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Conciliator's Final Report: Nunavut Land Claims Agreement Implementation Planning Contract Negotiations for the Second Planning Period
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Questions of Funding

A. The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism

I have said that if the objective of Article 23 is taken seriously, it implies there should be a program of bilingual education and that, in Nunavut, Inuktitut must be the principal language of the workplace and of the delivery of government services.

This country’s language policies have been built on the concept of linguistic duality. But when Nunavut entered Confederation, a jurisdiction was created in which neither English nor French is the majority language.

In attempting to negotiate a new deal on language, either under the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement or through Heritage Canada, Nunavut has run into a recurring obstacle. Unlike French and English, which are regarded as defining characteristics of Canada, and have been supported by the federal government with comprehensive programs and generous funding, the country’s Aboriginal languages, including Inuktitut, are regarded as part of the nation’s “heritage.” The federal programs and services that support these languages are restricted to the community and the home. Nunavut government departments cannot access this funding for teacher training in Inuktitut or curriculum and resource development.

The Inuit of Nunavut do not want support for Inuktitut to be confined within the limited scope of Aboriginal language policy, but desire a funding partnership based on their unique status as a majority in Nunavut.

The Inuit, though a majority in their own territory, are a minority in the sea of English. In this they resemble the Francophones of Quebec, a majority in their own province, but a minority in North America.

The Government of Canada’s own struggle to achieve fair representation for Francophones in its public service provides an illustration of the way in which we can achieve the objectives of Article 23 in Nunavut.

In the late 1960s the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (the “B&B Commission”) pointed out that there had been a failure to recognize the use of French in the federal public service, together with a failure to welcome Francophones into the public service, except in lower-paying categories.

The Commission revealed that in the federal government Francophones did not occupy in the higher echelons the place their numbers warranted; moreover, the Commission pointed out that educational opportunities for the Francophone minorities in the English-speaking provinces were not commensurate with those provided for the Anglophone minority in Quebec, and that French-Canadians could neither find employment in nor be served adequately in their language by the federal government .

The B & B Commission noted that, “there is an acute shortage of Francophones in higher salaried positions throughout the public service.”[76]

The B & B Commission wrote:

The problem of providing equal opportunity is universal. Wherever persons of different languages and cultures work with and for each other, patterns of differential participation in the work process develop. The patterns are based on the realties of group differences in types of training and skills. But they also tend to be based on stereotypes that suggest which people are suitable for what work and what social status. To a certain extent the stereotypes merge with the realities of genuine cultural difference and even reinforce them; in this sense they are self confirming. They can colour the whole environment of an organization. A supervisor who looks at subordinates of different cultural and linguistic backgrounds in terms of stereotypes will decide, on the basis of these stereotypes, whom to encourage and whom to ignore. As a direct result, some will become dynamic and self-confident, and others will become reticent and alienated. The upshot is not simple that people of ability or potential ability are overlooked (though this frequently happens), but that the environment itself partly determines who has ability by giving different labels to different types of people.[77]

The Commission went on:

The cultural ambience of the federal administration is that of a British model adapted to the politics and technology of English-speaking Canada. It is on the whole, an effective adaptation, but its great limitation is its lack of Francophones and, indirectly, French ways of thinking and operating. Everywhere in the Public Service there is great concern for recruiting Francophones, but the desire seems to be for men who will fit easily into the existing structure. The desire for Francophones was rarely complemented by a willingness to provide the intellectual atmosphere and working conditions for the development of their talents. Furthermore, there was apprehension that the Francophones would behave in the federal Public Service as “French Canadians.” There was little recognition for the beneficial impact such Francophones might have in broadening departmental orientations. The department of External Affairs, for example, showed a limited interest in French and French-speaking Africa before 1965. The department of Finance has neglected the later developments in econometrics that have come from Francophone economists, both in France and in Quebec, and its libraries lack the leading French-language economic journals. The greatest drawback Francophone public servants must face is the cultural milieu of the federal administration: it is so overwhelmingly “English” that it is difficult for Francophones to identify with its problems or with the style of life, honour, and prestige of its officers. The result is that some Francophones either give up, drained of ambition, or simply become narrowly ambitious. Neither orientation is conducive to a successful or useful career. The Public Service must recognize the necessity of creating work milieu in which the normal language will be French, where Francophones will constitute a majority, and where their experiences will incline them to stay in the Public Service. [emphasis added][78]

There is a striking similarity between the situation described by the B & B Commission and the situation in Nunavut today. The programs we developed in order to strengthen the French language in Canada can be useful models in Nunavut.

Beginning with the Official Languages Act in 1969 the Government of Canada pursued a comprehensive strategy aimed at increasing Francophone representation in the federal public service and supporting education and community development initiatives for Francophone minorities across Canada.

The Official Languages Act itself included strong measures to support French as a working language of the public service, a decisive step toward achieving a representative workforce.

The adoption of the Charter of Rights, section 23, in 1982 brought with it the establishment of minority language education rights for French (and English) throughout Canada "where numbers warrant".

All of these measures were intended, as Prime Minister Pearson put it, to ensure that French-speaking Canadians are “at home” in Canada. We must do as much to ensure the Inuit are “at home” in Nunavut.

The Official Languages Act is an expression of policy – a policy favouring English and French. But nothing in the Constitution or the Official Languages Act prevents Canada, as a matter of policy, from supporting a territorial initiative favouring Inuktitut.

As a result of its dual-language policy, the federal government subsidizes the teaching of French as a second language in schools in the provinces and the territories.

In Nunavut the fruits of this policy can today be observed. There are approximately 400 Francophones in the territory, concentrated in the capital, Iqualuit. With federal funding the local Francophone community has built a $5 million dollar school, where French is the language of instruction. Class sizes average six students. All of this was made possible under section 23 of the Charter of Rights. In addition, the federal government provides $4 million a year to promote the use of French in Nunavut.

The Inuit receive $1 million a year to promote the use of their language.

This is not to make invidious comparisons. But it shows what can be done to strengthen a minority language.

The French and the English are the founding peoples of Canada. They are the charter peoples of Confederation. Theirs are our two official languages.[79]

I wish it to be understood that the program I am recommending of federal support for bilingual education in Nunavut would in no way challenge or undermine the paramount place of English and French, as constitutionally protected languages, in Canada or in Nunavut. They would remain the languages in which federal government services in Nunavut would be delivered. The right enjoyed by the Francophone minority to have schools, “where numbers warrant,” under s.23 of the Charter would remain.

Today Francophones hold approximately one-third of positions in Canada’s public service. The success of official bilingualism in Canada indicates that it is possible that extraordinary measures can be taken in Nunavut to make Inuktitut a language of the workplace and a language of the delivery of government services to the Inuit.

The B & B Commission cast its report in terms of “language rights,” but conceded there was no constitutional mandate for its recommendations. At best, they said, section 133 of the Constitution Act, 1867, “represents embryonic concepts of equality”.[80]

The recommendations of the B & B Commission were made even though there was no constitutional instrument providing that the federal public service should be representative of the Canadian population, no provision in the Constitution similar to Article 23 of the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement. And certainly no provision in the Constitution which implied as a corollary mandating French as a language of the workplace and of service to the public.[81]

But, it will be said, French is a world language, spoken by millions around the world and which has produced a body of great literature. It is a traditional language of diplomacy, a language whose purity is guarded by the Académie française. What reason is there to believe that the same measures that we took with respect to French could succeed in the case of an Aboriginal language?

To start with, it was not at all certain that French would thrive in Canada. In 1763 the population of New France, coming under British rule, numbered only 60,000 (no more than twice the population of Nunavut today). Under the Quebec Act of 1774 their laws and their religion were protected.

Nevertheless, in 1839 Lord Durham in his famous Report on the Affairs of British North America did not think that the French language could survive in North America. Where was their literature, he asked? Where were their books? He recommended the assimilation of the French Canadians in Quebec. Of course, the idea was rejected by the old Province of Canada.[82]

Well, it is said, there are only 25,000 Inuit in Nunavut. But they are growing in numbers. In fact, since 1980 the Inuit population of Nunavut has almost doubled.

The recognition of the place of the French language in the federal public service and in schools across Canada is now unassailable. In the same way the recognition of Inuktitut in the public service and its place in the schools in Nunavut must bind the Inuit closer to Canada.

B. Federal Funding

Neither in 1993 or in 1999 was there adequate attention given to estimating, and then meeting, the real costs that would be required for the development of a bilingual education system to address the objective of Article 23. They are only now beginning to be appreciated.

Nevertheless, the Parties have always understood the centrality of the objective of Article 23, even if they did not understand the scope and scale of the efforts needed to fulfill it.

If we are to achieve the goal of Article 23, a goal to which Canada has committed itself, can it be left to the Government of Nunavut? I think not. Nunavut does not, under Territorial Formula Financing, have the resources.

If there ought to be a further commitment by Canada, when does it arise? I think now is the time. The Government of Nunavut is up and running. The initial representation of Inuit in the public service has levelled off. It is apparent that the specific measures contemplated by the Parties when the objective of Article 23 was agreed are not going to be sufficient.

The Government of Nunavut has since 2002 been seeking additional federal funding for a program of bilingual education.

I have set out in Part VI.D of this report the costs of the specific initiatives that I am recommending in the near term. They come to approximately $20 million per year. This figure does not include the cost of the program of bilingual education that I recommend for the long term.

These recommendations will require substantial investment immediately, particularly for teacher training and curriculum development, and the commitment must be sustained over a generation in order to bear fruit. The Government of Nunavut has come up with some cost estimates, but given that the program must be introduced in stages over years, it is not easy to determine the cost over the whole period of time.

But these costs must be put in perspective. In order to solidify our position in the Arctic, Canada is contemplating the purchase of several heavy naval icebreakers, the construction of a deep-water port at Iqaluit, and an enhanced military presence. These are matters for the Government of Canada to determine. I am simply urging the vital importance of what is truly incontrovertible evidence of our Northern commitment: a successful, thriving population with a well-functioning government, fully integrated into Canada but with a unique and historic Arctic character.

There can be no doubt that what I propose will be costly. Equally there can be no doubt that Canada must provide the lion’s share of the funding.

I have discussed with the Parties the question of how such an arrangement should be structured. I think that the Governments of Canada and Nunavut should develop bilateral agreements for the design and implementation of this program. In my view no other approach will work. The Government of Nunavut is in the business of educating Inuit; it has the expertise, it runs the facilities; it trains the teachers; it is involved in the health, housing and general welfare of the students. It has developed plans for bilingual education: the design of a Nunavut-specific curriculum, the training of a new and greatly expanded cohort of Inuit teachers to deliver it, and the involvement of the whole community. It is also accountable to the citizens of Nunavut for the decisions it makes and the priorities it sets.

It is therefore, I think, through the Government of Nunavut that the program should be delivered.

In the Clyde River Protocol of 2002 the Government of Nunavut and NTI agreed that “NTI occupies a special place in the affairs of Nunavut with respect to the rights and benefits of Inuit under the Nunavut Agreement” and that “NTI has a mandate to protect and promote the interest of the Inuit as an Aboriginal people.”

There can be no doubt that NTI, which in its submissions to me as Conciliator, has time and again expressed its belief in the need for bilingual education as the only means of meeting the objective of Article 23, is uniquely placed to support the Government of Nunavut in its determination to bring such a program to fruition.

I had thought that it might be possible to make Nunavut accountable to Ottawa, to require a financial audit and a performance audit by the federal government. But this would be inconsistent with the grant of authority that has been given to Nunavut to run its own affairs, which quite specifically provides Nunavut with jurisdiction over education. The Government of Nunavut is accountable to its own Legislative Assembly for the money it spends, and the Legislative Assembly is of course accountable to the citizens of the territory.

The federal funding will have to be over and above what Nunavut receives through Territorial Formula Financing. It is funding that, like the federal funds that go to the provinces and territories to fund English and French, will have to be targeted funding, not to be devoted to any other territorial priorities.

The Government of Nunavut is already spending $7.5 million in curriculum development and teacher education, specifically targeted to these objectives. The balance should come from Canada. Or it may be that a ratio corresponding to that which currently obtains, in the annual budget of Nunavut, between Canada’s subvention and Nunavut’s own revenue, would be appropriate. These are, of course, matters to be worked out between Canada and Nunavut.

Canada and the Government of Nunavut would develop a joint strategic plan setting out objectives and time frames.

I think there should be an independent panel to review the progress of the program. This should include experts in the field, ideally a blend of academics, teaching professionals and members of the community in Nunavut. The panel would monitor progress and results.

This will be a long-term project. Results will not be apparent at once. We have seen, however, in the case of French, that over time (in the case of French, over three decades) with federal support a minority language program can succeed.

C. The Cost of Failure

(1) Dollar Costs

The objective of Article 23 is to ensure that qualified Inuit occupy 85 percent of the positions in the public service in Nunavut. As long as there is a shortfall, there is continuing cost to the Inuit.

In February, 2003, PricewaterhouseCoopers provided an analysis of these costs in a study for NTI and the Government of Nunavut.[83]

After comparing the present income of the Inuit with what they would be earning if they filled 85 percent of the positions in government in Nunavut, PricewaterhouseCoopers calculated the incremental lost income to the Inuit as $123 million annually.[84]

Of course, the employed Inuit would have to pay income tax (as they always have) on these additional earnings, and Inuit on social assistance moving to employment would give up their social assistance. If you take these factors into account you get, according to PricewaterhouseCoopers, a net figure of $72 million in lost Inuit salary and wages for the year 2003 attributable to the failure to achieve the goal of Article 23.

Of course, failure to realize full Inuit employment also carries with it costs to the Governments of Nunavut and Canada.

PricewaterhouseCoopers, using data from the Saratoga Institute, went on in its 2003 report to consider the high cost of recruiting, hiring and training new employees, incorporating data indicating recruitment in the South was both more expensive[85] and more frequent[86] than when Inuit were hired. They factored in estimated savings in social assistance payments and the effect of tax revenue flowing back to government.

PricewaterhouseCoopers’s conclusion was that the net dollar cost to all the Parties amounts to some $137 million per year as of 2003.

Such calculations are inherently elastic. But the report is nevertheless an indication of the scale of the costs to the Inuit of doing nothing, or not enough, towards the fulfillment of Article 23’s objectives.

Furthermore, there is reason to believe that actual costs to all Parties must be higher still when indirect costs are taken into consideration. PricewaterhouseCoopers writes:

The indirect costs associated with not successfully implementing Article 23 are likely to extend well beyond just the direct costs described above. This is due the fact that many of the barriers that limit employment of the Inuit in the Government sector – such as education, housing, day care – also limit employment of the Inuit in the non-Government sector. Moreover, increasing Inuit employment and income is likely to have significant ripple-type effects throughout the whole economy… these costs are real and likely to be sizable in nature.[87]

(2) Social Costs

And then of course there are the social costs. It seems difficult to contest the proposition that a population that is unemployed and marginalized is likely to have a higher rate of social pathology than one that is fully employed, with consequent costs (for treatment of alcohol and drug abuse, health costs, the costs of high incarceration rates, family violence, and suicide).

No one expected that the establishment of Nunavut would eradicate social problems among the Inuit. Indeed, the division of the former Northwest Territories into a wealthier, better-developed Western Arctic (the Northwest Territories today) and the predominantly-Inuit, underdeveloped Eastern Arctic (Nunavut) was expected to spotlight many problems that had long persisted. A former Chief Medical Officer of the Northwest Territories said before Nunavut was established:

Division will consolidate not only the Inuit, but also their problems, [statistics on which] now are diluted by the presence of a substantial NWT non-aboriginal population, and to a lesser extent by the non-Inuit aboriginal population, whose health status is better than that of Inuit. Thus, the health status profile for Nunavut may come as a shock to many who may have become inured even to the depressing aspects of the overall NWT profile.[88]

Indeed the statistics for the Territory are bracing. Hicks and White, writing in 2002, synopsize:

When mortality data for Nunavut was first published by Statistics Canada, many Nunavummiut were shocked to learn that the life expectancy at birth for a baby born in Nunavut in 1996 was almost ten years lower than for Canada as a whole… Nunavut’s infant mortality rates have been halved over the last fifteen years, but are still more than three times the national rate. Mortality due to lung cancer among women in Nunavut is almost five times the national rate, and women in Nunavut were about seven times more likely to die of respiratory disease than Canadian women as a whole.

To the outside observer it must seem like there is no end to the depressing, statistics: over two-thirds of Nunavut residents 12 years of age and older smoke (compared to less than 30 per cent nationally), almost three-quarters of all Nunavut mothers smoke during their pregnancies, Nunavut’s rate of tuberculosis during the 1990s was more than eight times the national average, sexually transmitted disease rates are 15 to 20 times the national rate, and Nunavut’s suicide rate is six times the national average.

This latter statistic is perhaps that most disturbing. For the period 1986 to 1996, Nunavut’s crude suicide rate was 77.9 per 100,000 – and rising – compared to a national rate of 13.2 per 100,000.

The suicide rate was far higher among those between 15 to 29 years of age, much higher among males than among females, and higher in the Baffin region than in the Kitikmeot or Kivalliq regions.[89]

Hicks & White went on:

[S]uicide rates in the eastern and central Arctic were also rising sharply before the creation of Nunavut in 1999. The suicide rate for the period 1992 to 1996 was almost double what it had been a decade before. And during the first 16 months of Nunavut’s existence (April 1999 thru July 2000), at least 34 Nunavummiut took their own lives. Of the 21 suicides which occurred in the Baffin region, all but two were Inuit males. 12 of those 21 were from Iqaluit.[90]

Hicks & White summarize the danger (and by implication the costs) of leaving these problems unchecked:

[T]he territory’s new government, Inuit organizations and Institutions of Public Government face enormous challenges: a young work force with high levels of unemployment and dependence on social assistance, low (but rising) educational levels, high costs for goods and public services, inadequate public housing, poor health condition, and escalating rates of substance abuse, violence and incarceration.[91]

No one has attempted to put a dollar figure on the costs or consequences of young people growing up uneducated or undereducated, and with little hope for their future. Two things do seem to be clear, though: first, the costs are staggering both in human terms as well as in dollars and cents; and second, the costs are avoidable. We can pay now, or we can pay a lot more later.

Footnotes:

  • 76 Hugh R. Innis, Bilingualism & Biculturalism: An Abridged Version of the Royal Commission Report (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1972) at , p. 101. (return to source paragraph)
  • 77 Ibid. at p. 100. (return to source paragraph)
  • 78 Ibid. at p. 101-102. (return to source paragraph)
  • 79 So pervasive is this policy that, for instance, Article 2.8.1 of the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement provides: There shall be Inuktitut, English and French versions of the Agreement. The English and French versions shall be the authoritative versions. (return to source paragraph)
  • 80 Innis, supra note 76 p. 12. (return to source paragraph)
  • 81 It should be borne in mind that what is proposed for Nunavut is not a template for emulation elsewhere in Canadian Aboriginal communities. No other Aboriginal language can claim that its speakers constitute a majority in any jurisdiction in Canada; there should be no concern that the proposals made here would open the door to a host of minority languages claiming similar status. Nunavut is unique. (return to source paragraph)
  • 82 An even more startling proposal for assimilation of the Inuit of Nunavut was recently made by Professor Frances Widdowson of the University of New Brunswick. Professor Widdowson recommends "the depopulation of Nunavut" so that the Inuit might "become actual participants in the development of humanity": Frances Widdowson, "The Political Economy of Nunavut: Internal Colony or Rentier Territory?" (Paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, June 2-4, 2005). (return to source paragraph)
  • 83 The Cost of Not Successfully Implementing Article 23: Representative Employment for Inuit within the Government (PricewaterhouseCoopers, February 17, 2003). (return to source paragraph)
  • 84 This is not to say that the wages and salaries going to non-Inuit Canadians from the South, who are in Nunavut to do the jobs for which Inuit are not qualified, are somehow lost to Nunavut. Of course they are not. Much of the wages and salaries paid to non-Inuit are spent in Nunavut. Much of the money circulates there. But that was not the objective of Article 23. (return to source paragraph)
  • 85 In the case of a non-Inuit public employee, there are likely to be additional costs (not included by Saratoga), such as the cost of transportation to Nunavut and returning to the South. (return to source paragraph)
  • 86 Since the average Inuk stays on the job 6.4 years; the average non-Inuit 3.8 years, the $80,000 expenditure will be incurred oftener in the case of non-Inuit. (return to source paragraph)
  • 87 PWC report, supra note 83 at p. 49. (return to source paragraph)
  • 88 David Kinloch, “Health and health services in the NWT: A review of policies and programs,” unpublished report dated March 21, 1996, p 72, quoted in Hicks & White at p. 89. (return to source paragraph)
  • 89 Hicks & White, supra note 35 at pp. 89-90. (return to source paragraph)
  • 90 Ibid. at pp. 90-91. (return to source paragraph)
  • 91 Ibid. at p. 92. (return to source paragraph)

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