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VOTES, VICTORIES AND VALUES: PROBING THE ISSUE OF ELECTORAL REFORM IN CANADA

Premised on the notion that citizens must have the capacity to participate meaningfully in the democratic process, our Strategic Agenda promises that:

"the Commission will study public decision-making and governmental institutions and make proposals about optimal processes for effective governance in a framework of openness and accountability".

Free and open elections are the cornerstone of democratic nations. They are the mechanisms by which citizens can hold their representatives accountable. They have also been heralded as the primary means by which citizens participate in public life. In recent years, feelings of discontent and disengagement of the citizenry have been noted by several observers. Such feelings of discontent and disengagement were also evident in the initial consultations done by the Commission to determine its research plans.

Is there a connection between the possible dysfunctions in the electoral system and the feelings of discontent and disengagement of the public?    Is the current electoral system distorting the range of issues publicly debated? Is it possible to reform the current electroral system? These are the questions explored in this document.

            Canada employs a First Past the Post (FPP) electoral system, a model which confers a seat win to the candidate with the greatest number of votes in a given electoral district (riding/constituency). This means that a candidate can win a riding without having garnered a majority of the votes. In a three-person race, more voters may have voted against the ultimate winner than actually voted for him or her. Cumulatively, this means that the party that ultimately forms the government may have less than half of the total, national popular vote.

            FPP is lauded for its simplicity, its quick conferral of a winner and its creation, in most instances, of a majority government. Polling data provided by Ipsos-Reid indicates that a majority government able to take quick and decisive action is important to Canadians: 76 per cent voiced support for a strong government and 71 per cent supported a strong government able to take action.   

            A further argument in support of FPP is that, in electing one member per riding, a clear line of accountability is established between representative and voter. Others point out that there are connections between elements of our social, economic and political culture that are tied to the workings of our long-established electoral system. Therefore, caution is advised in tinkering with, or rebuilding, our electoral regime.

            While caution is undoubtedly warranted, one must also acknowledge the considerable problems attributed to the current electoral system. The main criticism of FPP is its tendency to inaccurately translate votes to seats, rendering disproportionate results.

            Many argue that the electoral system in Canada exacerbates regional and ethno-linguistic cleavages by offering parties incentives to promote tensions related to regionalism. Parties are rewarded by concentrating their votes in a given riding, but smaller, national parties are systematically unable to translate their broad appeal into enough concentrated support to win seats.

            This phenomenon can help determine which types of conflict gain prominence in the public agenda. Targeting regions can help determine a party's platform and ideology. Regionally based appeals maximize electoral success, more than appeals directed to dispersed socio-economic classes. Therefore, regional conflicts are tacitly promoted, whereas class conflicts are ignored.   

            Countries employing FPP are characterized by the lowest levels of women and minority representation of democratic countries. FPP is a "winner take all" system and parties wish to maximize their electoral success by running the "safest" candidates possible. Women and minority candidates are often regarded as "controversial" and are therefore not nominated as readily as white men.

            Commentators note that a system that is not reflective of the broader population will lose its legitimacy in the eyes of those excluded groups.    There is evidence that voter turnout is on the decline and identifiable groups in society have low rates of participation in electoral politics. It is important to probe the potential connection between such trends and the imperfections of the electoral system. Are the dysfunctions of the electoral system causing people to abstain from participating or are more complex forces at work?

            Another contention is that those voters who do not vote for a winning candidate are not represented by that candidate. This presupposes that voter and representative must share an ideological connection for representation to occur. It may also minimize the procedural aspect of representation that occurs after election day. Arguably, the most important function of an MP is to act as an intermediary between the constituent and the bureaucracy.

            Another criticism of FPP is that those whose votes are "wasted" develop a sense of inefficacy and abstain from voting. The Institute for Research on Public Policy carried out survey research exploring issues related to the quality of democracy. Fifty-five per cent of respondents felt that voter abstention could be attributed to feelings of inefficacy, the feeling that one's vote has no bearing on the outcome of an election. The authors of the report suggested that an electoral system that better translated votes to seats would lessen such feelings and improve rates of participation.

It is important to remember, when examining alternatives, that no model is capable of remedying every problem and a new model will reflect different interests, thereby creating new and different groups of "winners" and "losers".

Second Ballot Run-Off:

            This system, used in French elections, ensures that the winning candidate is elected with more than fifty per cent of the vote. On the first ballot, each voter chooses one candidate. Ballots are counted and if no candidate obtains more than fifty per cent of the votes, a second ballot is held. From this point, the process can vary: the weakest candidate may be dropped from the ballot, or those candidates who failed to meet a certain quota or all but the top two candidates may be dropped. Voters then cast their second ballot to decide between the remaining candidates.

            The second ballot run-off is generally used for its ability to produce a "legitimate" majority winner, but it is problematic in that it adds expense and delay to the electoral process. Fewer voters turn out to cast a second ballot.

Alternative Vote:

            Again, this system elects one member per riding. Voters rank order their preferences on a ballot sheet. If one candidate captures a majority of the votes on the first ballot, s/he is deemed elected and the process ends there. If not, the weakest candidate is eliminated and the second preferences from those ballots are redistributed to the appropriate candidates. The process is repeated until a candidate has gained a majority. Since voters' second preferences are recorded on the ballot, no supplemental ballot is required.

            Supporters of AV mention the relative ease with which it can be implemented and its ability to confer a majority, with representatives elected with fifty per cent of the vote. AV is also cited as an appropriate system to use in societies characterized by ethnic cleavages: the built-in incentive of the system to appeal to second preference voters can foster more consensual politics. Others note the ability of the system to produce more moderate parties that appeal to a broader base of voters.

Single Transferable Vote (STV):

            This system is also referred to as "non-list PR" and is the system currently used in Ireland. Voters are presented with a list of candidates to rank order. Ballots are counted and a threshold is established using the numbers of seats and the ballots cast. Those candidates who attracted enough votes to satisfy the effective threshold are elected on their first preference votes. If all the seats in the riding have not been filled, the weakest candidate is dropped from the running and their votes are reallocated to another candidate according to the preferences of their voters.

            The premise of STV appears to be maximizing the efficacy of the vote - to reallocate votes in a manner that ensures they are functional rather than wasted. It is applauded by academics for the greater choice it affords voters. Yet it is also complex and potentially confusing to voters, due to the method by which it reallocates ballots. It would also require an enlargement of the legislature to facilitate the multi-member districts required.

ProportionalRepresentation(PR):

            Most democratic nations employ some variety of PR. This is the option favoured by most proponents of electoral reform.

            PR allows a greater number of smaller parties to be included in Parliament: the number of votes needed to win a seat is lower in PR systems. PR systems employ multiple member districts, electing more than one member per district. This is seen to facilitate greater inclusion of women and minorities, as there is more incentive to produce a representative list including a diverse range of candidates.

            Mixed or moderated systems commonly use a near fifty-fifty split between elected constituency seats and "list" seats. Constituencies are generally larger than they would be under a FPP system. Voters are asked to vote twice on the same ballot: once for a single-member district and once for a candidate from the party "list". In the constituency seats, one candidate is chosen per riding. The list seats are then distributed (most generally) for corrective purposes, to offset the disproportionality of the single member district results and bestow seat wins to parties in accordance with their share of the national vote.

            Generally, PR systems preserve the single member districts to maintain the relationship between representative and voter.

            PR countries are characterized by higher numbers of elected women and minorities: the lists employed for the corrective seats encourage parties to present a broad and diversified slate to the electorate. They also allow smaller parties to be represented in Parliament.

            A common criticism of PR systems is that they breed instability and government deadlock. This is tied to the fact that multi-party systems are characterized by minority governments and coalitions. Yet the average length of governments between PR and FPP systems does not differ greatly, and comparative stability indicators such as unemployment and labour unrest show no great disparity between countries using the

two systems. Further, many favourably regard the slower policy process created under PR systems, noting that it leads to more consensual and compromise based policy-making.

An important caveat emerges when investigating the topic. We cannot predict with any accuracy how a new electoral system might interact with social, economic and political factors and institutions to produce new patterns of governance. Therefore, a degree of prudence and humility is warranted in advocating new models for Canada. Electoral reform is not a panacea - it is not capable of remedying all that troubles democracy, government and civic life. It is therefore important to make a responsible case either for or against electoral reform and not to oversell its potential or dismiss it out of hand.

            However, the process of electoral reform is also hampered by a lack of urgency amongst the public, and significantly, amongst elected officials. Politicians who have benefited under the current system have no incentive to alter the electoral system in a way that may reduce their prospects of success. The experience of the 1990 Commission of Electoral Reform and Party Financing (the Lortie Commission) is telling: although mandated to study "electoral reform", they were not to recommend altering its basic framework.    

Examining the experience of other countries that have reformed their electoral system can be instructive, pointing to the process, possible effects and limits of electoral reform. Of course, such experiments must be tempered by the realization that international examples can only teach us so much.

            In 1993, a long and convoluted process of electoral reform in New Zealand culminated in a binding vote for change. A referendum held concurrent with that year's general election indicated that 54 per cent of voters supported a change from FPP to Mixed Member Proportionality (MMP). New Zealand is an instructive model for Canadians to study, as it too, had a Westminster model characterized by many of the same institutional features as Canada. Yet, as commentators are quick to point out, there are significant differences, as well. New Zealand is a small, relatively homogeneous unitary state. Such differences would render the process of electoral reform comparatively more difficult in Canada than New Zealand.

            The impetus for electoral reform in New Zealand came about gradually and was the result of several factors rather than a specific catalyst. Such interconnected factors include: the concentration of power in the executive, and Social Credit's inability to translate its respectable popular vote results into seat wins. Labour, one of the two major parties in New Zealand, was also affected by skewed vote to seat translations, which prompted its interest in electoral reform.

            New Zealand also faced drastic economic and social policy changes in the 1980s and 1990s. These initiatives, implemented without public consultation and coupled with "dubious" electoral results, led to much public hostility towards government. And, when power switched hands from National to Labour with no reprieve from policies of economic liberalization and restructuring, resentment towards government intensified. The seeming inability to punish government for unpopular policies at election time led many to view electoral reform as a promising alternative.

            Labour took office in 1984 and established a Royal Commission to investigate reforming the electoral system, honouring earlier promises to investigate the dysfunctions of this institution. Its terms of reference were broad, including: Parliamentary terms, the nature of Maori representation and reform of the structure of the system. Both Labour and National wanted the Commission to look at making minor changes to the system, but the body ultimately tabled an extensive report (Towards a Better Democracy) which advocated a new, mixed proportional system to replace FPP. The existing system was criticized for its under-representation of women and minorities and for its systemic unfairness to minor parties. The Commission feared that a pattern of disproportionate results could lead to an erosion of legitimacy.

            Realizing that neither major party would be anxious to support a change that could lessen their electoral success, the Commission wanted to take decision-making power away from politicians and place it in the hands of the people. They recommended a referendum, in order to let citizens make the ultimate decision. It was held in concert with the 1993 general election. There, 54 per cent voted in support of adopting MMP.

            The first MMP election was held in 1996. Fifteen Maori were elected to the House, on par with their presence in the population. Women's representation increased from 21 to 29 per cent.

            MMP has also rendered certain discernible changes in the processes of governance and policy. Parliamentary committees, for instance, are seen to enjoy more power. The heightened multi-party influence means that legislation is no longer rushed through the system, but is generally seem to be subject to more meaningful debate and scrutiny.

Voter turnout in New Zealand, which many use as a proxy for interest in the political system, has not increased since the advent of MMP; in fact, numbers dipped further for the 1999 election.

            New Zealanders' impressions of MMP following its implementation seem to illustrate some inaccurate expectations of what they could expect from the new system. Such impressions also reveal that a majority of voters (or survey respondents at least) rushed to embrace MMP because they were dissatisfied with politics and government, not because they were sold on the advantages of the new electoral system. And, as commentators point out, reactive measures breed disappointment in results.

            A theme that pervades the investigation of electoral reform, and that is illustrated by the New Zealand example, is that electoral systems are expressions of the values, ideas and interests that a nation considers important. Any electoral model will create "winners" and "losers". Whose interests will gain ascendancy? How is this best decided?

            At least two terms are commonly offered as important elements of electoral systems: systems should offer both representation and legitimacy. The controversy arises, however, in pouring meaning into these concepts.

            A cursory examination of different sources on representation reveal many definitions of the concept. The concept of "descriptive" representation, for instance, denotes the idea of "standing for" someone. Proponents of this theory suggest that a legislature ought to be a "microcosm" of the larger society. This idea, also referred to as "direct representation" values the characteristics of the representative and holds that a representative's ascriptive characteristics help determine what they do in this role.

            "Descriptive representation" has been criticized for assuming that a person's identity can be defined on the basis of one characteristic, such as gender. Women, or even specific subgroups of women, can have vastly different priorities. Further, such a view ignores the procedural realities, such as party discipline and negotiation that can mitigate a female representative's ability to purely represent her social constituents' views.

            There is also the view of "virtual" representation, a theory that holds that a reflective legislature is not paramount if there are mechanisms available by which to hold elected officials accountable. Yet this view is criticized by some who feel that minority voices must be present in the legislature so that their views can be integrated into the policy process in a substantive and meaningful way.

            Representation is also viewed as a process, satisfaction of which can be measured by how responsive a representative is to his or her constituents. And, since it is a process, it is not something that can be guaranteed in advance. This procedural notion of representation has been the vision embraced in Canada. Representatives are to serve as intermediaries between their constituents and the bureaucracy.

            There is also a social justice dimension attached to the term "representation", an idea connected to notions of fairness and inclusiveness. As society has become more diverse, it is held unacceptable for our social institutions not to reflect that diversity.

            The courts have also waded into the discussion of how to define "representation" in litigation surrounding section three of the Charter, the "right to vote". The courts have had to decide between the individualistic, "one person, one vote" conception of the term and a more expansive idea that encompasses other political imperatives. In the Saskatchewan Reference, Madame Justice McLachlin held that the concept of "one person, one vote" has never formed part of our political tradition. While vote parity is a highly significant concern, it has always been mitigated by such factors as: geography, history and minority representation. The Charter section was seen to confer a right to "effective representation", which was not explained in any definitive way.

            "Legitimacy" is another important characteristic of any electoral system, but again, one that requires clarification. Legitimacy refers to the idea that governments are doing what is "right", according to both a procedural and substantive orientation. Procedural legitimacy suggests that the elections are conducted in an open, fair and transparent manner. Substantive legitimacy refers more to what actions government undertakes, rather than how it undertakes them.

Commentators who level criticisms against the "legitimacy" of the electoral system are making different arguments. The system may be illegitimate because governments can gain power without achieving a majority of the votes. It may be illegitimate because citizens do not trust it, do not participate in it or do not feel that their voices are effectively heard.

            Proponents of electoral reform tend to associate the dysfunctions of FPP with declining turnout and feelings of disenchantment amongst citizens. Citizens are certainly locating new and different means by which to express political opinions and dissent. Younger citizens are using new technologies and new techniques to register protest. Although such new methods likely respond to the perceived unresponsiveness of the "system", is it reasonable to say that reforming the electoral system would better accommodate the voices and preferences of people who engage in protests and demonstrations? Has the "unresponsiveness" of the system driven people to protest? Is it accurate to say that such protesters have "dropped out" because they have seized new avenues of influence?

            If high expectations and governmental underperformance have led to public disaffection, it is important not to oversell the potential of electoral reform to fix those problems.

In sum, electoral reform may remedy some political concerns and problems, but not all. Elections are designed to choose winners and losers; any system will always give certain interests preference over others. Further, electoral systems and results are intertwined with numerous other facets of a country's political culture: the effects of electoral reform on other political institutions can form only part of an examination of the process.

There are numerous areas for discussion. Among others:

• How can we ensure that new electoral models change the (entrenched) patterns of governance?
• Does an exploration of voting behaviour assist in understanding citizens' perceptions towards the electoral process?
• Are new methods of protest and interaction with government related to the "dysfunctions" of the electoral system? Can they herald possibilities for reform?
• What do people vote for (or against)? Ideas? Candidates? Parties? Leaders? How are such preferences best accommodated?
• Do elections offer enough opportunity for public debate? Or have they become media events?
• What values are important to Canadians? What model best accommodates these while respecting various Canadian political and cultural imperatives?
• Can an electoral reform project lead to a deeper reflection on the role of government in citizen's lives?
• Can a culture of governance be changed by increased political discussion on electoral reform?