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EVALUATION OF THE OUTAOUAIS ROAD AGREEMENT CONTRIBUTION PROGRAM - July 8, 2005
NOTE TO READERApril 2006 The reader should note that the following circumstances have changed since the completion of the evaluation report.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARYBackground
Main FindingsRelevance
Success and Impacts
Process Issues
Cost-Effectiveness
Recommendation
1.0 BACKGROUND1.1 IntroductionThis report provides a summary of the results of an evaluation of Transport Canada’s (TC) Outaouais Road Agreement (ORA) Contribution Program. The Departmental Evaluation Services Branch (Evaluation) undertook the evaluation at the request of Surface Programs and Divestiture – Highways in order to meet the requirements of the Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS) Policy on Transfer Payments. The Policy, in effect since June 2000, requires that a program evaluation be performed before renewal of any contribution program. The focus of this evaluation is the ORA program since 1996 when TC took over management of the program from the NCC. Note that while stakeholders tend to talk about the “agreement” rather than the “program”, the ORA program is a contribution program of the federal government. It is not simply a mechanism through which funds are dispersed; neither is it a sub-element of any other program. Thus, it has been evaluated as a stand-alone program. As far as could be determined, no evaluation was done during the time the agreement was managed by the NCC. No previous evaluation has been undertaken since the agreement was transferred to TC in 1996. 1.2 ProfileBackgroundThe Outaouais Road Agreement is a 50/50 cost-sharing agreement for the improvement of the regional road system in the Quebec portion of the National Capital Region (NCR), known as the Outaouais. The agreement was signed by the National Capital Commission (NCC), on behalf of the federal government, and the Quebec Government on January 7, 1972. It includes a list of road projects that the federal government will contribute to under the agreement, as described in Table 1. The cost-sharing agreement was intended to narrow the gap between the federal government contribution to road projects in the Ontario part of the NCR and those in the Quebec part, which at the time were estimated at $100M and $8.5M respectively. At the time of signing, it was stated that “it would be desirable that all the construction of the road system be undertaken in a six year period”. However, the ORA does not include any limitations on the time-frame or cost to complete the projects specified in the agreement. In 1996, the management of the agreement was transferred to TC, which then became the federal representative responsible for management of the program. The rationale for the transfer was TC’s prior involvement in federal-provincial agreements related to transportation. ObjectiveThe objective of the agreement is the construction of a road network to serve the Outaouais in order to reduce the inequality between the road networks in the Ontario and Quebec parts of the NCR. The agreement will be concluded on completion of the construction of the road projects specified in the agreement. It is apparent that the original intent of equalising the federal investment in roads in the Ontario and Quebec portions of the NCR has been subsumed under the assumption that equality will be achieved with the completion of the specified road projects. Description of ProjectsThe major roads to be completed under the ORA are shown in Table 1. They include three in the provincial highway system, eight in the urban arterial system, i.e. major roads that are under municipal jurisdiction, and two that are other types of roads.
*The project descriptions are quoted from descriptions provided by the program manager. References to Hull, Aylmer and Gatineau refer to those municipalities as they were prior to their amalgamation into the current City of Gatineau, ** A-50 became part of the National Highway System in 2004. Since the transfer to TC, the following ORA projects have been completed: 5 kms of Autoroute 50, 3.4 kms of La Vérendrye Boulevard, and 0.5 km of McConnell-Laramée Boulevard (part of St-Laurent/Laramée/McConnell). The main projects receiving ORA program funding over the 2003-04 to 2007-08 period include: La Vérendrye Boulevard, McConnell-Laramée Boulevard, Chemin Pink, sections of Autoroute 5, and Route 148. See Annex 1 for a list of all ORA projects by road segment, completion status of the segments as of 2003-04, total ORA contribution, whether the project was undertaken under NCC or TC management, and the amounts contributed by each. Roles and ResponsibilitiesAlthough the NCC is the legal signatory to the ORA, since 1996 TC has been responsible for program management, delivery, monitoring, reporting and 50% of capital costs. TC’s role is primarily management of the projects included in the agreement. Ministère des Transports du Québec (MTQ) is responsible for planning, design, obtaining all necessary approvals, and the other 50% of capital costs. In the agreement, the federal government is committed to transferring federal property required for the road projects to the province of Quebec for the sum of $1. Maintenance and periodic rehabilitation is the responsibility of the road authority, whether provincial or municipal. ResourcesWhen the agreement was signed in 1972, the estimated cost for all ORA projects was $130M, with 50% payable by Canada. Table 2 contains a summary of ORA program contributions up to 2003-04, a firm estimate of the contribution for the 2004-05 to 2008-09 period, and an order of magnitude estimate of the costs to complete the remaining projects. In the period from 1972 to 1995-96, when the agreement was managed by the NCC, the federal ORA contribution was $178M. Since the transfer of the agreement to TC in 1996, an additional $29M has been contributed: $3M by the NCC; and $26M by TC. In the five-year period 2004-05 to 2008-09, TC’s commitment for the 50% federal contribution is expected to be $45M. The MTQ estimates that for the period beginning in 2009-10, the remainder of the ORA projects will require an additional $570M, of which TC will be required to pay $285M. When all ORA projects are completed, the total federal contribution will be $537M. (Note that projected dollar amounts are in 2004 dollars). 1972-73 to completion of all projects
The management of the program was transferred to TC from the NCC without any associated resources, but with the understanding that TB would consider requests for funding assistance if TC were unable to “cash manage” it. TC agreed to manage the agreement, but did not accept the total outstanding financial obligation associated with the ORA program. Beginning with the Annual Reference Level Update (ARLU) of 1998-99, TC has had an annual allocation of $2.57M for the ORA program; the balance has come from TC funds. From 1996-97 to 2003-04, TC contributed $14M to the ORA program in addition to the $15M allocated. All funding was used solely for contribution payments towards highway infrastructure projects under the ORA. There is no budget for management and administration, which currently consumes 0.8 of an FTE in TC’s Surface Programs, part of the Programs and Divestiture Group. ReachThe ORA is an agreement aimed specifically at improvement of the infrastructure in the Quebec portion of the NCR. Specific beneficiaries include the MTQ, residents of the Outaouais, and others using the road system that has been improved through ORA investments. There may also be others who benefit indirectly, for example, from the economic and social development that the ORA program supports. Part of the road system included in the ORA is specifically noted in the NCC plans for the NCR, for example, as offering improved visitor access to Gatineau Park. The ORA Contribution Program can therefore be considered to benefit all Canadians who visit that part of the NCR. 1.3 Logic ModelTable 3 shows the logic model developed in 2004-05 as part of the preparation for this evaluation. It is an attempt to link ORA program outcomes to TC’s mandate, as well as the NCC’s. Note that the evaluation has concluded that this logic model is not appropriate because the link between the ORA program and TC outcomes is weak. The logic model will need to be updated for inclusion in the Results Based Management and Accountability Framework (RMAF) for the ORA Contribution Program, required for program renewal in summer 2005. Logic Model
1.4 Study RationaleThe evaluation study was conducted because it is required for program renewal under the TBS Policy on Transfer Payments and as input to departmental decision-making. 1.5 Evaluation Issues
Note: This list differs from the original list of questions, which can be found in Annex 2. In the course of the evaluation some questions have been added. Note that one question, “Is the current funding approach the most cost-effective method of achieving the ORA’s objectives? ”, has been deleted, because issues around where the ORA’s objectives fit in the federal government need to be addressed before this can be assessed. 1.6 Data Sources and MethodologyThe evaluation strategy and the methods for collecting the data needed to address the evaluation questions were developed in consultation with program management. The evaluation was carried out using a combination of document review, file review, interviews and a case study. Methodology
The following is a summary of the main data sources:
A list of the complete titles, authors and dates of the main reference documents is included in Annex 2. The file review began with a detailed review of the agreement itself and related legal interpretations. TC management provided other documents, including financial files with cost estimates for past and future projects, and anticipated time-frames.
The relevance of the ORA program, the process for identification of priorities, cost-effectiveness, anticipated results, achievement of results, and other impacts, were the subject of interviews with key stakeholders. Relatively unstructured interviews were carried out with the TC manager, the manager directly responsible for the ORA program, representatives of the MTQ, and of the NCC. Respondents were selected based on the need to get an in-depth understanding of how the ORA program is managed, a historical perspective on the origins of the ORA, the rationale, why the program came to be managed by TC, resources, projects completed to date and the impact. Prior to the interview, respondents were provided with information on the overall framework for the evaluation and the questions that would be addressed (see Annex 3). During the interview, they were advised of the three main types of evaluation questions, and then the individual questions were asked, with the interviewer prompting for specific types of indicators and soliciting comments. A list of those interviewed is included in Annex 4.
Due to a lack of data, as well as time and resource limitations, an in-depth review of the costs and benefits of all the projects was not possible. Instead, a case study was undertaken in order to get an in-depth perspective on the processes in place related to the assessment of costs and benefits for a major ORA project. The case study focussed on a project that is partially completed, the McConnell-Laramée Boulevard. This project was chosen because of the completeness of the documentation that was available, including a Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (CEAA) Screening Report and a “value analysis” of the project, and because the project was the subject of a detailed and well-documented public consultation process over a number of years. There is no assumption that this is a representative case or process, but it does provide a good indication of the kinds of processes that were used in project planning and implementation. It also provides some insights into the process whereby the MTQ made changes to the project in response to input from the public. The CEAA report refers to details in plans and documents that provide justification for the project. The evaluation did not review these source plans and documents, but assumed the accuracy of the CEAA report with respect to the contents of those documents. The case study documents identify expected impacts but do not contain evidence of actual impacts, which will have to be gathered in a follow-up study some years after project completion. The CEAA report does include requirements for tracking certain impacts, such as noise levels. Limitations The evaluation was limited by the nature of the agreement, which includes virtually no requirement for the recipient to provide follow-up information on the results of ORA projects. Thus, the information available for evaluating ORA program impacts is relatively limited for past projects. For projects in the planning stage, TC is trying to put in place a framework similar to that of the Strategic Highway Infrastructure Program (SHIP), and the MTQ has agreed in principle with this plan, although details have yet to be agreed upon. That framework includes a requirement that the recipient submit a pre-project assessment of the anticipated benefits and costs of the project, and a follow-up report on the benefits and costs achieved. If the MTQ commits to this kind of reporting, the reports will provide information for future evaluations of the ORA program. While limitations are imposed by the fact that the agreement is legally binding and does not terminate until all projects have been completed, it is reasonable to question TC’s role as ORA program manager, and that question is addressed in this study. 2.0 RELEVANCE1) Does the ORA program align with government priorities?
The objective of the ORA program is to improve the road system in the Outaouais in order to reduce the inequality between the road networks in the Ontario and Quebec portions of the NCR. It appears to fit well with the priorities and mandate of the federal government, in that it focuses on investment in infrastructure. The Speech from the Throne of October 5, 2004 stated that the federal government “will be working with the other orders of government on infrastructure and regional development”. However, the ORA Contribution Program is not consistent with current federal government infrastructure investment priorities, which focus on large-scale strategic projects to improve the National Highway System or highways that connect to it, such as those projects eligible for funding under Canada Strategic Infrastructure Fund (CSIF). The ORA program is regionally focussed on the Outaouais, part of the NCR, and is aimed at working with the Quebec government on infrastructure development, specifically investment in roads. Other orders of government are included as well, for example, the ORA projects include some municipal roads (roads in the urban arterial system). The ORA program fits closely with the objectives of the NCC: to build a great capital for Canadians, specifically "...to prepare plans for and assist in the development, conservation and improvement of the National Capital Region in order that the nature and character of the seat of the Government of Canada may be in accordance with its national significance....". [From the NCC mandate as defined in the National Capital Act (1958)] 2) Does the ORA program advance the strategic outcomes of TC?
The ORA projects completed to date would not normally fall under TC’s mandate, which is focussed on national transportation objectives in relation to the National Highway System (NHS). None of the projects were part of the NHS when TC assumed management of the ORA program. At the time when Autoroute 50 work was undertaken, it was not yet part of the NHS; now that it is, the remaining part of Autoroute 50 in the ORA is aligned with TC’s mandate of improving the NHS. (Note, however, that the MTQ does not plan to build that section, commonly referred to as the “Hull Bypass”, until 2030.) Given the change in status of Autoroute 50, five of the seven remaining ORA projects may be eligible for funding under TC’s SHIP program, but only under exceptional circumstances. In order to eligible for SHIP, projects must be on the NHS or “at the Minister’s discretion, projects could be the construction or improvements made to links between segments of the NHS”. TC’s current role as manager of the ORA program is questionable. Management of the ORA program was transferred to TC mainly because it had the capacity to manage highway projects, and the NCC did not. However, ORA program objectives remain far more closely aligned with the NCC’s mandate than with TC’s mandate. As can be seen from Table 4, it is possible to make the link with TC’s strategic outcomes, but such an attempt creates formidable accountability problems: the projects were not selected to meet TC outcomes, yet there is an expectation that TC will report ORA project outcomes in relation to them. The evaluation finds that this expectation puts TC in a difficult position. The most that can be said is that TC may be able to influence engineering decisions so that projects align more closely with TC outcomes. The advancement of TC outcomes through the ORA program becomes almost an unintended impact. Table 4: Justification of ORA Projects Completed since 1996-97 or in Planning
The TC strategic outcomes against which ORA projects are justified in Table 4 are:
Some ORA projects align with TC’s safety outcomes. At least one of the proposed projects has a specific, well-defined safety focus: a section of Autoroute 5 that is planned to bypass a dangerous section of Autoroute 105. Another project is assumed by MTQ to have safety benefits as it draws traffic from local residential streets onto dedicated arterial roads, but these types of benefits are less easily measured. A case can be made that most ORA projects promote an efficient transportation system that contributes to Canada’s economic growth and trade objectives. Different ORA projects have different rationale, but most are intended to result in improved access to parts of the Outaouais in order to stimulate economic and social development, or alleviate pressure due to growth. Many projects are aimed at reducing congestion due to rapid development and lack of adequate road capacity. Working with partners to develop an environmentally responsible transportation system that contributes to Canada’s sustainable development objectives is another TC strategic outcome. Environmental benefits of ORA projects are not directly measured, so the most that can be said is that the ORA program may contribute to this outcome. Based on models used by TC for assessing the benefits of investments in highways, observed and measurable decreases in congestion may result in environmental benefits such as more efficient fuel utilisation per trip due to improved traffic flow. While ORA projects are not inconsistent with TC outcomes, that alone is not sufficient to conclude that the program is a good fit with TC’s mandate. TC’s highways mandate focuses on national transportation objectives in relation to the NHS; ORA projects did not meet that criterion in the past. Even though future projects may be eligible for SHIP funding, there is no transportation rationale for the Outaouais being treated differently than other urban areas of Canada in relation to NHS requirements. The key objective of the ORA is to improve the NCR by improving its roads. If one assumed that TC was managing the ORA program solely to meet transportation objectives, then one would have to ask why TC is not also managing programs to improve other municipal road systems – whether eligible for SHIP or not – where access, congestion and capacity problems have been identified. 3) Should TC be the overall manager of the ORA contribution program?
The ORA program is well aligned with the mandate and priorities of the NCC, the official signatory of the agreement. Therefore, the NCC should manage the program. In interviews, NCC officials emphasised the importance of a number of the ORA projects to their NCR plans. They noted that many of the road projects in the ORA provide direct access or provide a link to access roads to federal lands and buildings, including the Prime Minister’s Meech Lake residence. Some projects traverse ecologically sensitive areas, such as the Meech Valley and Gatineau Park, which the NCC has special plans to protect. TC managers note that they do consult with the NCC, but the NCC has indicated to them that they would like to be more included in ORA program decision-making, such as occurs in steering committee meetings. Despite ORA alignment with the NCC’s mandate, ORA program management was transferred to TC because its history of managing federal-provincial transportation agreements gave it the technical capacity to manage highway investment projects. Given the nature of the agreement and the lack of any direction on roles and responsibilities in departmental and central agency correspondence about the transfer, TC’s ability to manage the program has been extremely limited. The nature of the agreement would make it difficult for any federal entity to manage the program. Quebec can undertake projects listed in the ORA and expect a 50% federal contribution; the federal partner has no ability to limit its financial obligation. TC has been able to risk-manage ORA program contributions and has done so, despite the risk of committing funds not in its budget. In fact, the $2.57M ORA program annual budget has covered only half of the actual contributions since TC began managing the ORA program. If the ORA program cannot be transferred back to the NCC, then the federal government needs to find a better way to accommodate the inconsistencies in mandate and accountabilities. One possibility lies in the example of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that TC has with Infrastructure Canada, which defines their respective roles and responsibilities for transportation infrastructure projects under the Canada Strategic Infrastructure Fund (CSIF) and Border Infrastructure Fund (BIF). This MOU clearly assigns overall responsibility and accountability for the management of CSIF and BIF to the Minister Responsible for Infrastructure, and responsibility for the implementation of transportation projects to the Minister of Transport. The evaluation considered how this type of structure could apply to the ORA: TC could be accountable for implementation of the specific projects and for reporting on project results; and the NCC could be accountable for overall results of the ORA program. However, the evaluation concluded that, given the limitations of the agreement, there is a high risk that this kind of arrangement would not work. As a rule, program managers have the responsibility to adequately monitor and report on program outcomes. As such, TC should devote considerably more resources to the management of the ORA. However, it doesn’t make sense for TC to report on outcomes, as stated in the 1972 agreement, since they are not well aligned with TC’s mandate. 4) Does the ORA program overlap or duplicate other federal government programs that contribute to investment in infrastructure?
The evaluation considered whether there was any overlap or duplication between the ORA program and other federal government programs that contribute to investment in infrastructure. No ORA road received funding from SHIP. As noted above, some ORA projects planned for the next 20 years could be considered eligible for SHIP funding, under exceptional circumstances. The Canada Strategic Infrastructure Fund (CSIF) is another federal program where overlap is possible. CSIF is directed to projects of major federal and regional significance in areas that are vital to sustaining economic growth and enhancing the quality of life of Canadians. The benefits to Canadians include “safer and faster movement of people and goods on Canada’s major land transportation routes, reduced production of greenhouse gases, more effective urban development, increased economic activity including tourism, and use of innovative technologies and practices to minimize green house gas emissions”. Clearly, some ORA projects could be funded under CSIF, although it is not clear what priority they would have. In interviews with both TC managers and stakeholders, no respondents thought that there was any overlap or duplication with other programs. ORA program managers in TC are also involved in SHIP and CSIF, so are in a good position to be aware of possible overlap or duplication. 5) Is there an ongoing need/demand for the ORA program?
Justification, including demonstration of need, is required for each ORA project and is provided by the MTQ. While justification differs from project to project, the most common is the need for increased capacity to relieve congestion and improve access. MTQ representatives noted that they collect information on road use at traffic count stations twice a year and that they have demand forecasts. In addition, sustainability is a rationale: economic and social development, an improved living environment, and reduced congestion leading to improved air quality and fuel efficiency. Safety is the main rationale for only one road project, a section of Autoroute 5 to bypass a dangerous section of Autoroute 105. However, this project is not in ORA plans for the next five years, an indication that TC priorities such as safety are not necessarily high priorities for the ORA program. There is sufficient evidence of need for specific ORA projects due to population increases and tourism development. For example, an Economic Profile of the City of Gatineau (2004) noted that the population has increased 36% over the past 15 years and is projected to continue increasing by about 3% per year for the next 10 years, and more slowly until 2031. The City of Ottawa has also grown quickly in that period, and transportation demand spills over to Quebec, as many Ottawa residents use the transportation network in the Outaouais to access recreation areas in or near Gatineau Park. In addition, the Outaouais captures about 20% of the 6 million tourists who visit the NCR each year. TC managers noted how demand for ORA funding has changed due to shifting priorities in Quebec. They explained that when TC first assumed management of the ORA, there was not much activity, as Quebec was not funding highways in the Outaouais; Quebec City and Montreal were the priorities for Quebec’s road investment. However, Quebec is now paying more attention to the Ouatouais, e.g. the recent commitment to build the long-awaited section of A-50 between Montreal and Gatineau. It is proposing a number of ORA projects, thereby putting pressure on TC since federal ORA funding is limited. The lack of TC funds may lead to delays, even with cash management, as TC sends the message to the MTQ that it may have to extend ORA contributions over a longer period. At the time the agreement was signed, Quebec planned to complete the projects in a six-year period, but almost 35 years later, many projects have yet to be undertaken. The MTQ indicated that they consider all ORA projects to be priorities, although some are in their long-term (30 year) plans. It is tempting to suggest that if they were all high priority projects, they would have been undertaken by now. However, some of the road projects are tied to other projects, such as the construction of bridges across the Ottawa River, which have been similarly delayed. Clearly, this contextual information needs to be considered in any assessment of need. Given the growth in the region, the demonstrated need for individual ORA projects is probably more pressing now than it was when the agreement was signed. However, an assessment of the demand for the program by TC remains problematical since it relates to the original program objectives that are clearly within the mandate of the NCC. 6) Could other partners including other levels of government, private and voluntary sector play a larger role?
The ORA is a partnership: the Quebec government pays 50% of capital costs, and the road authority (municipality or province) pays for maintenance and rehabilitation. Land acquisition is part of the allowable capital cost. When asked if there was a role for the private sector, the MTQ responded that due to the nature of ORA projects – primarily sections of municipal roads or highways linking other roads – there is not likely to be a role for a Public Private Partnership (PPP). They suggested that if the ORA included bridges, they could be tolled, but to date, there has been no opportunity for a PPP. It can be concluded that there is little scope for private sector investment in ORA projects. They involve public goods and no private sector party is likely to invest where they cannot capture the benefits of their investment. Capturing the benefits would require “privatising” sections of road by tolling or some other means, an approach that is not feasible for sections of road that are an integral part of a larger network.
3.0 SUCCESS AND IMPACTS7) Have all road projects specified in the agreement been completed?
Overall, the ORA has not been successful in achieving the objective of completing the road projects included in the agreement. When the agreement was initially signed in 1972, it was expected that all projects would be completed within six years. (See Annex 1 for a complete list of projects.) Some of the delay is due to a lack of funding from Quebec. The MTQ officials interviewed are based in the Outaouais; their ORA proposals go to the MTQ in Quebec City for consideration for funding. Neither local MTQ officials, nor TC officials can control the timing of project approvals. MTQ plans put one ORA project 25 to 30 years in the future. Therefore an overall evaluation of program success, whether from the perspective of the NCC’s or TC’s mandate, is not currently feasible. Three main projects proposed by MTQ have been completed since the transfer of the management of the agreement to TC:
These projects were successfully completed from a technical standpoint, and therefore it can be concluded that TC has been a successful manager of ORA projects. 8) Has the ORA program contributed to/resulted in an improvement in the road system in the Outaouais part of the NCR?
The evaluation attempted to answer the question of whether the ORA program had contributed to an improvement in the road system by reducing congestion, improving access, and providing environmental and safety benefits. While it could be assumed that project completion, de facto, leads to improvements, the current lack of data does not allow for any real analysis of benefits that would test the assumption. Neither the MTQ nor TC have done a systematic follow-up on projects to collect data on the benefits of ORA projects. Unlike more recent federal highway programs, there is no project reporting requirement in the agreement. MTQ officials note that they do not measure travel time, so do not have data on travel time savings. In addition, they claim that when traffic is diverted between municipal and provincial roads, it is difficult to measure safety benefits attributable to the ORA program, since each jurisdiction tracks road accidents separately. This situation may improve somewhat in the future. The safety benefits of the planned Autoroute 5 project can be tracked because the province has jurisdiction for both the by-passed section of road and the new section. The MTQ states that it will be able to carry out before and after safety studies, although it will take at least 3 years of post project tracking to get good evidence of safety benefits. For the McConell-Laramée project, the MTQ plans to do follow-up studies to determine the distribution of road system users by vehicle type. The issue of reporting on benefits of ORA projects is linked to the uncertainty about accountability for program outcomes. There can be no disagreement that the federal government should work with the MTQ to track and report on outcomes. The question is: what are the intended federal outcomes and within whose mandate do they lie? 9) Is funding directed towards the highest priority projects?
The evaluation found that TC is making efforts to manage ORA program planning and budgeting, but has limited ability to do so, due to limitations of the agreement. The priorities for the ORA program are largely determined by the MTQ, which submits a five-year plan to TC. There is a justification for each project so that there is some indication of how ORA projects fit into the overall MTQ plan, the NCR plan, and other transportation plans for the region. However, TC’s plans and priorities are not considered. In the absence of TC input to project prioritisation, it is difficult for TC to justify its allocation of funds to ORA projects. The fact that TC’s ORA budget is primarily determined by MTQ’s proposals and priorities, arrived at through consultations with other stakeholders, confirms the evaluation’s key finding that TC is managing ORA projects, but not the ORA program. The issue of accountability again becomes important as the federal entity that has the greatest stake in the longer term outcomes of projects, the NCC, should be assessing project priorities and influencing project choice and timing. 10) Is the road system in the Quebec portion of the NCR of comparable quality to that in the Ontario portion?
Those interviewed agreed that the objective of the ORA is the construction of a road network to serve the Outaouais in order to reduce the inequality between the road systems in the Quebec and Ontario portions of the NCR. The assumption is that equality will be achieved with the completion of the road projects specified in the ORA. Note that the intention was not to compare road quality attributes related to maintenance (e.g. pavement quality), but the existence of comparable road systems. MTQ respondents noted that, over time, ORA roads have become main transportation axes. They indicated that before the ORA, Quebec had no highway system in the Outaouais. Now it does, so they make the assumption that the Quebec system is now moving towards equality with the Ontario system. NCC representatives stated that they did not do any measurements that would allow them to compare the road systems in the two provinces. Similarly, TC managers had no information to make this kind of comparison. Without data, the evaluation can draw no conclusions on the equality of the two systems. Equally important, who should be accountable for achieving this objective continues to be an issue. Clearly, the NCC has a greater stake in the equality of road systems in the NCR than does TC.
4.0 PROCESS ISSUES11) Does the process for administering the ORA program meet the needs of TC and stakeholders?
Planning and budgeting problems have interfered with the efficient administration of the program. The MTQ noted that they have short- and long-term plans that they submit to TC, but provincial priorities can change suddenly, for example when a new government enters office. In these kinds of circumstances, the MTQ has found TC to be inflexible with regard to project timing. According to TC officials, it relies on MTQ’s plans to manage its funding pressures and there is not enough flexibility in the budgeting process to accommodate changes. Lack of dedicated funding for the ORA program is also an issue for both TC and the MTQ. Local MTQ officials want all levels of government to ensure that funds are available for the projects identified in the plan. TC makes the point that its funding is limited. The evaluation found that the low level of TC funding relative to the cost of ORA projects places restrictions on planning that has become a cause of frustration for all parties. TC’s lack of resources for administration was not a significant problem in the past, when there were fewer projects. More projects have meant more activity and the need for dedicated resources to manage and administer the ORA program. TC program staff do not believe they have enough resources, given the increased pressures. For example, in the past, TC’s meetings with the MTQ to discuss plans and priorities were held on an ad hoc basis; they are now held more frequently and more regularly. While time consuming, TC officials believe that these meetings are essential to addressing planning issues and maintaining open communication channels.Accountability problems arise from the nature of the agreement, which has very limited reporting requirements. Processes would be improved if the issue of federal government accountability for program outcomes was resolved and roles and responsibilities clarified. 5.0 COST-EFFECTIVENESS12) Are projects undertaken based on analysis of the most cost-effective option?
TC has its biggest impact on ORA program results through its role as project manager. While the MTQ can proceed with a project without TC approval, TC does have the responsibility to review aspects of the project such as engineering and design, and it can suggest improvements where necessary. The MTQ must adhere to standard processes and requirements of the Government of Quebec. In addition, most ORA projects are subject to the CEAA as they receive federal funding. These processes provide a degree of assurance that there is a planned approach to the road improvement, and that costs and benefits have been considered. However, the ORA presents a limited choice of projects. Alternatives not eligible for funding, such as public transit, are not considered. From the standpoint of a transportation plan that seeks to select the most cost-effective option, a funding mechanism that includes all transportation infrastructure options would be preferable. The evaluation concludes that TC is making reasonable efforts to ensure the cost-effectiveness of the ORA projects, although it cannot provide complete assurance because the MTQ has the ultimate power to make project decisions. Based on the case study evidence, which includes the Value Analysis of the McConnell–Laramée project, and the interviews with TC and the MTQ, it is evident that TC, in its role as project manager, does provide a sound review of projects and routinely suggests appropriate improvements, thereby contributing to project cost-effectiveness. 6.0 RECOMMENDATION
While the evaluation does not recommend that TC continue to be responsible for management of the program, so long as it is responsible, TC should:
7.0 ANNEXES
Government of Canada. Construction of McConnell-Laramée Boulevard between Highway 50 and Chemin de la Montagne. Canadian Environmental Assessment Act Screening Report. Prepared by Transport Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, and the National Capital Commission. May 2003. National Capital Commission. Plan for Canada’s Capital. 1999. National Capital Commission. Master Plan Review – Gatineau Park – Summary Document, Preliminary Master Plan for Consultation. October 2004. National Capital Commission. The NCC’s Strategic Transportation Initiative, An Overview. http://www.canadascapital.gc.ca/corporate/youropinions/transport/sti-intro-e.html November 2004. Transports Québec, Direction de l’Outaouais. Analyse de la Valeur, Axe Saint-Laurent-Laramée-McConnell, Troncon Saint-Laurent-de la Montagne. Rapport Final. June 1999. “Agreement between the Government of Québec and National Capital Commission regarding the improvement of the road system in the Québec portion of the National Capital Region” January 7, 1972.
Jean-Pierre Rochon Pierre Dubé Ahmed Khodari Marc Flamand Régent Dickey Marie-Josée Goulet
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