|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
|
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
|
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
|
|
|
|
  CTA Home : Rulings : Decisions : 2005 Decision No. 755-R-2005A redacted version of this Decision was issued on March17, 2006, pursuant to Decision No. LET-R-75-2006. December 30, 2005
File No. T6650-2INTRODUCTION [1] This Decision provides the Canadian Transportation Agency's (hereinafter the Agency) determinations of the Western Grain Revenue Caps, and revenues, for the movement of western grain by prescribed railway companies for crop year 2004-2005. These determinations, which must be completed by December 31, 2005, are necessary to ensure that a prescribed railway company's western grain revenue does not exceed its maximum revenue entitlement, which is referred to as its Revenue Cap. If a prescribed railway company's revenue exceeds its Revenue Cap, the company must pay out the excess amount and penalties, as specified in the Railway Company Pay Out of Excess Revenue for the Movement of Grain Regulations. There were two prescribed railway companies during the 2004-2005 crop year; the Canadian National Railway Company (hereinafter CN) and the Canadian Pacific Railway Company (hereinafter CP), about which the Agency made its Revenue Cap determinations. [2] The Agency's determination of CN's and CP's Revenue Caps must utilize the formula, the base year statistics, and the volume-related composite price index as defined in section 151 of the Canada Transportation Act (hereinafter the CTA). It also requires CN's and CP's specific tonnage and length of haul statistics for crop year 2004-2005. [3] The Agency's determination of CN's and CP's western grain revenue complies with the matters contained in subsections 150(3),(4), (5) and (6) of the CTA. It also complies with Agency Decision No. 114-R-2001 (In the matter of the Western Grain Revenue Cap established pursuant to Division VI, Part III of the CTA) dated March 16, 2001 concerning the interpretation of a number of matters that are to be considered when the Agency determines a prescribed railway company's grain revenue for Revenue Cap purposes. AGENCY DECISION
[4] A western grain movement for a given crop year is defined in section 147 of the CTA. Key terms are as follows:
[5] The Agency's determination of CN's and CP's volume and length of haul statistics for western grain movements for crop year 2004-2005 is shown in Table 1 below. This determination was based on detailed traffic submissions by CN and CP. The submissions were examined to ensure that the traffic qualified as western grain movements and that the related revenue, tonnage and mileage statistics were accurate. The examination led to the rejection of a relatively small amount of traffic. Table 1
[6] * Reflects movement by CP to Edmonton, with CN haulage from Edmonton to Prince Rupert. [7] The above table indicates that 24,312,301 tonnes of western grain were moved in the 2004-2005 crop year. The 24,312,301 volume figure is slightly lower than the western grain volume for the previous crop year. [8] The 2004-2005 crop year average length of haul of 904 miles shown in the above table is 15 miles higher than for the previous crop year. Churchill is an eligible western grain destination however, the Churchill-bound movements which took place did not qualify to be included under the Revenue Cap regime. The reason is that the CTA requires the carriage of western grain to be by a "prescribed railway company" and the Hudson Bay Railway Company is not a prescribed railway company.
[9] Subsection 151(1) of the CTA states that the following formula is to be used by the Agency in its determination of a prescribed railway company's Revenue Cap:
where
[10] For CN, in respect of crop year 2004-2005, the values for A, B, C, D, E and F are as follows:
[11] The source of CN's values for A, B and D is prescribed by subsection 151(2) of the CTA. As shown earlier in section 1.0 of this Decision, the 2004-2005 crop year values for C and E were 962 miles and 11,561,991 tonnes respectively. The value of 1.0108 for the volume-related composite price index for crop year 2004-2005 was determined previously by the Agency pursuant to subsection 151(5) of the CTA in Decision No. 203-R-2004 dated April 22, 2004. [12] Substitution of these CN values into the Revenue Cap formula results in a CN Revenue Cap for crop year 2004-2005 of $305,670,121. In other words, after accounting for the actual tonnage and actual length of haul in crop year 2004-2005, CN's Revenue Cap is $305,670,121. [13] For CP, in respect of crop year 2004-2005, the values for A, B, C, D, E and F are as follows:
[14] As above, CP's values for A, B and D are derived from subsection 151(3) of the CTA and as shown in section 1.0 of this Decision, the 2004-2005 crop year values for C and E were 851 miles and 12,750,310 tonnes respectively. The value of 1.0108 for the volume-related composite price index for crop year 2004-2005 was provided in Agency Decision No. 203-R-2004 dated April 22, 2004. [15] Substitution of these CP values into the Revenue Cap formula results in a CP Revenue Cap for crop year 2004-2005 of $323,581,776. In other words, after accounting for the actual tonnage and actual length of haul in crop year 2004-2005, CP's Revenue Cap is $323,581,776. 3.0 Determination of CN's and CP's western grain revenue for crop year 2004-2005 3.1 Revenue and revenue reductions: [16] The determination of a prescribed railway company's grain revenue requires many assessments as to what is, or is not, to be included as revenue, and what is, or is not, an allowable reduction to revenue. A partial listing of such matters appears in subsections 150(3), (4), and (5) of the CTA. A more comprehensive listing was established, following consultation with the grain industry, in Decision No. 114-R-2001. [17] As a brief summary, a prescribed railway company's statutory western grain revenue stems mostly from billings generated by application of rates contained in published tariffs or in confidential contracts applicable to western grain movements. A railway company's statutory grain revenue also includes: a portion of amounts received for ensuring car supply through the car ordering process; amounts received for providing premium service; amounts received for performing interswitching or exchange switching; amounts received for additional switching requested by the shipper; and, a portion of grain port demurrage charges. A railway company's statutory grain revenue is to be net of any amounts paid or allowed for incentives, rebates or any other similar reductions and does not include: amounts that are earned which the Agency characterizes as a performance penalty or as being in respect of demurrage or for the storage of railway cars loaded with grain; amounts earned for staging of rail cars in transit; amounts for additional car switching, necessary due to shipper error or failure to meet obligations; and, compensation received for running rights. [18] Allowable reductions to a railway company's statutory grain revenue include: the amortized amounts of contributions for the development of grain-related facilities to a grain handling undertaking that is not owned by the company (Industrial Development Fund contributions, or IDF); amounts paid or allowed for interswitching or exchange switching; and, amounts related to container pickup and delivery charges that are included in gross revenue amounts for intermodal movements. The following matters do not reduce a railway company's statutory grain revenue: amounts paid or allowed as dispatch; amounts paid by railway companies resulting from the discontinuance of grain dependent branch lines; amounts paid by the railway companies as a performance penalty; and amounts paid for running rights. 3.2 Agency review of revenue and revenue deductions, and general findings: [19] Railway company records relating to western grain revenue were audited by Agency staff. Initial freight revenue, including payments to other railway companies involved with the carriage of grain, were submitted by CN and CP on a per movement basis. Both were verified, on a test basis, against company accounting records and source documents. Numerous onsite visits were also made to CN and CP offices to ensure that all western grain revenue was captured and to determine whether revenue exclusions or reductions were appropriate and accurate. [20] Based on the audit findings, a number of adjustments were made to CN and CP revenue-related items. Five key issues were addressed this year and they are discussed below. Taking all of the findings and adjustments into account, the Agency has determined CN's and CP's western grain revenue for crop year 2004-2005 to be: CN = $305,788,835; CP = $323,068,715. I) Amounts earned from Manual Transaction Surcharges Issue [21] During the 2004-05 crop year, CN charged shippers "Manual Transaction Surcharges" (hereinafter MTS) for their failure to use certain electronic means when submitting shipping instructions, or empty/loaded railcar releases and where a copy of an original freight invoice is required or where payment is provided through non-electronic means. The surcharges were contained in Tariffs CN 7500 and CN 7500-AA. CP also charged a MTS relating to the Bill of Lading. CP's charge was contained in Item 4015 of CP Tariff 6666. [22] Section 150 of the CTA provides in part :
[23] The issues here are whether the amounts earned by CN and CP for MTS are revenue relating to the movement of grain and, if so, whether such amounts can reasonably be characterized as amounts earned as performance penalties. [24] If the amounts earned by CN and CP for the MTS are not revenue relating to the movement of grain or if the amounts can reasonably be characterized as being performance penalties, these amounts will not constitute revenue under the Revenue Cap Regime. However, if the Agency determines that these amounts are revenue relating to the movement of grain and cannot reasonably be characterized as being from performance penalties, the amounts will constitute revenue under the Revenue Cap Regime. Positions of the railway companies [25] CN and CP express their opinion that the MTS apply to all commodities, and not just to grain, and they apply to shippers who insist on using paper bills thereby creating a cost and inefficiency. CN and CP maintain that the MTS are a penalty that is not for or in respect of the carriage of grain, and cannot be considered "revenue" under the Revenue Cap Regime - given the definitions of "revenue" and "movement of grain" contained in sections 150 and 147 of the CTA. [26] CN makes reference to interpretations set out in Decision No. 114-R-2001 dated March 16, 2001. In this regard, it asserts that the Agency considered the intentions of the policy underlying the grain revenue cap, one of which was to make participants more accountable if the grain handling and transportation system is to improve. CN expresses its view that to the extent that penalties contributed to that objective, the Agency found that penalties should apply and that revenues from such penalties should not be included as revenue of a railway company under the Revenue Cap Regime. [27] CN refers to paragraph 7.1 of Decision No. 114-R-2001 where the Agency found the following four examples of ancillary charges to be performance penalties: the diversion or re-consignment of traffic, the occurrence of "no-bills", the overloading and re-weighing of cars, and additional switching - necessary due to shipper error or failure to meet obligations. CN points out that the Agency indicated that these charges compensated a prescribed railway company for inefficient activities and administrative burden beyond its control. CN submits that MTS have the same characteristics as the above mentioned examples of ancillary charges and consequently, it should be compensated for inefficient activities and administrative burden. [28] CN submits that electronic submissions accelerate the shipping process by eliminating delays and more importantly, by eliminating typographical/transcription errors associated with shipment instructions supplied by facsimile or telephone. [29] According to CN, its intent in applying penalties for non-electronic services is to induce appropriate changes in behaviour or business processes by the shipper in control of the activity that causes the inefficiency or increased costs in the railway or grain system. [30] With respect to the MTS related to providing a copy of an original freight invoice and payment details, CN indicates that this service exceeds the usual obligations of the railway company and that the MTS compensates it for the inefficient activity and administrative burden. Agency analysis and findings [31] As mentioned above, the first issue to be determined is whether the amounts earned by CN and CP for the MTS are revenue relating to the movement of grain. [32] In this respect, the Agency notes that CN's and CP's maximum revenue entitlements flow from the CTA Base Year Revenues. The CTA Base Year Revenues are derived, for the most part, from the definitions of "revenue" and "movement of grain" carried forward from the Western Grain Transportation Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. W-8 (hereinafter the WGTA). Under the WGTA, revenue was determined to be equal to Estimated Eligible Costs which were established annually based on costs derived from Quadrennial Costing Reviews. Under the Quadrennial Costing Reviews, the various administrative costs of a railway company related to car ordering and release, and carload billing functions were quantified and captured as eligible costs. [33] As the costs associated with the functions relating to car ordering and release and carload billing are included in each of CN's and CP's CTA Base Year Revenues, these costs are subject to a yearly inflation adjustment by the Agency. [34] In light of the above, both the current Revenue Cap Regime and the historical development of western grain revenue support the conclusion that functions relating to car ordering and release and carload billing generate revenue for the movement of western grain, and, therefore, do relate to the movement of western grain. [35] The second issue to be determined is whether the amounts earned by CN and CP for the MTS can reasonably be characterized as being in respect of performance penalties. [36] All revenue earned by CN and CP for the movement of grain in a crop year is to be included in their overall revenue under the Revenue Cap Regime. Subsection 150(3) of the CTA provides an exception to that principle. That is, a prescribed railway company's revenue in a crop year shall not include incentive, rebates or similar reductions paid or allowed, compensation for running rights or amounts earned that can reasonably be characterized as being a performance penalty or in respect of demurrage or for the storage of cars. [37] The scope of the Agency's mandate as it relates to the determination, under paragraph 150(3)(b) of the CTA, as to whether amounts earned by a prescribed railway company can reasonably be characterized as being a performance penalty or in respect of demurrage or for the storage of cars was clarified by the Federal Court of Appeal in Canadian Pacific Railway Company v. Canadian Transportation Agency, [2003] 4-F.C. 558. In that Decision, the Federal Court of Appeal confirmed that the Agency's mandate as it relates to amounts earned by a prescribed railway company in relation to demurrage was only to determine whether the amounts could reasonably be characterized as being in respect of demurrage and not to determine whether the total amount of revenue earned under a demurrage program was reasonable. [38] While the above Decision relates to demurrage, its underlining rationale is applicable to the present case. That is, the Agency must determine whether the amounts earned by CN and CP for MTS can reasonably be characterized as performance penalties. [39] The Revenue Cap Regime was introduced in 2000 by the enactment of Bill C-34, An Act to amend the Canada Transportation Act. Prior to the introduction of the Revenue Cap Regime, rates for the movement of western grain were established by the Agency as maximum rates. Under the Revenue Cap Regime, the Agency no longer regulates the rates charged by prescribed railway companies for the movement of grain but rather regulates the maximum revenue that a prescribed railway company can earn in a crop year for the movement of western grain. As mentioned in Decision No. 114-R-2001 dated March 16, 2001, the policy intent in the enactment of Bill C-34 was not only to regulate the movement of western grain in a more commercially-oriented manner which provided the railway company with flexibility in the setting of rates but also to make participants more accountable if the grain handling and transportation system was to improve. [40] The exclusions provided for in paragraph 150(3)(b) of the CTA are consistent with the above policy intent. That is, amounts earned by a prescribed railway company under certain programs designed to improve the grain handling and transportation system as a whole by making its participants more accountable as a result of the non-performance of their obligations in the movement of western grain are to be excluded from a railway company's revenue under the Revenue Cap Regime. [41] The words "performance penalty" used by Parliament in paragraph 150(3)(b) of the CTA were carefully chosen. While prescribed railway companies charge and earn amounts with respect to a myriad of penalties imposed on shippers or other participants in the grain handling and transportation system, only amounts earned as performance penalties are to be excluded from railway companies' revenue under the Revenue Cap Regime. [42] In this case, the Agency has examined the amounts earned by CN and CP for the MTS and finds that while these amounts are penalties, they cannot reasonably be characterized as performance penalties. [43] Rather than being designed to encourage changes in shippers' or other system participants' non-performance behaviour or to compensate prescribed railway companies for damage resulting from the non-performance by shippers or other system participants for their obligations, the MTS are primarily designed at relieving prescribed railway companies from their obligation to fulfill railway functions for which the railway companies receive compensation through the CTA Base Year Revenue. [44] The functions of receiving and processing transportation documents such as bills of lading, empty and loaded railcar release forms or empty railcar orders as well as the functions of providing shippers or other system participants with freight invoices and payment details are all railway functions which are integral to the operation of a railway company. These functions are recognized as being railway functions as the costs associated with their fulfilment are built into the CTA Base Year Revenues of CN and CP under the Revenue Cap Regime. [45] While the Agency acknowledges that the requirement to use only electronic transactions is highly beneficial to railway companies, it cannot be said that the failure by shippers or other system participants to conform with a requirement put in place to relieve railway companies from their own obligations is a failure, on the part of shippers or other system participants, to perform one of the shippers' functions or obligations. [46] In that context, the MTS are significantly different from the charges imposed by prescribed railway companies for the diversion or reconsignment of traffic, the occurrence of no-bills, the overloading and re-weighing of cars and the additional switching due to shipper error which were all deemed by the Agency to be performance penalties in Decision No. 114-R-2001. Contrary to the MTS, all of these charges are aimed at inducing shippers or other system participants to change their non-performance behaviour relating to the shippers' functions or obligations or to compensate railway companies for damage resulting from the non performance, by shippers or other system participants, of the shippers' obligations in the movement of western grain. [47] Therefore, rather than being performance penalties within the meaning of paragraph 150(3)(b) of the CTA, the MTS are merely administrative penalties imposed by prescribed railway companies to shippers and other system participants. As such and to the extent that these administrative penalties are imposed upon shippers or other system participants in relation to the carriage of western grain, the amounts earned under these penalty programs are deemed to be revenue for the movement of western grain. [48] The Agency finds that amounts collected as MTS can not reasonably be characterized as being performance penalties. Consequently, these amounts shall be deemed to be revenue under the Revenue Cap Regime. For the 2004-05 crop year, MTS amounts were $50,992 and $6,500 for CN and CP respectively. ii) CN Uncollectibles (Bad Debts) [49] CN submitted a total amount of $304,448 for uncollectibles for crop year 2004-05, reflecting revenue that was payable to CN, but which has been written off in its accounting records because there is no expectation that the amount will be recovered (for example, due to ceased operations or bankruptcy of the owing parties). [50] There may be a significant gap in time between the billing for a movement and the date that an uncollectible is written off. The reason is that once a movement takes place and a party becomes liable to pay, it may be many months, or years, before the railway company acknowledges - from an accounting perspective - that the amount will likely never be recovered. While the Agency will review each uncollectible amount submitted by a railway company on a case-by-case basis, the amounts must relate to the movement of western grain and the movements must have taken place after July 31, 2000, the date on which the Revenue Cap Regime took effect. The Agency expects that the uncollectibles submitted for a crop year will reflect those amounts written off in the railway company's accounting records during that crop year. The Agency will also ensure that, in future years, if amounts are recovered by the railway companies from previously written-off uncollectibles, such amounts will be captured as revenue under the Revenue Cap Regime. [51] Of the $304,448 total amount for uncollectibles submitted by CN, the Agency:
iii) CN intermodal traffic [52] CN's intermodal customers are charged a "composite" amount for haulage requiring both rail and truck movements. Hence, in order to determine the amount of revenue related only to rail, pickup and delivery (P&D) trucking charges, lifting charges, container maintenance costs, and ownership costs for CN-owned containers must be quantified and subtracted from the composite amount. Also, as many of CN's intermodal unit (hereinafter IMU) movements terminate east of Thunder Bay or Armstrong, Ontario, the rail-related revenue for these movements must be apportioned between the eligible western domain, and the ineligible eastern domain. [53] This year's review and verification of CN's revenue and revenue reductions included a review of the composite IMU revenue claimed by CN, in addition to a review of the P&D charges, lifting charges, container maintenance costs, ownership costs for CN-owned containers and the east/west allocation of IMU revenue. The review resulted in a major revision to the east/west allocation methodology and the temporary acceptance, subject to an adjustment, to CN's P&D charge methodology. East/west allocation of revenue [54] For non-IMU movements to eastern Canada, a predetermined formula is applied to prescribed railway company revenue on a movement-by-movement basis in order to derive the eligible western grain revenue. While CN's IMU traffic is subjected to the same allocation formula, the determination of western grain revenue was not derived entirely on a movement-by-movement basis in the past as some revenue reductions - due in part to data restrictions - were accounted for on a bottom-line basis. However, given specific information that is now available and which was submitted by CN as part of the Agency's review of IMU traffic this year, the Agency is able to apply all of the appropriate revenue adjustments on a movement-by-movement basis, prior to applying the east/west allocation formula. This methodological revision, which provides a better determination of CN's IMU western grain revenue, was used to determine CN's 2004-05 IMU western grain revenue and will be used in future years. The impact of this revision was to reduce CN's 2004-05 IMU western grain revenue from about $8.0 million to about $7.65 million. CN's P&D Charge Methodology [55] CN submitted a revised tariff-based "estimation" methodology (along with a set of inputs and assumptions) to arrive at estimates for P&D charges for IMU traffic. Agency staff tested the methodology by comparing its results with CN-supplied invoiced amounts for a sample of 43 movements, involving 81 P&D charges. For four of the 81 P&D charges, CN was unable to provide invoice amounts; hence, these four P&D charges were assigned a zero invoice amount. The remaining 77 charges all differed from the invoiced amounts and the variances were quite significant. For the entire 81 P&D charge sample, CN's estimation methodology overstated its invoice amounts by an average of 9.5 percent. [56] Given the 9.5 percent average overstatement, the Agency finds it appropriate to reduce CN's P&D charges by 9.5 percent. The impact of this adjustment is to raise CN's IMU western grain revenue from about $7.65 million to about $7.83 million. [57] Given that the variances between the invoice amounts and the estimates generated from CN's revised P&D estimation methodology were fairly significant, the Agency will continue to review this estimation methodology with CN during next year's Revenue Cap exercise. iv) CN Charges for cars-unsuitable-for-reloading [58] All cars released to CN must be "clean and suitable" for reloading. When a railway company supplied car is returned to the railway company in a condition unsuitable for immediate reloading, the shipper returning the car is subject to a charge of $300 per car. This charge, currently identified in Item 2000 of CN Tariff 9000, was in effect for the entire 2004-05 crop year. To be "clean and suitable" for loading, the unloader of the car must remove all lading and non-railway company owned dunnage, blocking, bracing, strapping or other material not part of the inbound shipment. Effective January 1, 2004, the definition of clean and suitable for reloading was expanded to include the closing and securing of all doors, gates and hatches. During the 2004-05 crop year, CP had no corresponding tariff; hence, no amounts were collected in this regard. But effective August 1, 2005, Item 2080 of CP Tariff 6666 indicates that CP will also apply a charge of $300 per car, when the doors, gates and hatches are not closed or secured. Issue [59] An Agency audit of CN's miscellaneous and ancillary revenue accounts found that CN had billed western grain shippers under this tariff for crop year 2004-05. The question arises as to whether amounts received by CN under this tariff should be deemed to be performance penalties, or not, under the Revenue Cap Regime. If the Agency determines that these amounts are performance penalties, the amounts will not be deemed to be revenue under the Revenue Cap Regime. If the Agency determines that these amounts are not performance penalties, the amounts will be deemed to be revenue under the Revenue Cap Regime. CN's position [60] CN argues that the amounts collected for cars-unsuitable-for-reloading are performance penalties as per subsection 150(3) of the CTA and consequently, they can not be deemed to be revenue under the Revenue Cap Regime. CN's arguments included the following: the unsuitable-for-reloading charges apply to all types of cars, in Canada and the United States; the charges apply to situations where CN has to close, or open, gates or hatches and this causes additional workloads and inefficiencies to CN; the return of unclean cars causes other delays in the system - for example - cars may have to be pulled out and/or switched before they can be cleaned; Bill C-34 noted the intent of the Revenue Cap legislation was to make participants more accountable; these amounts are penalty in nature as they are prescribed to compensate a railway company for inefficient activities and administrative burdens beyond its control; the charge has the same characteristics as other ancillary items that were deemed to be performance penalties under Decision No. 114-R-2001 (diversion of traffic, overloading or re-weighting of traffic, no bills, and additional switching due to shipper error); and the penalty is designed to induce appropriate changes in behaviour of the party in control of the activity. Agency analysis and finding [61] The Agency finds that charges related to cars-unsuitable-for-reloading are, in accordance with subsection 150(3) of the CTA, reasonably characterized as being performance penalties. That is, these charges are designed to encourage changes in shippers' or other system participants' non-performance behaviour or to compensate prescribed railway companies for damage resulting from the non-performance, by shippers or other system participants, of their obligation in the movement of western grain. [62] The Agency is aware that there is concern by the shippers that hopper car gates and hatches are not being maintained by the railway companies to an acceptable standard and that the poor condition of the gates and hatches may be the cause of gates and hatches sliding open during a car's empty return. However, under the Revenue Cap determination exercise, the Agency's task is not to assess liability but rather to determine, once a payment is made, whether it constitutes revenue or not under the Revenue Cap Regime. In this case, CN billed western grain shippers $183,300 under this tariff for crop year 2004-05. However, as of December, 2005, CN had waived or cancelled most of these charges, resulting in adjusted charges of $36,900 of which $16,050 had been collected and $20,850 was still due. Consequently, the amount considered under this issue was $36,900. v) Review of the railway companies' miscellaneous and ancillary revenue accounts [63] The Agency intends to continue and expand its reviews of the railway companies' miscellaneous and ancillary revenue accounts annually under the Revenue Cap Regime in order to ensure that all qualifying western grain revenue is captured. 4.0 Comparison of CN's and CP's Revenue Caps and Revenue [64] The Agency has determined western grain Revenue Caps and revenue for CN and CP for the crop year 2004-2005 as summarized below. The grain revenue for CN exceeded its Revenue Cap while CP's grain revenue was below its Revenue Cap. Table 2
[65] Subsection 150(2) of the CTA provides that if a prescribed railway company's revenues, as determined by the Agency, for the movement of grain in a given crop year exceed the company's Revenue Cap for that year, the company shall pay out the excess amount, and any penalty that may be specified in the regulations. The Railway Company Pay Out of Excess Revenue for the Movement of Grain Regulations, SOR/2001-207 (hereinafter the Regulations) provide, in part:
[66] As CP's statutory grain revenue was below its Revenue Cap for crop year 2004-2005, no penalty or payout applies. [67] Given that CN's statutory grain revenue exceeds its Revenue Cap for crop year 2004-05 by an amount of $118,714, CN is hereby ordered, pursuant to subsection 150(2) of the CTA and subsection 3(1) of the Regulations, to pay the Western Grains Research Foundation, within 30 days from the date of this Decision, an amount of $124,650 representing the sum of the excess amount of $118,714 and the prescribed penalty of $5,936 as provided for under paragraph 2(a) of the Regulation. [68] Upon payment of the excess amount and the applicable penalty, CN, pursuant to subsection 4(2) of the Regulations, is hereby requested to notify the Agency, in writing, of the amount paid out and the date on which it was paid. Members
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
||
| [ HOME | TOP | BACK ] | ||
| Last Updated: 2006-03-17 | [ Important Notices ] | |
