The Vidal-Anderson Report urged speed in reaching a land cession agreement with the Indians of Lake Huron and Lake Superior. The Mica Bay Incident intensified that urgency. And the provincial government determined to settle the northwestern land question quickly. The man chosen to do the job was William Benjamin Robinson. His appointment and his task were recommended by the Executive Council on January 8, 1850, and approved by Lord Elgin, in council, on January 11th. It was a happy appointment, for Robinson was a competent individual who had served as a government commissioner of public works from 1846 to 1848.¹ He also had experience in the Indian trade, with the attendant knowledge of Indian language and custom that that endeavour provided. He was also closely connected to the Tory party. His brother, John Beverly Robinson, had been a pillar of the Family Company and was currently serving as Chief Justice; and his brother-in-law was Samuel P Jarvis, a recent Chief Superintendent of Indian Affairs. This association, however, created anger among the Reformers who charged patronage at the appointment. Robinson's position was delicate, therefore, for he was expected to save the government from further embarrassment in the northwest; and he had to do so under close scrutiny from the Reformers. He was also the first person, outside the Indian Department, appointed to take a major Indian land surrender.

His instructions, issued by order-in-council on April 16, 1850, provided him with some problems too. He was to buy as much land as possible, but not settle for less than "the north shore of Lake Huron and the mining sites along the eastern shore of Lake Superior". To accomplish this he was given a budget of about £7500 which was expected to cover the cost of the negotiations as well as any annuity payments that would grow out of them.² He was also admonished against using gifts in order to promote the negotiations. Since gifts had been a standard practice for over a century, this condition was awkward, for it could easily - as it had before - cause a breach of wilderness protocol and thus retard negotiations.

Armed with the approval of the Governor, his own experience, the Vial-Anderson report and his instructions from the Executive Council, Robinson made an initial trip into the Indian country in April and May of 1850. This journey which took him as far as Michipicoten was simply an exploratory exercise to meet some of the bands, to acquaint himself with the country, and to announce his intention of returning for formal negotiations during the summer.

The actual negotiations began at Sault Ste. Marie in August. Before the formal council was held, Robinson visited the bands of the area, and greeted the chiefs from Lake Superior as they arrived for the council. He was assisted in his task by friendly fur traders, and also by the visit of the Governor General on August 31st.³ Lord Elgin had also pardoned Chiefs Shinguakouse and Nibina-goo-ging and the two Métis leaders for their parts in the Mica Bay affair. Apparently these efforts had dissipated some of the bitterness of the previous fall for Robinson noted that "all seem well disposed to treat on fair terms." ⁴

By the time that formal and final negotiations began on September 5th, Robinson had in fact determined to seek all the lands on both Lake Huron and Lake Superior but agreement did not come easily. When he made his offer of £4000 in cash and a perpetual annuity of £1000⁵ for the entire region, the principal chiefs (i.e. Peau de Chat and Shinguakouse) proved reticent, and requested time to consider the terms. In formal sessions on the 6th, Robinson stressed that the bands would continue to enjoy their hunting and fishing rights, and since extensive settlement was unlikely in the barren regions of the Canadian Shield, those pursuits would not be hampered as they had been in the eastern regions of Upper Canada.⁶

These arguments satisfied Chief Peau de Chat, and the Lake Superior bands followed his lead and signed the treaty on September 7th. Shinguakouse remained unconvinced, however, and the other Lake Huron bands followed him in refusing to sign. It would appear that Shingaukouse felt more money could be gained, for he had demanded an annuity of $10 per head⁷, which would have translated into a total $20,000. He also attempted to secure reserve land for the half breeds at the rate of 100 acres per head. Robinson stood firm. He would do nothing for the half breeds, because his instructions ordered him to treat with Indians, not whites. He did suggest that they could be given land on the Indian reserves if the band agreed.⁸ He was equally firm with respect to the money, and stated candidly that without a treaty he would simply take the money back to Toronto. Perhaps it was this threat that convinced Shingaukouse. More likely, he was convinced by other chiefs over the weekend of September 8th for, as has already been observed, some (including his son Augustin), did not share his strong feelings. In any event on Monday, September 9th Shinguakouse and the other Lake Huron chiefs present signed the agreement that Robinson had prepared for the surrender of the Lake Huron shore.⁹

Through these two agreements signed in September of 1850 at Sault Ste. Marie, W.B. Robinson secured virtually the whole of the Upper Canadian northwest for government use. Generally referred to as the Robinson-Huron Treaty, the agreement of September 9th called for the cession of the Lake Huron shoreline, including the islands, from Matchedash Bay to Batchewans Bay, and inland as far as the height of land. The agreement of September 7th, known as the Robinson-Superior Treaty, gave the Crown the shoreline of Lake Superior, including islands, from Batchewana Bay to the Pigeon River, inland as far as the height of land. The first contained 35,700¹⁰ square miles of land, sold by a total Indian population of 1240¹¹; the latter was occupied by 1422¹² people and contained 16,700¹³ square miles of territory.

The terms and conditions of the Robinson Treaties were based on previous land cession agreements, but they also contained several innovations. Both treaties provided a schedule of reserves. Three were specified on Lake Superior under the Robinson-Superior Treaty and twenty-one under the Robinson-Huron agreement. In most cases, the individual band chiefs were allowed to choose their own sites which were usually locations of longstanding usage such as a summer encampment where limited agriculture was practised. This practice of having chiefs select specific reserve areas had been used in earlier agreements, such as the Credit River Treaty of 1806 or the Long Woods surrender in 1822; but the practice was formalized and extended in the Robinson agreements. It would be formalized further in the 1862 Manitoulin Treaty when an allotment formula of 100 acres per family of five was adopted.

The Robinson Treaties contained significant clauses regarding three other features of Indian-white relations: the questions of mineral rights, the rights of half-breeds, and hunting and fishing rights. Both treaties contained a clause stating that the reserves could not be sold or leased without the consent of the Chief Superintendent of Indian Affairs. It was not new in that such a clause was simply an acceptance of a principle that dated back to the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and had been tacitly followed since then, but it was new in that the principle was actually written into the treaty.

It seems likely that the original purpose of government in seeking these land sales, i.e. the promotion of mining activity - inspired its inclusion at this time. By signing these treaties the Indians agreed to refrain from interfering with mining activities in the ceded area. But if valuable deposits were found on any of the Indian reserves, and if the band chose to sell it off, the sale would be conducted by the Chief Superintendent of Indian Affairs "for their sole use and benefit and to the best advantage."¹⁴

Another consideration which grew from this stipulation in these agreements was the issue of half-breed rights, which was raised by the Indians both with the Vidal-Anderson commission and with Robinson. If the bands were forbidden from selling or leasing their land, could they give it to half breeds by permitting persons of mixed blood to join the band and/or to share in the annuity money? Robinson suggested that this could be done. The matter was resolved by requiring that half-breeds declare themselves as either Indian or non Indian. It could be argued that by requiring this choice, the government effectively prevented the development of Métis communities in Ontario similar to those that grew in Western Canada.

Hunting and fishing rights for Indians in the ceded area had been implied in the very early land cessions (e.g. the Crawford Purchases in 1783-84) and had formed part of the negotiations a generation later in such agreements as the Rice Lake agreement in 1819. The Robinson Treaties were the first to include these provisions directly. That is the Indians were to have "the full and free privilege to hunt over the territory now ceded by them and to fish in the waters thereof as they have heretofore been in the habit of doing" ¹⁵ except in areas that would become private property.

The actual remuneration for the lands, although it included the use of annuities which by 1850 had been in place for over three decades, was unique in several ways. Each group of Indians received an initial sum of £2000. An annuity of £500 was to follow each year. And for the first time, these sums were to be paid in cash¹⁶. As in some previous arrangements, the annuities would decrease with a decline in population. In this case the crucial figure was two-thirds of the population at which point the annuity would be reduced proportionately. But if the sale of lands surrendered produced a greater than expected return, the annuities might be increased at the Crown's pleasure.¹⁷

A post script should be added regarding the boundaries of the Robinson-Huron Treaty. Robinson himself, and the Indians of the north shore of Lake Huron were satisfied that the lands described in the treaty had been duly sold. The Lake Simcoe bands, however, were not. On his return from Sault Ste. Marie, Robinson stopped at Manitoulin Island. There, on September 16, 1850, he was met by the three Chiefs, Yellowhead, Aisence and Snake, who registered their claims to the land near the Severn River. The recently concluded treaty included that territory, and at this meeting Robinson responded to the Chippewa's claim by promising to make inquiries "at the land and Indian offices in Toronto".¹⁸ After the success of his mission the commissioner likely considered this claim to be a minor irritant which could be easily resolved by providing the chiefs with expense money. But it was not. The claim would be repeatedly raised over the decades until the investigations and negotiations surrounding the Williams Treaty of 1923 established the rights of the Lake Simcoe Chippewa bands to the lands laying north and east of their village. In order to clarify this situation, the shoreline between Matchedash Bay and the French River, inland to the height of land, was included in the 1923 arrangements.¹⁹