The Environment Canada Policy Research Seminar Series

Dr. William Leiss November 24, 2000

On Friday, November 24th, the Environment Canada Policy Research Seminar Series hosted Dr. William Leiss, President of the Royal Society of Canada.  Following is a précis of Dr. Leiss' talk, entitled "The Trouble With Science:  Understanding Risk Controversies".

In discussing risk controversies, it is instructive to begin with specific examples of significant failures in risk issue management.  One such example, which has endured a media storm in the last two years, is that of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) and the genetically modified (GM) foods that are derived from them.

 In 1995 Monsanto repositioned itself as a biotechnology based "life science" company under CEO Robert Shapiro, and in the next three years went on a $6 billion US acquisitions binge in the seed production and distribution sector, sending its share price up to $60 in 1998 from $10 in 1995.  In 1997 opposition emerged in Europe, which was confronted aggressively by Monsanto.  European NGO's became involved in 1998, and in the spring of 1999 began boycotts of food retailers and food processors using and selling GMO-containing foods.  By December of 1999, with its share price down to $38, Monsanto merged with Pharmacia & Upjohn, spun off its agro-business along with the Monsanto name, and CEO Robert Shapiro had left the company.  In the wake of the public controversy, Novartis / AstraZeneca also divested their agro-business and Aventis put its agro-business up for sale.

 The nature of the GMO controversy that felled Monsanto is accurately summed up in a quote from a Deutshe Bank report:  "GMOs are good science, but bad politics.  Are GMO's safe, good for the environment, and necessary to support the inevitable growth in the world's population?  Yes, but the same arguments can be made for advancing nuclear power.  Despite the support of the scientific community, it is unlikely that we will add any new nuclear power plants any time soon."

Risk Issue Management (RIM), at which Monsanto demonstrably failed, is different from Risk Management (RM).  Whereas the latter deals with a risk domain where risk assessment governs decision-making, and is essentially performed in partnership between government and industry, RIM deals with a risk controversy, where the outcome results from strategic advantage, and involves all parties, including NGOs and the public.  Industries at risk from risk controversy include the wireless telecommunications industry, agricultural biotechnology industry and the forestry and petroleum industries.

Risk controversy can remain long after risk management has removed any threat to human well-being.  In the case of dioxins, risk assessment prompted action against occupational exposure and environmental buildup starting in 1965.  By 1985, levels had been reduced to the point that no significant human health or environmental risks remained.  Yet, dioxin remains high on the issue agenda, run by Greenpeace, for chemical and plastics industries who are making major investments in an effort to reduced dioxin emissions to non-detect levels.  The issue of silicone breast implants has suffered similarly from a failure of RIM.  While risk assessment of silicone breast implants, based on epidemiology for "systemic" health risks has shown no significant risks (though non-systemic risks have been validated), a multi-billion dollar legal settlement was made against manufacturers based on jury awards in the US for systemic risks.

The case of climate change is somewhat different, in that the issue has not been resolved from a risk management perspective.  The uncertainties involved in climate change are massive and  the cost for any meaningful action is very high.  Climate change presents a severe test for decision making, public policy and the precautionary principle.  On the RIM side of the issue, the controversy is set to get much worse before it gets better, due to impoverished public understanding, the failure of governments to explain complexity, uncertainty, the limitations of the Kyoto agreements, and the possible costs of both action and inaction.

The dangers of ignoring risk management are illustrated by the case of the gasoline additive MMT.  Five separate and credible Canadian risk assessments from the 1970s to the present have shown no significant risk to health or environment from manganese emissions.  Under pressure from the auto industry, who claim that MMT fouls post-1995 on-board pollution controls, federal politicians banned MMT as a gasoline additive, but were subsequently forced to pay MMT manufacturer Ethyl corp. $20 million, a sum much less important than the undermining of good risk assessment over this issue.

What are the root causes of these failures in risk issue management?  Risk assessment is supposed to give the right numbers for risks, thereby settling matters, but the public do not trust the numbers, those who calculate them, or those who put the "spin" on them.  Risk perception research is supposed to explain why and the public thinks about risks in completely different ways from "experts", but these explanations do not lead to ways of closing the gap between risk assessment and perceived risk.  Risk communication is supposed to show experts how to "package" their risk messages more effectively and persuasively, but very few people listen to these clever messages or change their opinions about how to manage risks.  Risk controversies are here to stay.  Long lasting risk controversies are endemic in modern society and are "normal" events.  No matter how good risk assessment and communication is made, risk controversies will not be made to "go away".  In fact, risk controversies are likely to get worse as populations become better informed about risks, risk reduction becomes more expensive, and internet-based information resources grow explosively.

To date, risk communication has occurred in a one-way manner, at the end of the risk management process.  In order to be effective, the risk dialogue needs to involve all parties and take place throughout the product development and marketing process.  Effective risk issue management needs to anticipate controversy and position an organization to accept responsibility, resist the urge to deny and hide, and to occupy the high ground by engaging the public fairly no matter how trivial the risks may appear to be.  Addressing uncertainties fairly means accepting that these uncertainties plausibly lead to "zero risk" demands where benefits are obscure or unfairly distributed, explaining a position on the precautionary principle and explaining how uncertainties are expected to be reduced over time.  Helping the public to manage the "science-policy interface" relates to the "do something" plea.  This involves making sure that someone credible is devoting sufficient resources to explaining the underlying scientific research.  Furthermore, government needs to "offload" risk communication, because lack of trust, like controversy, is endemic.  Credible, independent third-party resources should be used to deliver adequate public information resources for assisting citizens with the ongoing "risk dialogue" about both particular risk issues and about evaluating risk management options generally.  Risk issue management is a long term process.  The dioxin issue has lasted for thirty years, with Greenpeace being the sole driver for over half of this time.  Without the long view, one cannot understand the constantly-shifting dynamic of the controversy, and respond effectively to each phase as it emerges.

So far, public involvement programs have given priority to process over content.  The next phase must stress content, especially the explanation of the science that lies behind risk assessment.  Major efforts must be undertaken to concentrate on scientific literacy if the misunderstandings that exacerbate these risk controversies are to be overcome.  Providing the public with "science translation" skills is a task that can only be undertaken by government, and the only way to do it effectively is by using computer-based animated graphics, which the Internet and CD-ROMs make possible.  This new "Risk-com" template allows the user to "see" and interact with the science, as well as providing links, through the Internet, to other informational resources.  A prototype "Risk-com" site, expected to be launched in Canada in early 2001, is EM-Com, a resource for endocrine modulating substances.  While this site is being funded by the US and Canadian chemical industry, it is independently managed by a consortium of university research centres.

Biography

William Leiss is a Fellow and President (1999-2001) of the Royal Society of Canada and was the founding chair of the Society's Committee on Expert Panels. He is currently Professor in the School of Policy Studies, Queens University and Research Chair in Risk Communication and Public Policy in the Faculty of Management, University of Calgary. The Research Chair in Risk Communication and Public Policy is the first research chair in the world which specializes in the functions of risk communication within a risk management decision-making context.

From 1994 to 1999 he was Professor of Policy Studies and held the Eco-Research Chair in Environmental Policy at Queen's University, Ontario. The main research areas in this five-year, $1.3 million chair program have been: environmental risk management, stakeholder involvement, economic instruments for environmental regulation, inter-jurisdictional impacts on environmental policy and regulation, and environmental ethics. He held prior academic appointments in political science (Regina, York), sociology (Toronto), environmental studies (York), and communication (Simon Fraser); at Simon Fraser he was also Vice President, Research.

He is author, collaborator or editor for eleven books and numerous articles and reports; his most recent publication (with Douglas Powell) is Mad Cows and Mother's Milk: The Perils of Poor Risk Communications. This book, as well as his previous one, Risk and Responsibility (1994), contains detailed case studies of controversies over environmental and health risks in Canada and internationally. His new book, Risk Issue Management: A New Approach to Risk Controversies will be published in 2001.

Over a period of fifteen-plus years he has worked extensively in a consulting capacity with industry and with Canadian federal and provincial government departments in the area of risk communication, risk management, public consultation, and consensus-building, for a wide range of issues. Current risk communication projects include: climate change, endocrine disrupters, radio-frequency fields, genetic engineering, and tobacco control policy.

List of articles and books by Dr. William Leiss

Compiled in support of an Environment Canada Policy Research Seminar, held in Hull on November 24, 2000.

1. Leiss, W. The limits to satisfaction : an essay on the problems of needs and commodities. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976.
   
   
2. Leiss, W. Political aspects of environmental issues. Alternatives (1978) 8 (1) : 23-32, 44.
   Notes: Excerpt from his book Ecology versus politics in Canada. Extraits de son livre Ecology versus politics in Canada.
   
   
3. Leiss, W., (ed.) & University League for Social Reform. Ecology versus politics in Canada. Toronto : University of Toronto Press, 1979.
   
   
4. Leiss, W. A value basis for conservation policy. Policy Studies Journal (1981) 9 (4) : 613-622.
   
   
5. Leiss, W. The risk management process : working paper. Ottawa : Pesticides Directorate, Agriculture Canada, 1985.
   
   
6. Leiss, W. & Keir, A. Summary of follow-up consultations : multi-stakeholder response to toxic chemicals management issues. In : Toxic chemicals management in the Prairies : a consultative planning process : final report, part II, pp. 3-15. Edmonton : Conservation & Protection, 1987.
   
   
7. Leiss, W., (ed.) Prospects and problems in risk communication. Waterloo, Ontario : University of Waterloo Press, 1987.
   
   
8. Leiss, W. The idols of technology. Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada = Mémoires de la Société royale du Canada (1989) 4 : 35-42.
   Notes: " (...) drawn from the opening and concluding chapters of my (...) book Under technology's thumb". Under technology's thumb. Montréal : McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990.
   
   
9. Leiss, W. & Chociolko, C. Risk and responsibility. Montréal : McGill-Queen's University Press, 1994.
   
   
10. Leiss, W. "Down and dirty" : the use and abuse of public trust in risk communication. Risk analysis (1995) 15 (6) : 685-691.
    
    
11. Leiss, W. & Griffin, T., (web design & maintenance). William Leiss. Calgary, Alberta : University of Calgary, 1999.
    http://www.acs.ucalgary.ca/~wleiss/index2.htm
    Notes: This Web site "Contains numerous articles and papers pertaining to risk communication and public policy".
    
    
12. Powell, D.A. & Leiss, W. Mad cows and mother's milk : the perils of poor risk communication. Montréal : McGill-Queen's University Press, 1997.
    
    
13. Salter, L., Leiss, W. & Canada. Agriculture Canada. Consultation in the assessment and registration of pesticides : final report and recommendations. Burnaby, British Columbia : The authors, 1984.
    
    
14. Salter, L., Levy, E. & Leiss, W. Mandated science : science and scientists in the making of standards. Dordrecht, Holland : Kluwer Academic, 1988.
    
    
15. Salter, L., Leiss, W. & Canadian Centre for Management Development. Guide to consultation and consensus building : abridged version. Burnaby, British Columbia : Simon Fraser University, 1989.