Think Again Before Attempting a Cloud-breaking Procedure
 On October 10, 1999, a Cessna 172M departed Bancroft, Ont., at 0915
on a local visual flight rules (VFR) sightseeing flight. Approximately 15 min
after takeoff, the pilot encountered deteriorating weather and elected to return to
Bancroft. The pilot, who had a valid instrument rating, climbed into cloud instead of
attempting to maintain VFR in weather that he assessed to be unsuitable for continued
VFR flight. With the aircraft automatic direction finder (ADF) tuned to the local
broadcast radio station, the pilot flew in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC)
at 2600 ft ASL in the vicinity of the Bancroft aerodrome, waiting for the weather
to improve. After approximately one hour in solid IMC, the pilot climbed to about 3000
to 4000 ft ASL and contacted Toronto Radio for the latest weather. His fuel supply
was running low and, with no observable improvement in the weather, he decided to
attempt a landing at Bancroft aerodrome.
The pilot descended to 300 to 400 ft AGL before regaining visual reference
to the ground in an area where the visibility was one-quarter mile in fog. He then
turned the aircraft to a southerly heading in an attempt to set up for a visual
approach to Runway 12 at Bancroft. He turned to what he estimated to be the final
approach course but encountered rising terrain. The aircraft struck trees and crashed
on a wooded hillside approximately one mile west of the aerodrome at 1106. The pilot
and two passengers evacuated the aircraft with minor injuries, and the aircraft was
consumed by a post-crash fire. This synopsis is based on the Transportation Safety
Board of Canada (TSB) Final Report A99O0242.
Prior to leaving home on the day of the occurrence, the pilot checked the weather
on the Internet. He then observed the weather during his drive to the aerodrome and
on arrival, he called the Kingston Flight Service Station (FSS) for the forecasts for
Muskoka, 60 NM west, Peterborough, 55 NM south, and the surrounding areas.
The only weather information available for the Bancroft aerodrome was the area forecast
(FA) and the report from the automated weather observation system (AWOS). No terminal
aerodrome forecast (TAF) or aviation routine weather report (METAR) was available for
the Bancroft aerodrome. The forecasts for Muskoka and Peterborough called for low
visibility in fog throughout most of the morning. The report from the AWOS at Bancroft
aerodrome, which the pilot did not check, was showing light winds and 100% relative
humidity throughout the morning.
Based on the weather that the pilot observed at the aerodrome and during the drive
to work, he elected to conduct the first scheduled sightseeing flight. He took off at
0815 and flew an uneventful half-hour flight during which he observed the weather to
be quite acceptable for VFR flight. He estimated the ceiling to be at 1500 ft AGL
and well defined, with an in-flight visibility of eight to ten miles. After landing at
approximately 0845, he telephoned the Kingston FSS to give a pilot report (PIREP) based
on having observed weather that was significantly better than forecast.
The pilot did not add fuel before the next flight since he estimated the aircraft
fuel to be 15 to 16 gal., or 1 hr. and 45 min of fuel on board, which
would have been adequate for the scheduled one-hour flight. After filing a VFR flight
plan and briefing his passengers, he departed at 0915. When he encountered deteriorating
weather, he elected to climb into IMC during the return to Bancroft, although he did
not carry instrument flight rules (IFR) publications. His only navigation aid was the
ADF. The Bancroft aerodrome is not equipped with any instrument approach aid, so the
pilot used the local broadcast radio station as a navigation aid and set up a holding
pattern at 2600 ft ASL in the vicinity of the aerodrome.
After holding in solid IMC in controlled airspace for approximately one hour, the
pilot climbed to between 3000 and 4000 ft ASL and was able to communicate with
Toronto Radio. He was still in IMC and the quality of the radio reception was poor,
but he was successful in determining the weather in Muskoka and in Peterborough.
With his fuel supply now running low, the pilot decided that he had no option but
to try to land at Bancroft. He descended to 2600 ft ASL and, using the local
broadcast radio station for navigation, fixed the aircraft position over the aerodrome
and began a gradual descent to the north over known flat terrain. The pilot descended
until he gained visual reference with the ground at 300 to 400 ft AGL. He
estimated the visibility at this altitude to be one-quarter mile. He recognized the
terrain and was relatively sure of his position, so he turned to the south and
attempted to set up for a close-in left base for Runway 12. Using very limited
visual cues and the ADF, the pilot turned for Runway 12 when he believed he was
lined up with the runway, although he could not see the airfield. His position was
actually further south and west of the airfield than he had expected. The aircraft
struck trees and crashed on a hillside approximately one mile west of the aerodrome.
The pilot had 6.2 hr. of experience in actual IMC, 65 hr. of simulated
IMC, and 24 hr. in simulators. The pilot had only filed an IFR flight plan on one
occasion.
Analysis — Although the forecasts for Muskoka and Peterborough called
for low visibility in fog, the pilot was influenced by the relatively good weather that
he observed both at the airfield and during his drive to work. The decision to fly the
occurrence flight was based on the weather he observed during the first flight. He did
not use all of the weather information available to him since he did not check the AWOS
readout. Fog could quickly form in the Bancroft area because of the light winds and
100% relative humidity.
When the pilot decided to climb, though this action would place him in solid IMC
conditions, he expected to fly quickly through a very localized patch of weather and
then regain visual meteorological conditions (VMC). At no time did the pilot attempt
to change to an IFR flight plan. Based on available weather reports for the area and
the clouds observed by the pilot while holding, VMC conditions were present at a higher
altitude (6000 to 8000 ft ASL). The pilot never attempted to climb on top of the
cloud layer to regain VMC. An early decision to climb to on-top conditions would likely
have decreased the pilot's workload and simplified his decision making considerably. It
would have also allowed for clearer, more expedient communications with Toronto Radio,
which may have allowed the pilot to obtain detailed weather information regarding the
fog and low ceilings throughout the entire area as well as the assistance required to
obtain an IFR clearance.
By the time the pilot eventually climbed and contacted Toronto Radio, he was
already becoming concerned about his fuel supply. When he realized that the weather
in the surrounding area was poor, he decided that he had to make a landing attempt at
Bancroft aerodrome by conducting an IMC cloud-breaking procedure. When he broke out
of the clouds, the low ceiling and limited visibility prevented him from conducting a
successful visual approach.
While the pilot held a valid instrument rating, he had very little experience in
an IFR environment and was not prepared for in-flight weather conditions that would
force him to fly in IMC and change from a VFR flight plan to an IFR flight plan. The
pilot's lack of familiarity in an IFR environment, coupled with his expectation that
the low cloud at Bancroft would dissipate as quickly as it had formed, heavily
influenced his decision to hold in the vicinity of Bancroft.
The TSB determined that the pilot crashed as a result of his attempt to do a
cloud-breaking procedure using a local broadcast radio station for navigation and to
descend below safe altitude in IMC conditions to set up for a visual approach.
Contributing to the occurrence were the fact that the pilot did not use all the
available weather information, his lack of preparation for a rapidly deteriorating
weather situation, and his inappropriate decision making.
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