

Speaking Out:



Afghan Opinions on Rights and Responsibilities

The Human Rights
Research and Advocacy
Consortium

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About the Consortium

The Human Rights Research and Advocacy Consortium is a group of 12 Afghan and international NGOs working in the fields of humanitarian relief, reconstruction, human and women's rights, peace promotion, research, and advocacy. It was established in early 2003 to engage in proactive research and advocacy on human rights issues over a sustained period.

This project is a unique initiative both for Afghanistan and for other countries emerging from conflict and insecurity. It is distinctive in its aim, its methods, its partners, and its products.

- The aim is to bring together a group of organizations to systematically promote human rights through ongoing primary research, training and collective advocacy.
- The method attempts to capture the voices of ordinary Afghans to promote a wide array of policy changes over a sustained period.
- The partners are a consortium of six Afghan and six international agencies. These partners, who equally co-fund this project, include some of the most experienced and respected agencies working in Afghanistan today. The extensive programming experience of Consortium members gives us unrivalled access to communities.
- The products will offer an array of innovative resources, designed to impact policy change, both in Afghanistan and abroad. Focusing not just on what we say, but how we say it, our research capacity gives us access to a living database of photographs, film and

individual perspectives of hundreds of Afghans. Those resources will be captured in a variety of intellectually and visually compelling ways to influence debate on the contemporary human rights concerns of ordinary Afghans.

The United States Institute for Peace (USIP) and each Consortium member jointly funded this survey.

Consortium Members

Afghan Organizations

- ❖ Afghan Development Association
- ❖ Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission
- ❖ Agency for Rehabilitation and Energy-conservation in Afghanistan
- ❖ Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (advisory organization)
- ❖ Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance
- ❖ Cooperation for Peace and Unity

International Organizations

- ❖ CARE International
- ❖ Mercy Corps
- ❖ Ockenden International
- ❖ Oxfam International
- ❖ Rights and Democracy
- ❖ Save the Children Federation, Inc.

CONSORTIUM MEMBERS



Afghan Development Association (ADA) was founded in 1990. Its mission is to eradicate poverty from Afghanistan. ADA provides support to returning refugees, internally displaced persons, poor families, women, the unemployed and the uneducated as well as to community based organizations.



The Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) was based on the provisions of the Bonn Agreement and was established by a decree issued by Mr. Karzai (Chairman of the Afghan Interim Administration) in June 2002. The AIHRC is mandated to monitor the human rights situation in Afghanistan and initiate effective measures for the protection and promotion of human rights.



Agency for Rehabilitation & Energy-conservation in Afghanistan (AREA) is an Afghan non-governmental organization established in 1994 operating (at present) in the sectors of community development, alternative technology/environment protection, mine action, vocational/skill training and construction.



The Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) is an independent research institution that conducts and facilitates quality, action-oriented research and analysis to inform policy and improve practice in order to increase the impact of policies and programmes in Afghanistan.



CARE is a confederation of 11 organizations, working in more than 60 countries around the world (and in Afghanistan since the 1960s). CARE seeks a world of hope, tolerance and social justice, where poverty has been overcome and people live in dignity and security. CARE strives to be a global force and partner of choice within a worldwide movement dedicated to ending poverty.



Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (CHA) is an Afghan NGO. Its objective is to help the development of Afghan society through cooperation in rehabilitation, reconstruction and sustainable social and economic advancement of communities.



Co-operation for Peace and Unity (CPAU) is an Afghan NGO working in the areas of social peacebuilding and promotion of human rights with the aim of achieving a viable peace in Afghanistan.



Mercy Corps is a non-profit organization that exists to alleviate suffering, poverty and oppression by helping people build secure, productive and just communities. Mercy Corps operates in more than 25 countries reaching 5 million people worldwide and has been working in Afghanistan since 1986.



Ockenden International works in partnership with communities and vulnerable people affected by displacement. By involving people in resolving their own problems, we work to build more confident, stronger and self-reliant communities.



Oxfam International is a confederation of 14 organizations that is committed to invest its moral, personnel and financial resources to the shared promotion of a worldwide initiative for economic and social justice.



Rights and Democracy (The International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development) is an independent Canadian institution with an international mandate. It works in cooperation with civil society and governments around the world to promote, advocate and defend the democratic and human rights set out in the International Bill of Human Rights.



Save the Children (SC/USA) is a leading international nonprofit children's relief and development organization working in more than 40 countries, including the United States. Our mission is to create positive and lasting change in the lives of children in need.

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Overview

In early 2003 a consortium of twelve NGOs and human rights organizations formed to research and advocate on human rights issues in Afghanistan. The Consortium is unique for Afghanistan and other post conflict settings in its aims, its methods, its partners and its products. *Speaking Out* presents the findings of the Consortium's first piece of collaborative research.

The aims of *Speaking Out* are to promote Afghan voices as an important part of current policy discussions; to ensure that policy makers hear perspectives on rights and responsibilities from different ethnic, gender, age and geographic groups in Afghanistan; and to stimulate further collaborative advocacy by NGOs in Afghanistan.

The survey was conducted from April to June 2003. In total 1,479 Afghans participated in this survey from eight locations across the country. Of these, 1104 people were individually interviewed using a questionnaire and a further 375 participated in group discussions.

The survey and report looked at three specific rights drawn from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948):

Article 3: Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.

Article 21: Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his¹ country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.

Article 22: Everyone is entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, to the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.

Priorities for Afghanistan

We asked "if you were the President of Afghanistan, what would you do first to help your country?"

- 43% of the responses focused on protection of security rights through, for example, disarmament or army and police training.
- 40% focused on promotion of economic rights such as health care, education or job creation.
- Only 7% focused on addressing political rights such as removing corrupt politicians or ensuring representation of all tribes in government.

Group discussions reinforced the pre-eminence of security rights. Participants consistently talked about being tired of the long years of war, and the negative effects of the conflicts on their lives. Many expressed their hope for peace and stability in Afghanistan. A large majority of respondents mentioned security and economic progress as mutually dependant forces.


The following sections present the key findings of the survey under each rights theme.

¹ The use of 'his' reflects the original wording in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948).

² Two key facts are likely to have informed respondents' high levels of confidence about security:

- To protect respondents, NGO staff and programmes, the survey was carried out in secure areas only. Many areas of the country were already 'off limits' for many NGOs.
- People defined security differently. Sometimes they meant a lack of fighting at that point in time, sometimes they referred to their immediate vicinity only.

SECURITY RIGHTS: KEY DIFFERENCES BY LOCATION



SECURITY RIGHTS

Right to Physical Security

A mixed picture emerged about security issues. Whilst most respondents (92%) felt safe walking around their village or town, all 31 group discussions prioritized security as the key issue for Afghanistan moving forward.² Those surveyed in Gardez (76%) and Kandahar (80%) felt significantly less secure than elsewhere.

Overall 83% of respondents felt more secure now than three years ago, but there was significantly less optimism about security in Gardez (23%) and Kandahar (53%). Group discussions revealed fears about the rise in theft, the presence of armed groups and the related lack of rule of law and central authority.

Women generally felt the same level of security walking around their village/town as men, possibly as the boundaries of public space women are allowed to travel in are extremely restricted. Group discussions revealed this may also be linked to perspectives on the Taliban. Women recognised that security was good in an abstract sense under the Taliban, but personally felt insecure and restricted at that time, and therefore much safer now.

Security Responsibilities

Most respondents (48%) held the police responsible for providing protection against crime. The majority (82%)

of respondents thought that those they held responsible for providing security were fulfilling their responsibilities satisfactorily.

A relatively smaller number (65%) believed that the Afghan army or police would be able to provide security in local areas in the next five years. Similarly, group discussions revealed the hope of a strong national army and police force as a prerequisite for security. Over half of those surveyed (53%) wanted Afghan forces to be responsible for providing security, most of the remaining (42%) wanted either international forces alone or both international and Afghan forces working together.


Improving Security

Disarmament was prioritised as the most important thing to do to improve security. Group participants also thought that without disarmament it would be extremely difficult to hold free and fair national elections, or to make significant progress with reconstruction.

Prospects for Peace

While more than 90% feel safe now, only 78% think Afghanistan will be more peaceful a year from now. In Gardez (52%) and Kandahar (55%), optimism was significantly lower. In group discussions many referred to the current situation as 'partial peace', 'relative peace' or 'temporary peace'. Concerns about threats to long term peace included armed groups, rule by gun, lack of rule of law and impunity for commanders and warlords.

ECONOMIC RIGHTS: KEY DIFFERENCES BY LOCATION



ECONOMIC RIGHTS

General Sense of Economic and Social Rights

Respondents had high expectations (81%) that the government would be able to deliver services in the next three years, although those in Kabul (89%) were significantly more optimistic than elsewhere (77%).

Group discussions revealed these expectations often to be aspirations rather than forecasts. Many raised frustrations that they had seen little impact thus far, while they had heard of misuse of funds by government and aid actors. There was also a strong sense from the group discussions that there is a time limit on the delivery of services. Without tangible reconstruction progress, many feared the country would descend into anarchy again.

Responsibility for Reconstruction

Most respondents (85%) were aware that foreign governments had promised money to reconstruct Afghanistan, but only 54% thought these governments would keep that promise (a surprisingly low number given the generally high levels of optimism in the survey).

Participants were asked whether international aid money should be given directly to the Afghan government or

to NGO's and the UN. Thirty-eight percent thought it should go to the government, 40% to the UN and NGOs and 12% said to both.

In group discussions most supported giving aid money directly to government, and held the government responsible for service delivery. Nonetheless, participants recognized that the government currently has weak capacity, and there is a need to staff ministries with people that are educated, responsible and appointed on merit rather than because of social or political affiliations.


The Link to Security

A consistent theme arising out of discussions on government and the international community's role in reconstruction was the link to security and in particular disarmament. Participants thought that without disarmament it would be extremely difficult to hold free and fair national elections, or to make significant progress with reconstruction.

Right to Education and Health

Ninety-four percent of respondents said it was easier for their children to go to school today than it was three years ago. Health care (83%) is also perceived as easier to access today than three years ago. The results, however, do not give any insight into the quality of education or healthcare.

POLITICAL RIGHTS: KEY DIFFERENCES BY LOCATION



POLITICAL RIGHTS

Right to Political Participation

The level of awareness about the constitution-drafting process and the national elections was high - 70% and 69% respectively. Even higher (87%) was the number of respondents who want to exercise their fundamental right to vote in national elections.

Respondents had high expectations (73%) that national elections would bring positive change to Afghanistan.

Most thought that elections would result in good governance - they expected the elections to deliver a government which would be strong, legitimate, accountable and representative. However, group discussions revealed serious concerns about whether it would be possible to have 'free, fair and representative' elections until disarmament had taken place.

Also in group discussions, people expressed a desire for a strong central government, perhaps indicating the lack of confidence in existing power structures which many saw as based on the rule of guns. Yet many referred to the current central government as weak and in need of support in order to exert its influence in the provinces.

Women's Right to Participate

Seventy-two percent of those surveyed thought that women should be involved in community decision making. When asked why, many responded either that it was their right under Islamic rule, or simply because they were humans who made up half of the population. In group discussions, many observed that the abstract recognition of women's entitlements had not translated into fulfilment of those rights.

Local Decision Making

The survey aimed to find out who people held responsible for political decision making at the local level, and their ability to voice their opinions with those responsible bodies. Most respondents (75%) said that local mechanisms for decision making were functioning (local *shura* - council or assembly - or elders).

Where the community was unable to make decisions or resolve problems, most respondents (87%) said they would go to the government administration, judiciary or police for help, clearly indicating that people still held government institutions responsible. Yet in group discussions many said that the local government was unable to deliver fair decisions because of problems of corruption and partisan decisions based on social and political affiliations.

Photo courtesy of HRRAC



Photo courtesy of HRRAC



Overview

SUMMARY OF KEY GENDER DIFFERENCES

Security Rights-

- Forty-four percent of women wanted Afghan forces (rather than internationals) in comparison to 60% of men. Women (59%) were also less confident in the Afghan army and police than men (70%).
- Women seemed slightly more optimistic about the prospects for peace than men. Eighty-one percent of women thought Afghanistan would be more peaceful in a year's time in comparison to 75% of men.

Economic Rights

- Men were far more likely to know about aid pledges to Afghanistan than women – 91% of men were aware in comparison to 78% of women.
- There was no significant difference between men and women in their perceptions of access to health and education.

Political Rights-

- Sixty-one percent of women knew about both the constitution and the elections, in comparison to 78% of men. Men generally (79%) were more optimistic than women (68%) that elections would bring positive change.
- Most men (95%) said they would vote in the election compared with 78% of women. In fact the number of women willing to vote was lower than men in every location, but significantly so in the villages around Gardez, where 65% of the overall sample said they would vote, measured against 27% of women.
- Women (30% compared to 17% of men) were far more likely to cite peace as the positive outcome of elections and men (73% compared to 50% of women) thought elections would bring good governance.

QUESTIONS FOR POLICY MAKERS

Consider this...

Security Rights

- ❖ Why are so many Afghans comparatively pleased with their security situation on the one hand, and concerned that security is the most important issue for Afghanistan on the other?
- ❖ Why do respondents in Gardez and Kandahar feel less optimistic than elsewhere about security now and the prospects for peace in the future?
- ❖ Why do Afghans put disarmament as their top priority for improving security?

Economic Rights

- ❖ Why are people so optimistic about receiving reconstruction benefits when there have been such challenges in delivery of services?
- ❖ Why are so many Afghans comparatively sceptical that donors will come through on their commitments to Afghanistan?
- ❖ Why does optimism about the ability of the government to deliver services in the future significantly decrease outside of Kabul?
- ❖ How long can people's frustrations regarding the misuse of aid money and the lack of tangible reconstruction be contained?

Political Rights

- ❖ Why are so many people optimistic that national elections will bring positive change to Afghanistan?
- ❖ Why is there less optimism in political processes and the right to participate in Gardez and Kandahar?
- ❖ Why does the high rate of recognition of women's right to participate politically not translate into reality?
- ❖ Why do so many women feel listened to given the male dominant nature of most decision making bodies?
- ❖ Will the optimism in elections as a process for positive change remain over time?

Introduction

Afghanistan has been in the international spotlight since September 2001. Policies have been made and strategies written, yet there have been very few formal attempts to capture Afghan public opinion on priorities and expectations.

Speaking Out presents findings from the Consortium's first phase of collaborative research. It aims to ensure that Afghan voices become an integral and important part of the current policy discussions.

The survey was conducted from the end of April to the end of June 2003. It included two methods: questionnaire and group discussions. In total 1,479 Afghans participated in this survey from eight locations across the country.

Using a Rights Based Approach: Who is Responsible?

Every Afghan is entitled to the basic conditions for living with dignity. Afghans are born with the fundamental political, security and economic rights that will allow them to develop themselves as full human beings.

In recent years, few Afghans have been able to claim that birthright.

Speaking Out asks who is responsible. It points a human rights lens not towards the past—that will be the task of other human rights and justice organizations—but towards the future. It looks at who is responsible for ensuring that the human rights of Afghans are going to be respected, protected and fulfilled over the coming years.

Responsibility falls upon many shoulders. Ordinary Afghans must be willing to live in peace and to lift themselves out of poverty by taking control of their own development, but others must offer them that chance. Afghan policy makers, at the local, regional and national levels, must create the environment in which people can enjoy their basic human rights. International policy makers must fulfil their promises to Afghanistan.

This survey aims to provoke debate around who is responsible for creating the environment in which Afghans can enjoy their human rights.

Box 1: Chosen Human Rights Issues for Research

Security Rights: The Right to Physical Security

When people live free from physical violence, they live in peace. Security is both a symptom and a cause of long-term stability, and our research and advocacy aims to promote security in both respects. The research focuses on the core security right: the right to life, liberty and security of person. It explores how people perceive insecurity at the community level, their expectations for peace, and which groups they believe can provide security.

Social and Economic Rights: The Right to Benefit from National Economic Resources

It may seem optimistic to talk about economic rights in Afghanistan today. Asserting that every Afghan has the right to adequate health care, education and work, for example, appears naive, particularly when legal responsibility falls upon a state that is under-resourced, inexperienced and may appear to have more pressing concerns (such as its own survival). Yet, if Afghanistan is to move towards peace and political stability, progress on economic rights will be fundamental to its success. The people of Afghanistan are entitled to benefit from national economic resources. They have heard the promises from donors and government and now want service delivery. This survey explores the nature and extent of those expectations.

Political Rights: The Right to Political Participation

Long-term stability demands that Afghans can promote their interests and address their grievances politically through peaceful means. We chose to focus on participation in the political structures that affect people's lives.

Rather than tackling all the issues across the human rights spectrum, the survey focuses on one key issue in each of the three main groups of human rights (see Box 1).

These findings are a starting point for the Consortium to develop well-grounded advocacy strategies in order to hold policy makers accountable for their human rights responsibilities.

Priorities for Afghanistan


What do Afghans think are the highest priorities for policy attention in their country? Our survey asked the following:

If you were the President of Afghanistan, what would you do first to help your country?

Answers were coded¹ into the three main rights categories: Security Rights, Economic and Social Rights, and Political Rights. Box 2 gives examples of some of the types of answers received and the overall result.²

Whilst there were interesting gender differences in priorities for the future (see Chart 1) the overall emphasis on security rights was borne out in group discussions. The most frequently mentioned issue raised in every group discussion was the need for long term security. Participants consistently talked about being tired of the

Chart 1: Priorities for the Future: What Men and Women Think



long years of war, and about the negative effects of the conflicts on their lives. Many expressed their hope for peace and stability in Afghanistan.

Given this sentiment it is perhaps surprising that more respondents did not prioritise security issues. This may reflect a perceived mutual dependence between security and economic reconstruction – for peace and security Afghanistan needs to marginalise the ‘spoilers’ through economic reconstruction; similarly, economic reconstruction requires a relatively secure environment for aid agencies and the private sector to operate.

Answers did vary by location: Herat had the highest percentage of people who thought peace was the priority (53%) and Kandahar the lowest (29%). Kabul participants prioritised economic and social rights, whereas overall the locations outside Kabul prioritised security rights.

Box 2: If You were the President of Afghanistan

What would you do first to help your country?

Security Rights	Economic and Social Rights	Political Rights
Secure peace	Improve health and education	Ensure representation of all ethnic groups in government
Implement disarmament	Develop infrastructure	Remove corrupt government officials
Develop a national police force and army	Create jobs	
43%	40%	7%

HOW TO READ THIS REPORT

Speaking Out aims to stimulate further debate and discussion on the policy implications of the findings. It presents the results of this survey, but does not provide lengthy analytical discussions of the data rather, allowing the results to speak for themselves. In order to give some context to the results, brief profiles of each of the eight locations surveyed are provided in Annex A. The report raises many interesting but unanswered questions, which are summarised at the end of each chapter. The findings will be used by the member organisations and others to guide advocacy efforts, define future research questions, and develop programmes. However, the data cannot be used to talk about Afghan-

¹ See Annex D for an outline of the coding used throughout the questionnaire.

² Those surveyed were asked to give only their top priority, but in reality many respondents prioritised both security rights and economic rights. For the purposes of data input only the first answer was recorded.

istan as a whole. The statistics presented in this report represent only the sample population asked. In most cases this was 100 surveys at each location. Comparisons between the locations aim to be illustrative rather than representative of the populations in that area. Therefore, the data and the comments from group discussions cannot be extrapolated to the overall population.³

The remainder of the report is structured as follows: Chapter One provides the methodology of the survey. It outlines the methods used, where and how many people were interviewed and the methodological issues arising from the survey. The following three chapters present the findings of the survey in relation to security rights, economic rights and political rights.

³ See Annex F for a note on statistical methods and for a presentation of some of the raw data collected.

Chapter One: Survey Methodology

SUMMARY OF METHODS

Two survey methods were used: questionnaire and group discussions.

- **Questionnaire.** In developing the questionnaire (see Annex B), the prime consideration was balancing the need for important information while protecting the staff and programmes of the member organisations. The questionnaire was written in as simple language as possible to ensure that all people could understand the questions. It was field tested in Kabul and translated into Dari and Pashto. Male and female NGO surveyors interviewed men and women in their homes.
- **Group Discussions.** The aim of the group discussions was to provide context for the quantitative data. A minimum of three group discussions were held in each location with approximately 10 – 15 women, men and youth. Facilitators ran the discussions in local languages using guiding questions that closely linked to the questionnaire (see Annex C).

HOW MANY PEOPLE WERE SURVEYED AND WHERE

In total 1,479 people were involved in the survey. Of these, 1,104 people were individually interviewed using the questionnaire. A further 375 participated in group discussions (see Annex D for details of the group discussions).

The survey was carried out in eight locations.⁴ These locations were chosen by the Consortium members according to the following criteria:

- Member organisations were operational in the area and could provide local staff and logistics to carry out the survey.
- Security was considered good enough to conduct the survey.
- Rural and urban populations would be represented.
- Different ethnic groups would be represented.

Seven hundred and three surveys were conducted in the cities of Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, Faizabad and Saripul.

These cities vary considerably in size. Four hundred and one surveys were carried out in rural villages.

In each location permission was obtained from local authorities to conduct the survey. The Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) also gave written permission while the Independent Human Rights Commission wrote a letter of support.


Three hundred surveys were conducted in five districts (4,5,6,7 and 15) of Kabul as shown in Map 1. The districts were chosen randomly. More questionnaires were carried out in Kabul because the population far exceeds that of the other larger cities.

Table 1: Number of Surveys Carried Out in Each Location


Urban	Faizabad	103
	Herat	100
	Kabul	300
	Kandahar	100
	Saripul	100
	Sub-Total	703
Rural	Villages near Gardez	100
	Villages near Herat	100
	Villages in Panjao District	101
	Villages near Zaranj	100
	Sub-Total	401
TOTAL		1104

⁴ Herat is counted as one location, but the sample was split – 100 surveys were conducted in the city and a further 100 in villages approximately 30km from the city.

Map 1: Districts Surveyed in Kabul



Map 2: Survey Locations in Afghanistan




Throughout this report villages are not identified by name but by the district name or the nearest city.

WHO WAS SURVEYED?


Houses were randomly selected and one individual interviewed at each house/compound.⁵

For the quantitative questionnaire the sample was roughly evenly split by gender with most of the major ethnic, educational groups and age groups represented.


Chart 2: Sample Profile for the Survey Questionnaire




Gender Profile. The gender balance of the sample overall was 48% women and 52% men. Kabul was the only location where women were a larger proportion of the sample than men (62% women compared with 38% men). This is largely because the survey was conducted between 9am and 4pm, when many men were at work or looking for work.



Ethnic Profile. Tajiks were the largest ethnic group represented in the sample (40%), followed by Pashtuns (29%) and Hazaras (14%). Pashtuns represent a higher proportion of the overall population in Afghanistan; however, many of the Pashtun dominated areas are also those with significant security restrictions. Within each ethnic group there was a roughly even gender distribution with the exception of Pashtuns where men were 59% of the overall Pashtun sample.



Education Profile. The most striking feature of the sample related to education levels: 57% had no education at all, either formal or non-formal, just over half of which were women. In the 7-12 years of education and the 12+ years of education categories, women represented only 33% of the sample.



Age Profile. In terms of age distribution, the highest number of people interviewed (40%) was in the 27-40 years age group. Significantly higher numbers of younger people were interviewed in Gardez than other locations. Forty percent of the total sample aged 15-26 years was from Gardez.

⁵ Consortium members chose the particular villages, towns and cities where the survey was carried out. The districts in Kabul were chosen randomly. The individual respondents in each location were chosen through random sampling. Surveyors started at a central point in the village/area and chose the third house/compound on the right, turning left at the end of the road. One individual at each house/compound was interviewed. A roughly even split of male and female surveyors was used

KEY POTENTIAL BIASES TO BEAR IN MIND WHEN READING THE DATA

The Researchers

National NGO staff carried out this survey. In many cases the community surveyed knew them either personally or in organizational terms. Answers may have been more pro- or anti-NGO (depending on the particular relationship) as a result. Additionally in some cases the presence of an international staff member may have had an impact on results.

The Locations

The survey locations were relatively secure areas at the time of the survey. They are all areas where Consortium members have operational programmes. The security of staff and programmes were of paramount importance.

In this survey the eastern and southern provinces are underrepresented as many parts of these provinces are considered essentially 'no go' areas for NGO staff. This has undoubtedly had an impact on the data and in particular has led to generally more positive results about security than the Consortium were expecting.

The Respondents

The survey aimed to capture the opinions of a cross-section of ordinary Afghans across the country. Respondents were chosen randomly rather than on their ability

or knowledge to respond to the question. The majority of respondents (57%) had no education, either formal or non-formal and many stated that they had never been asked their opinions on these types of issues before. This is particularly true of the women interviewed. Most people were pleased to be asked their opinions on public issues, even if they felt that they were personally uninformed.

This may have had an impact on the data, giving a slightly more optimistic bias. The surveyors thought that, in some cases, respondents who were unsure about the issues had a tendency to give the answers that they thought we wanted to hear i.e. yes. In addition, when asked about expectations for the future many responded '*inshallah* (God willing), yes'. That this answer was then entered as a 'yes' or 'don't know' may not quite convey what people meant.

The Questions

The Consortium went to a lot of trouble to ensure that the questions asked were not so sensitive as to cause problems for operational agencies. The questionnaire did not use names or terms such as 'the Taliban,' 'President Karzai' or 'warlords'. Even so, in some areas local authorities viewed the survey with considerable distrust. In three of the survey locations the local authorities eventually gave us permission to conduct the survey, but were suspicious of our



Photo courtesy HRRAC

A survey team



Photo courtesy HRRAC

Conducting a survey

intentions and of the member organisation's involvement with such activities.

In parts of Afghanistan, now and in the past, it is not easy to question or criticise those in power. It is likely that some people answered yes to questions because a yes answer is the least questioning of the authorities, and a person could be reassured that there would be no consequences.

RESEARCH ETHICS

At all times during this survey the security of both the people conducting the research and those participating in it has been the highest priority. The surveyors also tried to be completely transparent in the aims of the survey. Some measures were taken to ensure this:

- Confidentiality. No names or addresses were recorded and surveyed villages in rural areas are not named. In Kabul, districts surveyed are named because the populations are so large in comparison to our sample size. In general, the size and random nature of the sampling makes it extremely difficult to attribute any comments to an individual.

- Informed consent. People who participated in the survey gave informed consent. Before the survey or group discussion surveyors explained the aim of the research and how the information would be used.
- Potential benefits. Respondents were informed that there would be no immediate benefits from this research, but that the aim was to inform the government and the international community of their opinions in order to promote policy change.
- Choice of location. Secure areas were chosen to avoid endangering the surveyors.
- Presentation of findings. Quotations used in this report are given a general location rather than naming a specific village or area. People photographed gave verbal permission to take their photographs. It should be noted that photographs used in this report are of a mix of people who did and did not participate in the research. Where they are used, they are not linked to any specific comments.

Chapter Two: Security Rights

WHAT SHOULD BE DONE TO IMPROVE SECURITY?

Disarmament is clearly considered the top priority to improve security in the country. Many other respondents listed disarmament though not necessarily first, and so this statistic may be underestimated. In terms of location, disarmament was prioritised as the most important priority in four of the locations - Saripul, Panjao, Herat and Faizabad. The lowest importance attached to disarmament was in Kabul. In Kabul, Kandahar and Gardez strengthening the Afghan police and army were viewed as the top priority.

All the group discussions reaffirmed the importance of disarmament; it was the most frequently mentioned issue related to security and views were particularly strong and passionate in Faizabad. Many participants stated that if disarmament is not carried out, then the security that some communities are enjoying at present will not last.

Survey Question and Results

In your opinion, what is the most important thing to do to improve security in your community? *

Disarmament	33%
Strengthen Afghan Police/Army	23%
Don't Know	11%
Political Reform	9%
Address Factional Tensions	8%
Economic Development	7%
International Support	2%
Other	7%

*Answers were coded into the eight categories as shown.⁶

Views about Disarmament

“Every single gunman can do what he wants and no one can stop him because he possesses a weapon and power.”

Man, Faizabad

“Disarmament is more important than any further step since without it nothing is possible.”

“Peace and stability are just under the force of guns. There are still many gunmen in Afghanistan, the only difference is they are not firing their weapons [at the moment].”

Man, Faizabad

“The first priority is that gunmen should be disarmed.”

“If disarmament is not conducted then there will be no security.”

Woman, Kabul

“We are afraid the government will not be able to disarm the irresponsibly armed people.... our hopes will not come true unless disarmament and the development of a national army and police starts...if the world leaves us alone again we will be ruled by terrorists.”

Man, Zaranj

Man, rural

⁶ See Annex E for a complete listing of all the coding used for open answers.

PROSPECTS FOR PEACE

There is general optimism about the prospects for peace: 78% think Afghanistan will be more peaceful in a year from now. However, the relatively lower figures in Kandahar and Gardez are noteworthy (see Table 2).

The overall optimism of the prospects for peace was echoed in group discussions where many stated that they were tired of the long years of war. Comments were phrased in aspirational terms such as 'we hope for peace' or 'everybody wants peace and security.' Women seemed slightly more optimistic about the prospects for peace than men. Eighty-one percent of women thought Afghanistan would be more peaceful in a year in comparison to 75% of men.

It is significant that many respondents felt safer today than they think they will a year from now. Ninety-two percent of respondents felt secure now in their own villages and towns, yet only 78% of them thought that Afghanistan generally will be more peaceful in a year.

This issue was explored in group discussions where almost all of the comments referred to the current situation in Afghanistan as 'partial peace', 'relative peace' or 'temporary peace'. Many concerns were raised about the threats to potential long term peace including armed groups, rule by gun, lack of rule of law, and impunity for commanders and warlords. Partial peace is a welcome respite for many – they felt safe in their area today, but they are concerned about the future.

Survey Question and Result

In your opinion, will Afghanistan become more or less peaceful in a year from now?

More	78%
Less	2%
Same	3%
Don't know	17%

Table 2: Prospects for Peace

	More (%)	Same (%)	Less (%)	Don't Know (%)
Faizabad	79	3	1	17
Gardez	55	6	6	33
Herat	83	6	1	11
Kabul	84	1	2	13
Kandahar	52	4	3	41
Panjao	86	0	2	12
Saripul	92	1	0	7
Zaranj	76	2	0	22

Perspectives on Peace

"We are worried [about security] because the system has taken off its cotton suit and put on a silk one. The commanders are the same commanders."

Young Man, Panjao

"Presently there is peace but it is under the shade of a gun."

Man, Faizabad

RIGHT TO PHYSICAL SECURITY

The survey aimed to find out to what extent people enjoyed the right to physical security within their community. The results were surprisingly positive: 92% felt safe walking around their village or town. Yet, at the same time security was considered the highest overall priority for Afghanistan (see Introduction) and was the most frequently mentioned issue in group discussions.

Differences in the right to physical security were revealed when the data was disaggregated by location and ethnicity. Whilst in every location respondents felt safe walking around their town and village, those surveyed

Survey Questions and Results

Do you feel safe walking alone in and around your village?

Yes	92%
No	8%

Do you feel more or less safe in your community today than you did three years ago?

More	83%
Less	10%
Same	6%
Don't Know	1%

in Gardez (76%) and Kandahar (80%) felt significantly less secure than other areas (see Chart 3). Of those who did not feel safe walking around their village and town, 53% were Pashtun.

Comparing Now to Three Years Ago

Overall, 83% of respondents felt more secure now than three years ago. Again those in Gardez (23%) and Kandahar (53%) were significantly less optimistic (see Chart 4). Similarly, 29% of Pashtun respondents felt less secure now than three years ago, a significantly higher figure than all other ethnic groups.

What is not clear from our data is whether it is location or ethnicity that most influences people’s sense of security. Further research is needed on this issue, but it is interesting to note that a couple of respondents in the survey and group discussion said, “we Pashtuns don’t feel safe.”

Women on the Taliban

“During the Taliban time there was security in Kabul, but it was like the security in a graveyard.”

“During the Taliban time there was security because most women were unemployed, so they just stayed at home.”

Woman, Kabul

“Security has completely changed, before we could not go outside [because of the Taliban].”

“Now the situation is better, before we had to travel with a *meharam* (chaperone).”

Woman, Panjao

Photo courtesy HRRAC



Of those surveyed, 92% feel safe walking around their village or town and 83% feel safer now than three years ago

Chart 3: Do You Feel Secure in Your Village or Town?





Chart 4:
Do you Feel More or Less Secure than Three Years Ago?



Gender Differences

Women (86%) felt that security has improved slightly more than men (80%). There is, however, no significant ethnic related gender difference. Most women, particularly in the rural areas, may feel so secure because the boundaries of the public space they are allowed to travel in are extremely restricted. In group discussions it is worth noting that only women from the immediate vicinity could attend, unless there was a vehicle and a male relative to collect them.

In group discussions, many women commented that during the Taliban security was good in an abstract sense, but they personally felt very insecure at that time. While women are aware that overall security may not be as good now, many said that their ability to work and move around freely has improved. For some of the women in Kabul it is clear that they now have the opportunity to attend university and to work.

The Bigger Picture

Group discussions revealed a broader range of opinions on security. Respondents were generally far more negative about the security situation because of the rise in theft, the presence of armed groups, and the

lack of rule of law. In fact the issue most frequently mentioned in all of the discussions was the need for more security.

The high number of people who felt secure within the geographic limits of their own village or town may reflect two facts:

- The survey was carried out in relatively secure areas. The choice of survey location was determined by the need to ensure the security of respondents, surveyors and programmes. Many areas of the country were already 'off limits' for many NGOs.
- Clearly, in different locations people define security differently; it is a relative and context related term. In many cases security was defined in its negative sense - a lack of fighting at that particular point in time. In other areas the landing of rockets nearby was considered a 'normal' event.

In group discussions however, respondents were aware that the situation was different 'out there'. For example, in the villages around Zaranj people said that security was good inside their village, but poor in other parts of the province because they were controlled by armed groups.

Views on Security

In Faizabad respondents main concern was the power of the commanders and their armed supporters. The ability of commanders to act with impunity because of the general lack of rule of law and the limited influence of the central government meant that many people did not feel completely secure.

In Kabul nobody said they felt 100% safe. They were concerned about robberies, the number of gunmen around and the complicity of security forces in crime.

In Herat city respondents felt partially safe, but were concerned about gunmen and the lack of police.

In Panjao respondents felt they were enjoying relative security because there is currently no fighting. Three years ago there was considerable fighting in areas surrounding Panjao and in comparison the situation is better. Respondents were concerned about the possible threat to peace from the number of gunmen around.

In Zaranj respondents said they felt secure in their villages, but consistently qualified it by stating that in 'outside' areas the security is not good.

In rural Herat respondents felt 100% safe since the fall of the Taliban.



Photo courtesy HBRAC



Photo courtesy HBRAC

WHO IS RESPONSIBLE TO PROVIDE SECURITY?

The majority of respondents (48%) held the police responsible for providing protection against crime. Interestingly, the second highest response to the question what group protects people from crime was nobody - 20% of the sample said that nobody protected them from crime.

Fulfilling Responsibilities

Most respondents (82%) thought that those they held responsible for providing protection from crime were fulfilling their responsibilities satisfactorily. Lowest satisfaction levels were recorded in Gardez (60%) and Panjao (64%). Panjao group discussions revealed a general dissatisfaction with the district administration.⁷ Interestingly, the highest satisfaction level was recorded in Herat (92%) where the majority of respondents said that nobody provided security. It seems likely that respondents are generally satisfied with the security provided by Ismail Khan's forces.

Expectations in the Afghan Army/Police

Respondents were generally optimistic that the Afghan army or police will assume responsibility for providing security in local areas in the next five years. Group discussions confirmed this when they said a strong national army and police force was a prerequisite for security. But while 65% thought that this was possible, almost a third (30%) did not know if it could happen. Women (59%) were less confident in the future role of the Afghan army and police than men (70%).

Faizabad and Kandahar showed the least confidence in the likelihood of a future competent Afghan army and police (48% and 46% respectively against an average of 65%). It is not entirely clear why, but from group

Survey Questions and Results

What group protects people from crime like stealing in your village?

Police/Amniat	48%
Community	13%
Mullah	3%
Other	8%
Nobody	20%
Don't Know	7%

Are you satisfied with that group's effort in providing security?

Yes	82.5%
No	8.5%
Don't Know	9.0%

Do you think the Afghan army or police will be able to provide security in your area within the next five years?

Yes	65%
No	5%
Don't Know / No Opinion	30%

Do you want Afghan or international forces to provide security in your area?

Afghan	53%
International	15%
Both	27%
Doesn't Matter	2%
Don't Know	3%

discussions it seems likely that in both cases people are more sceptical of the government's ability to exert its authority over regional power brokers.

Table 3: Who is Responsible for Providing Security?

Top answers by location

Kandahar	Police	85.0%
Kabul	Police	76.3%
Gardez	Community	60.0%
Panjao	<i>Wuluswal</i>	49.5%
Herat	Nobody	44.0%
Saripul	Police	44.0%
Zaranj	Police	43.0%
Faizabad	Police	42.7%

Most respondents held the police responsible for providing security except in Panjao, Gardez and Herat.

The role of the *wuluswal* (district governor) in Panjao is not surprising given the lack of a national police force and the importance of the local government system. Levels of self-reliance in Gardez were notable; while in Herat 'nobody' providing security may reflect Ismail Khan's relatively uncontested position.

⁷ It should be noted that since this survey was finished the administration in Panjao has changed.

Chart 5: Can the Afghan Army/Police Provide Security in the Next Five Years?





Chart 6: Should Afghan or International Forces Provide Security?



International or Afghan Responsibility?

Over half of those surveyed (53%) wanted Afghan forces to be responsible for providing security. Most of the remaining respondents (42%) wanted either international forces alone or both international and Afghan forces working together (see Chart 6).

In relation to this question there were differing responses by location and gender:

- The highest results in favour of Afghan forces alone were recorded in Zaranj (78%) and Herat (71%) while the lowest were in Saripul (25%) and Kandahar (27%).
- The highest result for some international involvement (either alone or together with Afghan forces) was recorded in Kandahar (61%).
- There is an interesting gender difference in the choice of Afghan or international forces - 44% of women wanted Afghan forces in comparison to 60% of men.

QUESTIONS FOR POLICY MAKERS

Consider this...

- ❖ Why are so many Afghans comparatively pleased with their security situation on the one hand, and concerned that security is the most important issue for Afghanistan on the other?
- ❖ Why do respondents in Gardez and Kandahar feel less optimistic than elsewhere about security now and the prospects for peace in the future?
- ❖ Why do Afghans put disarmament as their top priority for improving security?

Chapter Three: Economic Rights

RECONSTRUCTION:

EXPECTATIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Reconstruction needs in Afghanistan are huge, yet whilst the international community has pledged funding, not all of it has been delivered. Of the aid received, only a small amount has resulted in completed projects. This survey aimed to find out who people thought were responsible for reconstruction, and how much trust they placed in them to actually deliver.

Respondents had high expectations (81%) that the government would be able to deliver services in the next three years. Whilst expectations were generally high, there were variations by location. The lowest results were recorded in Faizabad (61%), villages around Zaranj (67%) and villages around Panjao (67%). In these locations participants in group discussions voiced disillusionment with the local government and its ability and/or willingness to assist local people. They pointed to the corruption within the system, and in Faizabad noted that power lies in the hands of armed men.

The level of optimism also decreased significantly outside of Kabul - 89% of respondents in Kabul expected the government to be able to provide services, compared to 77% of respondents outside Kabul.

Group discussions confirmed these findings. Participants had high expectations, but phrased them in terms of their hopes and aspirations for service provision in the

Photo courtesy HRRAC



Road Repair, Hazarajat

Survey Questions and Results

In the next three years do you think the government will help your community with, for example, services like education or health care or roads and bridges?

Yes	81%
No	3%
Don't Know	16%

Have foreign governments promised money to help rebuild Afghanistan?

Yes	85%
No	2%
Don't Know	13%

Do you think Afghanistan will get all the money that it was promised by foreign governments?

Yes	54%
No	6%
Don't Know	41%

Do you think that the money from foreign governments should be given directly to the Afghan central government or to NGOs and the United Nations?

Government	38%
NGOs/UN	40%
Both	12%
None	1%
Doesn't Matter	1%
Don't Know/No Opinion	8%

Why? (Answers were coded)

Government is responsible, efficient and effective	35%
NGOs/UN are efficient and effective	37%
Government is inefficient and ineffective	5%
NGOs/UN are inefficient and ineffective	1%
Don't Know	5%
Other	16%

International Responsibilities

The majority (85%) of respondents were aware that foreign governments had promised money to reconstruct Afghanistan, but only 54% thought that they would keep that promise. Given the optimistic answers this survey received for most questions, this seems surprisingly low. It may reflect a general feeling of being 'let down' in the past by the international community. A few participants thought that the international community would assist Afghanistan as long as doing so also met its own political objectives.

Perspectives on International Responsibilities

"If the international community's own objectives can be achieved then it will probably keep its promise to deliver aid."

Young Man, Kabul

"The international community will only assist us if it helps them."

Young Man, Faizabad

"The government will be able to help us because the world's attention is directed towards Afghanistan, therefore we are hopeful."

Man, Zaranj

Link Between Economic Rights and Right to Security

The consistent theme arising out of discussions on government and the international community's role in reconstruction was the link between reconstruction and security, particularly disarmament. Many stated that the government and international community could not deliver their responsibilities in terms of economic rights until security had been achieved.

Perspectives on the Link Between Economic Rights and Security Rights

"If gunmen are disarmed, the government can accomplish its duties and help people, otherwise they will not be able to do anything."

Young Man, Faizabad

"If weapons are collected and security improves they will keep their promises."

Young Man, Zaranj


"People can only be helped if there is peace."

Young Man, Saripul


"I would not assist Afghanistan while insecurity continues. When there is no stability, reconstruction is futile."

Man, Faizabad


Chart 7: Awareness of International Pledges for Reconstruction



Gender. Men were more likely to know about aid pledges to Afghanistan than women; 91% of men were aware in comparison to 78% of women.-



Location. The lowest awareness of international pledges was recorded in the villages around Panjao (66%) possibly due to the remoteness of the area. The highest were in the three larger cities of Kandahar, Herat and Kabul.-



Location (Kabul, other). The expectations that international promises of pledges would be kept were significantly higher in Kabul than in all the other locations. This is possibly due to the international presence in Kabul.

Diminishing Optimism Over Time?

Whilst there was optimism that the government would be able to provide services there was also a strong sense from the group discussions this would not continue indefinitely. Many feared that without tangible reconstruction efforts the country would descend into anarchy again.

Fears about Failure to Reconstruct

“If there is no reconstruction insecurity and war will start again.”

Young Man, Panjao

“If reconstruction is not started, Afghanistan will become an arena for conflicts and extremists will lead the world to destruction.”

Woman, Herat city

“If reconstruction starts people will be employed and our country will be improved. If plans for reconstruction are not implemented, we will expect many more disasters as we encountered before.”

Woman, Herat rural

Perspectives on Government Receiving Aid

“The current government is not strong; it needs assistance.”

Young Man, rural Herat

“The government is weak and does not do anything.”

Man, Panjao

“We wish the government to become powerful and spend the money itself.”

Woman, Faizabad

“The government should receive the money because we want them to improve.”

Young Man, Zaranj

Who is Responsible?

To analyse which actors respondents thought were responsible for reconstruction, they were asked whether international aid money should be given directly to the Afghan government or to NGOs and the UN. The result was that 38% thought it should go to the government, 40% to the UN and NGOs, and 12% to both.

There were some interesting differences in responses by location and gender. Kabul (48%) and Faizabad (47%) were the most supportive of the government receiving assistance; Kandahar (22%) and Gardez (24%) the least.

Yet in focus group discussions most participants supported aid money being given directly to the government. Some thought this would be a way of strengthening a currently weak central government by requiring it to live up to its responsibilities. Participants noted that the government currently has weak capacity to implement projects and that ministries should be staffed with educated and responsible people who are appointed based on merit rather social or political affiliations.

Group discussions viewed the government as responsible for providing for its citizens and one way to support the government was to ensure that it takes on that responsibility.

Perspectives on the Misuse of Aid

“The UN has done nothing except receive high salaries and drive the latest model cars.”

Man, Faizabad

“We see money coming to the country but it is not used properly...large amounts are spent on accommodation, transport and high expatriate salaries...this has badly effected the market and house rents have gone very high”.

Young Man, Kabul

“The government cannot get aid through to the people properly.”

Woman, Saripul

“Project funds have gone into the pockets of undeserving people.”

Woman, Kabul


“When 80% of funds are spent on salaries and 20% on implementing projects, how can we expect proper work and positive results?”

Woman, Kabul

“The government takes bribes and the aid money does not get through to those who need it.”

Young Man, Gardez

Chart 8: Where Should Aid Money go?



When asked why money should be given to the government or the UN/NGOs, 35% of respondents said that the government was responsible and effective and 37% thought that NGOs/UN were effective and efficient. Very few respondents referred to negative aspects of either the government or the UN/NGOs.

A slightly different perspective was gained from the group discussions. Frustrations were raised about the failure of aid implementation and in particular, the misuse of funds by aid actors.

RIGHT TO EDUCATION AND HEALTH

The right to education, particularly for girls, was severely restricted under the Taliban, so perhaps it was not surprising that 94% of respondents said it was easier for their children to go to school today.

Significantly lower figures were recorded in the villages around Gardez (68%) and Zaranj (78%). Pashtuns were the least likely to say it was easier for children to go to school now; 83% compared to a mean of 94%.

The fact that respondents perceived access to education to be easier did not actually mean that their children attended school. Furthermore, the results do not give any insight into the quality of education.

Health care (83%) was also perceived as easier to access today than three years ago. The villages around Gardez again reported significantly lower figures (56%) than the other areas surveyed.

Survey Questions and Results

Is it easier or more difficult for children in your community to go to school today than it was three years ago?

Easier	94%
More Difficult	1%
Same	4%
Don't Know	1%

Is it easier or more difficult for you to get health care today than it was three years ago?

Easier	83%
More Difficult	2%
Same	13%
Don't Know	1%



Girls' Classes, Nimroz

Photo courtesy of Ockenden International

QUESTIONS FOR POLICY MAKERS

Consider this...

- ✓ Why are people still so optimistic about receiving reconstruction benefits when there have been such challenges in delivery of services?
- ✓ Why are so many Afghans comparatively sceptical that donors will come through on their commitments to Afghanistan?
- ✓ Why does optimism about the ability of the government to deliver services in the future significantly decrease outside of Kabul?
- ✓ How long can people's frustrations be contained about the misuse of aid money and the lack of tangible reconstruction?

Chapter Four: Political Rights

THE CONSTITUTION AND ELECTIONS

Two major national political processes are currently underway in Afghanistan: the drafting of a new Constitution to be adopted by a Constitutional Loya Jirga at the end of 2003 and preparations for national elections in 2004.

The extent and nature of public consultation and education around these two processes has engendered much debate about the right of Afghans to participate politically.

This survey sought to gauge to what extent respondents were aware of the Constitution drafting process and the preparations for national election, the willingness of Afghans to exercise their right to participate politically, and their expectations regarding the impact of national elections.

Awareness of Political Processes

The level of awareness about the Constitution drafting process and the national elections was about the same - 70% and 69% respectively. This figure probably includes a range of awareness levels from those who have heard about the elections and constitution to those who are aware of the issues debated around these processes. Awareness varied by gender and location (see Chart 9).

The Right to Political Participation

A very small percentage of the respondents prioritised political issues over economic and security issues (see Introduction). Yet when asked directly about the impact of elections there seemed to be considerable faith in political processes as a way forward.

The vast majority of respondents (87%) wanted to exercise their fundamental right to vote in national elections. The desire to participate was higher than awareness of the planned elections themselves. However, there was a significant gendered difference in responses - 95% of men said they would vote in the election compared with 78% of women. In fact the number of women who said they would vote was lower than men in every location, but significantly so in the villages

Survey Questions and Results

Is there a new constitution being developed for Afghanistan?

Yes	70%
No/Don't Know	30%

Is there a national election in Afghanistan next year when people will choose their government?

Yes	69%
No/Don't Know	31%

Will you vote in the national election next year?

Yes	87%
No	4%
Don't know	9%

Why will you vote in the election? *

Peace	33%
Political Factors	51%
Economic Factors	5%
Other	9%
Don't Know	2%

In your opinion, will the general elections bring positive or negative changes to Afghanistan?

Positive	73%
Negative	0%
No Change	1%
Don't Know/No Opinion	25%

Why will the elections bring positive changes? *

Good Governance	63%
Peace	22%
Other	11%
Don't Know	4%

(*Answers were coded into categories)

around Gardez, where 65% of the overall sample said they would vote, but only 27% of women did (see Chart 10).

Those women who would not vote said that it was largely because of cultural constraints. If this gives any insight into how rural Pashtun villagers might respond to the election, then it is likely that there will be a significant female disenfranchisement.

Faith in Political Processes

Respondents had high expectations (73%) that national elections would bring positive change to Afghanistan. This seems to suggest that respondents still place a great deal of trust in those responsible to carry out the electoral process properly to ensure real participation. This is an interesting result, given the concerns expressed in group discussions about the power of those who hold guns. Group discussions also revealed serious concerns about whether it is possible to have 'free, fair and representative' elections until disarmament has taken place.

There were interesting differences by location: Herat (48%) and Faizabad (56%) were least confident that elections would result in positive change. In both locations, a higher proportion of respondents did not know what the impact would be. Highest confidence levels were recorded in Kandahar, with 91% of the sample thinking that elections would bring positive change. Men (79%) were more optimistic than women (68%).

Respondents were asked why elections would bring positive change. The question was open and the answers coded into two main categories: peace; and issues related to good governance. Sixty-three percent said that the elections would result in good governance - they expect the elections to deliver a government that is strong, legitimate, accountable and representative. Twenty-three percent said elections would bring peace, which places a great deal of trust in the concept of a representative government (see Chart 11).

Perspectives on National Elections

"National elections would be good, but the current situation will not allow for free elections. Warlords still control parts of the country and no one can vote for who they want. The result of an election [in these circumstances] will be adversity and conflict. The person who has a gun will win; with the force of guns the election will not be successful."

Young Man, Zaranj

"A real election can never be convened unless a general disarmament is conducted."

Man, Kabul


"As long as there are gunmen, neither impartial nor peace loving people can stand for election. Worst of all they cannot even vote for a deserving person or leader."

Woman, Herat city


"The emergency Loya Jirga result was nothing because people were not involved, only the warlords were. If we cannot have free elections then the future is very dangerous and black."

Young Man, Zaranj

Chart 9: Awareness about the Constitution by Gender and Location




Awareness by Gender. 61% of women knew about both the constitution and the elections, in comparison to 78% of men.



Awareness by Location. Respondents from villages around Zaranj had the lowest awareness about the constitution (49%) and the elections (62%). Herat and Kandahar had the highest awareness levels.

Chart 10: Women's Willingness to Vote in the Elections



In the disaggregated data there were some significant differences in results:


- Women (30% compared to 16.7% of men) were far more likely to cite peace as the positive outcome of elections and men (73% compared to 50% of women) thought elections would bring good governance.
- In Panjao, more respondents (33%) cited peace than any other location.

In group discussions participants expressed a desire for a strong central government and indicated the lack of

confidence in existing power structures which many saw as based on the rule of guns. Yet many referred to the current central government as weak and in need of support in order to exert its influence in the provinces.

There was optimism that the electoral process would bring positive change. Respondents wanted to exercise their right to participate politically. They wanted a government that would tackle existing power structures and ensure a legitimate and representative government. However, respondents also recognised that progress on political processes was fundamentally linked to disarmament.

Chart 11: Why Will Elections Bring Positive Changes?



Defining Good Governance: Examples of Answers

- “All people will participate in choosing their leaders”
- “A strong government”
- “A legitimate government”
- “Government that works for the people”
- “A representative government” -

Perspectives on Central Government

“Central government does not have enough control over our province. All the decisions are made at the provincial level. It is all due to the fact that the central government does not do anything about the warlords.”

Woman, Herat city

“We want a permanent and powerful government in Kabul which will cover and control all the provinces.”

Woman, Zaranj

“Definitely it [the central government] has a great influence...the government structure is like the rules in a family...children should obey their elders and if they do not then anarchy will emerge.”

Woman, rural Herat

WOMEN'S RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE IN DECISION MAKING

The rights and responsibilities of women in Afghan society have been the subject of intense international debate, particularly under the Taliban. The survey probed opinions on women's entitlement to participate in local decision making. Seventy-two percent of those surveyed thought that women should be involved in community decision making. When asked why, many responded either that it is their right under Islamic rule, or that they are half of the population therefore they have a right to participate. This acknowledgment of women's entitlements to participate was lower in the eastern and southern areas of Gardez, Zaranj and Kandahar.

In group and individual discussions the question of whether women's entitlements translated into the fulfilment of their rights was discussed. Many suggested that it was not for a variety of reasons:

- ‘Other women’. In some cases when respondents said yes, women should participate; they referred to

Survey Questions and Results

Do you think women should be involved in community decision-making outside their home in your community?

Yes	72%
No	17%
Don't Know/No Opinion	11%

Why do you think women should be involved? *

Women's Rights	86%
Benefits Society	2%
Other	9%
Don't Know	3%

(*Answers were coded into categories)

other women rather than themselves or their female relatives. As one man said in Faizabad ‘yes, women should participate in decision making, but not my wife’.

- Lack of education. The low level of female education seems to be a huge barrier. Some respondents

said women should participate, but qualified it by saying only ‘educated women’. Women themselves often said ‘we are illiterate and don’t know anything’. It was often stated that the first step towards women’s participation was their education. Interestingly, lack of education did not seem to be a barrier for male participation.

- Gendered roles. The nature of gendered relations as a whole affects women’s political participation.



Photo courtesy of HRRAC

Most respondents thought women should participate in decision making.

Perspectives on Women’s Involvement in Decision Making

“Only men make decisions in our village...women are not allowed to participate and no one listens to them.”

Woman, rural Herat

“Women’s participation now is merely symbolic; women should be involved in accordance with their talents and qualifications.”

Man, Kabul

“Men do not give us any information because we are illiterate; they say we do not know anything.”

Woman, Panjao

“Everybody participates except women...it is a big shame to let women participate because it is not our culture...women have no authority and do not want it either”.


Woman, Gardez

“We do not know anything, we are uneducated.”

Woman, Gardez


This is manifested in terms of time, but also in terms of the role women are expected to play. For example, one woman in Faizabad said ‘we just don’t have time; we are swamped by chores’. Other participants remarked that women should be involved in making decisions about the issues that concern them. This did not seem to imply broader political participation, but

Chart 12: Should Women Participate in Decision Making: Differences by Location and Education



Approval, by Location. In the villages around Gardez and Zaranj only 50% thought women should participate and 62% in Kandahar. Similarly, in ethnic terms Baluch and Pashtun showed the least support for women’s participation (57% and 58% respectively) while Hazara showed the most (82%).

Of those who said women should not participate in decision making, 68% gave cultural constraints as the reason why not.



Approval, by Level of Education. Gender and age were not significant factors in how people responded. As many women as men thought women should not be involved in decision making. But education did have an impact – 65% of those who had received no education at all (either formal or non-formal) thought women should be involved in decision making, compared to 81.5% of those who had received any education. Increasing years of education also increased the approval rating for women’s involvement in decision-making.

participation around issues such as health and education.

- Security. Some respondents thought that the security situation had played a significant role in the

lack of women's participation. Insecurity in the past meant that girls had not received an education and it would take time for things to change.

LOCAL DECISION MAKING

Political Responsibilities at the Local Level

In terms of political processes at the local level, the survey aimed to find out who respondents held responsible for resolving local level disputes, and their ability to exercise their right to voice their opinions with those responsible bodies.

Most respondents (75%) said that local mechanisms for decision making within the community were functioning. Local *shuras* (councils or assemblies) or elders were generally referred to in group discussions as the main community decision makers.

Answers about the existence of a community decision-making body varied by location and ethnicity, but there were no significant differences in answers by gender, education and age (see Chart 13).

In Panjao the number of respondents confirming a community decision making body was significantly lower (37%) than other locations. In group discussions participants explained that the *takia khana* (a community room) is the place where decisions are made,⁸ usually by elders. Therefore, it is not clear why the response was so low. It may be that respondents were commenting on the effectiveness rather than the existence of a decision maker.

In Faizabad city only 58% thought there was a community decision maker. This may relate to comments made

Chart 13: Is There a Decision Making Body in the Community?



Survey Questions and Results

If your family has a problem with another family about land, is there a decision-maker within this community who will solve this problem?

Yes	75%
No	22%
Don't Know	3%

If there is no decision-maker or this decision-maker in this community cannot solve the problem, who does your family go to for help outside the community? *

Government Administration /Judiciary	71%
Police	19%
Non-state Assemblies	4%
Other	5%
Don't Know	1%

If there is an important meeting about a community problem in your village/town, do you think the decision-makers will listen to your opinion?

Yes	70%
No	23%
Don't Know	7%

Do you think it is easier or more difficult to discuss community problems with your community leader today than it was three years ago?

Easier	83%
More Difficult	2%
No Change	11%
Don't Know	4%

(* Answers were coded into categories.)

in group discussions that power rests in the hands of the commanders.

Respondents clearly held community mechanisms responsible first for resolving local level conflicts. In group discussions many did not question the role of the *shura* or elders – that is how the system has always worked. However, if the community is unable to resolve the problem the majority of respondents seek help from the government.

The survey asked where respondents would go to for help outside of the community if the problem could not

⁸ See the Panjao profile in Annex A of this report.

be solved locally. Responses were categorised into three main groups - government administration and judiciary; non-state assemblies; and the police. The majority (71%) would go to the government administration and judiciary for help. In Kabul 45% of respondents would go to the police.

If you look at a state (government administration and judiciary plus the police) versus the non-state category - 87% of respondents would go to the state. Only forty-three respondents said they would seek the help of non-state institutions, primarily *jirgas* (tribal councils).⁹ The largest number of these respondents (18%) was from the villages around Gardez.

The fact that 87% of respondents would seek help to resolve problems from a government body clearly shows they still hold government institutions responsible. Yet, in group discussions many said that the local government was unable to deliver fair decisions because of the problem of corruption and partisan decisions based on social and political affiliations.

Perspectives on Corruption

“Problems are solved but it is based on money, you have to pay a bribe – so those who are poor cannot get things resolved because they cannot pay.”

Woman, Kabul

“We do not go straight to the government...we try to solve things in the village because the government takes bribes.”

Man, Gardez

“The courts do not solve our problems properly, because of corruption and powerful armed men.”

Woman, Saripul

Right to be Heard at the Local Level

Overall, 70% of respondents felt that their community decision makers listened them to, though there were considerable differences by location. The highest figure of respondents feeling listened to was recorded in Kabul (84%) and the lowest in the villages around Gardez (34%) (see Chart 14). Lower figures were also recorded



Photo courtesy of HRRAC

The shura is the main community decision making body

in Panjao (51.5%) and Kandahar (53%). In part this might be explained by dissatisfaction with the local administration expressed by participants in both Panjao and Gardez.¹⁰ In Panjao the lower figure is probably also related to the fact that a very low proportion of respondents thought there was a decision maker in their community.

Men had slightly more confidence that they will be listened to than women (72% men and 68% women), but the difference is very small. It is interesting that so many women felt listened to given that *shuras* are often male-dominated institutions and elders are

What is a *Shura*?

“*Shuras* (best translated as councils) can be either secular or religious and are long-standing features of Afghan political society. They are convened on an ad-hoc basis and are rarely standing bodies with identifiable members. Typically, *shuras* of the *ulema* (Islamic scholars) and *shuras* of elders, are found at the provincial level, while there are often competing local *shuras* and some commander-run *shuras* in the districts” (Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit, August 2003. *The A to Z Guide to Afghan Assistance*, p63).

Generally speaking, women do not participate in *shuras*.

Shuras are also used or formed by many NGOs as community based organisations for development. In these circumstances women may be allowed to participate in decision making and in some cases women-only *shuras* are encouraged by NGOs for programme planning and implementation.

⁹ A *jirga* is a Pashtun tribal assembly or council for decision-making.

¹⁰ Note that the administration in Panjao has changed since this survey was carried out.

invariably men. This may be a reflection of the fact that the traditional way that women's voices are heard - through their male relatives - was perceived as effective. It may also reflect an acceptance of gendered roles in decision making.

The survey wanted to get a sense of whether people's entitlement to voice their opinions had changed over time. Overall, 83% of respondents felt that it was easier to discuss issues with community leaders today than three years ago. The highest result, 97%, was recorded in Saripul and the lowest in the villages around Gardez, 50%.

Whilst respondents felt listened to it is not clear from the research the extent to which they think their opinion has any influence on the actual decision. As one person pointed out in a village in Panjao, "Yes, the elders listen, but that does not mean you have any influence on their decision."

Right to be Heard on Broader Political Issues

There was a strong disconnect between feeling listened to by the local *shura* or elders and feeling listened to at the city, provincial or national level. Many in group discussions were critical about the failure of accountability of those in power to consider the views of ordinary Afghans in the broader political decision making process. In particular, a lot of criticism was raised in Kabul and Herat.

Perspectives on Decision Making in Kabul

"People are very distant from the core issues being decided."

"The powerful and the gunmen make the decisions."

"People are really unaware of what is happening and the decisions being made."

"Nobody listens to the poor."

"Nobody is asked."

Perspectives on Decision Making in Herat


"Peoples' views are considered nowhere."

"There are no authorities who can solve our problems. Moreover people are afraid of gunmen and cannot express their views."

"Decisions are made by a few people and then we are informed."

"All decisions are made on the basis of factional, tribal and personal relations."

Chart 14: Respondents who Feel Listened to by Community Decision Makers




QUESTIONS FOR POLICY MAKERS

Consider this...

- ❖ Why are so many people optimistic that national elections will bring positive change to Afghanistan?
- ❖ Why is there less optimism in political processes and the right to participate in Gardez and Kandahar?
- ❖ Why does the high rate of recognition of women's right to participate politically not translate into reality?
- ❖ Why do so many women feel listened to given the male exclusive nature of most decision making bodies?
- ❖ Will the optimism in elections as a process for positive change remain over time?

Annex A:

Profiles of Areas Surveyed



Annex A provides a brief profile of each area where the survey was conducted. The aim of these profiles is to give the political and economic context in which to view the findings. They are not intended to be extensive backgrounds, but to outline the key issues and history relevant to that area from about 1995 to the present day.

Each profile is organised around the three main themes of the survey – political rights, economic rights and security rights. The main sources of information were key informants who knew the area well and published/unpublished reports from various aid organisations. For some of the areas a very limited amount of information was available.

There are graphic representations in each profile. These were based on discussions with local people and local NGO staff. They represent perceptions of the situation; they are not representative, but rather indicative of the local analysis and mood in that particular area.


The historical timeline shows the key events that have happened in the area surveyed from about 1995 to the present day.

The perceptions of power diagram maps out local views on power relations. The larger the circle the bigger the influence on the community, the distance from the community represents the closeness/distance of political influence.


The perceptions of livelihoods pie chart represents the importance of different livelihood sources (not necessarily cash income). It should be stressed that all the discussions about livelihoods were based on the legitimate economy. In some areas this may underestimate the number of households and the level of income gained from other sources, most notably poppy cultivation.

The perceptions of security thermometer gauges perceptions of the prospects for long term peace in Afghanistan. The figure shown is the average from the discussion.


HISTORICAL TIMELINE




PERCEPTIONS OF POWER



PERCEPTIONS OF LIVELIHOODS



PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY



Faizabad



Faizabad is the provincial capital of Badakhshan the most northeasterly province in Afghanistan. It has a long, mountainous border with Pakistan to the east; a northern border with Tajikistan defined by the River Amu; and a small border with China at the very end of the Wakhan corridor.¹¹ This makes it an important trading route, particularly for smuggled and illegal goods.




Photo courtesy of HREAC

View of Faizabad city

The province is mountainous and remote. Roads are poor and are generally impassable in winter due to snow. The city is divided into six wards and has an estimated population of 14,100, and the district as a whole has an estimated population of 46,200.¹² The majority of the people are Sunni Tajiks. There is a large Ismaili community in the Province, but they are

mostly concentrated outside the city. There are also very small minority groups of Pashtun, Hazara, Turkmen and Uzbek.

KEY RECENT EVENTS



¹¹ See Badakhshan, SMU Area Report, May 2001.
¹² Central Statistics Office (CSO), Kabul, 2003.


Political Profile

Badakhsan was the only province in Afghanistan to remain completely under opposition control during the Taliban times. The major party in the area has been *Jamiat-i-Islami*¹³ with some pockets of *Hizb-i-Islami*.¹⁴ In late 1996 and early 1997 *Jamiat-i-Islami* joined with other opposition parties to form an alliance against the Taliban called the National Islamic United Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan, or the United Front (UF). Burhanuddin Rabbani was the President of the UF, but the real power lay with his Commander, Ahmad Shah Massoud, until his assassination in September 2001.

There is a significant power struggle between those loyal to Rabbani and those associated with Massoud's *Shura-i-Nazar*. Massoud formed the *Shura-i-Nazar* (Supervisory Council of the North) in 1985. This group was a key partner of the United States in the overthrow of the Taliban and now dominates many of the senior positions in government.

Factions still retain power in the province. During the period of this research the Governor was allied to Rabbani's *Jamiat-i-Islami* and the Chief of Police was allied to *Hizb-i-Islami*. A new Governor, Deputy Governor and Head of Security have very recently been appointed. Commanders control different parts of the province, but relations between them and the local communities can vary considerably. Some commanders, such as Sardar Khan who is associated with *Shura-i-Nazar*, are extremely powerful. Commanders also control the administrative system and most officials are linked to particular factions.

PERCEPTIONS OF POWER



There is also reportedly some tension between *jihadis* and non-*jihadis*¹⁵ over who gets government positions.

The central government is seen as playing an insignificant role in comparison to the local commanders. However, there are strong links to Kabul because of the *Shura-i-Nazar*'s role in overthrowing the Taliban and the number of them who hold senior positions in the government.

At the local level traditional power structures still exist, with the local village leaders (*arbabs*) who call together *shuras* (councils, assemblies) to discuss community issues. These traditional power structures are seen as being extremely weak in the face of the general rule by commanders. In Faizabad, power is determined by political role and allegiance and control of the lucrative smuggling businesses.

¹³ Predominantly Tajik party led by ex-President Rabbani and military commander Ahmed Shah Massoud.

¹⁴ Pashtun Islamist party led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.

¹⁵ Participants in Islamic Holy War.

Photo courtesy of HRRAC



Community gathering

Economic Profile

The livelihoods for the vast majority of the population in the province have traditionally been dominated by agriculture and livestock production. However, the returns are extremely low and many families rely on off-farm incomes to make up the deficit. There are strong rural-urban linkages, which mean that some families in the city still get a proportion of their income from agriculture or from labour associated with agricultural production. Manual labour within the city and harvesting in neighbouring provinces are key sources of income. Others are employed in government offices or with aid agencies in the city.



Poppy cultivation

Photo courtesy of HREAC


The economy of the area, though always marginal, has been deeply affected by the control of supply routes. As the Taliban captured strategic routes the difficulty of getting supplies into the province led to shortages and steep increases in prices. The closure of the border with Tajikistan also increased prices, though illegal smuggling continued. This effective economic embargo of the area was greatly exacerbated

by the drought from 2000 onwards. Food supply decreased further, the livestock market crashed and prices were some of the highest recorded in the country.¹⁶ Coping mechanisms included decapitalisation, massive debt and mortgaging of land.

One major source of livelihood in the area as a whole, which is not reflected in the 'perceptions of livelihoods'

is poppy cultivation. Poppies have been cultivated in the province for years, but the area under cultivation is growing rapidly as is the number of processing factories. The trade is highly organised and is controlled by commanders. For ordinary people it is a good source of cash income and a way to repay the debts accumulated through the drought years. Extremely high daily wages are paid (approximately \$5 per day and more) and this is having a knock on effect of draining human resources away from wheat harvesting. Many, however, complain that the use of firewood in the opium processing factories has increased the price of wood for domestic use considerably.

PERCEPTIONS OF LIVELIHOODS



¹⁶ See Badakhshan, SMU Area Report, May 2001, p1-4.

Security Profile

The main cause of instability in the area has been because of splits and conflict between commanders. From the 1990s up to 2001, there were periodic incidents of insecurity related to tensions between Rabbani and Massoud within the *Jamiat-i-Islami* party. In December 1998 the Governor of Badakhshan was killed; this was followed by a period of fighting. In November 1999 the most powerful commander in the province, Najmuddin, was killed which again led to a prolonged period of instability. In some instances tensions have been between commanders loyal to the same leader, for example in 1999 two commanders loyal to Massoud split over control of an important access route.¹⁷

People in the province also felt insecure as the Taliban gained ground across the country. In 1997 the Taliban captured Mazar briefly and completely in August 1998. IDPs from neighbouring provinces began to flood into Faizabad. By September 2000 the Taliban finally captured Taloqan (an important supply route in neighbouring Takhar province), as the United Front (UF) was pushed further back, fears in Faizabad increased. Yet, the Taliban were never to advance any further.

PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY

Very confident

5

Cautiously optimistic

4

Don't know


3

Pessimistic

2

Very worried

1



The potential instability in the area caused by the assassination of Massoud in September 2001, was completely swept away by the United States led war against the Taliban and the UF's role in the war.

Faizabad has a long history as a military base for the opposition both under the Mujahiddin and then the United Front. This militarization of the area, with control largely in the hands of the commanders, has led to a generally very conservative society. The *burqa*¹⁸ was required attire for women without the need for Taliban edicts. Factional control of the area also probably poses the major threat to security along with potential conflicts over the divisions of the spoils of the lucrative poppy trade. At the village level conflicts are generally disputes over land and property rights.

¹⁷ See Badakhshan, SMU Area Report, May 2001, p4.

¹⁸ A garment that covers the body from head to foot leaving a lace grille to see through.

Photo courtesy of HRRAC



Militarization of society

Gardez



Gardez is the provincial capital of Paktia province. It lies in eastern Afghanistan, bordering the tribal areas of Pakistan's North West Frontier Province. The city of Gardez is situated in a plain surrounded by mountains and harsh winters are common, particularly in the surrounding villages at higher altitudes. It is rarely cut off to the outside world however, and one can make the trip from Kabul in two and a half hours or less on a good tarmac road.




Photo courtesy of HRRAC

Gardez villages

The majority of the people in the area are Pashtun from the Ghilzai tribe. The population of the city and its rural surrounds is estimated to be 65,500.¹⁹

KEY RECENT EVENTS




¹⁹ Central Statistics Office (CSO), Kabul, 2003

Political Profile

Immediately after the fall of the Taliban, a political power struggle ensued as a local militia leader and former governor of Paktia, Padshah Khan Zadran, sought to exert his influence over the province. Padshah Khan had been an ally of the US led military coalition in the fight against the Taliban, and had received ongoing support after the war in the search for Taliban remnants. When Karzai replaced him as governor with Governor Wardak, Padshah Khan declared himself an opponent to the Karzai regime.

Gardez has been a focal point for political attention since the fall of the Taliban. In contrast to other areas where the political leadership has been allowed to remain in place, President Karzai has replaced the governor of Paktia a further two times – to Raz M. Delili and then M. Assadullah.

Paktia has an unusually cohesive tribal system and tribal leaders often negotiate together and thereby exercise a huge amount of influence. Following the fall of the Taliban, a seven-tribe Council formed and immediately began to provide administration for Gardez city. The tribes remained actively engaged in provincial politics in 2003, negotiating on behalf of communities with the international military, the Karzai government, and the United Nations. Many believe that this is a core reason



why Paktia has remained relatively free of extremist militancy in 2003.

At the community level the *shura* (council) and *jirga* (tribal council) hold considerable power in local decision-making.

Young men in
a group
discussion



Economic Profile

Although Gardez straddles a commercial route to Pakistan, and has seen a boom in trade since the fall of the Taliban, it is not a trading centre of the level of Ghazni or Kandahar. It lies in a rural heartland, and the vast majority of the local population relies, directly or indirectly, on agriculture – in particular fruits and wheat. Like other areas of Afghanistan, the three-year drought from 1998 had a devastating effect on the agricultural economy and many people at that time left for Pakistan.

Gardez city has seen a recent surge in economic activity, with new construction work going and many investors returning. People have returned from Pakistan and a lot more labouring work is available in the city. Rural areas have also benefited from good harvests this year, but there have been fewer signs of reconstruction activity.


The military Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) has engaged in a number of small reconstruction projects in the Gardez area, but security and budgetary constraints have limited their impact on reconstruction needs. Large-scale reconstruction projects in the Gardez area have been limited by security and by the inability of donors and the government to move forward as expected with the reconstruction agenda.



Photo courtesy of HRRAC

Agriculture dominates the local economy

PERCEPTIONS OF LIVELIHOODS



Security Profile

Following the fall of the Taliban, Gardez and Paktia was seen as a potential flashpoint. On the border with Pakistan, and traditionally viewed as a Taliban stronghold, many thought Paktia would be the site of significant conflict for some time. There were tensions initially, but they were largely between former governor Padshah Khan Zadran and local tribal elders as well the Karzai regime. The conflict came to a head in April 2002, when Padshah Khan's forces rained down more than 500 rockets on Gardez city. This followed a similar attack by his forces in neighboring Khost a few months earlier. In the Gardez case, however, this has been the last major offensive by Padshah Khan's forces for some time. Either by negotiation or the threat of force, he is a much less threatening force to security in 2003.


The Taliban have not been able to destabilize Paktia in the ways that they have in neighboring provinces of Paktika, and Ghazni. It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that Gardez has been touted as a success story for the government and for the international military forces on the security front. Certainly, it has received more security attention than most areas, and there have been marked improvements in some areas of security in 2003. The number of illegal checkpoints particularly outside of Gardez, has gone down dramatically.



Photo courtesy of HREAC

Tribal links help to maintain security

PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY



Locals attribute this to new security leadership. Early in 2003, Karzai arrested the police chief, and replaced him with Gul Hai Sulaimankhel, a retired military officer with significant influence in the national military structures. Karzai also recalled the provincial military commander, a Northerner, who was perceived by many locals not to be focused upon the best interests of the Gardez people. Many locals appear to have responded positively to these changes in the security structure.

Gardez was the also first location to which a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) was located. It also received one of the first contingents of US trained Afghan National Army. There has been considerable effort by PRT supporters to demonstrate that their model has had a significant impact on security. Others have argued that their impact has been limited, and in fact it is the regular Coalition forces that maintain security.

Herat



Herat province lies in Western Afghanistan and borders Turkmenistan to the north and Iran to the west. Its strategic location has made it a historically important commercial, political and military place. The province as a whole has an estimated population of 1,208,000²⁰ a large percentage are concentrated along the Hari-Rud river and the main circular road from Kandahar through Herat. The city of Herat has an estimated population of 254,800.²¹ It lies in a fertile plain “between the mountains of Ghor and the arid plains along the Iranian border.”²² The people are predominantly Tajik (approximately 60%²³) with a large minority of Pashtuns and a much smaller minority of Hazaras.

The city has a very rich cultural, artistic and academic heritage. It is famous for its beautiful architecture and tile mosaics from the Timurid period and is still considered Afghanistan’s major cultural capital.





Photo courtesy of HRRAC

Herat has a rich cultural heritage

KEY RECENT EVENTS



²⁰ Central Statistics Office (CSO), Kabul, 2003.

²¹ Central Statistics Office (CSO), Kabul, 2003.

²² Herat Province, UNHCR Background Report, 1990.


²³ Discussion with community members.

Political Profile

The Taliban captured Herat in September 1995 and implemented their own political and administrative structures and staff. "The capture of Herat by the Taliban was felt to be a military occupation, not only because of the restrictions placed on female access to education and employment but also because, culturally and linguistically, the predominantly Pashtun and rural Taliban were very different from the Persian-speaking Heratis, with their long aesthetic and liberal traditions."²⁴

Since the fall of the Taliban power in Herat has rested largely with one man, Ismail Khan. He has played a major political role in the western region for the last 25 years. The area has a history of independence and Ismail Khan continues that tradition ruling the area as a virtual Emir. He controls every function of the local government with many senior positions filled by his relatives or those loyal to him. His iron grip on the city means that security is extremely good. He has used his power to develop the city – it has well-maintained roads, public parks and public buildings and there is a very visible prosperity in Herat compared to other cities in Afghanistan. There is little overt opposition to Ismail Khan in the city either because people are benefiting from his patronage and his maintenance of security or because they are too scared to oppose his oppressive rule. But nationally and internationally he is often criticised for the lack of political and social freedoms in Herat, and particularly for his conservative stance against women.

Ismail Khan has very strong *jihadi* (holy war) credentials that give him legitimacy in the eyes of some people. He led the 1979 mutiny against the Taraki government, which ultimately led to the Soviet invasion. His control of Herat is politically important to Rabbani²⁵ and Sayaaf,²⁶ as together they form a strong power base of ex-*jihadi* fighters.



He commands his own troops, which far outnumber the size of the Afghan national army. This military power exists because he has the means to pay for it with money gained from unregulated border custom revenues. While he has pledged allegiance to the current government in Kabul, the size of his powerbase makes it difficult for them to exert much influence over him. Attempts to appoint centrally approved posts in Herat, or to weaken his position by inviting him to join the cabinet in Kabul, have failed. Recently, after considerable pressure, he handed over some custom revenues to Kabul, though the amount is said to be insignificant in

comparison to his overall income. In addition Ismail Khan has strong links to Iran which are a cause for concern for the government.

In the rural areas Ismail Khan still retains overall power, but traditional structures also operate. The *arbab* or village leader is an important and powerful person at the village level.

²⁴ P. Marsden. 2002. *The Taliban: War and Religion in Afghanistan*. Zed Books.

²⁵ Rabbani is the ex-President and head of the *Jamiat-i-Islami* party.

²⁶ Sayaaf is head of the *Ittihad-i-Islami* party.

Photo courtesy of HRRAC



Men in a group discussion

Economic Profile

Herat is part of the eastern-edge of the Iranian plateau. It is characterized by wide plains and valleys which, with the aid of extensive irrigation, have historically been a major source of agricultural production.

In the rural areas livelihoods are dominated by agricultural and livestock production including wheat, rice and cotton and production is reliant on traditional forms of irrigation channels (*karez*). The three year drought from 1998, which effected large parts of Afghanistan, had a major impact on people's livelihoods – harvests failed and livestock prices collapsed. In the city trading and labouring are the predominant livelihood activities.

With the arrival of the Taliban in 1995 the economy slowed as reconstruction work was halted and professional and skilled people decided to leave for Iran. Repatriation of refugees from Iran, which had been happening since 1992, was halted. Since the departure of the Taliban the economy has been boosted as reconstruction work and trade increases.


Ismail Khan funds his personal army and the development of the city largely through custom duties. Trade through the borders of Iran and Turkmenistan brings in millions of dollars of tax revenues. One estimate suggests that custom duties amount to double the central governments revenue every month.²⁷ This money is derived largely from goods coming in from Dubai through Iran, particularly vehicles and electrical appliances. Herat province as a whole is said to be free of poppy cultivation.²⁸



Photo courtesy of HRRAC

Border trade provides significant custom revenues

PERCEPTIONS OF LIVELIHOODS



²⁷ "Divided Loyalties for 'Emir of Herat', J. Head, July 2002, www.news.bbc.co.uk

²⁸ However, in the neighbouring provinces of Ghor, Farah and Badghis poppy is cultivated.

Security Profile

In 1995 the Taliban attempted to capture Herat several times, finally succeeding in September of that year without any resistance. As in Kabul, urban life in Herat in the 1970's and 80's had been relatively liberal, particularly for women. There is a strong Iranian Shia influence in Herat, which has historically encouraged women to play an active role in public life and to be educated and work. The Taliban edicts therefore had a significant impact on people's lives – schools were closed and the administration was taken over by Pashtuns. There were important acts of defiance, such as the women's protest in 1997 against the closure of the public baths, and the widespread prevalence of home schooling for girls and literary meetings of women, but many people left the country and went to Iran.

Ismail Khan also fled to Iran where he tried to regroup his forces against the Taliban. However, in 1997 he was captured and spent two years in a Taliban jail, before escaping in 2000. After September 11th, 2001 he allied with Coalition forces and in November retook control of the western region.

Security is considered to be good, but it is maintained through a network of police, army and intelligence agents between whom it is often difficult to distinguish²⁹ and who report directly to Ismail Khan. This extends throughout most of the province, with the exception of a pocket of insecurity around Shindand in the south, close to the border with Farah province. This is a

PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY

Very confident

5

Cautiously optimistic

4

Don't know


3

Pessimistic

2

Very worried

1



predominantly Pashtun area whose commander is strongly allied to political leaders in Helmand, and who periodically clashes with Ismail Khan's forces.

²⁹ All Our Hopes are Crushed: Violence and Repression in Western Afghanistan, HRW, 2002, www.hrw.org/reports

Photo courtesy of HRRAC



The citadel - site of Herat's military power

Kabul



Kabul is the capital of Afghanistan and its largest city. It lies in a strategic trading location in a fertile valley surrounded by mountains. To the north lies the Shomali plain and to the east the Kabul gorge which opens out into the fertile plains around Jalalabad. Kabul's ethnically mixed population is currently estimated to be 2,799,300.³⁰


The people of Kabul have experienced dramatic changes over the last forty years including: the rapid modernization of the 1960s and 70s; the Soviet style communism of the 1980's; the total destruction of parts of the city to inter-*mujahideen* fighting in the early 1990s; and the hard line conservative rule of the Taliban from 1996 to 2001.



View of Kabul city

Photo courtesy of HRRAC

KEY RECENT EVENTS



³⁰ Central Statistics Office (CSO), Kabul, 2003.


Political Profile

Large parts of Kabul city were destroyed during inter-*mujahideen* fighting between 1992 and 1994 and during this lawless period, different groups controlled different parts of the city. The Taliban made several advances towards Kabul from 1994 and by the winter of 1995 they were on the outskirts of the city shelling and rocketing the *mujahideen* positions. Kabul at this time was effectively blockaded by the Taliban to the south and west and in the east by *Hizb-i-Islam*³¹ troops. After a stable impasse the Taliban finally took Kabul peacefully in September 1996.

During the five years of the Taliban's rule in Kabul political power rested in a system of *shuras* (councils) which reported directly to Kandahar. Kandahar became the *de facto* capital during this time. The faces of those in power changed over the years and there was room within the movement for relatively more moderate ministers.

Following the events of September 11th, the US led Operation Enduring Freedom allied with groups opposed to the Taliban, quickly took control of the country. In November 2001 the forces of the *Shura-i-Nizar*³² walked victoriously into Kabul and started to assume power. Ahmed Shah Massoud pictures were pasted across the city and many remain.

The *Shura-i-Nizar* maintains considerable political power in Kabul with control of two of the most powerful ministries – Defence and Foreign Affairs. Troops also



stayed in Kabul after the arrival of international forces (ISAF was deployed in December 2001), when under the Bonn Agreement they had agreed to leave.

The central government in Kabul has 29 ministries that together make up the Cabinet. But for the city itself the Municipality is the main decision making body regarding water and sanitation, housing, planning, land and administration. The Municipality is headed by the Mayor of Kabul who is currently politically linked to *Jami-at-i-Islami*.³³ Each of the sixteen districts of Kabul has a district Municipality office.

Photo courtesy of HRRAC



Women in a group discussion

³¹ Pashtun party led by Gulbiddin Hekmatyar

³² Supervisory Council of the North

³³ Predominantly Tajik party led by Rab-banni

Economic Profile

During the years of inter *mujahideen* fighting (1992-1996) many Kabulites left for Pakistan or other countries. The legitimate economy of the city was virtually destroyed. During the winter of 1995-1996, the effective economic blockade of the city led to spiralling rates of inflation and the price of basic essentials increased dramatically. Ordinary people struggled to survive.

Things improved slightly under the Taliban as roads reopened and prices decreased, but the situation was still desperate. Thousands of female government civil servants were told to stay at home, including many teachers. Aid agencies struggled to come to terms with the edicts issued by the Taliban – some suspended activities, others sought ways around the edicts.

International sanctions were imposed in November 1999 to try to force the Taliban to hand over Osama Bin Laden. One major consequence was that Ariana (the national airline) was not allowed to land in Dubai (except for humanitarian and religious purposes) and a huge source of income through trade and remittances decreased. Sanctions affected the economy, including Kabul, as remittances were, and still are, an important part of people's livelihoods.

Since the end of 2001 the economy in Kabul has been considerably boosted. Increased amounts of foreign aid have come into the capital, and foreign aid agencies are now important employers of local people. Construction work has increased dramatically and private business is flourishing. Yet there is still little long-term investment



Photo courtesy of HIRAC

Housing costs have spiralled

in industry. There are also significant economic downsides – prices for basic foodstuffs are much higher now than under the Taliban and, in particular, house rents and construction materials have skyrocketed, causing a serious housing crisis in the city.


A large number of returning refugees have decided to settle in Kabul so that the population of the city has increased significantly. Under the Taliban the estimated population of the city was 1.5 million, now it is closer to 3 million. This has led to severe pressure on basic services such as water and sanitation systems.

The water supply situation in particular is in crisis. Four water supply schemes provide piped water to Kabul residents. The largest is the Logar water supply scheme, east of Kabul. Only 22%³⁴ of Kabul's population benefits from a piped water supply from these schemes. The rest use shallow wells, public taps or private boreholes.

The drilling of boreholes is now completely unregulated and will cause serious problems for the long-term water supply to the city.

The growth of the city and premium property prices has made land in the city a valuable asset. This has resulted in a large increase in disputes over property titles, the illegal selling of state lands, and the buying or misappropriating of land by the rich and powerful.

PERCEPTIONS OF LIVELIHOODS



³⁴ Personal communication with the Head of Water and Sanitation, CARE

Security Profile

During the years of inter-*mujahideen* fighting (1992-1996) there was very little security in the city. The city was effectively bombarded with shells and rockets and parts were virtually destroyed, there was heavy street fighting and thousands of civilians were killed. After experiencing such devastation the people of Kabul initially welcomed the Taliban in the hope that they would provide peace and security. Certainly the security under the Taliban was better than it is today, but it was enforced through a strict interpretation of Sharia law, which included beatings, amputations and public executions in the Kabul stadium.

Since December 2001 there has been a UN- authorised multinational force in Kabul. ISAF was deployed as part of the Bonn agreement until August 2002 when NATO took over command and has been an important factor in maintaining security in Kabul. But there are also signs that criminal activities, including robberies and extortion are increasing, often with the suggestion that security forces are directly involved.

PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY

Very confident

5

Cautiously optimistic

4

Don't know


3

Pessimistic

2

Very worried


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Destruction in Kabul city



Kandahar



Strategically located on the major trading routes between Persia and the Indian subcontinent where the roads to Herat, Kabul and Quetta in Pakistan intersect, Kandahar is an important commercial and military centre.

Kandahar Province lies in the south-east of Afghanistan and is part of the Pashtun heartland. It has a long border (250 miles) with Baluchistan province in Pakistan to the east, Helmand province to the west and Uruzgan and Zabul provinces to the north and northeast. Its strategic location has made it an important commercial and military centre.




Photo courtesy of HREAC

Street scene, Kandahar

Kandahar city lies in a flat plateau next to the Tarnak River surrounded by hills in Dand district, the smallest and most populated district in the province. The city has been very badly affected by the conflict in the past – by 1994 large parts of the city were destroyed through fighting against the Soviets and inter-factional fighting.

The majority of the people in the city are Durrani Pashtuns (Afghanistan’s historical ruling class) though there is a small *Shia* minority. The city is divided into seven districts and has an estimated population of 468,200 including the surrounding rural areas.³⁵

KEY RECENT EVENTS



³⁵ Central Statistics Offices (CSO), Kabul, 2003.

Kandahar Profile


Political Profile

Before the arrival of the Taliban different *mujahideen*³⁶ groups battled for control of the city and the government administration was in a state of almost total collapse. When the Taliban took control of the city in late 1994 Kandahar became the political and spiritual centre of the movement. They established a *shura* (council) in the city as the main decision making body under the leadership of Mullah Omar. This *shura* had authority over *shura* in other Taliban controlled areas. Even when the Taliban captured Kabul, much of the senior leadership of the Taliban, including Mullah Omar remained in Kandahar throughout their years in power.

After the collapse of the Taliban, Gul Agha Sherzai (a former *mujahideen* leader before the Taliban) was appointed Governor of Kandahar. He has since been replaced by Engineer Yusuf Pashtoon.

Political power in Kandahar is determined in part by tribal affiliation. There are three politically important tribes in the city: the Barakzais, Populzais and Nurzais. Currently the Governor is Barakzai and the Mayor of the city is Populzai. President Karzai is part of the Populzai tribe. Nurzais control the military garrison and are affiliated with Rabannis *Jamiat-i Islami*.

Traditional power structures are based on the influence of large landowning *khans* (landlords) particularly in the rural areas. As in Kabul and other cities there are



also major land disputes within the city and contested ownership because of false land documents.

In rural areas the Taliban revived the *jirga* (tribal council) as local decision-making bodies, and within rural areas, power still lies with the *jirgas*.

³⁶ *Mujahideen* - soldiers of Islam

Photo courtesy of HIRAC



Local Trader

Economic Profile

As the political fulcrum of the Taliban movement, Kandahar saw stability and economic growth through their years of political control. They opened up the route from Pakistan, through Kandahar and Herat onto central Asia, which saw significant economic growth.

With the fall of the Taliban, there was a period of economic stagnation as local business people were unsure of what would happen, and some even fled with their assets south to Pakistan, particularly those closely affiliated with the Taliban. As the situation stabilized, however, the city returned to normal, and has seen a period of economic growth.



Photo courtesy of HIRAC

Small businesses are an important part of the economy

Reconstruction has been slowed significantly in rural Kandahar. Much of the province is now either medium or high risk for international NGOs and private contractors doing reconstruction work, which has significantly slowed reconstruction. Even though the Kabul-Kandahar road has received a huge amount of attention and resources since President Bush made it a priority, its repair has been continually slowed due to insecurity. It now looks unlikely to have a temporary surface on the road by the end of the 2003.


Kandahar's main economic output is agricultural. The province's southern half is desert and largely unpopulated, but the land around the city is flat and fertile and agriculture has been a well developed part of the economy. The province is famous for fruit production, a significant amount of which is exported to Pakistan

or transported to markets in Kabul. Agricultural production is supported by two tributaries of the Helmand River - Arghistan and Arghandab and by the Dahla dam. The dam is about 50kms northeast of the city and was built with US support in the early 1950s.

Damage to irrigation systems during many years of war badly effected agricultural production and later, as in other parts of Afghanistan, the three year drought from 1998 had a significant impact on the agricultural economy – yields reduced drastically, livestock prices collapsed as people sold off assets and migration to Pakistan increased. Kandahar province is home to one of the largest *kuchi* (nomadic) populations in Afghanistan. They suffered particularly badly during the drought, losing much of their livestock.

In the city, livelihoods are based on salaried work with government, private firms and trading, and aid agencies. Because of the proximity of the Pakistan border, there is a significant cross border economy, both of traded goods and labour. Some large scale trading exists around the fruit and dried fruit market and currently there is a lot of construction work going on in the city.

The southern region, including Kandahar, is part of the traditional poppy cultivation belt of Afghanistan. The harvest is smuggled via Kandahar to Pakistan or through Nimroz and onto Iran.



Security Profile

Until late 1994 Kandahar saw considerable fighting, first between *mujahideen* groups and the Soviet-backed Afghan Government and subsequently between the *mujahideen* factions themselves. During the inter-factional fighting, parts of the city were controlled by commanders from different factions, many of whom preyed upon the local populations. Checkpoints along access roads to and from the city allowed commanders to extort taxes from traders and civilians.

The Taliban first came to prominence protecting a trade convoy travelling from Pakistan through Spin Boldak district in Kandahar and on to Turkmenistan. Soon after, the Taliban moved into Kandahar city meeting very little resistance along the way. They immediately disarmed the city and implemented their strict interpretations of *sharia* law (Islamic law). After the previous years of inter-factional fighting, the security and order that the Taliban brought made them, at least initially, very popular with local people.

Kandahar city remained secure throughout the Taliban period - an advance towards the city in the summer of 1995 by Ismail Khan's forces was thwarted. However, Kandahar became a military target again in late 2001 as Coalition forces tried to eliminate the leading members of the Taliban and Al Qaeda groups. At this point many families left the city for the relative safety of the villages.

PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY

Very confident

5

Cautiously optimistic

4

Don't know

3

Pessimistic

2

Very worried

1

On condition that international troops remain engaged in the area.

The rapid collapse of the Taliban allowed them to return quickly.

Coalition forces have continued their military activities in the province, and maintain a large troop deployment at Kandahar airport. Still, anti-government groups

continue to operate in Kandahar province, and have targeted aid organisations and government institutions that they view as allied to the west and to the Afghan government. Currently the city remains tense, but relatively secure. However, outside the city there are serious security concerns. Many aid agencies have curtailed their programmes significantly as a result.

Photo courtesy of HRRAC



Security Forces

Panjao



Panjao is a district of Bamian Province, which lies in the central highlands of Afghanistan. It is part of an area known as Hazarajat because of the overwhelmingly predominant ethnic group (Hazaras) living within it. It is a barren, mountainous and remote area, isolated further in winter by heavy snowfall. Because of its remoteness and lack of strategic importance, it remains one of the least developed and poorest areas in the country.




Photo courtesy of HREAC

Hillsides of Panjao

Panjao district has an estimated population of 66,600.³⁷ It is almost exclusively Hazara and the people speak a distinct dialect of Dari called Hazaragi. The majority of the people belong to the Imami Shia sect.³⁸

KEY RECENT EVENTS



³⁷ Central Statistics Office (CSO), Kabul, 2003.

³⁸ Chris Johnson, Hazarajat report, unpublished. The whole of this profile draws heavily on this unpublished report.


Political Profile

Hazarajat has never really been a strategically important area. It is often talked about as being a 'forgotten' area - historically marginalised and neglected because of its remoteness. There have, however, been attempts to subjugate and politically weaken the area - most recently with the Taliban's economic blockade of the area (May 1997 to September 1998).

Links to the Kabul government are maintained through Khalili and Akbari who head rival factions of *Hezb-i-Wahdat*.³⁹ Khalili is a Vice President in the government. At the district level the two factions share power in a sometimes tense relationship. The Governor is allied with Akbari, and the Commander, or Head of Security, is allied with Khalili. Power relations have changed little in recent years. During the period of the research the Governor was from the Akbari faction. He had governed the district as a local Talib and since 2001 had retained the governorship. Recently a new Governor has been appointed.

Whilst Hazarajat is overwhelmingly Hazara there are divisions within this ethnic group based on traditional patterns of power and political allegiance. One of the key distinctions is with the *Sayyeds* (descendants of the Prophet who are said to number between 2-4% of the population). In some cases they expect non-*Sayyeds* to pay tribute to them - at times causing inter-community tension.

PERCEPTIONS OF POWER



The most powerful groups within communities are the landlords and commanders. In the recent past commanders have become landlords in the area and old landlords have made political affiliations to maintain power. They are all generally allied to one of the *Hezb-i-Wahdat* factions. Their power rests on their ownership of land and their political power within the factions - a power that also allows them to collect taxes. Conversely, those with the least power are those that lack access to resources such as the landless and other 'traditional' vulnerable groups (widows, displaced etc). Some small landowners may also lack power especially if they are not allied to a political faction.

At the community level the *takia khana* (community room) is the major village place for decision-making. Community discussions are held there and it is also often used for prayer.

³⁹ *Hezb-i-Wahdat* is a predominantly Hazara/shia party.

Photo courtesy of HRRAC



Women in a focus group discussion

Economic Profile

Hazarajat has always been a food deficit area. Even when Afghanistan was self-sufficient in grain, the area had to import food. Most households are involved in a variety of livelihood activities, but the major source of livelihood is overwhelmingly agriculture and livestock production. Wheat (both irrigated and rainfed) is the major crop and livestock are an essential cash income to families.

A smaller proportion of household income is gained from other activities. Local labouring is a necessary strategy for the poorest, though most of it is seasonal and poorly paid. Migration (seasonal and permanent) is also an important coping mechanism, though the significance of remittances to the economy varies geographically and over time. Handicrafts produced by women and sold by men make a very limited contribution to household income. This is largely due to the lack of market. One source of income, which is not reflected in the 'perceptions of livelihoods', is poppy cultivation. This is a very important and growing source of income for many in the area. Wages in this sector are good (more



Photo courtesy of HIRAC

Namad (felt rug) production


than cash for work projects) and the area under cultivation is growing. People told us that this was the first year that they had seen poppy in Panjao district.

There are a number of barriers to economic development in the area. Its geographical isolation and lack of access to markets, particularly in winter, is a key factor. The poor infrastructure reflects the economic marginalisation of the area. The physical terrain of barren mountains limits agricultural production and means there is enormous pressure on land leading to fragmentation and increasingly marginal landholdings. It also contributes to erosion and spring flooding. In times of hardship small landowners often mortgage their land, a common strategy for meeting immediate consumption needs.

The politically driven economic blockade imposed on the area by the Taliban from May 1997 to September 1998 had a significant impact. There were sharp increases in the price of food and a collapse in the livestock market, which subsequently increased out-migration. In the long term it weakened household economies through the dramatic increase in indebtedness, decapitalisation and the mortgaging of land.

Once the blockade was lifted in 1998 a three-year drought started. Panjao was not among the worst affected districts in Hazarajat, though the remoter villages suffered. The drought significantly reduced yields, particularly on rainfed land. Livestock prices collapsed again and migration increased. The good snowfall of winter 2002 seems to offer the first respite for the area from the recent years of serious economic hardship.

PERCEPTIONS OF LIVELIHOODS



- Agriculture
- Casual Labour
- Livestock
- Remittances
- Trading
- Local Products

Security Profile

The major source of conflict in the area has been between different political factions. There have been periods of serious conflict and instability in recent years. In the 1990s the rival factions of *Hezb-i-Wahdat* (Khalili and Akbari) clashed consistently in the area. During the late 1990s the Taliban advanced from Mazar into Hazarajat taking Panjao in September 1998. They met little military opposition - the Khalili faction fled and Akbari finding no support negotiated an alliance. The Taliban were greatly feared in Hazarajat because of the widespread reports of civilian massacres of Hazaras in Mazar-i-Sharif. The Taliban ruled the area mostly through local elites. Panjao was relatively stable under the Akbari-Taliban alliance, though there were pockets of fighting elsewhere. Some of this was against the Taliban (Bamian) and some was ongoing factional fighting (Dai Kundi).

Panjao continued to remain stable, but in late 2000 *Hezb-i-Wahdat* and the Taliban clashed over Yakawlang. During these clashes the Taliban were alleged to have massacred about 170⁴⁰ people, mostly civilians. People in Panjao were extremely fearful of the fighting and reported massacres in their neighbouring district. However, people now openly carry guns; they didn't under the Taliban because they feared the consequences.

The other major source of conflict in the area has been over land and water rights. This largely takes the form of small scale disputes within communities. At times larger disputes have emerged with the *kuchis* (nomads). The *kuchis* own large tracts of land in the area, but have been unable to graze them since the Soviet invasion.

PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY

Very confident

5

Cautiously optimistic

4

Don't know


3

Pessimistic

2

Very worried

1



Local Hazaras now farm the land. In May 1999, several hundred armed *kuchis* arrived in Panjao and started going to villages asking for 20 years of land rent. The Taliban resolved the dispute through negotiation.

⁴⁰ 'Massacres of Hazaras in Afghanistan', Human Rights Watch, February 2001, www.hrw.org



Land pressure leads to conflict over tenure

Saripul



Saripul Province runs from the Tir Band-i Turkestan mountains northwards into the foothills along the edge of the north Afghanistan plain. It is a relatively new province created in 1990 under Najibullah and carved out of Jawzjan, Balkh and Samangan provinces. It borders Ghor and Bamyian provinces to the south, Balkh and Samangan to the east, and Jawzjan and Faryab to the west.

Saripul city itself is a medium sized provincial centre, largely undamaged by the direct impact of the conflict. It has an estimated population of 24,400, and including surrounding villages this increases to 142,900.⁴¹

The city is ethnically mixed though Uzbeks are the dominant group (50%) followed by Tajiks (30%), Hazaras (15%) and Pashtuns (5%).⁴²

The major river is the Saripul river which originates in the southern mountainous part of the province, runs




Photo courtesy of HREAC

Hills around Saripul City

through the Saripul city and into Jawzjan province and provides irrigation water to a large part of central Jawzjan.

KEY RECENT EVENTS



⁴¹ Central Statistic Office, Kabul, 2003.

⁴² Estimates of local people.


Political Profile

Saripul province has been the scene of considerable conflict and power struggles since its birth in 1990. Following the fall of Najibullah there was a struggle for power in the province between *Jamiat-i-Islami*⁴³ and *Jumbesh*⁴⁴ and between the two main factions of *Hezb-i-Wahdat*⁴⁵ (Khalili and Akbari).

The Taliban push to the north in 1997 met with considerable resistance particularly from Balkhab district. Though the Taliban managed to gain control over most of the province by late 1998, Balkhab district remained a contested area.

The main political dynamic since the fall of the Taliban in 2001 has been the struggle between *Jamiat-i-Islami* and *Jumbesh*. *Jamiat* controls most of Sangcharak district and parts of other districts and *Jumbesh* controls most of the rest of the province including Saripul city. Many of the conflicts which still exist today in the province are a continuation of those which started in the 1980s, though their political formation has changed. The intra-mujahidin conflicts in, for example, Gosfandi and Kohistanat latterly became *Jamiat-Jumbesh*, Taliban-opposition, and intra-*Jumbesh* in character.

Saripul city is in under the control of *Jumbesh* and General Dostum. Abuse of power by local commanders throughout the province is prevalent including: violence, agricultural taxation, expropriation of government properties and resources (including natural resources)



and forced conscription or collection of conscription exemption payments.

As in other parts of the country, *shuras* (councils) are the main decision making body at the community level.

⁴³ Predominantly Takij party led by ex-President Rabbani

⁴⁴ Predominantly Uzbek party led by General Rashid Dostum

⁴⁵ Hazara/Shia party divided into two main factions – Khalili and Akbari

Photo courtesy of HRRAC



Local Elders

Economic Profile

The economic base of the province is primarily agriculture and livestock production, which varies by location. In Balkhab district the high altitude restricts cereal crop production but produces good fruit and cash-crop poplars. Kohistanat district is the poorest district in the south of the province. It is mountainous and any agricultural production is extremely limited. The lowland hill areas around Saripul city, rain permitting, produce good rainfed wheat crops and cash-crop poplars. The three year drought from 1998 onwards had a serious impact on the agricultural production of the area. There were huge losses of livestock and harvest failure.



Photo courtesy of HIRAC


Saripul is an important market centre

Handicrafts are prominent in certain areas and do contribute significantly to cash income particularly amongst the Hazaras in Saripul city. Labour migration and remittances also play an important role in family livelihood strategies. Men travel to Iran and Pakistan for employment or within Afghanistan for construction and harvesting work. Saripul is the main market town for the surrounding areas and there are lots of small traders and agricultural markets.

Saripul province has five oil wells which were established in the 1980s and then capped. These were reopened after 1992 and have been exploited periodically since then. The refining of the crude oil into fuel takes place in Shiberghan (Jawzjan province) in locally-built, private refineries. At present the production is limited, but potentially oil production could be a major employer and a major source of revenue.

Poppy cultivation, which had been traditionally very limited, has recently expanded as is the case throughout the north of the country. Saripul is also on one of the major transit routes for raw opium, which is smuggled south into Ghor province and beyond.

PERCEPTIONS OF LIVELIHOODS



Security Profile

Following the fall of Najib there was ongoing conflict between different *mujahideen* groups and many of these conflicts continue in different forms. Similarly, during the Taliban period there was also heavy conflict in the province and considerable resistance, particularly in Balkhab district. Opposition to the Taliban was dealt with harshly - in Gosfandi in 2000 civilians were reportedly deliberately massacred and a scorched earth policy was implemented in both Gosfandi and Sangcharak district. A large number of people were displaced to Balkhab - many of whom remain there.

Currently, there are sporadic conflicts between *Jamiat* and *Jumbesh*. In May 2002, *Jumbesh* took control of Saripul city from *Jamiat*. This was followed by struggles for power in Kohistanat district and Gosfandi. Since the summer of 2003 these conflicts have been in abeyance. The continued tension between *Jamiat* and *Jumbesh* and their two different divisions of the military continues to retard reform of the political and administrative structures.

In Balkhab district there have been repeated clashes between commanders linked to two different factions of *Hezb-i-Wahdat* (Khalili and Akbari). Plans exist to disarm parts of the district in October 2003.

PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY

Very confident

5

Cautiously optimistic

4

Don't know

3

Pessimistic

2

Very worried

1




Photo courtesy of HRRAC



Young men need employment opportunities

Zaranj



Zaranj is the provincial capital of Nimroz, which lies in the far southeast corner of Afghanistan. The province borders Iran to the west and Pakistan to the south. It is sparsely populated (with approximately 250,000 people⁴⁶) because it is largely an arid desert. The largest settlements run along the River Helmand, which defines the border between Iran and Afghanistan, and the River Khashrod, which runs from the northeast down to Zaranj.

Zaranj city and the rural areas around it are predominantly Baluch (70%) and Pashtun (30%) with a very small number of Tajiks.⁴⁷ In the province as a whole, the balance between Baluch and Pashtun is more even. The population are almost all Sunni Muslim, who in Zaranj district number about 82,000.⁴⁸




Photo courtesy of HREAC

Village house

The proximity to Iran physically, economically and socially is palpable - in Zaranj, city shops are stocked with Iranian products and prices are in Iranian currency.

KEY RECENT EVENTS



⁴⁶ Ockenden International, Information Project, December 2002.

⁴⁷ Estimates from local people.

⁴⁸ Ockenden International, Information Project, December 2002.


Political Profile

Zaranj is closely politically linked to Herat. Like Herat, this important trading route with Iran provides income from custom revenues. The leadership has strong links with Ismail Khan and both areas are allied to *Jamiat-i-Islami*,⁴⁹ and both have strong political links to Iran. Many of those in power fled to Iran during the Taliban regime (1995-2001) and maintain close relationships with the authorities there.

There are also interesting ethnic dimensions to power. The Baluch people around Zaranj are the same as the Iranian Baluchi people across the border in Iran. Like the Durand line with Pakistan the Iranian border divides families of the same tribes. There are six main Baluchi tribes, the two most powerful of which are *Brahui* and *Notani*. Their power was traditionally based on land ownership, but is now also linked to political allegiances and the lucrative cross-border economy.

During the 1980s many Pashtuns left to Iran because of the Russian occupation and drought. Many have not returned yet and remain in towns and camps in Iran particularly Zabul and Zahedan close to the border. Baluch people left in much smaller numbers during that time, but more left during the Taliban era. They have returned in larger numbers over the last two years than Pashtuns and subsequently the ethnic balance has shifted in their favour.

PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY



As in most other places in Afghanistan the *shura* (council, assembly) is the most important decision-making institution at the local level. Tribal affiliation can often play a role in how decisions are made.

⁴⁹ Predominantly Tajik party led by ex-President Rabbani.

Photo courtesy of Ockenden International



Women at a Community Meeting

Economic Profile

The major source of livelihood for people in Zaranj and the villages around is trade and daily labouring with, and in, Iran. Before the drought of 1998 onwards, there was more agricultural production particularly of wheat, beans and cotton. Irrigation water was channelled from the Helmand River to support this production. The drought had a major impact on people's livelihoods and many turned to small trading or left for Iran.

Now the drought is over, water is flowing in the River Helmand, and the dry Hamoon lakebed has been flooded for the first time in years. Some of the irrigation channels have not survived the drought and have completely silted up. The windy, dusty summers mean that sand dunes move fast - houses can literally be eaten up by dunes in the course of several years. Major irrigation channels are full of sand and would require major work to restore - there does not appear to be any plan to do so.

There are very strong economic links with Iran. The border is 15 minutes away by car and many people cross on a daily basis, labouring or bringing back goods to trade. This trade also provides significant custom revenues for the authorities. The Iranian currency is the norm - shopkeepers do not give prices in Afghanis. Iran provides 24-hour electricity to the city.

In Zaranj itself this year, there is a lot of work available in construction. Many private houses are being rebuilt as families return from Iran or move from other provinces in Afghanistan.



Photo courtesy of Ockenden International

Construction in Zaranj city

There are more than 800 displaced families from Ghor, Farah, Helmand and Herat provinces. Many, because of the proximity of Iran and the increased employment opportunities, have settled in the villages around Zaranj. The majority have a nomadic background and lost their livestock during the drought.


The lack of transport infrastructure makes trading within Afghanistan problematic. The road from Zaranj to the main southern route linking Herat and Kandahar is difficult to see as a road - cars and trucks wend their way through the fast-moving dunes. Local people are hoping that the plan to construct the road goes ahead.

Because of its location Nimroz is an important trade route with Iran of both legitimate goods and, in particular, poppy products. The neighbouring province of Helmand historically had the biggest area of land under poppy

cultivation in Afghanistan⁵⁰ and now Nimroz has started to produce. In Khashrod district poppy was cultivated on a large scale for the first time this year. It is not grown in Zaranj as a lack of water prohibits production. Cash income from poppy harvesting is approximately \$8-10 per day at the peak harvesting period compared to a 'normal' daily wage of \$2.50.

⁵⁰ UNDCP/ICMP, Afghanistan Opium Survey, 2002

PERCEPTIONS OF LIVELIHOODS



Security Profile

The Taliban captured Zaranj in 1995 with minimal fighting. At this time some people left for Iran, Pakistan or to other parts of Afghanistan. The political leadership fled to Iran, returning in late 2001.

The Taliban were concerned about the physical and political proximity of Zaranj to the Iranian border. They started to build a new provincial capital in the district of Khashrod, closer to the Helmand border. In part this was because of the serious lack of drinking water in Zaranj, but was largely a politically driven move

The rise of the narco-economy and the presence of groups opposed to the current government make parts of Nimroz insecure. In the northeast, armed groups move around and there have been numerous robberies and hijackings along the road between Ghorghori and Dilarum.

PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY

Very confident

5

Cautiously optimistic

4

Don't know

3

Pessimistic

2

Very worried

1




Photo courtesy of Ockenden International

Security checkpoint

- a. More
 - b. Less
 - c. Same
 - d. I don't know
8. Do you think the Afghan army or police will be able to provide security in your area within the next five years?
 - a. Yes
 - b. No
 - c. I don't know/ No answer
 9. Do you want Afghan or international forces to provide security in your area?
 - a. Afghan
 - b. International
 - c. Both
 - d. Doesn't matter
 - e. I don't know
 10. If your family has a problem with another family about land, is there a decision-maker within this community who will solve this problem?
 - a. Yes
 - b. No
 - c. I don't know
 11. If there is no decision-maker or this decision-maker in this community cannot solve the problem, who does your family go to for help outside the community? (NO NAMES REQUIRED) (OPEN QUESTION)
 12. If there is an important meeting about a community problem in your village/town, do you think the decision-makers will listen to your opinion?
 - a. Yes
 - b. No
 - c. I don't know
 13. Do you think it is easier or more difficult to discuss community problems with your community leaders today than it was three years ago?
 - a. Easier
 - b. More difficult
 - c. Has not changed
 - d. I don't know
 14. Do you think women should be involved in community decision-making outside their home in your community?
 - a. Yes
 - b. No
 - c. I don't know/no opinion
 15. IF ANSWER TO #14 IS "I DON'T KNOW," DON'T ASK THIS QUESTION: Why do you think women should be involved? OR Why do you think women should not be involved? (OPEN QUESTION)
 16. Is there a new constitution being developed for Afghanistan?
 - a. Yes
 - b. No/I don't know
 17. Is there a national election in Afghanistan next year when people will choose their government?
 - a. Yes
 - b. No/I don't know
8. Will you vote in the national election next year?
 - a. Yes
 - b. No
 - c. I don't know

19. IF ANSWER TO #18 IS "I DON'T KNOW," DON'T ASK THIS QUESTION: Why will you vote in the election? OR Why will you not vote in the election? (OPEN QUESTION)
20. In your opinion, will the general elections bring positive or negative changes to Afghanistan?
- Positive
 - Negative
 - No change
 - I don't know/have no opinion
21. Why will the elections bring positive changes? OR Why will the elections bring negative changes? OR Why will the elections bring no change? (OPEN QUESTION)
22. Is it easier or more difficult for children in your community to go to school today than it was three years ago?
- Easier
 - More difficult
 - Same
 - I don't know
23. Is it easier or more difficult for you to get health care today than it was three years ago?
- Easier
 - More difficult
 - Same
 - I don't know
24. In the next three years, do you think the government will help your community with, for example, services like education or health care or roads and bridges?
- Yes
 - No
 - I don't know
25. ONLY ASK IF ANSWER TO 24. IS "NO": Why do you think the government will not help your community? (OPEN QUESTION)
26. Have foreign governments promised money to help rebuild Afghanistan?
- Yes
 - No
 - I don't know
27. Do you think Afghanistan will get all the money that it was promised by foreign governments?
- Yes
 - No
 - I don't know
28. Do you think that the money from foreign governments should be given directly to the Afghan central government or to NGOs and the United Nations?
- Government
 - NGOs/UN
 - Both
 - None of them
 - Doesn't matter
 - I don't know/No opinion
29. Why?
30. If you were the president of Afghanistan, what would you do first to help your country? (OPEN QUESTION)

Annex C:

Group Discussion Guiding Questions

ECONOMIC RIGHTS

- ❖ What has changed in your community in the last three years in terms of the local economy and development? Why? (Not security)
- ❖ Who is assisting your community from outside?
- ❖ Do you think that the government will be able to help your community in the next five years? Why?
- ❖ Do you want money for this community to go through the national government? Why?
- ❖ The international community has promised to help rebuild Afghanistan. Do you think they will keep that promise? Why?
- ❖ What are your hopes and fears about the government and international promises to reconstruct Afghanistan?
- ❖ Are you consulted in the planning of projects? Do you think you should be consulted? If so why?

SECURITY RIGHTS

- ❖ Do *all* members of your community feel safe in this area? Do you feel safe travelling out of your area? Why/why not? Which people do/don't feel safe?
- ❖ Has the security situation been the same over the last three years or have things changed? If so what has changed, how and why?
- ❖ What do you think would help to improve security in your community? Why?
- ❖ Who do you think should provide security to your community? Why?
- ❖ How has insecurity affected your life in the last three years? Has it affected your family's choices in terms of where you live, what you do, what you buy or sell?
- ❖ Do you think Afghanistan is at peace or not? Why?
- ❖ Do you expect the security situation to change in the future and why? Do you think that you/your sons will have to fight again in the future?
- ❖ What should be done to improve the prospects for long-term peace? Why?

POLITICAL RIGHTS

- ❖ How are decisions made in this community?
- ❖ Do you think all members of your community's opinions should be heard or do you think decision making should rely on the experience of elders?
- ❖ If you have a problem how do you resolve it in the community? Does this system work for everybody?
- ❖ There is a plan to choose a new government in Kabul next year. Who do you think should be allowed to vote from this community?
- ❖ Do you think women should be involved in decision making or not? Why/why not? Do you think women should be allowed to vote in national elections? Why/why not.
- ❖ Does it make any difference to your life who is in government in Kabul? Why/why not?

Annex D:

Details of Group Discussions

Three hundred and seventy five people participated in 31 group discussions. Separate group discussions were held with women, men and youth. Participants in the youth group discussions were approximately 18-25 years old. In most cases, all youth were male, except in Kabul where some young women attended discussions.

Outside Kabul, local staff of member organisations invited people to the group discussions. Participants came from different parts of the area surveyed and from different socio-economic backgrounds. Many of the participants knew each other, particularly in the rural areas. Where possible, people who had participated in the questionnaire were not invited to participate in the group discussions.

Inside Kabul the five group discussions were held with members of local community groups.

NGO staff facilitated the group discussions in local languages based on a set of guiding questions (see annex B). Another staff member took written notes; these were later translated into English. Tape recorders were not used as staff thought this would inhibit participants.

The quality of the group discussions was largely determined by the skill of the facilitator and the willingness of the participants to engage. This varied enormously between locations and between different group discussions.

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS IN GROUP DISCUSSIONS

Location	Number of group discussions	Number of females	Number of males	Number of youth (18-25 years)	Total number of participants
Faizabad	3	10	11	9	30
Gardez	3	10	15	13	38
Herat city	3	11	10	10	31
Herat villages	3	12	11	7	30
Kabul	5	29	14	13	56
Kandahar	3	15	20	14	49
Panjao	5	13	25	19	58
Saripul	3	16	10	12	38
Zaranj	3	16	15	15	46
Total	31	132	131	112	375

Annex E:

Coding for Open Questions¹

Open Questions and Types of Answers	Code
Do you feel safe walking alone in and around your village/town? If not; why not?	
Fear of crime; burglary; robbers.	Petty crime
Power of commanders; fighting nearby; number of arms in the locality.	General Insecurity
In your opinion; what is the most important thing to do to improve security in your community?	
More police; formation of a national army/police; more resources to security forces; more patrols; more training.	Strengthen Afghan Army/Police
Increase government control; change power brokers; stop corruption.	Political Reform
International support and intervention to the security sector.	International Support
Collect weapons.	Disarmament
Stop factional fighting; reduce ethnic/political tensions.	Address Factional Tensions
Create jobs; reconstruct the country; improve education; provide electricity.	Economic Development
If there is no decision-maker or the decision-maker in this community cannot solve the problem; who does your family go to for help outside the community?	
District/provincial/central administrations or judiciary.	Government Administration/Judiciary
Police force.	Police
Elders; tribal assemblies (jirgas).	Non-state Assemblies
Why do you think women should be involved?	
Women have rights; equal rights with men; they are 50% of population.	Women's Rights
Women's involvement will benefit society.	Benefits Society
Why do you think women should not be involved?	
Women are illiterate; women do not know anything; men know about outside matters.	Different Capacities
Against local culture; no permission from men.	Societal Constraints
Lack of security; problems with travelling.	Physical Constraints

¹ The coding for the open questions was determined from the answers emerging from the first 300 surveys carried out in Kabul.

Open Questions and Types of Answers	Code
Why will you vote in the election?	
For peace and security.	Peace
For a good government; an elected representative; a government that works for the people; for a legal government; for one leader; for the right to elect our own leaders.	Political Factors
For reconstruction.	Economic Factors
Why will the elections bring positive changes?	
Because they will bring peace and security.	Peace
Because they will bring a representative government; the participation of all people in choosing national leaders; representative of all groups/opinions; a government accountable to the people.	Good Governance
Why do you think the government will not help your community?	
Area is too insecure for services to reach there.	Security
Government is not interested in this area for political reasons; corruption in government.	Political Factors
Government has no money.	Economic Factors
Do you think that the money from foreign governments should be given directly to the Afghan central government or to NGO's and the United Nations? Why?	
Government more effective and efficient at spending money properly; government are responsible for providing services.	Government: Responsible/ Efficient/ Effective
NGO/UN more effective and efficient at delivering services.	NGO/ UN: Efficient/ Effective
Government misuses funds; funds do not reach the right people.	Government: Corrupt/ Inefficient
NGO/UN misuses funds; funds do not reach the right people.	NGO/UN: Corrupt/ Inefficient
If you were the President of Afghanistan; what would you do first to help your country?	
Bring peace and security; disarmament; create a national army/police force.	Security Rights
Change some of those in power; strengthen the hand of the government.	Political Rights
Improve education; reconstruct the country; improve health services; provide jobs.	Economic Rights

Annex F

Statistical Results¹

1. Do you feel safe walking alone in and around your village/town?

	%	Yes	No
Gender	Female	93.52	6.48
	Male	91.19	8.81
Ethnicity	Baluch	97.96	2.04
	Hazara	91.50	8.50
	Pashtun	85.71	14.29
	Tajik	95.68	4.32
	Turkmen	97.56	2.4
	Uzbek	95.18	4.82
Location	Faizabad	92.23	7.77
	Gardez	76.00	24.00
	Herat	95.00	5.00
	Kabul	97.67	2.33
	Kandahar	80.00	20.00
	Panjao	89.11	10.89
	Saripul	97.00	3.00
	Zaranj	98.00	2.00
Total		92.30	7.70

2. If not, why not?

	%	Petty Crime	General Insecurity	Other	Don't know
Gender	Female	17.65	64.71	14.71	2.94
	Male	13.73	62.75	13.73	9.80
Ethnicity	Baluch	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00
	Hazara	15.38	53.85	15.38	15.38
	Pashtun	17.78	57.78	15.56	8.89
	Tajik	15.79	73.68	10.53	0.00
	Turkmen	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00
	Uzbek	0.00	75.00	25.00	0.00
Location	Faizabad	0.00	62.50	37.50	0.00
	Gardez	25.00	45.83	16.67	12.50
	Herat	10.00	80.00	10.00	0.00
	Kabul	57.14	28.57	0.00	14.29
	Kandahar	5.00	90.00	5.00	0.00
	Panjao	9.09	54.55	18.18	18.18
	Saripul	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00
	Zaranj	0.00	50.00	50.00	0.00
TOTAL		15.29	63.53	14.12	7.06

¹ For the data analysis a 'split-half analysis' determined that the sample size used was adequate. Chi-squared test was used to analyze the significance of the results. The data presented in this annex is a selection from the complete data set. For further data please contact the project staff.

3. What group protects people from crime like stealing in your village/town?

	%	Police	No body	Com- munity	Army	Com- mander	Gover- nment	ISAF	Mullah	Wakil	Walus- wal	Don't know
Gender	Female	46.67	22.10	11.05	0.19	0.57	0.38	1.71	2.86	0.19	5.33	8.95
	Male	50.09	18.65	15.20	0.86	0.00	0.00	1.04	2.25	0.00	6.22	5.70
Ethnicity	Baluch	42.86	18.37	8.16	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	16.33	0.00	10.20	4.08
	Hazara	32.68	11.11	11.11	0.00	0.00	0.00	5.23	1.31	0.00	31.37	7.19
	Pashtun	48.89	16.51	24.76	0.00	0.00	0.32	0.32	2.54	0.00	0.63	6.03
	Tajik	56.59	24.77	7.05	0.23	0.00	0.23	1.14	0.91	0.23	1.14	7.73
	Turkmen	31.71	51.22	2.44	0.00	0.00	0.00	2.44	4.88	0.00	4.88	2.44
	Uzbek	39.76	16.87	16.87	6.02	3.61	0.00	0.00	4.82	0.00	0.00	12.05
Location	Faizabad	42.72	34.95	19.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	2.91
	Gardez	2.00	35.00	60.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	3.00
	Herat	39.00	44.00	4.50	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	2.50	0.00	3.50	6.50
	Kabul	76.33	3.67	3.67	0.00	0.00	0.67	5.00	0.33	0.33	0.00	10.00
	Kandahar	85.00	7.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	8.00
	Panjao	9.90	15.84	13.86	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.98	0.00	49.50	8.91
	Saripul	44.00	15.00	16.00	6.00	3.00	0.00	0.00	5.00	0.00	0.00	11.00
	Zaranj	43.00	16.00	16.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	15.00	0.00	7.00	3.00
TOTAL		48.46	20.29	13.22	0.54	0.27	0.18	1.36	2.54	0.09	5.80	7.25

4. Are you satisfied with that group's effort in providing security?

	%	Yes	No	Don't know
Gender	Female	85.24	5.83	8.93
	Male	79.96	10.82	9.22
Ethnicity	Baluch	88.10	4.76	7.14
	Hazara	75.16	9.80	15.03
	Pashtun	73.68	13.82	12.50
	Tajik	90.11	4.83	5.06
	Turkmen	97.56	2.44	0.00
	Uzbek	82.93	7.32	9.76
Location	Faizabad	84.47	4.85	10.68
	Gardez	60.00	14.00	26.00
	Herat	92.11	2.63	5.26
	Kabul	90.33	6.00	3.67
	Kandahar	69.00	26.00	5.00
	Panjao	64.36	12.87	22.77
	Saripul	85.93	6.06	7.07
	Zaranj	89.66	4.60	5.75
TOTAL		82.48	8.43	9.08

5. Do you feel more or less safe in your community today than you did three years ago?

		More	Less	Same	Don't know
Gender	Female	85.71	8.00	4.57	1.71
	Male	79.79	11.9	6.91	1.38
Ethnicity	Baluch	89.80	2.04	8.16	0.00
	Hazara	96.08	3.27	0.00	0.65
	Pashtun	52.70	28.57	16.51	2.22
	Tajik	93.64	2.50	1.82	2.05
	Turkmen	97.56	2.44	0.00	0.00
	Uzbek	96.39	3.61	0.00	0.00
Location	Faizabad	94.17	2.91	0.97	1.94
	Gardez	23.00	53.00	21.00	3.00
	Herat	95.00	2.00	2.00	1.00
	Kabul	91.67	2.67	2.67	3.00
	Kandahar	53.00	34.00	13.00	0.00
	Panjao	97.03	2.97	0.00	0.00
	Saripul	97.00	3.00	0.00	0.00
	Zaranj	79.00	3.00	17.00	1.00
TOTAL		82.61	10.05	5.80	1.54

6. In your opinion, what is the most important thing to do to improve security in your community?

	%	Disarma- ment	Strengthen Afghan Police/ Army	Economic Develop- ment	Interna- tional Support	Political Reform	Address Factional Tensions	Other	Don't know
Gender	Female	27.62	24.38	7.81	1.71	7.81	8.38	5.71	16.57
	Male	37.65	21.93	6.91	1.73	10.19	7.60	8.12	5.87
Ethnicity	Baluch	32.65	14.29	2.04	0.00	14.29	4.08	4.08	28.57
	Hazara	45.75	15.69	4.5	2.61	11.11	4.58	5.23	10.46
	Pashtun	22.86	29.84	4.44	1.59	11.11	8.89	7.62	13.65
	Tajik	30.45	23.64	11.36	2.05	6.82	10.00	6.59	9.09
	Turkmen	39.02	14.63	14.63	2.44	7.32	2.44	17.07	2.44
	Uzbek	60.24	16.87	1.20	0.00	3.61	3.61	8.43	6.02
Location	Faizabad	44.66	7.77	5.83	0.00	11.65	14.56	9.71	5.83
	Gardez	16.16	24.24	4.04	0.00	6.06	22.22	10.10	17.17
	Herat	46.00	10.00	15.50	0.00	9.00	8.00	9.00	2.50
	Kabul	12.37	41.47	8.36	5.69	6.35	7.36	6.02	12.37
	Kandahar	25.00	49.00	6.00	2.00	12.00	0.00	6.00	0.00
	Panjao	59.00	1.00	4.00	0.00	15.00	4.00	3.00	14.00
	Saripul	63.00	14.00	1.00	0.00	3.00	4.00	8.00	7.00
	Zaranj	24.00	15.00	4.00	0.00	15.00	5.00	4.00	33.00
TOTAL		32.88	23.10	7.34	1.72	9.06	7.97	6.97	10.96

7. In your opinion, will Afghanistan become more or less peaceful in a year from now?

		More	Less	Same	Don' t know
Gender	Female	81.14	1.71	1.33	15.81
	Male	74.96	1.90	3.97	19.17
Ethnicity	Baluch	87.76	0.00	2.04	10.20
	Hazara	84.97	1.96	0.65	12.42
	Pashtun	62.22	3.17	5.40	29.21
	Tajik	83.18	1.14	1.59	14.09
	Turkmen	73.17	2.44	2.44	21.95
	Uzbek	90.36	1.20	1.20	7.23
Location	Faizabad	78.64	0.97	2.91	17.48
	Gardez	55.00	6.00	6.00	33.00
	Herat	83.00	1.00	5.50	10.50
	Kabul	83.67	2.00	1.00	13.33
	Kandahar	52.00	3.00	4.00	41.00
	Panjao	86.14	1.98	0.00	11.88
	Saripul	92.00	0.00	1.00	7.00
	Zaranj	76.00	0.00	2.00	22.00
TOTAL		77.90	1.81	2.72	17.57

8. Do you think the Afghan army or police will be able to provide security in your area within the next five years?

	%	Yes	No	Don't know
Gender	Female	59.43	6.67	33.90
	Male	70.29	3.80	25.91
Ethnicity	Baluch	81.63	4.08	14.29
	Hazara	67.97	9.80	22.22
	Pashtun	58.41	6.03	35.56
	Tajik	65.45	3.41	31.14
	Turkmen	73.17	0.00	26.83
	Uzbek	71.08	6.02	22.89
Location	Faizabad	47.57	4.85	47.57
	Gardez	67.00	7.00	26.00
	Herat	61.00	2.00	37.00
	Kabul	75.33	5.33	19.33
	Kandahar	46.00	5.00	49.00
	Panjao	65.35	9.90	24.75
	Saripul	76.00	6.00	18.00
	Zaranj	67.00	4.00	29.00
TOTAL		65.13	5.16	29.71

9. Do you want Afghan or international forces to provide security in your area?						
	%	Afghan	Inter-national	Both	Does not matter	Don't know
Gender	Female	44.38	19.81	29.52	2.29	4.00
	Male	60.79	11.05	24.35	1.04	2.76
Ethnicity	Baluch	81.63	8.16	8.16	0.00	2.04
	Hazara	36.60	31.37	28.76	0.00	3.27
	Pashtun	53.97	10.79	29.84	2.54	2.86
	Tajik	59.55	10.91	24.55	1.36	3.64
	Turkmen	63.41	7.32	21.95	4.88	2.44
	Uzbek	24.10	34.94	36.14	0.00	4.82
Location	Faizabad	60.19	16.50	14.56	3.88	4.85
	Gardez	68.00	7.00	16.00	5.00	4.00
	Herat	71.00	7.50	13.00	3.00	5.50
	Kabul	47.00	13.33	39.00	0.33	0.33
	Kandahar	27.00	10.00	61.00	0.00	2.00
	Panjao	41.58	34.65	17.82	0.00	5.94
	Saripul	25.00	36.00	35.00	0.00	4.00
	Zaranj	78.00	8.00	8.00	2.00	4.00
TOTAL		52.99	15.22	26.81	1.63	3.35

10. If your family has a problem with another family about land, is there a decision-maker within this community; who will solve this problem?

	%	Yes	No	Don't know
Gender	Female	72.57	23.24	4.19
	Male	76.34	20.90	2.76
Ethnicity	Baluch	69.39	30.61	0.00
	Hazara	45.75	47.06	7.19
	Pashtun	79.68	18.10	2.22
	Tajik	79.55	17.95	2.50
	Turkmen	82.93	12.20	4.88
	Uzbek	79.52	14.46	6.02
Location	Faizabad	58.25	38.83	2.91
	Gardez	87.00	13.00	0.00
	Herat	89.00	5.50	5.50
	Kabul	78.33	20.33	1.33
	Kandahar	76.00	20.00	4.00
	Panjao	36.63	56.44	6.93
	Saripul	79.00	14.00	7.00
	Zaranj	71.00	27.00	2.00
TOTAL		74.55	22.01	3.44

11. If there is no decision-maker or this decision-maker in this community cannot solve the problem, who does your family go to for help outside the community?

	%	Government Administration /Judiciary	Police	Non-state Assemblies	Other	Don't know
Gender	Female	67.62	20.00	2.67	8.00	1.71
	Male	73.92	17.96	5.01	3.11	0.00
Ethnicity	Baluch	95.92	0.00	4.08	0.00	0.00
	Hazara	81.70	13.73	0.00	3.27	1.31
	Pashtun	75.24	7.94	7.62	8.57	0.63
	Tajik	60.68	32.05	2.95	3.64	0.68
	Turkmen	41.46	53.66	4.88	0.00	0.00
	Uzbek	84.34	0.00	1.20	14.46	0.00
Location	Faizabad	82.52	2.91	4.85	9.71	0.00
	Gardez	78.00	0.00	18.00	4.00	0.00
	Herat	65.00	31.50	3.50	0.00	0.00
	Kabul	52.00	45.00	0.67	0.67	1.67
	Kandahar	60.00	8.00	6.00	26.00	0.00
	Panjao	91.09	0.00	0.99	4.95	2.97
	Saripul	85.00	0.00	1.00	13.00	1.00
	Zaranj	97.00	0.00	3.00	0.00	0.00
TOTAL		70.92	18.93	3.89	5.43	0.82

12. If there is an important meeting about a community problem in your village/town, do you think the decision-makers will listen to your opinion?

	%	Yes	No	Don't know
Gender	Female	67.62	22.48	9.90
	Male	71.85	22.80	5.35
Ethnicity	Baluch	89.80	6.12	4.08
	Hazara	57.52	32.03	10.46
	Pashtun	57.78	33.65	8.57
	Tajik	78.41	15.00	6.59
	Turkmen	85.37	9.76	4.88
	Uzbek	73.49	20.48	6.02
Location	Faizabad	66.02	27.18	6.80
	Gardez	34.00	61.00	5.00
	Herat	81.50	12.50	6.00
	Kabul	83.67	8.33	8.00
	Kandahar	53.00	32.00	15.00
	Panjao	51.49	41.58	6.93
	Saripul	69.00	25.00	6.00
	Zaranj	81.00	12.00	7.00
TOTAL		69.84	22.64	7.52

13. Do you think it is easier or more difficult to discuss community problems with your community leaders today than it was three years ago?

	%	Easier	More difficult	Same	Don't know
Gender	Female	81.52	2.67	10.29	5.52
	Male	84.80	2.07	10.71	2.42
Ethnicity	Baluch	89.80	2.04	6.12	2.04
	Hazara	83.01	3.27	8.50	5.23
	Pashtun	69.21	4.13	24.44	2.22
	Tajik	89.09	0.91	4.32	5.68
	Turkmen	95.12	0.00	2.44	2.44
	Uzbek	95.18	3.61	1.20	0.00
Location	Faizabad	90.29	2.91	2.91	3.88
	Gardez	50.00	9.00	39.00	2.00
	Herat	93.00	0.00	3.50	3.50
	Kabul	85.00	1.00	6.67	7.33
	Kandahar	72.00	3.00	22.00	3.00
	Panjao	84.16	3.96	8.91	2.97
	Saripul	97.00	3.00	0.00	0.00
	Zaranj	81.00	1.00	16.00	2.00
TOTAL		83.24	2.36	10.51	3.89

14. Do you think women should be involved in community decision-making outside their home in your community?

	%	Yes	No	Don't know
Gender	Female	69.71	17.33	12.95
	Male	73.92	16.75	9.33
Ethnicity	Baluch	57.14	34.69	8.16
	Hazara	81.70	13.07	5.23
	Pashtun	57.78	29.84	12.38
	Tajik	79.32	9.32	11.36
	Turkmen	73.17	7.32	19.51
	Uzbek	72.29	12.05	15.66
Location	Faizabad	80.58	4.85	14.56
	Gardez	50.00	44.00	6.00
	Herat	78.00	3.50	18.50
	Kabul	78.33	16.00	5.67
	Kandahar	62.00	26.00	12.00
	Saripul	78.00	8.00	14.00
	Panjao	79.21	13.86	6.93
	Zaranj	50.00	36.00	14.00
TOTAL		71.92	17.03	11.05

15. Why do you think women should be involved?

	%	Women's Right	Benefits Society	Other	Don't know
Gender	Female	81.15	2.46	12.02	4.37
	Male	89.72	1.40	6.78	2.10
Ethnicity	Baluch	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Hazara	86.40	1.60	6.40	5.60
	Pashtun	81.32	1.65	10.99	6.04
	Tajik	86.25	2.58	9.74	1.43
	Turkmen	80.00	3.33	16.67	0.00
	Uzbek	91.67	0.00	6.67	1.67
Location	Faizabad	79.52	4.82	14.46	1.20
	Gardez	64.00	0.00	28.00	8.00
	Herat	89.74	0.00	8.33	1.92
	Kabul	84.62	4.70	8.55	2.14
	Kandahar	98.41	0.00	1.59	0.00
	Panjao	82.50	0.00	10.00	7.50
	Saripul	93.59	0.00	3.85	2.56
	Zaranj	88.00	0.00	4.00	8.00
TOTAL		85.77	1.89	9.19	3.15

15. OR Why do you think women should not be involved?

	%	Different Capacities	Physical Constraints	Societal Constraints	Other	Don't know
Gender	Female	24.18	7.69	58.24	3.30	6.59
	Male	15.46	2.06	76.29	3.09	3.09
Ethnicity	Baluch	5.88	0.00	82.35	5.88	5.88
	Hazara	30.00	5.00	60.00	0.00	5.00
	Pashtun	9.57	6.38	73.40	5.32	5.32
	Tajik	43.90	0.00	51.22	0.00	4.88
	Turkmen	0.00	33.33	66.67	0.00	0.00
	Uzbek	20.00	0.00	80.00	0.00	0.00
Location	Faizabad	20.00	0.00	60.00	0.00	20.00
	Gardez	4.65	0.00	93.02	0.00	2.33
	Herat	14.29	14.29	57.14	0.00	14.29
	Kabul	45.83	0.00	52.08	0.00	2.08
	Kandahar	16.00	24.00	32.00	20.00	8.00
	Panjao	14.29	14.29	64.29	0.00	7.14
	Saripul	25.00	0.00	75.00	0.00	0.00
	Zaranj	8.33	0.00	86.11	2.78	2.78
TOTAL		19.68	4.84	67.74	3.23	4.30

16. Is there a new constitution being developed for Afghanistan?

	%	Yes	No
Gender	Female	60.95	39.05
	Male	78.07	21.93
Ethnicity	Baluch	53.06	46.94
	Hazara	66.67	33.33
	Pashtun	72.70	27.30
	Tajik	69.32	30.68
	Turkmen	65.85	34.15
	Uzbek	77.11	22.89
Location	Faizabad	57.28	42.72
	Gardez	68.00	32.00
	Herat	86.50	13.50
	Kabul	62.67	37.33
	Kandahar	88.00	12.00
	Panjao	65.35	34.65
	Saripul	81.00	19.00
	Zaranj	49.00	51.00
TOTAL		69.93	30.07

17. Is there a national election in Afghanistan next year when people will choose their government?

	%	Yes	No
Gender	Female	59.81	40.19
	Male	77.55	22.45
Ethnicity	Baluch	71.43	28.57
	Hazara	62.75	37.25
	Pashtun	68.89	31.11
	Tajik	69.09	30.91
	Turkmen	68.29	31.71
	Uzbek	79.52	20.48
Location	Faizabad	62.14	37.86
	Gardez	60.00	40.00
	Herat	82.00	18.00
	Kabul	62.00	38.00
	Kandahar	84.00	16.00
	Panjao	61.39	38.61
	Saripul	81.00	19.00
	Zaranj	62.00	38.00
TOTAL		69.11	30.89

18. Will you vote in the national election next year?				
	%	Yes	No	Don't know
Gender	Female	77.90	7.81	14.29
	Male	94.99	0.69	4.32
Ethnicity	Baluch	93.88	2.04	4.08
	Hazara	90.20	3.27	6.54
	Pashtun	81.90	8.57	9.52
	Tajik	88.86	1.59	9.55
	Turkmen	85.37	7.32	7.32
	Uzbek	85.54	0.00	14.46
Location	Faizabad	91.26	0.00	8.74
	Gardez	65.00	16.00	19.00
	Herat	89.50	3.00	7.50
	Kabul	87.33	3.67	9.00
	Kandahar	90.00	7.00	3.00
	Panjao	88.12	2.97	8.91
	Saripul	88.00	0.00	12.00
	Zaranj	92.00	2.00	6.00
TOTAL		86.87	4.08	9.06

19. Why will you vote in the election?						
	%	Peace	Economic Factors	Political Factors	Other	Don't know
Gender	Female	38.97	4.66	44.12	9.80	2.45
	Male	27.95	5.08	56.81	9.26	0.91
Ethnicity	Baluch	21.74	8.70	58.70	6.52	4.35
	Hazara	45.65	1.45	44.20	5.07	3.62
	Pashtun	20.93	6.59	59.69	10.08	2.71
	Turkmen	28.57	8.57	54.29	8.57	0.00
	Uzbek	38.03	2.82	47.89	11.27	0.00
Location	Faizabad	34.04	2.13	59.57	4.26	0.00
	Gardez	23.08	10.77	53.85	4.62	7.69
	Herat	12.29	7.26	65.36	15.00	0.56
	Kabul	54.20	4.96	34.73	6.06	0.00
	Kandahar	10.00	3.33	74.44	12.22	0.00
	Panjao	41.57	0.00	47.19	5.62	5.62
	Saripul	43.18	2.27	40.91	12.50	1.14
	Zaranj	19.57	7.61	53.26	16.30	3.26
TOTAL		32.64	4.90	51.41	9.49	1.56

20. In your opinion, will the general elections bring positive or negative changes to Afghanistan?					
	%	Positive	Negative	No change	Don't know
Gender	Female	67.62	0.57	1.33	30.48
	Male	78.58	0.00	1.04	20.38
Ethnicity	Baluch	81.63	0.00	0.00	18.37
	Hazara	86.93	0.00	0.65	12.42
	Pashtun	74.29	0.63	1.59	23.49
	Tajik	68.64	0.23	1.36	29.77
	Turkmen	48.78	0.00	0.00	51.22
	Uzbek	73.49	0.00	0.00	26.51
Location	Faizabad	56.31	0.00	0.00	43.69
	Garde	56.00	2.00	4.00	38.00
	Herat	48.50	0.50	3.50	47.50
	Kabul	88.33	0.00	0.00	11.67
	Kandahar	91.00	0.00	0.00	9.00
	Panjao	88.12	0.00	0.99	10.89
	Saripul	77.00	0.00	0.00	23.00
	Zaranj	77.00	0.00	1.00	22.00
TOTAL		73.37	0.27	1.18	25.18

21. Why will the elections bring positive changes?					
	%	Good Governance	Peace	Other	Don't know
Gender	Female	49.72	30.06	12.92	7.30
	Male	72.97	16.70	9.23	1.10
Ethnicity	Baluch	77.50	12.50	0.00	10.00
	Hazara	49.62	33.83	9.02	7.52
	Pashtun	69.79	15.32	12.77	2.13
	Tajik	62.91	24.17	9.93	2.98
	Turkmen	55.00	15.00	25.00	5.00
	Uzbek	55.74	27.87	14.75	1.64
Location	Faizabad	74.14	20.69	3.45	1.72
	Gardez	67.86	19.64	10.71	1.79
	Herat	63.54	20.83	14.58	1.04
	Kabul	59.62	27.92	8.68	3.77
	Kandahar	76.34	2.15	20.43	1.08
	Panjao	46.67	33.33	7.78	12.22
	Saripul	53.25	28.57	16.88	1.30
	Zaranj	72.37	15.79	5.26	6.58
TOTAL		62.76	22.56	10.85	3.82

22. Is it easier or more difficult for children in your community to go to school today than it was three years ago?					
	%	Easier	More Difficult	Same	Don't know
Gender	Female	92.00	0.95	6.29	0.76
	Male	95.68	0.69	2.94	0.69
Ethnicity	Baluch	89.80	0.00	8.16	2.04
	Hazara	98.69	0.00	0.65	0.65
	Pashtun	83.49	2.86	12.70	0.95
	Tajik	98.18	0.00	1.14	0.68
	Turkmen	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Uzbek	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Location	Faizabad	97.09	0.00	1.94	0.97
	Gardez	68.00	7.00	23.00	2.00
	Herat	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Kabul	98.33	0.00	0.67	1.00
	Kandahar	96.00	0.00	3.00	1.00
	Panjao	99.01	0.00	0.99	0.00
	Saripul	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Zaranj	78.00	2.00	19.00	1.00
TOTAL		93.93	0.82	4.53	0.72

23. Is it easier or more difficult for you to get health care today than it was three years ago?					
	%	Easier	More Difficult	Same	Don't know
Gender	Female	81.71	3.05	13.90	1.33
	Male	84.11	1.73	12.95	1.21
Ethnicity	Baluch	73.47	4.08	20.41	2.04
	Hazara	77.78	1.96	18.30	1.96
	Pashtun	72.06	5.40	21.27	1.27
	Tajik	89.77	0.68	8.64	0.91
	Turkmen	95.12	0.00	4.88	0.00
	Uzbek	93.98	1.20	2.41	2.41
Location	Faizabad	91.26	1.94	6.80	0.00
	Gardez	56.00	11.00	32.00	1.00
	Herat	95.00	0.00	5.00	0.00
	Kabul	86.67	0.00	11.33	2.00
	Kandahar	80.00	5.00	13.00	2.00
	Panjao	70.30	2.97	24.75	1.98
	Saripul	95.00	1.00	2.00	2.00
	Zaranj	70.00	4.00	25.00	1.00
TOTAL		82.97	2.36	13.41	1.27

24. In the next three years, do you think the government will help your community with, for example, services like education or health care or roads and bridges?

	%	Yes	No	Don't know
Gender	Female	77.90	3.81	18.29
	Male	82.90	2.76	14.34
Ethnicity	Baluch	81.63	2.04	16.33
	Hazara	74.51	4.58	20.92
	Pashtun	78.41	3.81	17.78
	Tajik	82.27	3.18	14.55
	Turkmen	82.93	0.00	17.07
	Uzbek	89.16	2.41	8.43
Location	Faizabad	61.17	6.80	32.04
	Gardez	85.00	4.00	11.00
	Herat	84.50	2.00	13.50
	Kabul	89.00	2.67	8.33
	Kandahar	82.00	2.00	16.00
	Panjao	67.33	4.95	27.72
	Saripul	88.00	2.00	10.00
	Zaranj	67.00	4.00	29.00
TOTAL		80.53	3.26	16.21

25. Why do you think the government will not help your community?

	%	Security	Economic Factors	Political Factors	Other	Don't know
Gender	Female	0.00	0.00	75.00	15.00	10.00
	Male	18.75	12.50	50.00	12.50	6.25
Ethnicity	Baluch	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00
	Hazara	0.00	0.00	85.71	0.00	14.29
	Pashtun	0.00	0.00	66.67	33.33	0.00
	Tajik	7.14	14.29	64.29	7.14	7.14
	Uzbek	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Location	Faizabad	14.29	14.29	71.43	0.00	0.00
	Gardez	0.00	0.00	50.00	50.00	0.00
	Herat	0.00	0.00	75.00	20.00	0.00
	Kabul	0.00	12.50	75.00	0.00	12.50
	Kandahar	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00
	Panjao	0.00	0.00	75.00	0.00	20.00
	Saripul	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Zaranj	0.00	0.00	80.00	0.00	25.00
TOTAL		8.33	5.56	63.89	13.16	8.33

26. Have foreign governments promised money to help rebuild Afghanistan?

	%	Yes	No	Don't know
Gender	Female	77.71	2.86	19.43
	Male	90.85	2.07	7.08
Ethnicity	Baluch	73.47	6.12	20.41
	Hazara	71.90	4.58	23.53
	Pashtun	83.81	2.22	13.97
	Tajik	89.55	2.27	8.18
	Turkmen	82.93	0.00	17.07
	Uzbek	90.36	0.00	9.64
Location	Faizabad	84.47	4.85	10.68
	Gardez	78.00	1.00	21.00
	Herat	92.50	0.00	7.50
	Kabul	88.67	1.33	10.00
	Kandahar	95.00	0.00	5.00
	Panjao	66.34	6.93	26.73
	Saripul	86.00	0.00	14.00
	Zaranj	70.00	10.00	20.00
TOTAL		84.60	2.45	12.95

27. Do you think Afghanistan will get all the money that it was promised by foreign governments?

	%	Yes	No	Don't know
Gender	Female	52.76	6.10	41.14
	Male	54.40	5.35	40.24
Ethnicity	Baluch	51.02	4.08	44.90
	Hazara	50.33	5.23	44.44
	Pashtun	50.16	8.25	41.59
	Tajik	56.14	4.77	39.09
	Turkmen	53.66	0.00	46.34
	Uzbek	65.06	2.41	32.53
Location	Faizabad	34.95	10.68	54.37
	Gardez	50.00	10.00	40.00
	Herat	42.00	8.50	49.50
	Kabul	75.33	1.00	23.67
	Kandahar	46.00	5.00	49.00
	Panjao	37.62	6.93	55.45
	Saripul	64.00	2.00	34.00
	Zaranj	48.00	8.00	44.00
TOTAL		53.62	5.71	40.67

28. Do you think that the money from foreign governments should be given directly to the Afghan central government or to NGOs and the United Nations?

	%	Government	NGOs/UN	Both	Doesn't matter	None	Don't know
Gender	Female	30.67	45.71	11.24	1.14	0.95	10.29
	Male	44.56	34.20	12.26	0.69	1.73	6.56
Ethnicity	Baluch	53.06	28.57	12.24	2.04	0.00	4.08
	Hazara	37.25	47.06	9.80	0.65	0.65	4.58
	Pashtun	28.57	42.22	13.65	2.22	2.86	10.48
	Tajik	43.64	35.91	10.91	0.23	0.68	8.64
	Turkmen	31.71	39.02	7.32	0.00	0.00	21.95
	Uzbek	36.14	45.78	12.05	0.00	2.41	3.61
Location	Faizabad	46.60	35.92	7.77	0.00	0.00	9.71
	Gardez	24.00	47.00	10.00	2.00	2.00	15.00
	Herat	34.50	35.00	10.00	0.50	1.50	18.50
	Kabul	48.33	35.67	13.33	0.00	0.33	2.33
	Kandahar	22.00	41.00	18.00	2.00	7.00	10.00
	Panjao	39.60	45.54	8.91	0.99	0.99	3.96
	Saripul	31.00	50.00	15.00	0.00	1.00	3.00
	Zaranj	40.00	40.00	10.00	4.00	0.00	6.00
TOTAL		37.95	39.67	11.78	0.91	1.36	8.33

29. Why?

	%	Government: Responsible/ Efficient/ Effective	Government: Corrupt/ Inefficient	NGO/UN: Effective/ Efficient	NGO/UN: Corrupt/ Inefficient	Other	Don't know
Gender	Female	30.74	4.42	45.26	0.42	16.21	2.95
	Male	39.30	5.35	29.89	2.03	15.87	7.56
Ethnicity	Baluch	31.91	12.77	34.04	2.13	19.15	0.00
	Hazara	38.78	1.36	44.22	2.72	10.88	2.04
	Pashtun	22.38	5.59	35.31	1.05	20.98	14.69
	Tajik	42.68	4.47	36.48	0.99	13.40	1.99
	Turkmen	37.50	3.13	46.88	0.00	12.50	0.00
	Uzbek	37.97	8.86	32.91	0.00	18.99	1.27
Location	Faizabad	41.94	11.83	30.11	4.30	10.75	1.08
	Gardez	10.59	0.00	37.65	0.00	11.76	40.00
	Herat	35.37	4.27	39.63	0.00	15.85	4.88
	Kabul	46.62	0.00	36.15	0.00	15.54	1.69
	Kandahar	20.88	4.40	37.36	3.30	32.97	1.10
	Panjao	40.21	1.03	41.24	5.15	10.31	2.06
	Saripul	31.25	8.33	40.63	0.00	17.71	2.08
	Zaranj	28.42	20.00	33.68	1.05	14.74	2.11
TOTAL		35.30	4.92	37.07	1.28	16.03	5.41

30. If you were the president of Afghanistan, what would you do first to help your country?

	%	Security Rights	Economic and Social Rights	Political Rights	Other	Don't know
Gender	Female	34.86	47.62	4.95	6.29	6.29
	Male	50.78	32.30	9.33	5.53	2.07
Ethnicity	Baluch	44.90	44.90	4.08	2.04	4.08
	Hazara	47.71	35.95	3.27	3.27	9.80
	Pashtun	40.32	38.73	9.84	8.89	2.22
	Tajik	41.59	42.27	6.59	5.68	3.86
	Turkmen	58.54	29.27	0.00	9.76	2.44
	Uzbek	51.81	39.76	6.02	0.00	2.41
Location	Faizabad	37.86	38.83	6.80	7.77	8.74
	Gardez	49.00	45.00	1.00	3.00	2.00
	Herat	52.50	30.50	7.50	9.00	0.50
	Kabul	36.33	49.67	8.00	2.67	3.33
	Kandahar	29.00	32.00	19.00	18.00	2.00
	Panjao	51.58	29.70	1.98	3.96	11.88
	Saripul	51.00	38.00	6.00	0.00	5.00
	Zaranj	42.00	42.00	6.00	6.00	4.00
TOTAL		43.21	39.58	7.25	5.89	4.08

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