



**Alberta Automobile Insurance Rate Board
Review of Profit Level for Automobile Insurance**

A Submission by Facility Association

November 8, 2006

1 **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

2
3 Facility Association operates two types of residual market mechanisms in Alberta: Risk
4 Sharing Pools and the “traditional” type, referred to simply as the Residual Market. Due to
5 their size and characteristics, the Risk Sharing Pools expose companies to an additional
6 element of financial risk that is largely beyond their control. To the extent that risk is
7 correlated with potential return, insurers ought to be able to pursue a higher level of return
8 to compensate for a higher level of risk. Residual Market risks have historically been
9 priced without a cost of capital provision included in the rates for those risks. Future
10 Residual Market rate filings will include a cost of capital provision. Solvency regulators
11 require member insurers to maintain capital to support their share of Residual Market
12 premiums as if those premiums were their own (i.e., they are treated as Direct Written
13 Premium of the member). That capital carries with it a real cost that must be paid. If a cost
14 of capital provision is not included in Residual Market rates, then the industry profit
15 provision for voluntary risks must include a component to cover that cost in voluntary
16 rates.

17
18 **BACKGROUND**

19
20 Facility Association is an administrative mechanism that administers involuntary residual
21 market automobile insurance on behalf of the voluntary/private sector automobile
22 insurance industry across Canada. Created by the industry and empowered by statute,
23 Facility Association’s mission is to guarantee the availability of automobile insurance
24 coverage for consumers who require it to legally operate their vehicles. Facility
25 Association has a full-time staff of twenty people and a network of outsourcing
26 arrangements.

27
28 In Alberta, Facility Association administers the Alberta Risk Sharing Pool (in reality, two
29 Pools – one for Grid and the other for Non-Grid risks) for private passenger vehicles. It
30 also administers the traditional Residual Market for non-private passenger vehicles and a
31 very small “Residual Market Segment” (with very tightly defined risk criteria) for private
32 passenger vehicles.

33
34 Because all licensed automobile insurers must participate in the residual markets
35 administered by Facility Association according to specified sharing formulas, their

36 financial results are subject to greater volatility and uncertainty than would otherwise be
37 the case. As well, because Residual Market rates are set without a cost of capital
38 provision, the necessity of assigning capital to support the Residual Market premiums can
39 be expected to act as a “drag” on member capital that could be employed pursuing
40 voluntary business. Participation in the Residual Market also imposes additional costs on
41 Facility Association member companies for such expenses as premiums taxes, health
42 levies, and compliance.

43

44 **THE RESIDUAL MARKETS - AUTHORIZATION**

45

46 In Alberta, Facility Association administers the Risk Sharing Pools and Residual Market
47 as authorized by its Plan of Operation, which is approved by the provincial Superintendent
48 of Insurance. (The Plan may be viewed and downloaded at www.facilityassociation.com.)
49 All companies licensed to sell automobile insurance in Alberta are required to abide by the
50 provisions of the Plan.

51

52 For risks ceded to the Alberta Risk Sharing Pool(s), the Plan requires Facility Association
53 to maintain and report separate financial results for those risks that are subject to the
54 premium grid and those that are not. This creates the need for two Risk Sharing Pools,
55 commonly referred to as the Grid Risk Sharing Pool and the Non-Grid Risk Sharing Pool.
56 Both are for private passenger automobiles only. All financial results of the Alberta Risk
57 Sharing Pools and the traditional Residual Market stay in Alberta. That is, they are not
58 spread across the other jurisdictions Facility Association serves.

59

60 **THE RISK SHARING POOLS - OPERATION**

61

62 Essentially, a Risk Sharing Pool is a residual market that acts as an industry-wide
63 reinsurance mechanism that is largely invisible to consumers and intermediaries. A
64 consumer buys insurance in the normal way, and the application is forwarded to a
65 company underwriter. The underwriter assesses the risk, decides whether to keep it on the
66 company’s own books or to transfer the risk to the Risk Sharing Pool, subject to the
67 operational rules and eligibility guidelines of the Pool.

68

69 For both Alberta Risk Sharing Pools, companies receive an expense allowance to cover
70 costs such as those incurred for acquisition, policy issuance, policy administration and

71 claims servicing. That expense allowance is set annually by the Facility Association Board
72 of Directors in consultation with the Superintendent. For both Pools, companies are
73 required to submit 100% of all premiums for all coverages on a policy and are eligible for
74 100% reimbursement of eligible claims and related expenses. Financial results of the Pools
75 are shared among companies based on the proportion of a company's private passenger
76 automobile exposures not ceded to a Risk Sharing Pool divided by the number of industry
77 private passenger automobile exposures not ceded to a Risk Sharing Pool. As Facility
78 Association is simply an administrative mechanism, all companies receive a monthly
79 report reflecting the operations of the Pool, providing them with the amounts they are then
80 required to book into their own financial statements.

81

82 The two Pools differ primarily in the number of risks companies can transfer to each. For
83 the Grid Risk Sharing Pool, companies can transfer risks without limit. This lack of limit
84 is based on the philosophy that companies are required to accept risks for which they have
85 no control over price and, therefore, little or no control over the financial results of that
86 business. For the Non-Grid Pool, companies can transfer up to 4% of written exposures
87 not transferred to the Grid Pool. This Pool is designed to help companies cope with the
88 "take-all-comers" environment in the province.

89

90 In a competitive market, most insurers tend not to target the entire universe of private
91 passenger automobile risks. Insurers generally each have their areas of expertise and a
92 healthy competitive marketplace tends to allow a proper mix of generalist and
93 specialist/niche private passenger automobile writers. Moreover, because it is a practical
94 impossibility to have a perfect price for every risk, most insurers choose to have risk
95 eligibility rules to complement and protect their respective pricing structures. An
96 underwriter faced with a requirement to accept a greater degree of risk than that
97 contemplated by the company's classification system and rates can transfer that risk to the
98 Non-Grid Pool. The Non-Grid Pool has a relatively low limit to ensure that it does not
99 become used as a marketing tool. That is, without such a limit, companies could
100 deliberately adopt a strategy of under-pricing certain risks to attract new customers.
101 Because these risks could then be transferred to the Non-Grid Pool, and because of the
102 way all insurers share in the results of the Pool, this would amount to companies growing
103 their businesses at the expense of their competitors.

104

105 The key point here is that Risk Sharing Pools are designed as mechanisms to promote
106 stability in the marketplace by making it possible for companies to accept risks they
107 believe are not adequately priced. Therefore, the general expectation is that Risk Sharing
108 Pools by their very nature will operate at a financial loss. It is also important to note that
109 because the Risk Sharing Pools also act as a cross-subsidization mechanism across the
110 industry, at any given point in time, companies will have their own, unique, financial
111 results vis-à-vis the Pools.

112

113 **RISK SHARING POOLS - SIZE**

114

115 There are two ways to talk about the size of the Risk Sharing Pools: premium volume and
116 exposure count. For calendar year 2005, the premiums written through the Grid Pool were
117 \$370.6M, and were \$56.9M through the Non-Grid Pool. Taken together, they represent
118 22.2% of the private passenger premium volume in the province. If the combined Risk
119 Sharing Pool were an insurance company, it would be the largest single automobile
120 insurance entity in Alberta on a premium-volume basis.

121

122 In terms of exposure count (exposure defined as one car insured for one year), 207,381
123 exposures were transferred to the Grid Pool in 2005, and 54,650 to the Non-Grid Pool.
124 Taken together, this is approximately 13.9% of the private passenger vehicles in the
125 province. This is high by historical Alberta standards, where the Facility Association
126 Residual Market averaged 1.9% of private passenger vehicles in the five years prior to the
127 introduction of the Risk Sharing Pools; this rate went as low as .9% in 2000.

128

129 The Risk Sharing Pool market share is very high by North America residual market
130 standards as well, with Alberta's being the third largest in the United States and Canada,
131 behind only those of Canada's territories and North Carolina. The size of the residual
132 market in a jurisdiction is often looked upon as an indicator of the "health" of a
133 competitive insurance market. Experience in North America suggests that a large residual
134 market over an extended period of time is symptomatic of widespread problems in the
135 insurance system, often related to inadequate pricing generally and/or inappropriate
136 relationships between residual market and voluntary market pricing levels.

137

138 At the Annual Adjustment Review in June of this year, Facility Association told the
139 AIRB that it was beginning to see a shift in the distribution of risks transferred to the Risk

140 Sharing Pools from the Grid to Non-Grid Risk Sharing Pool. As of August 31 of this year,
141 a total of 157,822 written exposures had been transferred to both Risk Sharing Pools, as
142 compared with 166,923 written exposures transferred in the same period last year – a
143 decline of about 5.5%. About 31% of the risks transferred to the Risk Sharing Pools in the
144 first eight months of this year were Non-Grid risks, compared with 12.9% for the same
145 period last year.

146

147 **RISK SHARING POOLS - FINANCIAL RESULTS**

148

149 Why is the size of the Risk Sharing Pool important? The main reason is financial. As
150 mentioned above, Risk Sharing Pools are expected to operate at a loss. When they are
151 large, as they are in Alberta, the potential financial impacts on automobile insurance
152 companies in the province are correspondingly large.

153

154 According to the audited financial statements for the first 13 months of operation of the
155 Pools, the Grid Pool showed a loss of \$93.9M on \$269M of earned premium, and the Non-
156 Grid Pool showed a loss of \$28M on \$18.6M of earned premium. The combined losses of
157 the Pools were \$121.9M.

158

159 As the AIRB indicated in its 2005 Annual Report, insurance accounting is based on
160 estimates, and the actual results can take years to finalize. Facility Association addressed
161 this point in its June submission:

162

163 “The notes to our audited statements make special mention of the
164 uncertainty around the estimates supporting those statements. Risk Sharing
165 Pools generally are subject to greater uncertainty in estimating claims
166 liabilities than a typical company by their very nature because decisions on
167 what types of risks to transfer to a Pool happen at the individual company
168 level as do decisions on claims handling and reserving practices. Not only
169 can these decisions vary from company to company, they can also vary
170 through time as well.

171

172 Other factors than those relevant to Risk Sharing Pools generally can and
173 likely will have a material impact on the current estimates underlying the
174 Alberta Risk Sharing Pools’ statements. One is that during the start-up

175 phase, companies began using the Risk Sharing Pool at different times and
 176 at different rates. Another is the timing and patterns of company claim
 177 submissions to the Risk Sharing Pool during the start-up phase. A third is
 178 the impact of the product reforms introduced in the province, particularly
 179 the cap on minor-injury claims. We expect all these factors to stabilize over
 180 a period of time, but right now, there is no question that this is a
 181 challenging time for our actuaries.”

182

183 As the Risk Sharing Pools’ experience continues to “mature” and stabilize, Facility
 184 Association’s consulting actuaries (with the input of its Actuarial Committee) have revised
 185 the Expected Loss Ratios (ELRs) for the Risk Sharing Pools along the following lines:

186

187 Impact of Change in Expected Loss Ratios at Aug./06

188

Grid RSP					
Accident Year	Previous ELR	Selected Ultimate Loss Ratio	Change in ELR	YTD Earned Premium at Aug./06	Impact of Change in ELR Aug./06
2004	87.0%	72.0%	-15.0%	47,387,740	-7,108,161
2005	87.0%	74.4%	-12.6%	269,014,551	-33,895,833
2006	87.0%	80.0%	-7.0%	199,124,359	-13,938,705
Total				515,526,650	-54,942,699

Non-Grid RSP					
Accident Year	Previous ELR	Selected Ultimate Loss Ratio	Change in ELR	YTD Earned Premium at Aug./06	Impact of Change in ELR Aug./06
2004	200.0%	225.0%	25.0%	616,176	154,044
2005	130.0%	110.0%	-20.0%	25,391,716	- 5,078,343
2006	120.0%	105.0%	-15.0%	50,469,068	- 7,570,360
Total				76,476,960	-12,494,659

189

190 While these changes are positive in terms of overall financial results, they are based
191 largely on industry experience estimates with little actual Pool experience, so the ultimate
192 financial results could be (and probably will be) materially different. A more detailed
193 exhibit highlighting the derivation of these figures may be found in Appendix A.

194

195 **RISK SHARING POOLS - MARKET IMPACT**

196

197 In terms of financial impact, the key point for all stakeholders to remember is that a Risk
198 Sharing Pool nearly half a billion dollars in size has the potential to have serious, negative
199 financial consequences for companies and, ultimately, consumers. Simply put, a large
200 amount of money is already being seen to behave in a volatile manner, with unpredictable
201 impacts on Alberta automobile insurers.

202

203 This is not to say that Risk Sharing Pools, in and of themselves, are necessarily harmful to
204 a competitive marketplace. Properly designed and monitored, they can be used to
205 guarantee availability and enhance stability in the marketplace to the benefit of the
206 consumer by, for example, providing an opportunity for a company to accept a marginal
207 risk on an otherwise profitable account, thus allowing the intermediary to maintain its
208 relationship with a client.

209

210 In the context of industry profit levels, the Risk Sharing Pools expose Alberta automobile
211 insurers to an additional level of financial risk over which they have little control. The size
212 and financial performance of the Pools are difficult to predict in advance because they
213 result from the sum-total of individual company actions. Not only are the results of the
214 Risk Sharing Pools themselves difficult to predict, but individual companies will be
215 exposed to an additional level of volatility depending on how the results of the risks they
216 cede to the Risk Sharing Pools perform vis-à-vis the Risk Sharing Pools as a whole.

217

218 The financial impact on members as a result of the Pool is driven by a number of factors,
219 including the volume of business transferred to a Risk Sharing Pool (affects the member's
220 share of Pool results – the more business transferred, the less the member shares in the
221 Risk Sharing Pool results), the performance of the business transferred to a Risk Sharing
222 Pool (once transferred, the financial results of transferred business are excluded from the
223 member's financial results) and the overall performance of the Risk Sharing Pool (because
224 the member receives a share of the overall performance of the Pool – as per the formula

225 mentioned above). So the net financial effect on members is driven by the profitability of
226 the business transferred to a Risk Sharing Pool and the overall profitability of the Risk
227 Sharing Pool. When both the transferred business and the overall Risk Sharing Pool results
228 are negative, the greater the amount of unprofitable business transferred and the more
229 favorable the net financial result on the member. The reverse is true if both the transferred
230 business and the overall results of the Pool are positive. When the business transferred by
231 a member to a Risk Sharing Pool is profitable and the Risk Sharing Pool is unprofitable, or
232 vice versa, it is the relationship between the profitability of the business transferred and
233 the Risk Sharing Pool profitability that will determine the net financial effect on the
234 member. However, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for members to predict such
235 results, and therein arises the great uncertainty and high risk.

236

237 Given this additional level of risk, one would expect providers of capital to Alberta
238 automobile insurers to seek a commensurately higher level of return, although there is no
239 precise figure for what that additional “risk premium” would be.

240

241 **RESIDUAL MARKET - OPERATION**

242

243 The Residual Market operates in a significantly different manner than the Risk Sharing
244 Pools. In the Residual Market, agents and brokers submit applications to an insurer
245 contracted with Facility Association to issue and service policies on its behalf (referred to
246 as “servicing carriers”). Brokers and agents in Alberta are not required to have a contract
247 with a servicing carrier, but if they do, they are required to abide by the provisions of that
248 contract and of the Plan of Operation. All applications are written in accordance with the
249 Residual Market Manual of Rules and Rates; that is, any specific risk will be written at the
250 same rate regardless of the intermediary approached by the consumer. In Alberta, the rules
251 in the manual are approved by the Superintendent, while the rates are those approved by
252 the Automobile Insurance Rate Board or its predecessor.

253

254 Financial results and statistical information are reported to Facility Association by the
255 servicing carriers, and pertinent financial data are reported to all members monthly via the
256 monthly participation report.

257

258 Financial results of the Residual Market are shared based on market share in the province.
259 For non-private passenger, the sharing is done on a premium-volume basis, while private

260 passenger sharing is done on an exposure-count basis. The share base is updated annually,
261 so members experiencing significant changes in their own business volume can anticipate
262 significant changes in their share of Residual Market results as well.

263

264 **RESIDUAL MARKET - SIZE**

265

266 Facility Association does not track non-private passenger exposure count volumes for all
267 vehicle types. However, for calendar accident years 2003, 2004 and 2005, non-private
268 passenger premium volume has been relatively stable at approximately \$65M, 69M and
269 \$71M, respectively. For the same years, commercial vehicle exposure counts written
270 through the Residual Market were 10,380, 10,217 and 9,769.

271

272 The private passenger volumes have been a much different story. As Appendix B shows,
273 on an exposure-count basis, business volumes for private passenger vehicles insured
274 through the Residual Market have been significantly more volatile. From a low of
275 approximately 14,500 in mid-2001, the exposure count rose to a high of nearly 75,000 in
276 September of 2004, then dropped again to approximately 9,500 by July of this year.
277 Written premium volumes exhibited similar volatility, peaking at \$177M for calendar
278 accident year 2003 and dropping to \$52M for calendar accident year 2005. The rapid
279 decline in the size of the Residual Market resulted from very strict eligibility criteria for
280 private passenger new business introduced effective October 1, 2004, and mandatory non-
281 renewal of existing private passenger business that did not meet that criteria effective
282 October 1, 2005.

283

284 If current private passenger eligibility requirements remain, Residual Market private
285 passenger vehicle volumes will likely settle at about 5,000 to 6,000 written exposures and
286 an annual written premium volume in the neighbourhood of \$17M. Facility Association's
287 best estimate is that 80-90% of all Residual Market private passenger risks are capped by
288 the Premium Grid. In short, the size and the financial performance of the private passenger
289 Residual Market will be largely driven by government-established eligibility rules and
290 premium levels.

291

292 Residual Market non-private passenger volumes are dependent in a general way on the
293 relationship between the price of insurance available through the Residual Market and that
294 of companies serving the market voluntarily. Because the Residual Market operates as an

295 “open market” for other than private passenger vehicles, Facility Association will attract
296 business if its prices are below those of its member companies. Volumes are also
297 impacted, again in a general way, by the willingness of member companies to write the
298 business voluntarily.

299

300 **RESIDUAL MARKET - FINANCIAL RESULTS**

301

302 Due to the nature of Residual Market (i.e., because Facility Association is not an insurer),
303 certain costs resulting from member companies’ compulsory membership are incurred on
304 the members’ own accounts, rather than on those of Facility Association. Prominent
305 among these are health levies, premium taxes, and the cost of capital. Because member
306 companies must book their share of premiums written through the Residual Market on
307 their own books, they must pay premium taxes, health levies, and other charges based on
308 premium volumes themselves. This means that even though Facility Association’s
309 financial statements may show a “break even” result, such a result represents a genuine
310 loss to member companies. Similarly, member companies are required by solvency
311 regulators to support their share of Residual Market premiums with their own capital.
312 These realities are highlighted in Note 2 of Facility Association’s annual audited financial
313 statements, and an exhibit illustrating a comparison of the Association’s results versus the
314 impacts on its member companies in Alberta is included as Appendix C.

315

316 Historically, Residual Market rates have been developed with the goal of generating
317 enough of a surplus to distribute to member companies to cover their costs arising from
318 their compulsory participation in the Residual Market, except that no provision was made
319 in previous rate filings for the cost of capital. The previous position not to include a cost of
320 capital provision was taken voluntarily by Facility Association at the direction of its Board
321 of Directors. Why this position was taken historically is not known with any degree of
322 certainty.

323

324 The Facility Association Board of Directors revisited the issue at a meeting held on
325 February 12, 2003 and passed a motion that a cost of capital provision be included in
326 future rate filings:

327

328 “Following further discussion, on **MOTION** made by Mr. G. Cooke,
329 **SECONDED** by Mr. Rodrigues and **CARRIED, IT WAS RESOLVED**

330 that rates should be developed including a factor for cost of capital and that
331 efforts be undertaken with the Regulators to bring this change about.”

332

333 Facility Association included a cost of capital provision in its rate filing for Prince Edward
334 Island for all classes of vehicles, to take effect during 2004. Following an investigation,
335 the Island Regulatory and Appeals Commission approved the rates as filed. Subsequently,
336 Facility Association included a cost of capital provision in rate applications submitted to
337 the New Brunswick Insurance Board (NBIB) in 2004, the Nova Scotia Insurance Review
338 Board (NSIRB) and the Financial Services Commission of Ontario (FSCO). In a decision
339 dated March 23, 2005, the NSIRB did not approve the inclusion of a cost of capital
340 provision, citing the need for further study and evidence. A similar conclusion was
341 reached by the NBIB, and FSCO has said that the cost of capital provision will likely be a
342 matter for a hearing at some future date.

343

344 Facility Association contends that a provision for the cost of capital supporting Residual
345 Market premiums should be included in its rates in the province of Alberta for the
346 following reasons:

347

348 (a) Solvency regulators require that Residual Market premiums booked by member
349 companies be supported by the capital of member companies just as voluntary
350 premiums must be. That capital has a cost and, because rates are to be developed to
351 cover expected costs, it is proper to include a cost of capital provision in Residual
352 Market rates.

353

354 (b) If voluntary market rates include a cost of capital provision and involuntary market
355 rates do not, there is an implicit subsidy of involuntary market rates by member
356 companies, and by extension, by their customers and shareholders. In Alberta,
357 those receiving this implicit subsidy are for the most part commercial enterprises
358 or objectively defined “high-risk” private passenger vehicles and drivers (who also
359 have the protection of the premium grid). This situation can lead to undesirable
360 public policy outcomes, such as the Residual Market being larger than it needs to
361 be. The Facility Association Board contends that drivers insured through the
362 Residual Market should face the same cost elements as drivers insured in the
363 voluntary market.

364

365 (c) Allowing the implicit subsidy mentioned above means that specialty insurers who
366 specialize in providing coverage for risks typically insured through either the
367 Residual Market or specialty insurers are put at a competitive disadvantage
368 because they are, in effect competing with a cooperative entity backed by the
369 financial strength of the insurance industry providing coverage at a subsidized
370 price.

371

372 (d) It could be suggested that the cost of capital to support Residual Market premiums
373 be included in the voluntary market rates of companies serving the Alberta
374 automobile insurance marketplace. In addition to the adverse public policy
375 implications of that approach (mentioned above), the volatility of Residual Market
376 premium volumes would require companies to frequently re-calculate the
377 “loading” in their rates for the cost of capital needed to support Residual Market
378 premiums.

379

380 Facility Association expects that the precise level of return to be used in calculating the
381 cost of capital provision in Residual Market rates will be a logical outcome of the current
382 hearing. Given the inherently higher uncertainty of Residual Market volumes and financial
383 results, the level of return used in calculating the cost of capital provision in Residual
384 Market rates should be slightly higher than the level of return set for the industry as a
385 whole.

386

387 At a Facility Association rate hearing before the Nova Scotia Insurance Review Board
388 (NSIRB) held November 9 and 10, 2004, the NSIRB’s actuarial advisor, Ted Zubulake of
389 Mercer Oliver Wyman (the Alberta Automobile Insurance Rate Board’s consulting
390 actuary), acknowledged that Facility Association’s operations were inherently more
391 uncertain than those of the voluntary market and that appropriate levels of return on equity
392 should vary directly with the levels of uncertainty facing the enterprise.

393

394 From the transcripts of that hearing (page 604):

395

396 Mr. Zubulake: “...to the extent a target -- a cost of capital provision is
397 allowed the Facility Association and to then -- and to the extent that a target
398 or a cost of capital or a profit contingency provision is -- a standard one is
399 identified and selected for the regular market that perhaps I would certainly

400 suggest or believe that consideration should be given to perhaps a slightly
401 higher return for the Facility Association. How much higher, what the
402 absolute number is, I don't know.”

403

404 The volatility in both the size of the Residual Market and in its net operating results pose a
405 significant business risk to Facility Association’s member companies due to their
406 compulsory participation. Dr. Richard McGaw from the Department of Economics of the
407 University of New Brunswick supported this statement in a written submission to the New
408 Brunswick Insurance Board in June, 2005:

409

410 **“Facility Association Cost of Capital**

411

412 The arguments used to justify a return to capital for a regulated enterprise
413 apply equally to the Facility Association. If capital is provided to the
414 operation of the FA then it has a cost like any other capital provided. To
415 the extent that the cost of capital is borne either by the insurance
416 companies through lower profits or (by) regular policyholders cross-
417 subsidizing FA rates through higher premiums, there is an undesirable
418 element of subsidization. Markets perform best when participants bear the
419 full cost of their choices. As a matter of principle, there should be
420 recognition of the cost of capital and it should be at least as high as the
421 rate for normal business. Given the larger risk, there are valid arguments
422 to exceed the general ROE. I note that a number of companies have
423 written to the effect that they have not included the FA capital in their
424 capital determination for regular policies.”

425

426 The question “How does the decision to include a cost of capital provision reconcile with
427 the Facility Association being a non-profit association?” or a similar variant has been
428 posed by various regulatory authorities.

429

430 Facility Association’s non-profit status has always been based on the fact that its
431 administrative activities have been invoiced to the member companies at cost. Facility
432 Association has always maintained that the financial results (both positive and negative) of
433 the various insurance pools it administers across Canada belong to its members.

434

435 The non-profit status of Facility Association was the subject of a lengthy public hearing
436 before the Newfoundland & Labrador Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities (PUB)
437 in 2000-2001. In its order A.I.36 (2000-2001), the PUB offered the following comment:

438

439 “From the evidence of witnesses and argument of Counsel, the Board
440 concludes that Facility is a non-profit association that operates as nothing
441 more than the administrator of a risk sharing automobile insurance pool. The
442 servicing carrier companies of Facility underwrite the business risks and, on
443 behalf of the member companies Facility carries out an administration
444 function including, *inter alia*, investment of funds, administration of the bank
445 accounts, issuing of reports on the status of funds and accounts, distribution
446 of members’ profits and issuing assessment notices for losses incurred.
447 Facility’s expenses are paid by the member companies and that is all Facility
448 is paid. As their revenues can never exceed their expenditures, Facility can
449 never earn a profit.”

450

451 In its press release announcing the above Order, the PUB stated:

452

453 “The Board found that any profit generated by the operation of Facility
454 Association belongs to the members of the Association.” (Appendix D)

455

456 This finding was consistent with the actuarial evidence presented at the hearing, both by
457 the PUB’s own actuarial advisor and Facility Association’s actuary, that historical Facility
458 Association operating results are not directly relevant for the purposes of prospective rate-
459 making, with its focus on expected future revenues and costs.

460

461 If, despite these arguments supporting the inclusion of a cost of capital provision within
462 the involuntary market rates, a cost of capital provision is not allowed there, the industry
463 voluntary market rates must include that cost. Facility Association has not attempted to
464 calculate what the cost of capital provision should be.

465

466 **CONCLUDING REMARKS**

467

468 The underlying premise of this submission is very basic: the level of return should be
469 commensurate with the risk. To the extent that Risk Sharing Pools expose companies to a

470 greater level of financial risk, the companies should be able to pursue a higher level of
471 return. Similarly, the higher level of risk associated with Residual Market results should be
472 recognized directly in Residual Market rates through the appropriate cost of capital
473 provision within those rates. If the cost of capital is not recognized within Residual Market
474 rates, then it must be recognized in the return companies are able to pursue through their
475 voluntary market rates. Facility Association has not attempted to prescribe the precise
476 adjustments required to voluntary market profit levels for the risks posed to companies
477 through their compulsory participation in automobile insurance Residual Markets in
478 Alberta. However, those risks are real and warrant consideration from the AIRB as it
479 deliberates on appropriate automobile insurance profit levels.

**FACILITY ASSOCIATION
ALBERTA RISK SHARING POOL
30 June 2006**

SELECTED ULTIMATE LOSS RATIOS

	Accident Year	Loss Payments At Jun/06 [1]	Expense Payments At Jun/06 [2]	Outstanding Losses At Jun/06 [3]	Reported Incurred At Jun/06 [4]	Earned Premium At Jun/06 [5]	Reported Loss Ratio At Jun/06 [6]	Relative to Grid Loss Ratio [7]	Selected Ultimate ^(#) Loss Ratio [8]	Relative to Grid Selected [9]
Grid Risks	2004	14,124,832	168,496	7,597,867	21,891,195	47,390,177	46.2%	1.00	72.0%	1.00
	2005	79,398,808	697,662	59,875,801	139,972,271	269,092,121	52.0%	1.00	74.4%	1.00
	2006	23,919,265	102,914	42,383,233	66,405,412	148,064,622	44.8%	1.00	80.0%	1.00
	Total	117,442,905	969,072	109,856,901	228,268,878	464,546,920	49.1%	1.00	75.9%	1.00
Non Grid Risks	2004	678,052	2,992	486,284	1,167,328	617,896	188.9%	4.09	225.0%	3.13
	2005	12,872,686	84,392	7,159,992	20,117,070	25,414,214	79.2%	1.52	110.0%	1.48
	2006	9,962,331	27,326	13,551,455	23,541,112	37,021,365	63.6%	1.42	105.0%	1.31
	Total	23,513,069	114,710	21,197,731	44,825,510	63,053,475	71.1%	1.45	108.2%	1.42


(#) The "Ultimate Loss Ratios in Column [8] reflect the time value of money, and include a provision for adverse deviations.

Impact of Change in ELR at Aug/06

Accident Year	GRID RSP				NON GRID RSP			
	ELR Per Aug/06 Report [10]	Implied Change in ELR [11]	YTD EP At Aug/06 [12]	Impact of Change in ELR - Aug/06 [13]	ELR Per Aug/06 Report [14]	Implied Change in ELR [15]	YTD EP At Aug/06 [16]	Impact of Change in ELR - Aug/06 [17]
2004	87.0%	-15.0%	47,387,740	-7,108,161	200.0%	25.0%	616,176	154,044
2005	87.0%	-12.6%	269,014,551	-33,895,833	130.0%	-20.0%	25,391,716	-5,078,343
2006	87.0%	-7.0%	199,124,359	-13,938,705	120.0%	-15.0%	50,469,068	-7,570,360
Total			515,526,650	-54,942,699			76,476,960	-12,494,659

RESIDUAL MARKET SEGMENT WRITTEN PREMIUM ALBERTA July 31, 2006


(\$'000)



FACILITY ASSOCIATION


Alberta PPV Written Exposures

Written Vehicles



RESIDUAL MARKET SEGMENT

Private Passenger Market Share Alberta



EXCERPT OF
FACILITY ASSOCIATION
RESIDUAL MARKET SEGMENT

Notes to the Financial Statements October 31, 2005

2. BASIS OF FINANCIAL STATEMENT PRESENTATION

The Association manages the following insurance pools:

- The Residual Market Segment, which provides a residual automobile insurance market for owners and operators of personal and commercial motor vehicles, who may otherwise have difficulty in obtaining such insurance, in the following provinces and territories: Alberta, Ontario, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador, Yukon, Northwest Territories, Nunavut.
- The Uninsured Automobile Funds for New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova Scotia and P.E.I., which fund claims for damages made by persons who cannot obtain satisfaction for damages under a contract of automobile insurance and where there is no other insurance or where other insurance is inadequate with respect to the damages claimed.
- Risk sharing pools, operating in Ontario, Alberta (two pools) and New Brunswick which provide a means for individual automobile insurance underwriters to transfer certain of the personal use automobile insurance exposures they underwrite in the respective province that may be deemed of higher risk but which do not qualify for the Residual Market Segment.

The Ontario Risk Sharing Pool has operated since January 1, 1993.

The two Alberta Risk Sharing Pools commenced operations as at October 1, 2004. A "Grid Pool" provides a means for Alberta automobile insurance underwriters to transfer personal use automobile insurance exposures that are subject to the statutory maximum premium. A "Non-Grid Pool" provides a means for individual Alberta automobile insurance underwriters to transfer certain of the personal use automobile insurance exposures they underwrite that may be deemed to be of higher risk but do not qualify for the Residual Market Segment. Their first statutory financial statements are for the thirteen month period ended October 31, 2005.

The New Brunswick "First Chance" Risk Sharing Pool commenced operations January 1, 2005. The "First Chance" Pool provides a means for individual New Brunswick automobile insurance underwriters to transfer certain of the personal use automobile insurance policies they underwrite that are eligible for the "First Chance" discount in that province. Its first statutory financial statements are for the ten month period ended October 31, 2005.

The financial statements contained herein are for the Residual Market Segment operations and for the Uninsured Automobile Funds of the Association.

Separate financial statements are prepared for each of the risk sharing pools.

EXCERPT OF
FACILITY ASSOCIATION
RESIDUAL MARKET SEGMENT

Notes to the Financial Statements October 31, 2005

2. BASIS OF FINANCIAL STATEMENT PRESENTATION (continued)

All of the premiums of the Residual Market Segment are allocated to member companies who are required by regulation to record these premiums in their financial records as direct written premiums. Member companies pay premium taxes and health levies directly to the provinces based on their direct written premiums. Members also incur other costs, such as association dues to industry organizations which are also based on direct written premiums. Accordingly, these costs are not recorded in these financial statements. Investment income earned by members on amounts due to the Association and certain premium levies charged to members in respect of uninsured automobile exposures are also not reflected in these financial statements.

No provision for income taxes is recorded in these financial statements. The results of operations of the insurance pools, including administrative expenses incurred by the Association and investment income earned on insurance pool assets invested by the Association, are included in the members' income for tax assessment purposes.

FACILITY ASSOCIATION RESIDUAL MARKET

ALBERTA - Historical Summary of Operations for Component (a)

Year ended October 31

(\$'000)

	TOTAL Years to Date	2005	2004	2003	2002	2001	2000	1999	1998
Premiums Written	\$2,179,015	\$110,745	\$265,080	\$ 218,250	\$96,285	\$64,539	\$58,388	\$63,116	\$89,530
Change in Unearned Premiums	(\$59,204)	45,569	(10,666)	(51,460)	(11,217)	(4,762)	2,062	4,411	4,960
Net Premiums Earned	\$2,119,811	\$156,314	\$254,414	\$166,790	\$85,068	\$59,777	\$60,450	\$67,527	\$94,490
Underwriting Expenses	\$2,125,217	\$117,334	223,489	157,361	83,410	61,291	54,773	48,547	75,638
Underwriting gain (loss)	(\$5,406)	\$38,980	\$30,925	\$9,429	\$1,658	(\$1,514)	\$5,677	\$18,980	\$18,852
Administrative expenses	\$14,975	468	721	477	594	793	914	1,028	1,027
Net investment income	\$229,296	8,772	10,570	6,417	5,331	5,508	5,293	10,872	13,747
Net operating result (a)	\$208,915	\$47,284	\$40,774	\$15,369	\$6,395	\$3,201	\$10,056	\$28,824	\$31,572
Net Operating Result as a % of Premiums Earned	9.9%	30.2%	16.0%	9.2%	7.5%	5.4%	16.6%	42.7%	33.4%

FOR ILLUSTRATION PURPOSES

Expenses Paid by Members:

Premium Taxes (per IBC bulletins)	\$62,831	\$3,322	\$7,952	\$6,547	\$2,888	\$1,936	\$1,752	\$1,893	\$2,686
Assoc. Dues @ 0.40005% (estimated)	\$8,718	443	1,060	873	385	258	233	252	358
Health Levies (% of Written Prem)	58,820	2,558	7,263	10,214	5,074	3,162	2,762	2,228	3,796
Sub-total	\$130,369	\$6,323	\$16,275	\$17,634	\$8,347	\$5,356	\$4,747	\$4,373	\$6,840
Less: Income Tax Credit received by Members on the above expenses	(\$54,295)	33.62% (2,126)	34.62% (5,635)	36.74% (6,479)	39.62% (3,307)	43.62% (2,336)	44.62% (2,118)	44.62% (1,951)	44.62% (3,052)
Add: Income Tax paid by (refunded to) Members on net operating result	\$81,769	15,897	14,116	5,647	2,534	1,396	4,487	12,861	14,087
Net Expenses after Income Tax (b)	157,843	20,094	24,756	16,802	7,574	4,416	7,116	15,283	17,875
Operating Result before Cost of Capital (a)-(b)=(c)	\$51,072	\$27,190	\$16,018	(\$1,433)	(\$1,179)	(\$1,215)	\$2,940	\$13,541	\$13,697
<i>Assumed Capital 2:1 Ratio WP:Capital</i>	\$1,089,508	\$55,373	\$132,540	\$109,125	\$48,142	\$32,270	\$29,194	\$31,558	\$44,765
Deemed Cost of Capital (10% for all years) (d)	\$108,951	\$5,537	\$13,254	\$10,913	\$4,814	\$3,227	\$2,919	\$3,156	\$4,477
Adjusted Net Operating Result (c)-(d)=(e)	(\$57,879)	\$21,653	\$2,764	(\$12,346)	(\$5,993)	(\$4,442)	\$21	\$10,385	\$9,220
Assessment to(from) Members 1980 - 2005	\$166,146	\$60,552	\$9,005	\$2,766	\$3,169	\$1,848	\$16,795	\$33,117	\$58,280

FACILITY ASSOCIATION RESIDUAL MARKET

ALBERTA - Historical Summary of Operations for Component (a)

Year ended October 31

(\$'000)

	1997	1996	1995	1994	1993	1992	1991	1990	1989
Premiums Written	\$102,646	\$105,881	\$109,047	\$107,428	\$120,159	\$117,614	\$97,915	\$66,885	\$47,932
Change in Unearned Premiums	(1,889)	2,147	(1,324)	6,369	(1,366)	(5,663)	(10,638)	(7,117)	(3,276)
Net Premiums Earned	\$100,757	\$108,028	\$107,723	\$113,797	\$118,793	\$111,951	\$87,277	\$59,768	\$44,656
Underwriting Expenses	81,853	101,749	96,392	127,223	153,254	159,658	118,576	67,084	48,580
Underwriting gain (loss)	\$18,904	\$6,279	\$11,331	(\$13,426)	(\$34,461)	(\$47,707)	(\$31,299)	(\$7,316)	(\$3,924)
Administrative expenses	816	829	881	1,022	953	606	422	255	274
Net investment income	24,061	17,437	15,020	15,896	27,197	25,974	14,461	6,930	4,449
Net operating result (a)	\$42,149	\$22,887	\$25,470	\$1,448	(\$8,217)	(\$22,339)	(\$17,260)	(\$641)	\$251
Net Operating Result as a % of Premiums Earned	41.8%	21.2%	23.6%	1.3%	-6.9%	-20.0%	-19.8%	-1.1%	0.6%

FOR ILLUSTRATION PURPOSES

Expenses Paid by Members:

Premium Taxes (per IBC bulletins)	\$3,079	\$3,176	\$3,271	\$3,223	\$3,605	\$3,528	\$2,937	\$2,006	\$1,438
Assoc. Dues @ 0.40005% (estimated)	411	424	436	430	481	470	392	268	192
Health Levies (% of Written Prem)	6,703	10,842	1,314	1,101	1,003	800	-	-	-
Sub-total	\$10,193	\$14,442	\$5,021	\$4,754	\$5,089	\$4,798	\$3,329	\$2,274	\$1,630
Less: Income Tax Credit received by Members on the above expenses	44.62% (4,548)	44.62% (6,444)	44.58% (2,238)	44.34% (2,108)	44.34% (2,256)	44.34% (2,127)	44.34% (1,476)	43.84% (997)	43.84% (714)
Add: Income Tax paid by (refunded to) Members on net operating result	18,807	10,212	11,355	642	(3,643)	(9,905)	(7,653)	(281)	110
Net Expenses after Income Tax (b)	24,452	18,210	14,138	3,288	(810)	(7,234)	(5,800)	996	1,026
Operating Result before Cost of Capital (a)-(b)=(c)	\$17,697	\$4,677	\$11,332	(\$1,840)	(\$7,407)	(\$15,105)	(\$11,460)	(\$1,637)	(\$775)
<i>Assumed Capital 2:1 Ratio WP:Capital</i>	\$51,323	\$52,940	\$54,524	\$53,714	\$60,080	\$58,806	\$48,957	\$33,442	\$23,966
Deemed Cost of Capital (10% for all years) (d)	\$5,132	\$5,294	\$5,452	\$5,371	\$6,008	\$5,881	\$4,896	\$3,344	\$2,397
Adjusted Net Operating Result (c)-(d)=(e)	\$12,565	(\$617)	\$5,880	(\$7,211)	(\$13,415)	(\$20,986)	(\$16,356)	(\$4,981)	(\$3,172)
Assessment to(from) Members 1980 - 2005	\$27,054	(\$10,175)	(\$16,069)	(\$6,458)	(\$3,291)	(\$1,102)	(\$309)	(\$9,746)	\$3,282

FACILITY ASSOCIATION RESIDUAL MARKET

ALBERTA - Historical Summary of Operations for Component (a)

Year ended October 31

(\$'000)

	1988	1987	1986	1985	1984	1983	1982	1981	1980
Premiums Written	\$42,212	\$41,971	\$42,268	\$34,935	36,405	50,417	46,891	27,166	15,310
Change in Unearned Premiums	(363)	826	(2,389)	(236)	5,151	1,316	(7,442)	(5,288)	(6,919)
Net Premiums Earned	\$41,849	\$42,797	\$39,879	\$34,699	41,556	51,733	39,449	21,878	8,391
Underwriting Expenses	47,845	44,747	37,788	34,165	39,832	50,972	43,460	33,852	16,344
Underwriting gain (loss)	(\$5,996)	(\$1,950)	\$2,091	\$534	1,724	761	-4,011	-11,974	-7,953
Administrative expenses	335	274	228	351	414	350	289	330	324
Net investment income	3,868	2,292	916	594	462	753	1,184	997	295
Net operating result (a)	(\$2,463)	\$68	\$2,779	\$777	\$1,772	\$1,164	(\$3,116)	(\$11,307)	(\$7,982)
Net Operating Result as a % of Premiums Earned	-5.9%	0.2%	7.0%	2.2%	4.3%	2.3%	-7.9%	-51.7%	-95.1%

FOR ILLUSTRATION PURPOSES

Expenses Paid by Members:

Premium Taxes (per IBC bulletins)	\$1,266	\$1,259	\$845	\$699	\$728	\$1,008	\$938	\$543	\$306
Assoc. Dues @ 0.40005% (estimated)	169	168	169	140	146	202	188	109	61
Health Levies (% of Written Prem)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sub-total	\$1,435	\$1,427	\$1,014	\$839	\$874	\$1,210	\$1,126	\$652	\$367
Less: Income Tax Credit received by Members on the above expenses	47.45% (681)	51.57% (736)	48.80% (495)	48.80% (409)	48.80% (426)	48.80% (590)	48.80% (549)	48.80% (318)	48.80% (179)
Add: Income Tax paid by (refunded to) Members on net operating result	(1,169)	35	1,356	379	865	568	(1,521)	(5,518)	(3,895)
Net Expenses after Income Tax (b)	(415)	726	1,875	809	1,313	1,188	(944)	(5,184)	(3,707)
Operating Result before Cost of Capital (a)-(b)=(c)	(\$2,048)	(\$658)	\$904	(\$32)	\$459	(\$24)	(\$2,172)	(\$6,123)	(\$4,275)
<i>Assumed Capital 2:1 Ratio WP:Capital</i>	\$21,106	\$20,985	\$21,134	\$17,468	\$18,203	\$25,209	\$23,446	\$13,583	\$7,655
Deemed Cost of Capital (10% for all years) (d)	\$2,111	\$2,098	\$2,113	\$1,747	\$1,820	\$2,521	\$2,345	\$1,358	\$766
Adjusted Net Operating Result (c)-(d)=(e)	(\$4,159)	(\$2,756)	(\$1,209)	(\$1,779)	(\$1,361)	(\$2,545)	(\$4,517)	(\$7,481)	(\$5,041)
Assessment to(from) Members 1980 - 2005	(\$10,221)	(\$7,459)	(\$2,969)	(\$2,608)	(\$4,937)	\$10,875	\$8,691	\$6,056	\$0

Rates Charged By Facility Association in this Province

Press Release

Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities

Friday, March 30, 2001

The Board has today released its findings resulting from an investigation into the rates charged by Facility Association in the Province.

The Board has concluded, in part, that the rates approved for Facility Association have been based on sound actuarial principles and the best information available at the time. The Board found that any profit generated by the operation of Facility Association belongs to the members of the Association. The Board also found that it would not be prudent to consider these profits in the rate setting process.

A complete copy of the Board's decision can be found in Order A.I. 36 (2000-2001) which is available on the Board's website at www.pub.nf.ca.

Any inquiry should be directed to Randy Pelletier, Legal Counsel.

Phone: 726-8600

E-mail: ito@pub.nf.ca

Facsimile: 726-9604

