not adequately priced. Therefore, the general expectation is that Risk Sharing Pools by their very nature will operate at a financial loss. It is also important to note that because the Risk Sharing Pools also act as a cross-subsidization mechanism across the industry, at any given point in time, companies will have their own, unique, financial results vis-à-vis the Pools.

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113 **RISK SHARING POOLS - SIZE**

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There are two ways to talk about the size of the Risk Sharing Pools: premium volume and exposure count. For calendar year 2005, the premiums written through the Grid Pool were \$370.6M, and were \$56.9M through the Non-Grid Pool. Taken together, they represent 22.2% of the private passenger premium volume in the province. If the combined Risk Sharing Pool were an insurance company, it would be the largest single automobile insurance entity in Alberta on a premium-volume basis.

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In terms of exposure count (exposure defined as one car insured for one year), 207,381 exposures were transferred to the Grid Pool in 2005, and 54,650 to the Non-Grid Pool. Taken together, this is approximately 13.9% of the private passenger vehicles in the province. This is high by historical Alberta standards, where the Facility Association Residual Market averaged 1.9% of private passenger vehicles in the five years prior to the introduction of the Risk Sharing Pools; this rate went as low as .9% in 2000.

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129 The Risk Sharing Pool market share is very high by North America residual market 130 standards as well, with Alberta's being the third largest in the United States and Canada, 131 behind only those of Canada's territories and North Carolina. The size of the residual 132 market in a jusirisdiction is often looked upon as an indicator of the "health" of a 133 competitive insurance market. Experience in North America suggests that a large residual 134 market over an extended period of time is symptomatic of widespread problems in the 135 insurance system, often related to inadequate pricing generally and/or inappropriate 136 relationships between residual market and voluntary market pricing levels.

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At the Annual Adjustment Review in June of this year, Facility Association told theAIRB that it was beginning to see a shift in the distribution of risks transferred to the Risk

140 Sharing Pools from the Grid to Non-Grid Risk Sharing Pool. As of August 31 of this year,

141 a total of 157,822 written exposures had been transferred to both Risk Sharing Pools, as

142 compared with 166,923 written exposures transferred in the same period last year – a

decline of about 5.5%. About 31% of the risks transferred to the Risk Sharing Pools in the

first eight months of this year were Non-Grid risks, compared with 12.9% for the sameperiod last year.

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147 **RISK SHARING POOLS - FINANCIAL RESULTS**

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Why is the size of the Risk Sharing Pool important? The main reason is financial. As mentioned above, Risk Sharing Pools are expected to operate at a loss. When they are large, as they are in Alberta, the potential financial impacts on automobile insurance companies in the province are correspondingly large.

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According to the audited financial statements for the first 13 months of operation of the Pools, the Grid Pool showed a loss of \$93.9M on \$269M of earned premium, and the Non-Grid Pool showed a loss of \$28M on \$18.6M of earned premium. The combined losses of the Pools were \$121.9M.

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As the AIRB indicated in its 2005 Annual Report, insurance accounting is based on
estimates, and the actual results can take years to finalize. Facility Association addressed
this point in its June submission:

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163 "The notes to our audited statements make special mention of the 164 uncertainty around the estimates supporting those statements. Risk Sharing 165 Pools generally are subject to greater uncertainty in estimating claims 166 liabilities than a typical company by their very nature because decisions on 167 what types of risks to transfer to a Pool happen at the individual company 168 level as do decisions on claims handling and reserving practices. Not only 169 can these decisions vary from company to company, they can also vary 170 through time as well.

171

Other factors than those relevant to Risk Sharing Pools generally can and
likely will have a material impact on the current estimates underlying the
Alberta Risk Sharing Pools' statements. One is that during the start-up

175phase, companies began using the Risk Sharing Pool at different times and176at different rates. Another is the timing and patterns of company claim177submissions to the Risk Sharing Pool during the start-up phase. A third is178the impact of the product reforms introduced in the province, particularly179the cap on minor-injury claims. We expect all these factors to stabilize over180a period of time, but right now, there is no question that this is a181challenging time for our actuaries."

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As the Risk Sharing Pools' experience continues to "mature" and stabilize, FacilityAssociation's consulting actuaries (with the input of its Actuarial Committee) have revised

- 185 the Expected Loss Ratios (ELRs) for the Risk Sharing Pools along the following lines:
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187 Impact of Change in Expected Loss Ratios at Aug./06

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	Grid RSP										
Accident Year	Previous ELR	Selected Ultimate Loss Ratio	Change in ELR	YTD Earned Premium at Aug./06	Impact of Change in ELR Aug./06						
2004	87.0%	72.0%	-15.0%	47,387,740	-7,108,161						
2005	87.0%	74.4%	-12.6%	269,014,551	-33,895,833						
2006	87.0%	80.0%	-7.0%	199,124,359	-13,938,705						
Total				515,526,650	-54,942,699						

	Non-Grid RSP										
Accident Year	Previous ELR	Selected Ultimate Loss Ratio	Change in ELR	YTD Earned Premium at Aug./06	Impact of Change in ELR Aug./06						
2004	200.0%	225.0%	25.0%	616,176	154,044						
2005	130.0%	110.0%	-20.0%	25,391,716	- 5,078,343						
2006	120.0%	105.0%	-15.0%	50,469,068	- 7,570,360						
Total				76,476,960	-12,494,659						

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While these changes are positive in terms of overall financial results, they are based largely on industry experience estimates with little actual Pool experience, so the ultimate financial results could be (and probably will be) materially different. A more detailed exhibit highlighting the derivation of these figures may be found in Appendix A.

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195 **<u>Risk Sharing Pools - Market Impact</u>**

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In terms of financial impact, the key point for all stakeholders to remember is that a Risk Sharing Pool nearly half a billion dollars in size has the potential to have serious, negative financial consequences for companies and, ultimately, consumers. Simply put, a large amount of money is already being seen to behave in a volatile manner, with unpredictable impacts on Alberta automobile insurers.

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This is not to say that Risk Sharing Pools, in and of themselves, are necessarily harmful to a competitive marketplace. Properly designed and monitored, they can be used to guarantee availability and enhance stability in the marketplace to the benefit of the consumer by, for example, providing an opportunity for a company to accept a marginal risk on an otherwise profitable account, thus allowing the intermediary to maintain its relationship with a client.

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In the context of industry profit levels, the Risk Sharing Pools expose Alberta automobile insurers to an additional level of financial risk over which they have little control. The size and financial performance of the Pools are difficult to predict in advance because they result from the sum-total of individual company actions. Not only are the results of the Risk Sharing Pools themselves difficult to predict, but individual companies will be exposed to an additional level of volatility depending on how the results of the risks they cede to the Risk Sharing Pools perform vis-à-vis the Risk Sharing Pools as a whole.

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The financial impact on members as a result of the Pool is driven by a number of factors, including the volume of business transferred to a Risk Sharing Pool (affects the member's share of Pool results – the more business transferred, the less the member shares in the Risk Sharing Pool results), the performance of the business transferred to a Risk Sharing Pool (once transferred, the financial results of transferred business are excluded from the member's financial results) and the overall performance of the Risk Sharing Pool (because the member receives a share of the overall performance of the Pool – as per the formula 225 mentioned above). So the net financial effect on members is driven by the profitability of 226 the business transferred to a Risk Sharing Pool and the overall profitability of the Risk 227 Sharing Pool. When both the transferred business and the overall Risk Sharing Pool results 228 are negative, the greater the amount of unprofitable business transferred and the more 229 favorable the net financial result on the member. The reverse is true if both the transferred 230 business and the overall results of the Pool are positive. When the business transferred by 231 a member to a Risk Sharing Pool is profitable and the Risk Sharing Pool is unprofitable, or 232 vice versa, it is the relationship between the profitability of the business transferred and 233 the Risk Sharing Pool profitability that will determine the net financial effect on the 234 member. However, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for members to predict such 235 results, and therein arises the great uncertainty and high risk.

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Given this additional level of risk, one would expect providers of capital to Alberta automobile insurers to seek a commensurately higher level of return, although there is no precise figure for what that additional "risk premium" would be.

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241 **Residual Market - Operation**

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243 The Residual Market operates in a significantly different manner than the Risk Sharing 244 Pools. In the Residual Market, agents and brokers submit applications to an insurer 245 contracted with Facility Association to issue and service policies on its behalf (referred to 246 as "servicing carriers"). Brokers and agents in Alberta are not required to have a contract 247 with a servicing carrier, but if they do, they are required to abide by the provisions of that 248 contract and of the Plan of Operation. All applications are written in accordance with the 249 Residual Market Manual of Rules and Rates; that is, any specific risk will be written at the 250 same rate regardless of the intermediary approached by the consumer. In Alberta, the rules 251 in the manual are approved by the Superintendent, while the rates are those approved by 252 the Automobile Insurance Rate Board or its predecessor.

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Financial results and statistical information are reported to Facility Association by the servicing carriers, and pertinent financial data are reported to all members monthly via the monthly participation report.

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- 258 Financial results of the Residual Market are shared based on market share in the province.
- 259 For non-private passenger, the sharing is done on a premium-volume basis, while private

260 passenger sharing is done on an exposure-count basis. The share base is updated annually,

so members experiencing significant changes in their own business volume can anticipate

significant changes in their share of Residual Market results as well.

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264 **Residual Market - Size**

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Facility Association does not track non-private passenger exposure count volumes for all vehicle types. However, for calendar accident years 2003, 2004 and 2005, non-private passenger premium volume has been relatively stable at approximately \$65M, 69M and \$71M, respectively. For the same years, commercial vehicle exposure counts written through the Residual Market were 10,380, 10,217 and 9,769.

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272 The private passenger volumes have been a much different story. As Appendix B shows, 273 on an exposure-count basis, business volumes for private passenger vehicles insured 274 through the Residual Market have been significantly more volatile. From a low of 275 approximately 14,500 in mid-2001, the exposure count rose to a high of nearly 75,000 in 276 September of 2004, then dropped again to approximately 9,500 by July of this year. 277 Written premium volumes exhibited similar volatility, peaking at \$177M for calendar 278 accident year 2003 and dropping to \$52M for calendar accident year 2005. The rapid 279 decline in the size of the Residual Market resulted from very strict eligibility criteria for 280 private passenger new business introduced effective October 1, 2004, and mandatory non-281 renewal of existing private passenger business that did not meet that criteria effective 282 October 1, 2005.

283

If current private passenger eligibility requirements remain, Residual Market private passenger vehicle volumes will likely settle at about 5,000 to 6,000 written exposures and an annual written premium volume in the neighbourhood of \$17M. Facility Association's best estimate is that 80-90% of all Residual Market private passenger risks are capped by the Premium Grid. In short, the size and the financial performance of the private passenger Residual Market will be largely driven by government-established eligibility rules and premium levels.

291

Residual Market non-private passenger volumes are dependent in a general way on the relationship between the price of insurance available through the Residual Market and that of companies serving the market voluntarily. Because the Residual Market operates as an 295 "open market" for other than private passenger vehicles, Facility Association will attract 296 business if its prices are below those of its member companies. Volumes are also 297 impacted, again in a general way, by the willingness of member companies to write the 298 business voluntarily.

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300 **Residual Market - Financial Results**

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302 Due to the nature of Residual Market (i.e., because Facility Association is not an insurer), 303 certain costs resulting from member companies' compulsory membership are incurred on 304 the members' own accounts, rather than on those of Facility Association. Prominent 305 among these are health levies, premium taxes, and the cost of capital. Because member 306 companies must book their share of premiums written through the Residual Market on 307 their own books, they must pay premium taxes, health levies, and other charges based on 308 premium volumes themselves. This means that even though Facility Association's 309 financial statements may show a "break even" result, such a result represents a genuine 310 loss to member companies. Similarly, member companies are required by solvency 311 regulators to support their share of Residual Market premiums with their own capital. 312 These realities are highlighted in Note 2 of Facility Association's annual audited financial 313 statements, and an exhibit illustrating a comparison of the Association's results versus the 314 impacts on its member companies in Alberta is included as Appendix C.

315

Historically, Residual Market rates have been developed with the goal of generating enough of a surplus to distribute to member companies to cover their costs arising from their compulsory participation in the Residual Market, except that no provision was made in previous rate filings for the cost of capital. The previous position not to include a cost of capital provision was taken voluntarily by Facility Association at the direction of its Board of Directors. Why this position was taken historically is not known with any degree of certainty.

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The Facility Association Board of Directors revisited the issue at a meeting held on February 12, 2003 and passed a motion that a cost of capital provision be included in future rate filings:

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- 328 "Following further discussion, on MOTION made by Mr. G. Cooke,
 329 SECONDED by Mr. Rodrigues and CARRIED, IT WAS RESOLVED

- that rates should be developed including a factor for cost of capital and that
- 331 efforts be undertaken with the Regulators to bring this change about."
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333 Facility Association included a cost of capital provision in its rate filing for Prince Edward 334 Island for all classes of vehicles, to take effect during 2004. Following an investigation, 335 the Island Regulatory and Appeals Commission approved the rates as filed. Subsequently, 336 Facility Association included a cost of capital provision in rate applications submitted to 337 the New Brunswick Insurance Board (NBIB) in 2004, the Nova Scotia Insurance Review 338 Board (NSIRB) and the Financial Services Commission of Ontario (FSCO). In a decision 339 dated March 23, 2005, the NSIRB did not approve the inclusion of a cost of capital 340 provision, citing the need for further study and evidence. A similar conclusion was 341 reached by the NBIB, and FSCO has said that the cost of capital provision will likely be a 342 matter for a hearing at some future date.

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Facility Association contends that a provision for the cost of capital supporting Residual
Market premiums should be included in its rates in the province of Alberta for the
following reasons:

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348 (a) Solvency regulators require that Residual Market premiums booked by member
349 companies be supported by the capital of member companies just as voluntary
350 premiums must be. That capital has a cost and, because rates are to be developed to
351 cover expected costs, it is proper to include a cost of capital provision in Residual
352 Market rates.

353

354 If voluntary market rates include a cost of capital provision and involuntary market (b) 355 rates do not, there is an implicit subsidy of involuntary market rates by member 356 companies, and by extension, by their customers and shareholders. In Alberta, 357 those receiving this implicit subsidy are for the most part commercial enterprises 358 or objectively defined "high-risk" private passenger vehicles and drivers (who also 359 have the protection of the premium grid). This situation can lead to undesirable 360 public policy outcomes, such as the Residual Market being larger than it needs to 361 be. The Facility Association Board contends that drivers insured through the 362 Residual Market should face the same cost elements as drivers insured in the 363 voluntary market.

364

365 Allowing the implicit subsidy mentioned above means that specialty insurers who (c) 366 specialize in providing coverage for risks typically insured through either the 367 Residual Market or specialty insurers are put at a competitive disadvantage 368 because they are, in effect competing with a cooperative entity backed by the 369 financial strength of the insurance industry providing coverage at a subsidized 370 price.

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372 (d) It could be suggested that the cost of capital to support Residual Market premiums 373 be included in the voluntary market rates of companies serving the Alberta 374 automobile insurance marketplace. In addition to the adverse public policy 375 implications of that approach (mentioned above), the volatility of Residual Market 376 premium volumes would require companies to frequently re-calculate the 377 "loading" in their rates for the cost of capital needed to support Residual Market 378 premiums.

379

380 Facility Association expects that the precise level of return to be used in calculating the 381 cost of capital provision in Residual Market rates will be a logical outcome of the current 382 hearing. Given the inherently higher uncertainty of Residual Market volumes and financial 383 results, the level of return used in calculating the cost of capital provision in Residual 384 Market rates should be slightly higher than the level of return set for the industry as a 385 whole.

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387 At a Facility Association rate hearing before the Nova Scotia Insurance Review Board 388 (NSIRB) held November 9 and 10, 2004, the NSIRB's actuarial advisor, Ted Zubulake of 389 Mercer Oliver Wyman (the Alberta Automobile Insurance Rate Board's consulting 390 actuary), acknowledged that Facility Association's operations were inherently more 391 uncertain than those of the voluntary market and that appropriate levels of return on equity 392 should vary directly with the levels of uncertainty facing the enterprise.

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394 From the transcripts of that hearing (page 604):

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396 Mr. Zubulake: "...to the extent a target -- a cost of capital provision is 397 allowed the Facility Association and to then -- and to the extent that a target 398 or a cost of capital or a profit contingency provision is -- a standard one is 399 identified and selected for the regular market that perhaps I would certainly

400 suggest or believe that consideration should be given to perhaps a slightly
401 higher return for the Facility Association. How much higher, what the
402 absolute number is, I don't know."

403

The volatility in both the size of the Residual Market and in its net operating results pose a significant business risk to Facility Association's member companies due to their compulsory participation. Dr. Richard McGaw from the Department of Economics of the University of New Brunswick supported this statement in a written submission to the New Brunswick Insurance Board in June, 2005:

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410 "Facility Association Cost of Capital

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412 The arguments used to justify a return to capital for a regulated enterprise 413 apply equally to the Facility Association. If capital is provided to the 414 operation of the FA then it has a cost like any other capital provided. To 415 the extent that the cost of capital is borne either by the insurance 416 companies through lower profits or (by) regular policyholders cross-417 subsidizing FA rates through higher premiums, there is an undesirable 418 element of subsidization. Markets perform best when participants bear the 419 full cost of their choices. As a matter of principle, there should be 420 recognition of the cost of capital and it should be at least as high as the 421 rate for normal business. Given the larger risk, there are valid arguments 422 to exceed the general ROE. I note that a number of companies have 423 written to the effect that they have not included the FA capital in their 424 capital determination for regular policies."

425

The question "How does the decision to include a cost of capital provision reconcile with
the Facility Association being a non-profit association?" or a similar variant has been
posed by various regulatory authorities.

429

Facility Association's non-profit status has always been based on the fact that its
administrative activities have been invoiced to the member companies at cost. Facility
Association has always maintained that the financial results (both positive and negative) of
the various insurance pools it administers across Canada belong to its members.

434

The non-profit status of Facility Association was the subject of a lengthy public hearing
before the Newfoundland & Labrador Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities (PUB)
in 2000-2001. In its order A.I.36 (2000-2001), the PUB offered the following comment:

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439 "From the evidence of witnesses and argument of Counsel, the Board 440 concludes that Facility is a non-profit association that operates as nothing 441 more than the administrator of a risk sharing automobile insurance pool. The 442 servicing carrier companies of Facility underwrite the business risks and, on 443 behalf of the member companies Facility carries out an administration 444 function including, inter alia, investment of funds, administration of the bank 445 accounts, issuing of reports on the status of funds and accounts, distribution 446 of members' profits and issuing assessment notices for losses incurred. 447 Facility's expenses are paid by the member companies and that is all Facility 448 is paid. As their revenues can never exceed their expenditures, Facility can 449 never earn a profit."

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451 In its press release announcing the above Order, the PUB stated:

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453 "The Board found that any profit generated by the operation of Facility

- 454 Association belongs to the members of the Association." (Appendix D)
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This finding was consistent with the actuarial evidence presented at the hearing, both by the PUB's own actuarial advisor and Facility Association's actuary, that historical Facility Association operating results are not directly relevant for the purposes of prospective ratemaking, with its focus on expected future revenues and costs.

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461 If, despite these arguments supporting the inclusion of a cost of capital provision within
462 the involuntary market rates, a cost of capital provision is not allowed there, the industry
463 voluntary market rates must include that cost. Facility Association has not attempted to
464 calculate what the cost of capital provision should be.

465

466 **CONCLUDING REMARKS**

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The underlying premise of this submission is very basic: the level of return should be commensurate with the risk. To the extent that Risk Sharing Pools expose companies to a 470 greater level of financial risk, the companies should be able to pursue a higher level of 471 return. Similarly, the higher level of risk associated with Residual Market results should be 472 recognized directly in Residual Market rates through the appropriate cost of capital 473 provision within those rates. If the cost of capital is not recognized within Residual Market 474 rates, then it must be recognized in the return companies are able to pursue through their 475 voluntary market rates. Facility Association has not attempted to prescribe the precise 476 adjustments required to voluntary market profit levels for the risks posed to companies 477 through their compulsory participation in automobile insurance Residual Markets in 478 Alberta. However, those risks are real and warrant consideration from the AIRB as it 479 deliberates on appropriate automobile insurance profit levels.

FACILITY ASSOCIATION ALBERTA RISK SHARING POOL 30 June 2006

SELECTED ULTIMATE LOSS RATIOS


	Accident Year	Loss Payments At Jun/06 [1]	Expense Payments At Jun/06 [2]	Outstanding Losses At Jun/06 [3]	Reported Incurred At Jun/06 [4]	Earned Premium At Jun/06 [5]	Reported Loss Ratio At Jun/06 [6]	Relative to Grid Loss Ratio [7]	Selected Ultimate ^(#) Loss Ratio [8]	Relative to Grid Selected [9]
Grid Risks	2004	14,124,832	168,496	7,597,867	21,891,195	47,390,177	46.2%	1.00	72.0%	1.00
	2005	79,398,808	697,662	59,875,801	139,972,271	269,092,121	52.0%	1.00	74.4%	1.00
	2006	23,919,265	102,914	42,383,233	66,405,412	148,064,622	44.8%	1.00	80.0%	1.00
	Total	117,442,905	969,072	109,856,901	228,268,878	464,546,920	49.1%	1.00	75.9%	1.00
Non Grid Risks	2004 2005 2006	678,052 12,872,686 9,962,331	2,992 84,392 27,326	486,284 7,159,992 13,551,455	1,167,328 20,117,070 23,541,112	617,896 25,414,214 37,021,365	188.9% 79.2% 63.6%	4.09 1.52 1.42	225.0% 110.0% 105.0%	3.13 1.48 1.31
	Total	23,513,069	114,710	21,197,731	44,825,510	63,053,475	71.1%	1.45	108.2%	1.42

(#) The "Ultimate Loss Ratios in Column [8] reflect the time value of money, and include a provision for adverse deviations.

Impact of Change in ELR at Aug/06

		GRID	RSP			NON GR	ID RSP	
	ELR Per	Implied		Impact of	ELR Per	r Implied		Impact of
Accident	Aug/06	Change	YTD EP	Change in	Aug/06	6 Change	YTD EP	Change in
Year	Report	in ELR	At Aug/06	ELR - Aug/06	Report	t in ELR	At Aug/06	ELR - Aug/06
	[10]	[11]	[12]	[13]	[14]	[15]	[16]	[17]
2004	87.0%	-15.0%	47,387,740	-7,108,161	200.0%	25.0%	616,176	154,044
2005	87.0%	-12.6%	269,014,551	-33,895,833	130.0%	-20.0%	25,391,716	-5,078,343
2006	87.0%	-7.0%	199,124,359	-13,938,705	120.0%	-15.0%	50,469,068	-7,570,360
Total			515,526,650	-54,942,699			76,476,960	-12,494,659


Appendix B Page 1 of 3




Appendix B Page 2 of 3

FACILITY ASSOCIATION Alberta PPV Written Exposures







EXCERPT OF

FACILITY ASSOCIATION RESIDUAL MARKET SEGMENT

Notes to the Financial Statements October 31, 2005

2. BASIS OF FINANCIAL STATEMENT PRESENTATION

The Association manages the following insurance pools:

- The Residual Market Segment, which provides a residual automobile insurance market for owners and operators of personal and commercial motor vehicles, who may otherwise have difficulty in obtaining such insurance, in the following provinces and territories: Alberta, Ontario, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador, Yukon, Northwest Territories, Nunavut.
- The Uninsured Automobile Funds for New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova Scotia and P.E.I., which fund claims for damages made by persons who cannot obtain satisfaction for damages under a contract of automobile insurance and where there is no other insurance or where other insurance is inadequate with respect to the damages claimed.
- Risk sharing pools, operating in Ontario, Alberta (two pools) and New Brunswick which provide a means for individual automobile insurance underwriters to transfer certain of the personal use automobile insurance exposures they underwrite in the respective province that may be deemed of higher risk but which do not qualify for the Residual Market Segment.

The Ontario Risk Sharing Pool has operated since January 1, 1993.

The two Alberta Risk Sharing Pools commenced operations as at October 1, 2004. A "Grid Pool" provides a means for Alberta automobile insurance underwriters to transfer personal use automobile insurance exposures that are subject to the statutory maximum premium. A "Non-Grid Pool" provides a means for individual Alberta automobile insurance underwriters to transfer certain of the personal use automobile insurance exposures they underwrite that may be deemed to be of higher risk but do not qualify for the Residual Market Segment. Their first statutory financial statements are for the thirteen month period ended October 31, 2005.

The New Brunswick "First Chance" Risk Sharing Pool commenced operations January 1, 2005. The "First Chance" Pool provides a means for individual New Brunswick automobile insurance underwriters to transfer certain of the personal use automobile insurance policies they underwrite that are eligible for the "First Chance" discount in that province. Its first statutory financial statements are for the ten month period ended October 31, 2005.

The financial statements contained herein are for the Residual Market Segment operations and for the Uninsured Automobile Funds of the Association.

Separate financial statements are prepared for each of the risk sharing pools.

EXCERPT OF

FACILITY ASSOCIATION RESIDUAL MARKET SEGMENT

Notes to the Financial Statements October 31, 2005

2. BASIS OF FINANCIAL STATEMENT PRESENTATION (continued)

All of the premiums of the Residual Market Segment are allocated to member companies who are required by regulation to record these premiums in their financial records as direct written premiums. Member companies pay premium taxes and health levies directly to the provinces based on their direct written premiums. Members also incur other costs, such as association dues to industry organizations which are also based on direct written premiums. Accordingly, these costs are not recorded in these financial statements. Investment income earned by members on amounts due to the Association and certain premium levies charged to members in respect of uninsured automobile exposures are also not reflected in these financial statements.

No provision for income taxes is recorded in these financial statements. The results of operations of the insurance pools, including administrative expenses incurred by the Association and investment income earned on insurance pool assets invested by the Association, are included in the members' income for tax assessment purposes.

FACILITY ASSOCIATION RESIDUAL MARKET

ALBERTA - Historical Summary of Operations for Component (a)

Year ended October 31

<u>(\$'000)</u>

Premiums Written Change in Unearned Premiums Net Premiums Earned	TOTAL Years to Date \$2,179,015 (\$59,204) \$2,119,811	2005 \$110,745 45,569 \$156,314	2004 \$265,080 (10,666) \$254,414	2003 \$ 218,250 (51,460) \$166,790	2002 \$96,285 (11,217) \$85,068	2001 \$64,539 (4,762) \$59,777	2000 \$58,388 2,062 \$60,450	1999 \$63,116 4,411 \$67,527	1998 \$89,530 4,960 \$94,490
Underwriting Expenses	\$2,125,217	\$117,334	223,489	157,361	83,410	61,291	54,773	48,547	75,638
Underwriting gain (loss)	(\$5,406)	\$38,980	\$30,925	\$9,429	\$1,658	(\$1,514)	\$5,677	\$18,980	\$18,852
Administrative expenses	\$14,975	468	721	477	594	793	914	1,028	1,027
Net investment income	\$229,296	8,772	10,570	6,417	5,331	5,508	5,293	10,872	13,747
Net operating result (a)	\$208,915	\$47,284	\$40,774	\$15,369	\$6,395	\$3,201	\$10,056	\$28,824	\$31,572
Net Operating Result as a % of Premiums Earned	9.9%	30.2%	16.0%	9.2%	7.5%	5.4%	16.6%	42.7%	33.4%
FOR ILLUSTRATION PURPOSES									
Expenses Paid by Members:									
Premium Taxes (per IBC bulletins)	\$62,831	\$3,322	\$7,952	\$6,547	\$2,888	\$1,936	\$1,752	\$1,893	\$2,686
Assoc. Dues @ 0.40005% (estimated)	\$8,718	443	1,060	873	385	258	233	252	358
Health Levies (% of Written Prem)	58,820	2,558	7,263	10,214	5,074	3,162	2,762	2,228	3,796
Sub-total	\$130,369	\$6,323	\$16,275	\$17,634	\$8,347	\$5,356	\$4,747	\$4,373	\$6,840
Less: Income Tax Credit received by Members		33.62%	34.62%	36.74%	39.62%	43.62%	44.62%	44.62%	44.62%
on the above expenses	(\$54,295)	(2,126)	(5,635)	(6,479)	(3,307)	(2,336)	(2,118)	(1,951)	(3,052)
Add: Income Tax paid by(refunded to) Members									
on net operating result	\$81,769	15,897	14,116	5,647	2,534	1,396	4,487	12,861	14,087
Net Expenses after Income Tax (b)	157,843	20,094	24,756	16,802	7,574	4,416	7,116	15,283	17,875
	· .			·	<u> </u>	i	i		
Operating Result before Cost of Capital (a)-(b)=(c)	\$51,072	\$27,190	\$16,018	(\$1,433)	(\$1,179)	(\$1,215)	\$2,940	\$13,541	\$13,697
Assumed Capital 2:1 Ratio WP:Capital	\$1,089,508	\$55,373	\$132,540	\$109,125	\$48,142	\$32,270	\$29,194	\$31,558	\$44,765
Deemed Cost of Capital (10% for all years) (d)	\$108,951	\$5,537	\$13,254	\$10,913	\$4,814	\$3,227	\$2,919	\$3,156	\$4,477
Adjusted Net Operating Result (c)-(d)=(e)	(\$57,879)	\$21,653	\$2,764	(\$12,346)	(\$5,993)	(\$4,442)	\$21	\$10,385	\$9,220
Assessment to(from) Members 1980 - 2005	\$166,146	\$60,552	\$9,005	\$2,766	\$3,169	\$1,848	\$16,795	\$33,117	\$58,280

FACILITY ASSOCIATION RESIDUAL MARKET

ALBERTA - Historical Summary of Operations for Component (a)

Year ended October 31

<u>(\$'000)</u>

Premiums Written Change in Unearned Premiums	1997 \$102,646 (1,889)	1996 \$105,881 2,147	1995 \$109,047 (1,324)	1994 \$107,428 6,369	1993 \$120,159 (1,366)	1992 \$117,614 (5,663)	1991 \$97,915 (10,638)	1990 \$66,885 (7,117)	1989 \$47,932 (3,276)
Net Premiums Earned	\$100,757	\$108,028	\$107,723	\$113,797	\$118,793	\$111,951	\$87,277	\$59,768	\$44,656
Underwriting Expenses	81,853	101,749	96,392	127,223	153,254	159,658	118,576	67,084	48,580
Underwriting gain (loss)	\$18,904	\$6,279	\$11,331	(\$13,426)	(\$34,461)	(\$47,707)	(\$31,299)	(\$7,316)	(\$3,924)
Administrative expenses	816	829	881	1,022	953	606	422	255	274
Net investment income	24,061	17,437	15,020	15,896	27,197	25,974	14,461	6,930	4,449
Net operating result (a)	\$42,149	\$22,887	\$25,470	\$1,448	(\$8,217)	(\$22,339)	(\$17,260)	(\$641)	\$251
Net Operating Result as a % of Premiums Earned	41.8%	21.2%	23.6%	1.3%	-6.9%	-20.0%	-19.8%	-1.1%	0.6%
FOR ILLUSTRATION PURPOSES									
Expenses Paid by Members:									
Premium Taxes (per IBC bulletins)	\$3,079	\$3,176	\$3,271	\$3,223	\$3,605	\$3,528	\$2,937	\$2,006	\$1,438
Assoc. Dues @ 0.40005% (estimated)	411	424	436	430	481	470	392	268	192
Health Levies (% of Written Prem) Sub-total	6,703 \$10,193	10,842 \$14,442	1,314 \$5,021	1,101 \$4,754	1,003 \$5,089	800 \$4,798	\$3,329	- \$2,274	- \$1,630
Sub-total	\$10,195	\$14,442	\$5,02 I	\$4,754	\$ 5,069	4, 7 90	\$3,329	\$ 2,274	\$1,030
Less: Income Tax Credit received by Members	44.62%	44.62%	44.58%	44.34%	44.34%	44.34%	44.34%	43.84%	43.84%
on the above expenses	(4,548)	(6,444)	(2,238)	(2,108)	(2,256)	(2,127)	(1,476)	(997)	(714)
Add: Income Tax paid by(refunded to) Members	40.007	40.040	44.055	0.40	(0.040)	(0,005)	(7.050)	(004)	440
on net operating result	18,807	10,212	11,355	642	(3,643)	(9,905)	(7,653)	(281)	110
Net Expenses after Income Tax (b)	24,452	18,210	14,138	3,288	(810)	(7,234)	(5,800)	996	1,026
Operating Result before Cost of Capital (a)-(b)=(c)	\$17,697	\$4,677	\$11,332	(\$1,840)	(\$7,407)	(\$15,105)	(\$11,460)	(\$1,637)	(\$775)
Assumed Capital 2:1 Ratio WP:Capital	\$51,323	\$52,940	\$54,524	\$53,714	\$60,080	\$58,806	\$48,957	\$33,442	\$23,966
Deemed Cost of Capital (10% for all years) (d)	\$5,132	\$5,294	\$5,452	\$5,371	\$6,008	\$5,881	\$4,896	\$3,344	\$2,397
Adjusted Net Operating Result (c)-(d)=(e)	\$12,565	(\$617)	\$5,880	(\$7,211)	(\$13,415)	(\$20,986)	(\$16,356)	(\$4,981)	(\$3,172)
Assessment to(from) Members 1980 - 2005	\$27,054	(\$10,175)	(\$16,069)	(\$6,458)	(\$3,291)	(\$1,102)	(\$309)	(\$9,746)	\$3,282

FACILITY ASSOCIATION RESIDUAL MARKET

ALBERTA - Historical Summary of Operations for Component (a)

Year ended October 31

<u>(\$'000)</u>

1988	1987	1986	1985	1984	1983	1982	1981	1980
Premiums Written \$42,212		\$42,268	\$34,935	36,405	50,417	46,891	27,166	15,310
Change in Unearned Premiums (363)		(2,389)	(236)	5,151	1,316	(7,442)	(5,288)	(6,919)
Net Premiums Earned \$41,849	\$42,797	\$39,879	\$34,699	41,556	51,733	39,449	21,878	8,391
Underwriting Expenses 47,845	6 44,747	37,788	34,165	39,832	50,972	43,460	33,852	16,344
Underwriting gain (loss) (\$5,996)	(\$1,950)	\$2,091	\$534	1,724	761	-4,011	-11,974	-7,953
Administrative expenses 335	5 274	228	351	414	350	289	330	324
Net investment income 3,868	3 2,292	916	594	462	753	1,184	997	295
Net operating result (a) (\$2,463)	\$68	\$2,779	\$777	\$1,772	\$1,164	(\$3,116)	(\$11,307)	(\$7,982)
Net Operating Result as a % of Premiums Earned -5.9%	0.2%	7.0%	2.2%	4.3%	2.3%	-7.9%	-51.7%	-95.1%
FOR ILLUSTRATION PURPOSES								
Expenses Paid by Members:								
Premium Taxes (per IBC bulletins) \$1,266	\$1,259	\$845	\$699	\$728	\$1,008	\$938	\$543	\$306
Assoc. Dues @ 0.40005% (estimated) 169	168	169	140	146	202	188	109	61
Health Levies (% of Written Prem) - Sub-total - \$1,435	 \$1,427	- \$1,014	\$839	\$874	- \$1,210	- \$1,126	\$652	\$367
Sub-total \$1,433	φ1,42 <i>1</i>	\$1,014	4009	φ074	φ1,210	φ1,120	Φ 0 5 2	<i>\$</i> 307
Less: Income Tax Credit received by Members 47.45%	51.57%	48.80%	48.80%	48.80%	48.80%	48.80%	48.80%	48.80%
on the above expenses (681)) (736)	(495)	(409)	(426)	(590)	(549)	(318)	(179)
Add: Income Tax paid by(refunded to) Members								
on net operating result (1,169	35	1,356	379	865	568	(1,521)	(5,518)	(3,895)
Net Expenses after Income Tax (b) (415)	726	1,875	809	1,313	1,188	(944)	(5,184)	(3,707)
Operating Result before Cost of Capital (a)-(b)=(c) (\$2,048)	(\$658)	\$904	(\$32)	\$459	(\$24)	(\$2,172)	(\$6,123)	(\$4,275)
Assumed Capital 2:1 Ratio WP:Capital \$21,106	\$20,985	\$21,134	\$17,468	\$18,203	\$25,209	\$23,446	\$13,583	\$7,655
Deemed Cost of Capital (10% for all years) (d) \$2,111	\$2,098	\$2,113	\$1,747	\$1,820	\$2,521	\$2,345	\$1,358	\$766
Adjusted Net Operating Result (c)-(d)=(e) (\$4,159)	(\$2,756)	(\$1,209)	(\$1,779)	(\$1,361)	(\$2,545)	(\$4,517)	(\$7,481)	(\$5,041)
Assessment to(from) Members 1980 - 2005 (\$10,221)								

Appendix D

Rates Charged By Facility Association in this Province

Press Release

Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities

Friday, March 30, 2001

The Board has today released its findings resulting from an investigation into the rates charged by Facility Association in the Province.

The Board has concluded, in part, that the rates approved for Facility Association have been based on sound actuarial principles and the best information available at the time. The Board found that any profit generated by the operation of Facility Association belongs to the members of the Association. The Board also found that it would not be prudent to consider these profits in the rate setting process.

A complete copy of the Board's decision can be found in Order A.I. 36 (2000-2001) which is available on the Board's website at <u>www.pub.nf.ca</u>.

Any inquiry should be directed to Randy Pelletier, Legal Counsel.

Phone: 726-8600

E-mail: <u>ito@pub.nf.ca</u>

Facsimile: 726-9604

